democracy in bolivia: the 2000 cochabamba water war
DESCRIPTION
This paper is an analysis of Bolivia's historical evolution from colonialism to its present day democracy and examines the 2000 Water War as a defining moment in this transition.TRANSCRIPT
DemocracyinBolivia:FromSubalterntoCitizenAnAnalysisofthe2000CochabambaWaterWar
TomLorenzen
May2009SeniorThesisColoradoCollege
2
“Alivingmancanbeenslavedandreducedtothehistoricconditionofanobject.Butifhediesinrefusingtobeenslaved,hereaffirmstheexistenceofanotherkindofhumannaturewhichrefusestobeclassifiedasanobject” AlbertCamus,TheRebel238
Inthe2000CochabambaWaterWar,thesubalternpopulation,inresponseto
theprivatizationofwater,collectivelypressuredthegovernmenttoabdicateits
contractualandlegalcommitmenttotheprivatization.Ataglance,thenatureofthe
victoryappearstobematerial,but,infact,whenviewedinitsgreaterhistorical
context,the2000WaterWarstandsasthedecisivemomentina500year‐old
identityconflict.
Thispaperwillfollowthehistoricprocessofidentitystrugglebetweenthe
hegemonicgovernmentandthepoliticallyinvisible“subaltern”.Thesubalternwill
bedefinedastheportionofthepopulationthatthegovernment:(1)renders
politicallyinvisibleviatheabsoluteexclusionfromparticipatingandcontestingin
thepoliticalsphere(2)economicallyobjectifiesthuslegalizingitsexploitation.
ThehistoryoftheBoliviansubalternbeginswithSpanishcolonialrule,
whichusedaracialcastesystemasitslegalfoundation.Thisformalizedsystemof
apartheidbothprohibited,ongroundsofracialinferiority,theindigenous
populationfromenteringthepoliticalsphereandlegalizedtheirenslavement.
Throughitspoliticalhegemony,theSpanishgovernmentdehumanizedandthus
objectifiedthesubalternasessentially“savages”.Afterindependence,theexploitive
treatmentofthesubalterncontinuedinasystemofinformalapartheid;thenew
republicintegratedthesubalternbutonlynominallyas“Bolivianothers”.
3
AftertheRevolutionof1952,unifiedsectorsofthesubalternvia“forced
negotiations”gainedaccess,albeitlimited,tothepoliticalsphere;however,anew
oligarchicparty,relyingoncorporateclientelism,regulatedsubalternparticipation
andcontestation.Soonafterthe1952Revolution,asubsequentcounter‐revolution,
whichwouldlastuntil2000,systematicallyincapacitatedthesubalterns’abilityto
contestthegovernment.Bythe1990s,thegovernmenthadatomizedthemain
subalternorganizationsthathadbeencapableofchallengingthenational
government.
TheprivatizationofwaterinCochabambalegalizedtheexploitationofwater
serviceandthuspushedtheentirepopulationintoasubalternposition.Inreaction,
thesubalterncollectivelyarticulatedwaterasapublicgood,andsuccessfully
challengedthegovernment’shegemoniccontrolover“subalternity”.Waterwas
activelyarticulatedasacitizen’sright.Inthissense,acitizenisdefinedas:(1)one
whoispoliticallyvisibleviaactivepoliticalparticipationandcontestationinthe
politicalsphere(2)onewhoactivelycreateshisorherownidentityinthepolitical
sphere.
Oncewaterwassuccessfullyarticulatedinthepoliticalsphereasapublic
good,ittransmutedfromthematerialintotheimmaterial—inthat“water”became
thekeystoneofthe“citizen”identityinthepoliticalsphere.Throughthecollective
articulationofthepublicgood,thesubalterncantranscenditspoliticallyinvisible
statusandacquireaneffectualidentityofcitizenship.
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ReviewoftheLiterature
Thispaperwillexaminethehistorictransformationfromsubalternityto
citizenship.Thestrugglewithinthesubalternconditiondefinesthepoliticalhistory
ofBolivia.FromtheonsetofWesterninfluenceinBolivia,colonialruleused
governmentandlawasinstrumentsofexploitation.Governmentdidnotform
aroundnotionsofthepublicgood,ratherarulingoligarchydesignedgovernmentto
protecttheireconomicinterests.ThroughoutBolivia’shistory,theoligarchyhas
takenvariousforms,andyetitsexploitationofthemajorityhasremaineda
constant.
Bymeansofabsolutepoliticalexclusion,thegovernmenthasbeenableto
objectifythepoliticalidentityofthemajority.Inthispaper,politicalidentitywillbe
definedasthegovernment’sprescribedidentityforthesubordinatedsubaltern.In
otherwords,thegovernmentdefinesthetermsoftherelationshipbetweenthe
objectifiedmajority(thesubaltern)andthegovernment.Thetermsofthe
relationshipsuperimposeapoliticalidentityonthesubaltern.
OverthecourseofBolivianhistory,eachofthevariousoligarchic
governmentsdelineateddifferentsocialparametersofthesubalternand
correspondinglydifferentpoliticalidentitiesofthesubaltern.Forexample,under
Spanishcolonialrule,theSpanishstratifiedallindigenouspeoplesassubalternand
superimposedaracializedpoliticalidentityuponthem;threehundredyearslater,
the“Revolution‘52”oligarchycharacterizedthesubalterndifferentlyusingsocio‐
economicratherthanracialclassifications,whichwerereflectedina
“mestizaje/campesino”subalternpoliticalidentity.Inthispaper,Iwilldeducethe
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givenpoliticalidentityofthesubalternbasedongovernmentlawsandpolicies.It
isnecessarytonotethatthepoliticalidentitiesofthesubalternareonlyrelevantin
thepoliticalspherewherethegovernmenthashegemoniccontrol.
OntheUseof“Subaltern”
Iusetheterm“subaltern”primarilytoavoidessentializingtheBolivian
indigenouspopulation.Thereareanumberofindigenousethnicitiesandcultures,
whoseidentificationrelyonthemembersthemselves.Thegovernmentdefinesthe
subalternstatus,andthepoliticalidentityreflectsthepoliticalconditionorthe
degreeandnatureofsubalternity.Theterm“subaltern”isone,whichcanbeusedto
describetheentirehistoricevolutionoftheoppressed.Inthispaper,Iidentifyand
discusseachofthesehistoricconditions.The2000WaterWarsocialmovementcan
onlybeunderstoodwithinitsgreaterhistoricalcontext.
PartI:HistoricalBackground
TheColonialPeriod
PriortotheSpanishconquestoftheterritorythatisnowBolivia,theregion
wascomposedofvariousethnicpopulations—Guaranís,Aymarans,Incansanda
numberofAmazoniantribes.Inthe1570s,upontheconsolidationofcolonial
control,theSpanishreducedallnativepeoples,regardlessofethnic,culturalor
historicbackground,to“Indians”.TheSpanishrestructuredindigenousidentityasa
meanstosubjugationandexploitation.Thelegacyof“Indian”haspersistedtothis
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dayandisthereforecentraltounderstandingthecontemporarystrugglefor
citizenship.
TheSpanishcoloniesintheAndeanregionwereforemostorientedtoward
extraction—thiswascontingentondomination.Inordertomaintaincontrolover
thediverseethnicgroups,whichinhabitedgeographicallydividedregions,the
Spanishinstitutedasystemofindirectrule,calledthecacicazgosystem(Hyltonand
Thomson36).TheSpanishappointedauthorities,caciques,whowerechosenbased
onhereditary,Andeannobility,togovernoverdensesettlementsofindigenous
populationsandtoactasintermediariesbetweenthesettlementandtheSpanish
(HyltonandThomson36).Inexchangeforlimitedself‐government,communal
property,andtherighttopracticeculturaltraditions,thecaciazgosettlementswere
forcedtopayatributetax,aswellas,supplylabor.
Tofacilitatetheextractionofforcedlabor,theSpanishinstitutedamitayo
system.TheSpanishdividedtheregionbetweenCuzcoandPotosíinto16mita
districtsandrequiredeachdistrict,composedofcariazgosettlements,tocontribute
oneseventhoftheentiremalepopulationtooneyear’sserviceintheminesof
Potosí(Postero28).Withinonehundredandfiftyyears,thesilverminedfrom
PotosíamountedtomorethantripletheamountofsilverinEuropeanreserves,and
theextractioncostnothingshortofaholocaust—eightmillionindigenouspeople
losttheirlivesworkinginthemines(Postero28)(Dangl15).
Asanadditionalstipulationofthecariazgosystem,theSpanishenforcedthe
repartimientotax.Spanishgovernorsbought,oncredit,largeamountsof
commodities(suchasmulti‐coloredsilkstockings)frommerchantsandthenforced
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theindigenouscommunitiestobuytheproductsatahigherprice(Postero30).
Frequently,thesepurchaseswouldsendthesettlementintodebt,whichthe
governersusedaspoliticalleverageforcontinuedcontrol(Postero30).Inmany
cases,thecaciquessidedwiththecorregidoresinordertotakeacutoftheprofit,
which,inturn,dividedthecommunitiesagainstthemselvesandinhibitedunified
resistancemovements(Postero30)(HyltonandThomson37).
Inordertolegallyjustifythisexploitation,theSpanishdividedthepopulation
alongraciallinesintotwodistinctlegalapparatusescreatingadualdualrepublic.In
therepúblicadelosespañoles,theeconomicallyandpoliticallyhegemonic
(peninsulares,criollos,andmetizos)receivedpreferentialrightsandprivileges.In
therepúplicadelosindios,ontheotherhand,aseparatesetoflawsandinstitutions,
whichincludedthecariazgo,mitayo,andrepartimientosystemgovernedthe
indigenouspopulations.
Thelegallegitimacyofthedualrepublicwasgroundedinacastesystem
basedonbloodpuritythatrangedfromthepurest(theSpanish),tothemostimpure
(theIndians).Overtime,thelinebetweenthevariousracialstratificationsbecame
increasinglyblurredandarbitrary,butbecausethelegalapparatuswascontingent
uponthecastesystem,theSpanishcontinueditsusebutinamodifiedformat
(Postero28).The“Indian”cametobeidentifiedasonewholivedoncommunal
landwhowaspartofthe“workingtributarypopulation”(Postero28‐29).In
essence,theSpanishcolonyoperatedasanapartheidsystemthatallowedthe
Spanishtocontrolaspecificgroupofpeopleinordertocontinueexploitation.
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Bythelate18thcentury,anumberofresistancemovementsformedin
responsetotherepressivecariazgosystem.Attheheightoftheinsurrectionperiod,
anindigenousforceofmorethanonehundredthousandwasabletocapturea
multipleSpanishtowns(Postero31).In1781,TúpacKataribesiegedthecityofLa
Pazfor109days.Whiletheserebellionswereeventuallysuppressedbythe
Spanish,theydemonstratetheformidableresilienceoftheindigenouspopulation.
Neartheendofcolonialism,indigenouscommunitiesunderwentpolitical
changes.NancyPosterowrites:
“Andeancommunitieshadgraduallyshiftedtoamoredemocraticsystemofrepresentation,inwhichauthoritywasnotbasedonnobilityorstateregulation,butratheronaccountabilitytothecommunity.Thepowerthathadbeencentralizedattheapexofthepoliticalsystemwasdispersedtoanumberofsitesinthecommunity,particularlythroughthecivilcargosystem,arotatingsysteminwhichcommunityeldersdotemporarilycommunityservice”(Postero31).
Thisshiftfromtraditionalformsofleadershiptoamoredemocratic
structurewascriticalinBolivianhistory.Theeffectsofthisshiftareseentothisday
(Postero31).
TheRepublicanPeriod
DespiterevolutionaryrhetoricthathadchastisedtheSpain’streatmentofthe
Indians,therepublicans,afterindependencein1835,reinstatedcariazgosystemas
ameanstopayoffwardebtsaswellsasmaintaincontrolovertheindigenous
population(Postero32).Butastimepassed,duetothechangingdemandsofa
rapidlycapitalizingworld,thenewcriolloeliteneededtodevelopamodelof
citizenshipthatwouldallowthemtomoreefficientlyexploittheindigenous
populationforlabor.NancyPosterowrites:
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“The big paradox for liberals…was how to impose universaldefinitionsoffreelaborandcitizenshipandtomoldnationalculturesintohomogenouswholeswhileatthesametimecreatingsymbolsandcategoriesofinnatedifferencethatwouldsetlimitsonthoseuniversalideals—this would allow continued domination over the IndianOther”(Postero32).
ThenewBolivian constitution reconciled thisparadox. In the constitution,
althoughsuffragewas technicallyuniversal, inorder tovoteonehadtobeable to
readandwriteinSpanish;belandedorpayrent;andnotbeadomesticservant.The
qualifications were deliberately intentionally excluded the same indigenous
populationthatcomprisedtherepúblicadeindios.JustastheSpanishusedthedual
republic to sanction apartheid, the architects of the Bolivian constitution used
appearanceofuniversalliberalrightstojustifyaninformalsystemofapartheid.
In order to advance the nation‐state project, in 1874, the republican elites
passed a land reform,which ended the tribute andmade holding communal land
illegal. The intended effectwas twofold. First, by dissolving communal land, the
government sought to establish itself as the main source of political legitimacy.
Second, the communal land was sold in large tracts, which restructured the
traditionalagriculturesystemintolatifundios.
Political exclusion and the abolishment of community self‐governance
situated the indigenous population in an extremely vulnerable position. Without
land or political rights, in the republican period, the role of the new Indian
“Bolivian” was to provide cheap, slave‐like labor for an export‐oriented country
tryingtocompeteintheglobalmarket.
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The political identity of the Bolivian subaltern was worker/slave. While
nominallyBolivian,thesubalternretainedthedehumanizedstatusfromtheSpanish
period.Inthissense,thesubalternwasidentifiedasthe“Bolivianother.”
TheRevolutionof1952
Increasedsubalternprotestcharacterizedtheearlypartofthetwentieth
century.Peasantsandworkers,wholivedunderdeplorableconditions,articulated
demandsforland,theendofrepressiveworkingconditions,accesstoagriculture
markets(whichweredominatedbythelatifundios),andpoliticalrightsand
representation.
Asamajorcatalysttosubalternprotest,theChacoWarofthe1930s,forthe
firsttimeinBolivianhistory,unifieddividedsectorsofthesubaltern,mostnotably
minersandpeasants.Thewarresultedinthedeathsofover100,000Paraguayans
andBoliviansandthelossofBolivianterritory.Thesheerdevastationofthewar
strengthenedthesubalternalliancesandcontributedtoapoliticalenvironmentthat
wasconducivetopoliticalchange.
Intheyearsfollowingthewar,militarizedpeasantsandminerveterans,who
formednewpeasantandtradeunions.Pactsbetweenruralandurban
organizationsenabledcoordinatedboycotts,strikesandprotests(Dangl19)
Resistancetothegovernmentwasfiercestintheruralareas,especiallyinthe
Cochabambavalley,wherepeasantmilitiasstagedattacksonthelatifundios.Many
ofthesesubalterngroupswereabsorbedintoanewnationalparty,theMovimiento
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NacionalRevolucionario(MNR),whichwascontrolledbydisenfranchisedurban,
whitemiddleclassman.
Inordertobuildanationallyunifiedmovementcapableofchallengingthe
oligarchy,theMNRchanneledindividualgroupstowarditsownpoliticalaims.
LeadersoftheMNRrealizedtheimmensepoliticalpotentialofaminer‐peasant
coalitionandso“toorganizetheircooperation,theMNRtookadvantageofthe
coloniallegacyofcorporatistsocialvaluesandsectoralorganizations”(Postero38).
OnApril10th1952,themobilizedforcesoftheMNRtookLaPazbyforceand
supplantedtherepublicanoligarchy
Onceinpower,theMNR,undertheleadershipofthenewpresidentVictor
PazEstenssoro,movedquicklytoplacatethepressingdemandsofthevarious
groupsthathadenabledtherevolution.OnlythreedaysafterthecouptheBolivian
Workers’Center(COB),arecentlyformedminersunion,demandedthefull
nationalizationofthemines.ByOctober31,1952,theMNRhadcompliedand
institutedCOMIBOL—aworker‐runminingcompany,whichassumedcontrolover
163minesand29,000workers(Dangl21).InJulyof1952,thegovernment
establisheduniversalsuffragebringing80%ofthepreviouslyexcludedpopulation
intotheelectorate(Dangl21).InAugustof1953,inordertoappeasethepeasant
militias,theMNRpassedanAgrarianReformAct,which,intheory,wassupposedto
redistributeland;butbecauseofinternalfracturingwithintheMNR,thislawwas
nottrulyenforced(Dangl22).Sweepingreformhadcreatedanunstablepolitical
climate,which,astimewenton,becamehardertomanage.
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Eachoftherevolutionarysubalterngroups,whichwereorganizedby
economicsector,pressuredthegovernmenttomakereformswithintheirparticular
sector.Becausethesegroupswerelargeandmilitarized,theMNRpoliticalelites
hadtomakeconcessions.Asameanstomaintaincontrol,theMNRelitesresorted
togoverningbyclientelism.MerileeGrindlewrites,
“Whileinpower,thepartybecameskilledatrespondingtospecificneedsofspecificgroupsandatdistributingjobsandresourcestosupportersinanefforttoestablishandmaintainorder.Overtime,thisresponsebecamemoreembeddedinthedynamicsofeverydaypolitics,andeventuallysuchsupportfortheMNRreflectedresponsetotheparticularisticneedsoforganizedgroupsratherthanidentificationwithaprogramorevenaleadershipgroup”(Grindle336).Sincethestatehadcontrolovertheresourcesespeciallyrevenuefromthe
mines(whichaccountedforover95%ofallexportsand45%ofstaterevenue),
politicianscouldusefundsinordertopurchasesupport.TheMNRdividedthe
subalternpowerbytheselectiveuseofpatronage(HyltonandThomson78).
Also as ameans to consolidating their power, theMNRelites attempted to
mollifythesectoralandethnicradicalizationbycreatingaunitarynationalidentity.
The MNR elites did not politically recognize individual ethnicities, rather they
createdtheirownunitarynationalidentity:themestizo.JavierSanjinéswrites
“The1952Revolutionhademphasizedthepoweroftradeunionsandpeasantmilitias,andtheIndianhadbeentied,withgreatpoliticalzeal,tothesemovements…ThisbindingofthepeasanttothestatewasparticularlyevidentinthepeasantunionismoftheQuechuazonesaroundCochabamba,wheretheprocessofmestizajewasmuchmoreintenseandprolonged(Sanjinés14).
TheMNRelitespoliticaluseofmestizoindicatesthecontinuationofthe
Republicannation‐buildingproject;theunitaryidentitywasdesignedtoblurthe
differencesbetweeneconomicsectors,ethnicities,classes,levelsof“bloodpurity”
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and“civilizationessences”andunitethecountryaroundasingleBolivian(MNR)
identity(HyltonandThomson80).Theelitesdefinedthenewmestizocitizenas“a
consumerandproducerofmerchandise,aspeakerofSpanishandanaspiranttoa
westernidealofcivilization”(Cusicanqui177).
Inordertoestablishcontroloverthevarioussubalterngroups,whichwere
organizedwithintheeconomicsectors,MNRgovernmentsponsoredsindicatos
(workerunions)andcreatedacampesinoministry,whichco‐optedpeasantmilitias
(Postero39).Theworkerprogramsdirectlyconnectedthesubalterngroupstothe
stateandthusfostereddependency.Thepoliticaleffortsoftheeliteswerechiefly
focusedonpreventingthedissolutionofthestateandthereturntopoliticalchaos.
Duringthisperiod,theminersunionsandthepeasantmilitiashadthepowerto
directlyinfluencethepoliticalactionsoftheMNRelites.Therewasnoseparation
betweenthewhimsofthesesubalterngroupsandpoliticalcapabilityoftheMNR
elites.Duetothepoliticalforceofthesesubalterngroups,theMNRelitesdeveloped
astyleofgovernmenttomeettheirneeds.Viaclientelism,theMNRelitesmanaged
theircontrolovergovernment.
Inthisstyleofgovernment,thesubalternindividualcouldonlyparticipatein
thepoliticalsphereasacampesinoorasaworker.SincetheMNRmaintained
powerbybuildingclientelisticcoalitionswiththemainsubalterngroups,the
generalelectionsweremeaningless.TheMNRelitesonlyacknowledgedthe
associationsthatwereneededforpowerstability.Becauseofthisclientelistic
systemofpolitics,theonlyavenueofsubalternpoliticalrepresentationwasthrough
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thesindicatosandthepeasantunions.Thismodeofparticipationandcontestation
wasseverelylimited.
Theunions,suchastheCOB,thathaddirecttieswiththeMNReliteswere
hierarchicalandbureaucratic.Whiletheunionswieldedsubstantialpower,these
werenotdemocraticorganizations,butratherwereoftencontrolledbycorrupt
leaders(Postero39).Furthermore,subalternworkerswereobligatedtojointhe
unions,andassociatetheirpoliticalviewswiththeunion.Withhopesofindividual
representationlimitedtostate‐controlledassociations,thesubalternremained
politicallymarginalized.AstheMNRconsolidatedpower,themarginalizationofthe
subalternwasincreased.BenjaminDanglwrites,“Astimewenton,right‐wing
elementswithintheMNRco‐optedandweakenedthesocialmovementsthathad
broughtittopower,pushingtheradicallaborandagrariangroups—particularlythe
COB—outofthepoliticalsphere”(Dangl22).
Whilepoliticaldisenfranchisementcontinued,theMNRrevolutiondidhavea
positiveeffectonthesubalternstatus.Newlawsandpoliciesimprovedliving
conditions,andpeasantsandworkersdidgainexperienceinthepoliticalsphere.
TheCOB,whichcontrolledthestate’smostvaluableindustry,wasespecially
powerfulduringthistimeandwasthereforeabletoobtainsignificantreforms.
Bythe1960s,theMNRelitepowerfragmentedandwanedintodissolution.
ThedownfalloftheMNRresultedfromitsinabilitytomanageincreasinglyradical
sectordemands.AsitbecameobviousthattheMNRwasmoreconcernedwiththe
maintenanceofpoweroveractualreform,therevolutionaryregimebegantolose
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politicallegitimacyamongsubalternorganizationsthathadplacedthepartyin
power.This,inturn,ledtoincreasedradicalizationandpoliticalchaos.
Morethananything,theMNRcollapsedbecauseitlackedapolitical
backbone.Theunificationofthesubalternhaddissolvedafterthemainobjectiveof
theRevolutionhadbeenachieved.BecausetheMNRhadmadeitselfonewiththe
subaltern,thestatewaspulledinalldirections.Therewasnocheckonacceptable
politicalbehavior,norwasthereanagreedupondirectionorvision.Politically
dividedindividualsectorspursuedtheirownagendasoftenattheexpenseofother
subalternsectors.Theclientelisticcoalitionsystemofgovernancethatdeveloped,
asameansofmaintainingorder,establishedamaterial‐basedrelationshipbetween
thegovernmentandthesubaltern.Thepoliticalparticipationandcontestationof
thesubalternwaslimitedtobiddingforgovernmentpatronage.Forthesubaltern,
therewasnowaytochallengetheactualinstitutionvialegitimatemeans—thiswas
thecauseforthefractionalizationandultimatelyendoftheMNRgovernment.
TheCounter‐Revolution:1964‐1982
Inresponsetothepoliticalupheaval,themilitarycapitalizedonthepolitical
fragmentationoftheMNR,usurpedpowerin1964.ThemilitarycoupledbyRené
BarrientoswassupportedbytheUnitedStateandassumedaColdWaranti‐
communistideology.Afterthecoup,theBarrientosregimecouldnotrelyonthe
militaryaloneforcontrolbutneededthesupportofthesubaltern.Inorderto
securecontrol,theBarrientosregimeexploitedthesectoraldivisionscreatedbythe
MNRandbarteredanalliancewiththepeasantmilitiasandusedthissupportinits
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effortstosuppresstheminersunions,whichstoodasthemostformidable
challengestotheregime.TheMilitary‐PeasantPactformalizedanagreement,which
gavepeasantsland,education,andstate‐developmentfunds,inexchangeformilitia
support.Relationsbetweentheregimeandthepeasantswerefacilitatedby
Barriento,whospokefluentQuechuaandwouldroutinelytravelbyhelicopterto
peasantcommunitiestogiveoutsuchthingsassoccerballsandtelevisions(Hylton
andThomson84).InJuneof1967,thegovernmentandapeasantmilitiamassacred
eighty‐sevenmen,womenandchildreninaminingtown(SanJuan)outsideof
Potosí.ForrestHyltonandSinclairThomsonwrite,
“Thoughminers struck for the next twoweeks in protest, they hadsuffered a historic defeat. Their “peasant brothers”—Quechua‐Aymaras and mestizos—were against them, or at best indifferent.ThisiswhatRene’Zavaletareferredtoasthe“isolationoftheBolivianproletariat”(HyltonandThomson84).
This event and others dramatically alienated the two largest subaltern
sectors.Italsomarksasignificantdevelopmentingovernment‐subalternrelations.
TheBarrientosdictatorshipbegan theprocessof separating thegovernment from
direct subaltern influence. This was the counter‐revolution. The MNR had
established direct relations with the subaltern via economic and clientelistic
integrations. Enormoussubalternorganizationsthusheldpowerinthosesections
of the political sphere and demanded recognition in the decision‐making process
that concerned their sectors. In this sense, in theMNR period, the subaltern did
haveaccesstothepoliticalspherebutonlyinalimitedsense—withintheinfluence
oftheirparticularsector.Barrientossoughttoretakecontroloverthesectorsthat
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wereunderthesubalterninfluence.Beginningwiththeminingsector,thecounter‐
revolutionremovedthesubalternfromthepoliticalspherepiecebypiece.
In1971,BoliviangeneralHugoBanzer took controlof thegovernment. At
thispoint, statepowerwasmorewidelyconsolidatedand thus theBanzerregime
wasnolongerreliantonthesupportofpeasantmilitias.Becauseofthis,Banzerwas
able to exclude and suppress a wider range of the subaltern. Numerous protests
wereviolently suppressed. In theMassacreof theValleyof1974 inCochabamba,
the government suppressed a peasant protest and killed between 80 and 200
protestors—nottenyearsbefore,thispeasantregionhadbeenheartofsupportfor
theBarrientosregime(HyltonandThomson86).
UnderBanzer,thesubalternwasremovedfromthepoliticalsphere,butthis
did not preclude the subaltern frommaking demands to the government. Nancy
Posterowrites:
“Sindicatos obtained concessions from the government for itsconstituentsthroughmobilizations,strikes,andthethreatofpopularviolence. Thuspoliticiansandsindicatossharedpowerinanuneasytruce, an equilibrium regularly broken by violence and conflict”(Postero132).RenéZavaletacalledthispoliticalsystemof “forcednegotiations” thepoder
dual (dual power) (Postero 132).During this time, the poder dualwas a defining
featureofBolivianpoliticsthatoccurredwithacyclicalregularity:subalternworker
unions would force the government to negotiate directly, the government would
then placate with promises and concessions (or outright suppress the protest);
thesepromisewerethenignored,which,inturn,forcedmoreprotests(Postero132‐
133). Sincethesubalternworkerpopulationwassolargeandsincetheeconomy
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wassodependentuponsubaltern labor, thesubalternworkerorganizationshada
considerable amount of power. The subaltern did not have direct access in the
politicalspherebutitcouldstillimpressuponit.
Katarismo:IndigenousIdentity
The Katarismo movement was the most influential subaltern social
movement during the counter‐revolution. Katarismowas originally developed in
the mid‐1960s as a counter‐narrative to the homogenizing‐mestizo policies
mandatedbytheMNR.DevelopedbyAymaranintellectuals,the“Indian”ideology
called for therecognitionof “IndianrightswithinamulticulturalBolivia” (Postero
42). Drawingfromhistoricalresistancefigures,suchasTúpacKatariwholaidthe
1781 siegeonLaPaz,Katarismoengenderedahistoric‐ethnicnationalism. Javier
Sanjinéswrites,
“ThetwogreatachievementsofKatarismowere,first,toperceivethecontinuityofcolonialismthatmarkstheothersideofmodernity,and,second, to see that politically the Indians formed a national ethnicmajority(Sanjinés14‐15).
WhereassocialmovementsduringtheMNRperiodmadedemandsdirectlytothe
state,Katarismodemandedthecompleteoverhaulofthestate.Initsmostmilitant
forms,Katarismo sought to overthrow the government and establish autonomous
indigenousnations.
The articulation of an Indian identity, albeit one not acknowledged by the
state,helpedtomendsubalternsectordivisions.Usingancestralcommonality,the
katarista “Indian” identity unified both miners and peasants—rural and urban
dwellers. In the period between 1977 and 1984, Bolivian peasant unions, which
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previouslyhadbeenintenselymestizajeintheirself‐identification,begantojointhe
Katarismo movement (Sanjinés 15). In the late 1970s, this identification‐shift
culminatedwhentheConfederaciónSindicalÚnicadeTrabajoadoresCampesinosde
Bolivia (Unified Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Worker Unions CSUTCB), a
federation that organized and channeled peasant’s political goals, began working
withtheTupajKatariRevolutionaryMovement(MRKT)(Sanjinés15).
Katarismoprovidedaforumforthesubalternpopulationtodiscusstheissue
of indigenous identity. Thisdebateoccurredautonomously fromthegovernment,
whichhadpoliticallyexcludedthequestionofidentity.Whileconsensusamongthe
different factionsofKatarismowasneverreached, theveryprocessofholdingthe
debate had important effects. Katarismo represents the first government‐
independentattemptatanarticulationofanational identity. Rejecting thestate’s
definition of the “citizen”, the subaltern population began to define their own
conceptionofwhatitmeanstobe“Bolivian.”Katarismothusenabledthesubaltern
population to identify itself as separate from the government’s imposed political
identity.
TheNeoliberal“BigBang”
In1982,Bolivianreturnedto“democracy”.Rightswerenominallyrestored,
andthesubalternremainedexcludedfromnationalpolitics.Apartycoalitionthat
representedeliteinterestssharedpower.In1985,VictorPazEstenssoro,whohad
recentlyreturnedtopoliticsafterbeinginexile,orchestratedthePactoPorLa
Democracy(PactforDemocracy)betweenthemainparties.Theagreementcalled
20
forlegislativestabilityinordertoimplementneoliberalstructuralreadjustmentsin
ordertorecoverthefailingeconomy.Thecountryinthechaoticyearsafterthe
revolutionhadacquiredamassiveamountofinternationaldebt.This,alongwitha
collapseintheworldtinprices(Bolivia’smainexport),sentBolivian’seconomyinto
hyperinflation—in1985,inflationhadreacheditspeakof27,000%(Hyltonand
Thomson95).WithunanimouspoliticalsupportguaranteedbythePactfor
Democracy,Estenssorhadthepoliticalpowertooverhaultheeconomyandcontain
protest.
UnderpressurefromtheWorldBank,EstenssorowiththeaidofAmerican
economistJefferySachsliberalizedtheBolivianeconomy.The1985liberalreforms
oftheNewEconomicPlanwerecomprehensiveandextreme:markets,salariesand
priceswerederegulated;theBolivianowasde‐dollarized;thetraditionalagriculture
structurewasdismantled;andthetinindustrywasprivatized.Thesocialcostof
thesereformswasenormousasthelivingconditionsforworkersinboththe
agricultureandminingsectorsignificantlydeteriorated.
Theliberalizationoflaborlawsdisempoweredthesubalternworker
organizations,which,inturn,erodedthesubalternworker’scapacityto“force
negotiations”withthestate.Laborlawswererestructuredtobenefitbusiness
ownersandcurtailthebargainingpoweroftheunions.Thesechangesespecially
affectedtheminingsector.Thenewlyprivatizedmineslaid‐off20,000miners,who
werethen“relocated”bythegovernmenttoindustrialcitiesaroundthecountry
(HyltonandThomson95‐96).In1986,theEstenssorogovernmentsanctioneda
massacreofaminersprotest,theMarchinDefenseforLife.OscarOliverawrites,
21
“Todaythankstothisassault,whichcoincidedwithaworldwideminingcrash,nota
singleunionizedworkerremainsinthemines”(Olivera13).Withoutcollective
bargainingpower,theminers,whohadnottheirjobs,wereforcedtoworkin
conditionsdictatedbyownersofthemines.
Theneoliberalreformsalsoerodedthepowerofpeasantorganizations.
Sincethereformsreorientedtheeconomytomaximizeexports,thepriceof
agriculturepricesplummeted—thiscausedmanysmallpeasantfarmstocollapse.A
droughtandalivestockepidemicintheintheearly1980sexacerbatedtheeffectsof
theeconomy(Goldstein71).Thousandsofpeasantsmigratedfromthealtiplanoto
industrialcitiesortotheburgeoningcocainemarketintheChapare(Goldstein71).
Thisdispersionfragmentedthesolidarityofoncepowerfulpeasantorganizations.
ThereformsoftheNEPcompletelyrestructuredthesubalternlaborforce.
Peasantandminermigrationtoindustrialcitiesledtoamassiveinfluxinformaland
informalmanufacturingindustryjobs.In1986,therewere83,000inthe
manufacturingindustry;by1991,thisnumberhadincreasedto150,000and
reached231,000in1995and390,000by1997(Olivera107).Whiletheindustrial
manufacturingsectorexpanded,unemploymentremainedhigh.By1991,morethan
45,000minersandstateadministratorsand35,000factoryworkers(duetofactory
shut‐downs)hadlosttheirjobs(HyltonandThomson95‐96).From1989to1996,
thenumberofworkersinpermanentjobsdeclinedfrom71%to29%(Olivera107).
Reflectiveofthelackofformalemploymentopportunities,in1991approximately
60%oftheurbanpopulationsubsidedoff““informal”activities,andofthose
families,halfwereunabletomeetbasicfoodcosts”(HyltonandThomson96).
22
Desperateconditionscombinedwithliberalizedregulationsfragmentedthe
subalternworkforceandhinderedtheformationofasignificantsocialmovement.
Intheurbanindustrialsector,theunstableneoliberalmarketprecludedsubaltern
workerorganizations.Thenewlaborlawsgaveemployers“flexible”useofthe
workforce.Subalternworkerswerestrippedoftheirrightstobasicjobsecurity,
adequateworkingconditions,andafairsalary(Olivera107).OscarOliverawrites:
“Thegrowingfragmentationofconditionsinwhichproductionactivitiestake
place,andtheuncertaintyandinsecurityofemployment,makeseachmembera
“traveling”worker,bouncingamongthesmallfactory,commercialworkplace,
agriculturelabor,andbacktotheshopfloor”(Olivera107).
Temporarycontractuallaborandthethreatofjobterminationpreventedthe
formationofworkerorganizations.Also,thiseconomicinsecuritycreatedadivided
andcompetitiveworkeratmosphere,whichfurtherinhibitedworkercollaboration
(Olivera107).
The1985NEPandthesubsequentatomizationofthesubalternworker
completelyunderminedthePoderDualthathaddefinedBolivianpoliticsfrom1952
to1985.Bydismantlingthecountry’slargestunionsandfragmentingthesocial
relationsofthesubalternworker,thegovernmentendedthecycleof“forced
negotiations”andthereforeseparateditselffromthelastvestigesofsubaltern
control.Inapoliticalsystemdominatedbyclientelismandcorporatism,this
developmentrenderedthesubalternpoliticallypowerless.
Withoutpoliticalpower,thevoiceless,amorphoussubalternpopulationhad
nopoliticalidentitywithinthecontextofthestate.WhileKatarismoprovidedan
23
identityoutsideofthestate,itwasunabletosecureapoliticalidentityforitself
insidethestate.Theethnic‐basedclaimsofKatarismowerenotconsidered
politicallyviablesincethegovernmentrefusedtheethnicdebateentirelyandonly
acknowledgedthemestizajeasthenationalethnicity.Furthermore,because
Katarismowasneverabletoarticulateandconsolidateaunifiedmovementcapable
offorcingnegotiations,itnevergainedalegitimatepoliticalidentity.
Bydissolvingworkerorganizations,thegovernmentdelegitimizedthe
politicalidentity‐constructofthe“peasant”andthe“sindicalista.”Intheyears
between1952to1985,workerorganizationsgainedpoliticalviabilityalbeit
indirectlythroughforcingnegotiations.Onlybycompletelyidentifyingoneselfwith
thepoliticsoftheworkerunioncouldasubalternindividualobtainalimited
politicalvisibilityinthepublicsphere.Duringthecounter‐revolution,subaltern
politicalidentitydependedupontheunion’sabilitytoforcenegotiationsandthe
government’stoleranceoftheunion.Therefore,after1985,thedisbandingofthe
workerorganizationsdissolvedthepoliticalidentityofthesubalternworkersince
thegovernmentwasnolongerforcedtoacknowledgetheorganizations.Inthe
midstofhorrendouslivingconditions,thesubalternwasagainpoliticallyinvisible.
MulticulturalDecentralization
Intheearly1990s,theBolivianeconomy,despitethepromisesofthe1985
reforms,wasstillinastateofdisarray.Characterizedascorruptandoverly
centralized,theBoliviangovernmenthadmadelittleprogresswithits
modernizationplan.In1993,GonzaloSánchezdeLozada,whohadbeenthechief
architectoftheNEPunderEstensorro,waselectedpresidenthavingrunonaquasi‐
24
populistplatformpromisingsocialandeconomicreform;Lozada’svice‐president
selection,VíctorHugoCárdenas,aformerKataristaleaderandintellectual,helped
legitimizehispledgesamongindigenouspopulations(HyltonandThomson99)
Onceinpower,theLozadaadministrationshedthe“mestizaje”ethnicpolicyand
declaredBoliviatobe“multicultural”—meaningthegovernmentwouldformally
recognizeethnicdifferences.Althoughthispolicychangeappearedtobeasignof
socialprogress,Lozadausedthesemblanceofpopulistreformtocontinuethe
implementationofneoliberaleconomicreforms(HyltonandThomson).
Politicallyframedasacommunityempowermentproject,theLawofPopular
Participation(LPP),promulgatedin1994,decentralizedthedistributionofstate
revenue.Inordertocircumventthecorruptandinefficientcentralgovernment,
undertheLPP,thegovernmentchanneleddevelopmentfundstoinstituted
communitydevelopmentorganizations,OrganizacionesTerritorialesdeBase
(OTBs).Theseorganizations,whichwererunbycommunity‐electedleaders,were
givencontrolovertheappropriationofstate‐grantedfunds.Intheory,theOTBs
wouldallowthegovernmenttomoredynamicallyrespondtolocalproblemsby
utilizingcommunityparticipationandinitiative(Postero131).
WhiletheOTBsallowedthesubalterngroupstoparticipateingovernment,
theirparticipationremainedregulatedbythecentralgovernment.DanielGoldstein
writes,“ParticipaciónPopularenabledthenationstatetoidentifyandregulatelocal
basecommunitiesbydeterminingtheforumsuchcommunitiesmusttakeandthe
meansbywhichtheymustoperate”(Goldstein80).Byimposingastate‐controlled
politicalstructureatthelocallevel,thegovernmentunderminedthelegitimacyof
25
preexistingformsofcommunityorganization,suchasneighborhoodassociationsor
peasantunions;andthusextendedpoliticalhegemonyoveraportionofthe
populationthathadpreviouslyresidedoutsidedirectgovernmentcontrol(Hylton
andThomson99).
Havingalreadyerasedallformsofthesubaltern’spoliticalidentity(by
dismantlingtheworkers’organizations),thegovernment,throughmulticulturalism
andtheLPP,attemptedtoimposeanewidentityuponthesubalternpopulation.In
thedecentralizedpoliticalsystem,thepoliticalparticipationofthesubaltern
populationwaslimitedtoregulated,communityactivism.PurposelytheOTBsdid
notprovideaforumtocontestorparticipateinnationaldecision‐making;ratherthe
spanofpoliticalcontestationwasdelimitedtolocaldecision‐makingregarding
developmentprojects(Postero132).Sincethegovernmentonlyacknowledged
subalternswhoparticipatedintheOTBs,subalternpoliticalidentitywasconfinedto
thestate’sdefinitionofacceptablesubalterncontestation.
In spite of the narrow scope of contestation in the OTBs, the subaltern
communities did gain valuable skills in the practice of government. Through the
processofcoordinatingdevelopmentprojects(suchasdiggingawell),communities
strengthened organizational structures (Postero 218). Also, in the participation
process communities developed their sense of political rights. Nancy Postero
writes:
“Bylearning“techniquesoftheself”—suchpersonalskillsasrationalparticipation,effectivemoneymanagement,and,mostimportant,“responsibilization”–IndianleaderspreparedfortheexerciseofcitizenshipinmulticulturalBolivia”(Postero218).
26
Thus,theOTBsgavesubalternmembersfirst‐handexperienceinan
extremelylimitedportionofthepoliticalsphere.Theseskillswouldlaterbeapplied
inthearticulationofnewformsofsocialmovements.
Onthemacro‐level,thelimitedparticipationofferedbytheLPPprovideda
politicaldistractionasthegovernmentcontinuedtoliberalizetheeconomy(Hylton
andThomson99).Between1995and1997,theoilandgas,telecommunications,
airline,electricity,andrailroadcompanieswereprivatized(HyltonandThomson
99)(Postero131).Decentralizationwasforemostamodeofpoliticalcontrol;using
politicaldistractionandinstituted,regionalfragmentation(decentralization),the
governmentwasabletocontinueimplementingtop‐downeconomicreform.
AsanunintendedconsequenceoftheLPP,thedecentralizationofstatefunds
transferredthecorruptionthathadplaguedthecentralgovernmenttothe
municipallevel.Overtime,politicalpartiesandNGOsestablisheddominanceover
theOTBs,andsubsequentlytheseorganizationsbecamethenucleiofclientelism
andcorporatism(Postero218).Again,evenatalocalgovernmentlevel,the
subalterncommunitieswerecontrolledanddeniedlegitimateparticipationand
contestation.Becauseoframpantcorruption,theOTBslostmuchoftheirlegitimacy
amongcommunities.Disenfranchisedsubalterncommunitiesthusbeganexploring
othermodesofobtainingpoliticalpower.
LeadingUptotheWaterWar:TheHistoryofCochabamba
Foundedin1571,Cochabamba,oncereferredtoasthe“silo”ofBolivia,wasa
mostlyrural,grain‐producingdepartment.Upuntilthe1950s,rural,Quechua
27
peasantsconstitutedthemajorityoftheDepartment1ofCochabamaba’sdenizens.
ThelatifundiossystemdominatedagricultureintheCochabambavalleyuntilthe
endofthe19thcentury,when,duetochangingtrendsineliteinterests2,piqueros,
peasantsmallholders,wereabletopurchasesmallplotsofland(Goldstein57).In
the1940s,frustratedbyinequitablelanddistributionandthemonopolythat
latifundioscontinuedtoholdovertheagriculturemarket,piquerocommunities
formedmilitiasandforcefullyclaimedlatifundioland.Later,thesemilitiasplayeda
seminalroleintheRevolutionof1952.
Beginningwithamigrationwaveinthe1950s,thedemographicof
Cochabambaunderwentamajortransformation.VeteransfromtheChacoWarof
the1930sandAymaranpeasantsfromthealtiplano,uprootedbydrought,migrated
tothecityofCochabambainsearchofopportunitiesinthe“thrivinginformal
economycenteredonsmallscale‐scalecommercialopportunitiesintheCancha3,
artisanalandindustrialwork”(Goldstein72).Inthe1980s,asaresultofthe
neoliberalreforms,Cochabambaexperiencedasecondwaveofurbaninflux.
Cochabambareceivedanumberof“relocated”minersfromPotosíandOruro,and
Aymaranpeasantsfromthealtiplano,whohadmigratedbecauseoffalling
agricultureprices,drought,andalivestockepidemic(Goldstein71).
MigrationcontributedtotherapidurbanizationofthecityofCochabamba.
From1950to1976,Cochabamba’spopulationincreasedfrom80,000to204,000
1ThereisaDepartmentofCochabamba(thestate)andacityofCochabamba(thecapital).2Duringthistime,economicelitesreorientedtheirintereststowardurbancommerce,industryandtrade.3TheCanchaisamassiveindigenousmarketplacethatoperatesasaclearinghouseforthedepartment’sagricultural,industrialandartisanproducts.
28
(Goldstein62).By1992,Cochabamba’spopulationhadreached408,000thousand,
andforthefirsttimethepercentageofurbandwellersoutnumberedthepercentage
ofruraldwellersinthedepartment—from1950to1992,thepercentageorurban
dwellershadincreasedfrom24%to52%(Goldstein71).BythetimeoftheWater
Warin1999,theurbanpopulationhadgrownto500,000(Dangl58).
Theurbaninfluxfarexceededthecity’sabsorptioncapacity,andthisledto
thedevelopmentoflargesquattersettlements(marginalbarrios)ontheperiphery
ofthecity.Withalackofaffordablehousingwithinthecityproper,migrantsseized
andoccupiedlandillegally(Goldstein29).Thesesettlementsexistedwithoutaccess
togovernmentservices—transportationinfrastructure,electricity,policy,wateror
sewage.Insteadofattemptingtodeveloptheperi‐urbanareasandestablish
control,inthemid‐1970s,themunicipalgovernmentdeclaredthesettlements
illegalandofficiallybeganapolicyofexclusion—inotherwords,theperi‐urban
settlementsweremadeinvisibleandthuscompletelyignored(Goldstein79).The
policydeclaredthelargest,mostimpoverishedsettlementsintheSouthtobe
“congelado”(frozen),essentially,amandateddenialofbasiccivilrights(Goldstein
79).In1993,80%oftheperi‐urbanbarrioswereconsideredillegal,constituting
40%ofthecity’stotalpopulation(Goldstein79).Withamandatedillegalstatus,the
governmentcompletelydeniedtheperi‐urbansquattersapoliticalidentity.Butas
DanielGoldsteinwrites,“Theunintendedconsequenceofexcludingthese
neighborhoodsfrommembershipinthecityhadbeentopreventthestatefrom
penetratingandcontrollingtheexcludedbarrios”(Goldstein79).Toaddressthis
issue,in1993,themunicipalgovernmentadoptedapolicyof“inclusion.”
29
InasimilarimplementationofSánchezdeLozada’spolicyofmulticultural
decentralization,ManfredReyesVilla,themayorofCochabamba,decentralizedthe
distributionofdevelopmentfunds.Villa’snewprogramof“inclusion”was
politicallycastassociallyprogressive.UndertheguidanceofVilla’stechnocrats,the
governmentestablishedTalleresZonalesinsixofthemarginalbarriosdeemedmost
inneed.ComparabletotheOTBs,theTalleresZonaleswerelocalgovernment
bodies,whichprovidedtechnicalandadministrativeassistancetocommunity
developmentprojects(Goldstein87).
JustastheOTBsweredesignedtoestablishgovernmentlegibilityinethnic
communities,theprimaryfunctionoftheTalleresZonaleswastolegalizethe
squattersettlementsandestablishcontrol.Inordertoreceivedevelopment
assistance,eachbarriofirsthadtobecomelegal.Theprocesswasabureaucratic
andlegalmaze,whichinvolvedfilingpaperworkandhiringanarchitectto
standardizeindividuallots(Goldstein87).Throughthebureaucraticprocessthe
squatterwastransformedintoataxpaying“citizen”intheeyesofthegovernment.
ThedevelopmentambitionsotheTalleresZonalesfellshortduetoalackof
elitemunicipalsupport(Goldstein83).Forthemostpart,themarginalbarrios
remainedwithoutgovernmentservices—evenwiththenewlegal“citizen”status,
peri‐urbandwellersremainedwithoutapoliticalidentity.Theonlysignificant
changeintheirrelationwiththegovernmentwasthattheperi‐urban“citizens”had
topaytaxes,includingforthe“congelado”period(Goldstein87).Retainingtheir
subalternstatus,theperi‐urban“citizen”,asdefinedbythegovernment,was
actuallya“voicelesstaxpayer.”
30
PartII:TheWaterWar
ThePoliticsofWater:TheHistoryofSEMAPA
Inmanyways,thehistoryofSEMAPA(ServicioMunicipaldeAguaPotable
Alcantarilldo),Cochabamba’smunicipalwaterservice,encapsulatestheoverarching
themescharacterizingBolivianpolitics.Inthemid‐1960s,themunicipal
government,facedwitharapidlygrowingpopulation,beganlookingforforeign
assistancetoimproveitswaterservice.In1967,theInter‐AmericanBankgranteda
fourteenmilliondollarloanthatstipulatedmunicipalownership—thecontract
situatedthemayorastheheadoftheexecutiveboard(Shultz11).Fromits
inception,SEMAPAandtherevenueitgeneratedwasusedasamunicipalslushfund
supportingavastclientelisticnetwork.Thecompanyquicklybecamemiredin
corruptionandwasconsistentlyunabletomeetthedemandsofCochabamba’s
populationgrowth.
ThemanagementofSEMAPAreflectedtheoverallinequitiesof
Cochabamba’spoliticallandscape;servicefavoredthewealthysectionsofthecity
andwasnearlynon‐existentintheimpoverishedneighborhoodsoftheSouth
(Shultz12).In1999,priortothewaterwar,only57%ofthepopulationhadwater
connectionsand48%hadsewage(Shultz14).A1997investigationfoundthat
whilethenorthernmorewealthypartofthecityhadcloseto90%coverage,inthe
South,lessthanhalfofthebarrioshadconnectionswithSEMAPA(Shultz12).
Withoutwaterservice,thesecommunitieshadtoprovideforthemselves.
31
ThosewhowerenotconnectedtoSEMAPAeitherobtainedwaterfromwater
tankersorcommunitymanagedwells.Sincethetankerserviceswereprivately
ownedandunregulated,thequalityofthewaterwasoftenlessthanadequate.
SometankercompaniesdrewtheirwaterfromtheRioRocha,ahighlypollutedriver
thatbisectsthecity,andminimallytreatedit,beforedeliveringittothebarrios
(InterviewASICASUR).
Manybarriosorganizedwatercommitteestodigwellsandlaypiping
infrastructure.Inthelate1990s,therewerearound5,000to7,000independent
wellsdugandmanagedprimarilybyneighborhoodwatercommittees(Shultz14).
Inthesecommunities,accesstothewellwateriscontingentuponactive
participation—fund‐raising,4laborcontributionfortheconstruction5andconstant
management.Inordertofacilitatetheprocess,mostcommunitieshaveformed
watercommittees,whicharelocallygoverned,autonomous,democratic
neighborhoodassociations.Thewatercommitteesremaindemocraticandfree
fromco‐optationorclientelismbecauseoftheirsmall‐scale:everymemberofthe
communitydirectlyparticipatesinthemanagementofwater(InterviewASICASUR).
InSacaba,abarriointheSouthofCochabamba,Ivisited,alocallymanagedwell,
whichprovidedapproximately200familieswithtwenty‐fourhourservice
(InterviewMario).Basedonmyinterviewsandresearch,Iestimatethatmostwater
committeesmanagewaterforabout100‐600families.Furthermore,these
4FundsareraisedeitherfromwithinthecommunityorbyobtainingoutsidefinancialsupportfromNGOsorthegovernment.5Inmostcases,NGOsorthemunicipalgovernmentprovidethetechnicalsupportwhilethecommunitycontributesthelabor.
32
committeesprovidethemselveswiththeirownmaintenancefunds—waterrather
thanprofitistheintendedgoalofthewatercommittees.
WaroftheWells:PracticefortheWaterWar
Inthe1990s,thelargeaquiferbeneathCochabambaandthesurrounding
areabecameapoliticized,highlycontestedresource.Politicalproblemsregarding
theappropriationofwaterbeganinthe1970s;duetoclimatechangeanda
mushroomingurbanpopulation,CochabambawasnolongerabletorelyonAndean
run‐offtomeetitswaterneeds(Shultz13).Inresponsetoanacutewatershortage,
thegovernmentdrilledten120‐meterwellsintheVintoDistrictofQuillacollo
Province(aboutfifteenmilesoutsideCochabambaproper).Communitymembers
protestedtheprojectoutofafearthatthedeepwellswoulddry‐uptheirportionof
theaquiferwhichtheyreliedonforirrigation.Despitethegovernment’spromises,
thesefearscametofruition.
WhentheCochabambasufferedanotheracutewatershortagein1994and
thegovernmentproposeddrillinginadistrictclosetoVintoasasolution,
communitymembersrecalledthelessonsfromthemid‐1970s.Atthetime,70%of
theagriculturalareassurroundingCochabambawerepermanentlyirrigatedwith
muchofthewatersupplyrelyingontheaquifer(Shultz14).Muchlikethemembers
oftheperi‐urbanwatercommittees,farmers,managedtheirirrigationsystems
collectivelyinirrigators’organizations.Thesetight‐knitfederations,basedon
traditionalegalitarianvalues,hadastrongmobilizationcapacity(Interview
FEDECOR).Whenthegovernmentproposeddrilling,theirrigators’organizations
politicizedandrecastthemselvesasdefensecommittees.Inspiteoforganizinga
33
10,000personmarchinAprilof1995,thedrillingwentaheadasplanned—butwas
movedtomilitarylandandconstructedunderpoliceprotection(Assies20).
Again,in1997‐1998,thegovernmentproposeddrillinginresponsetoyet
anotheracutewatershortage.Andagain,despiteprotests,thedrillingbeganon
armyland;however,bymid‐1998,communityprotestorsforcedtheengineersoff
thelandanddrillingstopped(Assies20).Reflectingthegovernment’surbanbias,
municipalandnationalleaderslabeledtheirrigators“criminals”(Assies20).
Regardlessoftheirrigators’smallvictory,tensionscontinued.
Inresponsetocontinualgovernmentthreat,thedefensecommitteesfrom
variousruralcommunitiesconsolidatedthemselvesandformedFEDECOR6
(FederaciónDepartamentalCochabambinadeOrganizacionesdeRegantes).The
organizationalstructureofFEDECORwasdistinctfromtheestablishedhierarchical
trade‐unionstructureinthatitoperatedasapoliticalforumforthevarious
irrigators’organizationstodiscusstheissuewater,strategizeandcoordinate
mobilizationsonanevenplane.FEDECORalsofacilitatedtheeducationofits
members,“ThroughmeetingsandworkshopsthelocalbasesofFEDECORbecame
familiarwiththedebateoverwaterlegislation”(Assies21).
BecauseFEDECORwashorizontallystructured,theissuesunder
considerationhadtobeclearlyarticulatedinordertomaintainthecohesivesupport
ofthevariousirrigators’organizations.Beforebeingabletoengageintheprocess
ofdebateandconsensusbuilding,membersfirsthadtounderstandtheissue—this
requirededucation.Onceeducated,memberscollectivelydeterminedthebestplan
6CochabambaDepartmentFederationofIrrigators’Organizations
34
ofaction.Thus,member‐activistswereunifiednotoutofobligationbutratherbya
commonunderstandingoftheissue(FEDECORinterview).Inthedevelopmentof
civilsociety,thispointiscrucial.
AlsoinresponsetotheWaroftheWells,theCochabambachapterofthe
SocietyofBolivianEngineers(SIB)becamepoliticallyinvolvedinthewaterissue.
Initially,thisgroupstaunchlysupportedthegovernment’spolicyofdrilling,butas
factsmountedtheSIBchangeditsposition(Assies21).Overtime,itbecameclear
thatthecostly,corruptdrillingprocess,whichhadbothnegativesocialand
environmentaleffects,wasnotthismostproductivesolutiontothewatershortages.
TheSIBjoinedFEDECORandwithitstechnicalexpertisehelpedprovidealternative
solutionstodrilling(Assies21).Atthetime,theSIBwasoneoftheonlyurban
organizationstosupporttheruralcause,FEDECORandthecalltoenddrilling
(Assies21).TheSIB,aprofessionalorganization,wasalsooneofthefirstnon‐
subalternorganizationstojointhewaterdebate.
ThePrivatizationofWater
ThemannerinwhichwaterwasprivatizedinCochabambaeffectively
alienatedandangeredasubstantiallywidespectrumofthepopulation.In1999,the
Boliviangovernment,havingincurredmassiveamountsofdebtduringthe
neoliberalreformation,wenttotheWorldBankseekingrelief(Dangl59).Usinga
$600milliondollardebt‐reliefpackageasleverage,theWorldBankforcedthe
Boliviangovernmenttoundergoyetanotherroundofstructuraladjustments,
35
includingtheprivatizationofSEMAPA.7Inasupposedlyfreeandopenauctionfor
theCochabambawatercontract,theWorldBank,dubiouslyonlyreceivedonebid—
fromtheAmerican‐basedBechtel,theworld’slargestconstructioncompanywith
annualearningsthatnearlytripletheGDPofBolivia(Dangl61).TheBolivian
governmentandAguasdeTunari(thesubsidiarycorporationownedbyBechtel)
negotiatedthetermsofthecontractinsecrecyandbehindcloseddoors(Olivera8‐
9).
Thefairlyone‐sidedstipulationsofthecontractdemonstrateaclear
transgressionoftraditionalconceptionsofsovereignty.Theforty‐yearcontract
guaranteeda16%annualrateofreturnregardlessofitsperformance,and
determinedpriceincreasesbasedontheU.S.consumerpriceindex(Olivera10).
Furthermore,“Therewasaclauseinthecontractstatingthatthecontractitself
supersededanyothercontract,lawordecree”(Olivera10).Essentially,thecontract
privilegedBechtel’sinterestsoverwellbeingoftheBolivianpeople.Theentire
processwasundemocratic;and,finalizingthis,thesuperintendentofenergy,who
wasnominatedbyCongressforaten‐yearterm,“promulgated”thecontractof
behalfoftheBoliviangovernment(Olivera10).
InordertoprovideacomprehensivelegalframeworkfortheTunaricontract,
themunicipalgovernment,beforethecontractcameintoeffect,passedWaterLaw
2029,whicheffectivelyprivatizedallwaterinCochabamba.Thelaweliminatedthe
irrigators’righttopracticetraditionalwaterusosycostumbres—thecommunal
irrigationsystems—andendedtheguaranteeofwaterdistributioninruralareas7“In2002,inaninternalreport,thebank’sownauditorsconfirmeditwas,infact,coercionthatsettheCochabambaprivatizationinmotion”(Shultz15).
36
(InterviewFEDECOR).Inbothruralandurbanregions,thewellsandpiping,that
hadbeenconstructedandmaintainedbythecommunities,becamepropertyof
Bechtelwithoutreimbursement.Law2029evenwentsofarastoprivatize
rainwateroutlawingtheconstructionanduseofrain‐collectiontanks.Withno
regardtothe‘politicallyinvisible’,governmentelites,criminalizedtraditional
conceptionsofwaterandsacrificedthecountry’ssovereigntyinordertofacilitate,
essentially,corporateAmericanprofiteering—tosaytheleast,thisinfuriatedmany
Cochabambans.
TheDynamicsofSocialMovementLanguage
TheCochabambaWaterWarbeganinNovemberof1999immediatelythe
contractwaspromulgatedontheruralcountrysidewhereorganizations,having
gainedexperienceduringtheWaroftheWells,werewellpreparedtochallengethe
privatizationofwater.Irrigators’organizationsactingautonomouslyandalsooften
incollaborationwithFEDECORorchestratedtheconstructionofroadblocksonthe
majorhighwaysleadinginandoutofthecity(Shultz2008,16).Thetight‐knit
organizationalstructureoftheirrigators’organizationsallowedforahighly
effective,andstrategicimmobilizationofthecity.Inspiteoftheconstant
dismantlingoftheroadblocksbythepolice,whousedrubberbulletsandteargasto
dispersetheirrigators,theorganizationswereabletostophighwaytravelfor
extendedperiodsoftime(Dangl62).
Havinganestablishedbaseofknowledgeregardingwater,theirrigators’
werewellawareofthefutureimplicationsoftheprivatization.Whereastheurban
37
populationwaslargelyinexperiencedinregardstowaterpolitics,therural
irrigatorshaddeepculturalties,whichtheyfeltinclinedtofightindefenseof.For
hundredsofyears,irrigatorshadmanagedtheirwatercommunallywithtraditional
usosycostumbres.However,ownershipforthissystemwasnotconsidered
communal;rather,traditionalirrigatororganizationsconceiveofwaterasbelonging
toPachamama(MotherEarth).InthefiveinterviewswithirrigatorsthatI
conducted,withoutfail,everyone,whenspeakingabouttheWaterWar,first
mentionedPachamama.Theprivatizationofwaterunderminedthelegitimacyof
theirtraditionandoverallworld‐view.
Inadditiontothesocialeffect,privatizationthreatenedtheirrigators’
economicsecurity.Priortoreceivingthemonthlybill,thepresidentofFEDECOR
predictedwiththeanticipatedratehikesthatbetween15,000and20,000farmers
wouldbeputoutofbusiness(Assies22).Furthermore,thecontractdramatically
reducedtheamountofirrigationwaterguaranteedtotheruralareas(Assies22).
Clearly,WaterLaw2029andtheTunaricontractjeopardizedtheirrigators’
livelihoods;butitisnotpossibletodelineatebetweensocialoreconomic
infringementsassignifyingtheimpetusforprotest.PoliticalanthropologistArturo
Escobarwrites:
“Socialmovementsmustbeseenequallyandinseparablyasstrugglesovermeaningsaswellasmaterialconditions,thisis,asculturalstruggles.Areeconomiesnotculturalformsanyway?Dotheynotentailprofoundculturalchoices,astheanthropologyofmodernitydemonstrates?CertainlyHomooeconomicusisnotaculturallyneutralsubject.“Materialneeds”and“technologies”arepermeatedbyculturalcontents.Everynewtechnologyinauguratesaritual—awayofdoingthings,ofseeingtheworld,andoforganizingthesocialfield.Howthen,couldwebrushasidetheconsiderationoftheculturalcontentof“economies”?”(Escobar69).
38
Boththe“irrigationtechnologies”oftheirrigatorsthatphysicallytransect
thevariousplotsandprovidewaterforassociationoffarmersandthe
spiritual/communalconceptionofwaterascommunalcreateacultureofwater.In
otherwords,thesocialwatertraditionofPachamamaaswellastheeconomic
livelihoodofthefarmerreflexivelyreinforcetheothertothepointwherethey
cannotbeseparated.
Therefore,thelanguagedevelopedintheWaterWarprotestwasfullof
loadedterms.Thewordsusedinprotest,suchasPachamama,usosycostumbres,
neoliberalism,Americanimperialism,lossofsovereignty,injustice,all
simultaneouslycarriedeconomic,social,historical,politicalandthuscultural
connotations.Forexample,irrigatorsconstruedtheculturalideaPachamamaasthe
ultimatejustificationforthecommunaltraditionofwaterpractice,andtherefore,
alsoastheultimatedefenseagainsttheeconomicandpoliticalinjusticesurrounding
theconditionsofprivatization(InterviewFEDECOR).InthecontextoftheWater
War,theculturalsignificanceofPachamamaisconcurrentlypro‐Boliviantradition,
anti‐Americanimperialism,aswellas,anti‐government‐sponsoredinjustice.
Inasense,thelanguageoftheWaterWarestablishedamoredefinedformof
irrigatorculturebydemarcatingboundariesbetween“irrigatorculture”and
unacceptablyinvasive“Otherculture.”Thedevelopmentofsocialmovement
languagethereforereflectstheprocessofdiscoveringandarticulatingone’sown
culture.ToreferagaintoArturoEscobar,
39
“Cultureisnotsomethingthatexistsintheabstract;itisembeddedinpractices,intheeverydaylifeofpeople.Cultureis(madeof)people’spractices.Encounterswithotherswhoaredifferentfromusintensifytheawarenessofourowncultureandmakeusrealizehowwethinkandfeelinsomewaysratherthanothers,thatis,thatwehave“aculture””(Escobar70).
Ontheindividuallevel,cultureisexpressedasidentity.Beforeprivatization,
intheeyesofthegovernmenttheirrigatorswerepoliticallyinvisible,butthisdid
notnecessarilyaffecttheculturalidentityoftheirrigatorsbecausetheywerestill
abletoengageinthedailypracticeoftheirculture.Conversely,sincetheirrigators’
weredeniedtheright“topractice”governmentasapartoftheirdailylives,they
derivedlittleidentityfromtheBoliviangovernmentinthepoliticalsphere—thatis
tosay,sincetheirrigatorswereexcludedfromthepoliticalsphere,theircultural
spheredeveloped,persisted,andexistedindependently.But,sinceprivatization
directlyaffectedthedailypracticeoftheirrigators’culturalidentity,this,inturn,
createdanidentity‐basedconflict.
Inordertocounterthethreattoidentity/culture/livelihood,theirrigators
firsthadtoarticulateaconceptionofthe“collectiveself”.AccordingtoArturo
Escobar,beforetheunifyingmovement,theidentityofindividualsandcommunities
arecharacterizedbyamultiplicityofmeanings,calledthe“pluralityoforientations”
(Escobar78).Escobarwrites:
“Theconstructionofcollectiveidentities“hastwoaspects:theinternalcomplexityoftheactor(thepluralityoforientationsthatcharacterizeshim),andtheactor’srelationshipwiththeenvironment(otheractors,opportunitiesandconstraints)”…Becausealloftheseaspectsareladenwithmeaning,actorsareleftwiththeonlypossibilityofbuildingcollectiveidentitiesthroughthearticulationofmeaning”(Escobar78).
40
Theunity,whichbindsthemembersofamovement,doesnotemerge
passively,butratheritmustbeactivelycreated.Beforethemovement,themeaning
ofwords,suchaswater,variedbetweenindividualsandcommunities,anditexisted
inthepassiveculturalsphere.Meaningintheculturalsphereispassivesince
cultureis,aswasmentioned,peoples’everydaypractices—andthereforecultureis
notexperiencedas“culture”ratheras“everydaylife.”Withinthecontextofone’s
ownculturalenvironment,peoplearenottypicallyabletoseparatethemselvesfrom
their“dailyculture.”Cultureissimplylived—itisnotactivelyexpressedassuch
(undernormalcircumstances).Forexample,intheculturalsphere,words,suchas
water,areamorphousintheirmeaning.Culturaltraditionsandthepluralityof
meaningsofwords,whichvaryfromindividualtoindividual,arepassivelyaccepted
as“dailylife.”
When“dailyculture”isthreatened,meaningmovesfromthepassivecultural
spheretotheactivepoliticalsphere.Immediately,outofaculturalconfrontation,
onedevelopsaself‐awarenessofone’sowndailylife.Whathadbeenpassivelylived
becomesactivelydefined.Thisprocessisprincipallyenactedthroughthecreation
ofalanguageofcollectivemeanings.The“dailylife,”thatwasoncecharacterized
byapluralityofamorphousmeanings,iscodifiedinapoliticizedlanguage.The
meaningofeachwordisdistilledtoitsculturalcommondenominator—thisgives
thewordsaunifyingpower.
Whilethespecificculturaltraditionsofeachcommunityvaried,theirrigators
collectivelydistilledandcreatedapoliticalvocabularywithwords,suchas
Pachamama,usosycostumbres,etcetera.Everypoliticizedwordofasocial
41
movementimplicitlyexpressesacollectivesentiment:toresistandovercomethe
threat.Asthemovementprogresses,meaningbecomesincreasinglymorepolitical.
Inotherwords,eachwordbecomesmoreexpressiveofitsimplied/intendedend.In
ordertomakedemands,onehastobeabletocommunicateabasisforthedemands.
Thewordsthemselvesarethusremovedfromtheirculturalcontextandfully
submittedtothepoliticalsphere.
Theprotestlanguagedevelopedbytheirrigatorshelpedbridgethedivide
betweentheruralandurbansectorsofCochabambansociety(Dangl62).Urban
protestersadoptedthecultural‐basedlanguage,whichwasmoredevelopedinthe
ruralareas.BeforetheWaterWar,theuseofculturallanguage,suchasPachamama,
wasnotaspredominantintheurbanpopulation’sconceptionofwater;asthe
movementgainedmomentum,however,theurbanprotestorsassumedamore
cultural,“Bolivian”identity.
ConnectingtheDots:ForminganAssociationofAssociations
InadditiontoFEDECOR,otherorganizationshadbecomeinvolvedinthe
issueofprivatization.PuebloenMarchwasoneofthefirsturbangroupstoprotest
theprivatization.Theorganizationconsistedofenvironmentalists,architects,
economists,andsomeelectedofficials,who,priortotheWaterWar,hadprotested
relevantissuesinthecity’smainplazaeveryTuesday(Olivera27).Asnewsofthe
eminentprivatizationemerged,PuebloenMarchaacquainteditselfwiththeissue
andbeganprotestingeveryTuesdayintheplaza(InterviewFEDECOR).
42
InJulyof1999,inreactiontothegovernment’sproposedplanstoprivatize
SEMAPA,agroupofengineersformedtheCommitteefortheDefenseofWaterand
thePopularEconomy(DefenseCommittee)8.Thecommitteeorganizedurban
protestsagainsttheirpredictionsofratehikes.BeforeNovember,theextentof
urbanprotests,however,waslocalizedtoprofessionalgroups.
Adifferentorganization,theCivicCommittee,attemptedtodiscreditthe
accuracyoftheDefenseCommitteepredictions(Assies22).Formedinthe1970s,
theCivicCommitteewasoriginallybroad‐basedwitharangeoforganizationsand
expressedregionaldemandsagainstthecountry’scorruptionauthoritarianregime;
overtime,however,theorganizationhadcomeunderthecontroloflocalbusiness
elitesandhadthuslostmuchofitspopularlegitimacy(Assies22).Inordertogive
theprivatizationthepoliticalappearanceofhavingpopularsupport,ManfredReyes
VillapublicallylegitimizedWaterLaw2029andtheTunariContractbyutilizingthe
supportoftheCivicCommittee,whichgavetheprivatizationthepolitical
appearanceofhavingpopularsupport.Intheplanningphasesoftheprivatization
ofSEMAPA,VillaReyesexcludedtheCDWPEandincludedtheCivicCommitteeas
the“representative”ofthepeoples’interests(Assies22).
IncontrasttotheCivicCommittee,theFabrileswasanurbanorganization,
whichbecameasubstantialactorintheWaterWarthatactuallyrepresenteda
broadportionofthepopulation.Inthe1990s,Fabrilesemergedinresponsetothe
NEP‐instigatedtrade‐unioncrisis:
“TheFDTFChasmaintainedapresenceinthelocalmediatoinformthepopulationaboutlaborconditionsandsoughttoorganizeunions
8ManymembersofPuebloenMarchaalsoparticipatedintheCDWPE.
43
inthesmallfactoriesandsweatshopsthatmakeuptherestructuredindustrialsectoreventhoughtheGeneralLaborLawprohibitsunionizationwithfewerthan20workers”(Assies23‐24).Withitsopen‐doorpolicyandcreativeresponsestothelaborcrisis,Fabriles
hadgarneredwidespreadsupportanda“significantmoralweightinthecity”
(Assies24).ThoughtheFabriles,initsdefenseoftheworkers,actedasadefacto
union,theorganizationwasnottraditionallystructuredasaunioninthattheitdid
notcollectfeesorhaveobligatorymembership.Mostly,theorganizationhelped
individualworkersfindsolutionstowork‐relatedinjustices(Olivera26).
OnNovember12,afteraseriesofpreviousnegotiationsinitiatedby
FEDECOR,Fabriles,theDefenseCommittee,andFEDECORcollectivelyformedthe
Coordinador(CoordinadoradeDefensedelAguaydelaVida).9OscarOlivera,the
presidentofFabriles,becamethepresident;OmarFernández,thePresidentof
FEDECOR,becametheVicePresident;andGabrielHerbas,thepresidentofthe
DefenseCommittee,becamethegeneralsecretary.
TheCoordinadoraencompassedaconglomerationofitsfounding
organizations’strengths10.ThemergerbetweenFEDECORandFabrilesunitedthe
ruralandurbansubalternpopulationsoverasingleissue;inregardstothehistory
ofBoliviansocialmovements,thistypeofalliancewasararity.Whereasinearlier
socialmovementsthegovernmentwasabletoco‐optorsuppresscertainsocial
sectors,witharural/urbanunification,thewidersocial‐baseprovedresilientto
governmentcontrol.9CoalitioninDefenseofWaterandLife10ItshouldbementionedthatwhiletheCoordinadorawascentralintheorchestrationoftheWaterWar,manyorganizationsandassociationsoperatedindependentlyindefianceoftheprivatization.Giventhescopeofthispaper,IwillfocusontheactionsoftheCoorinadora.
44
Organizationally,theCoordinadoraadoptedthecoordinatingstructurethat
FEDECORhadusedduringtheWaroftheWells.Aspartofahorizontallyorganized
associationofassociation,eachofthememberorganizationsretainedfullautonomy
overtheiractions.ThroughouttheWaterWar,theCoordinadoraprovidedbroader
strategieswhileindividualorganizationsandassociationsacted,attimes,
independently—maintainingroadblocksandorganizingneighborhoodprotests
(InterviewFEDECOR)(Assies25).Also,aswasmentioned,FEDECORwasableto
contributetheirrigatorcultural“language”thatithadpreviouslydeveloped,which
greatlyenhancedtheCoordinadora’sabilitytoarticulateitself.
TheDefenseCommittee,alongwithmembersfromPuebloenMarcha,
providedtheCoordinadorawiththenecessarytechnicalexpertise.TheTunari
contractandWaterLaw2029wereriddledwithtechnocratjargonthatrequiredthe
professionalexpertiseoflawyersandeconomiststodecipher.Intermsof
articulatingpoliticaldemands,understandingtheproblemandpossiblesolutionsis
critical.Also,thesupportofmiddleclassprofessionalsallowedtheCoordinadorato
transcendtheclass‐struggleimage.
WaterWar
Whilenumerousprotestshadoccurredintheruralareasimmediatelyafter
privatization,largeurbanprotestdidnotbeginuntilpeoplebeganreceivingtheir
monthlybillsinDecember.HigherthanAguasdeTunarihadpromised,theaverage
ratehikewas51%(43%forthepoorestusers)(Shultz19).Insomeareas,people
hadtheirmonthlybillincreaseby300%(Olivera10).Inacitywithamonthly
45
minimumwageof$41dollars,thepriceincreasescouldnotbeafforded(Olivera8).
NotonlydidAguasdeTunariraisetheirrates,butthecompanyalsochargedpeople
formorewaterthantheywereconsuming(McKissick5).Ultimately,the
unreasonablewaterbillsservedasthecatalystfortheurbanstruggle;however,the
natureofthisstrugglewasnotinitsessencematerialoreconomicallybased.As
wasmentionedinregardstotheirrigators,theWaterWarwasaculturalstruggle,
onewhichsoughttodefendthedailylife.Thesocialcostprivatizationwasnot
simplyaneconomicburdenbutanunjustculturalinfringement.
OnJanuary11,theCoordinadoracollaboratedlooselywiththeCivic
Committeeandorganizedanindefiniteshut‐ownofthecityinprotestoftherate
hikes.IntheearlystagesoftheWaterWar,theCivicCommitteeattemptedto
appearasrepresentativeofthepeople.Thesuccessofthisprotestwaslargely
dependentupontheroadblocksoftheirrigatorswhoeffectivelycut‐offallhighway
transportation.Aftertwenty‐fourhours,theCivicCommitteewithdrewitssupport
ofthestrike,butthemassiveprotestcontinuedunderthedirectionofthe
Coordinadora(Assies25).ThislegitimizedtheCoordinadoraintheeyesofthe
governmentandtrivializedtheCivicCommitteeintheeyesofthepeople(Assies
25).Withthecityfullyimmobilized,thegovernment,havingunsuccessfullybroken
themobilizationwithteargas,optedfornegotiations.
TheJanuary13thnegotiationsinvolvedthemunicipalgovernment,Civic
CommitteeandCoordinadora.Thegovernmentstatedthatitwouldrevisethe
WaterLaw2029andtheAguasdeTunaricontract,butthatitwouldnotchangethe
rates.Furthermore,thegovernmentstatedthatitwouldreviewthedemandsmade
46
bytheCoordinadorawithinthreemonths.Thegovernmentsapparentappeasement
wasmerelyanattempttooutlastanddissolvetheCoordinadora:“Thegovernment’s
negotiatingtacticatthisstagewastotrytostrikeadealwiththeCivicCommittee,
marginalizetheCoordinadora,andmaintainanappropriatelevelofsecurityfor
investment”(McKissick6).
Soonafterthenegotiations,thearrivalof1000heavilyarmedDalmatians,
theequivalentofBolivianspecialforces,revealedthegovernmentstrueintentions
(Shultz19).Reminiscentoftheauthoritarianyears,PresidentHugoBanzer,who
hadbeendemocraticallyallowedtoreturntopower,gavetheordertosendthe
Dalmatians.
Inspiteofthegovernment’sattempttoendtheprotestswithempty
promisesandincreasedrepression,thedemonstrationsandroadblocksnotonly
continuedbutalsointensified.TheCocaleros,cocagrowersfromtheChapare,who
hadextensiveprotestexperiencestrugglingagainstanti‐narcoticsmissions,joined
themovement.Inresponsetoincreasedpressure,thegovernmentmadeasecond
attemptatappeasementandstatedthatitwouldfreezetheratehikesat20%
(Assies25).Protestorsdidnotheedtothisconcessionanddemonstrationsonly
intensified.
After70civiliansand51policemenwerewoundedand172arrests,the
CatholicChurcharrangedforanadditionalroundofnegotiations(McKissick6).On
February6th,thegovernmentsignedadealwhichincludedthecreationofa
committeetostudythewaterrates,arevisionofthewaterrates,aproposalfora
generalwaterlaw,whichwouldrespectruralcommunitytraditions,andthe
47
revisionofWaterLaw2029within45days(Assies25).Again,through
appeasementthegovernmentattemptedtomarginalizetheCoordinadora.
Inordertoassessthepoliticalwillofthepeopleaswellasmaintainthe
cohesionofthemovement,inearlyMarchtheCoordinadoraheldapublic
referendum(ConsultaPopular)completelyindependentofthestate.Inpreparation
forthereferendum,forthreedaysactivistsfirstset‐upworkshopsinruraland
urbancommunitiestoeducatethepeopleaboutthecomplexitiesoftheissue.More
than50,000people,onetenththeelectorate,willinglyparticipatedintheConsulta
Popular,whichinturnestablishedthat90%ofthepopulationwasinfavorof
cancellingtheTunaricontract(Assies27)(Shultz26).TheConsultaPopularhelped
legitimizetheCoordinadorabothfromaninternalandexternalperspective;inthat,
itdemonstratedthattheCoordinadorawascommittedtothepeople’sinterestsand
thattheCoordinadorahadconsolidatedaconsiderableamountofpopularsupport.
WhiletheCivicCommittee,whichclaimedtorepresentthepeople,wasmaking
dealswithManfredReyesVillaandthemunicipalgovernment,theCoordinadora
establisheditselfastheexecutivevoiceofthemovement(McKissick6).
InlateMarch,frustratedwiththegovernment’sinaction,theCoordinadora
demandedareturntonegotiationsbyApril4thandthreatenedtoorganizeanother
massprotest.Meanwhile,operatingindependently,otherorganizations,suchasthe
ConferaciónSindicalÚnicadeTrabajadoresCampesinosdeBolivia(CSUTCB)11
beganroadblockinghighwaysallaroundthecountryandmadeitsownsetof
11UnitaryUnionConfederationofBolivianPeasantWorkers
48
demands.FEDECORalsomaintaineditshighwayroadblocksontheoutskirtsofthe
city(Assies26).
“ThegovernmentandtheCivicCommitteecongratulatedthemselvesontheseemingimpotenceandisolationoftheCoordinadora.Galindo12statedthat“thereisnothingtonegotiate.”Onthenextday,April5,however,thousandsofCochabambinos,amongthemavarietyofwatercommitteesaswellsastheheavytransportworkers’unionanddelegationsfromtheruralareas,filledthePlaza14deSeptiembre”(Assies28).Atthispoint,thousandsofactivists,representingmanyorganizations,
converged,andtheCoordinadoradidnothavefullcontrol.Thepoliceshadbeen
orderedtostanddown,ratherthanantagonizethecrowd,andsotheactivistsno
longerhadavisibleenemytounifyagainst(Dangl65).Realizingthepotentialfor
spontaneoussocialcombustion,theCoordinadoraorganizedasetofmeetingsand
assembliestoonceagaingaugethewillofthepeople—inamediatedmanner.
TheCoordinadoraarrangedthreelevelsofpublicdeliberations.Thefirst
leveloperatedasatown‐hallassemblyandenableddirectcommunityparticipation.
Workerorganizationandneighborhoodorganizations,suchaswatercommittees,
formedassemblieswithintheirparticularsectors,forexampletheirrigation
farmers’assembly.Withinthesecommunitylevelassemblies,allmembershadthe
opportunitytopersonallyvoicetheiropinionsandparticipateinthepolitical
process(Olivera37).Eachassemblyafterreachingconsensusthensentadelegate
tothenextlevelofmeetings—theCoordinadoraassemblies.
IntheCoordinadoraAssemblies,informalrepresentativefromeachsector
wereonlyallowedtospeakonthebehalfoftheirsector.Additionally,inorderto
12ThePrefectoftheDepartmentofCochabamba
49
speakandbeheardatthesemeetings,communitieshadtohavedemonstrateda
commitmenttoaction(i.e.roadblocks)(Dangl65).TheseCoordinadoraAssemblies
“werewherethecommuniquéswerewrittenandstrategicanalysistookplace
(Olivera38).GiventheorganizationalstructureoftheCoordinadora(an
associationofassociations),communitiesandorganizationswerenotonlyinvitedto
butalsonecessaryinthestrategicplanningofthemovement.
Transitioningtothethirdlevel,leadersoftheCoordinadoratookthemost
importantstrategicquestionstothecabildo—townmeeting.Theactivistgathering
involvedbetweenfiftyandseventythousandpeople,whorespondedtothe
Coordinadora’svariousproposalsthroughcollectivesentiment.OnApril5,
Coordinadoraleadersproposedtogivethegovernmenttwenty‐fourhoursto
abrogatetheTunaricontract.Unwillingtowait,thecrowddeclinedand
subsequentlymarchedtoandpeacefullyoccupiedtheAguasdeTunarioffice.In
effect,theCoordinadorawasunabletochanneltheenergyofthecabildotowardits
owngoals.
DemandingtheannulmentoftheTunaricontractandtherevisionofWater
Law2029,massivecrowdsoccupiedthemainplazaonboththe6thandthe7thof
April.Conflictintensifiedwhenthepolicebeganarrestingorganizationleaders.On
April8,PresidentHugoBanzerdeclaredaninetyday“stateofsiege.”National
governmentofficialsjustifiedthesiegesayingthatdrugtraffickerswereresponsible
forthedisorder.Telltailsignspointedtoaneminentmassacre.Thenew
developmenthadinflamedpeopleallaroundthecountryandcountrywideprotests
increased(Assies29).Themilitaryevenwentsofarastocuttheelectricityofnew
50
stationstopreventthedisseminationoftheprotest(Assies29).Thatday,aftera
snipershotandkilled17year‐oldHugoDaza,themovementhadintensifiedand
wasbeyondthegovernment’scontrol.
ByApril9,thegovernmentofficiallyannouncedtheterminationoftheTunari
contract.Thenextday,anagreementbetweenthegovernmentandthe
CoordinadorareinstatedSEMAPAwithfullmunicipalownership.AndbyApril11,
WaterLaw2029wasrescindedandreplacedbyLaw2066,proclaimedbyBanzer,
whichcontainedthirtyarticles.Themainpointsof2066involved“(1)the
possibilityofcreatinganationalwatercouncilwasleftopen;(2)insteadoffive‐year
licensespeasantsandindigenousorganizationsnowhadtoregisteronlyfor“the
usefullifeofservice”;(3)inconcessionareastheconcessionaireswouldnothave
monopolyrightsandwatercommittees,cooperatives,andotherusosycostumbres
wouldberecognized;and(4)ratestructuresweretobeestablishedinconsultation
withthemunicipalitiesandthelocalunitsofPopularParticipation”(Assies30).In
essence,thegovernmentfullyrecognizedthepoliticaldemandsoftheWaterWar
socialmovement.
PartIII:Analysis
HistoricRebellion:FromSubalterntoCitizen
Citizenshipisaquestionofsovereignty—thatistosay,aquestionofcontrol
overlaw.MichaelOakeshottwrites:
“Incivilassociationthevalidityofalawliesneitherinthewisdomoftheconditionsitimposesuponconduct,noreveninitspropensitytopromotepeace,butinitsbeingthecommandofthesovereignand
51
(althoughthisisobscure)initsbeingeffectivelyenforced”(Oakeshott262).
Duringthecolonialperiod,theSpanisholigarchywasthesovereign.The
lawsdecreedbytheSpanishweredesignedtoprotectandfacilitatetheirinterests,
whichwereprimarilyconcernedwiththeexploitationoftheindigenouspopulation.
Thedualrepublicsystemofgovernancedefinitivelydemarcatedthedivision
betweenthesovereignandtheindigenoussubaltern.WithintheSpanishpolitical
sphere,indigenousparticipationwaslegallyimpossible—andtherefore,the
subalternwascompletelydeniedasovereignstatus.
Intermsofpoliticalidentity,theSpanishimposedaunitaryidentity,based
onraceandeconomicobjectification,uponthesubaltern.Legalizedinthedual
republic,asingularpoliticalidentityencompassedtheentiresubaltern:Indian
savage/slave.Therewerenodelineationsbetweenthevariousformsofeconomic
objectifications(i.e.noformaldivisionoflabor).TheSpanishextractedthetypeof
laborfromasinglesubalternpool(usingthecariazgosystem)whenitneededit(i.e.
toworkinthemines).
Althoughthesubalternwasunifiedinitsobjectifiedidentity,thisdidnot
correlatewithactualsubalternunity.TheSpanishmaintainedphysicalsubaltern
divisionsusingthecariazgosystem,whichineffectisolatedcommunities.Atthis
point,thesecommunitieshadnobasisforthecollectivearticulationofacommon
demand.Theculturalidentities,atthistime,remainedgroundedinpre‐colonial
indigenoustradition,and,asidefromtheSpanishexploitation,therewasnothingto
linkthevariousindigenouscommunities.Thus,atthispoint,therewasnocommon
senseofselfinwhichtobaseacommondemand.Furthermore,giventheseverityof
52
theSpanishexploitation,alliancesbetweencariazgocommunitiesweredifficultto
arrange.
Theentireweightofthesovereignpusheddownuponthesubalternleaving
noroomforthesubalterntoorganizewithintheresistancesphere.Idefinethe
resistancesphereasthesocialspacewherethesubalterncanorganizeandresist
thesovereign.Indiagram1,theSpanishsovereigndirectlyexertsitsforceonthe
subaltern.Thehegemonicsovereignwasprincipallyconcernedwiththe
exploitationthesubaltern,andthesubalternhadnomeansofpushingback.Inthis
period,therewasnospaceforthesubalterntoresist.
DuringtheRepublicanperiod,theBoliviancriollooligarchywasthe
sovereign.InordertocreateaunifiedBoliviannation‐state,therepublicansended
thedualrepublicsystem,andincorporatedthesubalternintothesamelegal
frameworkasthesovereign.DespitethenominaluniversalityofBolivianrights,the
sovereignlegalsystem,throughitsspecificationsforcitizenship(ex.voting
requirements),nonethelessexcludedthesubalternfromparticipatinginthe
politicalsphere.
InthenewBolivianstate,thesovereignmodifiedthepoliticalidentityofthe
subaltern.Theeliminationofthecariazgosysteminturnfacilitatedthecreationof
aformalizeddivisionoflaborthatcouldmeettheneedsofacapitalizingworld.In
ordertoincreasesovereigncontrolandeconomicefficiency,thesovereign
standardizedthesubalternidentitybyeliminatingcommunityself‐governanceand
byrequiringculturalhomogenization,suchaslearningSpanish.Thesovereignno
longerrecognizedthesubalternas“Indians”butratheras“Bolivianothers.”This
53
newpoliticalidentityretainedeconomicobjectificationasitscore.Thesovereign
maintaineditsexploitivepracticesbydenyingthe“Bolivianother”rights(see
diagram2).
Inregardstotheculturalidentityofthesubaltern,the“Bolivianother”
politicalidentitydidhaveaunifyingeffect.Intherepublicanperiod,inadditionto
thecollectiveexperienceofexploitation,thesubalternsharedanationality.Also,
becauseofthedivisionoflabor,thesubalternbegantounifywithinvarious
economicsectors.Thecaraizgocommunity,oncethecenteroftheculturalidentity,
wasreplacedbylargepeasantandminerorganizations.
Outsidetherepublicansovereign,thesubalternhadincreasedspacefor
resistance(seediagram3).UnliketheSpanishsovereign,whichdirectlyexploited
thesubaltern,therepublicansovereignindirectlyfacilitatedtheprivatized
exploitationofthesovereign.Whileconditionsremainedharsh,thesovereign
playedalessactive,oppressiveroleintheexploitationprocess(ex.suppressing
strikes).Thisgavethesubalterntheopportunitytoorganize.
Withintheresistancesphere,thesubalternarticulateditselfintheeconomic
sectors.Largepeasantandminerorganizationsmadedemandsforbetterworking
conditionsandrights.Inthissense,thesubalternidentitywithintheresistance
spherewasprimarilyeconomicallybased.AftertheChacoWar,partsofthe
subaltern,especiallytheveterans,didincorporatenationalismintotheiridentity,
butbyandlarge,resistanceidentitywasgroundedintheeconomicsectors.The
formationoftheseidentitiesindicatestheexistenceofpoliticalidentityspace
betweenthesovereignandthesubaltern—sincethesovereigndidnotdirectly
54
controltheexploitationandthusidentityofthesubaltern,thesubalternhadroom
(theability)toorganizeamovementintheresistancesphere.Forthisreason,the
subalternwaseffectiveintheRevolutionof1952.
Intheyearsimmediatelyfollowingtherevolution,thesubalternandtheMNR
oligarchywereessentiallyone,andyettherewasnosovereign.Thevarioussectoral
groups,whichweredivided,andtheMNRoligarchyeachhadtheirownagendaboth
whenfightingandinpower.Thesectoralgroupssoughttoadvancetheirparticular
sectors,andtheMNRoligarchysoughttoconsolidateitspower.Atthispoint,each
groupinvolvedwasdefactosovereignbutonlyinanextremelylimitedsense—over
thelawsregulatingtheirownsector.Becausethesovereigntywasdivided,there
wasnoinstitutionalized,all‐inclusivenotionofsovereignty,whichwouldhave
transformedthesubalternintocitizens.
Thus,intheseearlyyearsaftertherevolution,thegovernment,asan
institution,wasnotsovereignbutrathertheindividualactorsingovernment(see
diagram4).Tocounterthechaosofthis,theMNRoligarchydistancedthe
subaltern’sdirectinfluenceandconsolidatedsovereignpower.TheMNRoligarchy
usedclientelismtomanagethesubalternsectordemands.Thesubalternwas
separatedandisolatedwithinthesectorsbythematerialconcessions;thisfurther
preventedatrueimmaterialparticipationandcontestationascitizens.
Thisperiodcementedthesubalternpoliticalidentityaseitherpeasantsor
sindicalistas.Outsideoftheseidentities,thesubalternwasinvisible;insidethese
identitiesthesubalternhadtheopportunitytowingovernmentconcessions.
Subalternfragmentationwasthemostsignificantdrawbacktothispoliticalidentity.
55
WhilethesubalternhadpoliticalspacetoresisttheMNRoligarchy,theresistance
wasneverunifiedbyacommonvision.JustastheMNRoligarchyobjectively
identifiedthesubalterninthepoliticalsphereasworkerunionists,intheresistance
sphere,thesubalternconceivedoftheirresistanceidentitiesasworkerunionists.
Asseenindiagram5,intheMNRperiod,thereweremultipleresistancespheres
thatexistedoutsidethedirectcontroloftheMNRoligarchy.Ultimately,thisledto
thedeepeningoffactionallinesandtheradicalizationofdemands,which,inturn,
ledtothedownfalloftheMNRgovernment.
Inthecounter‐revolutionperiodfrom1964to1982,thedictatorships
reestablishedahegemonicoligarchicsovereign;thisprocessinvolvedincreasingthe
politicalspacebetweenthepoliticalsphereandtheresistancespheres.Atfirst,
undertheBarrientosregime,thesovereignmanipulatedandturnedthesubaltern
sectoralresistancespheresagainstthemselves(i.e.peasantsvs.miners)(see
diagram6).Oncetheresistancesphereoftheminerswasdecreased,thesovereign
wasabletominimizetheinfluenceofthepeasantunions.Eventhoughthe
sovereigndisempoweredthesubalterndirectinfluenceongovernment,the
subalternretainedsomeofitssovereigntywithinitsownsector.
Thepoderdualdynamicwascharacterizedbytheinterplaybetweenthe
sovereignandtheresistanceofthesubaltern.Thesovereigndidnothavethepower
tocompletelyeliminatetheresistancespheresofthesubaltern,andthesubaltern
didnothavetheunifiedpowertoaccessthepoliticalsphere,butitdidhavethe
powertopressurethesovereign.Indiagram7,theresistanceandsovereign
politicalspheresareseparate,andthecentralsovereignpreservestheirdivisions.
56
NeoliberalismandtheNEPeconomicreformsof1985dissolvedthe
resistancespheres.Therestructuringoflaborlawsalongwiththecollapseofthe
miningindustryatomizedthesubalternworker.Becausethesubalternhad
articulateditselfineconomictermsintheresistancesphere,aftertheneoliberal
reforms,theresistancespheresdissipatedconcurrentlywiththeunions.This
markedtheendofthepoderdual,aswellas,thesubalternabilitytopressurethe
politicalsphere.Indiagram8,thesovereignhasconsolidatedhegemonicpower
andfragmentedallformsofsubalternresistanceorganization.
Havingeliminatedtheresistancesphere,thesovereignnolongerhada
meansofdirectlycontrollingthesubaltern.Whenthereisaresistancesphere,itis
easyforthesovereigntoidentifyandthusoppresstheparticulargroupof
subalterns.Withouttheresistancespheres,thesovereignhadnomeansofcreating
anobjectifiedidentity,whichwouldallowthesovereigntocontrolthesubalternby
preventingtheemergenceofnewresistancespheres.
Indirectly,thesovereigncontrolledthesubalternvianeoliberalism.
Subalternworkerrightsandorganizationswereeithernonexistentorpowerless.In
thissense,thedirectcontrolofthesubaltern,whichwasindirectlysupportedbythe
sovereign,wasinthehandsoftheprivatebusinesssphere.
Inordertomoredirectlycontrolthesubaltern,thesovereigninitiated
multiculturaldecentralization.TheLPPattemptedtoobjectivelydefinethe
subaltern’srelationtothesovereign,inthatitchanneledpoliticalactivismaway
fromthesovereignintotheOTBs(seediagram9).TheOTBs,whichhadbeen
designedbygovernmenttechnocrats,allowedonlyalimitedamountofparticipation
57
andcontestation,butdidnotgivethesubalternaccesstoactualsovereigndecision‐
making.WhiletheOTBsprovidedapoliticaldistraction,thesovereigncontinued
implementinglawsreflectingitsneoliberalinterestsatthenationallevel.Because
58
theOTBsbecamemiredbycorruption,theylosttheirlegitimacyintheeyesofthe
subaltern,andthustheintendedoutcomeoftheOTBswasneverfullyrealized.
ThesuccessoftheWaterWarresultedfromtheunificationofsmall
resistancespheres.Groups,suchasFabriles,FEDECOR,watercommittees,
neighborhoodassociations,smallprofessionalassociations,developed
autonomouslyinalimitedpoliticalspacethatwasnotdirectlyorindirectly
oppressedbythesovereign.Giventheirsmallsize,thegroupswereinvisibleinthe
politicalsphere,andwerethusabletoevadethesovereign.Forexample,water
committeesdevelopedinneighborhoodsasameanstoprovidethecommunitywith
water.Thesovereigndidnotinhibitthistypeoforganizationasitwasseenas
necessarytothesurvivalofthesubaltern.Togiveanotherexample,thesovereign
didnotdirectlysuppressFabrilesbecause,byandlarge,theorganizationnever
garneredsufficientsubalternsupporttoactuallyposeathreattothesovereign.In
thecaseofFEDECOR,whilethesovereigndidsuppressFEDECORintheWarofthe
Wells,itdidnotdismantletheirrigators’associations,whichconstitutedthetrue
coreofFEDECOR.
Largely,thesegroupsfirstorganizedasameanstomeetspecific,localneeds
andthuswereinseparablefromthecommunitiesinwhichtheyoperated.The
resistanceidentitieswithineachofthesegroupswasnoteconomicallybased,aswas
thecasewithpreviousresistancegroups,butprimarilylocallybased.Whereas
institutionalizedandhierarchicalunionswereeasilysubduedwithforceandco‐
optation,communityorganizations,whichhaddemocraticinternalstructures,were
abletoresistthesovereign’straditionaltactics.
59
Individually,theresistancesphereswereunabletoeffectivelypressurethe
sovereign;however,collectively,whenunifiedbythepublicgood,theseresistance
spheresactuallybecamethesovereign.TheimplementationoftheWaterLaw2029
andtheTunaricontractdirectlythreatenedthelivelihoodsoftheentire
Cochabambasubalternpopulation.Thenatureofthisthreatfirstaffectedthe
particulargroups(irrigators,workers,watercommittees)passiveculturalsphere.
Intheculturalsphere,theissueofwaterismaterialinitssignificancetothe
community.Forexample,water,fortheirrigators,wasessentialtotheirsurvivalas
irrigators.
Intheprocessoftransmutingwaterfromthepassiveculturalspheretothe
activeresistancesphere,watertransformedfromthematerialtotheimmaterial.
Whilethematerialsignificanceofwaterdifferedineachsubalterngroup,the
immaterialsignificancewasuniversal:inallcommunitiesandorganizations,just
accesstowaterwasessential.Thus,thepublicgoodisthecollectivearticulationin
theresistancesphereoftheimmaterialessential.
Theoligarchicsovereign,despiteitsmanyattempts,wasunabletomaterially
placateorforcefullyoppressthedemandsofthesubalternresistancespheres.
Ironically,theatomization,thatwastheproductoftheneoliberalperiod,facilitated
thearticulationofthepublicgood.Hypothetically,hadthereonlybeenafewlarge
unionorganizationsmakingademandforwater,thesovereigncouldhaveeasily
suppressedorco‐optedinthegroupswithpatronage.ButinthecaseoftheWater
War,theentireatomicsubalternwasunifiedbyanimmaterialdemandthatcould
notbeboughtoff.
60
Throughthearticulationofthepublicgoodandthesubsequent
immobilizationofcityofCochabamba,thesubalternbecamesovereignoverwater.
Theoligarchicsovereignlostitscontroloverthesovereigntyofwaterwhenitlost
controloverthesubaltern.Throughthestrikesandmassprotests,thesubaltern
gainedhegemoniccontroloverwater.
Atthispoint,itisnecessarytoreexaminethedemographicsoftheoligarchic
sovereignandthesubaltern.BecausetheWorldBankcoercedtheBolivian
sovereignintoprivatizingwater,theBolivianoligarchicsovereigndefacto
surrendereditssovereignty.WhilemembersoftheBolivianoligarchicsovereign
stillbenefittedfromtheTunaricontract,thecontract,andthusBechtel,heldthatit
wastheultimatesovereignwhenitcametotheissueofwater.Thestipulation
guaranteeing16%returnsregardlessofperformanceperfectlyillustratesthispoint.
Ineffect,theentireBolivianpopulationwasplacedintoasubalternpositionbythe
exploitivecontract.Forthisreason,manyBoliviansinboththeupperandmiddle
classjoinedthetraditionalsubalterninthefightforsovereignty.
ThepassingofWaterLaw2026,whichreplacedWaterLaw2029,
transformedthesubalternintocitizens.Afterexpellingtheoligarchicsovereign
(Bechtel),thesubaltern,representedbytheCoordinadora,cementeditssovereignty
intheformoflaw.Thehegemonicprotectionofthislawisnotmaintainedbythe
oligarchicgovernment13butratherbythecitizens,whowereoncethesubaltern.It
isreasonabletosaythatwaterwillneveragainbeprivatizedinCochabamba—not
13Here,Iuseoligarchicgovernmentinsteadofoligarchicsovereignbecausetheoligarchicgovernmentisnolongersovereignoverwater.
61
simplybecauseoftheexistenceofalaw,butbecauseoftheexistenceofasovereign
defenderofthepublicgood.
TheWaterWartransformedthesubalternintocitizens.Law2026endedthe
exploitiveuseofpower,andnowthe“people”notanoligarchyholdsovereignty
overwater.Citizenshipisdefinedastheabsenceofasubaltern;inotherwords,
citizenshipnecessitatesuniversality.Concerningthecontemporarypoliticsofwater
inCochabamba,allpersonsarepoliticallyvisible,inthatallCochabambanscan
participateandcontesttheissueofwaterinthepoliticalsphere.SincetheWater
War,theoligarchy,withoutitsexclusivehegemonicforce,hasnotbeenableto
significantlyexcludeanyCochabambansviarepressionorco‐optation—everyoneis
sovereignandthuspoliticallyonanequalplane(seediagram10).
Inregardstothepoliticsofwater,althoughcitizenshiphasbeenestablished,
thisdoesnotmeanthatissueofwatermanagementhasbeensolved.Infact,in
manyways,therealwaterwarhasonlyjustbegun.Questionsovermanagement,
service,ownership,anddevelopmentremainunsettled.ShouldSEMAPAbesocially
orpublicallyowned?HowcanSEMAPAmoredemocraticallyrepresentthewillof
thepeople?Howandtowhatdegreeshouldthepublicbeabletoparticipateand
62
conteststrictlytechnicalissues?Inwhatwaysshouldservicebeextended?How
shouldSEMAPAintegrateautonomouswatercommittees?(Aguilar62)Howcan
theinstitutionaltransparencybeincreasedinordertopreventcorruption?
Currentlyindividualcitizensandcitizenorganizationsactivelyand
competitivelyareaddressingthesequestions.Ononeendofthepoliticalspectrum,
governmentelitesareattemptingtoreestablishinstitutionalcontroloverSEMAPA.
Giventheirexperience,resourcesandclientelisticconnectionsingovernment,the
eliteshavehadsuccess.TravisDriessenwrites:
“Themayor,reinforcedbyhistechnocraticstaff,hasusedthisofficetoconstructpoliticalcampaignstoconsolidatehiselectoralsupportwithOTBpresidentsbyofferingthemaccesstoserviceprovisions”(Dreissen4).
Usingtheirpoliticaladvantages,theelitesatthispointhavepreventeda
majorsocialoverhaulofSEMAPA;theireffortsandinterests,however,havenot
goneunchecked.In2007,theCitizenDirectors(CDs),anelectedcivilianoversight
bodythatsitsontheSEMAPAboardofdirectors,revealedthatonemilliondollars
hadbeenlosttocorruption(Dreissen5).Asaresult,theexecutivedirectorwas
forcedtoresign.
Inadditiontocurtailingtheeliteagenda,citizenshavecontinuedthe
democratizationofSEMAPA.Groups,suchastheCoordinadora,haveworkedto
changetheinstitutionalstructureofSEMAPA’sbureaucracyandhaveadvocatedthe
decentralizationofdevelopmentprojects.TravisDriessenwrites:
“Astheseprogressiveactorsarduouslychipawayattheformidablepowerstructureandstrengthentheircapacitiesintheprocess,theirgoalsforthesocialappropriationofthecompanystillappeartobeachievable”(Dreissen5).
63
Perhaps,thegreatestchallengetotheprogressivecitizensisreachinga
consensus.EvenimmediatelyaftertheWaterWar,theCoordinadorawasinternally
fracturedoverwhatreformstopursue.Groupsweresplitbetweensupporting
socialorpublicownership.Thisdivision,likemanyother,haspreventedtherapid
advancementoftheprogressiveagenda.
InthewakeoftheWaterWar,theunityofdirectionhasdissipated.The
futureofwaterinCochabambaisnowinthehandsofCochabambancivilsociety.
Bothprogressiveandconservativegroupsarecompetitivelyengagedintheprocess
ofdeterminingthedetailsofhowthepublicgoodshouldbemanaged.Asofnow,it
istrulydifficulttodefinitelysaywhichsideis“winning”.Inmanyrespects,the
competitivenatureofthewaterissueishelpingtoestablishatraditionofactive
engagement(viaactiveparticipationandcontestation)ofthecitizen.
Inspiteofthehotlydebate,waterpoliticsinCochabambahasnotspunoutof
control.Thisisbecauseboththeconservativesandtheprogressiveengagetheissue
withintheparametersofthepublicgood.Ifwaterservicedoesnotremainjust,the
sovereignwillreassertitself.ThisdistinguishestheWaterWarfromtheRevolution
of1952.DuringtheRevolutionof1952,thesubalternneverarticulatedapublic
good;eachsubalternactorhaditsownsenseofthegood,andthis,inturn,ledto
politicalpandemonium.TheWaterWaravoidedthischaos,inthat,itwasguidedby
acommonvision.Inthissense,thepublicgoodcontainedandregulatedtherange
ofpoliticalactivism;thisisnecessaryconditionforagenuinecitizen‐basedcivil
society.
64
CompletingCitizenship
ThecitizenshipthatarosefromtheWaterWarislimitedinitsscope.Since
thesubalternestablisheditselfassovereignoverwater,citizenshipisonly
applicabletoissuesconcerningwater.Inrespecttootherissues,suchaslabor
rights,manyBoliviansremainpoliticallyinvisible,assubalterns.Anoligarchic
sovereigncontinuestodominatemuchofthepoliticalsphere,thusperpetuating
exploitationandsubalternity.
However,theWaterWardidcreateaboundary,guardedbythecitizenand
thepublicgoodthattheoligarchicsovereigncannottransgress.Inotherwords,the
outcomeoftheWaterWarestablishedalimitonthereachoftheoligarchic
sovereignsincethe“people”,ascitizens,aresovereignoverthepoliticsofwater.
ThecontemporaryBolivianpoliticalsystemcontainstwodistinctconcentric
politicalspheres.Theoligarchicsovereigngovernswithinthecentralsphere;their
interestsaremaintainedbytheexclusionandsubordinationofthesubaltern.The
oligarchicsphereexertsanoutwardpressuretopreventthesubalternfrom
entering.
Encirclingtheoligarchicsphere,thecitizenspheredemarcatesthelimitsof
theoligarchicsovereign’sreach.Thecitizensphereexertsaninwardpressureon
theoligarchicsphere.Thesuccessfularticulationofthepublicgoodinstillsanotion
ofpoliticalrights.Subalterns,whoexperiencetheempowermentoftheirlimited
citizenship,seektoadvancetheirpoliticalrightsinotherareaswheretheyare
suppressed.
65
Ifmultiplepublicgoodsarecollectivelyandsuccessfullyarticulatedand
established,thecitizensphereexpandswiththeseincreasesinsovereignty.
Citizenshipiscompletedonlywhenthecitizensphereovertakestheoligarchic
sovereign—thatistosay,whenthecitizenbecomesfullysovereign,freefrom
exploitationandpoliticalinvisibility.Atthisfinalstage,thepoliticalsphereis
universal,andthecitizenscollectivelyupholdthesovereigntyofitslaws.
TheWaterWarpromptedanationalmovementtowardtheadvancementof
theBoliviancitizen.In2003,inresponsetoaoligarchicgasexportationplan,across
thecountry,theBoliviansubalternroseupinprotest.Intheend,aftermass
proteststhatimmobilizedthecountry,theplanwascanceled,PresidentLozadawas
oustedfrompower,andthenationalizationofthegasindustrybecamepartofthe
publicgood.
InMarch2005,EvoMoralesbecameBolivia’sfirstpresidentofindigenous
ancestry.Sincehiselection,Moraleshaspassedanumberoflawsandconstitutional
reformsthatreflectanintenttoendsubalternity.Incertainregions,however,these
lawshavenotbeenfullyenforced,demonstratingthattheMoralesadministrationis
notfullyincontrolofthepoliticalsphere.Regardless,afterfivehundredyearsof
subjugation,theascensionofanindigenousleadertothepresidencyhashad
momentoussymboliceffectontheonceinvisibleindigenouspopulation.Whilein
Bolivia,IaskedastudentifhethoughtMoraleswasapopulist,heresponded,“The
movementwillgoonwithorwithouthermanoEvo.”
66
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