defense at & l magazine · 2019-10-22 · documentation. dfars clause 252.204-7012 is required...

DEFENSE A PUBLICATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY | dau.edu November-December 2019

ACQUISITION

Protecting Critical DoD Information

Intelligence Acquisitions

Policy Complexity Drives Critical Thinking

Disasters in the Making

When Critical Thinking and Ethical Persistence

Do Not Converge

Learning at the Speed of Relevance

The Quest for Rapid Acquisition

There Are Some Who Call Us … Test?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 Protecting Critical DoD Information Tim Denman Myriad vulnerabilities affect defense information—given the various contractors’

networks, systems and subsystems that handle the information.

6 Intelligence Acquisitions Policy Complexity Drives Critical Thinking

Carol J. McIlwain, Ph.D., and Christopher J. PageChallenge-driven leadership, focused on problem solving, can advance

technology’s state of the art.

14 Disasters in the Making When Critical Thinking and Ethical

Persistence Do Not Converge Sherwood “Woody” Spring and Robert L. Tremaine

Almost all accidents or disasters follow warning signs that could have resulted in avoidance of the catastrophe.

19 Learning at the Speed of Relevance

Joni Dowling, Ph.D., and Ryan Johnson, Ph.D.

Developing new technology is no longer a guarantee of success in global defense matters; it is important to more quickly integrate and adapt to the new technology.

22 The Quest for Rapid Acquisition There Are Some Who Call Us … Test?

Lt Col Mark Massano, USAF A key to success at the speed of rel-

evance involves Test early and through-out programs.

2

6 14 19 22 27

DEFENSEACQUISITION | November-December 2019 | 1

Article preparation/submission guidelines are lo-cated on the inside back cover of each issue or may be down loaded from our website at https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/p/Writers-Guidelines. Inquiries concerning proposed articles can be made by e-mail to [email protected] or by phone to 703-805-4282 or DSN 655-4282.

Subscribe/unsubscribe/change of address: Fill out, sign, and fax or e-mail the subscription form in this issue, or download the form at https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/DATLFiles/Sept-Oct2018/DEFACQ%20Subscription.pdf.

Privacy Act/Freedom of Information ActIf you provide us your business address, you will be-come part of mailing lists that are public information and may be provided to other agencies upon request. If you prefer not to be part of these lists, use your home address. Do not include your rank, grade, ser-vice, or other personal identifiers.

Defense Acquisition (ISSN 2637-5052), formerly De-fense AT&L and earlier Program Manager, is published bimonthly by the DAU Press and is free to all U.S. and foreign national subscribers. Periodical postage is paid at the U.S. Postal Facility, Fort Belvoir, Va., and additional U.S. postal facilities.

POSTMASTER, send address changes to: DEFENSE ACQUISITION DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY ATTN DAU PRESS STE 3 9820 BELVOIR ROAD FT BELVOIR VA 22060-5565

DisclaimerDefense Acquisition magazine promotes the free ex-change of ideas. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Acquisition University, the Department of Defense, or the United States Govern-ment. Articles are in the public domain and may be reprinted or posted on the Internet. When reprint-ing or posting, please credit the authors and Defense Acquisition.

Some photos appearing in this publication may be digitally enhanced.

Vol XLVIII No. 6, DAU 271

Published by theDEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

Ellen Lord

DAU PresidentJames P. Woolsey

DAU Chief of StaffJoseph Johnson

Director, DAU Operations Support GroupLeo Filipowicz

Director, DAU Visual Arts and PressRandy Weekes

Defense Acquisition Editorial StaffManaging Editor/Senior Editor, DAU Press

Benjamin Tyree

Art DirectorTia Gray

Online Content Editor Collie J. Johnson

Production ManagerFrances Battle

Online SupportNina Austin

Copy Editor/ Circulation Manager

Debbie Gonzalez

Editorial SupportNoelia Gamboa

Michael Shoemaker

DEFENSEACQUISITION

27 Whom Can You Trust? Mitigating Security Risk in Industrial Base Investments Daniel M. Hartnett Manipulation by foreign states increasingly threatens the security of U.S.

industrial base investments.

30 System Integration Enabling Capability Through Connectivity Eugene A. Razzetti System integration is a major failing in many programs. Success is more

likely when program managers focus on integration throughout the pro-gram, not just at the end.

36 Contracting Officer Leadership The Essential Ingredient Michael P. Fischetti, J.D., CPCM, CAE U.S. national security requires dramatic improvement in “cost, schedule

and performance” of the defense acquisition system.

41 Credibility: The Second Currency of Acquisition Col Todd E. Wiest, USAF Opening dialogue with users and addressing what they want will help

increase our credibility with stakeholders.

44 Cutting Time and Costs for Controlled Substance Orders Zachary S. Connor A Web-based application developed by the Joint Medical Logistics Func-

tional Development Center dramatically cut order processing and delivery time and expense.

ALSO13 MDAP/MAIS Program Manager Changes

26 Statement of Ownership

6 14 19 22 27 30 36 41

2 | November-December 2019 | DEFENSEACQUISITION

Protecting Critical DoD Information

Tim Denman

Denman since 2015 has been the Defense Acquisition University’s Cybersecurity Learning Director and leads a geographically dispersed team. The team specializes in cybersecurity workshops and training.

A SERIOUS THREAT EXISTS THAT THE NATION’S ADVERSARIES MAY GAIN access to defense information covered by the Department of Defense (DoD). Deal-ing with this threat and establishing accountability is difficult when the information resides on networks, systems and subsystems that belong to contractors and subcontractors. Furthermore, the great complexity of acquisition programs means that covered defense information—also known as

DoD-controlled unclassified information (CUI)—is protected through contractual requirements to ensure protection throughout the program life cycle, from the earliest stages forward.

The DoD has taken several steps to safeguard information, and these steps encompass policy, training and enhanced communication. These steps include:• Developing Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)/leveraging Federal standards—DFARS

Clause 252.204-7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting, National Institute of Stan-dards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfed-eral Systems and Organizations

• Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technologies Task Force (PCTTF)—Secretary of Defense Memorandum, October 2018

• Town Halls, training and workshops—collaborative effort between Defense Acquisition University (DAU), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD[A&S]), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD[R&E]), Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer


(ODoD CIO), Defense Contract Management Admin-istration (DCMA), and NIST Manufacturing Extension Partnerships (MEP)—began in July 2018

• Other initiatives—including communication efforts, col-laborative training efforts and ongoing partnerships

Developing DoD Policy, Leveraging Federal PolicyCovered defense information is unclassified controlled information or other information associated with the performance of a contract and requires safeguarding. Examples of this information include technical draw-

ings, blueprints, plans, reports, computer software and documentation. DFARS Clause 252.204-7012 is required in all contracts except for those solely for the acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf items. This clause describes how covered defense information must be safeguarded and requires contractors and subcontractors to imple-ment the security requirements included in NIST SP 800-171, Rev 1 (Protecting CUI in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations), when covered defense infor-mation is involved.

DFARs 252.204-7012 requires the program office/requir-ing activity to:


• Mark or otherwise identify in the contract, task order or delivery order covered defense information provided to the contractor by or on behalf of, DoD in support of the performance of the contract.

DFARs 252.204-7012 also requires the contractor/sub-contractor to:• Provide adequate security to safeguard covered defense

information that resides on or is transiting through a contractor’s internal information system or network.

• Report cyber incidents that affect a covered contractor information system or the covered defense information residing therein, or that affect the contractor’s ability to perform requirements designated as operationally criti-cal support.

• Submit malicious software discovered and isolated in connection with a reported cyber incident to the DoD Cyber Crime Center.

• Submit media/information as requested to support damage assessment activities.

• Flow down the clause in subcontracts for operationally critical support, or for which subcontract performance will involve covered defense information.

Establishment of the Protecting Critical Technologies Task ForceOn Oct. 24, 2018, the Secretary of Defense established the Protecting Critical Technologies Task Force (PCTTF). His memo establishing this Task Force stated the following:

I am committed to protecting the Department’s criti-cal technology. Each year, it is estimated that American industry loses more than $600 billion dollars to theft and expropriation. Far worse, the loss of classified and controlled unclassified information is putting the Department’s invest-ments at risk and eroding the lethality and survivability of our forces. Solving this problem will require an integrated effort across the Department. Because of the cross-cutting nature of the problem, I am establishing the Protecting Criti-cal Technology Task Force (PCTTF).

This task force includes the Secretaries of the Mili-tary Departments; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff ; OUSD(R&E), OUSD(A&S); USD for Policy; USD for Intelligence; Director of Cost Assessment and Program

Evaluation; DoD CIO; Commandant of the Marine Corps; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Director, Defense Security Service; U.S. Army Counter Intelligence; Naval Criminal Investigative Service; Air Force Office of Special Investigations; and any other representatives as deemed necessary by the Director.

While the statement above establishes a clear connec-tion to the protection of covered defense information, the closing statement brings the importance of protecting DoD covered defense information into even greater focus. This statement reads:

Working with our partners in the defense industry and re-search enterprise, we must ensure the integrity and security of our classified information, controlled unclassified infor-mation, and key data. The impacts of the loss of intellectual property and data cannot be overstated—we must move out to protect our resources and our forces.

Town Halls, Training and WorkshopsFor DoD acquisition policy to be effective, it must be understood and applied consistently across the military Services and the cross-departmental civilian Fourth Estate. Because of the criticality and time sensitivity of safeguard-ing covered defense information, DAU’s role is especially important in training the acquisition workforce. In 2018, DAU Foundational Learning Directorate (FLD) Cyberse-curity Professors Chris Newborn and Paul Shaw began meeting with industry and government agencies such as the NIST Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) and the Defense Contract Management Agency to train the acquisition workforce and industry on the implementation of DFARS Clause 252.204-7012.

Because of the criticality and time sensitivity of safeguarding covered defense information, DAU’s role is

especially important in training the acquisition workforce.


In July 2018, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) representatives Vicki Michetti (Director of Cybersecu-rity Policy, Strategy, International Engagement, and the Defense Industrial Base [DIB] Cybersecurity Program, under the DoD Chief Information Officer); Melinda Reed (Program Protection Policy Lead, USD[R&E]); and Mary Thomas (Program Analyst for the Principal Director, De-fense Pricing and Contracting [DPC], in the USD[A&S]), began co-presenting at DAU-sponsored Town Halls related to covered defense information and the DFARS clause listed above. Additionally, the three OSD representatives, in collaboration with DAU FLD Cybersecurity Professor Kim Kendall, developed a short series of videos discussing the principles of the DFARS clause 252.204-7012. These and related videos can be found on the DAU website at https://media.dau.edu/channel/CyberSecurity/62925431.

As of this writing, DAU and OSD have collaborated on five separate Town Hall events in four locations, ranging from San Diego, California, to Huntsville, Alabama, and trained more than 500 people on this important subject. Vicki, Melinda and Mary have been well received at each event and have answered many excellent questions generated by participants. In collaboration with OSD, DAU also has

led monthly covered-defense-information Town Halls and Workshops for more than 500 additional industry and acquisition workforce members at multiple locations during Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. Several follow-on events are scheduled through the end of FY 2019 and will continue into FY 2020.

Other InitiativesDAU is forging a relationship with the DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3), DoD-Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Col-laborative Information Sharing Environment (DCISE), and is building a partnership with the Defense Security Service (DSS) Center for Development of Security Excellence. In addition, opportunities will be available to share and co-host courses, post training content on websites, and

co-develop course curricula. Establishing a partnership with these DoD organizations that have unique subject-matter expertise will enable DAU to train the acquisition workforce required to protect covered defense information to support the warfighter and meet its mission.

DAU also plans to post a video on its website in the near future presented by Professor Chris Newborn on safe-guarding covered defense information, and that video will cover education and training implementation discussion from a DAU Town Hall on the DoD and Industry protec-tion of covered defense information. Newborn also began hosting a series of webinars in April, running through September 2019, addressing the challenges and sharing lessons learned related to implementing DFARS clause 252.204-7012. Finally, DAU continues to update its train-ing across acquisition career fields to reflect the latest policies and guidance in cybersecurity and protecting covered defense information.

Summary As stated by the Secretary of Defense, “The impacts of the loss of intellectual property and data cannot be over-stated—we must move out to protect our resources and

our forces.” OSD, DAU, DCMA and many other organiza-tions take this warning very seriously. Through DFARS clause 252.204-7012, the DoD is making great strides to protect covered defense information that resides on the DoD contractors’ networks. An expansive communication, education and training effort is under way and the entire acquisition workforce must continue to be vigilant in this seemingly endless battle.

For more information on steps that DAU and other orga-nizations are taking and if you would like a Town Hall or workshop in your area, please contact the author at the e-mail address below.

The author can be contacted at [email protected].

DAU continues to update its training across acquisition career fields to reflect the latest policies and guidance in

cybersecurity and protecting covered defense information.

https://media.dau.mil/channel/CyberSecurity/62925431


INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITIONS

Policy Complexity Drives Critical

ThinkingCarol J. McIlwain, Ph.D. n Christopher J. Page


McIlwain is Senior Leader for Acquisition for Naval Intelligence. Page is the Command Information Officer at Naval Intelligence Activity (NIA).

IN THEIR STRATEGY+BUSINESS MAGAZINE (SPRING 2018) AR-ticle “How to Cultivate Leadership That Is Honed to Solve Prob-lems,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Professors Deborah Ancona and Hal Gregersen described the secret to generating boundary-spanning innovation through establishing

an environment for solving really hard, edgy, cool problems. “Chal-lenges are cherished at MIT because they offer opportunities to test and prove one’s skill and push the boundaries of what is possible. Presented with some barely achievable objective, people dive in to work the problem, and the more wicked the problem the better.” MIT calls this challenge-driven leadership, a focus on problem solving to push the state-of-the-art for technology.

In the December 2018 United States Naval Institute’s Proceedings maga-zine article, “Naval Intelligence’s Lost Decade,” the author describes former Chief of Naval Operations ADM Gary Roughead’s November 2009 memorandum referencing the actions of Spanish explorer Hernan Cortes in motivating his men to conquer the new world by leaving no means of escape. The boats were burned and Cortes’ men had the choice of conquer the land or die trying. This action is a metaphor for bold, decisive actions required to spearhead organizations through fundamental change to achieve exceptional performance. The ar-ticle explains that industry has moved forward in mass digitalization, artificial intelligence, robotics and rapid technological change; however, this fundamental change has yet to occur within Naval Intelligence. Leveraging these industry achievements requires acquisition and the ability to acquire industry efforts through a contractual agreement. The complexity of intelligence acquisition policy challenges the Department of Defense (DoD) to leverage industry’s technological achievements, particularly in a rapid response environment.

BackgroundThe Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) started operations on April 22, 2005, resulting from the Sept.11, 2001, at-tacks and a post-9/11 investigation proposing sweeping change in the Intelligence Community (IC), including the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The Intelligence Reform and Terror-ism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 was signed into law on Dec. 17, 2004. The DNI serves as the head of the IC, overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget and acting as the principal advisor to the president, National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security.

As depicted on ODNI website:

The core mission of the ODNI is to lead the IC in intelligence integration, forging a community that delivers the most insightful intelligence possible. That means effectively operating as one team: synchronizing collection, analysis and counterintelligence so that they are fused. This integration


is the key to ensuring national policymak-ers receive timely and accurate analysis from the IC to make educated decisions. The mission of ODNI is to lead and support IC integration; delivering insights, driving capabilities, and investing in the future. The vision of ODNI is a decisive national security advantage through agile leadership of the IC.

As outlined in IRTPA of 2004, the DNI is respon-sible to:• Ensure timely and

objective national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior military commanders, and Congress.

• Establish objectives and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence.

• Ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within IC.

• Develop and ensure the execution of an annual budget for the NIP based on budget proposals provided by IC component organizations.

• Oversee coordination of relationships with the intelli-gence and security services of foreign governments and international organizations.

• Ensure the most accurate analysis of intelligence is de-rived from all sources to support national security needs.

• Develop personnel policies and program to enhance the capacity for joint operations and to facilitate staffing of community management functions.

• Oversee the development and implementation of a pro-gram management plan for acquisition of major systems, doing so jointly with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)for DoD programs, that includes cost, schedule and per-formance goals and program milestone criteria.

Sixteen organizations compose the IC: Air Force Intel-ligence, Surveillance and Reconnaisance Agency; Army Intelligence; the CIA; Coast Guard Intelligence; Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Energy Department; Depart-ment of Homeland Security (DHS); Department of State;

Treasury Department; Drug Enforcement Administra-tion (DEA); the FBI; Marine Corps Intelligence; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); National Recon-naissance Office (NRO); National Security Agency (NSA); and Office of Navy Intelligence—as illustrated in Figure 1.

There are six basic intelligence sources or collection disciplines: signals (SIGINT), imagery (IMINT), measure-ment and signature (MASINT), human-source (HUMINT), open-source (OSINT), and geospatial (GEOINT). SIGINT is derived from signal intercepts comprised of communica-tions (COMINT), electronic (ELINT), and foreign instru-mentation signals (FISINT).

The integration of intelligence information within specific sources or disciplines, as well as across sources and dis-ciplines, creates the ability to link actions and events that might otherwise be considered independent. Figure 2 illus-trates intelligence discipline integration. This also creates complexity across the 17 intelligence organizations that have pieces of the intelligence discipline within a greater organizational structure, such as the military Services that are part of DoD and the Coast Guard that is part of DHS but maintains a role with DoD.

The U.S. Intelligence budget has two components: NIP and Military Intelligence Program (MIP). NIP includes all programs, projects and activities of the IC to include other

Figure 1. Intelligence Community Network with ODNI as Nucleus

Source of figures: Carol J. McIlwain.

State EnergyDHS

Treasury

ODNI

DEA

FBI

CoastGuard

MarineCorpsNavyArmy

AirForce

DIA

NGA

NSA

NRO

CIA


IC programs designated jointly by the DNI and the head of department or agency, or the DNI and the President. MIP is devoted to intelligence activity within the military depart-ments and agencies in the DoD that support tactical U.S. military operations.

ODNI’s role for integration creates a common picture for intelligence collec-tion and analysis, information, and policy. ODNI influ-ences the 16 other intelligence organi-zations by influenc-ing the budget for each organization. DoD organizations receive a combina-tion of NIP and MIP; NIP used for the national common efforts and MIP used for specific Service mission. Figure 3 depicts the integra-tion of the IC into a common database for information. De-lineating and lever-aging the budgeting

and execution of NIP and MIP funds affords optimal intelligence performance.

Policy ParadoxDoD acquisition policy regarding developing de-fense systems is found in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.01 The Defense Acquisition System and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, Operation of De-fense Acquisition System. The Defense Acquisition System is a process-dependent, decision-making system to mature technology from basic research to system disposal. The process has decision points or milestones to evaluate progress and consciously decide to invest further funding for system development. Developed systems transi-tion from development phase into procurement phase and then operation and maintenance phase. Operational commands operate and maintain the systems that are developed and procured by the acquisition commands.

For acquiring services, the applicable policy is DoDI 5000.74, Defense Acquisition of Services. The policy

assigns responsibilities and provides procedures for defin-ing, assessing, reviewing, and validating requirements for the acquisition of services. The policy authorizes decision authority consistent with statutory and regulatory require-ments for the acquisition of services allowing tailoring

Figure 2. Intelligence Discipline Integration

SIGINT

IMINT

MASINT

HUMINT

GEOINT OSINT

Figure 3. Common Intelligence Picture

SIGINT

IMINT

MASINT

HUMINT

GEOINT OSINT

State

EnergyDHS

TreasuryDEA

FBI

CoastGuard

MarineCorps

Navy

Army

AirForce

DIANGANSA NRO CIA

ODNI -- Common Intelligence Picture


of procedures to best achieve cost, schedule and perfor-mance objectives.

Conversely, IC acquisition policy is found in Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 800, Acquisition, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance; Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 801.1, Acquisition; and Intelligence Com-munity Standard (ICS) 801-4 IC, Services Acquisition. Each armed Service/organization also has its own acquisition policy providing more specific details for execution. The relationships between these two policy foundations are not always consistent, and the overarching document addressing the overlap of DoD and IC acquisition is the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the SECDEF concerning the Management of Acquisition Programs executed at the DoD Intelligence Community Elements dated March 2008.

The MOA provides that ODNI and DoD will jointly conduct oversight for wholly or majority NIP-funded acquisition programs. Quarterly, the parties are to jointly review and assess program execution against Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)-approved baselines for cost, schedule and performance. As the SECDEF sets policy for DoD, the MOA flows down to military Services, requiring joint management, unless an alternative agreement has been documented. Although specific policy is not established in practice for non-Major System Acquisitions (MSA), the ex-pectation is that MSA policy provides the guidance for best practices in implementation. Figure 4 depicts a simplified

overlap of DoD and IC policy for acquisition; however, Title 50 includes DoD authority for specific purposes.

IC MSA are equivalent to DoD Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and II programs: (MSA Research, Develop-ment, Test and Evaluation [RDT&E]) greater than $200 million (Fiscal Year [FY] 2017 base year), ACAT I RDT&E greater than $480 million (FY 2014 base year), and ACAT II RDT&E greater than $185 million (FY 2014 base year). ACAT III programs are all others not considered an ACAT I or II. DoD ACAT III programs require oversight, per the DoDI 5000.02. For the Navy, below ACAT III is further bro-ken into ACAT IVM, ACAT IVT, and Abbreviated Acquisi-tion Program (AAP).

DoDI 5000.74 established oversight of service acquisitions through a Senior Service Manager (SSM) citing a program management chain-of-command from program manager to SSM. This service policy tailors the acquisition to five service categories, dollar-based.

The MOA between DNI and SECDEF states that “wholly or majority NIP-funded acquisition programs shall be executed according to IC acquisition policy. This will be implemented through direct reference of the DNI policy in DoD 5000.” The SECDEF and DNI may delegate MDA to a DoD IC element agency head for wholly or majority NIP-funded acquisition program. The delegation would be cap-tured in a formal memorandum, with review conducted by Deputy Director National Intelligence/Acquisition (DDNI/

Figure 4. DoD and IC Policy Overlap

Key: ASN(RDA) = Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; DFARS = Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; DoDI 5000 = Department of Defense Instruction 5000 on acquisitions; FAR = Federal Acquisition Regulation; IC = Intelligence Com-munity; IC 800 = IC 800 series acquisition directives; NMCARS = Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement; ODNI(AT&F) = Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Acquisition, Technology and Facilities); ODNI(CIO) = ODNI, Chief Information Officer; SCI = sensitive compartmented information; SECNAVINST = Secretary of the Navy Instruction; U.S.C. = United States Code.

FAR andDFARS, butFlexibility in

meeting

ODNI (AT&F)and ODNI (CIO)responsible for

acquisitions

Acquisitionof Systems:

IC 800seriesIC 800

(TBD)acquisitionof services

ICAcquisition

Title 50U.S. Code

Title 50U.S. Code

ODNIpolicy &

protocols

FAR, DFARS,

NMCARS, and IC

contracts

FAR, DFARS,

andNMCARS

DoD 5000.01/.02,SECNAVINST

5000 series, andIC 800 series

Acquisition of Sytems:

DoD 5000.01/.02,and SECNAVINST

5000s

DoDI5000.74,

SECNAVINST5000.41 andIC 801.4 for

Services

Acquisition of Sytems:

DoDI5000.74,

SECNAVINST5000.41

ONIAcquisition

Title 10and 50

U.S. CodeSECNAVINST

S5460.3(Management and oversight

of SCI)

SECNAVINST5400.15

(Roles of CNOand

ASN (RDA)

DoD/NavyAcquisition

SECNAVINSTS5460.3

(Management and oversight

of SCI)

SECNAVINST5400.15

(Roles of CNOand

ASN (RDA)

Title 50 includes some DoD-speci�c authority.


AQ) and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment for assurance that a mature, repeatable and fundamentally sound acquisition program is in place prior to the recommendation of the delegation of MDA. A joint assessment will be accomplished at least annually to as-sess need for changes of MDA delegation.

Organizational System PerformanceThe intelligence mission is unique and drives the establish-ment of intelligence commands that must perform both operations and acquisition functions. The same command organization develops, procures, operates, maintains and disposes of the systems. This is a paradox for military ser-vices that traditionally separate the roles into operational commands and acquisition commands. Even Combatant Commands have recognized acquisition missions. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) established an acquisi-tion center within the command. Transportation Command and Cyber Command have an Acquisition Executive and Program Executive Offices (PEOs).

The intelligence mission is data-oriented, requir-ing an information technology (IT) platform that may interface with other military Service plat-forms of aircraft, ships, submarines and space-enabling systems. This drives an IT-oriented workforce regardless of the primary acquisition discipline. The March-April 2018 Defense ATL magazine article, “Including Cybersecurity in the Contract Mix,” emphasized that cybersecurity crosses all acquisition disciplines: program man-agement, IT, engineering, test and evaluation, finance, logistics and contracting, and should be included in the earliest phases of contract planning from acquisition planning to contract maintenance and closeout. It is imperative that the contracting officer understand the program’s cybersecurity requirements and construct a con-tracting strategy to determine whether offerors are capable of delivering those requirements. Fig-ure 5 reflects the intelligence acquisition puzzle of balancing requirements across all policies and initiatives.

IT and Chief or Command Information Officer (CIO) RoleAll IC elements, to include those of the DoD Armed Services, depend heavily on Information Technology, Information Management, and Cy-bersecurity (IT/IM/CS) capabilities to enable the prompt and sustained conduct of their assigned missions. It is imperative that those elements gain and maintain the freedom of action needed to acquire such capabilities in a manner that maximizes Intelligence mission value by meeting

or beating cost, schedule and performance requirements linked to threats and/or opportunities. To an increasing de-gree, that necessary freedom has less to do with the tradi-tional work of “making things” and more to do with buying services securely from the most innovative segments of the commercial marketplace. This shifts policy implementa-tion from DoDI 5000.02 and developing systems to DoDI 5000.74 and acquiring services.

In order to become an effective buyer of commercial IT services, the IC elements of the DoD Armed Services must master the performance of IT/IM/CS Service Manage-ment (SM) functions based on commercial best practices. Mastery will arise from each element’s IT, Acquisition and Mission Business Owner (MBO) teams working together with commercial subject-matter experts to learn how best to balance in a hybrid fashion the operation and mainte-nance of specialized capabilities that must, because of mis-sion imperatives, remain on-premises and the consumption of commoditized services provisioned by external entities,

Figure 5. Intelligence Acquisition Puzzle

Supply Chain Strategic Intelligence vs. Management Sourcing Acquisition in DoD or IC in DoD Expertise or IC

Appropriations DNI and (RDT&E, SECDEF CyberOPN, O&M) MOA Threat Framework

Acquisition Lead vs. CIO IT MIP vs. NIP Require- ments

Risk Mgt Framework DoD vs. IC Operational vs. Program policy vs. Risk Mgt Acquisition Mission


particularly commercial entities involved in the provision-ing of properly secured cloud services.

The DoD CIO is the principal staff assistant and senior ad-visor to the SECDEF and Deputy SECDEF for IT (including national security systems and defense business systems), information resources management (IRM) and integration efficiencies; therefore, the DoD CIO is responsible for all matters relating to the DoD information enterprise, such as cybersecurity, communications, information systems and more. This role and responsibility flows down to the military Services and organizations of the Fourth Estate (i.e., predominantly civilian, non-Service sectors of DoD). The DoD CIO role complements the role of the MDA for IT systems and Defense Business Systems.

In comparison, the IC CIO is the MDA for IT systems for national intelligence mission as established by National Security Act of 1947, Section 103G:

The IC CIO shall manage activities relating to IT infrastruc-ture and enterprise architecture requirements, have pro-curement approval authority over all IT items related to the enterprise architectures of the IC components, direct and manage all IT-related procurement for the IC, and ensure that all expenditures for IT and research and development activities are consistent with IC enterprise architecture and the strategy of the Director for such architecture.

Critical ThinkingFor programs that intersect DoD and IC, specific “rules of the road” for that acquisition need to be established and managed differently. Developing an acquisition strategy accommodating the intelligence acquisition puzzle requires a network or decision-tree diagram approach with inter-sections leading to multiple forks. Choosing the right fork is a risk-based decision. The shift from an organization doing IT to procuring IT through service models of Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IAAS), Platform-as-a-Service (PAAS), and Software-as-a-Service (SAAS) changes the skills required for the organization. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certifications are required for personnel managing acquisitions through establishing requirements and purchasing these IT services. Leverag-ing commercial industry may advance technology but also increase risk to cybersecurity.

The overlap of knowledge from multiple career fields sheds insight between the fields. In the March-April 2018 Defense AT&L magazine, the article “Interdisciplinary Competence” described the benefits of interdisciplinary knowledge:

Integrated and interdisciplinary teams achieve better prob-lem-solving skills by leveraging common knowledge. Results from academic institutions and a 3M Company study sup-

port the development of depth and breadth in disciplines to achieve exceptional performance… Complex problems cross disciplinary fields and require the use of multiple disciplines to develop a solution… An interdisciplinary perspective requires bridging knowledge between disciplines to address complex problems. Successful teams integrate multiple disciplines to frame a problem, agree on a methodological approach, and collaboratively analyze data. Exceptional teams do a better job of integrating knowledge… Greater integration of disciplinary knowledge enables the develop-ment of more effective critical thinking and innovative ideas than are possible in traditional multidisciplinary teams.

Critical thinking encompasses the process of actively conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing and evaluating information to resolve a problem or draw a conclusion. Acquisitions for the intelligence mission benefit from critical thinking and the ability to reconcile the applicable policy between DoD and the IC. Critical thinking will springboard the Naval Intelligence mission, as well as DoD Intelligence mission, to yield the results envisioned by Roughead.

ConclusionComplexity influences the ability to balance planning with the chance to anticipate and respond to changing condi-tions and feedback. The integration of operational and acquisition within the same command adds complexity; however, this complexity affords the opportunity to more closely align the user and developer expertise, a challenge for command structures that are separated. Agile acquisi-tion principles emphasize the users’ involvement through-out the acquisition with feedback shaping each iteration.

In addition, the overlap of policy further adds integration complexity affording the workforce the opportunity to apply critical thinking. In simplistic situations, separa-tion and reduction of the whole into smaller manageable pieces achieves optimal performance. However, under complexity where the whole is not a summation of the pieces but something different, leveraging the integration of operational and acquisition can achieve nonlinear per-formance. The expression, “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts” reflects a nonlinear relationship versus a linear relationship. SOCOM has experienced favorable performance with an acquisition center embedded within an operational command.

The Intelligence acquisition mission is different from other defense acquisition missions, requiring understanding of related problems and developing different solutions. The expertise of the workforce is different, requiring an integra-tion of knowledge across disciplines for teams, as well as individuals. Critical thinking enables identifying the critical aspects of policy integration across all policy owners to


ensure appropriate policy implementation without com-promising the intelligence mission.

Intelligence acquisitions afford individuals the opportu-nity to work complex, as well as really hard, edgy, cool problems, and to generate boundary-spanning innovation while developing critical thinking acumen. The leaders of organizations such as MIT, Google, Microsoft, and Apple understand developing a forward-thinking workforce

means challenging them at every level. In order to accom-plish this effort, continuous training within their expertise and across other fields is needed. Intelligence acquisition requires elements of the fast-paced commitment of agile project management to leverage technology advances and maintain a cutting-edge mission.

The authors can be contacted at [email protected] and [email protected].

MDAP/MAIS Program Manager Changes

With the assistance of the Office of the Secretary of De-fense, Defense Acquisition magazine publishes the names of incoming and outgoing program managers for major de-fense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and major automated information system (MAIS) programs. This announcement lists recent such changes of leadership for both civilian and military program.

ArmyElanor “Jeannie” Winchester relieved Col. Donald Burton as product director for General Fund Enterprise Business Systems (GFEBS) on May 13.

Preston Pysh relieved Lt. Col. Rodney Turner as prod-uct manager for Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM) on May 23.

Col. Jack Taylor relieved Col. Gregory Coile as the proj-ect manager for Tactical Network on July 1.

Lt. Col. Sherida Whindleton relieved Lt. Col. Timothy Sugars as the product manager for Waveforms on July 1.

Lt. Col. Sung In relieved LTC Kelvin Graves as the prod-uct manager for Tactical Cyber and Network Operations on July 1.

Col. Senodja Sundiatawalker relieved Col. Donald Hurst for the project manager of DoD Biometrics on July 2.

Lt. Col. Johnathan Nelson relieved Lt. Col. Rob Barnhill as product manager for Vehicle Systems Integration (JLTV-VSI) on June 4.

Michael Sprang relieved Col. Shane Fullmer as project manager for the Joint Program Office, Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JPO JLTV) on June 6.

Lt. Col. Raymond Yu relieved Lt. Col. Michael Baker as product manager for the Joint Tactical Radio System Embedded/Handheld/Manpack (JTRS-E/H/M HMS) on June 13.

Col. Calvin Lane relieved Col. William Jackson as the project manager for Utility Helicopter on July 14.

Col. Guy Yelverton relieved Col. James Mills as the project manager for Precision Fires Rocket and Missile System on July 15.

Col. Gregory Fortier assumed role as the project man-ager for Future Vertical, July 12.

Lt. Col. Shawn Chuquinn relieved Lt. Col. Shermoan Daiyaan as product manager for the Tactical Mission Command (TMC) on June 20.

Lt. Col. Tyler Tafelski relieved Lt. Col. Jared Novak as product manager for Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems (SPHS) on June 30.

Lt. Col. Matthew Peterson relieved Lt. Col. Joseph Herman as the product manager for Apache Develop-ment and Modernization on Aug. 7.

Lt. Col. William Reker relieved Lt. Col. Preston Hayward as the product manager for Global Combat Support Systems (GCSS) - Army on Aug. 9.

Navy/Marine CorpsCAPT Shaun A. Swartz relieved CAPT Robert D. Croxson as program manager for Multifunctional Infor-mation Distribution System (MIDS) (PMA/PMW 101) on July 2.

CAPT Jason M. Denney relieved CAPT David D. Kindley as program manager for F/A-18 & EA-18 Aircraft (PMA 265) on July 11.

CAPT Kevin J. Watkins relieved CAPT Joseph B. Hornbuckle as program manager for Naval Air Traffic Management (PMA 213) on July 29.

Edward E. Quick relieved Shannon E. Seay as program manager for Navy Enterprise Business Solutions (PMW 220) on Aug. 1.

mailto:[email protected]


Text to fit the SpaceSubhead Main

Byline


DISASTERS in the Making

When Critical Thinking and Ethical Persistence

Do Not Converge

Sherwood “Woody” Spring Robert L. Tremaine

The 1986 explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger.NASA Photo.


Spring, a graduate of West Point and former test pilot and NASA astronaut, and pro-gram manager, is a professor of Engineering, Test and Evaluation, plus Science and Tech-nology Management at the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) West Region in San Diego, California. He is also a chief learning officer for all Western Ranges and a regional executive coach. Tremaine is the Associate Dean for Outreach and Mission Assistance where he is responsible for providing a wide variety of time-urgent workplace solutions for defense acquisition customers in the West Region of DAU. He holds DAWIA Level III certifications in Program Management and in Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering (SPRDE) functional areas, and is an instructor, course manager, mentor and leader in various capacities. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Air Force Academy, and a master’s in Research and Development from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).

The 1986 explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger.NASA Photo.

AFTER ALMOST EVERY ACCIDENT OR DISASTER, THE postmortem analysis invariably uncovers telling signs along a consequential chain-of-events leading up to the catastrophe itself. At a key point, there was a high probability that someone could have helped change the

future. In two well-known cases, people spoke up but were over-ruled by senior management professionals exercising something far worse—their reluctance to think more critically, thereby falling victim to the likely catastrophic consequences. What if they had dug a little deeper and exercised more divergent thinking? What else did they fail to consider? This article addresses those “whys, “hows” and “whats.”

Learning Through the Forensics When a major system has an accident or near accident, an investigation board convenes. Replete with subject-matter experts, this multi-disci-pline team hunts for the root cause and contributing factors.

After combing through what they have at their disposal (e.g., mate-rial, processes and interviews with personnel involved with both) they pursue multiple related questions in their inquiry: Why did the space shuttle explode? Why did the plane crash? Why did the nuclear power plant leak radiation? Why did the oil rig release hundreds of thousands gallons into the ocean? If the evidence points to a manufacturing pedigree issue, why did the part fail? Was it poorly designed? Were the design tolerances exceeded and why? Was there a manufacturing abnormality? Did counterfeit parts/material sneak into the assembly line? Did an unknown design defect finally materialize? On the other hand, if the basic cause was operator error, why did that error occur? Was it due to inadequate training, lack of currency, poor judgment, poor instrumentation or simply work overload? Did the previously unknown problem that materialized pose an immediate safety concern that was prematurely dismissed or discounted? Did the affected personnel understand the severity of the situation but have little time to fully as-similate the “fix” in a way that could overcome any impending danger? Was the operator impaired due to some sort of psychological trauma or physical illness?

Only after the possible root causes and contributing factors are fully understood along the chain-of-events can corrective measures be


established to significantly reduce the risk of future recur-rences. And more important, what was missing to promote deeper thinking to prevent the catastrophe in the first place? Who did what or why not?

The Missing VariablesThose of us in the acquisition profession who find our-selves on the training side of the equation have discovered what sometimes gets overlooked, or too hastily minimized all too often—the importance of critical thinking, and its inextricable link to ethical persistence. Aside from nurturing functional exper-tise, the need to reinforce both of these qualities couldn’t be more vital. In their absence, how can the professional Defense Ac-quisition Workforce who oversee the development, production and sustain-ment of weapons possibly ensure that they are lethal, safe and give our war-fighters the competitive advantage they deserve in the battle sphere? Our ex-periences as practitioners alone constitute a rather convincing argument as far as an ideal training princi-ple goes to meet that end. As simple as it sounds, it’s all about conditioning our students to ask the “whys” and “hows” back in their respective workplaces, and thereby more fully prepare them for unattended consequences. Rarely will you find a course or workshop at the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) without some combination of both. Critical thinking and ethical considerations are carefully woven into many of these learning opportunities along with the necessary functional focus. More and more though, DAU is driving its students to think more about their own thinking (AKA metacognition), by asking a lot of “whys” well before they ever get to the “hows” and “whats.”

Striking the Learning Chords in ClassIn a DAU classroom, the colorful NASA videos and slides of nominal mission profiles and life on orbit demonstrate the marvel of space travel, notwithstanding the inherent risks. However, using the NASA Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia accidents as the medium for a facilitated discussion quickly magnifies the potential perils. Traveling

at speeds fast approaching 25 times the speed of sound is clearly a wonder albeit a treacherous one. For Challenger, 73 seconds after it launched on its 10th voyage in Janu-ary 1986, an O-ring failed causing one of two Solid Rocket Booster struts to pivot, rupturing the external fuel tank. Tens of thousands of gallons of fuel cascaded into a white-hot exhaust. Challenger was gone.

During Columbia’s Feb. 1, 2003, liftoff, a briefcase-sized piece of foam insulation peeled away from the external

fuel tank. At about MACH 2.5, that fragment struck and shattered the carbon epoxy leading edge of Columbia’s left wing. Days later, upon re-entry, part of the thermal protection on the leading edge of the left wing vanished, enabling a jet of hot plasma gas that literally melted the critical wing structure and its em-bedded sensors. Columbia was gone.

At NASA, the risks were well known. Theoreti-cally, what could go wrong is considered in every case. Backed by empiri-cal evidence afterward, a finding of what actually goes wrong, what could have been done and what should have been done generally leads to some-thing more obvious as seen in both tragedies. The

forensics for these disasters provide a well-documented account of the more dominating leadership decisions at all levels. Did NASA’s leadership back on Earth that these two crews trusted discount the telling signs of a potential disaster? Whatever environmental and cultural pressures reduced their natural propensity to think more critically in the context of ethical persistence helped shepherd a more heartbreaking destiny along the causal chain of events.

During class discussions (with 20/20 hindsight), most students fervently agree that neither accident should have occurred. Students start asking, “What were they thinking? How could they ignore the clues? Why didn’t they take any action?” No one intentionally ignored the signs. However, both accidents appeared to simply represent leadership imprudence and reluctance to challenge their own beliefs or accept the recommendations from others. A shortage

As simple as it sounds, it’s all about

conditioning our students to ask the “whys” and “hows”

back in their respective workplaces, and thereby

more fully prepare them for unattended

consequences.


of critical thinking and ethical persistence sprinkled with group think, cognitive bias, conation and maybe a bit of hu-bris allowed these two accidents to occur. There are many ways to depict it. Figure 1 illustrates one particular way that highlights the susceptibility of our declarative knowledge in addressing “why” individuals decide to act (or not) and where ethical persistence should enter the decision loop but may not do so.

One technique that NASA and the testing community frequently employs is the 60-Minutes Challenge by as-suming the worst consequence (e.g., destruction, severe injury or death) relating to the situation or problem under consideration. Imagine a “60 Minutes” reporter with a mi-crophone rushing toward you, demanding: What did you know, when did you know it, and what did you do about it? It’s time to defend your action or absence thereof. The 60-Minutes Challenge promotes more critical thinking, ethical persistence, and the likelihood of any accompany-ing regrets.

Two Hypothetical Situations to ConsiderNothing stirs curiosity and challenges our own behavior more like these cataclysmic disasters when it comes to influencing the action we would take next, especially when we think about our role and action in the chain-of-events. The test community is no stranger to these scenarios. They face them with regular frequency when a system finds itself at the outer edges of its operating envelope. Although

the following two scenarios are fictitious, they serve to test our own resolve along these salient lines:• What will I do if or when I am placed in a similar situa-

tion? • Will I take the time to think more deeply, and act accord-

ingly to break the chain of events and prevent something like this from happening on my watch, and how far will I go?

• Is ethical persistence part of my decision equation?

Scenario 1 You are the Test Lead on a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) for a Fourth Generation Fighter involved in the development testing for a modification at the customer’s request. As a part of the sale, the customer wants the Fighter certi-fied for operations at Mach 3. The aircraft can do Mach 3, but is not designed for sustained operations there. You already know that an aircraft traveling at these kind of speeds generates excessive temperatures. Its kinetic energy converts to tremendous heat through compres-sion and friction. After the flight test, you notice that the air inlet became deformed and the canopy was still too hot to touch after the flight. Both developments raise safety concerns. In your view, the system failed the test, luckily without a catastrophic result. When test results are sent to the program office, the staff there let you know that they don’t plan to share the results since they firmly believe that the FMS customer would never fly at Mach 3. You wonder why and ask. Your program office counterpart said that

Figure 1. A Look at How We Decide to Act or Not to Act

Source: Adapted from the article “Conation as an Important Factor of Mind,” William G. Huitt, Sheilia C. Cain, Educational Psychology Interactive, Valdosta State University, Valdosta, Georgia, 2005.

Establish Declarative New Belief Knowledge Images/Visualization No

Yes

External Disposition Disposition Conation Action Stimulus or Attitude Critical or Attitude to Ethics (Plan and (Emit Overt (Argument or to Think Thinking Take Action Determination Commitment) Behavior) Proposition) Critically

Employ 60- Con�rm Minutes Test Previously Held Belief

Develop Procedural Knowledge

Environmental Feedback

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinetic_energy

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinetic_energy


he will document what you sent and that “should be good enough.” But that’s not good enough for you. You contact your 0-6 and explain your concerns. She says that she’ll follow up, and take it from here. A couple of months go by, and you later find out that the sale went through. Your cu-riosity compels you ask your O-6 if the FMS customer was notified of the limitations. She said they have what they need to know, and you decide that’s good enough. What do you do?• Stop testing because the

data are good and you trust the team?

• Keep testing because the program manager needs the data and hope nothing bad happens?

• Raise your concerns to the program manager and the base safety of-ficer to get another look at the test cases with aviation safety in mind?

Scenario 2 You start noticing signs that your chief test pilot might have a drinking problem. Occasionally, he shows up at work late smelling of spirits and seems a little unsteady. You’re concerned about his safety and that of oth-ers around him whenever he’s in the air. Until now, you’ve modeled your behavior after him. He is a highly decorated veteran of two wars and has logged more than 10,000 flight hours and 200 combat sorties. He is a legend within the fighter community and one of the hum-blest officers you have ever encountered. If you speak up, you might ruin his career and maybe call to attention to your own if you’re wrong. What if it’s not alcohol you smell? You are in charge and responsible for your team. You decide to speak to your supervisor, and he says he’ll check it out. A month goes by, and you haven’t seen a change. The smell of spirits is still prevalent. Your orders come through for your next assignment to the Pentagon. What do you do? Some choices:• Ignore the situation, keep flying and hope nothing goes

wrong.• Hold off doing anything because he is an experienced

test pilot and you don’t want to jeopardize his career.• Confront him as the concerned test lead and own the

problem. Challenge his behavior and your concerns, and take any appropriate action.

The day before you depart, the chief test pilot has a Class A mishap. His aircraft is totaled, and he is killed. There is talk that he failed to eject. In both cases, what did you know, when did you know it, and what did you do about it? If you did nothing, or decided to transfer “ownership responsi-bility” to someone else or someone more senior, yet you believe they did not act as you would have, what inhibited further action on your part? Was it a lack of consideration

for more critical thinking, and its inextricable link to ethical persistence when it mattered the most? When fully invigorated, these are powerful combinations to meet the challenges required by more rapid acquisition pursuits riddled with risk as well as time-ur-gent operational demands saturated with danger.

SummaryIf we relentlessly employ more critical thinking along with the tenacity of ethical persistence, the decisions that warrant both will go well beyond acting on declarative knowledge alone. Without experienc-ing these challenges and failures through hands-on learning simulations in class, the acquisition workforce is more likely

to experience them for the first time, which might be too late. NASA had no shortage of technical experts. Seem-ingly, they may have run short of ethical persistence. Both failures didn’t live in the technical world. They lived outside it. More recently, Boeing Aircraft Corporation faced a test of its own. When Boeing could have taken “reasonable precautionary measures” to immediately ground the 737 MAX 8 aircraft after the second crash, it chose not to. If two relatively new airplanes of the same model crash shortly after each other under what appears to be under similar circumstances, why did regulators need to wait until they knew for sure what caused the crashes before they took action? As a regulator, what would you have done to be more critical and ethically persistent? More important, what will you do next time as an acquisition professional in your role along the causal chain of events, especially when the life of others could be placed at risk?


...These are powerful combinations to meet the

challenges required by more rapid acquisition pursuits riddled with

risk as well as time-urgent operational demands saturated

with danger.




Learning at the Speed of Relevance

Joni Dowling, Ph.D. n Ryan Johnson, Ph.D.

Dowling is a Learning Director in the Contracting Foundational Learning Directorate at Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Johnson is Instructional Systems Designer in the Enterprise Integration Directorate at DAU.

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (2018) ENCOURAGES THE ACQUISITION COMMUNITIES TO FOS-ter a competitive mindset. This competitive mindset requires business practice reforms for superior perfor-mance and affordability, replacing outdated business practices that have contributed to our increasing un-responsiveness. The need for speed of relevance requires many of us to rethink how we currently do things. As stated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, “Success no longer goes to the country that develops a

new technology first, but rather to the one that better integrates it and adapts its way of fighting.”

Resuscitating existing authorities and repacking old ideas or decade-old streamlining practices may look like sufficient change for those who cannot get out of their comfort zone. If this statement causes a reaction, it was meant to do so because your attention is needed. As members of this acquisition community, we can be part of the problem. Transition-ing from a complacent to a competitive mindset requires transformation or deep change. In his 1996 book, Deep Change: Discovering the Leader Within, Robert E. Quinn opined that, unlike incremental change, deep change requires a new way of thinking and behaving. It requires innovative thinking. Innovative thinking comes from learning to solve complex problems in a nontraditional way. If we change how we learn, we can solve complex problems. Innovation should not and cannot be


limited to our research and development community. In-novative thinking should be inculcated into our day-to-day work life.

Innovative thinking needs to be present at every level of our acquisition community…whom we recruit, whom we promote, and whom we retain. A holistic approach involves innovative thinking not only with the program manager and his or her acquisition team but with policymakers, academic community, human capital management, finance and industry. We can either continue operating as we have been, which will mean staying stuck in old ways of thinking, or we can learn how to change the equation and be part of the solution.

Business practice reforms can start with you and your ac-quisition team through innovative learning at the speed of relevance. This article will give you tips on how to improve the way you learn and enhance your ability to make good business decisions that foster a competitive mindset. Being part of the solution will mean exploring new ways to learn. Improving the way you learn can change your perspective and commitment to acquisition excellence. We cannot solve wicked acquisition problems using only successful methods of the past, including our methods of teaching and learning. Deep change comes from new ideas. So, let’s get started.

First, we need to understand how our brain works. Neu-roscientists now recognize that our brain operates in two different ways—focused mode and diffuse mode (see Barbara Oakley’s 2014 book, A Mind for Numbers: How to Excel at Math and Science). Our brain’s cerebral hemi-spheres support these two distinct modes that are associ-ated with learning. The focused mode (left side of brain) is a narrow thought process that filters out information that does not fit a given situation based on past experiences. The diffused mode (right side of brain) is more tolerant of ambiguities and remains adaptive, taking in more nonlit-eral, nonverbal clues to assess situations through sensing and perceptions.

As adult learners, we often tap into prior experience to guide our decision making. While this has many posi-tive benefits, it can impede “outside of the box” thinking. We should be striving to create new neural pathways to

solve new problems. Instead we continue to solve today’s problems with solutions using old neural pathways that were used to solve problems from our past. This is referred to as the Einstellung effect or tendency to habitually rely on our existing cognitive framework which results in negative consequences of innovativeness. Transformational experi-ences, or “ah-ha” moments, are lost by relying too heavily on existing cognitive frameworks; but when we are able to let go of stagnant ways of thinking, or when new meaning is given to prior experiences, we can see old problems in a new light (see Jack Mezirow’s 1990 book, Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood: A Guide to Transformative and Eman-cipatory Learning).

Unfortunately, relying on existing cognitive frameworks often is why we see no real change; even with the advance-ment of technologies, deep change has not occurred. Past thinking often divided brain functions into hemi-spheres—left brain or right brain with one side playing a more dominant role. The new school of thought is that this is simply not true. In order to solve difficult problems, we must include diffuse mode thinking, and as long as we are consciously focused (i.e., using focused mode) we are blocking our abilities to use the diffuse mode. In order for us to have a competitive mindset as decision makers, policymakers and practitioners within our complex defense acquisition environment, we need to switch between these modes in performing different activities. A new way of learning is required by the acquisition workforce, with a greater emphasis on adult learning principles, as well as an overhaul of our business processes and human develop-ment programs. We need deep change in the way that we learn in order to problem solve the wicked problems our Defense acquisition community faces.

Second, we need to understand how our brains store infor-mation. Research findings of neuroscientists and psycholo-gists concluded that the most effective way for information to be stored in our brains is through encapsulating ideas into chunks of information (i.e., smaller pieces or sequence learning tasks), so that the information received can be properly stored in our memory systems. Using the focused mode side of our brain to chunk learning activities can help transfer information into our working memory. As these newly form chunks of information enter our brain, the dif-fuse mode function of the brain can retrieve these chunks

Transformational experiences, or “ah-ha” moments, are lost by relying too heavily on existing cognitive

frameworks; but when we are able to let go of stagnant ways of thinking, or when new meaning is given to prior

experiences, we can see old problems in a new light.


to form innovative ideas and problem solving, thus avoiding the Einstellung effect.

Learning more effective ways to learn and interleaving focused mode and diffuse mode techniques can lead to better problem solving. Hermann Ebbinhaus, considered a pioneer of memory research, published a book in 1913, titled Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology, and suggested that we learn best by forgetting. This may sound counterintuitive at first, but when we return to mate-rial studied once, and then largely forgotten, the relearning of that material strengthens neural connections. If this pro-cess is repeated over time, known as spacing, the brain cre-ates even stronger, more permanent connections. There-fore, enhancing the learning process also involves recalling newly learned chunks of information using a retrieval practice (i.e., knowledge review quiz or practice exam used in an academic settings or recalling information learned by testing yourself instead of rereading the material). Retrieval practice is a knowledge retention strategy that provides a better opportunity for storing the information gained and transferring it into our long-term memory system, espe-cially when you are unfamiliar with the content.

Another knowledge retention strategy involves interleav-ing information. Interleaving information means organizing information by intermixing rather than grouped by topic or type. Increased learning performance occurs when a subject, e.g., statistics, was being introduced, individuals will understand and retain more information when after each lesson, a set of practice exercises follows that provide a brief review of concepts that were learned several days or weeks prior. This interleaving technique creates a degree of time intervals or space between learning which enhances memory retention and learning performance. Terry Kidd and Lonnie Morris explained this process as modular learn-ing in their 2017 book, Handbook of Research on Instructional Systems and Education Technology. Modular learning is the process of chunking new information using interleaving technique and time intervals.

Third, we need to increase the use of technology. More than a decade of research and met-analysis led Claire Wladis, Katherine Conway and Alyse Hachey in a 2017 article, titled “Studies in Higher Education,” to conclude that the learning outcomes are the same for both online and traditional classroom learning. Integrating technol-ogy and modular learning into the Department of Defense and Armed Services academic settings will enable the speed of relevance, as current research findings suggest and improve learning outcomes. As we reform our busi-ness practices for superior performance to increase our national defense responsiveness, so must our academic and training communities embrace the use of technology in the design, development and delivery of information.

Ultimately, increasing job performance through learning, memory retention and relevance of material.

Fostering a competitive mindset, for me, is where the sense of urgency comes from … the need for protecting our democratic society and providing our warfighters with the tools and resources they need to defeat our adversaries. As leaders of the Free World, our national defense posture de-pends on all members of the acquisition workforce. Parts of what we do require deep change. Oakley’s salient points remind us that we need to be willing to “learn how to learn” using new and innovative methods and we need to expect this willingness from our colleagues as well as ourselves. Our future truly does reside in our brains!


Sources and Suggested Reading List

Barbara Oakley, A Mind for Numbers: How to Excel at Math and Science, (New York, New York: Penguin Ran-dom House, 1999).

Hermann Ebbinhaus, Memory: A Contribution to Experi-mental Psychology, (New York, New York: Columbia University, 1913).

James Mattis, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, (National Security Strategy Archive, 2018).

Jack Mezirow, Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood: A Guide to Transformative and Emancipatory Learning, (New York, New York: Joey-Bass Publishers, 1990).

Robert Quinn, Deep Change: Discovering the Leader Within, (San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Publish-ers, 1996).

Terry Kidd and Lonnie Morris, Handbook of Research on Instructional Systems and Educational Technology, (Her-shey, Pennsylvania: IGI Global, 2017).

Claire Wladis, Katherine Conway, and Alyse Hachey, “Using Course-Level Factors as Predictors of Online Course Outcomes: A Multi-Level Analysis at a U.S. Urban Community College,” Studies in Higher Education, Vol. 42, No. 1: 184-200, (2017).




Illustration by Jim Gray

THE QUEST for Rapid Acquisition

There Are Some Who Call Us … Test?

Lt Col Mark Massaro, USAF


Massaro is Chief of the Policy, Programs, and Resources Division, Headquarters Air Force Test and Evaluation (AF/TE) in the Pentagon. He is an experimental test pilot with extensive test experience in fighter aircraft. The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense nor of the Department of the Air Force.

ONE OF THE MOST RECOGNIZED BARRIERS TO NEW TECHNOLO-gies transitioning into usable capabilities is the “valley of death,” that gap between promising technologies and the resources required to transition them to warfighting capabilities.

Demonstrations, experimentation and prototyping combined with experienced test professionals are all paths to bridge that valley. However, as an experienced test professional who can help with transition, I have often had the im-pression that the Test Enterprise is viewed as the Black Knight from “Monty Python and the Holy Grail,” a comic villain whose only purpose was to stop or slow progress even when the quest was noble. Instead, I think Test is more like Tim the Enchanter from the same movie. The quest was well under way when he was brought on-board, but he quickly understood the importance of King Arthur’s quest. Once a part of the team, he provided early and valuable insight into the difficulties they faced and continued on their quest with them to provide data about their threat’s big pointy teeth.

Those reading this publication are likely aware of the 2018 National Defense Strat-egy (NDS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) push to restore readiness and increase lethality to achieve decisive advantages against competitive adversaries. What the audience here may be less aware of are the unique Service responses to answer the NDS’ call to “deliver performance at the speed of relevance.”

Let’s look at how the Air Force Test Enterprise is postured to increase performance and affordability. As a critical element in acquisition of these capabilities, the Air Force Test Enterprise focuses on enabling increased performance through


innovation and streamlined rapid, iterative developmental and fielding approaches.

This is not the first time that the Air Force Test Enterprise has responded to the need for speed in acquisitions. In its 2004 response to the Air Force shift to evolutionary acquisition and the spiral and incremental development processes, Headquarters Air Force Test and Evaluation (AF/TE) published Air Force Instruction (AFI) 99-103 Capabilities Based Testing. AFI 99-103 consolidated into a single policy document aimed at integrating test planning and execution three separate test policy documents (AFI 99-101, Developmental Test and Evaluation; AFI 99-102, Op-erational Test and Evaluation; and AFI 99-105, Live Fire Test and Evaluation).

After 2018 National Defense Strategy was published, the Air Force acquisition community pivoted to rapid acquisi-tions, including utilizing Middle-Tier Authorities (Sec-tion 804) and tailored DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 programs. In response, AF/TE published a policy guidance memorandum that described policy guidance for Test and Evaluation of rapid acquisition programs (Middle-Tier Acquisitions, tailored DoDI 5000.02 programs, and Experiments). The Jan. 10, 2019, memo highlighted five key messages that form the basis for how the Air Force Test Enterprise can best support these programs. These five key messages are:• Test and evaluation’s main goals are to reduce risk and

provide data to inform acquisition decisions or answer warfighter capability questions.

• Rapid acquisition relies on a cycle of rapid learning; test and evaluation is the primary means of learning.

• Delivering performance at the speed of relevance still requires independent testing (“independent” refers to chain of command separation from program offices).

• Rapid does not mean reckless, nor does it mean ignor-ing the “ilities” that make a system suitable as well as operationally effective.

• The key to rapid testing is early and continuous tester involvement during a program.

In addition to the memorandum informing the update to AFI 99-103, it also helped shape the acquisition commu-nity’s soon-to-be published AFI 63-146, Rapid Acquisition Guidance. Rather than discuss the intricacies of policy, it is better to explore these key messages through a vignette that illustrates how early test involvement through pro-totyping and experimentation can enable the delivery of performance at the speed of relevance.

As I suggested earlier, one of the Test Enterprise’s meth-ods to help transition technologies across the “valley of death” is through demonstrations or experimentations using experienced test professionals. One such way this is done by test is through the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Test Pilot School (TPS) Test Management Project (TMP) program. TMPs are part of TPS’ curriculum through which students and staff work with various custom-ers to plan, execute and report on a short-duration test program. TMPs are a graduation requirement for students, but TPS staff sometimes conduct TMPs outside of the curriculum when a program exceeds the scope of curriculum requirements or the timeline does not synch with the academic calendar. What follows is a discussion on a TPS staff-led TMP, aimed at helping to

The U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School’s NF-16 Variability Stability In-Flight Simulator Test Aircraft (VISTA).Photos from the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School


advance technology through the valley of death in order to increase performance and lethality.

Born out of previous attempts to integrate flight control and weapons delivery functions in tactical aircraft (Tactical Data System and Integrated Flight and Fire Control pro-grams), USAF TPS staff hatched a plan to enable the transi-tion of a promising technology into a warfighting capability. In 2017, with DoD funding, the staff began a demonstration exploring the feasibility of a fighter aircraft-based auto-matic gun-tracking capability against air-to-air and air-to-ground targets named Digitally Enhanced Aiming Through Control Law (DEATH CLAW). DEATH CLAW had three objectives: (1) Demonstrate the automatic capability of the DEATH CLAW system to aim the gun in flight, (2) compare human performance against the system’s performance using air targets and both moving and stationary ground targets, and (3) identify plans to transition the system into Block 30 and Block 40/50 F-16 fighter jets.

The demonstration kicked off in August 2017; executed 12 test, evaluation and demonstration missions from No-vember 2017 to January 2018; and issued a final report in March 2018. An 8-month program is rapid by any mea-sure, but unheard-of for flight control law development. Even though it was fast, the test demonstration applied the appropriate rigor necessary to ensure that technical

and safety risk were acceptable and that the data collected would be useful for decision makers. TPS collaborated with Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, Calspan, the 412th Test Wing and the 416th Flight Test Squadron to plan, execute, and report on the demonstration. It was flown using the USAF TPS NF-16 Variable Stability In-Flight Simulator Test Aircraft (VISTA).

The VISTA provides a safe way to rapidly fly and update flight control law software. In essence, it takes off like a normal F-16. But, once airborne, the test aircrew members activate the test configuration control law, giving them the ability to rapidly evaluate new designs. During this demonstration, the VISTA provided the test team with the capability to fly DEATH CLAW in a controlled manner against both air and ground targets. After each mission, the team reviewed data and was able to update the control algorithm. The ability to rapidly iterate this cycle sped up the process.

The demonstration consisted of an integration and check-out phase, formal testing phase and a final demonstration phase. Integration and checkout lasted 1 week and ensured that the DEATH CLAW algorithm could be safely flown and operated as expected. The team flew three times and ensured DEATH CLAW integration with VISTA while refin-ing some of the control laws. The formal evaluation

VISTA Heads Up Display images overlaid with data showing a precise comparison between DEATH CLAW and manual pilot tracking.

Even though it was fast, the test demonstration applied the appropriate rigor necessary to ensure that technical

and safety risk were acceptable and that the data collected would be useful for decision makers.


immediately followed the integration phase. The team ex-ecuted six missions over 1 week during which six different test pilots executed the same mission profile to evaluate the full air and ground target test matrix. Finally, the team executed the demonstration phase using three pilots in leadership positions from Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) and the Air National Guard (ANG) with varying levels of experience and back-grounds. Following the successful, TPS-led demonstration, both the USAF and the ANG funded integration efforts on their F-16 fleets. The ANG plans to begin flight testing on its Block 30 F-16s in 2020 at the ANG Air Force Reserve Command Test Center (AATC).

The DEATH CLAW demonstration proved successful and achieved its three objectives, paving the way for future platform-integration efforts. Estimates showed that costs savings were 90 percent and time savings were 80 percent of what normally would be expected for this type of a pro-gram. Success depended on early involvement of the right kind of test and test support organizations. The USAF Test Pilot School, the 412th Test Wing, Calspan, and Lockheed Martin brought deep knowledge and experience in flight-control development and testing. This combined team proceeded rapidly without being reckless.

Contributing to planning early in the timeline, the test team members used their knowledge of the risk analysis process to effectively and quickly understand and mitigate safety and technical risks. Furthermore, the program’s limited scope enabled the team to focus and succeed in demonstrating a performance improvement of a lethality enhancement’s technological readiness. It also supported rapid learning during the integration and checkout phase through quick, focused iterations that included experts from the entire team. While limited in scope, the project demonstrated that the test enterprise is able to rapidly pro-duce relevant data to deliver increased technological readi-ness, ultimately delivering performance to the warfighter.

The bottom line in achieving success at the speed of rel-evance is involving Test early and keeping Test continually engaged. As Dr. William B. Roper Jr. noted in his April 10, 2018, memo, “it takes a team to go fast,” and there is an entire Test Enterprise in the Air Force ready to assist with a shared sense of purpose. If King Arthur and his merry band of knights had brought Tim into the quest at the begin-ning of the movie, it probably would have been boring for the audience, but he would have reached the final castle earlier and been able to go on additional quests before the authorities put an end to it all. The Air Force Test Enterprise enables rapid acquisitions. Unlike Monty Python’s Black Knight, we promise to not “bite your legs off.”

The author may be contacted at: [email protected].

Section 3685, Title 39, U.S.C.Showing Ownership,Management, And Circulation

Defense Acquisition magazine is published bimonthly at the Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, Va. 22060-5565. The university publishes six issues an-nually. DAU Press is headed by Randy Weekes; the managing editor of Defense Acquisition is Benjamin Tyree; and the publisher is the Defense Acquisition University Press. All are colocated at the following address: Defense Acquisition University, Attn: DAU Press, 9820 Belvoir Rd., Ste. 3, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5565.

Average Number of Copies of Each Issue During the Preceding 12 MonthsA. Total number of copies printed

(net press run): ________________________ 3204B. Paid and/or requested circulation: ________ 3091

1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors, and counter sales: __________0 2. Mail subscriptions paid and/or

requested: _____________________________ 16C. Total paid and/or requested circulation: ____3107D. Free distribution by mail, carrier, or other

means; samples, complimentary, and other free copies: ____________________ 45E. Total distribution: _______________________3152F. Copies not distributed: _____________________52G. Total: _________________________________ 3204

Actual Number of Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing DateA. Total number of copies printed

(net press run): _________________________3194B. Paid and/or requested circulation: 1. Sales through dealers and carriers,

street vendors, and counter sales: ______ 3078 2. Mail subscriptions paid and/or

requested: _____________________________ 16C. Total paid and/or requested circulation: ___ 3094D. Free distribution by mail, carrier, or other

means; samples, complimentary, and other free copies: _____________________55E. Total distribution: ________________________3149F. Copies not distributed: ____________________ 45G. Total: __________________________________3194


Whom Can You Trust?Mitigating Security Risk in Industrial Base Investments

Daniel M. Hartnett

Hartnett is an associate managing director in the Compliance Risk and Diligence division of Kroll, a division of Duff & Phelps, where he advises clients on third-party risk management. He previously served as a special advisor in the Pentagon and as a research scientist with CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization supporting the DoD.

U.S. COMPANIES INCREASINGLY FACE CHALLENGES FROM STATE ACTORS SEEKING TO LEVERAGE the companies to the states’ advantage. The U.S. Government repeatedly has emphasized concerns about “economic aggression” against U.S. businesses carried out by potentially adverse states (and even non-state actors). These concerns are referenced in both last year’s U.S. National Security Strategy and the Na-tional Defense Strategy, as well as other recent high-level government publications and announcements.

Furthermore, media reports frequently carry stories about how U.S. companies often face an uneven playing field in which other nations seek to improve their domestic firms’ capabilities at the expense of U.S. businesses. Such activities include providing government subsidies that promote domestic firms, imposing market and investment barriers on foreign firms, supporting targeted overseas investments and acquisitions and even conducting industrial espionage and intellectual property theft. Both U.S. Government and news media reports most often point to China as the primary culprit for these activities, but there are others, such as Russia.

Of concern to the U.S. defense community is the impact such aggressive economic and trade policies could have on the U.S. defense industrial base. For example, last year a U.S. interagency task force produced a report on the state of the U.S.


manufacturing and defense industrial base that highlighted the deleterious effect that opportunistic states are having on the U.S. defense industry. One area of concern stems from the rapidly increasing military potential of cutting-edge technologies, often developed by small and medium enterprises, and possibly even startups—all of them de-pendent upon external investments to continue operations. There are resultant concerns that adversarial states might seek to leverage investments in such companies to acquire key defense technologies critical to U.S. military capabili-ties, the same technologies that would otherwise be denied to the state. The state need not directly own the targeted company, either, for this potential to exist. Rather, it could exert control through several layers of ownership, in effect obscuring the true ownership and control of the company.

A Possible Solution: The Trusted Capital MarketplaceTo mitigate some of the risk that adversarial states pose to the U.S. defense industry, the Pentagon is launching the Trusted Capital Marketplace (TCM) project. The stated objective of this program is to connect innovative defense and technology companies with trusted inves-tors. Doing so would help companies working on key de-fense or dual-use technologies find necessary capital and funding to continue to carry out research and develop-ment or conduct additional operations. The TCM project could also help minimize the risk that an investor—be it a company or individual—would be susceptible to leverage by adverse actors. Notably, the TCM is intended not just for U.S. companies but defense and technology compa-nies of the greater National Technology Industrial Base (NTIB), which currently also includes Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia.

The TCM project includes three lines of effort to achieve this goal. First, it seeks to identify sources of innovation within the NTIB defense and technology community that are of value to the Department of Defense (DoD). Second, the program aims to develop a pool of investors that have been sufficiently screened to ensure that they are likely free of adverse foreign influence. Third, TCM seeks to provide a platform so that the identified innova-tive companies and the vetted investors can more read-ily financially engage with each other. By doing so, TCM will ostensibly allow companies to more easily identify

sources of necessary funding without the correspond-ing concern of wondering about the ultimate source of the funding. In addition, TCM could minimize concerns within the defense community that adverse actors are leveraging financial investments to acquire prohibited technologies.

Undergirding With Due Diligence Best PracticesDue diligence has long been a standard practice within the financial and business communities, where it is used to investigate a potential investor or future business partner to confirm facts or identify possible red flags. For ex-ample, finding out later that a major investor in your firm has breached a sanctions regulation, such as by export-ing goods to a sanctioned foreign entity, could lead not only to significant legal repercussions but also potentially impact the company’s bottom line due to any associated reputational risks and lost business. Therefore, undertak-ing proper due diligence prior to an engagement not only helps companies comply with the law but also makes good business sense.

For the TCM project to succeed, the Pentagon will need to ensure that approved investors are properly screened and vetted. Drawing upon some due diligence best practices could help the program achieve its stated goals. At a mini-mum, the Pentagon should consider the following for its trusted investors screening program.

Create a risk assessment. This is a critical first step and will guide subsequent steps. The TCM project needs to ensure that it clearly identifies the potential risks it is con-cerned about. It also needs to characterize the identified hazards, to include likelihood of occurring, potential se-verity and possible impact. Categorizing the risks into risk buckets—such as low, medium and high—will help later determine how best to implement controls and where to devote resources and effort. The final risk assessment periodically should be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure it remains relevant to evolving risk concerns.

Develop an objective due diligence program. Using the risk assessment developed in the previous step, identify the appropriate level of investigation into potential inves-tors. Prioritization of resources and efforts should be on

For the TCM project to succeed, the Pentagon will need to ensure that approved investors are properly

screened and vetted.


investigating those subjects that fall into higher-risk cat-egories. However, given the objective of the TCM proj-ect, identification of key pieces of information should be required for all potential TCM funding pool participants. These key components should include checks into the following:• Adverse media • Sanctions, watch lists and other enforcements• State ownership• Beneficial ownership (discussed more fully below)• Corporate registration and corporate affiliations• Regulatory and litigation fines and other enforcements

Conduct the appropriate due diligence on potential investors. All potential investors should undergo the prescribed level of due diligence prior to consideration for inclusion in the pool of trusted investors. The outcome of the due diligence investigation into the potential investor

should be a key determinant when considering whether to approve an investor’s application. At the same time, how-ever, to safeguard a funder’s wellbeing and not scare off potential investors, any information gleaned during the due diligence process should be considered sensitive, and not used other than to decide whether to approve the inves-tor’s application.

Establish ultimate beneficial ownership. Understand-ing the ownership of important partners has always been a sound business practice. However, while many due diligence programs often stop at identifying immediate ownership only, the TCM project should, where relevant, seek to identify the ultimate beneficial owner(s) of any potential investor. Beneficial ownership, different than legal ownership, refers to anyone who enjoy the benefits of ownership without being on the record as the owner. In effect, the beneficial owner(s) would have ultimate effec-tive control. Identifying who truly controls a company is not always easy, as the information may be hidden behind opaque ownership and control structures. But it is crucial to understanding with whom one is really doing business. Depending upon the outcome, it may be worthwhile to

consider additional due diligence on the identified benefi-cial owner(s) as well.

Identify important third-party relationships. Who else does the investor fund? With what other organizations does the funder engage? Casting a wide net to clarify important business relationships that the potential investor currently has would help provide a better understanding of any possible hazards. For investments considered par-ticularly high-risk due to sensitive defense technologies or large sums of money involved, additional due diligence into key third-party relationships should be conducted.

Monitor and routinely rescreen. Investment into and ownership of firms changes frequently, as do any associ-ated risks. Appropriate monitoring should occur at least monthly to quickly capture any newly emerging adverse information that could potentially disqualify a trusted

investor. In addition, continued status as a trusted investor should be contingent upon an annual rescreening to ensure risk profiles remain accurate with the current situation.

ConclusionThe TCM project seeks to provide the DoD with an im-portant tool to ensure that key innovative companies can continue to research and develop cutting-edge defense technologies without fear of undue influence by adversarial states. To help achieve this goal, the DoD should draw upon due diligence best practices. Financial institutions and corporations have long used due diligence screen-ing to help identify any potential red flags in a financial or business engagement prior to finalizing the engagement, thus avoiding what could be significant legal or financial problems later. The same procedures could be used to help screen potential investors in key defense and technology companies. Doing so would help to ensure that innovative defense and technology companies maintain access to capital critical for continued operations, while minimizing their exposure to adverse foreign influence.


Casting a wide net to clarify important business relationships that the potential investor currently has would help provide a better understanding of any possible hazards.



SYSTEM INTEGRATION

Enabling Capability

Through Connectivity

Eugene A. Razzetti

Razzetti, a retired U.S. Navy captain, is a management consultant, auditor, military analyst, and frequent contributor to Defense Acquisition and Defense AT&L magazine. He is the author of five management books, including Fixes that Last–The Executive’s Guide to Fix It or Lose It Management.

IN THE PAST, I HAVE WRITTEN ABOUT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR:• Risk management and gap analysis• Operator and/or warfighter participation in the program • Meaningful feedback, follow-up and accountability • Modeling and simulation, including tabletop exercises and/or wargames

This article adds “System Integration” to the discussion, as both a component and a byproduct of successful program management. System integration is not rocket science, but it is a challenge and, according to certain studies, up to 70 percent of system integration projects fail or fall short in some part. When program managers stay focused on system in-tegration throughout the program, and not as an end-of-pipe activity, successful integration of subsystems into a finalized system is almost certain. The “System Integration Plan” will write, revise and continually improve itself.

Successful system integration employs the principles and practices of successful program management—you have to do all this stuff anyway.

System Integration and Program ManagementSystem Integration is the process of bringing together the component subsystems into one system. It is an aggregation of subsystems cooperating so that the resultant system is able to deliver an overarching functionality or capability by ensur-ing that the subsystems function together as one system. In information technology, this is the process of linking together

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/System


different computing systems and software applications physically or functionally, to act as a coordinated whole. An integrated system streamlines processes, reduces costs and increases efficiency.

System integration connects multiple separate com-ponents—often from different sources—to work as one. Some subsystems are old, some are new. Program managers usually find that putting the subsystems together as early as possible in the program’s develop-ment improves mission effectiveness and helps to ensure seamless connectivity, enabling commanders at the front and at the rear to better execute and assess strategic and tactical accomplishment.

Connectivity refers to a program’s or device’s ability to link with other programs or devices. For example, a program that can import data from a wide variety of sources and can export data in many different formats is said to have “good connectivity,” especially when connecting to or com-municating with another computer or computer system. The finest subsystems are useless (or at least fall short) if they cannot effectively connect with each other and form the system. Connectivity in decision making means harnessing information from many information generators

(or sensors) into one total picture—often called the Com-mander’s Dashboard.

System integration employs all the principles and prac-tices of successful program management; there is virtually nothing that should be considered new, unique or over and above. Table 1 summarizes and compares the requirements of system integration with those of successful program management. The requirements are identical.

Please note especially the inclusion of “warfighter involve-ment,” “technological yield,” and “connectivity.” These requirements, often neglected in a program’s early stages, are essential not only for managing the program but for ensuring that subsystems and components successfully address the mission and integrate into a viable end product (e.g., a weapons system, with all hardware, software, train-ing simulators, and supply support).

Research and Development— Another Way to Look at ItPast usage of the familiar and perhaps archaic term “Re-search and Development” or “R&D” has often suggested its detachment, and/or inclusion as an end product at the beginning of the design. “Acceptance testing” (an equally

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computing

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_application


archaic term) often is thought to be at end of the development pipeline. Taking these ap-proaches invites programmatic disaster.

The alternative approach shown in Figure 1 de-picts potential gain from a robust and ongoing integration/connectivity strategy in the R&D processes, where subsystems are measured continuously against system requirements. Acceptance testing is constant and action-able feedback is immediate. Quality testing throughout development replaces quantity testing at the end; and proactive configuration management replaces recalls and retrofits.

Subsystems are validated and tested. Test engineers, detecting any problems, can initiate corrective action. The subsystem again undergoes opera-tional (acceptance) testing, to ensure that the subsystems come as close as possible to errorless performance.

Modeling and SimulationI have written of the importance of modeling and simula-tion in wargames and/or tabletop exercises and as replace-ments for case studies. I have tried to stress two points:• Modeling and simulation should take place throughout

the program. • Warfighters/operators should participate throughout

the program.

In Table 1, we see that these points are just as necessary (if not more so) in system integration. Manufacturing and developmental process outcomes can be gamed—especially when dealing with the inevitable potential for reconfiguration and/or a change in operational re-quirements. Simulations can optimize projected human interactions, information collection, artificial intel-ligence, and data analyses. Modeling and simulation across all systems integra-tion processes provide the timely feedback and alterna-tive approaches for informed decision making. The greater the integration, the greater and more dynamic are the ability and effectiveness of the decisions.

With regard to warfighter/operator involvement, we need only remember that Department of Defense (DoD) programs, especially those involving our nation’s of-fensive and defensive weapons systems, leave the most compelling risks to in-theater operators, and not program managers. Warfighter/operators need to be involved in the system integration.

PersonnelSystem integration requires dedicated, focused, profes-sionals with exceptional expertise. Excellent technology is not enough if the required integration expertise is not

Table 1. Comparing Systems Integration with Program Management

Requirement Program Management

System Integration

Mission planning; concept development

Design/development (including hardware/software)

Modeling/simulation

Research and development

Risk management plan

Gap analysis

Core team developed; responsibility/accountability assigned (including decision makers)

Warfighter involvement

Performance-oriented; metrics developed/consistent/actional

Test plans developed; tech yield identified

Contract in place; executable

Connectivity/feedback

Configuration/change management process defined/in place

Internal/external security procedures in place

Life-cycle management plan

Figure 1. Research and Development Connectivity

Table and figures by the author.

Research

Integration/Connectivity

Development

Acceptance testing


there to implement it. Organizations may struggle to find and retain employees with the required skill sets for system integration. Contractors may advertise having expertise even if it does not yet exist, hoping to pick it up on the fly. An external or “third-party” specialist/consultant may bring needed integration expertise to the table more expeditiously.

Technological “Yield”—Potential Into PerformanceFor our purposes, technological “yield” refers to how mea-surably successful the essential technologies are integrated into the overall product architecture, application and user environment. The yield, as described in performance metrics such as miles per hour, target acquisition range, or mean time between failures, is a measure of how close actual performance comes to theoretical performance. A high yield suggests a successful integration of the technol-ogy. That said, technological yield findings are not always immediate, accurate or predictive. Subsequent testing and re-testing may produce lower values, suggesting that the technology may not yet be mature and, therefore not ready for production and/or implementation.

System Integration ProcessThere is no such thing as a standard system integration. Every system uses different subsystems to achieve differ-ent goals. The System Integrator (or team) must under-stand all the current and predicted program require-ments. Translating program requirements into needs, and continuously improving communication between

program management and the system integration team, connect the visions of the designers with the program managers’ realities.

Figure 2 describes how the system integration process fits in the big picture of program management. Again, noth-ing in the process is beyond the requirements of effective program management.

The task of integrating legacy or already existing subsys-tems into new systems or capabilities can require much research and effort. Only in recent years have systems been deployed that can interconnect innovative and exist-ing subsystems. However, many systems and subsystems were “stovepipe” designs with no thought about future connectivity. Depending on their number and size, con-necting several independent systems and subsystems into one while ensuring uninterrupted connectivity will take time and meticulousness. Successful system integration in the private sector helps forward-thinking companies to grow and prosper by automating many business processes and providing accurate decision-making data throughout.

The longest and the most challenging phase of the pro-gram can be where the actual integration is performed. Based on a logical architecture design, a physical equiva-lent is developed. If all previous steps have been followed with a close attention to detail, a system integrator should perform system integration successfully and easily, without losing valuable time, funding or data.

Figure 2. The System Integration Process

Mission,Concept, or Legacycapability

Design Planning

Engineering*War�ghter input

Contractors/subcontractorsMaintainabilityHuman factorsRedundancy &sustainability

Supply supportSystem security

Modeling/simulationPerformance/yieldCon�guration mgt.

C4/ISR**Process integration

InnovationAnalysis

System Integration&

Connectivity

Subsystems(Design, Security,

Architecture,Maintainability)

Yield/Validation/Feedback

Yield/Validation/Feedback

EndProduct

*All applicable general and specialty engineering disciplines (including safety and environmental).**Command, Control, Communications, Computers/Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.


Design, Architecture and MaintainabilitySystem integrators/teams must design the architecture to create strong foundations and to minimize risk as much as possible, in order to ensure that multiple subsystems and components function as one. Only then will the system meet (or exceed) mission requirements. Blueprints of the integra-tion components will help to visualize the process(es). The goal is enhanced efficiency and seamless data connectivity.

Program managers should consider having subsystems integrated by professional integrators, rather than buy-ing “off-the-shelf” solutions implemented by unqualified contractors. If a system or subsystem is difficult to operate or deficient, the integrator should initiate corrective action immediately. If and when a mission evolves, the system must evolve with it. Also, there may be no need to acquire a new product, as it can be more beneficial to upgrade the system you already know and find easy to use.

System Security DoD programs (now and forever) will depend on the most accurate and actionable information, securely collected, stored and displayed. DoD security systems must protect data, information and the knowledge acquired therefrom from theft, sabotage, accidents, misuse and ignorance. The greater that amount of data—the greater the security challenge. The threat of cyber-attack will be with us always, and DoD programs must function in a cyber-secure envi-ronment—from preliminary design through the entire life cycle. Lives may depend on it.

How is information networked? The Internet may seem an obvious answer, but it is increasingly vulnerable to denial of service, hacking and physical destruction of the key “hubs.” A dedicated military communication system is the default solution, although bandwidth allocation and management create additional challenges for program managers.

Organizational “Inertia” and Lack of Accountability System integration always involves multiple players as well as multiple subsystems. Accountability for the success (or failure) of the integration becomes blurred very easily when integrating many different subsystems. There can be multiple stakeholders (e.g., vendors, users, system own-

ers, etc.), none of them ultimately responsible for the entire system integration. Each may only handle or care at most about one piece of the integration and be unlikely to appre-ciate the big picture or have a sense of urgency for it. When something goes wrong, the situation turns almost imme-diately to finger pointing and blaming other parties instead of someone “owning” the integration. When a single party manages the system integration project, he or she is (often contractually) responsible and accountable for integration success, and there is no longer any ambiguity. Accountabil-ity replaces ambiguity.

Some decision makers elect to acquire new or off-the-shelf packages instead of integrating already existing subsystems. Contractors often procure only the components that they actually need at the moment or to solve an immediate prob-lem. This way may be faster and cheaper in the beginning, and thus seem more profitable and efficient. But the practice can very quickly become counterproductive, as the new ad-ditions become obsolete or create interoperability problems down the road. As the program evolves, it may start using more and more independent, free-standing, tools, possibly resulting in productivity decline and inaccurate/inconsistent data analyses. The longer the project takes, the more sig-nificant this issue becomes. Records become confusing and incapable of audit. Funds are used faster or are prematurely exhausted. Problem correction is funded from other finding lines or kicked to the next fiscal year. Keeping the integration projects as short as possible can improve program suc-cess. Furthermore, an agile working methodology that can address changing requirements along the way and also after the project is essential for systems integration success.

The “good” news, remember, is that system integration is program management; and with DoD contracts, the pro-gram manager is in charge. He or she controls the funds, owns the integration and establishes subordinate respon-sibility and accountability accordingly. The challenge to program managers is the time-consuming and complicated nature of integrating various subsystems.

Problem-Solving and Continual Improvement We cannot discuss day-in, day-out program management and system integration without discussing two

The threat of cyber-attack will be with us always, and DoD programs must function in a cyber-secure

environment—from preliminary design through the entire life cycle. Lives may depend on it.


indispensable “mindsets.” A problem-solving mindset accepts the fact that problems are inevitable but that any problem can be corrected—and, if not corrected entirely, in some way mitigated. “Don’t fix the blame, fix the prob-lem” should be the reaction; appreciating that a problem, once identified, is half solved. International Quality Man-agement Standards such as ISO 9001:2015 instruct that corrective actions should be realistic and measurable, and that follow-up must ensure that the corrective actions produced the desired results.

Closely related is the continual improvement mindset that reminds program managers that any system or process, however efficient, can always be made better. The program managers must always be on the lookout for opportunities to improve a system, process or situation. Outside auditors measure the continual improvement mindset in an organi-zation by assessing:• Adherence to policies and objectives• Analysis of data and effectiveness or recurring reports• Effectiveness of following up previous corrective and

preventive actions• Structured program reviews, with actionable findings,

conclusions and recommendations

SummaryThere are essentially no more stand-alone operations or weapons. DoD programs, especially those involving our nation’s offensive and defensive weapons systems, leave the most compelling risks and decisions to in-theater operators, not to stateside program managers or contrac-tors. Connectivity in decision making means harnessing information from many information generators (or sensors) into one total picture.

Successful system integration and the need to streamline processes for more effective program management and warfighting is more important now than ever, due to the increasing advances in warfighting technology among major powers and the pernicious adventurism of a few thug nations.

Comprehensive program management creates, in its execution, successful system integration. Program managers need to stay focused on system integration throughout a program, and not as an end-of-pipe activ-ity. Only then will integration of subsystems into a final-ized system be possible.

The author can be reached at [email protected].

Defense AT&L: July–August 2017 b

DAU is continually looking for new topics, tools and resources to help you succeed on the job.

HOW DO WE KNOW WHAT YOU NEED?YOU TELL US!

https://www.dau.edu/tools/t/Request-a-New-ToolTake a quick two-question survey on the topics, tools and resources you need.



Contracting Officer Leadership The Essential Ingredient

Michael P. Fischetti, J.D., CPCM, CAE

Fischetti joined the executive acquisition faculty at the Defense Acquisition University in January 2019. He is a Certified Professional Contract Manager (CPCM) and Certified Association Executive (CAE) through the American Society of Association Executives. He has more than 36 years of contracting experience through a variety of Defense, civilian agency, and industry roles ranging from operational Contracting Officer positions to HQ procurement analyst/policy roles. He most recently was the Executive Director of the National Contract Management Association. He holds a Juris Doctorate from Northwestern California University School of Law, a Master’s in National Resource Strategy from the Eisenhower School, National Defense University, a Master’s in Business Management from Central Michigan University and a Bachelor’s degree in Economics and Political Science from the State University of New York in Buffalo.

THE FUTURE SUCCESS OF AMERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIRES dramatic improvement in “cost, schedule and performance” of today’s de-fense acquisition system to meet present and future threats. Getting there mandates early and proper identification of acquisition need; better risk assessment through well-defined requirements; a rapid, proactive acquisi-

tion process delivering quality solutions while navigating and leveraging public law and regulation; and a mission-driven culture and environment supportive of produc-tive organizations that attract the nation’s finest public- and private-sector expertise.

Managing within the defense acquisition system to deliver the best and latest ca-pabilities of highest quality and technological superiority requires a robust corps of smart, hard-working, dedicated professionals. This public-private sector acquisition field includes expertise in finance, engineering, logistics, law, information technology, human resources and technical disciplines from almost every field imaginable, as well as superior knowledge and leadership in project/program management and other acquisition professions.

One of the most crucial roles within this system is that of the contracting officer (CO). This person is the link by which formal contractual communication flows between the Department of Defense (DoD) and industry support. The CO is vital to successful acquisition programs. Thus, there also is a long list of attributes that they must have. They must understand and apply seemingly endless laws and regulations governing how the federal government and DoD acquire more than $500 billion worth of supplies and services each year. This involves not only understanding and judiciously interpret-ing the ton of laws, regulations, policy letters, requirements, standards, interpretative guidance, management initiatives, local procedures and legal precedent, but properly leveraging this myriad guidance to get stuff where it is needed fast! Every CO action


affects system cost, schedule and performance further down the line.

COs need a general knowledge of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense FAR Supplement and all of their complex supplemental guidance and must under-stand everything from market research, cost and price analysis, acquisition planning, source selection procedures, business clearances, pre-award surveys, financial audits, technical reports, award fee plans, responsibility determi-nations, etc., etc. They must properly format and prepare formal documentation to justify their acquisition decisions. The contract file in a federal acquisition (indeed any public expenditure of appropriated dollars) must “tell the story” about the judgment and rationale used to arrive at those conclusions.

Clearly, this requires multiple competencies. These include understanding and applying complex external and internal rules, regulations and policy; knowing the high-level technical requirements of their programs; hav-ing written and verbal communication proficiency, and more. Before things are reduced to writing, all manner of face-to-face communication occurs—and not only be-tween the CO and the contractor. Communication flows internally between the CO and their CO representative; program or project manager, legal counsel, technical writ-ers—indeed, everyone on the acquisition team. The CO must know how and when to guide the acquisition team through compliance with the myriad and seemingly con-flicting objectives of the government acquisition process. This leads immediately to the need for COs not only to be articulate, but diplomatic and team oriented; in short; able to influence and work well with everyone concur-rently with supporting positive program (cost, schedule and performance) outcomes.

Thus, COs must obviously be good at many things. Today’s training appears to provide most of what is necessary to excel at these requirements. But is it? Today’s acquisition education and training requirements emanate from the De-fense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) and implementing guidance, authorizing training require-ments for contract specialists from entry and as they rise the ranks in preparation for receiving their “warrant” (tai-lored, written authority to procure and manage contracts within specific, predefined authorities and limitations). DAWIA is the framework for defining experience, knowl-edge, and training requirements for the defense contract-ing workforce.

In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense imposes qualifications on a CO with a warrant above the simplified acquisition threshold. Along with that, a senior contracting official must have at least four years contracting experi-

ences before assignment to a “critical acquisition position.” These positions are a subset of the acquisition workforce specifically designated by component acquisition execu-tives based on the criticality of that position to the acquisi-tion program, effort or function. Each Service and DoD agency provides additional procedural requirements prior to obtaining a CO warrant.

Leadership acquisition courses offered to DoD contract managers today include the following: • ACQ 450 Leading in the Acquisition Environment• ACQ 451 Integration for Decision Makers• ACQ 452 Forging Stakeholder Relationships • ACQ 453 Leader as Coach• ACQ 401 Senior Acquisition Course (competitive selec-

tion to the Eisenhower School)

There has been considerable research and skill gap analysis in this area. Leadership competencies sometimes also were included, but not always emphasized. While iterations of acquisition reform have occurred via statute, regulation, policy, reorganization and enhanced training requirements, we know that dramatic acquisition improve-ments have not materialized. Skill gaps were determined; knowledge and certification requirements defined; courses created and then modified over time.

One survey documenting issues facing practitioners in the field discovered the workforce believed they were not equipped to meet demands of the acquisition environ-ment. They concluded that successful operation requires workforce ability to shorten the learning curve; modern tools appealing to changing workforce demographics; and cultural changes that encourage critical thinking.

• 10 percent believed it takes more than 20 years to be-come proficient.

• 18 percent believed it takes more than 15 years to be-come proficient.

• 10 percent cited formal acquisition training as their primary avenue for learning. While classroom training supplies foundational acquisition knowledge, it is not translatable to day-to-day practice. Respondents pre-ferred more experienced colleagues or reference tools for those questions.

• 46 percent confirmed experienced colleagues are their primary source of acquisition information.

• 44 percent use reference tools as their first choice.

So where is contracting success found? It lies beyond historical focus areas. Today’s formal structure, includ-ing education and training requirements, is not the end of the story. We must recognize the crucial leadership and management skills, as well as key personal attributes, necessary to be a successful CO. Contract management


professional training emphasizes technical acquisition knowledge but must better leverage existing leadership qualities and provide advanced leadership development. Such competency investment should include that offered to DoD’s program management community.

Results—good and bad—in acquisition today emanate from leadership experience and proficiency levels in “soft skilled” competencies such as innovation, communication, teamwork, passion, integrity, character and more.

Combined with organizational support, accountability, common duty to mission and minimal bureaucracy, a viable pathway to the future success of our acquisition programs and national security becomes clear. The envied culture embodied in todays’ successful, nontraditional, in-novative private firms, and seen historically in government during significant national imperatives, requires nurturing to improve government and defense program outcomes. That includes superior leadership from our contracting community, because they are responsible for so much internal coordination and communication, as well as the formal contracts and informal relationships with industry, to make that a reality.

It’s clear when talking to contracting leaders that under-standing and leveraging technical guidance is indispens-able, such as that obtained through the FAR, Deskbooks, DoD policy and procedures, information technology support, etc. But possessing those unique, inherent “soft” skills is where great COs come from. As in most career fields, those personal traits will shine if given the right environment. Prescribing targeted acquisition policy and procedure to any given acquisition scenario only goes so far. Such an approach will tie the hands of contract and program managers (PMs). Judgment and discretion, as vital attributes of leadership, must ultimately dominate.

We have seen that revising acquisition laws and regula-tions, or undergoing yet another reorganization, miss the mark, absent great leadership. Great COs relate to the PM; are true “business advisers” to the program and use their leadership skills more than actual authority to make their PM successful.

Although against conventional wisdom, analysis indi-cates we must reassess past decisions associated with professionalizing the contracting workforce. Standards established did not achieve what they were intended to do and created unintentional adverse consequences. The risk-averse culture within acquisition professionals is not news. The rules must be revisited. An example is the need to rethink the hiring criteria used to select candidates for contracting positions. Considering candidates with a wider variety of educational and professional backgrounds beyond business may enhance the pool of talented can-didates available for the contracting field, while looking at past leadership experience. Have they led people, such as in clubs, church, scouts, student government? Indeed those places may be where our future leaders are to be found. History suggests that specific formal education may not result in great leaders. Some of the best recent leaders in DoD contracting did not have today’s advanced business degrees. A degree is a measure of education, but it might be in almost anything. Leaders are both born and developed. That, however, does not diminish the need for proficiency in the technical skills of contracting.

A good leader must have the ability to manage up, as well as down. Tone is set at the top. Leaders must lead! COs must be at that top level, but only by having earned their right to be there. The National Contract Management Association’s Contract Management Body of Knowledge (CMBOK) considers Leadership the most important competency.

Whether via formal training, mentorship or guidance from existing leaders who take the time to work with and for their team, the acquisition community must work to ensure COs develop in all ways as contracting leaders. Those of us fortunate to have run into great leaders in our career often shine over those without those inspirational models.

One characteristic may include the need to move around for diverse experiences, versus deep familiarity with one or two agency cultures and mission. Creating good leaders requires exposure to different contracting environments, cultures, people, contract types, commodities and mis-sions. Staying in one place for a long time minimizes those experiences. COs need multiple developmental experi-ences. Mobility can be hard, but moving emerging leaders around can be good. Those that self-initiate usually are ahead of those who stay put for too long. Similarly, COs

Proficiency in new technologies is only one part of the 2022 skills equation. “Human” skills such as creativ-ity, originality and initiative, critical thinking, persua-sion and negotiation will likewise retain or increase their value, as will attention to detail, resilience, flexibility and complex problem-solving. Emotional intelligence, leadership and social influence as well as service orientation are also set to see particular increase in demand relative to their current promi-nence today.

—World Economic Forum’s 2018 report, The Future of Jobs Report 2018


need not be experts in all program aspects, but they do need the ability to evaluate technical problems and risk assessment for their customer to arrive at the contract solution. What is the degree of failure? How can he or she, as the CO, create evaluation criteria to assess particular technical characteristics? A good CO will figure that out. Once involved in making decisions that make their PM suc-cessful, their perspective changes and leadership compe-tencies are developed.

The following are anecdotal quotes from experienced con-tracting colleagues and leaders:

COs must relate to the PM. They are advisers with the authority to make the PM successful.

To be a leader you have to be a good follower.

You must be able to manage up as well as down.

The attitude of “we’re gods” is wrong.

If leaders do not show interest, then the others cannot. Leaders must lead!

I believe that leadership was not a specific requirement. Some classes might require it, but no real leadership training was available.

Leadership training was not available. I was lucky to run into leaders during my career.

As a career-long contracting professional, I had and con-tinue to have the opportunity to work in many different contracting organizations, on many unique programs, with many diverse missions and cultures. In many cases, prior to entry on duty, I was not experienced or familiar with the particular supplies or services the organization acquired; specific contracting rules or regulations unique to them; or any special organizational structure or reporting mecha-nism they had. The key to any success I had in each con-tracting environment was the ability to establish credibility through the leadership attributes discussed in this article.

Each contracting office is “unique” in several respects. Thus, while contracting technical knowledge can be somewhat transportable, depending on the contracting strategies employed in any given product or service line, leadership qualities are completely transportable. Pro-gram conflict or drama with the programs I supported was minimal so long as the contracting leadership I provided included credibility, integrity, dependability, perseverance, communication and other aspects of leadership.

Leadership style is unique to each individual and only at-tained through successfully demonstrating acceptance of responsibility, backed by technical knowledge. Not all of today’s contracting managers possess those capabilities, but many do. It is past time to recognize that leadership is that quality most lacking in contracting success and that it is a vital necessity. Only then, with the support, coopera-tion and leadership of program, project and other agency leaders, can we kick-start Defense and other government agency acquisition programs into high achievements. Lead-ership also must come from senior government leaders in the Executive Branch and Congress, but it is leadership at the program level that will make things happen.

The time is right for massive change. America’s national and economic standing in a global hyper-competition is on the line. Our military require agile, technologically superior equipment faster than our adversaries. We have tweaked acquisition rules, organization structure and course re-quirements for years and addressed needs via competency assessments. The data reports are in! Our COs must have the leadership qualities, traits and skills to acquire products and services in an urgent, war-life footing, as was the case in past world conflicts and the race to the moon. Develop-ing solid contracting leaders must be a priority today! To repeat the title of an April 2018 article in Contract Manage-ment magazine, “Leadership is not Optional in Contract Management!” What are we waiting for?


The labyrinth of complicated procurement legisla-tion for federal acquisition can be daunting and, as a result, the field attracts individuals who excel at technical aspects such as analysis and legal review.

Nevertheless, those skills are not the only ones that acquisition professionals need. Negotiating the best contracts, attracting new service providers, and streamlining and simplifying the federal acquisition process requires more than technical knowledge. Agencies need creative acquisition leaders who excel at “soft skills” such as communication and collabora-tion. However, the technical nature of acquisition jobs sometimes leads agency leaders to assume (that) acquisition professionals do not need to be expert in communication and other skills to do their jobs well. That notion can close doors to leadership develop-ment opportunities for these professionals.

—Rachel Verlik, a coach with the Partnership for Public Service “Leadership Excellence for Acquisition Professionals (LEAP)” program geared to develop agency contracting officers into leaders


CREDIBILITY: The Second Currency

of Acquisition Col Todd E. Wiest, USAF

Wiest is retiring after more than 26 years of service in the U.S. Air Force. In his current position, he is responsible for execution of $3 billion across the Future Years Defense Program to keep missile warning, missile defense, space situational awareness, and nuclear command, control, and communi-cation capabilities operating past original equipment design life. He spent more than 20 years acquiring assets to support space in space situational awareness, space control, missile warning, and space command and control mission areas.

“IN 2004, A SENIOR U.S. AIR FORCE PROCUREMENT OFFICIAL WAS ARRESTED IN A TEXTBOOK EX-ample of revolving door corruption, landing not only herself but also senior executives from contractor Boeing in jail,” according to Samuel Perlo-Freeman’s account of the Darleen Druyun scandal, which was published on the World Peace Foundation website of Tufts University’s Fletcher School. That scandal (in which Druyan secured a Boeing job for herself while negotiating an increased price contract with the com-

pany) occurred some time ago, but procurement integrity issues still occur. The Navy is dealing with the “Fat Leonard” kickback and bribery scandal.

And acquisition challenges are not just highlighted by scandals. The system review by the Section 809 Panel is another in a long list of “acquisition reform” initiatives written in law to get capability in the hands of the operator for an appropriate amount of taxpayer resources. These cases and reform initiatives call into question the reputation of professionals in the acquisition career field. These are high-profile, senior-level activities, but is there something that acquirers in the field can do day-to-day to improve trust in the acquisition system? This paper contends that credibility is at the core of acquisition and procurement and can be built at the program level while providing capability to the warfighter. Hence, credibility is as important as congressional appropriation levels in getting meaningful capabilities to the warfighter.

According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, one definition of credibility is “capacity for belief.” Essentially, this defi-nition implies that the receiver has reason to believe the message of the sender. One tangible way to view


credibility is to compare it to a checking account, a lens I used before reading The Speed of Trust, the New York Times bestselling book by Steven M.R. Covey, while writing this article. On any given day during any interaction with a stakeholder, you may deposit or withdraw “funds” from your acquisition credibility account. Without a statement for this account, it can be difficult to know if your balance is positive or negative. However, you do find out when you’ve significantly overdrawn your account; the U.S. Air Force knew its account was overdrawn after the Druyun scandal made headlines! With the recent “Fat Leonard” scandal, the Department of Defense (DoD) account with Congress is still experiencing withdrawals even as the DoD strives to transition to a culture of performance where results and accountability matter. With scandals making significant withdrawals from the acquisition cred-ibility account, it’s important to make many deposits. But how can acquisition programs make daily deposits into their credibility account?

The key to building credibility is, as Covey points out, making and keeping commitments. Within the Air Force Program Executive Officer (AFPEO) Digital Directorate, led by Steven Wert, building credibility is a top priority. In the Digital Directorate, making and keeping commitments is all about identifying Critical Events and tracking their on-time or early completion. Meeting these Critical Events make deposits to our account by increasing our stakeholder’s “capacity for belief.”

Using Critical Events is how AFPEO Digital measures performance of its 2019 portfolio goal to “Continue to plan and execute extremely well.” To monitor this goal, Wert asks that each program identify Critical Events to meet during the year. These Critical Events are the specific dates of significant milestones in the program within the next fiscal year. While baselining their program sched-ule in late summer for the next fiscal year, each program manager selects at least two events that will move the program closer to delivering high-priority capabilities to the warfighter. The guidance for selecting these events is twofold. First, the event should be as close to operational delivery as possible. Second, the acquisition community should control most, if not all, of the schedule leading up to the event. Some examples of Critical Events selected by AFPEO Digital portfolio programs include operational test certification, delivery of the first production article of a multiple end-item procurement, and significant contract awards. While the latter may not seem close to operational delivery, it can be a major step in the current fiscal year to deliver future capability. During the yearly AFPEO Digital Baseline Execution Review, each program manager base-lines program Critical Events with Wert, then identifies the event to stakeholders, including Industry. These Critical Events become the AFPEO Digital commitments that lead

to either a deposit or a withdrawal from the credibility account. Once baselined as a Critical Event, the Program Executive Officer (PEO) and staff monitor progress while the divisions are responsible for tracking the events.

As the leader of the Strategic Warning and Surveillance Systems Division (the Sentinels), which is part of AFPEO Digital, I ensure that the Division focuses on achieving all of our Critical Events. We track them closely as we sustain aging ground-based radars and nuclear command, control, and communication systems that provide warning of mis-sile attacks on North America. However, reality always gets a vote in our plans, and as we see the schedule float for a Critical Event decrease, I engage with the program office to help meet the Critical Event. Often, it only takes a phone call or e-mail from me to an external organization to help the bureaucracy move faster. Sometimes, though, it takes more than an Air Force colonel like me to keep things moving. If that’s the case, I request a “save” from the PEO and his staff. While there are certain elements that we can-not save—e.g., a technical integration issue—more often than not bureaucratic activity is the schedule driver.

Going back to the bank analogy, I request a “save” when I am concerned that there is a “glitch in the banking system” that could prevent a credibility deposit in the Sentinels’ account. With the “save” request, everyone who can do so supports actions to meet the Critical Event date, By meet-ing the established and publicized date for each Critical Event, the program team and the PEO increases credibility with acquisition leadership and the users by reporting “mission accomplished as promised.” Every on-time or early Critical Event becomes another deposit in the Senti-nels’ and AFPEO Digital’s credibility account.

Critical Events aren’t the only way in which Wert is building the credibility of the Digital Directorate. The second Direc-torate goal, at its core, positions the team to build credibil-ity now and sets the conditions for many more deposits in the Directorate credibility account in the future. Given the numerous speeches and articles from government leader-ship to “deliver faster” to increase our competitive space, the second AFPEO Digital goal is for “Speed and Innova-tion.” By asking for and tracking the number of innovative acquisition approaches—such as agile software develop-ment—Wert is driving his portfolio to “deliver faster.” This sends a clear message to senior leadership that AFPEO Digital is striving to meet its goal, and this builds current credibility. Spreading an innovative culture throughout the organization will have long-term benefits by being more re-sponsive to the warfighter in the future, especially with the small, frequent deliveries at the core of an agile construct. The credibility benefits of the high-trust relationships built with senior acquisition leaders and stakeholders will enable AFPEO Digital to move through the delivery process faster.


I recognized Wert’s focus on building credibility and the need for the Sentinels to develop that culture. It was my responsibility to get it started because, according to Edgar Schien, “leaders … are the main architects of culture.” To adjust the Sentinel culture, I started being transparent with our myriad stakeholders and told my folks to do the same. I knew that keeping the three main elements of the Acquisi-tion System (the Joint Capabilities Integration and Devel-opment System [JCIDS]; Planning, Programming, Budget-ing and Execution [PPBE] system; and Defense Acquisition System) synchronized is a challenge for every program. Therefore, being transparent enables the Sentinels to find the best way forward with the stakeholders when reality changes the plan. Transparency works because your open-ness shows personal responsibility for the commitment made and focuses the stakeholder team on the constraints to address in dealing with the changes. Sentinel transpar-ency begets transparency from the stakeholders, and when everything is out in the open, the program community can develop the best way forward. Being transparent with my stakeholders, and suggesting my Branch Chiefs do the same, reaped great day-to-day benefits because, as Simon Sinek notes, trust is more important in advancing organiza-tions than skill set alone.

When challenged by Wert to identify a Division goal, the Sentinels selected a goal that would provide transparency and enhance our credibility even more. With a diverse portfolio of systems that support and enable the nuclear command, control, and communications enterprise, Sentinel leadership decided general/flag officers should approve the system requirements we address in the coming fiscal year as well as the future system roadmap. We decided to bring the users into the selection process to help gain their understanding and support while promising to address high-priority capabilities with the funds we receive. We knew that getting customers’ input on their biggest challenges at the senior officer level would focus us on delivering more desired results for them each year. Opening up the dialogue and promising to address coveted user needs will more than likely increase our stakeholder’s “capacity for belief” in what the Sentinels do now and in the future.

However, I knew that being transparent would not build credibility as quickly as it was needed. To do that, there had to be results, because, as Covey points out, results create instant credibility and trust. Consequently, I established Warfighter Commitments to directly demonstrate our day-to-day efforts to support our stakeholders. The focus of Warfighter Commitments goes straight to the heart of the acquisition mission: delivery of capability on time thereby helping to keep costs in check. These Warfighter Commit-ments would provide another metric to show the diverse Sentinel stakeholder community that we were doing what we said we would do. While similar to the Critical Events

discussed earlier, Warfighter Commitments are what the Sentinels promise to deliver to the warfighter each fiscal year; they are tangible results of the way the Sentinels acquire for our customers. Established through the same process as Critical Events, Warfighter Commitments are specific capabilities that we will make sure are operation-ally accepted in a quarter of the coming fiscal year. Instead of a specific date, I selected a quarter because the program office does not control all actions leading to operational acceptance. Meeting Warfighter Commitments are the “results” of our daily hard work and provide tangible capa-bilities to the warfighter. Like Critical Events, these commit-ments give us an opportunity to deliver on promises and, therefore, enhance our warfighters’ “capacity for belief” in what the Sentinels say they will do every day.

Being credible implies a “capacity for belief” by stakehold-ers, for which the acquisition community continues to strive after acquisition scandals and numerous “acquisition reform” recommendations. Each scandal makes a signifi-cant withdrawal from the intangible credibility account. Although these scandals and reforms happen at very senior levels, individual programs can build their credibility through daily actions and meeting commitments.

It is credibility that enables us to establish and sustain trust to the point where even a misspoken phrase will be overlooked. By establishing, announcing and then deliver-ing to AFPEO Digital Critical Events and Sentinel War-fighter Commitments while maintaining transparency with both the Sentinel plans and how reality impacts them, we continue to make deposits into our credibility account. By also working closely with our warfighters and addressing their most coveted needs, the Sentinels deliver more im-portant “results.” By enhancing our stakeholder’s “capac-ity for belief” and making frequent “credibility deposits,” the Sentinels support AFPEO Digital’s vision to “Innovate, deploy, win!” The dollars appropriated by Congress, along with Sentinel credibility, provide much-needed capability to the warfighter.


Sentinel transparency begets

transparency from the stakeholders.


Cutting Time and Costs for

Controlled Substance

OrdersZachary S. Connor

Connor is a communications specialist on the Stakeholder Engagement Team in the Solutions Delivery Division of the Defense Health Agency’s Deputy Assistant Director for Information Operations.

A WEB-BASED APPLICATION DEVELOPED BY THE JOINT MEDICAL LOGISTICS FUNCTIONAL DEVEL-opment Center (JMLFDC) dramatically reduced Schedule II controlled substance order processing and delivery time and expense by replacing paper-based processes with electronic orders.

“The goal of the Narcotics Order Review and Approval (NORA) program is to automate the ordering pro-cess to reduce the amount of time users were required to focus on ordering controlled substances,” NORA

program manager John Dittig explained.

Since its 2016 launch, NORA accelerated controlled substance order processing while cutting overall delivery times by 40 percent, he added. NORA also helped reduce Department of Defense (DoD) controlled substance acquisition costs by more than 27 percent over previous years’ spending.

Part of the Defense Health Agency (DHA) Solution Delivery Division (SDD), JMLFDC provides DoD Medical Logistics (Med Log) application development and sustainment, maintains systems serving more than 24,000 users and processes more than 940,000 supply chain transactions daily with annual supply requisitions valued at $4.5 billion.


Over the past 3 years, JMLFDC on-boarded more than 300 approved NORA users and executed more than 19,000 purchase orders, Dittig added. Approval and delivery times for continental U.S. (CONUS) custom-ers dropped from between 5 and 7 days to just 1, while approval and submittal processing dropped from 4 days to less than a day for those outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS). Before NORA, Dittig said that the DoD spent $84.7 million on controlled substance orders over a 3-year period, whereas DoD spending fell to $61.6 million with NORA due to customers maintaining less on-hand inventory—a $23.1 million savings.

NORA users include Military Health System (MHS) phar-macists and the approved vendor, Dittig said. Applicants are screened by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and must meet federal government guidelines for ordering and distributing controlled substances.

Controlled Substance RegulationsControlled substance distribution is regulated by Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control

Act of 1970, called the Controlled Substances Act. Accord-ing to the DEA website, under the Act, Schedule II drugs are defined as those that have a high potential for abuse; are currently accepted for medical use in treatment in the United States or currently accepted for medical use with severe restrictions; and may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence if abused. Schedule II drugs include morphine, opium, codeine, hydrocodone and others.

Individuals who order, handle, store and distribute con-trolled substances, including DoD pharmacists, must be registered with the DEA, the site explains. Substance handlers also are required to maintain accurate inventories, records and security for the controlled substances.

Electronic Versus Paper FormsBefore electronic prescriptions or pharmacy applications may be used to transmit prescriptions, a third party must audit the application for compliance with the requirement of Title Code 21 of Federal Regulations part 1311, Dittig said. Title Code 21 rules govern creation, transmission and stor-age of electronic orders and prescriptions. Alternatively,


organizations whose certification processes have been approved by the DEA can verify that the applications meet the requirements.

NORA enables users to digitally sign Schedule II controlled substance orders and check their status online without the formerly requisite paper DEA Form 222, called the DEA 222. Dittig said NORA does this by enabling DEA regis-trants and their powers of attorney (POAs) to control the electronic submissions, which allows them to file electronic DEA 222s.

Dittig said electronic DEA 222 submissions are reviewed and cross referenced with the pharmaceutical vendor’s inventory. When the available warehouse inventory is determined, additional orders for substitute pharmaceuti-cals can be placed for out-of-stock items. He said that the electronic orders take precedence over paper DEA 222 submissions. The vendor processes electronic submissions before any paper DEA 222 forms—and, if medication avail-ability is limited, electronic orders are filled first.

“NORA put the DoD on a level playing field with our civilian counterparts who have been using the Controlled Substance Ordering System (CSOS), the DEA’s version of NORA, for the past few years,” noted Donald K. Pearson, a pharmacist at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia.

NORA’s easy-to-use interface also provides a more user-friendly ordering system than paper forms and helps reduce potential administrative and dispersal errors, Dittig added. The automated process helps strengthen admin-istrative controls for controlled substances management, resulting in reduced overall investments for sites that main-tained large pharmaceutical inventories to accommodate longer delivery times.

“Productivity in our pharmacies has been increased through fewer out-of-stock medications,” said Pearson, whose pharmacies annually place approximately 300 Schedule II controlled substance orders.

NORA Security RequirementsInitially, JMLFDC planned to use a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) product to support NORA functions, Dittig said. COTS applications are designed to be used without modification and are relatively inexpensive because they often are mass-produced. However, he said that avail-able COTS products did not meet stringent DoD cyber security requirements so the JMLFDC team opted for a government off-the-shelf (GOTS) product developed in-house.

“Using a GOTS product gave us the flexibility to design and build a system that met all our needs,” Dittig explained. “It

also allowed us to incorporate the DoD security safeguards early in the design process.”

Dittig said that, after 6 months of progress developing NORA, JMLFDC was granted authority to operate the application in July 2015. Two months later, NORA received DEA third-party accreditation. Over the next 8 months, JMLFDC tested the system with vendors, the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Automatic Addressing System Center and completed enrolling DEA registrants before going live in August 2016.

Third-Party VerificationBefore electronic prescriptions or pharmacy applications may be used to transmit prescriptions, a third party must audit the applications for compliance with federal regula-tions governing electronic order and prescription creation, transmission and storage. Or organizations meet the requirements if they have with DEA-approved certifica-tion processes and can verify that the applications meet the requirements.

To allow NORA to perform the requisite third party certi-fication, Dittig said that the team decided to host the ap-plication in the JMLFDC Production Support Environment within the Fort Detrick, Maryland, Network Enterprise Center, separate from other JMLFDC applications, such as the Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support (DMLSS) Med Log application suite and the Theater Enterprise Wide Logistics System (TEWLS) portfolio.

CSOS Final Rule DocumentDittig said that, by being separate from DMLSS and TEWLS, NORA’s third-party validation process complies with the DEA CSOS Final Rule Document, the electronic equivalent to the DEA official order form. The Final Rule Document is legally required for all distributions involv-ing Schedule I and II controlled substances. The Docu-ment allows, but does not require, registrants to approve or disapprove an order for Schedule I and II substances electronically and maintain digital order records. The Final Rule Document reduces paperwork and transaction times for DEA registrants who handle, sell or buy controlled sub-stances—but has no effect on patients’ ability to receive prescriptions from practitioners, nor on practitioners’ ability to have controlled substance prescriptions filled at a military pharmacy.

If embedded within DMLSS or TEWLS, NORA would have been subject to the DEA CSOS Final Rule Docu-ment. However, Dittig said that DMLSS and TEWLS users already have worldwide access to the NORA application to research order status since they meet public key infra-structure (PKI) access requirements. PKI is a set of roles, policies and procedures needed to create, manage,


distribute, use, store and revoke digital certificating and manage public-key encryption. Access to all DHA Med Log systems is PKI-controlled via common access cards (CACs).

NORA security standards are the only ones allowed for electronic transmission of Schedule II controlled substance orders between manufactures, distributors, pharmacies and other DEA ordering entities, Dittig said. “NORA is available to all DMLSS and TEWLS users worldwide. Cur-rently there are more than 300 registrants or POAs who have signatory authority in NORA.”

Approved users who have signatory authority must be registered with the DEA and authorized by the agency as either registrants or signatory approval POAs, he added. Once approved, registrants must participate in training for approving, signing or rejecting controlled substance orders. All NORA users must also register with the DEA to use the electronic DEA 222.

Users generate controlled substance orders in either DMLSS or TEWLS. The order is electronically transmitted to NORA via the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS). After the electronic order form is generated, NORA will notify the registrant or POA of the pending order. From there, the registrant or POA logs into NORA and completes the approval or disapproval process. If the order is approved, NORA will complete the order process using the DEA certificate for the approver and send it to the DoD-approved pharmaceutical vendor via DAAS.

“Since its deployment, NORA has reduced costs, chain-of-custody problems and processing times along with cutting administrative and order fulfillment errors,” noted SDD Chief Col. Francisco Dominicci. “It’s a speedy, modern upgrade to a slow, antiquated process.”

Dominicci said that NORA is one of several JMLFDC programs designed to create more streamlined, cost-effi-cient Med Log acquisition processes to help improve the patient experience for the MHS’ 9.5 million-plus eligible beneficiaries.

“Another major program, called LogiCole, will eventually transition all Med Log applications, including NORA, into a single, Web-based suite on the cloud,” he added. “The new suite will provide an enterprise view of all Med Log func-tions, including supply, equipment, medical maintenance and facility management. For acquisitions, LogiCole will use authoritative product and sourcing data to push users toward preferred, standardized items.”


DAU ALUMNI ASSOCIATION

Join the Success Network!The DAU Alumni Association opens the door to a worldwide network of Defense Acquisition University graduates, faculty, staff members, and defense industry representatives—all ready to share their expertise with you and benefit from yours.

Be part of a two-way exchange of information with other acquisition professionals.

• Stay connected to DAU and link to other professional organizations.

• Keep up to date on evolving defense acquisition policies and developments through DAUAA newsletters and the DAUAA LinkedIn Group.

• Attend the DAU Annual Acquisition Training Symposium and bi-monthly hot topic training forums—both supported by the DAUAA—and earn Continuous Learning Points toward DoD continuing education requirements.

Membership is open to all DAU graduates, faculty, staff, and defense industry members. It’s easy to join right from the DAUAA Web Site at www.dauaa.org, or scan the following QR code:

For more information call 703-960-6802 or 800-755-8805,

or e-mail [email protected].


DEFENSEACQUISITION

WRITERS’ GUIDELINES IN BRIEFPurposeDefense Acquisition is a bimonthly magazine published by DAU Press, Defense Acquisition University, for senior military personnel, civilians, defense contractors and defense industry profession-als in program management and the acquisition, technology and logistics workforce.

Submission ProceduresSubmit articles by e-mail to [email protected]. Submissions must include each author’s name, mailing address, office phone number, e-mail address, and brief biographical statement. Each must also be accompanied by a copyright release. For each article submitted, please include three to four keywords that can be used to facilitate Web and data base searches.

Receipt of your submission will be acknowledged in 5 working days. You will be notified of our publication decision in 2 to 3 weeks. All decisions are final.

DeadlinesNote: If the magazine fills up before the author deadline, submis-sions are considered for the following issue. Issue Author Deadline January–February 1 October March–April 1 December May–June 1 February July–August 1 April September–October 1 June November–December 1 August

AudienceDefense Acquisition readers are mainly acquisition professionals serving in career positions covered by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) or industry equivalent.

StyleDefense Acquisition prints feature stories focusing on real people and events. The magazine seeks articles that reflect author experiences in and thoughts about acquisition rather than pages of researched information. Articles should discuss the individual’s experience with problems and solutions in acquisition, contracting, logistics, or program management, or with emerging trends.

The magazine does not print academic papers; fact sheets; techni-cal papers; white papers; or articles with footnotes, endnotes, or references. Manuscripts meeting any of those criteria are more suit-able for DAU’s journal, Defense Acquisition Research Journal (ARJ).

Defense Acquisition does not reprint from other publications. Please do not submit manuscripts that have appeared elsewhere. Defense Acquisition does not publish endorsements of products for sale.

Length Articles should be 1,500–2,500 words.

FormatSend submissions via e-mail as Microsoft Word attachments.

GraphicsDo not embed photographs or charts in the manuscript. Digital files of photos or graphics should be sent as e-mail attachments. Each figure or chart must be saved as a separate file in the original software format in which it was created.

TIF or JPEG files must have a resolution of 300 pixels per inch; enhanced resolutions are not acceptable; and images downloaded from the Web are not of adequate quality for reproduction. De-tailed tables and charts are not accepted for publication because they will be illegible when reduced to fit at most one-third of a magazine page.

Right to Use IllustrationsNon-DoD photos and graphics are printed only with written per-mission from the source. It is the author’s responsibility to obtain and submit permission with the article. Do not include any clas-sified information.

Author InformationContact and biographical information will be included with each article selected for publication. Please include the following infor-mation with your submission: name, position title, department, institution, address, phone number and e-mail address. Also, please supply a short biographical statement, not to exceed 25 words. We do not print author bio photographs.

CopyrightAll articles require a signed Work of the U.S. Government/Copy-right Release form, available at https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/Lists/PageContent/Attachments/6/DATLcopyright-release_032217.pdf. Fill out, sign, scan and e-mail it to [email protected] or fax it to 703-805-2917, Attn: Defense Acquisition.

Alternatively, you may submit a written release from the major com-mand (normally the public affairs office) indicating the author is releasing the article to Defense Acquisition for publication without restriction.

The Defense Acquisition University does not accept copy-righted material for publication in Defense Acquisition. Articles will be considered only if they are unrestricted. This is in keep-ing with the University’s policy that our publications be fully accessible to the public without restriction. All articles are in the public domain and posted to the University’s website, https://www.dau.edu.

http://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/p/Writers-Guidelines

defense at & l magazine · 2019-10-22 · documentation. dfars clause 252.204-7012 is required...

Documents