DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN

MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES:

THE CASE OF SURINAME

Jack Menke

Introduction

~ ulti-ethnic societies in the Caribbean suffer from ethnic tensions or conflicts in the '-------'

prevailing system of political democracy, with a negative impact on social and economic development. Some scholars believe that the cooperation between ethnic elites via an informal brokerage system in the context of the so-called consociational democracy might be an attractive solution for those living in a multi-ethnic society with a potential for ethnic conflicts (Deosaran 1996). Others consider the democratic tradition of Suriname as a panacea.

A solution to the aforementioned problems must take the Suriname experience into account . In the first instance, the degree of alienation experienced by the major races has been notably less because of the presence of an informal brokerage system which has ensured that those races are a part of the government and decision-making process (AJexander 1993)

One should however be careful not to exaggerate the assumed positive elements of consociational democracy since there are

also negative elements in the sphere of policy decision making . In the era of global restructuring, there are also changes in the policy decision cycle on strategic issues that one should also take into consideration . Against this background, it is a simplification to assume that consociational democracy, as applied in Suriname, ensures that "those races are part of the government and decision­making process" as Alexander suggests.

This paper discusses democracy in multi-ethnic societies in a much wider framework of socia l stratification , the interplay between political and economic power, state formation and policy decision­making on strategic issues.

Post World War Stratification and Ethnicity

In Suriname, the actual transition towards the post-colonial society begun in 1947 when the law on the 'Welfare Fund' was passed in the Dutch parliament which laid the basis for the modern planned development of Suriname. In 1948, general suffrage was introduced and in 1949 the first general elections were held . At that time Suriname had a typical social structure with the predominantly white colonial oligarchy in the

highest social stratum. This group represented the Dutch colonial interests, and held key positions in the state bureaucracy, parliament and the army. Second in rank was the colonial middle class, consisting predominantly of mulattos in the higher and middle occupational ranks, lawyers, medical doctors, schoolteachers, journalists and middle-level civil servants.

The peasants and wageworkers in agriculture were mainly of Indian and Javanese descent. Wageworkers in the balatta and mining sectors, self-employed and wageworkers in the urban manufacturing sector were predominantly of African origin. The mulatto segment of the colonial middle class initially opposed the introduction of general suffrage in 1948. This group feared increasing competition of the Indians as regards employment opportunities in the state bureaucracy. Against this background, the electoral system of 1948, designed by the representatives of the mulattos, was meant to consolidate their class position. Owing to this electoral system that was sanctioned by Holland, this group came to power by winning the first elections in 1949. They kept state power until 1958, depending strongly on the Dutch colonial bourgeoisie. After the elections of 1958, state power came in the hands ofthe leading middle classes ofthe three major ethnic groups the Creoles, the Indians and the Javanese. In the political history of Suriname, the 1958-1969 period of politics is referred to as the 'Verbroederingspolitiek' (consociational democracy).

The period of the 1960s and 1970s is characterized by 'transitional stratification' (Benedict 1962) : the major ethnic groups were represented more or less in all strata, except the highest managerial stratum. Remarkable is the greater mobility to white

collar jobs, which was due to development aid, political patronage, and greater access to education . In the stage of ' integrational stratification,' the major ethnic groups are represented more or less in all strata, which is the case in Suriname in 2001.

State Formation and the Policy Decision-Making Cycle

This section focuses on two issues: first, the political functions of the state and the interplay with ethnicity and class; and second, changes in the decision-making process by the state and the consequences for class, ethnicity and governance in multi-ethnic societies.

Two specific political functions of the state can be distinguished in developing coun­tries (Menke 1991):

i) The state as an instrument via which political power is executed by groups, strata, or classes;

ii) The state as a central source for class creation and for gaining economic power, improvement or mobility of (ethnic) groups or for individual survival.

The state is conceived as the institutions, instruments, ideological and repressive apparatus via which political power is executed. National interests and national security are the principal categories in which strategic goals are conceived (Allison 197133). There are four stages in the policy decision-making process by the various state institutions: determining strategic policy issues; policy formulation; policy preparation and policy implementation. Traditionally, it is assumed that the choice of strategic policy

issues is determined by the state. In today's globalizing world , external factors have a major influence on the choice of strategic policy issues.

The extent to which governments have the room to formulate and take decisions on strategic policy issues is critical to political power via the state. The question therefore is : which are the changes in state formation and the policy decision making cycle? Examples of present strategic policy issues in the Caribbean are , among others , WTO determined regulations on trade, contracts with transnationals in key economic sectors, and policies on narco-traffic (shiprider agreement)

State Formation and Ethnicity in Pre-Restructuring Period : 1960-1980

This section deals with the formation of the state as a central source for class creation, economic improvement or mobility of ethnic groups in the pre-restructuring period from the 1960s to 1980, i.e., the period preceding global restructuring.

Consociationalism in the 1960s

Suriname has a political tradition of a multi-party system. From 1958-1967 consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977) was dominant in politics This was achieved by the cooperation between elites of the major ethnic groups and their respective political parties - Indians (VHP), Javanese (KTPI) and Creoles/ blacks (NPS) - via an informal broke­rage system. In the context of 'the state as a source of power' the 'ethnic state' emerged : in terms of distribution of resources within the state sector, ministries were divided along

ethnic lines, including ministers and rank and file civil servants. The distribution of resources is also reflected in the allocation of development aid in distinct economic sectors: Creoles occupying strategic positions in parastatals and the public sector, while Indians dominated the development resources (mainJy from Dutch aid) for the agricultural sector.

State Interventionism and the State Elite of the 1970s

State interventionism, characteristic in the pre-restructuring 1970s, started in some developing countries with the launching of the joint venture strategy. The interventionist role of the state is reflected in the establishment of a large number of parastatals and public enterprises. In Suriname, this strategy was applied in particular in the primary sector, in agriculture and forestry.

The VHP-PNP government (1969-1973) was the first Indian dominated coalition since the first general elections in 1949. They introduced the Joint Venture Strategy with participation in enterprises by both foreign and national capital, the latter generally participating with at least 51% of the shares. The change in the ethnic political power balance is reflected in the state bureaucracy by the increased proportion of ministries under control ofVHP affiliated Indians. Unlike the preceding consociational democracy period (l958-1969), there were an equal number of ministries led by Creoles and East Indians. This was different from the period of 'Verbroederingspolitiek' (consociational democracy), when the distribution was quite in favor of the Creoles (Table 1)

Table 1. Ministers by Ethnicity in Twenty-Three Administrations, 1949-2001

1949- 1958- 1969-58 69 73

Creoles 46 30 6 East Indians 4 6 6 Javanese 0 I I Others 0 0 I Total 50 37 14

The poor results of the Joint Venture strategy - in terms of per capita economic growth, income distribution and employment - gave rise to class conflicts especially of the middle and lower strata of the state bureaucracy against the state. As the majority of this bureaucracy was composed of Creoles, the conflicts had a very strong ethnic element, a protest of Creoles against the perceived 'domination' ofIndians.

In the 1969-1973 period the evolution and differentiation of the middle classes was continued, more or less coinciding with ethnic divi s ions . Thus , in the rice sector. as a consequence of the 'Green Revolution' of the sixties, an agrarian and commercial elite evolved, composed predominantly oflndians. The evolution of this class can be explained historically and economically, but must be related also to the 'Ethnic State' characterized by the division of the government into ethnic ministries. In the case of the Ministry of Agriculture, between 1958 and 1973 all 4 ministers were of Indian origin. The state evolved towards an instrument of 'class formation ' through political patronage by providing facilities and resources (e.g., land) to members of political parties or ethnic

Total Ethnicity 1973- 1980- 1988- 1991- 1949-

80 88 90 2001 2001

23 68 7 33 213 2 20 7 19 64 4 5 3 to 24 0 2 I 6 to

29 95 18 67 310

groups This also occurred in ministries governed by ministers of Creole or Javanese ongin.

Bureaucratic State Elite

The eve of political independence in Suriname (around 1970-1975) was characterized by ethnic tensions both within and outside the state, labor conflicts involving in particular the middle strata of the state bureaucracy against the state, and the mass emigration of Surinamese to Holland. The colonial power exerted pressure to force political independence of Suriname. This pressure can be explained in two ways: first, there were problems with the growing Surinamese minority in Holland as a consequence of the mass migration of Surinamese who were Dutch citizens; and second, the growing labor and political unrest in Suriname in the 1970s.

The political response of the opposition to the increasing class and et lmic tensions was the mass mobilization of creoles in one political organization (NPK) - together with the largest Javanese party (KTPI). The creole­dominated NPK advocated political

independence and the 1973 elections resulted in a creole dominated cabinet that remained in power until the military coup of1980. The strategic policy issue was the political independence of Suriname which was initially opposed by the largest Indian party, the YHP.

The proclamation of political independence of Suriname in 1975 did not only mean that state functions (such as the repressive apparatus) were merely transferred to the former colony. The new development aid-agreement between the Dutch and Surinamese state gave rise to a more economically active role for the state. The influential Committee on Development Aid Cooperation between Holland and Suriname (CONS) was an expression of this changing role of the state. In fact , this committee determined the strategic issues and allocation of development aid, with the exclusion of the official planning institutions and the government.

In fact the bureaucratic state elite was authorized to function as the representative of Dutch neo-colonialism with respect to its interest at the level of the state . The administration of the huge amount of 3.5 billion Dutch guilders of development aid for

the period 1975-198511990 was entrusted to exponents of this fraction and the representatives of the Dutch state in the CONS (Figure I and 3). On the one hand, this expresses the dependent character of this class; and on the other, this can be considered an attempt towards the consolidation of its political and economic power in Suriname.

In Guyana and Trinidad, the state had greater influence in determining strategic policy issues involving state interventionism. Suriname was to a certain extent an anomaly. In the context of the huge Dutch develop­ment aid, a joint development committee with representatives of the Dutch and Surinamese state (the CONS) was influential in decision­making on strategic development issues.

Guyana, Trinidad and Suriname have in common that political parties supported by blacks dominated the political scene during state interventionism. They became the state elite and were in control of the state enter­prise sector, the administration/allocation of development funding, the policy formulation and strategic policy issues to the extent that the latter were not determined by the metro­pole.

Figure 1. Policy Decision-Making on Strategic Issues and Ethnicity in Suriname, 1949-1955, 19705

1949-1955 Policy Decision-making: 19705

Strategic issues

ns Fonnulation

Mulatto's

C n r d

e a a

e Preparation i 0 V y

c 5

Military State 1980-1988

In February 1980, State power in Suriname was seized by non- commissioned officers of the Surinamese army. The deeper background of the coup as in many postcolonial societies are attributable to the ' low' political culture, the stagnation in capitalist development , and the social problems. The low political culture on the eve of the military coup reflected stagnation in capitalist development, in the indecisiveness of the government, the disintegration of parliamentary democracy, the depolitization of the population, political instability, and corruption. Directly related to the low political culture was the weakness and discord of the ruling fraction of the middle class.

a c n n 5 e

5 e

The military leaders made several attempts to transform the social and economic structures. Various measures were taken : land reform in the interest of smallholder ' s agriculture; the development of resource­based industries, and the launching of a mass alphabetization program. Generally speaking, these attempts failed An important reason for this failure was the unrealistic expectations of the role of the state within existing production - and class relations . These projects did not yield sufficient political support, which was due to the weak organizational and mobilization structures on the one hand, and the strength of the counter ideology of the existing middle classes and the political pressure by foreign powers (USA and Holland) on the other hand.

Redemocratization and Strategic Issues in the 1980s

To understand the character of the state in the 1980s and 1990s, it is necessary to go back to the very beginning of the redemocratization process. Redemocra­tization commenced in 1983 by an informal dialogue between the Military Authority and the leaders of the traditional political parties representing the major ethnic groups (KTPI, NPS and VHP) The dialogue initiated by the military leaders should be understood as a safety measure to prevent their continued isolation which they feared could lead to loss of state power. On further observation of the background and the nature of the 'dialogue,' two points are of importance: the choice of the dialogue partners by the Military Authority and the strategic issues in the dialogue.

Two key issues probably played a role in the choice of the dialogue partners. First, they felt that the most effective way to halt the continuing isolation from the people, was to go via the emotional-affective ties of the traditional political leaders with their ethnic rank and file. Second, the military opted for dialogue partners who were willing to accept a balanced phased withdrawal of the military, leading to a sharing of State power. In particular, in the field of defense and in internal security, the power should remain in the hands of the military apparatus. This sharing of State power was laid down formally prior to the elections of November 25, 1987 in the decree of 'National Army ' which was adopted on November 19, 1987 by the National Assembly

As regards the nature of the' dialogue' and the dialogue partners, military regimes normally opt for civilians who prefer juridical­political changes to social economic changes

(Petras 19861) In the process of redemo­cratization in Suriname, emphasis was laid on juridical-political matters, such as the constitution, parliament and other State institutions.

Paradoxically, the emphasis on juridical­political issues coupled with the neglect of the dialogue on the social-economic development policy led to the crisis of the first elected civilian government after the military regime. On several political issues (such as discussions with the Dutch State on the internationalization of the development aid, and the problem of the so-called EA import and transit trade) the civilian government was confronted with the crucial choice on strategic issues that would be of influence on its existence: on the one hand, the option was to try and solve internal problems (high unemployment rate, inflation, scarcity of basic goods and the low standard of living) to guarantee internal political stability. On the other hand , the option was to try and meet the external political and economic demands of the former colonial power, in particular the implementation of a structural adjustment program and the 'internationalization' of the

. development relation between Suriname and Holland in order to enhance international creditworthiness. Ultimately, the emphasis was on meeting the external demands at the costs of solving internal problems.

Electoral Instability and Fragmentation, 1988-2001

During the 1980s and 1990s, the impact of global restructuring was felt in many Caribbean so cieti es, among others, by the falling terms of trade of primary export commodities (bauxite) and the austerity policies of international finance agencies and

donor countries. Changes in strategic policy issues and the traditional decision-making cycle in Suriname since the 1980s resulted from both internal and external developments. Internal developments relate to the military regime and the resulting changes in class and state formation, while external developments were due to the global restructuring.

This section assesses the redistribution of political power and its relation with political fragmentation and ethnic representation after the first post military elections in 1987, won by a coalition of the major traditional ethnic parties (NPS, VHP, KTPI) by almost 90% of the votes cast.

Electoral Instability

Electoral instability refers to the decrease or increase of the proportion of votes cast, related to previous elections . Electoral instability can be determined by the instability index: the sum of the procentual gains of all political parties that had an electoral growth compared to previous election results. This index ranges from 0 to 100. An index of 0 indicates no change, thus no instability. T he electoral instability is -39.4 for 1987-2000, which is quite high . The highest electoral instability in the postwar political history of Suriname (1949-2000) was calculated for the 1987-1996 period with an index of -45.4, or a decrease fo r the traditional party combination (FRONT) from 87.1 % to 41 .7% of the national valid votes cast.

Table 2. Electoral Instability, 1987-2000 Based on Valid Votes by Party/Combination

Year Front" NDP/ Other Total Millennium Parties

1987 87.1% 9.3% 3.7% 100%

199 1 54 .2% 2 1.9% 24% 100%

1996 41.7% 26.2% 32 .1% 100%

2000 47 .5% 15 .1% 37.4% 100%

Loss(-)gains(+)

1987-2000 -39.5% +5.8% +33.7 % 0%

* 1.6% of SPA that was not in the FRONT in 1987 is included in the figures of FRONT.

There are indications that the negative growth of the traditional parties in the FRONT combination becomes permanent in some districts (Nickerie, Saramacca and Coronie) In these districts the share of its electorate decreased further since 1987 to approxi­mately one third of the valid votes cast in the 2000 elections . On the other hand , new parties show a continued positive growth since 1987 in five of the ten electoral districts, including the three largest districts of Paramaribo, Wanica and Nickerie .

Electoral instability can be explained by internal and external factors (Menke 1997). Among the important internal factors are the political leadership and organization, and the changing demographic composition of the electorate. In the 1950s and 1960s, foreign influence came particularly from the colonial powers or the United States to prevent radical political or economic experiments, for instance, in Guyana in the early 1960s and Jamaica in the 1970s Since the 1980s, there is a change in foreign influences due to economic restructuring policies imposed by multilateral institutions or individual donor countries. At the same time there is the inabi­lity of many ruling coalitions to deal with global rest ructuring and imposed structural adjustment programs in a proper way.

Fragmentation and Non­traditional Coalitions

One of the possible consequences of electoral instability is fragmentation of political parties/coalitions and the birth of non­traditional government coalitions. Examples in multi-ethnic societies are Trinidad , Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. Trinidad had its first non-traditional coalition in 1986, 30

years after the first general elections were held, and Suriname after 47 years .

In Suriname the 1996 elections marked a turning point in the history of general elections. In that year the hegemony of traditional politics that was based on ethnic cleavages was terminated . Historically the traditional parties derived their electoral sup­port predominantly from one ethnic group: NPS (blackS/Creoles), VHP (East Indians) and KTPI (Javanese). Since none of the participating parties obtained the majority of seats, a broad coal ition was formed, led by the multi-ethnic National Democratic Party (NOP) of Desiree Bouterse, former leader of the military regime (1980-1987) In additi­on to the NOP, this coalition comprised three new parties (PYF, HPP, OPDA) as well as fragments (BVD, KTPI) of traditional ethnic­oriented parties or combinations.

The first general elections in 1949, 12 political parties contested . In the 1996 elections, there were 15 political parties. The largest number of political parties was in the 2001 elections (23 parties). The critical question is : are there changes in the political representation of ethnic groups since the first elections? And how is fragmentation of the ethnic representation related to political and economic power?

Fragmentation of Ethnic Representation

Ethnic fragmentation is reflected in two ways : the split of existing ethnic oriented political parties or combinations; and the representation of each ethnic group by more than one party in the national assembly. In the 1996 elections, the fragmentation of

existing political combinations or parties occurred after the elections. All three combinations of parties - Nieuw FRONT, Alliantie and DA9 1 - which had elected members in parliament suffered from splits. The ruling FRONT-coalition, which had a minority of seats in parliament, was unable to engineer a wider coalition with two other parties/combinations. Two months after the elections, the fragmentation in the Nieuw FRONT, the combination with the largest number of parliamentary seats (24), begun by the withdrawal of 5 elected Indians who established a new party This was followed

shortly by another split in Nieuw FRONT with the withdrawal of the KTPI, a Javanese party with 5 elected members. Due to the with­drawal of elected members, two other party­combinations, A1liantie and DA9l , also lost seats (Table 3).

In the meantime, attempts to form a new coalition were undertaken by the NOP, which had 16 seats. This party established a new coalition with all the members who withdrew from the original political combinations, ensu­ring the election of the President and vice­president, and the formation of a government .

Table 3. Political Parties/Combinations by Seats in Parliament Prior and After Fragmentation, Suriname 1996

Party/Combination

NOp

Nieuw Front *BVD-VHP *KTPI

DA91 (AF, BEP, OPDA) 'OPDA

A1liantie (DP,HPP, PVF, PSV) DP 'HPP 'PVF

Pendawalima

Total seats

Before Fragmentation

16

24 o o

4 o

3 o o o 4

51

After Fragmentation

16

14 5 5

3

o

4

51

• Elected members who withdrew and went in a non-traditional coalition with the NOP. Sources composed of data from Egger 1996.

In Suriname, the processes that resulted in a non-traditional coalition in 1996 were : Electoral Instability, Fragmentation, and Coalition Forming

In the 2000 elections fragmentation in terms of splitting of existing political parties, continued . The difference with the 1996 elections was that the fragmentation in 2000 occurred before the elections, resulting in 5 political parties. Two factors explain the most drastic fragmentation that ever occurred in the history of elections in Suriname: the urge to unite economic and political power; and the urge for completion of the emancipation of the ethnic group concerned.

Economic and Political Power

We deal first with the necessity to unite economic and political power. The capital accumulation developed in the 1980s by various ethnic elites necessitated political fragmentation and new alliances in order to link economic and political power. It is remarkable that two of the fragmented parties, which became part of the new government, represent important local capital groups of Indians. Another fragmented parly (the PVF) represents non-traditional trade unionism in agriculture .

As was observed earlier, control of the state in post-colonial states is the basis for the creation or further development of economic power and consolidation of ruling elites. During and after the military regime in the 1980s, the military leaders, who gradually transformed this power politically to the civili­an political party, the NDP (Menke 1991), reserved an important share of state power. This is one of the pull factors for other economic elites to prefer an alliance with the

NDP. A push factor for the economic elite to withdraw from the traditional parties is related to reduced Dutch aid inflows since the 1980s, which has been a principal source for the power basis of these parties . In addition, due to changed and more stringent procedures, the possibility of using development aid for political patronage has been reduced signifLcantly. It is no surprise therefore, that attempts to strengthen the economic power base of the 1996-200 I non-traditional coalition in Suriname is directed towards local capital and managerial groups and private capital sources in Asia, the Arab world, and Latin America.

A second factor that could explain the fragmentation of political parties is the urge for completion of the emancipation of the ethnic groups . Traditional ethnic voting, meaning that most persons of a particular ethnic groups vote for their own ethnic party, is to some extent over. The consequence of the fragmentation process is that in 1996 and 2000, variou s parties in parliament (Schalkwijk 1996) represent members of one particular ethnic group. Five parties have East Indian representatives, five parties have black representatives, three have Javanese, and another three represent Bushnegroes.

There is a certain sequence in this process of what I call 'ethnic delinking' and emancipation. The black and mixed group was the first to experience fragmentation, which started in the early 1950s. Then gradually the Indians started in the 1960s, with the highlight in 1996. As regards the Javanese, by numbers the third ethnic group, non­Javanese parties have not yet succeeded in attracting significant portions of their electorate. This is an indication that the emancipation process of this group has not yet been completed.

Ethnic Representation in Political Institutions

With regards to the issue of ethnic representation and political power we com­pared the 1949-1955 period, the 1991 and \996-2000 periods on the distributions by

ethnicity in the national assembly and the council of ministers, respectively (Table 4) . The 1949-1955 interval is the period prior to the maturing of consociational democracy in Suriname.

Table 4. Ethnic Representation in Parliament, Council of Ministers and in Suriname

Parliament Council of Ministers

Ethnicity 1949-55 1991 1996 1949-55

Creole/mixed 59% 33 % 29% 83%

East Indian 33% 35% 33% 9%

Javanese 6% 18% 20% 0%

Bushnegroe 2% 14% 14% 0%

Amerindian 0% 0% 4% 0%

Europeans 0% 0% 0% 4%

Others

Total 100% 100% 100% 100%

(63) (51) (51) (23)

* Bushnegroes are included in Creole/mixed "based on the 1980 census

••

1991 1996

50% 33%

33% 39%

17% 28%

0% 0%

0% 0%

0% 0%

100°/., 100%

(18) (IS)

Suriname

19S0 ••

39.14%'

37.8%

18.42%

,

148%

0.49%

3.17%

100%

Table 4 shows that in the 1949-1955 period, Creole! mixed had a majority both in parliament and the council of ministers . Moreover, their representation in the council of ministers is relatively much larger than the representation in the parliament. This contrasts with the 1990s, particularly the non­traditional coalition of 1996-2000, wh ich shows that ethnic distributions in parliament and the council of ministers resemble the ethnic distribution of the population as a whole . Moreover, Indians rank first in parliament and in the council of ministers . However, this does not mean that Indians have most political power. This is true because a Creole, who is a representative of the multi­ethnic NDP - the most powerful party in the coalition dominated by Creoles - held the strategic portfolio of president. However, in 2000, the president and some of the ministers founded a new party (DNP) that spliced from the NDP.

Due to the reduced aid inflows and the changed development aid procedures, which are determined much more by the donor, there is also a change in the sectors and ministries that are strategic. Consequently, the finance ministry, traditionally strategic for controlling development funds, has declined in importance. On the other hand, the growing importance and high world market prices of minerals in Suriname, such as gold , resulted in the strategic importance of the Ministry of Natural Resources .

In addition, it is important to note that in the three successive governments of 1987-1990, 1990-1991 and 1991-1996, the presi­dent of Suriname did not concentrate politi­cal power in his own hands . However, in the non-traditional coalition (1996-2000) the President did concentrate much more political power in his hands .

Strategic Policy Issues

The shift in strategic policy issues from 1975-2001 is evident (Table 5). In the pre­restructuring 1970s, emphasis was on the 'Big Push ' economic issues (hydroelectricity and bauxite projects) and on the political issue of Independence ' forced' by internal social tensions and the mass emigration to Holland. The military period (1980-1988), was characterized by anti-colonia l and nationalist issues, ranging from changing the focus and ope rat ion of the Dutc h-Suriname aid agreement to participatory democracy Of the four civilian governments in the 1988 - 2001 period, all had to deal with the impact of g lobal restructuring and the changed development relation with Holland . The difference between the traditional and the non­traditional government is that the latter opted for a combination of 'development by own financial resources ' and ' diversification of foreign financial resources' in the absence of a clear development strategy and an economic recovery program that resulted in a huge internal and external debt. The traditional governments executed relatively orthodox structural adjustment programs of a monetari st type, neglecting the importance of a coherent and integrated program, including a social safety net. At the same time, they focused on juridical-political issues to cope with the perceived 'threat' of a growing opposition and potential political power of the NDP, a multi-ethnic party led by exponents of the military regime of the 1980s. Despite differences in political framework and strategic policy issues, both the traditional and non-traditional coalit ions did not succeed in solving the major problem of a low standard of living of the population, of which the majority lives below the poverty line.

Policy Cycle

In formal terms, the traditional policy decision-making cycle is as follows. Once the priority of strategic policy issues is determined in parliamentary democracies, the formulation of policy and policy objectives are determined de jure by the parliament, de Jacto by the government. The policy preparation, including

the operationalisation of policy choices and objectives, is a task of the administration.

Table 6 shows a periodisation of decision-making on strategic policy issues. In the ongoing restructuring and the concomitant internationalization of capital, labor and development policy, the focus of donors shifted from project planning to macro­economic policy programs.

Table 5. Strategic Policy Issues in Suriname, 1975-200t

Period Strategic Issue Coalition Ethnic/Social Composition

1975-1980 • Political Independence NPK (NPS, PNR, Creole majority, • Development Aid Agreement KTPI Javanese

• Hydroelectricity & bauxite

19RO-1988 • 4 revolutionary renewals Successive civil- Major and other • Change focus and operation of Military Govem- ethnic groups

Development Aid Agreement ments

• Redemocratization & Constitutional change

1988-1990 • Amending Constitution FRONT(NPS, Major etlmic groups • Restore Development aid VHF, KTPI) • Structural Adjustment program

• Peace treaty interior war

1990-1991 • New elections Civil-Military Major ethnic groups Government

1991-1996 • Executing Structural Adjustment NEW FRONT Major ethnic groups + NPS, VHF, KTPI, largest trade unions SPA)

1996-2000 • Diversification foreign policy Non-traditional Najar and other (such as Regi onal cooperation) coalition ethnic groups

• Change Dutch - Suriname development relation

• Local goveollncnt

2001 • Strengthening democratic NEW FRONT Major ethnic groups + nation state (Trias Politic) (NPS, VHF, SPA, largest trade unions

• Good Governance Pertjaya Luhur)

• Security & territorial integrity

• Structural adjustment

At the same time, the preconditions for providing aid shifted from project execution -and evaluation to policy formulation. These changes are accompanied by reducing tradi­tional state functions, which is reflected in three processes:

I. the state is reduced to an execu­ting unit in decision making on strategic policy issues; many administrations or state institutions are reduced to 'task forces' rather than institutions which determine strategic policy issues.

u. the reduction of the state to an executing unit implies the underutilization and informalization of local professionals and techno­crats;

111. the state has lost a large share of effective political power and gover­ning capability in the process of global restructuring.

The electoral instability followed by the installation of a non-traditional government coalition (Wijdenbosch adminis­tration) in 1996, led to changes in choice of strategic policy issues and the position of the Surinamese State in the policy cycle (Table 6). This is reflected in the fact that the Surinamese State determined some of the strategic policy issues, which went at the cost of the Dutch influence. Consequently the development cooperation with Holland was terminated in strategic sectors during the 1996-2000 non-traditional coalition. A clear example is the technical cooperation for strengthening the tax system in Suriname with assistance of Dutch experts, which was not continued by this coalition.

Table 6. ChanCes In the Policy Cydeon Strateclc wues in Suriname, 1950-2001

Period net,"n1ninC Polky PoHcy PoHey Slrateclc roues Fonnullltion Preparation lmplemenbtion

50-60s - State Parliaml!Tlt Administration Executive - Colonizer

Foreign Cap.

19708 Holland Parliament Administration Executive - Cons Cons Cons- Subcommittee Executive

(Joint Suriname Dutch Cortunittce)

80-88 - Military Military -Adminiru Burocr.cy State State -Mil. State Mil State

88-96 Holland Foreign Foreign Exocutive - Multilateral Consultants Consultants State

Organization Administration Administration Task Forces

96-2000 State Foreign Foreign Executive Consultants. Conrultan" State

AdrniniSlration Administration Task Forces

2001 - Holland Foreign Foreign Executive - Multilateral Consultants Consultants State

Organi7.ation Holland Administration Administration

Conclusions and Recommendations

From 1980-2000, the role of the Surinamese State in the policy decision­making process changed due to political conflicts, electoral shifts and the impact of global restructuring. The electoral instability and the political changes in the post-military state of Suriname (1988-200 1) influenced the representation of elected! appointed members of ethnic groups in the state institutions, which resembles more or less the ethnic composition in the society as a whole in the year 2001.

At the electoral level the traditional parties (NPS, VHP, KTPI) that are affiliated with the major ethnic groups (Creoles, East Indians and Javanese) since the first elections in 1949, experienced a significant decline in the share of valid votes cast in the 1987-2000 period. Despite the fact that these parties united in the Nieuw Front (with the KTPI replaced by Pertjaya Luhur in the 2000 elections) won three of the four elections in this period, there is declining electoral support. The total valid votes cast by the New Front was 87% in the 1987 elections, 54% in 1991,42% in 1996 and 49% in the 2000 elections. On the other hand, the category of new parties other than the NDP or Millennium Combinatie (that is related to the former military leaders of the 1980s) shows a steady growth ofthe electoral support since 1987. The 8 new political parties established in the 1999-2000 period, together obtained 20.8% of the total valid votes cast in the 2000 elections, but a disproportionately low number of seats.

The differences between mobilizing and challenging parties (in Suriname mostly fragmented parties) is that "mobilizing parties develop stronger attachments among the

electorate and enjoy greater longevity in Parliament than do challenging parties" (Rochon 1985). The elections of May 2000 in Suriname demonstrated once again the strength ofthe established (traditional) parties to develop a sound electoral machine generally based on defensive campaigning, and their weakness to formulate new development policy issues. Apart from the disadvantage of not being part of a larger political combination, the mobilizing parties generally demonstrated weaknesses in building a sound electoral machine; however, these parties were relatively strong in introducing and formulating modern policy issues on development and governance.

The political decision-making process shows significant changes. It was observed earlier that in the process of global restruc­turing, the focus of donors shifted from pro­jectplanning to macro-economic policy programs, while the preconditions for provi­ding aid shifted from project execution and evaluation to policy formulation. These changes are accompanied by reducing tradi­tional state functions in various ways, among others reducing the state to an executing unit in decision-making on strategic policy issues. However, differences were identified between the traditional coalitions and the non­traditional coalition of President Wtjdenbosch (1996-2000). Some strategic policy issues (on strengthening the tax system) that were introduced during the preceding traditional New Front coalition (1991-1996) were deleted by the non-traditional coalition, which went at the cost of the Dutch influence. Despite differences in political conception and strategic policy issues, neither the traditional nor the non-traditional coalitions succeeded in solving the major problems of the population, of which the majority lives below the poverty line.

It is true that both consociationalism and political changes due to the military entering parliamentary politics influenced the representation of elected! appointed members of ethnic groups in state institutions resembling more or less the ethnic composition of the society as a whole. This is positive for harmony between ethnic groups and political stability. However, the issue of cooperation between ethnic elites via an informal brokerage system in the context of the so-called consociational democracy should not be seen solely as an attractive solution for those living in a multi-ethnic society with a potential for ethnic conflicts (Deosaran 1996).

One should consider the price and the negative elements of consociationalism as well. First, informal brokerage in order tq achieve consensus between thr elites of the various ethnic groups often hinoers effective and efficient policy decision-making. This may retard planning and the achievement of deve­lopment objectives, which in its tum might be detrimental to creating more opportuni­ties and the maintenance of the democracy.

Second, the multiplication of parties since the 1990s within the tradition ofa multi­party system, enforces the elitist character of consociationalism, and effectively excludes rather than include actors of important interest groups (NGOs, Trade Unions, Employers Associations) in the policy decision-making process.

Third consociationalism could fulfill the , fun"tion of preventing people and the ethnic segments from being organized politically on ideological or development oriented issues. On the extreme, leaders could mislead their followers by defensive campaigning or indicating the danger of ethnic conflicts rather

than focusing effectively on critical development issues.

Finally, I would like to raise two issues for managing the ethnic diversity in Caribbean societies: reform of the political system, and ethnicity in the context of regional identity.

Reform of the Political System and Governance

In multi-ethnic societies with a multi­party system in the tradition of a consociatio­nal democracy, fragmentation of political parties could have a positive function in the emancipation process of ethnic groups. However, it could also give rise to serious problems in coalition forming and decision­making. Among possible negative effects are the long time it takes to form a coalition. Anot­her problem is the weakening of and delays in decision-making due to opposing interests. This could result in increased corruption and patronage, which could be detrimental for the preserving of democracy. One possible solu­tion to the problems arising from fragmenta­tion is to change the political system, in order to reduce the number of political parties and establish appropriate procedures and formal regulations for coalition forming.

Multi-ethnic societies with the tradition of a two-party system (Guyana) pose another problem. Here the possibility of political hegemony by one ethnic group could be an obstacle to political stability and ethnic harmony. In the majority system, small and new parties are discouraged as the chance of winning a seat are far lower than in an electoral system with proportionate representation. As a consequence, a possible solution for most Anglophone Caribbean countries is to introduce in lesser or greater

extent the system of proportionate representation.

Ethnicity and Regional Identity

Caribbean countries need to develop an integrated approach to the development of a regional identity, with more emphasis on political integration, ethnic integration and democratization. This should be enhanced in the context of a multi-step and incremental integration process.

The development ofa political and social union of Caribbean states can be enhanced by a step by step approach of sub-regional unions. For example, Trinidad, Guyana and Suriname have not only historical

commonalties, but also demographic, ethnic and political similarities. Together they have a relatively large population of over 2 .5 miUion. The favorable geo-strategic location in the northern cone of South America, could form an important bridge between the continent and the Caribbean archipelago. The common ethnic composition of the populations of Trinidad, Guyana and Suriname is a core dimension of the social reality which could facilitate integration. At the political level, these countries could share experiences of the pros and cons of their political traditions in a multi-ethnic society: the Surinamese consociationalism versus the one-party monopoly in government of Trinidad or Guyana.

References

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Deosaran, Ramesh. 1996. "Political Management of Conflict in a Multicultural Society." In Choices and Change, Rej/ections on the Caribbean, edited by Winston Dookeran. Washington, IDB.

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JapAJoe, Harold. 1988. "De persistentie van etniciteit in de Surinaamse politiek; enkele sociaal­historische notities." SWI Forum voor Wetenschap en Cultuur (5) I . Foundation for Information and Development (SWl), Paramaribo .

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ANNEXES

Annex 1. Evolution of Political Parties and Combinations 1996-2000

~I Pendawalima

I Nieuw Front ! V

Alliantie

PertJoyo Luhu. Somohardjo 1

1 L1:" 1-- -- -......................... ~ 1£ ....... ....

BVD Sardjoe

V IPVFl ~

NPS Venetiaanan

+ IsPAl ~

Naya Kedarn Djawala

Coalitie Reqerinq

1996

V

HPP Kisoensingh

.................... > KTPI F Soemita

L

_ _ ND

_P_---' ........ > l __ D_P_---'

~ V DA

MilI.Dnium Comblnatie

===::::> = coalition

__ --I.~ = alliance

................. > = faction

= independent

'-----' Bouterse . PI ayfair

NPLO Wangsab.

....... ~

---

D 21 Moestadja

DNP2000 Wijdenbosch

~fAPSl1NHPl1NPWl ~ L-J L-J L-J

Annex 2 Typology of Political Parties and Voters

Established Parties

• Strong attachment voters along Traditional cleavages ( ethnic/religious)

• Strong party affiliation

• High % that decides on voting preference long before elecitons

• Relative high age of electorate

New Parties

A. 'Challenging' Party

• Most fragmented from established party

• Competes with established party for already mobilized voters within traditonally ethnic/religious segment

B. Mobilizing Party

• Introduces new issues for mobilizing voters