democracy sidney hook

Source: The Iran Human Rights Library www.tavaana.org

Democracy Sidney Hook

Democracy. The word democracy has many meanings, but in the modern world its use

signifies that the ultimate authority in political affairs rightfully belongs to citizens.

There was a time when democrat was a term of abuse, virtually synonymous with mob

rule or anarchy. Today democracy's connotations are honorable. This is especially true

given the growth of democratic trends in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the

Soviet empire. Dissidents in these societies evoked democracy as the ideal alternative to

a bureaucratic, authoritarian state. A transition to democratic regimes appears to be a

dominant political pattern at the end of the 20th century.

Whereas in centuries past there were principled opponents to democratic political rule,

such antidemocrats are rarer today in nearly all societies. Democracy's opponents tend

to be fundamentalists who favor theocratic regimes or adversaries who find democracy

wanting because it seems not to meet certain abstract standards of justice or perfect

freedom. Because democracy is so much in favor, even dictators and authoritarians

embrace the democratic idiom to characterize their regimes and their actions. As a

result, the 20th century has seen a proliferation in the meanings of democracy, though

not all evocations of democracy, past or present, are credible. The leaders of the Soviet-

dominated authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe called themselves "worker's

republics" and wrapped themselves in the mantle of democracy. The People's Republic

of China proclaims itself democratic even as protestors demanding freedom of speech

and of the press, hallmarks of democratic polities, are routinely imprisoned. No one, it

seems, wants to be called "antidemocratic."

In view of the variety of ways in which the term democracy is used, the only way to

distinguish between arbitrary definitions and coherent ones is to observe under what

circumstances positive or negative judgments are made concerning the absence or

presence of democratic institutions. For example, when communists classified the

former Soviet Union as a socialist democracy and denied that Spain under the regime of


Gen. Francisco Franco had an organic democracy, the reasons listed for denying the

democratic nature of the Spanish state would also apply to the communist states these

advocates had labeled democratic.

The converse is also true. Defenders of Franco's authoritarian order characterized Spain

as a democracy in some sense and scornfully rejected the view that communist countries

were democracies in any sense. But the reasons they gave for refusing to describe

communist regimes as democratic largely invalidated their ascription of a democratic

character to Spain during the years of Franco's reign.

Concept of Democracy.

Proceeding in this way, and using the historical context to control specific applications

of the term, a central or basic concept of democracy may be presented that will

approximate most nonarbitrary uses. Democracy is a form of government in which the

major decisions of governmentor the direction of policy behind these decisions rests

directly or indirectly on the freely given consent of the majority of the adults governed.

This makes democracy essentially a political concept even when it is used and

sometimes misused to characterize nonpolitical institutions.

Democracy as a political process is obviously a matter of degree depending on the areas

of society open to political debate and adjudication and the number of adults qualifying

as citizens within the political system. The differences between nondemocratic and

democratic states are sometimes characterized as being "merely" one of degree. But this

rhetorical ploy is used to minimize and confuse the difference between democratic and

nondemocratic states.

Freely Given Consent. It becomes necessary, therefore, to supplement the above

definition with a working conception that will enable us to distinguish democratic

regimes from others. One such working conception is the view that a democratic

government is one in which the minority or its representatives may peacefully become


the majority or the representatives of the majority. The presupposition is, of course, that

this transition is made possible by, and expresses the freely given consent of, the

majority of the adults governed. The implications of the presence of freely given consent

call attention to the difference between ancient democracies, which stressed only

majority rule as a validating principle, and modern democracies, which since the birth of

the American republic have stressed the operating presence of inalienable rights.

Direct and Indirect Democracy. Before developing the implications of this distinction, it

is necessary to dissolve certain misconceptions that have often plagued discussions of

democracy. The first is the view that the only genuine democracy is "direct" democracy

in which all citizens of the community are present and collectively pass on all legislation,

as was practiced in ancient Athens or as is the case in a New England town meeting.

From this point of view an "indirect" or "representative" democracy is not a democracy

but a constitutional republic or commonwealth. This distinction breaks down because,

literally construed, there can be no direct democracy if laws are defined not only in

terms of their adoption but also in terms of their execution. Delegation of authority is

inescapable in any political assemblage unless all citizens are in continuous service at all

times, not only legislating but also executing the laws together. The basic question is

whether the delegation of authority is reversiblecontrolled by those who delegated it.

Democracy versus Republic. The second misconception is the identification of, or

confusion between, the terms democracy and republic. Strictly speaking, a republican

form of government is one in which the position of the chief titular head of government

is not hereditary. A republic can have an undemocratic form of government, whereas a

monarchy can be a democracy. There is no necessary connection between the two terms,

although particular regimes usually embody a complex mingling of republican and

democratic principles.

Majority Rule and Minority Rights. Any community in which a majority of the adult

population are slaves cannot be considered democratic. Nonetheless, there is a valid

distinction between the kinds of government that existed in antiquity in which the

freemen however limited in numbers were the source of ultimate political authority and


governments in which the authority of government was vested in a dictator or an

absolute monarch. The former were democracies, even though the free citizenry or its

representatives recognized no limitation on the nature and exercise of their rule and

others enjoyed no political rights. The result of elections in the ancient democracies

often was the civil equivalent of a military victory, and vae victis ("woe to the

vanquished") often described the fate of the defeated. Under such circumstances

democratic rule was bloody, disorderly, and frequently a preface to the emergence of a

strongman or dictator. Even where power was in the hands of the majority, there was no

democracy in the modern sense, for minority rights were not considered.

With the emergence of a theory of human rights beginning in the 17th century and its

explicit development in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and, above all, John Locke, the

way was prepared for a conception of democracy in which the principle of majority rule

was a necessary but not a sufficient condition. The will of the majority was to enjoy

democratic legitimacy only if it was an expression of freely given consent. The specific

provisions of the U.S. Bill of Rights and the unwritten, but not unspoken, assumptions

of the British constitution after the Cromwellian revolution expressed the limits set by

human rights on the power of ruling majorities, minorities, or monarchs.

Majorities could do everything except deprive minorities of their civil rights, including

freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly and the right to a fair trial, the exercise

of which might enable the minority to win over the electorate and come to power.

Minorities might do everything within the context of these human rights to present their

case, but so long as they accepted the principles of democratic organization, they were

bound by the outcome of the give and take of free discussion until another opportunity

for persuasion might present itself. Since unanimity among human beings about

matters of great concern is impossible, the majority principle, insofar as it truly respects

human rights, is the only one that makes democracy a viable alternative to tyranny,

whether ancient or modern.


Conditions for Democratic Rule

What are the signs of freely given consent, or under what conditions is it present?

Briefly, freely given consent exists when there is no physical coercion or threat of

coercion employed against expression of opinion; when there is no arbitrary restriction

placed on freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly; where there is no monopoly

of propaganda by the ruling party; and where there is no institutional control over the

instruments or facilities of communication. These are minimal conditions for the

existence of freely given consent. In their absence a plebiscite, even if unanimous, is not

democratically valid.

These may be considered negative conditions for the presence of democratic rule. But it

may be necessary for a government to take positive measures to ensure that different

groups in the population have access to the means by which public opinion is swayed. If,

for example, an individual or a group had a monopoly of newsprint or television

channels and barred those with contrary views from using them, both the spirit and

letter of democracy would be violated.

Informed Citizenry. Philosophers of democracy, especially Thomas Jefferson, John

Stuart Mill, and John Dewey, have called attention to certain positive conditions the

presence of which quickens and strengthens the democratic process. Foremost among

these is the availability of education, allowing for an informed and critical awareness of

the issues and problems of the times. If the avenues of communication are open, an

educated electorate can become aware of the consequences and costs of past policies

and of the present alternatives.

If, as the 17th-century philosopher Barukh Spinoza declared, men and women may be

enslaved by their ignorance, uninformed freedom of choice may lead to disaster. It is

this fear of mass ignorance or the excitability and gullibility of "the herd" that is one root

of opposition to democracy. The more informed and better educated the electorate, the

healthier the democracy is. This, at least, has been the nearly universal claim of most

democratic theorists. But modern means of mass communication and persuasion,

especially political advertising, present challenges to this fondly held dictum of


democratic faith. How does one distinguish between unacceptable manipulation of the

citizenry and wholly legitimate efforts to persuade? There is no consensus on these

matters, and the debate promises to grow more intense given the explosion in

information technology in the last quarter of the 20th century.

Citizen Participation. A second positive condition for the existence of an effective

democracy is the active participation of the citizens in the processes of government.

Participation is all the more essential as government grows in size and complexity and

as individual citizens may be tempted to succumb to a feeling of ineffectiveness in the

face of anonymous forces controlling their destiny. The result may be wide-scale apathy

and a decay in democratic vitality, even when democratic forms are preserved. "The

food of feeling," observed Mill, "is action. Let a person have nothing to do for his

country, and he will not care for it."

It was Dewey and Jane Addams, however, who stressed the importance of participation

in the day-to-day political affairs of the street, the borough, the city, the region, the

state, and the nation, to a point where the whole concept of democracy acquired a new

dimension. By involving the greatest number of citizens in different ways and on

different levels in political action, plural centers are developed to counteract the

tendency to expansion and centralization of government, and the conditions of "a Great

Community" are established. "Democracy," Dewey wrote, "is a name for a free and

enriching communion." Civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., evoking religious

language, described American democracy as an ideal of a "beloved community."

However, this generous conception of a participatory democracy can be misunderstood

and vulgarized. Some have interpreted it to mean that there is no place for expertise in a

democracy, that all citizens are capable of administering all things, and that all opinions

not only have a right to be heard but also are entitled to receive equal weight. This

denies Jefferson's insistence that one of the fruits of democracy is the emergence of an

"aristocracy of virtue and talent."

Delegation of Power. This reinforces the third positive condition for effective

democracy. Intelligent delegation of power and responsibility is essential because no


community can sit in continuous legislative session, and not everybody can do

everything equally well. In addition, it is necessary during periods of crisis to entrust

certain institutions and persons with emergency powers to ensure the defense and

preservation of the community.

Skepticism and Judgment. The possibility of abuse of the delegation of power both in

ordinary and extraordinary times reinforces the fourth positive condition for a healthy

democracy. This is an intelligent skepticism concerning claims to absolute truth, the

possession of charisma among leaders, or the infallibility of experts. As indispensable as

experts are, the assumption of both democratic thought and common sense is that one

does not have to be an expert to evaluate the work of experts. One does not have to be a

cook to judge the claims of great cooks, a general to know when the war has been won or

lost, or a civil servant to discover whether the policy of bureaucracy leads to well-being

or woe. In a democracy the citizen is and should be king.

Democratic Way of Life

In recent years the concept of democracy has been expanded so that it may be used both

as a political and as an ethical term. Is the expression "the democratic way of life"

merely rhetorical? Dewey perhaps did the most to extend the ethical connotations of the

term democratic. The justification of the extension is implicit in the actual use of the

term. We regard a community as progressively more democratic if the base of its

citizenship is expanded from white men of property to all men of property to men and

women of property, until finally it is open to all adults regardless of race, gender,

religion, or property. Further, even when an action is approved by a democracy we

sometimes say that it violates the spirit if not the form of democracy. The only ethical

concept of democracy that makes sense of these distinctions is that it is a form of

organization in which the institutions of society are geared to manifest an equality of

concern and respect for all human beings. No one is to be denied political standing on

the grounds of an ascriptive or unchangeable characteristic such as race or gender.


Decision Making. The democratic way of life presupposes another principle that has

broad application to nonpolitical as well as political institutions. This is that human

beings who are affected by decisions should have some say in influencing those

decisions.

The democratic approach, as distinct from the authoritarian approach, invites open

expression and discussion of needs, options, and alternatives. But it would be ridiculous

to permit small children to make the major decisions in family life or even to decide

what should constitute the minimum requirements of an adequate education. There

may be a difference in morale between the army of a democratic nation and that of a

nondemocratic nation, but to assume that the same mechanisms that operate in the

political sphere of a democracy should operate in its military affairs would be folly.

Kinds of Democracy. Although the use of the expression "the democratic way of life" is

legitimate, the primacy of the meaning of democracy as a political form of rule should be

kept firmly in mind. Otherwise confusion may result from claims that there are different

kinds of democracy such as economic democracy or ethnic democracy, either of which

may be present when political democracy is absent. For example, throughout the 45

years of the Cold War, a period of geopolitical, economic, and ethical contestation

between Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe and the Western coalition led by the United

States, some political partisans and theorists asserted that the difference between the

Soviet state and the United States lay in the fact that in the Soviet Union economic

democracy prevailed while political democracy was absent, whereas in the Western

political democracies, especially the United States, political democracy was present but

not economic democracy.

This argument rests on some basic confusions, as dissidents in the former Soviet-

dominated societies and most Western democratic theorists long contended. Economic

democracy is often identified with economic equality, which is an entirely different

concept. A people may be equally poor or equally affluent. Or great disparities may

persist despite the claim to equality. Even if something approaching economic equality

did in fact exist in a given society, this by itself would not establish the presence or


absence of democracy. Economic democracy, by contrast to economic leveling, exists

when those who are affected by the economic institutions of society have a meaningful

right to determine the conditions, the nature, and, in significant measure, the rewards of

work. Normally, this right is dependent on the flourishing of free and independent trade

unions or other effective organizations of the workers, whether blue collar or

professional, independent of the state and responsible to their members. The

functioning of economic democracy in this sense depends on the free exercise of speech,

the press, and assembly. Consequently, although political democracy can exist without

economic democracy, economic democracy cannot exist without political democracy.

This is a point that has been subscribed to by the democratic successor regimes in the

Baltic states and the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish republics and by their most

important spokespersons.

Democracy and Freedom

The problems and challenges of democracy are many. Some flow from the tension

between the emphasis on equality in the democratic outlook and the desire to preserve

individual variation and freedom. Alexis de Tocqueville and other critical observers of

democracy, as well as friends of democracy such as Mill, feared that its extension would

lead to the erosion of personal freedom by imposing legal restrictions on the use of

property and on personal behavior.

Individual Liberties. To some extent restrictions on individual freedom in a democratic

society flow not from the theory and practice of democracy but from the complexity of

social relations in a growing community. So long as there is recognition of the area of

personal privacy that may not be invaded by public power, freedom faces no intolerable

threats. Despite the fears of Tocqueville and Mill, there is far greater allowance for, and

tolerance of, deviant ideas and practices in all areas of personal life in contemporary

democratic society than was the case in the less democratic world of these scholars.

According to some latter-day voices, the sphere of personal freedom has been extended

to a point where law and order seem threatened. This is particularly true in the United


States, where the proliferation of weapons of deadly force in private hands, under the

constitutional right to bear arms, is implicated in dangerously high rates of homicide

and assault in large urban areas. Many critics claim that this right has been extended to

the point where public safety, the most basic right of all, is increasingly jeopardized.

Balancing individual rights against one another in light of the legitimate need of

communities for safety and security promises to be one of the great democratic

challenges of the 21st century.

Inviolable Rights for Minorities. The acceptance of the inviolable rights of minorities

reduces the danger of dictatorship by the majority in a democracy. However, the rights

of minorities cannot be construed as absolute; rather, these rights depend, in part, on

the consequences of the actions of minorities, on the freedom and safety of majorities,

or on society as a whole. In addition, rights may conflict. Freedom of speech may

interfere with a person's right to a fair trial and sometimes, as when an orator is inciting

a lynching mob, with the victim's right to life. In such circumstances the rights of a

minority may have to be abridged. What, then, is the difference between democratic and

nondemocratic governments? Do not the latter also abridge the rights of citizens in the

alleged interests of the common good?

The first distinction is that democratic government recognizes the intrinsic as well as the

instrumental value of civil rights. When it moves to restrict or abridge civil rights, it does

so slowly and reluctantly. Second, if and when the exercise of a civil right creates a clear

and present danger of a social evil that threatens other human rights, it is abridged only

for a limited period of time and is restored as soon as normalcy returns. Finally, the

restrictions imposed by government agencies on every level in a democracy are subject

to appeal, review, and check by an independent judiciary.

Compatibility of Economic Systems

The relation between democracy and forms of property is extremely tangled. It is

sometimes argued that the collective ownership of the means of production is


incompatible with democratic government, because the monopoly of control and the

necessities of a totally planned economy necessarily result in dictatorship over the lives

and movement of citizens.

Socialism. It is true that in societies where the economic system was centralized and

socialized, as in the Soviet Union, or where it was brought under complete political

control, as in Nazi Germany, democracy could not exist. In these situations political

democracy was destroyed, and control of all aspects of economic life was a central

feature of the overall assault on democracy. Measures of partial economic socialization

adopted in Britain and the Scandinavian countries in the post World War II era did not

erode democratic political processes. Nonetheless, although economic centralization

and democracy are not incompatible in principle, there is an antidemocratic thrust to a

completely socialized and state-dominated economy. Concentrations of power of this

magnitude will always pose a threat to political democracy even as democracy must

challenge excessive centralization of power; hence political democracy is either

destroyed first as a prelude to such centralization, or concentrating economic power

foreshadows the assault on democratic political forms.

Capitalism. Some have argued that capitalism is incompatible with democracy because

private ownership of the means of production gives entrepreneurs control over the lives

of those who earn their living by using those means of production. Such ownership, it is

claimed, gives a disproportionate influence over the electorate to those who command

great wealth. Though not without merit, these contentions overlook the fact that

political processes in a democracy make possible the limitation of economic power not

only by establishing free trade unions or other solidaristic organizations as

countervailing forces to capital but also by the use of taxation and the regulation of

elections. Laws protecting civil liberties guarantee a dramatic extension of free

expression and keep open the free marketplace in ideas. Furthermore, new information-

technologies have decentralized political power, making it less likely that a narrow elite

will exert disproportionate control. This by no means eliminates the disparity between

social classes, but it does complicate any simplistic picture of "haves" versus "have nots"

as characteristic of capitalist regimes.


Furthermore, once we distinguish between personal property home, land, tools, books

and property in the large social instruments of production mines, factories, plantations

we can appreciate the insight of Locke and Jefferson that ownership of the former

actually may be a source and guarantee of individual freedom.

The Welfare State. The origins of modern democracy are rooted in the scientific

revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries and in the industrial and technological

revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. These upheavals enlarged the imaginations of

citizens and would-be citizens by making what seemed merely possible probable. Thus

they transformed social relations to a point where persons whose status was one of

relative powerlessness appendages of machines began to demand first suffrage and then

their fair share of the social product. The growth of political democracy depended more

heavily on the activities of trade unions, dissident religions, and social reform

movements than on the actions of traditionally established institutions. Because power

limits power, the landowning and capitalist classes, in their struggles with each other,

sought allies among the lower classes and therewith extended the scope of political

suffrage and recognition in dramatic and irreversible ways.

With the extension of political suffrage, the middle and lower classes acquired the

strength and opportunity to carry democratic principles into other dimensions of the

social system. As a result, a massive system of social security developed in most

democratic countries, and educational facilities and a higher standard of living became

available to greater numbers of citizens. The welfare state emerged as a consequence of

the influence of political democracy on other areas of social life, particularly through the

redistribution of wealth.

Some Problems of a Democratic Society

The complexity of modern democratic societies, the free flow of ideas, and the need to

balance competing interests all introduced new challenges to these contemporary

democracies as they approached the 21st century.


Communication. It is especially difficult to define the role of the press and other mass

media in a democratic society. Everyone believes that the press should be free within the

confines of laws against personal libel, the scope and severity of which vary from

country to country. But beyond this, the issue of ownership of the press is crucial to

determining its degree of freedom and its responsibilities to the society in which it

functions. For obvious reasons a free press cannot be a government-owned press. In

democratic countries the press is usually privately owned; yet the very nature of this

ownership sometimes shapes its news or may result in the exploitation of stories for

sensational purposes. Ideally, a free press should be a "responsible" press, responsible

to truth, balanced, fair, and careful to distinguish between reports of fact and statements

of political opinion, but these terms are difficult to define let alone realize to everyone's

satisfaction.

In some countries large institutions, such as political parties, trade unions, churches,

interest groups, and social movements, are encouraged to publish their own

newspapers, so that a free press consists in the freedom to publish newspapers with

plural commitments. To get their message across, autonomous sectors of democratic

social systems also take advantage of other forms of media, particularly community-

access television. This revolution in technology is especially evident in the United States

but is spreading rapidly to all developed societies.

Devices for increasing both the number and the responsibility of newspapers and

public-interest media outlets remain to be discovered. No single formula can be applied

universally. What is possible in Britain, whose government-owned broadcasting system

is considered a model of objectivity, is apparently not possible in France, whose

television system tends to support the government in power, a scenario most frequently

encountered. Perhaps the best defense of a free mass communications system in a

democratic society lies in the plurality of media and channels, public and private,

jealously evaluating their performances under codes of professional ethics voluntarily

developed.


Education. The role of the press in a democracy is one facet of the role of education in a

democratic society. If one takes seriously the democratic ethical ideal of equality of

concern for all individuals to develop themselves, the community must accept the

responsibility of providing educational opportunity to all of its members who can profit

from it. This goes beyond the necessity of providing education on which the exercise of

intelligent citizenship depends. It extends to preparing individuals for the careers

appropriate to their potential talents. This means that education in a democracy cannot

be merely education of an elite whether of blood, money, or brains. Not all can be

chosen, but all must be called; therefore equality of educational opportunity must be

provided.

Strictly and literally, equality of educational opportunity is impossible because of

differences in families and in home environments; nevertheless, this principle is

extremely far-reaching in its implications. It points to the necessity of progressively

removing deprivations in housing, health, and economic welfare that inhibit individual

growth. Ways must be found to diversify educational experiences so that individual

needs of students can be met. Once the ethical ideal of democracy is accepted, it

becomes possible to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate, relevant and

irrelevant forms of discrimination in school and in society.

There is no place in democratic society for discrimination that prevents the emergence

of respect and recognition for all persons. Equality of educational opportunity cannot

and should not result in sameness of treatment or result. There will always be

differences in power, prestige, income, and achievement no matter how narrow the

distance between the upper and lower limits. But to the extent that these differences are

a function not of race, class, gender, ethnicity, or religion but of merit and social

contribution and the unfolding of individual capacities, the situation is more equitable

than in systems based on inherited privilege or administrative and bureaucratic

domination by a self-perpetuating managerial elite.

Indigenous Antidemocratic Groups. The presence of political groups that advocate the

overthrow of the democratic system poses a particularly sensitive theoretical and


practical problem of recurrent significance in democracies. Such groups may exploit the

institutions of a free and open society with the intent of destroying that society. Insofar

as the subversive group may be so closely identified with a foreign power that it

functions as a fifth column, the problem can be met by invoking a law requiring

registration of agents of foreign powers, providing such groups willingly admit to their

affiliation. But the theoretical problem remains in relation to the emergence of

indigenous antidemocratic groups that invoke constitutional freedoms and privileges in

pursuit of a program devoted to abolishing these rights and to denying to future

dissenters and minorities the opportunities they enjoyed.

Two fundamental positions on this issue have been held by representative

spokespersons of democratic thought. The first argues that a democracy is under no

obligation to commit suicide by permitting a transient majority to destroy the principle

of democratic majority rule that defines the very nature of democracy. Walter Lippman

asserted, "The right of free speech belongs to those who mean to transmit that right to

their successors. The rule of majority is morally justified only if another majority is free

to reverse that rule." In this view, democratic regimes should tolerate antidemocratic

political groups so long as they are feeble and have only nuisance value; once they

constitute a formidable threat, they should be outlawed.

The second position asserts that so long as the enemies of democracy engage in peaceful

propaganda to destroy democracy, they should be permitted to present their point of

view. Theoretically, if a community is truly dedicated to the democratic process it will

not entrust power to any group sworn to destroy it. Historically, there is a great deal of

evidence to support this view. Furthermore, those who defend tolerance of

antidemocratic parties contend that a people cannot be forced to be free or kept in

tutelage to prevent them from destroying democratic institutions. Finally, they argue

that if and when the people of a country vote democratically to abolish the principles of

democratic rule, they prove themselves unfit for self-government. In the interest of

freedom it may then become necessary to resist the decision, but this could not be

consistently done on the basis of allegiance to democracy. As a political system,

democracy would have to be morally condemned as an unviable form of government.


The practical problem is complicated by the fact that antidemocratic groups frequently

profess to seek to extend and strengthen democratic institutions. The public must

therefore develop a critical consciousness and must carefully examine the promises and

programs of political contenders. Such attention makes it less likely that a democracy

can be transformed into a "mobocracy," intolerant of dissent and vulnerable to

demagogues who may seek to establish a dictatorship "for the good of the country."

Allegiance to democratic institutions becomes firm only when there is a realization that

the integrity of the processes of democratic decision is more important than any

particular measure won by reliance on such processes. Just as due process of law is

more central than any specific legal judgment that results from it, just as the scientific

method of establishing conclusions retains its validity in the face of failure to solve a

specific problem, so must one value the procedures of democracy over and above any

particular product.

Democracy and Nationalism

Nationalism in its present form is a comparatively recent movement inspired by the

revolutions of the 18th century, especially the French Revolution, and by reactions to

attempts to spread liberating ideals by force. National self-determination is a legitimate

ideal that coincides with the democratic principle that those affected by decisions should

have a voice and, when mature, a vote in determining the policies that affect them. It is

intolerable that the national destiny of a people should be decided by representatives of

a foreign nation whose interests usually conflict with those of the people whom they

hold in colonial subjection.

Where nationalism developed among subject or colonial peoples, it tended to take a

democratic form. But in many cases these democratic forms were regarded merely as

instruments for achieving national independence; once that was attained the ideology of

nationalism became of overriding importance, and democratic processes eroded. The

consequence has been that in some newly independent countries dissenting and


opposition elements enjoy less freedom than they had under hated colonial rule.

Historical evidence seems to confirm the proposition that people prefer to live under

nondemocratic forms of government if they enjoy a sense of national independence

rather than to benefit from the less repressive forms of political life under relatively

benign versions of colonialism. The experiments in democracy under way in the

successor states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states show varying degrees of

commitment to democracy coupled with national self-determination. Where ethnic

nationalism triumphs, as in the former state of Yugoslavia, individual rights are violated

and authentically democratic regimes seem a distant prospect. This, perhaps, should not

be too surprising. For colonial and imperial domination negates the principle of respect

and recognition for particular cultural traditions and identities. Nationalism, it must be

said, has vied with democracy as the dominant political passion of the last half of the

20th century, which saw dozens of new nation-states, some democratic, some not,

created out of the wreckage of old empires.

In some Asian and African nations that became independent after World War II,

democratic forms were abandoned in favor of one-party, militarized dictatorships. This

has been variously justified or rationalized on the grounds that conditions were not ripe

for democracy or that democracy is simply a luxury for highly literate and industrialized

peoples.

These arguments overlook the fact that it is hard to know when a country is ready for

democracy. There were times when observers of civil wars and regicides in England and

France would undoubtedly have declared those nations unready. A case can be made for

establishing a strong nondemocratic government to replace a corrupt feudal monarchy

or dictatorship when there are no democratic forces on the horizon, in the expectation

that democratic forms may be introduced after stability has been established.

But where embryonic democratic forms do operate, as was the case in most African and

Asian states when independence was won, the burden of proof rests on those who argue

that the sacrifice of these democratic institutions was required to preserve national unity

and economic prosperity. So far this proof has rarely, if ever, been furnished.


Justification of Democracy

One of the most difficult theoretical and ethical problems faced by democrats is the

question of how democracy is to be justified. Some thinkers who subscribe to the

emotive school even deny that the question of justification is cognitively meaningful,

that is, that it makes sense to say that one political system is better or worse than

another. However, unless one believes that all political decisions and judgments are

completely conditioned by antecedent physical or social causes, it must be

acknowledged that reasons or grounds for acceptance or rejection of democratic

government can be adduced and indeed have been since the time of Plato. The chief

types of justification have been religious, metaphysical, and empirical.

It is important to distinguish between the historical question of the causal influence of

religious, metaphysical, and empirical beliefs on the growth of democracy and the

analytical question of whether belief in the validity of democracy logically depends on

the acceptance of the truth of any religious, metaphysical, and empirical propositions.

Religious Argument. A typical illustration of the religious justification of democracy is

the argument that because all persons are equal in the sight of God, they should

therefore enjoy political dignity and respect and share in the power that defines the

democratic community. This dictum of faith has played a powerful role in shaping

democratic political and social commitments in the West. This does not mean that a

belief in equality in the sight of God entails in any automatic sense a commitment to

equality before the law, as those who pleaded for the divine right of kings well realized.

Belief or disbelief in democracy does not turn on the truth or falsity of any theological

dogma; nevertheless, much of the moral passion of democratic struggles historically

derives from a prior set of commitments to principles of ontological equality in God's

eyes. This mingling of religious and democratic influences has been observed by many

democratic theorists. Certainly some of the most important democratizing social

movements abolitionism, women's suffrage, civil rights were deeply shaped by religious

beliefs and commitments. One of the great songs of abolitionism, Oh Freedom, ties the


yearning of slaves to be free and to reject slavery to faith. The formative influence of

Judeo-Christian principles of a community established by covenant surely helps to

account for the fact that modern democracy first emerged and was secured within

Western societies.

Metaphysical Argument. The metaphysical justification for democracy is typified by the

argument that belief in natural law and natural rights is a necessary and sufficient

condition of belief in democracy. One of the most notable defenders of this view is

Jacques Maritain. The difficulties it faces are many. The notion of natural law is highly

ambiguous. If it is a law like the laws of natural science, it cannot be violated; if it is a

law that states what should be done, it requires a justification itself. Nor is it clear that

belief in natural law is incompatible with belief in nondemocratic systems of

government. Some of the most stalwart defenders of natural law in history were not

noteworthy for the strength of their democratic beliefs. Yet natural law ideas, universal

in scope and application, helped to give rise to the current notion of human rights.

Although human rights emerged as a political commitment within Western

democracies, the concept of human rights is a force worldwide. Many international

organizations exist exclusively for the purpose of protecting human rights and

protesting violations of such rights.

Empirical Arguments. The empirical justifications of democracy are of two generic

types. One seeks to find in some facts of the natural or physical order or in some facts of

human nature truths that could substantiate or invalidate belief in democratic society.

The other more modestly asserts that the validity of democratic society over all other

viable alternatives can be established only by their relative fruits in experience. The first

type of empirical justification seeks to derive ethical or political conclusions from

physics or from specific features of human nature. But physical truths are compatible

with all or no forms of political government, and anthropological and psychological

accounts can establish, at best, only which kinds of human association are possible, not

which one is desirable.


The second type of empirical justification is the one most human beings employ in

concrete historical situations in which they must choose between democratic and

nondemocratic alternatives. Which form of government is more likely to produce and

preserve peace, freedom, prosperity, justice, absence of cruelty and fear, growth of

material and human resources, and so forth? From Plato to the present, it is these

considerations, whatever other arguments they have been buttressed with, that have

agitated those who make political choices and determine their allegiance.

Ideology and Philosophy. The decay of absolutist and authoritarian systems of

philosophy has certainly contributed to the triumph of the ideology of democracy.

Democracies are put under pressure where some specific dogma is held with fanatical

zeal, where the spirit of tolerance is regarded as an expression of moral weakness and

compromise as an act of opportunism or outright chicanery. That is why a strong

democracy tolerates all ideologies, provided only that their adherents play according to

the democratic rules of the game.

Some have argued that the philosophical temper of empiricism is more congenial to

democracy than is any other theory of knowledge. But this is contestable. Many

philosophical positions can be squared with sufficient ingenuity with a variety of

political faiths. Thomas Hobbes and David Hume were empiricists but unfriendly to

democracy, whereas the empiricist John Locke was a democratic constitutionalist. The

French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau was committed to a paradoxical set of

beliefs about human beings, nature, and civil society. The English utilitarians and the

American pragmatists, key players in much democratic social reform, embraced

empirical approaches with ingenious modifications that recognized the active and

selective character of human thought. But other reformers brought theistic and

ontological commitments to bear in shaping their democratic faith.

Nonetheless, to the extent that democratic social movements are movements of social

reform, they often embrace an empirical philosophical attitude to values and conflicts of

values in order to reveal the interests at their source. The English utilitarians and the

American pragmatists who were in the forefront of democratic social reform adopted


the empirical approach of Hobbes and Hume with modifications that recognized the

active and selective character of human thought. In the American pragmatic tradition

thought does not limp after events but redetermines them.

Arguments against Democracy. The most powerful arguments against democratic

government have been formulated by its honest opponents from Plato to George

Santayana, not by modern authoritarians professing to be democrats. The nub of these

arguments is that most human beings are either too stupid or too vicious, or both, to be

entrusted with self-government, that the upshot of majority rule therefore is tyranny

and terror, and that the nature of the public good which is the end of government is so

complex, so largely a matter of philosophical wisdom and administrative skill that only

an elite of the intellectually gifted and spiritually elect can discover and implement it.

"Knowledge, and knowledge alone," writes Santayana, "gives divine right to rule."

The weakness in these arguments was exposed by Plato himself. If most human beings

are vicious, who is to control the guardians? Who can guarantee the benevolence of the

benevolent despot? In his account of the inevitable decline from the ideal aristocracy of

his Republic to the depths of the irresponsible tyrant, Plato admits that rule of the

philosophers is also flawed. And although he uses the analogy of the ship to argue that

just as it makes no sense to elect the pilot of a ship, who must be specifically trained for

the task, so it makes no sense to elect the pilot of the ship of state, he overlooks the fact

that the destination of the ship is not within the competence of the pilot. Indeed, his

other analogies reinforce the argument for democracy. For example, he eloquently

points out that it is not the cobbler who knows best what a good pair of shoes is, but the

wearer. The whole philosophy of democracy may be expressed in the implications of the

homely maxim that he who wears the shoes knows best where they pinch. Despite all the

drawbacks and limitations of democracy, there is considerable point to Winston

Churchill's declaration: "Democracy is the worst possible form of government except all

the others that have been tried."

Twentieth-Century Critics. Something should be said of some early-20th-century critics

of democracy who argued on the basis of their analysis of the nature of political


organization that democracy is impossible. The most sophisticated expressions of this

position are found in the writings of three Italian sociologists: Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo

Pareto, and Roberto Michels. Mosca denied that majority rule is possible and claimed

that in effect every government, no matter how democratic, is run by a minority of

insiders. Pareto developed the doctrine of "the circulation of the elite," which held that

because of variations in native endowment that make most individuals dolts and a

minority shrewd, and because of the aggressive or selfish nature of humankind, all

societies are ruled by interlocking elites or, in modern parlance, the establishment.

Revolutions simply replace one establishment with another.

Michels argued that political success depends on organization. To be efficient in the

modern world, organization has to be hierarchically and nondemocratically run. One

organization can be successfully replaced only by another organization. The leaders of

successful organizations and their cadres constitute the ruling class and live on a level

and style of life illustrating the maxim that the more things change, the more they

remain the same. Michels based his conclusion that "socialists [democrats] can be

victorious but socialism [democracy] never" on an examination of the structure and

functioning of the largest democratic organization of its time in the world, the pre World

War I German Social Democratic party.

As critiques of democracy these writings suffer from at least two fatal difficulties. First,

the authors define democracy in such a way that it is impossible of realization, because

for them democracy is direct democracy, and any representative democracy or system of

delegated authority is ipso facto proof of a class society. Second, they systematically

underplay the advances made possible for the masses when elites must compete with

each other under democratic rules of the game. They ignore the extent to which politics

is the art of choosing the lesser evil or the greater good. Although they assert that, at

bottom, all societies are political class societies in which minorities exploit majorities

and that what changes is only the composition of successive elites who uniformly live on

the backs of the masses, all of them lived to experience, either directly or vicariously and

to condemn bitterly the dictatorship of Mussolini that replaced political democracy in


pre World War II Italy. The differences turned out to be far more than mere changes of

elites.

So long as the voting masses of the population are free to reject or repudiate the rule of

the elite, they exercise a genuine power over it, which may extend even to changing the

lines of advancement within the elite. The history of Western democracies may be

written in terms of the succession of different establishments, but the impressive fact is

that both the standards of living and the degree of political influence of the voting

masses have risen.

Faith in Democracy. The faith in democracy ultimately rests not in the belief in the

natural goodness of human beings but in the belief that most human beings are open to

democratic responsibility and possibility. This faith derives from a notion of the human

person as deserving of recognition and respect. It is true that democracies are imperfect

and democratic citizens may do foolish or dangerous things. But the democrat holds

that the solution to such dilemmas is more informed democratic action rather than

salvation in a dictatorship, whether of a single leader or of the proletariat. Those who

have moved down this latter path are responsible for much of the horror of 20th-century

politics, with its millions of human beings lost to political terror and millions others

displaced, tortured, or tormented to varying degrees.

Democracy, as we have seen, is not indivisible — all or nothing — in the sense that its

political form necessitates the extension of the democratic principle to other areas of

experience. It only makes an extension possible to those who have the vision, courage,

and intelligence to struggle for it. Nor is democracy indivisible on the international

scene in the sense that the world must soon become one democratic community.

Democratic regimes are compelled to coexist with nondemocratic regimes for the sake

of peace and security.

What can be expected is that the ideals of freedom in flourishing democratic cultures

still struggling to solve problems of poverty, ignorance, and violence have functioned

and will continue to function as an aspiration to the subjects of nondemocratic regimes.

Having secured and extended democracy throughout the years of the Cold War, the


citizens of democratic states face new and daunting challenges. Freedom may be

infectious, but so are nationalism and intolerance. "Eternal vigilance," in Jefferson's

memorable phrase, is the continuing price citizens of a democracy pay to sustain and

secure freedom for future generations.

Sidney Hook*, New York University

Revised by Jean Bethke Elshtain, Vanderbilt University

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democracy sidney hook

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