Issue 1 July – September 2012

The Arab Spring: Revolution without Revolutionaries?

How militaries leverage their greatest asset: information?

What does The Flame mean for cyber security?

Welcome to the first edition of the Defence IQ Review. Everyday we publish articles on the website but we thought it would be a good idea if we picked out the very best and brightest pieces once in a while. We wanted to put them all in one place to make it an easily accessible and engaging read. And so the Defence IQ Review was born. In this edition we look at the UK’s recent U-turn on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and talk to Peter Luff, the Defence Minister responsible for procurement, in an exclusive interview. Other topics include a great analysis of the use of social media during the Arab Spring and Richard de Silva considers the U.S. Army’s decision to equip its troops with smartphones. We hope you enjoy it! Andrew Elwell, Editor Defence IQ www.defenceiq.com

3. News in brief 4. New cyber-weapon ‘The Flame’ Discovered 5. Leveraging our greatest asset: Information 6. Defence IQ announces winners of the 2012 Blogging Awards 7. F-35 in Focus: Defence Minister Peter Luff discusses the F-35 and carrier strike capability

9. F-35 head to head: STOVL vs Carrier Variant 10. Opinion: Two carriers now a necessity following F-35 U-turn 12. US Army gets smart… Phones 14. The Arab Spring: Revolution without Revolutionaries? 17. Op ed: France: out of the frying pan and into Syria?

For further information on the Defence IQ Review: For editorial enquiries, please contact: Andrew Elwell, Editor, andrew.elwell@iqpc.co.uk

For marketing and advertising enquries, please contact: Samantha Tanner, Marketing Manager, samantha.tanner@iqpc.co.uk For all other enquiries: newsletter@defenceiq.com

© Defence IQ – a division of IQPC International July 2012.

Welcome

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News in Brief

Amazonas to make a splash in Brazil as BAE set to deliver first OPV In June BAE Systems will delivered the first of three Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to Brazil as part of the £133 million deal it struck earlier in the year. The OPV, named Amazonas, was handed over to Brazil at the end of the month. Originally the three ships were to be built for Trinidad and Tobago but the contract was cancelled following schedule and design issues. The new deal with Brazil now includes a manufacturing license for the Brazilians to continue to build additional OPVs indigenously.

Exoskeleton robot to produce He-Man Army The French Ministère de la Défense is developing an exoskeleton robot designed to assist service personnel while carrying and handling heavy loads. The exoskeleton is intended to enhance a soldier’s strength by providing a mechanized frame that enhances the muscle power of the wearer. Hercule will allow the user to lift loads “effortlessly” by supporting the dorsal structure through its revolutionary “mechatronic” legs Each arm has the capability to carry up to 20kg and the entire system will be able to support 100kg in its final configuration, although current demonstration models only have a payload of 40kg.

Study to reveal 30-year defence landscape in Europe The European Defence Agency (EDA) is conducting the Future Land Systems study to review the European land system industrial base over a 30 year period. With BAE Systems leading the study and another 16 member companies supporting it, the study is designed to highlight capability gaps as ties between the European nations continue to strengthen as the economic mire hastens. Claude-France Arnould, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency, said that “now is a critical moment for EU defence … there is a strong political impulse to cooperate …and clearly it’s time to act.”

MI5 boss reveals "astonishing" cyber attack secrets Everyday the UK is subject to an “astonishing” number of cyber attacks, according to the head of Britain’s Security Service. Jonathan Evans, the Director General of MI5, made his first public appearance in over two years to warn against the increasing threat of state-sponsored cyber attacks. “Vulnerabilities in the internet are being exploited aggressively not just by criminals but also by states," Evans said. “The extent of what is going on is astonishing.”

Find all the latest news at www.defenceiq.com

The throwable robot....catches on The Throwbot, designed by the robotics specialists at ReconRobotics Inc. in Minnesota, has been chosen by the U.S. Army’s Rapid Equipping Force to provide four- and five-man fire teams with immediate tactical reconnaissance during urban warfare operations, surveillance missions and counter-IED efforts. The Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract is for an initial 1,000 units at a cost of $13.9 million. “For several years, our micro-robot systems have played a key role in protecting the lives of our soldiers and Marines as they conduct operations in active combat theatres,” said Ernest Langdon, Director of Military Programs for ReconRobotics. "We are honored that the Rapid Equipping Force has once again selected ReconRobotics to deliver this unique capability to those warfighters at the tip of the spear.”

Replacement Trident nuclear programme gets £1 billion boost Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence, has said that a £1 billion deal has been struck to develop the next generation of nuclear reactors that will replace Britain’s current Vanguard class submarines, which carry the Trident nuclear missiles.

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News

By Andrew Elwell May 2012

A cyber weapon 20 times more sophisticated than Stuxnet has been discovered by Russian internet security firm Kaspersky Lab it was revealed this morning. The malicious programme, called the Flame, is thought to have been undetected for two years having been active, or “in the wild”, since March 2010. Middle Eastern countries including Iran, Israel, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have all been affected according to reports. Due to the complex nature of the virus, the Flame has been labelled a “super-cyberweapon.” Fears have been growing over a possible ‘cyber war’ for a number of years; the uncovering of the Flame as the next phase in that conflict is unlikely to allay those fears. Eugene Kaspersky, CEO and co-founder of Kaspersky Lab, said: “The risk of cyber warfare has been one of the most serious topics in the field of information security for several years now. Stuxnet and Duqu belonged to a single chain of attacks, which raised cyberwar-related concerns worldwide. The Flame malware looks to be another phase in this war, and it’s important to understand that such cyber weapons can easily be used against any country. Unlike with conventional warfare, the more developed countries are actually the most vulnerable in this case.” What’s worse, considering the Flame has been running wild for over two years, the “next phase” of cyber warfare and the even the phase after that may also be running through our networks undetected as we speak. Kaspersky said that the Flame “can steal valuable information, including but not limited to computer display contents, information

about targeted systems, stored files, contact data and even audio conversations.” It’s believed that such a complex programme is unlikely to be the work of cyber criminals or individuals within a group, such as Anonymous or LulzSec, and is probably a government-backed virus just as the Stuxnet virus was. It is, however, easy to overstate this threat. The term ‘cyber warfare’ itself is one that polarises opinion, with many commentators and experts insisting that there will never be a ‘war’ fought solely in the cyber domain; rather, that attacks in the cyber domain will be utilised as a warfare tactic during a physical conflict. Indeed, according to Kaspersky, “the primary purpose of Flame appears to be cyber espionage, by stealing information from infected machines.” Espionage is not an act of war. The Cold War was underpinned by 50 years of espionage and intelligence gathering on all sides; it did not lead to conflict per se. Similarly, no nation is likely to perceive any such attack on its computer networks as an act of war. Dick Crowell of the U.S. Navy War College has a thoughtful response to this, which he expressed at a recent conference on cyber security. “I don’t believe there will ever be a thing which we can call a ‘Cyber War’ … but I think cyber warfare tactics will be employed in all future conflicts.” The Flame is clearly a serious threat to national security, personal privacy and commercial intellectual property, but it’s flippant to throw terms like ‘cyber war’ around unduly. The discovery of each of these new “phases” should be considered within a sensible and contextual framework.

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Cyber

Joint C4ISR

Leveraging our greatest asset: Information By Padraic McCluskey May 2012

As a decade of operations begin to wind down in Afghanistan, it is clear that the military’s insatiable demand for timely, secure and high quality information will continue to grow exponentially. Some estimates forecast a near 1000% rise in information generation before 2020. Afghanistan has shown that severe challenges exist in how information is gathered, exploited and shared in the global battlespace. While recent multinational and national networks have gone some way in alleviating a number of these challenges, it is far from certain that future mission networks will not suffer from the same problems. The continuing proliferation of remotely piloted aircraft, satellite based intelligence, handheld devices and a whole host of networked devices means that the amount of information rocketing around the theatre will only but continue to rise. One thing is clear: More than bullets or bombs, information will remain militaries’ greatest force multiplier. No circle, full circle In yester year the warfighter couldn’t gather enough information, but now the issue is coming full circle as the data that military devices and platforms are able to collect, store and analyse increases in both volume and quality. Industry solutions have raced ahead of the military on the front lines, back at HQ, and within its rigid organisational structure. Information is being churned out at a rate and at a quality that is overwhelming the military’s capacity to handle it, meaning it is often duplicated, lost or simply unused. With a drive underway to extend networks down to the tactical level, forces’ battlespace agility and speed should increase but it also opens up new avenues for more information to bloom out of. Industry continues to promise that its solutions will make the information gathering, exploitation and sharing process more seamless and less over-burdening but challenges still abound. Solutions using commercial technology, existing architectures and commercial levels of security have made great in-roads into the problem. However, industry has not yet managed to

convince militaries that its solutions, often with hefty price tags, are the answer to their problems. While it’s fair to say industry solutions have not quite reached a level of operational relevance for the military yet, there are also other issues that need to be resolved. Organisational structures within the military have often contributed to the problem as rigid and antiquated operating procedures have meant that critical information has often not been shared with the right people at the right time. In turn, countless operations have been unable to utilise their most important asset: Information. Operation Unified Protector has recently shown that some nations often had to revert back to commanders very high up the chain before information could be shared, with the delay marring the effectiveness of the information. Former ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal encountered these same organisational strictures during his time in Iraq. His approach to reduce delays in sharing information throughout the chain of command across a wide area of operations is something that has now started to be incorporated more widely. If such an agile structure could be transposed into the multinational environment then it would go a long way to rectifying a growing problem. The solution then does not then lie in the military, political or industrial realms alone. A balanced approach will be required so that nations can make the most of the information that is out there. Industry needs to provide solutions that are simple for people to use, can handle and exploit increasing volumes of data, and not cost the world. Militaries and their political superiors must start to take a serious look at the organisational structures and procedures they employ on operations. There will be little value in adopting future technological advances if they are met by antiquated structures that constrict the flow and utilisation of information.

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Winners of the Defence IQ Blogging Awards 2012 announced

In May, Defence IQ launched the search for the best defence and military blogs in a bid to recognise those who constantly keep us informed of worldwide events. From these nominations, 33 blogs were chosen to make up the shortlist while the panel discussed and debated who should be crowned the winner from each category. On 20th June 2012, Defence IQ finally revealed what the blogoshpere had been waiting for - the list of winners…

Counter Terrorism: WINNER: The Freedom Fighter Blog http://www.matthewvandyke.com/blog/ Defence Industry: WINNER: RAF Airman http://rafairman.wordpress.com/ Maritime Security: WINNER: Daly History Blog http://dalyhistory.wordpress.com/

Information Operations: WINNER: Small Wars Journal http://smallwarsjournal.com/ Regional Defence: WINNER: Livefist http://livefist.blogspot.in Cyber Security: WINNER: CWZ http://www.cyberwarzone.com/

For more information on all upcoming awards, join Defence IQ now www.defenceiq.com/join.cfm

Defence IQ Review Issue 1 Q3 2012 6

Blogging Awards

By Andrew Elwell May 2012

Does the UK need an aircraft carrier? Does carrier strike represent a relevant strategic capability considering Britain’s likely role and influence in world affairs over the next 50 years? There is growing debate among politicians, the military, historians and analysts about whether or not carrier strike capability is justifiable on the back of the significant cost of building two Queen Elizabeth class carriers and acquiring the new fleet of fifth generation fighters that they will accommodate. I posed this question to Peter Luff, the Minister responsible for defence procurement at the MOD, during an interview recently. He is firmly on the side of the exponents. “It would be a very big decision for the UK to abandon carrier strike as one of its key capabilities to project power around the world,” Luff said. His slight hesitation in answering the question suggested the premise itself was somewhat amiss. That even the thought of not proceeding with a carrier strike strategy was unrealistic, irrational. As a strategic defence capability to protect our nation we need carrier strike. As an effective way of safeguarding our trade, resources and supplies globally we need carrier strike. As a way of projecting our power around the world we need carrier strike. “We are still, I think, fundamentally a maritime power with absolute dependence on trade,” said Luff. “Our ability to show that we are able to use the sea to protect our nation is of strategic importance. “The ability to project power around the world is uniquely offered by carrier strike, so it’s the right thing to go for.” The strategic importance of carrier strike was highlighted in the government’s recent decision to revert back to the STOVL F-35B variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. One of the key drivers for that decision was based on the fact that if the MOD proceeded with the

current plan then the UK would have been without carrier strike capability for 13 years. With the STOVL variant, carrier strike will be restored three years earlier. “A ten year gap [in carrier strike capability] was the most we felt we could take strategically – a thirteen year gap would have been irresponsible,” said Luff. In his article, ‘Does anybody still need aircraft carriers?’, Tom de Castella says that “there have been sceptics for some time.“ “In 1981, David Howarth wrote in Famous Sea Battles that "the only practical value of carriers in the future will be in simply existing, not in fighting". To use them in anger would be to trigger a nuclear war, he argued. “But just a year later, the UK's carriers ensured that the Falkland Islands were regained.” Having an operational aircraft carrier capability allows the UK to not only project power on the world stage, but also support other nations around the globe. “They will play a pivotal role in the UK's defence strategy,” Geoff Searle, Programme Director for the QEC aircraft carriers, told Defence IQ in an interview earlier this month, “while also providing a platform for humanitarian aid.” Aside from strategic relevance, there’s also the plain fact that we are building the carriers now. Does mothballing both really present itself as a viable option? “We have two superb carrier ships being built, not to use them would be a crime,” Luff concluded. God Save the Queen…and the Prince of Wales On the QEC aircraft carriers though Luff did say that, although the reversion to the STOVL variant may lead to both carriers being active in the future, “there’s no immediate plan to operate two carriers.”

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“We now have the ability to operate a second carrier should we choose to do so,” said Luff, “but that decision is effectively for the next SDSR. “So at present we stick with using one, but with the next SDSR due by 2015 … we will review that.” That’s probably not quite the affirmative answer many would hope for. The Navy Campaign, an independent body borne out of the SDSR, has been working closely with the government as it weighed up which F-35 variant to buy. At the time of Hammond’s announcement it said the following: “The Government has repeatedly stated that by reverting to the STOVL jet, both carriers will become operational sooner than the one ‘cats and traps’ carrier would. We look forward to seeing both carriers in service.” The F-35 The obvious question: Why did the government choose to make a U-turn on the decision to procure the STOVL F-35B variant of the JSF? “The facts changed,” the purposeful and candid defence minister told me. “We had understood that the carriers were easily adaptable to take the ‘cats and traps’ system. That probably was true in their early design life, say ten years ago … but it was just more expensive to install the equipment in the carriers than we had been told at the time of the SDSR [in 2010].”

So cost was a major driver in the decision. But so was capability. “The other fact that changed from the SDSR was that there were doubts being stressed about the B variant,” Luff said, referring to the questions being asked about the design of the new jets after a number of issues surfaced at the time. “But those doubts have now been swept aside; [the F-35B] is off probation,” Luff confirmed. “It’s done a lot of flying hours and landing on vessels, so that uncertainty over the B variant has disappeared.” “The 2010 SDSR decision on carriers was right at the time, but the facts have changed and therefore so too must our approach,” Philip Hammond announced in a statement to parliament earlier this month regarding the F-35 decision. “This Government will not blindly pursue projects and ignore cost growth and delays.” On the F-35 U-turn Luff is equally clear: “It was the responsible thing to do.”

F-35

Are two carriers now a necessity? David Moroz from Defence Dateline Group presents the case for it…

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F-35 head-to-head: STOVL vs. Carrier Variant

F-35

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By David Moroz, Defence Dateline Group May 2012

Nineteen months ago, when the new coalition government published its hurried and much-maligned Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), I was engaged in studying the review process for my dissertation. In interviews with officers and academics alike, all echoed the same warning: (I paraphrase) ‘The SDSR is only the beginning. You watch – the government will realise its mistake before the 2015 SDSR.’ And so it came to pass. On the decision to abandon the Short Take Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35B in favour of the catapult-launched F-35C the experts have been proven remarkably prophetic. To be entirely fair, the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter did, in 2010, appear to offer three distinct advantages over the STOVL F-35B. Closer inspection and subsequent events, however, show these to be far from the ‘compelling evidence’ we were presented with in the SDSR. Firstly, it is entirely true that the F-35C has a greater range and payload, operating out to 30% further and carrying almost 20% more weight. This ignores the facts that both variants can carry the full range of weapons that the UK intends to operate with the aircraft, and that the STOVL variant offers greater flexibility and agility – not least with regards to operating bases. Additionally, since 2010, the cost of fitting the necessary catapults and arrestor gear to the carriers has spiralled, cited as the primary reason for now reverting to the STOVL variant. Secondly, in 2010, the F-35B was suffering from serious power and stress problems that threatened the future of the programme. Since January 2012, it has been declared back on track, albeit behind the other two and with a significant cost increase to the aircraft. Thirdly, using catapult launched jets offered interoperability with French and American carriers and aircraft. This ‘requirement’ was parachuted into the SDSR at the last minute in order to justify selection of the F-35C. With jets and carriers due to enter service approximately simultaneously, interoperability was of no use in plugging the ten-year capability gap left by withdrawal of the Harriers and Invincible class carriers. Besides, weight issues mean that operating F-35s from the Charles de Gaulle looks unlikely to be possible. It is true, however, that abandoning ‘cats and traps’ will allow the new carriers and jets to enter service up to five years earlier. Furthermore, there are other important partner nations who operate STOVL carriers – Spain and Italy for example. Applauding the decision to finally revert to the F-35B is not to deny that the government is guilty of committing a U-turn of vast proportions, at a cost of up to £1 billion to the UK taxpayer. It is at the very least inconsistent to profess that a ten-year capability gap

will not adversely impact the UK’s ability to protect her interests overseas and then justify abandoning a ‘superior’ replacement on the grounds that such a gap was intolerable for any longer than eight years. Although the latter is not an argument that has yet been used explicitly, many have come close to it in recent days. The facts stand that the correct decision has been made and for that we should be grateful. Within days of the F-35 decision the MoD also announced, with considerably less fanfare, that it had succeeded in balancing its budget, plugging the alleged £38 billion gap in its finances so widely publicised in the run up to the SDSR. This is a bold claim to make but, if true, then it is a considerable achievement for the new Defence Secretary after only seven months in office. Key programmes now ‘guaranteed’ to be going ahead include the delivery of fourteen new Chinooks; upgrades to the Apache, Puma and Merlin; the building of all the Type 45 destroyers, Type 26 frigates, Astute class submarines and two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers; introduction of the Lynx Wildcat, Voyager and A400M; and ‘continued investment’ in Typhoon and F-35. Taken together, these recent developments would seem to make possible the rectification of one of the biggest strategic mistakes committed by the 2010 SDSR, the choice to only bring one aircraft carrier into service. The farce of the decision was pointed out at the time but, in the light of recent events, carrier advocates – all too aware of their collective failure in the run up to SDSR – have begun to emerge from the woodwork. And their argument makes strategic, as well as economic sense. It must be borne in mind that a single carrier capability is a part-time carrier capability – only available around 60% of the time. Other European nations maintain only one carrier as a perfectly valid strategic choice – as a discretionary capability it is not strictly essential for national security. The British case has never been framed in these terms, however – it would appear simply to be cost that has led the government to its current position. In addition, the construction of both ships is well underway and breathing a lease of new life into the ailing British shipbuilding industry. If the defence budget is back in the black and savings have been made by returning to the F-35B, then surely there is no better time to reassess the carrier decision. The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, in his recent letter to the Telegraph explaining the F-35 U-turn puts a carrier decision off until 2015: ‘It [switching to F-35B] also gives us the ability to operate two carriers if we choose, a decision that the next SDSR will review.’

F-35 Opinion

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http://www.maritimerecon.com/Event.aspx?id=639732&mac=DFIQ_Events_Title_Listing_2011&utm_source=defenceiq.com&utm_medium=iq_partner&utm_campaign=iq_eventlist&utm_content=text&utm_term=eventpage_titlelink

On the back of recent reports that the US Army has begun to ship Google Android operated touchscreen devices to more of its troops in Afghanistan, progress on this experimental step has been of high interest to militaries worldwide, particularly as the roll out is also being used as a litmus for the same programme to soon be delivered to government officials and other key agencies. At a recent forum on the subject of modernising tactical communications, Major General Alan R. Lynn, Commanding General of the US Army Signal Center of Excellence, addressed a room of international delegates on the recent evolution. The aim for the Signal Corps is to ensure that the infantry communication network applies itself is “an extension of the soldier” and whatever is fielded should allow the warfighter to train wherever they are, be it on home soil or downrange. Lynn outlined the Signals Transformation Project, emphasising the importance of constantly questioning the utility of what is being fielded. “Every three years we look at ourselves and ask did we get it right?” said Lynn. “We’re now addressing all of the issues identified in the Signal Tactical Functional Area Assessment.” The mission has been made all the more complex by a reduction of the signals soldier teams from nine to four, but with a concurrent demand for greater capability, and no actual increase in budget. The answer to this riddle has been the futuristic-sounding Micro-Cyber (‘μCyber’), which naturally aims to shrink the technology at hand and hinges on taking a flexible approach. This SWAP-C (Small Weight and Power - Cost) programme is designed to do exactly as it sounds, changing out the old for the new. The priority aim across the board is the concerted effort to

lessen the load that communications equipment adds to the soldier in the battlefield – one of the continuously difficult ambitions of militaries worldwide, particularly in an age when troops are expected to act as everything from a human broadcasting tower to an artillery piece on legs. In one example, Lynn said, “we asked whether there is now a need for voice or a need for data? As soldiers need more data, we need to provide more than the traditional voice systems. “Senior commanders didn’t used to understand communications. The extent of it was ‘fix that’. Now, after another decade of warfighting, three and four star generals have begun to ‘get’ it.” He highlighted here that where the old, “limited” voice kits would cost $46,000 a piece, swapping these out for commercial off-the-shelf tablet computers represents a cost-saving that any level of command can appreciate. Usually, it is a 5-7 year process to take an idea for new Army equipment from proposal to theatre. However, due to the general lifespan of relevance for today’s technology being roughly 6 years, soldiers can find themselves taking delivery of kit that proves obsolete within a matter of months. Michael McCarthy, Director of the Brigade Modernisation Command, has been leading the process of rolling out smart devices to US soldiers worldwide while tackling this very pitfall. According to him, it has been a struggle to repeal what he calls the “Bubba Law”. “Bubba is my cousin’s friend’s sister’s cousin’s friend… basically, there’s a culture of simply following a rule that someone made up and no one wants to change in case something goes wrong,” he said.

By Richard de Silva May 2012

Smart Technology

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McCarthy knew that he would be taking commanders out of their comfort zone when he proposed that they reject the usual 7 year wait and fundamentally change how soldiers share information, training and knowledge in both garrison and operations… all in just 4 months. Fortunately, McCarthy has been able to draw on the benefits of smart technology use currently being implemented across the other US services. The Air Force is procuring 18,000 iPads for its pilots to engage in virtual cockpit training, helping to orient new aviators and keep the skills of seasoned officers fine-tuned. The Navy meanwhile has been seduced by the prospect of collating physical on-board manuals and guidebooks to just a few tablet computers per vessel. The reason being is that documentation adds several tons of weight to every ship, and in turn adds significantly to already rising fuel costs. “We’ve got to keep thinking that way and looking at second and third effects,” says McCarthy. With the change in technology also comes a change in the way soldiers are trained. Where the technology picks up or simplifies some of the hard graft that the traditional user used to be troubled with, being trained in some of these skills has since become redundant, thereby allowing commanders to pare down courses to meet the essentials. “As we’re buying boxes more often,” said Lynn, “and the equipment changes rapidly over the years, training is becoming more and more theory-based.” The 13 defined skillsets of the traditional signals officer is now down to 7, including the hot button issue – cyber defence. Overall, it’s an “agile” approach that updates the capability in an incremental basis. If there is no warfight, or there is budget that is not immediately being funnelled to operations, funding can instead be diverted to buying further units of the modern kit, such as smartphones. Such a tactic should prevent the technology as a whole from becoming outdated. Eventually, when smart technology or handheld devices become a thing of the past (probably sooner than we think), the Army will already have one foot forward in the right direction. “This could be the base we use for all our future systems,” continued Lynn. ‘Ruggedising’ the equipment is also easier, with gorilla glass and shock cases being easy to obtain, plus a newfound disregard for the general wellbeing of the hardware. “The whole premise of this is that it’s affordable technology,” declared McCarthy. “When you break it, you just get another one.” He relates a recent incident of the tablets undergoing field testing, during which a 32,000 lb MRAP armoured vehicle accidentally rolled over one of the devices, turning it to dust. The soldiers involved had been worried they would be in trouble for destroying it, but as was pointed out to them, this is exactly why the equipment is undergoing field testing, and there’s little cost in replacing them. How small a cost? According to the contractors, the company supplying the hardware agreed to a deal that involves the devices themselves costing a mere $1 cent a piece. Just as benefits the commercial smart phone user, another vital part of networking the dismounted squad has been in the provision of apps to further simplify and accelerate tasks. The Signal Corps has long been developing its very own ‘App Store’, with 84 military-specific applications completed to date, 75 of which have been published. The Brigade Combat Team app, offering training, terminology and other information, currently tops the charts among the personnel using smart devices, but Lynn also pointed out that it has helped keep troops refreshed, entertained and sociable, with an app offering bugle call audio files one of the other most popular downloads. Development of these apps is neither idly done nor limited to military developers. Industry is encouraged to assist in ensuring the software soldiers are familiarising themselves with in the comfort of

the barracks is also identical to what they would need to know or use in the battlefield. Lynn provided another example: “If we ask industry to develop an app, the second part of the conversation goes ‘If you’re giving me a training app, make that the Graphical User Interface’. “We look to give industry a base line of requirements, and anything above that is great. Our message is that if you think you can improve on what we have or provide us something useful, show us what you’ve got.” Smart devices in theatre are physically connected across their own wave forms, but it is of course an ongoing focus to ensure the security of the network wherever possible. The US National Security Agency is involved in the software encryption of Micro-Cyber, and has been one of the most active agencies taking on responsibilities for long-term cyber security across military and government infrastructure. McCarthy raises the point of the need for the technology superseding the immediate availability of the technology as a security concern today. “Currently, soldiers are buying cell phones out of their own pocket and using them on local networks, which you’d rather not want in theatre,” he said. “At the same time, we can’t put a soldier at risk by giving them a system that’s vulnerable.” That being said, he also stressed that there is now the need for the Army to not act in a strictly risk-averse fashion but instead access “appropriate risk” in order to see that the door to advancement does not swing shut. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Miles, Operations Officer of the Army’s Chief Information Officer, is responsible for the management of data sharing, and explains to us how less really can be more where IT security is concerned. “We have extra networking capability that we could consolidate,” explained Miles. “We have right now many different networks and it’s large on our operational environment only because we have a lot of redundant capability. “So it’s an environment of multiple user devices and multiple networks, which is inherently less secure because there’s more you need to manage. You have a larger digital footprint. “In the future, where there’s going to be a larger data requirement, the network – which will be consolidated – will therefore be more secure only because there will be less of a perimeter.” Asked how much information is provided on each of the handheld devices, Lynn confirmed that virtualisation was already in the works. “GPS, base maps, and so on, are physically added to the device,” he said, “but additional and more detailed information should be part of a cloud. The NIE (Network Integration Evaluation) is helping with this.” Lt Col Miles outlined the initiative’s role in the broader picture. “NIE is really looking at how we’re modernising IT capabilities in the future, trying to keep a better pace with available technology and modernising the entire network, from the operational and tactical forces to our generating forces prior to deployment,” he said. “For the overall vision – the vision of one network and enterprise available, having data always available – it’s more than just about their data; it’s about their identity. “It’s about how we’re changing the soldier interfacing with the network on the battlefield. We are hopefully in the future going to be giving them the same access to the network as they have back in the rear, and the very same data. “So when the soldiers and the units and the leadership access this data back at a camp posting station prior to deployment, they get on the plane, they get off in a contingency environment, and they still have the same identity, the same email address, the same products they’re used to using, their staffs are already integrated using the network that they’re comfortable with… the data follows them.” For McCarthy, despite the abundance of benefits in the outlook from a joint relations perspective, or even a cost perspective, there’s also an added incentive that keep him dedicated to seeing this programme through:“My personal goal is that if I can save one soldier’s life or prevent them from being injured because we’ve provided them with better access to info and training, then I feel it will be worth it.”

Smart Technology

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April 2012

Since the Arab Spring commenced lively debate has ensued about the part played by social media in igniting the first flash of revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and beyond. Contending theories suggest either that the effect was overstated or that new media and social networking sites were among the critical fulminates. The truth perhaps lies somewhere in between, and this article attempts to provide further perspective. My overriding sense is that within the context of the 2011 revolutions, social media networks were essentially barometers, rather than catalysts. They certainly had an effect in terms of organisation, mobilisation and networking, but it hardly needs saying that mass movements of Arab people pre-date new media and technology. Neither the First Intifada in Palestine in 1987, nor the Shabaniya revolt in Iraqi in 1991 were motivated by blogs, Facebook or Twitter. In the Middle East, freedom isn't a new idea. In shifting so much focus onto the relevance of social media in the Arab Spring, my own feeling is that the debate tells us more about the West's impercipience than it does about the Middle East. The preoccupation with social media's role in the 2011 revolutions manifests Western commentators and politicians' desperate desire to review and interpret the people of the Middle East through a prism that they can readily comprehend. Internet access is increasing rapidly, but as Hisham Matar has stated ¹, social media usage in the Middle East is limited to a thin crust of cosmopolitan, techo-fluent 'top people'. So, really one might argue that this preoccupation with Facebook and Twitter merely represents one metropolitan elite reviewing the actions and behaviours of another, whilst giving insufficient weight to the critical constituency, al sha'ab: the people. So, where does the balance lay?

The long struggle that resulted in Algerian independence in the 60s was initiated before the First World War by Les Evolues, ('the evolved ones'), Francophone Algerians schooled in France, who exported progressive ideas back to North Africa. But the people of the salon couldn't achieve their 'gradualist' agenda because they lacked a strong attachment to the street. So it is today. The cosmopolitan elites and the intellectual Arab diaspora can create the narratives of change in their erudite blogospheres, but they require a spark to mobilise the people to recite and pursue those narratives with passion and purpose. Those 'sparks' are normally born of palpable social, economic and political grievances, rather than an intellectual or ideological motivation. This was certainly the case during the Arab Spring, and the socio-political tremors in the years preceding it. In 2008 there was unrest in Bahrain, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, largely motivated by the rising cost of living. However, the circumstances in Egypt, in particular, illustrate an important dimension to the current debate regarding the relevance of social media. In the Egyptian cyberspace in 2008, a Facebook page was established calling for a General Strike on April 6th, in support of a long-running industrial dispute in Ghazl el Mahalla, in the Delta. The page soon garnered some sixty thousand supporters, and is credited with organising and promoting a successful nationwide expression of dissent. The industrial dispute centred upon the largest cotton mill in the Middle East, employing some 27,000 workers. The Textile Workers League had demanded an increase in the national minimum wage from a mere $6.40 per month - the level established in 1984 - and had threatened action if their

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much for a population already weighed down by repression, high unemployment and inflation. These revelations helped to set the mood of the street in the weeks preceding Mr Bouazizi's climactic act.³ The net activists, “Anonymous,” also played a minor part in the Tunisian revolution, attacking government websites and attempting to secure online anonymity for opposition's cyber partisans. However, the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences both underline the fact that social media might play a role in mass protest, but it will rarely be the decisive factor. To over-estimate the importance of social media in the Arab Spring is to misunderstand the character of the Middle East, and to cloud clarity with our own partial perceptions. In the capitals of the West, where communities are fragmented, social cohesion is loose and even family ties are stretched and strained, we communicate via Skype, Facebook and of course by email and text. Raves, 'Flash Mobs', destructive teenage parties, even weddings and anti-capitalist demonstrations are convened on the internet. We don't see one another at Church, nor in the Market Square, we travel alone in our cars, inured to the world by our iPods. But in the Middle East, it's wholly different. Communities with strong cohesion still exist. Bonds of faith, family, tribe and town are far more tangible than ethereal 'virtual communities', which the overwhelming majority don't access anyway. In the madrassa, masjid, majlis or Muski Street, the great mass of the people talk and talk and talk. The social synapses are firing incessantly, and news travels fast. In the Middle East, social media is just another form of communication, but not the most pervasive, and certainly not the most practical or effective. As a further illustration of this point, it's worth considering the capacity for traditional political mobilisation in the Middle East, taking just three examples: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas in Gaza and the Sadr Movement in Iraq. These three popular movements have regularly demonstrated their ability to march hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people through the streets and the polling booths of their respective domains. This is achieved not via online social networks, but by real human networks and local community organisations. It's networks such as these which will continue to be the foundation and the primary engines of political mobilisation in the region. Just as trade union involvement was critical in Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, so properly organised, unified and coordinated groups will always be necessary to effect change and influence the course of events. Organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood are of course cognisant of social media, and are embracing it. The Muslim Brotherhood now hosts its own social networking sites and tweets too. What will be interesting will be whether religious movements, having real and extensive social networks, can in the future magnify their existing influence exponentially through such virtual networks. Perhaps we in the West have confused ourselves by conflating the desire of Arabs to rid themselves of dictators and political dynasties with the desire to embrace Western liberal democracy. One doesn't necessarily follow the other. The language of the young, progressive Tahrir Square liberals might have implied that, but they and their ilk were simply the photogenic poster boys of the revolutions, the people that the West could relate to. In the wake of the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, we can already see that whilst everyone seems to want change, not everyone wants the same variety or extent of change, and in many instances it's not the young, metropolitan liberals who are now in the driving seat, it's the Islamists. The influence of the internet revolutionaries currently seems to have been short lived. In recognising this, one might begin to conclude that the internet is unlikely to be a major catalyst for extensive or rapid political change in the Middle East, except where the preoccupations of

had called since December 2006, during an era in Egypt where labour unrest was growing, moreover, it was spreading beyond the industrial working classes to professionals such as doctors and university professors. Significantly, during this time, expressions of opposition to Mubarak began to feature alongside the demands for higher wages too. The April 6th General Strike campaign was promoted in blogs and social media sites by young, middle class metropolitan internet activists, and is credited with amplifying the mill worker's struggle to a national cause. Whilst the April 6th General Strike is deemed to have been successful, marking a hitherto unknown scale of coordinated public protest, a sequel planned for May 4th the following year and also promoted by cyber activism, fell flat on its face. There were only minor street protests, and the severe repression of industrial activism in the preceding years deterred many would-be working class protestors from participating and reinforcing what was, on this occasion, a largely middle class movement. In reviewing the failed cyber campaign, Egyptian blogger and activist, Hossam el-Hamalawy, stated, “this technology should be complimentary, and a logistical support for whatever we do on the ground.” In other words, you can't have a 'virtual' revolution. In Tunisia, where the Arab Spring proper first blossomed, the critical and unforeseen inducer of the 'Jasmine Revolution' occurred on the morning of 17th December 2010, when a young Tunisian street vendor encountered the hostile and unheeding state in the shape of Ms. Faida Hamdi, a municipal functionary. With 30% unemployment in his home town, having been turned down by the army and having failed to secure other employment, Mohammad Bouazizi had resorted to selling fruit and vegetables in order to support his widowed mother, ailing uncle and large extended family. However, he was trading without a license, and for this reason Ms. Hamdi, a local trading inspector, had his produce confiscated and allegedly slapped him around the face, publicly humiliating him. His further remonstrations to the municipality were merely met by violence. So great was Mr Bouazizi's sense of rage and injustice, that he returned to the municipal offices later, doused himself in paint thinner and set himself afire in a final, desperate act of protest. The internet flashed the reports of the incident around the country. By the time Mohammad Bouazizi died on January 4th 2011, protests were in full flood across Tunisia. Ten days later, President Ben Ali fled the country, marking the end of his 23 year rule and the commencement of the Arab Spring. The Jasmine Revolution finally combusted when Mr Bouazizi's dramatic act of defiance ignited the tinder of pre-existing economic and social issues. However, in the weeks immediately beforehand, the internet had also played an interesting role in precipitating the Tunisian uprising. The Ben Ali regime was zealous in its repression of dissent, and didn't neglect cyberspace. Their efforts to control the flow of information into the country included a clumsy attempt to block access to a Wikileaks revelation that was being circulated by Lebanese newspaper, al-Akhbar. Even for a US ally, this action may at first appear odd, but in December 2010, Wikileaks had released classified US diplomatic cables, which revealed some fairly un-diplomatic language. Some of it struck a raw nerve in Tunis. Whilst in the UK we focused with amusement upon candid accounts of Prince Andrew's conduct as a UK trade emissary, in Tunisia, close attention was paid to US Ambassador Robert Godec's wry, yet clearly disapproving account of the outrageously opulent lifestyle of Ben Ali's son-in-law. Among many other indulgences, Godec revealed that he kept a pet tiger called 'Pasha', and had frozen yoghurt flown in by private jet from St Tropez. These galling details of extravagance plus commentary upon corruption, nepotism and human rights abuses were too

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Social media has drawn in educated and literate female activists too, giving them an opportunity to express themselves powerfully and eloquently in societies where their voices are sometimes muted. Esra Abdel Fattah, for instance,was the force behind the April 6th 2008 Facebook campaign in Egypt, and was detained for three weeks for her trouble. Across the region, a new generation of young women has been inspired and mobilised by their contact with politics via the web, and that is surely a positive thing. Above all, new technology, social media and citizen journalists have helped to draw attention to the struggles for liberty and dignity taking place in remote and misunderstood societies, of which many people in the West know little. In some instances, despite the continuing feed of emotive footage and information from forsaken fronts like Bab Amr or Deraa or Homs, and despite the best efforts of a new breed of bi-lingual citizen cyber-journalists like Danny Abdul Dayem, nothing substantial has happened, and perhaps for good reason. For, besides UN brokered cease-fires, what can happen? In conclusion, I think that social media is likely to be more influential in terms of evolution as opposed to revolution. The Arab Spring of 2011 represents a first chapter in a process of change, not the conclusion. The disparate groups which composed the ineluctable popular fronts are now shedding their common revolutionary colours and hoisting their own particular flags. The new orders in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have already expended their honeymoon periods, and face the challenge of remedying the woes of decades of neglect, corruption and economic mismanagement. The new Tunisian government has served its first hundred days, but a new Sigma Conseil opinion poll has already revealed that between 75-90% of the public perceive extensive failure to resolve unemployment, corruption and inflation. Tunisians don't appreciate, or aren't prepared to accept, that democracy takes time. Be uncompromising with your elected representatives, by all means, but be realistic too. In the results of this poll, in the continuing confusion in Egypt and the dissatisfaction of people in Libya with the NTC, one can already perceive the greatest challenge facing the internet revolutionaries. The people of the Middle East have no tradition of democracy as we know it. The general public need to be taught to understand it and to participate patiently, and that's where the online conversations, independent media and information portals can do their most significant work in the future. And what of the other, less social, social networks? What of the jihadist forums? What will be their conversations in the years to come? The Arab Spring has pulled down in a matter of months some of the edifices they have been assaulting and railing against for years. How much damage has the Arab Spring done to their credo of violent jihad? Has it done any at all? Are the converts to democracy amongst the older generation of militants really experiencing some Damascene conversion, or is democracy simply an expedient route to achieving the same ends? Regardless, in the countries of the Arab Spring, the new democratic processes will face a stern test of utility from all quarters. Moreover, with great optimism comes great scope for disappointment and disillusion: Democracy has its work cut out. Despite what happens online, the real story will always play out on the street. And one of those critical realities will obviously be the provision of the technological infrastructure necessary to enable greater access to the cyber elite's liberal discourses. The ascendant Islamists, of course, don't require that. Their extensive social networks are not virtual.

the cyberspace elites coincide with the immediate concerns of the street, as they did in 2011. The experience of a non-Arab country tends to underline this. Iran's disputed 2009 election saw alleged millions take to the streets, but aside from the desire to depose the President, the opposition leadership was divided and some within the religious elements of the Green movement certainly didn't want wholesale regime change, they wanted change from within. The regime itself, however, was ruthless and resolute, and Ahmedinejad apparently had the crucial support of the working class. Therefore, the government prevailed in spite of social media and despite the internet martyrs like Neda Agha Soltan, who died on phone-camera for the world to see. Since then, the Green leaders, under house arrest and largely gagged, are seeming to lose support and credibility amongst opposition activists. The regime has cracked down relentlessly on journalists and bloggers and jammed foreign and dissenting websites.² There were demonstrations in 2011, which were crushed, and the various opposition groups boycotted the March 2nd 2012 elections, rendering them a run-off between the conservatives. Heavy security presence during the ballot rendered any other option suicidal. However, if the hard-pressed Iranian opposition movement has currently run out of steam, things may to begin to change during the latter part of this year. When EU oil sanctions begin to bite in earnest from July 2012, Iran's present economic travails will start to deteriorate further. Energy sales represent Iran's major source of foreign exchange, and with inflation worsening and the value of the Rial falling, paying for vital food imports will become increasingly difficult. According to the IMF, Iran imported 62% of its maize during 2010-2011, 45% of its rice and 59% of its sugar, so problems are looming that may exacerbate the existing travails of the Iranian public and galvanise broad public dissent. So, if change 'from below' does eventually occur in Iran, with inflation running at 22.5% and unemployment at 15%, it's much more likely to be due to the cost of tomatoes than it is due to the internet. Given all the above perspectives, what has social media contributed to the Arab Spring? Well, it's clearly had an effect, which this article doesn't seek to undermine. The internet bloggers and cyber activists have played their part, and many have been beaten, arrested and worse. Their achievement has been to open up a new frontier in the war of ideas, creating forums for debate and free expression and helping to galvanise solidarity amongst opposition movements throughout the region and with their supporters beyond. Moreover, the internet has created another interface between government and the governed, and the Arab Spring and the years immediately before it do demonstrate that politicians in the region feel bound to take that seriously. In 2008 Egypt's Prime Minister, Ahmad Nazif, surprised Egypt's internet community by leaving a comment on an opposition blog, responding directly to criticism regarding education policy. But if cyber activists alone can't bring governments down, it's reassuring to know that the, “weary giants of flesh and steel”4 cannot sustain their tenure through online forays either - Ahmad Nazif's government was an early victim of the January 25th Revolution. Ironically, prior to holding the office of Prime Minister, Nazif had been Egypt's first Minister of Communication and Information Technology.

Notes: ¹ Daily Telegraph, 11th July 2011: “Ways With Words: Role of Twitter and Facebook in Arab Spring uprising 'overstated'” ² As a footnote on Iran, it's interesting that the use of social media in the 2009 Green revolution might actually have hampered the opposition's efforts to some degree, since the American Haystack 'anti-censorship' software that was intended to enable Iranian activists to circumvent government filters, allegedly exposed them rather than securing their anonymity. ³ However, there is a second dimension. It's also been suggested by Christopher Alexander, writing in Foreign Policy that some Tunisians concluded that Ambassador Godec's frank critiques must surely have implied US disavowal of the Tunisian regime. How much impetus this gave the rising is open to speculation, but given that Secretary Clinton was quick to state at the time, “We can't take sides”, it's probable that it wasn't ultimately a major stimulus. 4John Barlow: “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”

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France: Out of the frying pan and into...Syria?

By Xander Ross June 2012

France’s new President François Hollande recently announced that French troops will withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2012, one year earlier than initially planned. Until recently, Hollande has remained relatively mooted in terms of his overall defence policy. His election was won on the arguably more urgent economic crisis than it was for his stance on getting soldiers out of the desert. Despite this, the most divisive issue confronting him is perhaps now not the Eurozone debate, but instead responding to the heightening atrocities in Syria. Some commentators have suggested that the withdrawal from Afghanistan is a cynical move to enable him to justify intervention in Syria. Whether this is the route that should be taken is as much a bone of contention for all French citizens as it is for their new head of state. What is known is that real action, be it political, economic or military-led, must be carried out quickly as each day sees new reports emerge of fatalities. A point asserted by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius is that he will call on the UN Security Council to make mediator Kofi Annan's Syria peace plan mandatory. This would be achieved through the implementation of the UN's Chapter Seven provision, which permits the use of force. The type of support the French could provide has not been disclosed, but what is likely is that - as in Libya - France could support the intervention through attempted air dominance, beginning with electronic strikes to disable the ground-to-air defences Syria currently holds in its deck. As we know, air power played the deciding role in Libya. In the words of Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, Commander of the NATO operations in Libya, "the use of attack helicopters [provided] the NATO operation with additional flexibility to track and engage pro-Gadhafi forces who deliberately [targeted] civilians and [attempted] to hide in populated areas.“ As mentioned in my previous article on the subject, attack helicopters provide a level of accuracy and firepower not necessarily possible with high flying, high speed fighter jets. Of course, Assad has just lost out on several new units of the Russian Mi-35 owing to NATO’s stance on arms coming into the country.

While Syria is obviously a different conflict it is not known just how much NATO’s aerial tactics would need to re-adapt between last year’s mission and this new theoretical intervention. We hear time and again that Syria is not simply a stone’s throw from Libya, but that it instead presents a more genuine risk of loss of life among troops. Would Hollande roll the die so early into his career given the impact that such publicity has on the home front? Would his left-wing supporters back the exchange of one conflict for another? And would France’s significant Muslim population (now 10 per cent of the total) see him as an aggressive dabbler in the affairs of the Middle East, or as a saviour of the downtrodden? The industry will be playing close attention to developments in Syria and the use of attack helicopters, EW capabilities, fast jets and early warning systems. Several different rotary wing platforms, for example, could already be lined up: the British with their Apaches, the French with the Eurocopter Tigers or Aérospatiale Gazelles, and the Italian’s Agusta A129 Mangustas – all itching to again prove their worth. There is also the new kid on the block – Turkey’s home-grown T129, based on the Agusta A129 Mangusta, which could see Syria as the ideal testing ground to advertise its capabilities to the defence market. The Turkish Army could also bag vital operational lessons, which those with an eye on Kurdish relations would be wise to consider. While speculation remains over how to deal with Bashar al-Assad’s arsenal, one thing that is known is that intervening nations will do all they can to avoid ground engagement beyond Special Force operations, so as to wage a more covert, low-risk and impersonal fight. As strategic analyst James Farwell mentioned in his recent webinar with Defence IQ, it is thought by some that French COS task forces may already be working their way through Syria’s streets. Hollande need only look to his US counterpart to see just how a left-leaning leader can indeed operate an aggressive campaign without coming across as a hawk to his supporters at home.

Op ed: Syria

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