defense in depth: jeff stevenson federal network consultant [email protected] nmci symposium...

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Defense in Depth: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant [email protected] NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

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Page 1: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

Defense in Depth:Defense in Depth:

Jeff Stevenson

Federal Network Consultant

[email protected]

NMCI Symposium

June 18, 2003

Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

Page 2: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 2

Network Security is a Serious Issue

$202 Billion Lost Every Year by Companies to “Cybercrime”

90% of cybercrime financial losses are INTERNAL (intranets)

U.S. Government alone will experience over 300,000 Internet attacks this year

Over 400,000 WWW pages contain some form of Hacker Tools

Cybercrimes are estimated to take place every 20 seconds...

Page 3: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 3

Network attacks byinsiders are a real threat

Computer Crime and Security Survey 2001—Joint CSI/FBI survey of 538 US organizations

97% with Web sites 47% provide electronic commerce services

78% reported financial losses due to attacks—Only 37% could quantify loss monetarily—$377 million in total losses reported

49% reported incidents of unauthorized network access by insiders

Source: Computer Crime and Security Survey 2001

Page 4: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 4

Know Who’s on Your Know Who’s on Your Network– Robert Hanssen Network– Robert Hanssen

Unauthorized access to:The National Measurement and Signature Intelligence Program, involving acoustic intelligence, radar intelligence and nuclear radiation detection. The FBI Double Agent Program. The Intelligence Community's Comprehensive Compendium of Future Intelligence Requirements. A study on recruitment operations of the KGB against the CIA. An assessment of the KGB's effort to gather information on U.S. nuclear programs. A CIA analysis of the KGB's First Chief Directorate (FCD), its international intelligence division. FBI counterintelligence techniques, sources, methods and operations. .

"In one case, he compromised an entire technical program of enormous value, expense and importance to the United States Government," the affidavit states.

Page 5: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 6

Networked Servers

Information Servers Infrastructure Servers Applications Servers

What are we protecting?

Security is required to protect the privacy and integrity of server contents and to

ensure that network resources & business process availability are not

compromised

Page 6: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 7

Typical Attacks

Insider attack Social engineering Virus infiltration Denial of Service OS or application bug Infiltration via passwords Infiltration via “no security” Spoofing Trojan horse Brute force Stealth infiltration Protocol flaw or exploit

Page 7: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 8

Virtual Private Network

VPN

Current Network Security The ‘Big Picture’

Perimeter Firewall

Internet

Web Srvr(s)

Anti-Virus, Intrusion Detection

Internet

Page 8: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 9

Current Network Picture

Perimeter Firewalls Departmental Firewalls

— Assume all hacking is inter-departmental— Topology Dependent— Don’t provide for sniffing/spoofing protection— Don’t harden individual hosts

Intrusion Detection Systems— Only “detects” and do not “protect”— IDS “signatures” have to be updated— Only deal with known protocol deficiencies or known

applications— IDS can be “Noisy”, forwarding many “False Positives”

Distributed anti-virus— Signature based and needs to be updated

Page 9: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 12

Introducing the 3Com Embedded Firewall

Implements distributed tamper-resistant firewalls at the NIC

Enforces security policy at the network connection

Limits network access on a “need-to-know” basis

Creates protected enclaves Provides intrusion

resistance Allows for asset

management

Policy Server

Management Console

EmbeddedFirewalls

Page 10: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 13

Introducing Hardware Based Distributed Firewalls

3Com Firewall Cards with 10/100 LAN— Embedded Firewall— With security co-processor— Offload IPSec to the card (VPN Acceleration)

Centrally managed policies on remote machines Easy deployment, manageability and upgradeable

— Via policy server which manages servers, desktop and laptops

Tamper Resistance— Cannot be turned off by malicious code— Policy cannot be changed or disabled by user— HW based Firewall

Page 11: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 14

DARPA Is Excited About Embedded Firewall

“EFW demonstration tremendously successful…identified by the U.S. Navy as the most promising technology. The Navy has begun the process of programming and budgeting to buy these EFW’s in bulk.in bulk.”

– April 2002 DARPA Fact File– http://www.darpa.mil/body/Newsitems/

darpa_fact.html

“Distributed firewall technology places a firewall inside every computer on a network…providing much more robust protection than a single network firewall.”

– April 2002 Testimony to U.S. Congress

Page 12: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 15

EFW Combines the Best of Hardware and Software

EFW provides the advantages of hardware security—Unlike software firewalls, EFW is extremely

tamper resistant “Throwing more security software at a security problem

that is caused by the essentially insecure nature of software is like going to a blind barber -- it can only end badly and, more likely than not, bloodily.” - Software Security is Soft Security - John Pescatore, Gartner Research Vice President

EFW also allows the flexibility, mobility and central management of distributed software

Page 13: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 16

Implementation approaches: software/personal firewall

Protects the local OS and applications from network attacks

Firewall actions visible to OS, applications, and users

Relies on OS for firewall integrity Attacker or applications could

bypass or interfere User may have some control over

rules within software Successful external attacks

demonstratedHost Hardware

Apps

Mail

Web

Host OSSFW

Page 14: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 17

Vulnerabilities of software firewalls

The OS modifies or turns off the firewall.

The firewall is intended to protect the OS.

Software firewall

Operating System

Hostile Code or User

Page 15: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 18

Implementation approaches: Embedded Firewall

Firewall actions transparent to OS, applications, and users

Independent of local OS Unable to Bypass Tamper-resistant User has no control over

rules— Centrally managed

Secure against external attack

Examples: 3Com Embedded Firewall

Embedded Firewall

Host Hardware

Apps

Mail

Web

Host OS

Page 16: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 19

Superiority of Embedded Firewalls

Packets intercepted and examined before

being sent to OS

OS sends information to embedded hardware for

examination

Operating System

Embedded Embedded FirewallFirewall

Hostile Code or UserHostile Code or User

Page 17: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 20

Components of the 3Com Embedded Firewall

Policy Server—Centrally creates, defines and distributes security

policies to the NICs Management Console

—Provides intuitive user interface 3Com 10/100 Secure NICs with Embedded

Firewall—Executes the packet filtering rules dictated to it

by the Policy Server

Page 18: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 21

Embedded Firewall Domain

Up to 3 Policy Servers per domainManagementConsole

Policy Server

Policy Server

Policy Server

PrimarySecondary

Primary Policy ServerSecondary Policy Server

PrimarySecondary

DomainTertiary Policy Server

Page 19: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 22

Create Protected Enclaves

FinanceR&D Marketing

1st floor

2nd floor

Provides access on a “need-to-know” basis…

Topology independent—Don’t need to configure

at every point in the path—Policies are role based

Enclaves can limit access to:

— Individual devices—Host based applications

- Enclaves

Page 20: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 23

EmbeddedFirewall

Applications

Page 21: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 24

No Sniffing

Good insiderGood insider logs into Telnet server logs into Telnet server Bad insiderBad insider sniffs the password from the LAN sniffs the password from the LAN No sniffing policy is pushedNo sniffing policy is pushed

• Hostile insider is unable to sniff passwordsHostile insider is unable to sniff passwords

Win 95/98/2000 Client

EmployeesSenior Managers withConfidential information

Windows 2000 Server

Data

Data

Data

Good Insider

Bad Insider

Policy Server

Page 22: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 25

THREATCON Alpha

Protocols and/or addresses can be restricted on a per host basis as INFOCON changes

— Block all port x traffic to a user’s machine— Block a service from a specific subnet

Win 95/98/2000 Client

EmployeesSenior Managers withConfidential information

Windows 2000 Server

Data

Data

Data

Alpha

Alpha

Policy Server

Internet

Page 23: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 26

THREATCON Bravo

Win 95/98/2000 Client

EmployeesSenior Managers withConfidential information

Windows 2000 Server

Data

Data

Data

Alpha

Bravo

Policy Server

Internet

• Each host can be at a different INFOCON level• Changing INFOCON is easy

• No user action required• No rebooting required

Page 24: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 27

No Denial of Service

Win 95/98/2000 Client

EmployeesSenior Managers withConfidential information

Windows 2000 Server

Data

Data

Data

Good

York(Zombie)

Policy Server

Internet

York is a zombie launching a DDOS attack against the server— Good insiders cannot access the server

“Block all” policy is pushed to the zombie— Service is restored to good users

Page 25: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 28

The Internal Network: Uncontrolled Inventory

SQLBootstrapTFTPFingerHTTP(Port 80)Sun RPCNetBIOSSNMPInternet relay chatHTTP management…

Message Send ProtocolFTP (Port 21)SSH remote loginTelnetSMTP (mail)Host name serverLogin host protocolDomain name server

Ports/Protocols

IP Addresses

64,000 Ports & Dozens of Protocols are allowed in and out of this system

Unprotected System

Millions of Ports & Protocols

are allowed in and out of this Network

Leave Everything Open – Use Whatever You Want. Anyone Can Attach.

Page 26: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 29

Asset Control – Defined by Security Administrator

Ports/ProtocolsIP Addresses

Only services (protocols)

required & portsnecessary to supportservices are open on

this system

SQL

HTTP (Port 80)

SNMP

FTP (Port 21)

Telnet

Login host protocol

Protected System

Access Control Policy

Use Only

What’s Allowed!

Page 27: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 30

Contractor Workstation:E-mail Access

On workstation, enforce the following rules:—Allow access to/from IP address of e-mail server—Allow port 110 for POP traffic—Deny all other traffic

Contractor workstation

POP

E-mail Server

Page 28: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 31

Hardened FTP Server

On FTP server, enforce the following rules:—Use Windows 2000 pre-defined rule set—Use FTP Server pre-defined rule set to allow the host

to accept/provide file transfers using FTP—Deny all other traffic

FTP

FTP ServerFTP Client

Page 29: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 32

Sensitive Information Server

On server, enforce the following rules:—Same rules as Hardened Server—Allow traffic to/from specified IP addresses—Deny all other traffic

IP

HR Server

192.165.3.1

192.165.22.17

Page 30: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 33

Network Attack Response(In Real Time)

If an attack is detected, IT administrator can:—Block outgoing traffic from attacking host—Block all traffic on critical servers to prevent further

damage/proliferation of attack—Block protocols or ports used in attack

Compromised ServerAttacking Host

Page 31: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 34

Summary Need-to-know policies can be enforced at each node in

real-time 3Com Embedded Firewall is tamper-resistant -

embedded in the NIC and independent of the operating system

Provides security on both servers (extranets) and hosts. Auditing enhances intrusion detection Complements the Perimeter Firewall Centrally managed and controlled – transparent to the

user Remote/traveling user support Supported by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency).

Page 32: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

3Com Corporate TemplateRev 04/00 page 35

Embedded Firewalls Meet Today’s Security Challenges

Provides protection for every computer Know who’s on your network Stops hackers at the most likely point of

entry, the network connection Provides managed security controls Protects your valuable network assets Distinguishes users based on role or

function, not “outsider” versus “insider”

Distributed Embedded Firewalls are complementary to existing Distributed Embedded Firewalls are complementary to existing network-centric solutions, enabling a “Defense in Depth” strategynetwork-centric solutions, enabling a “Defense in Depth” strategy

Page 33: Defense in Depth: Jeff Stevenson Federal Network Consultant jeff_stevenson@3com.com NMCI Symposium June 18, 2003 Securing the Desktop in a Managed Environment

For more information, please visit www.3com.com