Demographic Pressure and Institutional Change:

Village-Level Response to Rural Population Growth in Burkina Faso

Margaret S. McMillan, William A. Masters, Harounan Kazianga

Background and Motivation

Motivation

• We know that institutions matter for economic outcomes

• Little evidence on the determinants of institutions

• According to Boserup – population pressure leads to institutional and technical change

• Demographic shifts in Africa could help to explain past outcomes and help to predict future outcomes

Our Project

• Study links between population pressure and institutions in Burkina Faso

• Survey and census data exist for Burkina Faso for the period 1985–2006.

• The missing information is the information on institutions

• We designed a new survey to create a time series measure of institutional change

Why Burkina Faso?

Well, not only is Harounan a great economist but he is also Burkinabe!

Some great data are already available and some highly qualified statisticians are willing to work with us to collect the rest

Burkina has experienced significant within country variation in demographic shifts due to the Onchoceriasis Control Programme (74-85) and the repatriation of Burkinabe from Cote d’Ivoire (99-02)

The Onchoceriasis Control Programme

Foreign Population in CIV in 1998

Data

Collaborators on field work

• Collaborators: Direction Generale des Statistiques et des Previsions Agricoles

• Permanent Agricultural Survey: farm households level survey: 1993-2006

• Sample+sample weights to get village level population

Data: Existing Survey

• Nationally representative surveys• Village-level panel (same villages surveyed over

the 14 years)• Data:– Household characteristics– Household agricultural production– Land conservation

Survey: Planned Village Survey

• Village level survey (700 villages) starting in April 2009

• Village population from census data (1975, 1985, 1996 and 2006)– Population size– Population composition (age and gender)

• Current population composition– By ethnicity– By migration status

Village Population

• Two sources to calculate village population growth– From household surveys (sample size+sample weights)– From census data

• Number of migrants returning from Cote d’Ivoire:– Taken from village surveys

Construction of Time-Varying Measures for Institutions and Infrastructure

• Ask respondents to characterize:– the situation now and when it was established; – the previous situation and when it was established;– …and so forth back to 1985

• Use responses to construct annual time series– Variables may be categorical (e.g. able to sell land?)

or continuous (e.g. distance to nearest bus or bush taxi stop)

• Group variables into types of institutions/infrastructures:– Roads– Services– Land tenure– Etc.

Examples of Types of Infrastructures

• Road Access (= average of…)– 5B. Route passable par car ou camion toute l’année– 5C. Route passable par car ou camion saisonnière– 5D. Arrêt d’autocar/taxi brousse rural

• Services Access – 5A. Représentant de l’administration centrale (pour les

registres des naissances)– 5E. Bureau des Caisses populaires – 5F. Localité la plus proche avec électricité– 5G. Localité la plus proche ou il y a le téléphone fixe

Examples of Types of Institutions• Land Tenure (selected)

– 8A. Type de droit appliquée pour les terres de culture:– 8B. Location, vente et prêts de terres de culture:– 8C. Est-ce qu’il y a des terres de culture qui ont étés louées ?– 8D. Est-ce qu’il y a des terres de culture qui ont étés vendus ?– 8E. Est-ce qu’il y a des terres de culture qui ont étés prêtées ?– 8F. A qui devrait-on demander permission pour louer ses terres?

• Markets– 6A. Fréquences des marchés: – 6B. Type de source pour accès a l’eau dans le marché– 6C. Hangars dans le marché – 6D. Accès à l’électricité dans le marché– 6E. Frais (niveau des taxes de marché)– 6F. Autres restrictions d’accès au marché

Draft Questionnaire: Sample Questions

• 8A. Type de droit appliquée pour les terres de culture:• Type de droit appliquée Date de début d’application• (1=oui, 0=non) (année)• 8A1. Propriété individuelle : ____ ______ • 8A2. Propriété collective-familiale: ____ ______ • 8A3. Propriété collective-lignagère: ____ ______ • 8A4. Propriété collective-communautaire: ____ ______• • • 8B. Location, vente et prêts de terres de culture:• Possibilité de transaction Date • (1=oui, 0=non) (année)• 8B1. Est-ce que la terre peut-être louée : ____ si oui, depuis quand ______• 8B2. Est-ce que la terre peut-être vendue : ____ si oui, depuis quand ______• 8B3. Est-ce que la terre peut-être prêtée : ____ si oui, depuis quand ______

Empirical Strategy

Empirical framework

• Main regression:

– Where: i is institution P is population X is a vector of control variables village level fixed effects error term j indexes villages, k indexes institutions,

and t indexes time (1985, 1996, 2006)

jktjjtjtjkt XPi

Empirical framework• Sources of endogeneity and identification strategies:

– i. Correlations between unobservable village characteristics and Population:• Our village-fixed effects already control for time-invariant village

characteristics• How about time-varying village characteristics not included in X

(e.g. a village had a birth control program for sometime?)

Empirical framework• Sources of endogeneity and identification strategies:

– ii. Unobserved variables driving both institutional changes and population growth :• Use instrumental variables which are correlated with population

but not institutions (restrict sample to 1996 and 2006):– Returnees from Cote d’Ivoire (caused by the civil war between 2000 and

2002)– Population below 15 in 1985 for population momentum– Inflows of migrants due to the eradication of river blindness (note that

villages with government sponsored settlements may have started with different institutions)

– Distance to railroad