democracy hedman

The Philippines in 2005: Old Dynamics, New ConjunctureAuthor(s): Eva-Lotta E. Hedman ,Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January/February 2006), pp. 187-193Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2006.46.1.187 .Accessed: 03/07/2014 01:36

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to AsianSurvey.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 202.125.102.33 on Thu, 3 Jul 2014 01:36:04 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

187

Asian Survey

, Vol. 46, Issue 1, pp. 187193, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. 2006 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requestsfor permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of CaliforniaPresss Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.

Eva-Lotta E. Hedman is Senior Research Fellow, Department of Inter-national Development at the University of Oxford, U.K.

THE PHILIPPINES IN 2005

Old Dynamics, New Conjuncture

Eva-Lotta E. Hedman

Abstract

The year 2005 witnessed much argument and effortto enact tax reforms,impeach the president, combat terrorism, amend the Constitution, and endlong-standing armed insurgenciesand little real change. The outcome ofthese specific initiatives is likely to remain largely unresolved in 2006, as is thebroader issue of the stability and substance of democracy in the Philippines, aquestion that loomed large throughout 2005.

In the Philippines, the year 2005 wavered uneasily be-tween two alternative retrospective categorizations. On the one hand, it wascharacterized by many of the same dynamics of other off-season years in theelectoral cycle that has so dominated the countrys politics and society sinceindependence in 1946: corruption scandals, conicts between the president andoppositionist elements in Congress, disappointing economic performance, un-fullled promises to enact economic and political reforms, minor frictions mar-ring the countrys special relationship with the United States, and somethingin between war and peace in those areas of the Philippines touched bylongstanding armed insurgencies. Thus, the past year in many ways resembled1954 or 1962 or 1993: dj vu all over again, so to speak.

On the other hand, 2005 was also characterized by some of the same dy-namics of the peak crisis years of post-independence Philippine history: deadlybomb blasts in Manila and other cities, impeachment proceedings against thepresident, evidence of coup-plotting by dissatised military ofcers, PeoplePower in the streets of Manila, and plans to amend the Constitution to allowfor a parliamentary form of governmentsuch were the highlights of 2005.Thus, the past year in some ways also resembled 1949 or 1972 or 1986 or 2000.


188

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVI, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

Politics

Public allegations of electoral fraud by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyoled to the onset of a national political crisis in May 2005. On June 27, thepresident, citing a lapse in judgement, publicly admitted that she had spokenwith a senior ofcial of Comelec (the Commission on Elections) during thecounting of votes in the 2004 national elections, which gave her the presi-dency. This admission lent strength to charges that Arroyos narrow defeat ofopposition candidate Fernando Poe Jr. was achieved by fraudulent means.

In response, 10 cabinet ofcials resigned on July 8, 2005, and called onArroyo to step down; leading members of the administrations coalition in Con-gress also withdrew support from the president. Former President Corazon C.Aquino, an erstwhile Arroyo backer, joined in the demands for resignation asdid the inuential Makati Business Club, as well as many non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) and other elements of civil society. Signicantly, the in-uential Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) refrainedfrom making such a call in its statement to the nation on July 10, thus discour-aging further popular opposition and buying more time for Arroyo and hersupporters.

On September 6, the House of Representatives voted 158 to 51 (with six ab-stentions) to throw out the impeachment complaint against President Arroyo.A number of congressmen afliated with opposition parties joined pro-admin-istration legislators to defend the president or conveniently absented them-selves, sparking accusations that votes had been bought for money, favors, andpromises. A newly formed anti-Arroyo coalition led a march to the Philippinelegislature, where thousands of demonstrators denounced the outcome of thefailed impeachment process. In the forefront of this march were two of the na-tions most prominent widows, Aquino and movie actress Susan Roces, whoselate husband, the lm star Ferdinand Poe Jr, had died shortly after his narrowdefeat in the 2004 elections.

However, Arroyo moved swiftly to foreclose the familiar scenario of a PeoplePower uprising in Manila reminiscent of the episodes leading to the oustersof Presidents Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and Joseph Estrada in 2001. Against thethreat of mounting popular mobilization in the streets, the Arroyo governmentintroduced a so-called calibrated preemptive response policy that prohibitedany protest action without a permit with immediate effect on September 21,2005, the 33rd anniversary of the declaration of martial law by then-PresidentMarcos. Against the challenge of growing opposition in the legislature, thepresident issued Executive Order 464 on September 28 prohibiting govern-ment, military, and police ofcials from testifying before any inquiry in theSenate or House of Representatives without her permission. The Senate, longa site of stubborn resistance to presidential authority, had been conducting



189

hearings with two military ofcers about the so-called Arroyo tapes of wire-tapped telephone conversations between Arroyo and a senior election ofcialduring the 2004 national elections.

Against the backdrop of these persistent threats to her presidential authority,over the course of 2005 Arroyo and her supporters sought to draw attentionaway from presidential misdeeds and toward the broader, long-standing issueof reforming Philippine political institutions and processes. Having stated pub-licly that our political system has degenerated to such an extent that it is verydifcult to move within the system with hands totally untainted, Arroyo emergedover the course of the year as a vocal supporter of a shift away from the cur-rent presidential system with its bicameral legislature toward a federal repub-lic with a unicameral parliamentary government. Such a proposed shift wouldrequire amendment of the 1987 Constitution, and to that end a 55-memberConsultative Commission (Con-Com) was appointed by Arroyo in September2005 to formulate proposals for congressional consideration.

By late December, the commission had issued its recommendations toamend the Constitution in order to pave the way for a new system of govern-ment. In particular, commissioners recommended that the upcoming 2007 localand congressional elections be suspended and that members of both houses ofCongress be allowed to serve in an interim Parliament until the national elec-tions scheduled for 2010, at the end of Arroyos six-year term. By offering par-liamentary seats until then for incumbent legislators in both houses; continuedtenure for serving city, municipal, and provincial ofcials for the same period;and the new post of prime minister (under presidential supervision until 2010),the commissions formula for a shift to parliamentary rule was designed tomaximize its appeal within the political class. Yet, a dissenting vote by at least20 commission members against the no elections recommendation suggestedthat the Arroyo administrations efforts to stage-manage a shift to a parliamen-tary system could run aground in the months to come. Indeed, December 2005also saw renewed signs of opposition-led activity against the president in Con-gress, and a public opinion survey the same month reported that Arroyo en-joyed the lowest ratings of any president since the transition from authoritarianrule in 1986.

Renewed Insurgency by Communist Guerrillas

Beyond Manila, the year 2005 also witnessed a similar pattern of uncertaintyand instability in those areas of the Philippine archipelago where longstandingarmed insurgencies remained active. After a brief interlude of formal peacetalks between the government and the National Democratic Front (NDF) in2004, hostilities resumed and persisted throughout 2005. Talks brokered byNorway had been suspended by the NDF in August 2004 after the United States


190


decided against removing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) andits New Peoples Army (NPA) from a list of foreign terrorist organizations, akey demand of the NDF in its negotiations with the government. Despite ini-tial hopes that Manila would persuade the U.S. and European governments toremove the CPP and NPA from their terrorist blacklists, the Arroyo adminis-tration instead issued a public statement in late October that year warning ofincreasing linkages between the CPP-NPA and international terrorist organi-zations and calling for far-reaching changes in government counter-insurgencystrategy.

In this context, and against the backdrop of continuing challenges to theArroyo government in Manila, in 2005 the NPA asserted its strength in its re-maining pockets of inuence around the country. With the House vote againstimpeachment in September, the NPA intensied its anti-government campaign,reportedly killing some 50 government soldiers in more than 100 attacks sincethat month.

1

According to a CPP spokesman, late in the year the NPA countedsome 13,500 regular ghters and maintained an active presence in 69 out of 79provinces. While other sources put the total number of regular ghters closerto 8,000, the government proclaimed the NPA the biggest threat to nationalsecurity.

The Arroyo administration achieved some minor successes against the in-surgent threat by exploiting factional divisions within the remnants of the armedrevolutionary movement. In October, the government signed a ceasere accordwith the Revolutionary Workers Party of Mindanao (Rebolusyonaryong Partidong Manggagawa ng Mindanao, RPMM), a breakaway faction of the CPP-NPAclaiming some 500 members and 3,000 supporters in several provinces onMindanao.

2

In early December, there were also reports of an agreement be-tween the government and the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex BoncayaoBrigade (RPA-ABB), another small breakaway faction of the NPA. But 2005ended amid continuing NPA attacks on government troops and installations

3

that killed more than 400 soldiers over the course of the year.

The Peace Process with Muslim Secessionists

While peace talks with Communist rebels remained scuppered by the contin-ued blacklisting of the CPP-NPA by the U.S. and the European Union, theglobal War on Terror campaign appeared to encourage moves toward a peace

1. Manny Magato, Philippine Communist Rebels Kill 3 Soldiers, Reuters, December 16,2005.

2. Joel Francis Guinto, Breakaway Reds Ink Ceasefire Accord with Government,

INQ7.net

,November 9, 2005.

3. Ben Serrano, NPA Rebels Attack Caraga; One Killed, Reuters, December 18, 2005.



191

agreement with Muslim secessionists of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF) late in the year. Already identied as a refuge for the shadowy Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 2002, the southern Philippines gained increas-ing signicance in subsequent years as an area of Islamic terrorist sanctuaryand training, even as kidnappings attributed to the Abu Sayyaf Group in the SuluArchipelago enhanced the notoriety of the region. In this context, the MILF,with its bases of popular support and armed strength in Muslim provincesof Mindanao, emerged as the key to counterterrorism efforts in Mindanao forPhilippine and U.S. government ofcials alike.

Continuing Manilas efforts to persuade the U.S. to drop the group from thelist of foreign terrorist organizations, these talks and draft proposals expandedupon a deepening pattern of cooperation between the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP) and the MILF in the War on Terror. After early moves inthis direction in 200304, a major shift came in the wake of a series of bomb-ings in February 2005 attributed to hard-line Islamic extremists in the Philip-pines. These bombings, which claimed several lives in Manila, Davao, andGeneral Santos City on February 14, provided the impetus for an aggressiveU.S.-backed AFP campaign, including air strikes, on alleged Islamic terroristbases in Mindanao in subsequent months. During the campaign, the MILFleadership reportedly shared information with the AFP about hard-line ele-ments in its ranks, suspended local commanders suspected of association withthe Abu Sayyaf Group, and removed MILF troops from areas under govern-ment assault.

4

This level of cooperation provided the basis for a ceasere be-tween the MILF and the AFP through much of the year and progress toward aformal peace accord based on new provisions for autonomy for Muslim areasof the southern Philippines.

5

Yet, as 2005 drew to a close, the prospects for a lasting settlement remainedfar from certain, given both domestic and foreign constraints. Indeed, in thenal months of the year commentators were already predicting that the newplans for autonomy in the Muslim South would be held hostage to partisanpolitics in Manila and to the Arroyo administrations push toward a parliamen-tary system. Some active and retired AFP ofcers voiced strong opposition toArroyos pact with the MILF, even as the United States government offeredonly very limited public support for the deal. Thus, 2005 witnessed inconclu-sive movement from war to peace in the southern Philippines, with the morefamiliar mixed pattern of informal accommodation and sporadic aggressionprevailing as in previous years.

4.

Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts

(Brussels/Jakarta: InternationalCrisis Group, December 2005).

5. Marites Danguilan Vitug, Isolating the Terrorists,

Newsbreak

, December 18, 2005.


192


Economy

The year saw a similarly mixed pattern on the economic front, with much talkof reform but little real progress in the face of the countrys entrenched prob-lems of poverty, social inequality, and indebtedness. Budget decits continuedto deepen the nations debt, which almost tripled to 3.94 trillion pesos ($74.9billion) since 1997, when the government last posted a budget surplus. Al-though economic growth slowed to a record two-year low in the third quarter,the pesos 5.4% appreciation against the dollar in 2005 helped reduce importprices and dampen inationary pressures, thus allowing the Central Bank tokeep interest rates unchanged.

Some progress on establishing a stronger scal basis for future years wasarguably achieved over the course of the year. The Arroyo administration in-troduced legislation imposing new taxes on cigarettes and beer that was passedby the House of Representatives in May. Ofcials in November imposed a10% value-added tax on oil, power, and other previously exempt products andservices, with plans for a further increase to 12% in February 2006.

6

Forecast-ing some 80 billion pesos ($1.52 billion) in extra revenue from this tax in thenext scal year, the government predicted a narrowing of the budget decit to125 billion pesos ($2.38 billion) in 2006, which, if achieved, would mean a41% decrease from the record 211 billion pesos ($4.01 billion) in 2002. Suchmeasures, the government claimed, should allow for a balanced budget by 2008,two years ahead of the announced schedule.

7

Meanwhile in 2005 remittances from the estimated 7.4 million Philippinenationals working abroad helped boost the Central Banks foreign exchangereserves, as well as consumer spending and the local economy. According tothe Asian Development Bank, the Philippines ranked third, after Mexico andIndia, in the amount of money sent home by workers abroad; the Central Bankin Manila reported a total of $8.8 billion in remittances during the rst 10months of the year, a 27% increase compared to the previous year. Mean-while, the 10.3% jobless rate reported by the National Statistics Ofce in De-cember remained one of the highest in Asia, only surpassed by comparablegures available for Indonesia and Pakistan. As noted above, economic growthslowed down after the rst quarter, with predictions of annual growth rangingfrom 4.7% to 5.3%, far more conservative estimates than the 2004 gure of6.1%, a 15-year high for the Philippines.

6. In July, Moodys Investors Service, Standard & Poors, and Fitch Ratings all reduced thenations debt rating outlook to negative after the Supreme Court stopped Arroyo from imposingthe expansion of the value-added-tax.

7. Bloomberg Update, Philippine Central Bank Cant Rule out 2006 Rate Rise, New York,December 15, 2005.



193

Conclusions

Overall, the year 2005 witnessed considerable drama and yet little in the wayof denitive outcomes in the Philippines. The year saw much argument andeffortto enact tax reforms, impeach the president, combat terrorism, amendthe Constitution, and end long-standing armed insurgenciesand little realchange. Questions as to the outcome of these specic initiatives are likelyto remain largely unresolved in 2006, as is the broader issue of the stabilityand substance of democracy in the Philippines, a question that loomed largethroughout 2005.


democracy hedman

Documents