defence force journal · 4 australian defence force journal no. 146 january / february 2001 it is...

NO.146

JANUARY/FEBRUARY

2001

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DEFENCEForce

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementBrigadier Steve Ayling, AM (Chairman)Air Commodore Ken BirrerGroup Captain Allan CroweColonel Roger DaceCaptain Peter Leschen, RANColonel Michael Goodyer

Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should betyped double spaced, on one side of the paper, or preferablysubmitted on disk in a word processing format. Hardcopyshould be supplied in duplicate.

All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:The EditorAustralian Defence Force JournalR8-LG-001Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600(02) 6265 1193Fax (02) 6265 6972

CopyrightThe material contained in the Australian Defence Force Journalis the copyright of the Department of Defence. No part ofthe publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwisewithout the consent of the Editor.

Email: [email protected]/pacc/dfj/

© Commonwealth of Australia 2001ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 2001

Bronwen GreyKaren GriffithDr Ron HuiskenLieutenant Colonel Ian WingMr Darryl JohnstonColonel Paul McGrane

1

NO. 146

JANUARY/FEBRUARY

2001

DEFENCEForce

JOURNAL

Editor

Irene M. Coombes

Contributors are urged to ensure the

accuracy of the information contained in

their articles; the Board of Management

accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.

Permission to reprint articles in the Journal

will generally be readily given by the

Editor after consultation with the

author. Any reproduced articles should bear

an acknowledgement of source.

The views expressed in the articles are the

author’s own and should not be construed as

official opinion or policy.

Front Cover: A Military Working Dog Specialist with his dog

guarding the Comoro Airfield in Dili East Timor.

Photograph by Sergeant W. Guthrie

Printed in Australia

by National Capital Printing,

Fyshwick, ACT 2609

A U S T R A L I A N

CONTENTS

3. Letters to the Editor5. From Transformation to Transcendence:

Cultural Change at the AustralianDefence Force Academy 1989-1998.Squadron Leader J.R. Leonard, RAAF

11. Developing Creativity and Innovationthrough the Practice of MissionCommandLieutenant Colonel David Schmidtchen,AAPsych

19. Sectarianism’s Last Stand? Mannix,Menzies and the 1954 Duntroon ColoursControversyWing Commander John Steinback, RAAF

27. Information Operations: Cornerstone ofan RMA?V.C. Sobolewski, Head, Information WarfareStudies Group, DSTO

47. Job Rotation and Military Capability:Benefits, certainly – but is anyonecounting the cost?Nick Jans and Judy Frazer-Jans, ManagementConsultants

60. Reviews

Australian Peacekeepers in East Timor. Photograph by Sergeant W. Guthrie

Personnel and the "Revolution in MilitaryAffairs"

Dear Editor,

The ADFJ (Sep/Oct 00), devoted to the topicof the “Revolution in Military Affairs",managed to encompass almost a full issue of11 papers without specifically addressingstrategic personnel issues. It was only in theclosing contributions by Doctors Evans andCheeseman that one finds acceptance thatmilitary capability and its development isprimarily a “people" matter.

In one of its few mentions, “People" isgrouped with “budget, acquisition anddoctrine" as part of the “Technical" (!)dimension in a diagram of an ADO“Enterprise Architecture Model" (p. 9). In theaccompanying text, however, Personnel getseven shorter shrift. The “technical" level, weare then told, is “made of the underlyingprocesses including acquisition and budget":no mention of strategic “People" issues. Andin the article on “RMA – the ADFapplication", the sole mention of personnelimplications was that “It shall be necessary torecruit people who are Information Operations(IO) specialists" (p. 67).

Given that most of the contributors seemedto agree that we are facing “an emergingmilitary revolution, one driven by rapidadvances in information technology andinformation-related technologies" (p. 3), itmight have been thought that the personnelimplications would be thoroughly andthoughtfully explored. The next battlefield isunlikely to be an extrapolation of what wehave asked our sailors, soldiers, airmen andairwomen to deal with in the past; so how willwe prepare them for those contingencies? Norare traditional ADF organisational forms andcultural norms necessarily appropriate to the

challenges of the new era: so how will weprepare the institution?

It might be surprising that personnel issuescan receive such superficial attention in an eraof great social change and where many civilianorganisations are accepting that people reallyare their most important resource. Sadly,however, this is par for the ADO course. At theday-to-day administrative level, ADFpersonnel management ranks with the best,but its approach to strategic personnelmanagement lags well behind what would beregarded as community “best practice".

The ADF’s “competitive advantage" is notin its hardware, but in the skills and spirit ofthose who man it. So far, the ADF has beenwell served in this regard. But the personnelcomponent of capability is a fragile quality, atrisk in an age of economic rationalism andchanges to career paradigms and employmentopportunities in the community at large. Thereis much evidence that the personnelcomponent of ADF capability is teetering onthe balance between either continuing to be astrength and sliding into a close-to-unrecoverable crisis: between riding on a post-East Timor surge and declining because manymembers are close to being fed-up with thecontinued poor strategic management of ADFhuman resources.

I hope I am wrong; but this ADFJ specialedition indicates to me just how far we stillhave to travel.

Nick Jans

A Bright Shining Lie

Dear Editor,By chance last week I happened to place

my copy of A Bright Shining Lie on the“Reading Shelf" ready to once again relivethis “absolutely riveting" story of so longago. I certainly agree with Alistair Pope that

Letters to the Editor

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 146 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 20014

it is both a disturbing yet fine piece ofliterature.

As a young captain on my second tourof Vietnam in 1971 I met Vann, albeitbriefly, at General Fred Weyand's HQ's (11Field Force Victor) and was left bemused bythe man in real life. Having heard thestories I, like many held him in awe notonly because of his length of service in-country but because of his achievments. Atthat time it would be honest to say that weknew that the War was not going well buthere was Vann, a civilian, a survivor and sodetermined to fight on. His was certainly adefining presence at that time.

I agree with Pope when he commentsthat we have ruined the concept of the hero

today. Putting everyone on pedestals causesus to neglect the real hero's in our past andindeed in our midst. John Paul Vann was tome a hero in the real meaning of the word.He had it all. Ego, determination, presence,focus and the list goes on. Above all he didnot want to leave country and let so manyof the Vietnamese down. He, I am surecould see what was to come and whatindeed did come to pass when it all ended.Above all he looked so unlike a hero. This Isuppose is why he was such a definingindividual at a time when real hero's werein demand.

I congratulate Alistair Pope on anexcellent review.

Kel Ryan

5

My association with the Academy beganin 1989, when I set out to examine, in a

five-year longitudinal study, the process bywhich cadets become officers, with theproviso that I would not be concerned withthe purely “academic" (i.e. University of NewSouth Wales) components of that process. Mystudy was intended to cover the cadets’ timeat ADFA, their periods of post-ADFA single-Service training, and their first years asoperational junior officers.

The subject group was a 10 per centsample of the first-year cadet intake in 1989,selected randomly, but with regard for theAcademy ratios of male: female; Navy:Army:Air Force; Engineering:Science: Arts;and membership of specific cadetadministrative Divisions. They were to beinterviewed twice yearly, in April andOctober, in each of the five years, as well ascompleting questionnaires on a number ofoccasions throughout the study.

All cadets were volunteers, approachedconfidentially by the researcher. Theinterviews, of approximately 45 minutes,were audio-recorded, with the cassette beinggiven to the subject immediately after theinterview for review and subsequent return.This strategy aimed to reassure the cadetssufficiently to encourage them to speak freely.

The interviews were also conducted in avenue to which cadets could go in the normalcourse of events, without attracting undueattention.

The first year of the project proceeded asplanned, and generated substantial data onthe Academy culture. However, late in thatyear, I was posted overseas for two years,which effectively aborted the long-term plan.When I returned from that posting, a varietyof other commitments ensured that I couldnot resurrect the project for some years and,indeed, that I could not conduct it at all asoriginally intended. However, eventually, asense of having expended such considerableeffort for so little result led to a decision toreplicate the 1989 study in 1998, to determinethe extent of cultural change, if any, duringthe intervening period, and to account forthat change where applicable.

Transformation and TranscendenceI will discuss specific differences between

the Academy culture of 1989 and that of1998 later in this article. However, firstly, theconceptual basis of that discussion needs tobe articulated. Carl Jung [1964] described twoenduring, but conceptually divergent,traditions in the processes by which humans’transition from one stage of life to another,

From Transformation to Transcendence:Cultural Change at the Australian Defence

Force Academy 1989-1998By Squadron Leader J.R. Leonard, RAAF

The Australian Defence Force Academy (“ADFA” or “the Academy") would not be regarded bymany people, even in the ADF, as a model of positive cultural change. In its brief history - itaccepted its first cadets and midshipmen (hereafter the generic “cadets”) in 1986 – it has beenplagued by a succession of allegations of unacceptable treatment of female cadets, and of juniorcadets in general. While, in this respect, it could probably have argued that it was no worse thanmany other Defence establishments, ADFA has, nevertheless, attracted considerable unfavourableattention.


e.g. from infancy to childhood, childhood toadolescence, adolescence to adulthood,unmarried to married, etc. These transitionsare frequently marked by socially constructedrituals, designed to provide both publicrecognition of the transition and publicreinforcement of the societal valuesunderpinning it.

TransformationIn one of those traditions:the novice for initiation is called upon to

give up willful [sic] ambition and all desire,and to submit to the ordeal. He must bewilling to experience this trial without hope ofsuccess. In fact, he must be prepared to die;and though the token of his ordeal may bemild … or agonizing … the purpose remainsalways the same: to create the symbolic moodof death from which may spring the symbolicmood of rebirth. [Jung in Leonard, 13]

This “transformation" model, as it isknown, in which initiates symbolically “die"and are “re-born" has four key components:

The impetus for change is provided byattacks on former ways, former associations,and former status. The object is to convincethe initiate that the former life is tainted, ordeficient in some way.

The tactics employed are essentially toisolate the initiate from former associations,to deliberately disturb initiates’ equilibrium byintroducing new and unpredictable activitiesand routines, to demand achievement ofobjectives which can only be achieved inconcert with other initiates, and to create newassociations of initiates that will replaceformer affiliations.

The individuals experience an initialperiod of intense value confusion, and anxietyabout compliance, until they ultimatelysubmit.

The desired end-state is expressed in termsof very specific orthodoxies, a heavy overlay ofsubmission and resignation, and a markedreduction of autonomy and individuality, and

is largely, if not wholly, communicated byformer initiates. [Leonard, 25]

The 1989 rounds of interviews describedan Academy that exhibited the followingfeatures:

Authority appeared to be routinely abusedby those in possession of it. While all of thesubjects accepted the need for the use of legalauthority in a military organisation, theircomments suggested that its use at theAcademy was frequently gratuitous, andperhaps illegal.

Civilian values, attitudes and standardswere considered anathema to the profession ofarms. This prompted a sustained, ifunsystematic, program of alienation of thecadets from their former ways andassociations, which appeared to have achievedconsiderable success. It was accompanied byunsystematic, but persistent, attempts torebuild them in acceptable forms.

Female cadets were generally considered bytheir male peers to have little right to be atthe Academy. Both male and female cadetsdemonstrated the belief that this view receivedsupport, or at least acquiescence, from highlevels in the institution. This was both thecause and the effect of their being routinelyharassed, and sometimes assaulted.

The relationships between first and thirdyear cadets were based principally on acombination of fear and frustration. Theformer was prompted by anxiety regarding theapparently random exercise of authority, andthe latter by the belief that first year cadets’performance would never be consideredacceptable. The typical reaction by first yearcadets was avoidance of interaction whereverpossible.

The characteristic Academy sanctions wereoverwhelmingly negative, i.e. threat- orpunishment-oriented. Since there appeared tobe little concern for rewarding excellence,cadets had to content themselves with theavoidance of punishment.

FROM TRANSFORMATION TO TRANSCENDENCE: CULTURAL CHANGE AT THE ADF ACADEMY 7

As would be expected in Australia, andparticularly in the Australian military, thenotion of “mateship" was frequently talkedabout at the Academy. However, while theAcademy created some impressive team spiritin a remarkably short time, there were seriousconcerns at some of the uses to which it wasput, notably the suppression of individualityand the exclusion of some from the group.

The tradition was guaranteed to continue,because the predominant view during theOctober interviews was that, for all theircomplaints about the treatment meted out tothem over the previous nine months, the firstyear cadets of 1989 were determined to inflictsimilar treatment on another junior course atthe first opportunity, reflecting an acceptanceof the system.

The values that cadets espoused in theirquestionnaires were usually at odds withthose that they perceived to be espoused bythe Academy. Significantly, few believed thatpersonal integrity and leading by examplewere Academy priorities. More significantly,the disparities between individual andAcademy priorities intensified between Apriland October, despite [perhaps because of?] thecadets having being exposed for a further sixmonths to the Academy environment.

This finding was reinforced by theidentification of a far more intense cynicismabout the Academy in the October interviewsthan in their April counterparts. The existenceof such obvious tension, over matters ascentral as the ethos of the profession, thesatisfaction of whose requirements are theraison d’etre of the Academy, says a greatdeal about the Academy culture of thosetimes. Either by negligence or design, thatculture fostered such a serious ethicalmismatch that cadets found serious difficultyin reconciling the institution with their veryreasons for being in it. [Leonard, 90-91]

TranscendenceHowever, in another transition model

altogether:there is … another kind of symbolism,

belonging to the earliest known sacredtraditions, that is also connected with theperiods of transition in a person’s life. Butthese symbols do not seek to integrate theinitiate with any religious doctrine or seculargroup-consciousness. On the contrary, theypoint to man’s need for liberation from anystate of being that is too immature, too fixed,too final. In other words, they concern man’srelease from – or transcendence of – anyconfining pattern of existence, as he movestoward a superior or more mature stage in hisdevelopment. [Jung, in Leonard, 14]

In the “transcendence" model:Former status, associations and

relationships are recognised, and theirmaintenance encouraged.

New associations, while encouraged, arenot intended to displace former links, and aremulti-focused, rather than singular in outlook.

The rationale for new routines isexplained, and the transition is conducted in asupportive, sympathetic milieu. Initiates are,therefore, less prone to confusion and anxiety.

The desired end-state is the enhancementof autonomy and individuality. [Leonard, 25]

The 1998 rounds of interviews describedan Academy that exhibited the followingfeatures:

Nineteen ninety-eight began with authorityused by the senior cadets in ways that werestill authoritarian, but overlaid with anapparent concern for their subordinates’welfare.

No cadets commented on any perceiveddiscrepancy between Academy and civilianvalues.

Female cadets appeared to have achievedrelative equality, and the absence of anysignificant harassment or discrimination wascommented on freely by male and femalecadets alike.


Changes to the relationships between thecadet “classes" in April 1998 showed signs ofproducing a leadership relationship based farmore on mutual respect than on fear andintimidation. By October, this had becomefirmly established.

While disciplinary standards appeared tohave been maintained, and punishments stillregularly used, there was far more emphasison rewards and incentives than in 1989, withthe result that when punishments wereadministered, the fact that they were seen tobe balanced by positive reinforcement of goodperformance seemed to enhance theirlegitimacy.

The importance of the group appeared tobe as strongly promoted in 1998 as in 1989.The difference in 1998 was that it did notappear to be nearly as dependent on thesubjugation of individuality. Cadets routinelycommented on the critical role of the group,while insisting that individuality, and asurprising degree of autonomy, survived.

The 1998 intake’s view that later intakesshould have the same induction experience astheirs corresponded with that of the 1989intake. The difference, of course, was in theirrespective motivations. While the latter weredissatisfied with their experience, but stillmaintained the validity of imposing similartreatment on later years, the 1998 intake weresatisfied with their induction, and wereanxious to share that benefit with others.

The values that cadets espoused in theirquestionnaires were only marginally at oddswith those that they perceived to be espousedby the Academy. Any disparities betweenindividual and Academy priorities declinedmarkedly between April and October. Indeed,on most measures, the two sets of valuesconverged rather than diverged during thatperiod. The only exceptions were in areas notconsidered important by the bulk ofrespondents. [Leonard, 113-114]

The Sources of ChangeThe Academy training culture of 1989 was

dominated by the “transformation" model,whereas that of 1998 was characterised quitemarkedly by the “transcendence" model.Therefore, the fact that so dramatic a changecould be achieved, especially given that otherresearch suggested that little had changed atthe Academy between 1989 and 1997,demands an examination of the processes atwork between late 1997 and October 1998.

The changes to the Australian DefenceForce Academy in 1998 gave the impressionof being conducted in a comprehensive,carefully sequenced and timed,implementation program. Those responsiblefor the implementation were trained, and newarrivals were treated in ways that made themfeel positive about the institution. Shortlyafter that, the major group of potentialbacksliders – the senior cadets – were strippedof their power and privileges and, hence, theirability to undermine the system.

Finally, the structure was drasticallyaltered to both lessen any one individual’s, orgroup’s, ability to acquire power through thecontrol of significant elements of thestructure, and to lessen the susceptibility oftheir juniors to any one source of influence.

They [the changes] were designed to soembed the outcomes that there would be noturning back. They were predicated on theunderstanding that some people would remainunconvinced, and would have to be regardedas dispensable.

While the success of these strategies wasremarkable enough, even more so was the factthat, in every sense, they represented asignificant paradigm shift in officer educationin Australia. Whereas the symbolic“transformation" model had dominated notonly the methodology but also, and far moreimportantly, the mindsets that had determinedits perpetuation, the Academy swept it away,and replaced it with one that challenged, even

FROM TRANSFORMATION TO TRANSCENDENCE: CULTURAL CHANGE AT THE ADF ACADEMY 9

threatened, the foundations of the officercorps in Australia.

It challenged the paradigm founded on thenotions that an officer cadet had to be purgedof civilian ways, that former initiates were thesole “keepers of the flame", that individualitywas anathema to the profession of arms, andthat obedience to authority transcended allother imperatives.

However, it did more than simply destroy.In the place of the original model, itintroduced another that sat very comfortablywith Jung’s “transcendence" model. In doingso, it finally paid more than lip service to theinsistent demand that:

The new military needs soldiers who canuse their brains, can deal with a diversity ofpeople and cultures, who can tolerateambiguity, take initiative, and ask questions,even to the point of questioning authority.[Leonard, 129-30]

Implications for ADF Initial OfficerEducation/Training

Readers will draw their own conclusionsas to the relevance of the two transitionmodels to the production of an Australianmilitary officer. Undoubtedly, many willargue that we have done pretty well with theformer officer training system, thank youvery much, and that, if it aint broke, thenleave the bloody thing alone!

Clearly, however, if we consider thedemands on military officers generated by theso-called Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA), the transcendence model sits far morecomfortably with the leadership challengesthrown up by the RMA than does thetransformational model. The RMA demands,inter alia, officers who can not only exhibitinitiative, imagination and creativity, but whoare also prepared to question orthodoxies,even to the point of insubordination, ifnecessary.

Sound familiar? Well, it ought to, becauseAustralian military folklore is replete withexamples that suggest that thesecharacteristics have always been valuedabove conformity and orthodoxy in theAustralian worldview! Indeed, the Gallipolilegend, so central to Australians’ sense of self,draws heavily upon the perception offundamental contradictions between Britishand Australian views of leadership, the latterapparently far less bound by orthodoxy thanthe former. If that really is the case, onewonders why such fundamental changes as Ihave described to the professional preparationof military officers at ADFA should have beenso long in coming!

BIBLIOGRAPHYJung, C. 1964, Man and His Symbols, London,

Jupiter Books.Leonard, J.R., 2000, From “Transformation to

Transcendence: Cultural Change at theAustralian Defence Force Academy 1989-1998”, University of New South Wales, MA(Hons) Thesis

Squadron Leader John Leonard joined the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in 1980 as an Education Officer, after15 years as an educator at secondary and tertiary levels. He has worked in a variety of training/educationalinstitutions, including the RAAF School of Technical Training, RAAF Officer Training School, RAAF Academy, RAAFCollege, Defence International Training Centre and RAAF School of Postgraduate Studies. He also spent two years inBangkok as a Training Adviser to the Royal Thai Armed Forces. More recently, he was Commanding Officer of No 21 (City of Melbourne) Squadron, a RAAF Reserve Squadron, fromJanuary 1997 until August 2000, when he transferred to the RAAF Reserve Staff Group.His qualifications include a Diploma of Physical Education, Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Education, Master ofEducational Administration, Master of Business Administration and Master of Arts (Honours). The MBA includedmajor studies in Organisational Change, while the MEdAdmin and MA (Hons) involved research into officer cadeteducation at the RAAF and ADF Academies respectively.

The Defence Science and Technology

Organisation (DSTO) invites registrations of

interest from the Australian Defence Organisation

for attendance at the annual

Takari SeminarTheme: Experimentation for Capability

Development

Wednesday, 14 March 2001, 9 am - 4 pm,including lunch

Russell 1 Theatrette, Russell Offices, Canberra

The seminar will include:

• Takari Executive presentation and review of highlights

• A structured panel session - Experimentation for Force Development

• Demonstrations ofDSTO’s C4ISREWresearch

http://web-sa.dsto.defence.gov.au/DSTO/divisions/takari/ by 16 Feb 2001

For informationand registration

form go to,

11

It is a leadership responsibility to create anorganisational climate that supports and

encourages Mission Command. The actionsand decisions of leaders have a profoundinfluence on organisational climate andconsequently on the development of individualprofessional mastery and organisationalperformance.1 A climate based on theconsistent application of Mission Commandwill result in more capable people who havethe self-confidence and initiative to implementinnovative solutions to the problems they face,regardless of the environment.

This article shows that in MissionCommand the Army already has a tool, whichif used appropriately and regularly, willproduce a “concept-led Army whereinnovative concepts guide capabilitydevelopment”.2 The article briefly describes theprinciples of Mission Command and someperceptions of their application in a peacetimeand operational environment. Next, it explainsthe relationships between Mission Command,professional development, creativity andinnovation.

The Principles of Mission CommandIn simple terms, Mission Command requires

the commander to outline his or her intentionin terms of what is to be achieved, then toallocate tasks to subordinate commanders andthe resources they have to carry them out, andany constraints on their freedom of action toachieve their tasks.3 How the subordinatecommanders achieve these tasks is entirely amatter for them.

The commander’s intention is the guideand underlying purpose for the subordinatecommanders’ actions. While the immediate aimmay have to be modified in accordance withchanging circumstances, the higher intentionremains and the commander closest to theleading edge of the conflict is responsible fortaking the initiative.

The principles of Mission Command can besummarised as: trust, understanding,responsibility, and risk.4

Mutual Trust. The need for a high level oftrust and mutual respect between commandersat all levels is a key element of MissionCommand. The superior must be able to trustthat the subordinate will remain true to the

Developing Creativity and Innovationthrough the Practice of Mission Command

By Lieutenant Colonel David Schmidtchen, AAPsych

It is easier to herd sheep than lions – but lions will act stronger against the enemy.Mission Command describes the decentralised approach to command and control used by the

Australian Army. It is a command philosophy designed to overcome the inherent problems ofoperating in the dynamic environment of the battlefield: it is a functional necessity in anenvironment where small, independent, and geographically dispersed units operate over largedistances. Correct application of the concept affords maximum responsibility for decision making tothe lowest possible level in the organisation, acknowledging that it is at this level that initiative isrequired to recognise and exploit opportunity.

Implementing the philosophy of Mission Command involves more than accepting a “rule-book”for decentralised operation in complex environments. As a “philosophy” it must be reflected in theculture and practice of the organisation at every level and in every undertaking. Its principles mustbe practiced as the behavioural norm.


commander’s stated intention, and thesubordinate must trust the superior will notgive a task that cannot be achieved. Thisrelationship can be summarised as:

The superior trusts his subordinate toexercise his judgement and creativity and toact as the situation dictated to reach aspecified goal. And the subordinate trustedthat his superior would support whateveraction he took in good faith to contribute tothe good of the whole.5

Mutual Understanding. Subordinatecommanders must have a clear understandingof their superior’s intention so that assituations develop they act in accordance withthose intentions, without requiring furtherdirection from the superior. Central control inplanning the purpose of the activity ismaintained, but execution is left to subordinatecommanders. The onus is on the commanderto be clear in his or her intention, as it is thebasis for making quick decisions that willachieve the intention despite changingcircumstances. The thinking of subordinatesshould be:

When my superior gave me this mission he(or she) could not foresee this situation; so Iwill not follow an obsolete mission but willfollow the intention of my superior.6

Mutual understanding contributes to unityof purpose in the collective action of the force,avoiding the fragmentation associated withdecentralisation. However, action in thesecircumstances will be based on the previousdevelopment of a high level of professionalcapability and mutual trust.

Acceptance of Responsibility. A keyelement of Mission Command for subordinateand superior commanders is the notion ofresponsibility. Subordinates must acceptresponsibility for making quick decisions basedon minimal and sometimes conflictinginformation, and then acting decisively.7

Superior commanders must accept thatresponsibility for conducting operations passes

from them to their subordinates. Repeatedand/or forceful intervention by a superior inthe conduct of the operation, on the premise ofavoiding mistakes, stifles independence anddestroys the confidence of subordinates.8

Acceptance of Risk. In adopting MissionCommand, the organisation accepts a degree ofrisk in the achievement of success. Subordinatecommanders must have the depth ofexperience and professional capability tosuccessfully assess the risk in attaining thegoal. Superior commanders must accept thatwhere there is risk, errors will be made.Punishment of errors without consideration ofintention develops risk aversion insubordinates and undermines the foundationsof Mission Command.

The Practice of Mission Command in theAustralian Army

There are two broad organisationalreactions to dynamic, complex and ambiguousenvironments:9 detailed planning ordecentralised control.

The first is the stereotypical bureaucraticapproach that aims to reduce uncertaintythrough advance planning. The key element isto ensure that close relationships aremaintained between various levels of thecommand and control structure such that therelationships become part of the routine, sothat every individual knows what to do in anysituation. This process centralises decision-making, and places a high premium on gainingcorrect information from lower levels aboutlocal conditions.

The alternative is to decentralise commandand control, effectively acknowledging that itis difficult to plan for the uncertainty inherentin conflict. This approach requires people whotake the initiative and are prepared to takeaction. The superior commander places trust inthe judgement of the subordinates. Theproblem with decentralisation is that it canlead to fragmentation in the organisation thatreduces the superior commander’s flexibility to

DEVELOPING CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION THROUGH THE PRACTICE OF MISSION COMMAND 13

directly influence the wider battle and possiblya loss of economy in effort.

Officers and soldiers describe theirexperience of the peacetime Army asbureauratic. Descriptions of the commandclimate refer to the frustration of “micro-management”, perceptions that subordinatesare not trusted to do the job for which theyhave been trained and the lack of attentiongiven to focused development throughexperience.10 The following comments drawnfrom the Officer Attitude and Opinion Surveyconducted in 1997 are indicative:11

Army officers invariably claim to usedirective control [Mission Command] butthis often means that they set targets,goals and tasks and leave subordinates toget on with it within the availableresources. There is frequently a “can-do”attitude which sees officers agree to do farmore than their time and resources allow,which then demands super human effortsfrom the subordinates to achieve. This maybe necessary sometimes but it should notbe “ops normal”.

Lieutenant Colonel

The competing issues associated withchange mean that there is a need fordirective control [Mission Command] but alatent desire not to implement thephilosophy.

Major

In many areas I feel that often issues ofmanagement swamp leadership. Even insenior ranks there seems to be a tendencyfor micro-management rather than directivecontrol [Mission Command].

Captain

Paradoxically, a study of Armypeacekeepers noted that they found thedifference between command and control in abarracks environment distinctly different tothat applied in the operational environment.12

They observed that operational necessity

required the application of MissionCommand. However, these officers wereconcerned that the transition from thebureaucratic climate of the barracks Army tothe Mission Command environment of anoperation was not seamless.

Operational deployment forces a change inthe culture because people feel that it has tochange. Remoteness of locality helps. Thischange in culture is initially disturbing tothe individual, and has the potential toparalyse action.

Lieutenant Colonel

We had a lot more flexibility over therethan we had back here. The militarysystem imposes certain limits orrestrictions on you, but over there youwere given a job, and you did it how yousaw fit. The consequences, if there wereany, fell on your head. It seemed to bringout the best in people.

Captain

The principles of Mission Command aremutual trust and understanding, and theacceptance of risk and responsibility. Theseprinciples are the norm in an operationalenvironment and the benefit to theindividual was not lost on the peacekeepers.The following comment captures thatsentiment:

People do grow at a personal andprofessional level. They are moreconfident in the skills they possess, andmore aware of their potential. When theyreturn to a peacetime militaryenvironment they feel constricted andrestrained in realising their new potential.The problems that stem from this shouldnot occur. They should have the sameopportunity to grow and develop in thepeacetime Army as they find ondeployment. The system, or bureaucracyshould not be restricting the soldier indeveloping his or her talents, but it does.


We should be encouraging a level ofpersonal growth and responsibility ineverything we do.

MajorMission Command fills the middle ground

between the lack of flexibility in thebureaucratic approach and fragmentation andloss of economy in effort associated withdecentralisation. It captures the principles ofdecentralised operation but also provides aframework for implementation. However, to beeffective it must be underwritten by a culturethat supports the principles and encouragesongoing professional development andpractice.

From a command climate perspective it isimportant that the transition between abarracks environment and an operationalenvironment is relatively seamless. Consistentexpectations of performance and executionallow officers and soldiers to quickly adapt tothe many other demands posed in theseenvironments. However, the other majorbenefit from practicing Mission Command ascultural norm is that it results in more capablepeople. As an everyday practice it results inpersonal growth, self-confidence and supportsan environment of creativity and innovation.

Mission Command, Professional Development,Creativity and Innovation

Morris Janowitz observed that as modernarmies adapted to the increasingly complexenvironment there was a move away from theexercise of authority based on status toauthority based on morale.13 He argued that tobe effective a morale-based system must havethree organisational rules:14

a. there must be no organisational rigidity,each soldier must be considered to be apotential officer;

b. there must be a concern with technicalcompetence rather than rank; and

c. the commands must be explained.

These conditions have been advanced inthe modern Army through a combination ofthe: a. doctrinal acceptance of Mission Command

as a command philosophy; b. an emphasis on technical competence as a

prerequisite for attaining rank;15 and c. a doctrinal approach that recognises the

need for small, multi-skilled units operatingwith greater self-sufficiency andmanoeuvrability.16

However, in the implementation of thesechanges there has been no concurrentattention paid to fostering or sponsoring thechange in culture that is required to supportand sustain these initiatives. Rather, theapproach has been to continually re-structure the organisation in the hope thatthe appropriate cultural norm will emerge.The result has been widespreadunderstanding of the principles of MissionCommand but little encouragement to applythem. The environment of continualrestructure has resulted in an organisationalclimate that is characterised by employmentinsecurity and resource reduction on onehand and demands for increased output andindividual commitment on the other. Thisoperating environment is the antithesis ofthat required for exercising MissionCommand.

Creativity and InnovationIn LWD1, Army has stated a desire to have

a “concept-led approach” to fighting where“innovative concepts guide the developmentand application of military capability”. Oneway to achieve this end is to sponsor a cultureof creativity and innovation that is based onthe principles of Mission Command.

Creativity and innovation are consistentlyassociated with organisations where:17


a. decision making is decentralised, b. subordinates have a degree of discretion

over how their work is completed,c. there is a flat structure with work teams

that have specific tasks,d. power and authority change with changing

circumstances and individual skills andabilities, and

e. job definitions are fluid and are oftendefined through interaction withcolleagues. Clearly, the effective implementation of

Mission Command will create a climate thathas these features. That is, it will create aclimate where creativity and innovation canoccur. However, Mission Command, creativityand innovation are more than process – as onecommentator on creativity puts it, “ifcreativ[ity] was a process, by this time itsoperation would have been reduced toformulas, recipes, which intelligence andmethod could apply to produce great art andgreat science”. 18

Creativity and innovation are given freelyby people who are motivated and committedto their organisation or immediate task. To beeffective, the principles of Mission Commandshould be an inherent part of theorganisation’s culture and everyday practice.Core values play a crucial role in focusing andmotivating behaviour. It is the leader’s role toinfuse the organisation with values and toserve as the role model of the behavioursrequired of innovation. If Mission Command isto be the Army’s command and controlphilosophy it should be taught, practised,rewarded and lived by all Army officers andsoldiers. This is the operational environmentdescribed by some peacekeepers thatcontributes to the growth and capability ofArmy’s people. Unfortunately, it is not oftenassociated with the peacetime Army.

Professional Development. Mutual trust inthe application of Mission Command is derivedfrom a long-term commitment to professional

development through training, education andexperience. Mistakes in this learningenvironment are an expected part of thelearning process with students critiqued on thereasoning for their actions rather than theaction itself. The aim is to develop leaders withself-confidence who would not hesitate toexercise their initiative.19

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel noted thatbattles (and wars) were won by “flexibility ofmind, eager acceptance of responsibility, afitting mixture of caution and audacity …”.20

In the German Army of Rommel’s time thisability was underwritten by an ongoingcommitment to professional militaryeducation and development that stretched anofficer’s thinking beyond his or her currentposting or next promotion. Education anddevelopment must provide the officer withsufficient context to be able to makemeaning of complex social, political andtechnical situations and accept the risk (andtherefore the responsibility) that is inherentin exercising professional judgement.

In an increasingly complex environment,Army’s leaders will become more reliant onthe professional advice of officers who aretechnical experts in their field (as opposed togeneralist staff officers temporarily manningpositions). The balance between specialistand generalist officers is being questionedand this will have a direct impact on thenature of professional military educationand development. Officers must avoidbecoming too narrow in the culture of theirprofession or speciality as the requirement toremain flexible and adaptable enough todeal effectively with unfamiliar problems inan unfamiliar context will always exist.

This requirement is driven by the natureof war and supported by the philosophy ofMission Command. It should be a foundationprinciple of professional military educationand development. In every way, educationand development should stretch an officer’s


professional and technical knowledge suchthat he or she understands the reasons fortheir actions and has the self-confidence toapply their knowledge in situations whererisk, ambiguity and complexity are thenorm.

ConclusionMission Command is a complex

command philosophy that to be effectivemust be accepted as a fundamental part ofthe everyday culture and climate of theArmy. Education and training are the keyelements to success in implementing thisphilosophy. However, the Army must providean environment in which understanding,initiative and risk-taking are encouraged as amatter of course, not just when faced withunexpected circumstances. The philosophy ofMission Command delivers an organisationalclimate within which decision-making andaction take place, but it is apparent thatsuccessful implementation is dependent onchanges in culture and climate. It is based onprofessional development and adherence tocore values. It produces confident officersand soldiers who willingly use their initiativein creative and innovative ways. It is asmuch a way of thinking as it is a way ofdoing.

Those who think auftragstaktik [MissionCommand] is nothing but a way ofwording operation orders have missed thepoint. Those who think they can introduceauftragstaktik from above or order it to befostered within units are like the farmerwho sows wheat in the desert. There isonly one way to achieve auftragstaktik:You must ignore it. Instead, you mustconcentrate on building forces thatare intrinsically characterised byindependence, professional skills andconfidence. In such forces, independentaction will be a matter of course.

Brigadier General Karl Hoffman,German Army

NOTES

1. D.J. Schmidtchen, (1 October, 1999). Buildinghigh performance military organisations: Aleadership responsibility. Annex C to OfficerProfessional Effectiveness Review – Army,Submission 1.

2. Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1, TheFundamentals of Land Warfare, Doctrine Wing,Combined Arms Training and DevelopmentCentre, 1999.

3. R.E. Simpkin, (1985). Race to the Swift:Thoughts on twenty-first century warfare.London: Brassey’s.

4. Successive Australian and internationalauthors have outlined the key principles ofMission Command. Those identified in thisarticle have been distilled from the followingsources. T.N. Dupuy, (1978). A Genius forWar: The German Army and General Staff1807-1945. Simpkin (1985), ibid.; AustralianArmy (1988) op. cit., Bergman, 1987;Hoffman, K. (1994). Auftragstaktik: Mission-based leadership. Engineer, 23 (12), 50-54.;M.B. O’Brien, (1990). Mission Command: TheCommand Panacea? Australian Defence ForceJournal, 83(4), 1-16.; J.A. Silva, (1989).Auftragstaktik: Its origin and development.Infantry, September/October, 6-9.

5. J.A. Silva, (1989), p. 7 op. cit.6. K. Hoffman, (1994), p. 54. op. cit.7. Australian Army (1988). Directive Control

Training Information Letter (Number 1/88).This TIL was subsequently discontinued andthe concept of Directive Control is detailed inthe Manual of Land Warfare 1.1.2 Conduct ofOperations.

8. K. Hoffman, (1994), op. cit.9. A. Offerdal, and J.O. Jacobsen, (1993).

Auftragstaktik in the Norwegian Armed Forces.Defense Analysis 9(2), 211-213.

10. In this article these comments are taken atface value as an indicator of the failure toapply Mission Command. An alternateinterpretation is that Mission Command is apoorly understood philosophy within theofficer corps. Mission Command is generallyimterpreted as a “loose” approach to commandand control, however a more complete andaccurate interpretation of the philosophy mustinclude an assessment of the context and theresources available to the commander and theexperience of the subordinates. For example,where the commander has experiencedsubordinates, the freedom of action allowedwill be greater than when his or hersubordinates are inexperienced. Consequently,


there is a “sliding scale” in the application ofMission Command that is driven by thesubordinates experience. A similar case can bemade for context. Some junior officers maybelieve that they are being “micro-managed”when in fact they are being managed withinthe limitations of their experience. If this is notthe case then it is their responsibility to alertthe commander to the issue.

11. D.J. Schmidtchen. The State of Leadership inthe Australian Army: A qualititive analysis ofthe 1997 Officer Attitude and Opinion Survey.

12. D.J. Schmidtchen. (1997). Preparing AustralianDefence Force personnel for peace operations:Principles and foundations. Defence FellowshipReport, Canberra.

13. M. Janowitz, (1959). Changing patterns oforganisational authority: The military

establishment. Administrative ScienceQuarterly, 3(4), 473-493.

14. M. Janowitz, (1959), p.490-91, ibid.15. Review comments on this article noted that

while intent of this statement might beaccurate, in practice most officer courses are“attend only” with virtually no testing oftechnical competence.

16. Australian Army, (1999), LWD1, op. cit.17. N. King, and N. Anderson, (1995). Innovation

and Change in Organizations. London:Routledge.

18. J. Barzun, (1989). “The Paradoxes ofCreativity”. The American Scholar, 58, p. 347.

19. J.A. Silva, (1989), op. cit.20. B.H. Liddell Hart, (1953). The Rommel Papers,

New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.p. 517.

Lieutenant Colonel David Schmidtchen joined the Australian Army as a military psychologist in 1989, aftercompleting a Bachelor of Science (Honours) degree at the University of Newcastle, New South Wales. He subsequentlycompleted a Graduate Diploma in Human Resource Management at the University of Southern Queensland. In 1996,David was awarded a Defence Fellowship to conduct a research project examining the human resource developmentissues associated with preparing Australian Defence Force personnel for peace operations. The Defence Fellowshipforms the basis of a Doctorate degree that was awarded by Macquarie University in 1998. In 1999 he joined theOfficer Professional Effectiveness Review for the Army (Project OPERA) as the research and development officer. In2001 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and posted as the SO1 Strategic HRM with the team implementing therecommendations of the ADF Posting Turbulence Review.

Trooping of the Colours

19

That Dr Daniel Mannix, Roman CatholicArchbishop of Melbourne,3 and occasional

prime ministerial gadfly, held a commission inthe Army for forty-six years, is not wellknown, and while that length of service maynot be a record, that he still held it at the timeof his death in 1963, at age 99, probably is.4

Mannix’s military career had begun amid greatcontroversy. As a leading anti-conscriptionisthe could accept a large share of the credit forthe defeat of the two plebiscites Prime MinisterHughes put to the nation, on 28 October 1916and again on 20 December 1917, to makemilitary service compulsory.5 His opposition toconscription led to frequent claims of Catholicdisloyalty, mischievous accusations of aKaiser-Pope link, and newspaper cartoons ofMannix in full ecclesiastical garb beingdecorated by a stern-faced Wilhelm II. Empireloyalists, Orangemen and many practisingCatholics, not to mention Hughes and theGovernor-General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, were demanding, variously for hisprosecution, imprisonment and deportation onthe grounds of treason. Hughes, through LloydGeorge, even went to the Vatican to haveMannix silenced or assigned elsewhere. All tono avail and it was therefore ironic that theAustralian Catholic Bishops votedunanimously for Mannix’s appointment asCatholic Chaplain-General, a position he

accepted on 21 July 1917 and would hold forthe rest of his life. He never saw his militaryresponsibilities interfering with his otherinterests. As an Irish nationalist, he condemnedwhat he saw as English misrule in Ireland, aposition which did not endear him to theBritish authorities. When he arranged to visitIreland in 1920, the Royal Navy intercepted theship on which he was travelling before hecould disembark, preventing him fromreaching his homeland. The Chief of theImperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir HenryWilson, also banned him from Liverpool,Glasgow and Manchester, cities with large Irishcommunities.6 The incident caused Mannix toremark, “Since the Battle of Jutland the BritishNavy has not scored any success comparableto the chasing of the Baltic from the Irishshores and the capture without the loss of asingle British sailor, of the Archbishop ofMelbourne.” Further, he quipped “The RoyalNavy has taken into custody the Chaplain-General of his Majesty’s Forces in Australia”.7

When the RN landed him at Penzance, theepisode had all the ingredients of a farce.

While he may never have worn theuniform to which he was entitled – that of amajor general, and it was said that wild horsescould not have dragged him into militaryattire8 – the Army gave him a final salute of 13guns fired at one-minute intervals as his body

Sectarianism’s Last Stand? Mannix, Menziesand the 1954 Duntroon Colours Controversy

By Wing Commander John Steinback, RAAF

The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing anyreligious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shallbe required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.1

No member of the Forces who has conscientious objections shall be compelled to answer anyquestion as to his religion, nor shall any regulation or other order compel attendance at anyreligious service.2


was being laid to rest in a vault in Melbourne’sSt Patrick’s Cathedral on Sunday 10 November1963.9

Mannix was a controversial figure. He hadnow twice beaten one Prime Minister, Hughes,and was now to deal with Robert Menzies, andagain he would succeed because he was right.It was a long-running sore, a sectarianisminstitutionalised within the Forces, bearing ona minority, more or less tolerated even thoughillegal and unconstitutional, on which he nowset his sights. In challenging an entrenchedpractice, Mannix resuscitated elements ofreligious bigotry reminiscent of 1916 and1917. The outcome was worth the effort: aceremony which should have a profoundinfluence on the esprit de corps of a unit,would no longer be marred by resentment andcrises of conscience.

Mannix had had a long-standing andprincipled opposition to ecumenical or jointchurch services. As a matter of conviction, atthat time, Catholics were not to attendProtestant services.10 This was a position notalways respected by military or civilauthorities. On 18 September 1952 at RAAFBase Laverton, the then Hon. W. MacMahon,Minister for Air, on behalf of the Governor-General Sir William McKell, presented theQueen’s Colour to the Royal Australian AirForce.11 Embedded within this ceremony wasan essentially Anglican service of theconsecrating of the Colours.12 The question ofthe participation of Catholics led to someunpleasantness. Should they have failed toattend, their military superiors threatenedCatholic cadets with prejudice to their futurecareers, airmen with disciplinary action andthe Catholic Chaplain with accusation ofviolating his Oath of Allegiance.13 Theceremony went ahead with its Anglican liturgydespite the protestations of Catholics, at theexpress insistence of the Minister. Similarproblems arose in civic ceremonies, when inMelbourne in 1953 it was proposed to conductan inter-denominational service on 31 May in

the Exhibition Building as a “citizens”Coronation Commemoration. This timeMannix could and would be uncompromising.The solution was “ ‘emasculated’ and ‘gutless’and pleased nobody". To remove thepotentially divisive elements of the service,laymen ran it. Now another event was comingup, one of the highlights of the Royal Tour, aparade at Duntroon in the national capital. Setfor 17 February the following year, thereigning monarch herself (and head of theChurch of England) would present newColours, replacing those presented by the Dukeof York during a visit to open the newParliament House in 1927. The significance ofthe occasion was unmistakeable, andsomething of a family affair: not only was theQueen following in her father’s footsteps butalso the officiating cleric, C.L. Riley, Bishop ofBendigo, (also the Anglican Chaplain-General)whose father had consecrated those earlierColours. Then there was Menzies whoseabiding interest was to see everything runsmoothly.

The issue at hand was that the Colourceremony had been adopted from the Britishand since the Anglican Church was also theestablished or official church in England, thefact that a civil ceremony (the presentation ofthe Colours) embedded a Protestant religiousservice was legally acceptable. In a countrywhose Constitution explicitly forbade imposingany religion on anyone and with a DefenceAct to reinforce that principle in the Forces, theBritish military order of service in theAustralian context could only be a vexatious,provocative and above all an insensitiveintrusion into the religious convictions of afaith which was over-represented, per capita,in the Australian Army. This presented adilemma to Mannix. Should he threaten tojeopardise this pageantry in the name ofsectarianism (which it was but clouded as suchby its symbolism and its traditional characterand many Australians valued those links backto Britain) or could he simply accept what was

SECTARIANISM’S LAST STAND? MANNIX, MENZIES AND THE 1954 DUNTROON COLOURS CONTROVERSY 21

after all, unconstitutional, by givingdispensation to the Catholics on parade, whichhe as Chaplain-General could. The firstapproach would be unpopular, a spoiler likelyto bring great contumely on his office, onCatholics and on the Catholic Church. Whileno one was likely again to challenge hisloyalty, as had happened in 1916-17, therewere questions of form: nobody, includingMannix, wanted to upset the parade aboutwhich an Age reporter would later write, “It isdoubtful if ever before has a ceremonial paradein Australia been carried out with suchperfection.”14 But he could not betray hisprinciples. Moreover, in view of his known andwidely expressed opposition to combinedservices, he would need to keep his followersinformed of his thinking on the matter. Andthe trick would be to convince all and sundrythat he was not prepared to ransom a regalevent of such significance to press his point, toavoid Menzies and the Government anyembarrassment. And Mannix was well versedin constitutional proprieties.15

While the Prime Minister was one of thecountry’s most renowned constitutionallawyers and entirely sympathetic with Section116, his error was in not addressing in a timelyway, what in the Catholic press, was referred toas the “conscientious difficulties of Catholicservicemen faced with military ceremoniescombined with Protestant religious services”,which had been the subject of high-leveldiscussion since the drama at Laverton.16 Thatthe Colours ceremony at Duntroon wouldbecome an issue had been anticipated. A 24May 1953 letter from Bishop John McCarthy,the Catholic Deputy Chaplain-General, that is,Mannix’s deputy, to the Catholic Chaplain atDuntroon, Jack Hoare, advised that the“blessing of the colours” was beinginvestigated in Britain and America “as to theusual Catholic practices”, added that “theBishops here have apparently decided againstany kind of cooperation”, and thatgovernmental intervention had been sought.17

According to the Argus, Mannix had made itknown six months before the Duntroonparade, that he would not give dispensation tothe Catholic cadets to attend the parade.18

Clearly, the Government was procrastinating.Now, with the Royal Tour almost upon him,Menzies finally wanted the matter quicklyresolved. Therefore, in January 1954 he wroteto Monsignor Fox, the Vicar-General, aboutDuntroon and three days later to theArchbishop himself apologising for the delayin dealing with the problem on the grounds ofhis absence at the Coronation. Making thepoint that Cabinet would discuss it thefollowing week, Menzies told him he could flyto Melbourne afterwards to “have a purelyprivate talk with you about it”.19 Menzies didgo to Melbourne but met with John McCarthy,as Mannix was elsewhere. That resulted in anunderstanding: that it was now impractical tochange the order of service given the timing,that Mannix be asked to give dispensation, andan undertaking from Menzies there would beno more Colour ceremonies of the type held atLaverton and due to take place at Duntroon.On McCarthy’s advice, Mannix was prepared togive the dispensation and at Portsea where hewas holidaying, drafted a letter in reply toMenzies to that effect. McCarthy alsodespatched a copy of this letter to Hoare on 11February, “against future developments”, asuggestion which in view of the subsequentcontroversy, was particularly prescient.20 Onthe same date Major General Ronald Hopkins,Commandant of the Royal Military College,wrote to Hoare telling him that the presence ofa number of Catholic cadets was essentialbecause of the positions they held on theforthcoming parade and expressed hope thattheir dispensation would be given “favourableconsideration” because their “functions in theceremonial drill are so important that thesuccess of the various movements depends onthem.”21 Given Hopkins’ concerns, it isreasonable to assume that one of the aims ofMcCarthy’s 11 February letter to Hoare was to


inform RMC by circumventing the officialcommunications channel – Prime Minister toMinister for Army and down to Duntroon –that the matter had now been resolved andthat rehearsals with Catholic cadets involvedshould continue.

Menzies had wanted to avoid publiccontroversy; however, there was, according toMannix, a “leakage of information fromCabinet” that made the news on 9 February.22

The press comments, as Mannix had feared,were giving the impression that he wanted toembarrass the Queen. To deal with this,Mannix added a post-script to his letter, tellingthe Prime Minister that in view of the adverseand unwarranted publicity, that he (Mannix)with Menzies’ permission would give a copy ofthe letter to the newspapers the following daybecause “Catholics should know firstly that anexceptional concession had been made, andsecondly why it had been made.”23 Mannixalso wanted to counter claims that he wantedto sabotage the Duntroon ceremony. However,on the following day, as more newspaperswere carrying a story of Catholic intransigence,he sent a telegram to Menzies from Sorrentosaying that he had no option but to issue anexplanatory statement. Both the SydneyMorning Herald and The Age were telling theirreaders that Catholic cadets at Duntroon hadbeen informed by their Church that they couldnot take part in the ceremony.24 This was nownot the case but according to the SMH, thePrime Minister would neither confirm nor denyhe had met the chaplains while the Armyminister, J. Francis, would make no comment.25

The Melbourne Sun reported that Catholicsenior public servants were withdrawingacceptance of their invitations to attend theDuntroon ceremony.26 On 12 February, thematter reached the SMH editorial. Again thepaper took the stance that Mannix hadforbidden Catholic cadets to participate. Thiswas patently wrong. To make matters worse,the paper suggested that a cadet’s officialduties obliged him to attend and that Roman

Catholics should try to respect the traditions ofthe Army and the sentiment of the majority,not exactly words that would please DrMannix. In fairness, the paper agreed thatsome decent compromise had to be foundbecause “Protestants and Catholics are bothsoldiers of the Queen.”27 The matter could havebeen settled but Menzies who could easily haveended the speculation by simply admitting thatan agreement had been reached would not act:in reply to Mannix’s 10 February telegramwith another telegram, he implored theArchbishop not to make any press statementuntil he (Menzies) had an opportunity to get intouch again.28 The next day Menzies sentMannix a letter deploring what the newspaperswere saying and repeated his request to “avoidany public controversy of a sectarian kind.”29

Mannix now acted. On 12 February hetelegrammed Menzies suggesting that “in viewof deplorable publicity I cannot accept yourproposal. The obvious logical course is even atthis late stage to abandon at Duntroon aservice you admit was indefensible at Laverton.Then there will be no further publicity”.30 OnSaturday 13 February, The Age printedMannix’s letter of 9 February in full. And onceagain Menzies was “unavailable” forcomment.31

Mannix’s letter hinting at a “solution”suggesting some form of compromise was toomuch for some: in a letter to The Age, theReverend A. Chrichton Barr from the ScotsChurch, Collins Street, predicted that the “endof the road is obvious – turn over all religiousacts to the Roman church or cut them out alltogether.”32 Barr was joined by The Rt. Rev.G.F. Cranswick, Anglican Bishop of Tasmania,who argued that while under British ruleminorities are protected, they have no right todictate to the majority. The requirements eitherof the Australian Constitution or of theDefence Act did not apparently, figure. Evenafter Duntroon, Howard Sydney, AnglicanArchbishop of Sydney, wrote to Menziespredicting that if the Government surrendered


to the arrogant attitude of a minority section ofthe community, the practical effects would beto paganise important national functions in aprofessedly Christian country,33 a point sharedby the Protestant Council of NSW (the LoyalOrange Institution of NSW was affiliated),which also saw it as a further step to theincreasingly evident paganism in Australia,driven by a minority and “advanced by a manwhose past record of disloyalty to the BritishEmpire called upon his head the wrath ofPrime Minister Hughes, Governor-GeneralMunro-Ferguson and the Government of GreatBritain.”34

While the publishing of Mannix’s letter putto rest any concern about the viability of theColours ceremony at Duntroon, it did raise thespectre of sectarianism and that was the priceMenzies ultimately had to pay. The Duntrooncontroversy was for all intents over whenMannix wrote to Menzies again in a letterdated 16 February to elucidate his actions: theissue had been on the boil for well over twelvemonths long before the Royal visit wasarranged; the Colours ceremony is mostembarrassing to the Queen’s AustralianCatholic subjects; and the pressmisrepresentation or “misunderstanding”,could not be ignored or to go unchallenged. Hehad withheld publication of the 9 Februaryletter at Menzies’ request for two days in whichMenzies could have set the record straight. Inclosing he hoped the Duntroon function “willbe everything that you desire of theoccasion.”35

There is another account of how Mannixdealt with the issue in Gilchrist’s book. In that,responsibility for dealing with Menzies wasgiven to Monsignor Ken Morrison, the RAAF'ssenior Catholic Chaplain. According to thisversion, Menzies had been hard to convince.“If I died as a black Presbyterian, could notArthur Calwell get a dispensation to attend myfuneral?” Morrison replied that he could.Menzies then asked what is the differencebetween that and the Colours ceremony.

Morrison answered: “If you die as a blackPresbyterian there is reason why you should beburied as a black Presbyterian, but there is nojustification in this country, which has noestablished religion, to arrange this function inaccordance with an Anglican formulary.” Thatconvinced Menzies of the Catholic position.Morrison then took a legal expert, one JohnDavoren, with him to Portsea.36 With anassurance from Menzies that change wouldcome, Morrison was able to successfullyrecommend to Mannix to take the pressure offindividual Catholics by allowing them toattend the parade.37

In his 9 February letter, Mannix made itclear that the dispensation given at Duntroonwas to be for “this occasion only” and hemeant it. On 2 March as “Melbourne basks inRoyal enchantment”, another Queen’s Colourpresentation was under way, involving onlythe Duke of Edinburgh, at the Flinders NavalDepot. Before the consecration of the Coloursby the Anglican Chaplain, the order was givenfor Roman Catholics to fall out. More than400 left the parade ground, formed up andprayed for the Queen with their own chaplainand then doubled back to their originalpositions.38, 39

The Duntroon controversy showed thatthere were still pockets of sectarianism, if notin the forces, then certainly on the outside.40 IfMannix’s assessment of a leak emanating fromCabinet was correct, then there were Ministerswho were not sympathetic with Menzies’feelings or intentions who were quite preparedto foment sectarianism. That Menzies even hadto take such a matter to Cabinet in the firstplace says much about how emotive an issue itwas. Perhaps his wish to deal with it quietly,even outside of Cabinet, may have arisen notjust to avoid public discussion leading up tothe Royal Tour, but not to be seen truckingwith a Catholic Archbishop, or worse, and asMenzies knowledge of the Constitution wouldhave told him he had little choice in the matter— ultimately he would have to go along with


Mannix — that in some quarters this obligationcould be interpreted as nothing short ofweakness, a surrender, a sell-out. It must alsobe recalled that at this time, the “Split” in theALP was not in sight and Menzies had no needto appease Catholic opinion the way he woulda year later.

In due course, the format of the Coloursceremony was restructured. Rather thanseparating the military and religious elements,the solution, and a most sensible one, was toinvolve three Chaplains-General ortheir representatives in the service: theAnglican, Roman Catholic and ProtestantDenominations’, in that order, with the threealways occupying the same relative positionson the parade ground.41 Each would in turn layhis hands on the Colour, and in orderconsecrate, bless and dedicate it.42 The newprocedures would be introduced for thepresentation and consecration of Colours to 2Infantry Battalion, City of Newcastle Regimenton 15 April 1956.43 In the lead-up to thisceremony, which was to involve Sir WilliamSlim and be the first for a CMF unit sinceWorld War II, the new format was still beingcontested. The Reverend Dr Malcolm Mackay,44

general secretary of the Australian Council ofChurches, in a letter to Menzies, wanted aceremony that was “more widely acceptableand departing less violently from long-established custom”. He challenged the PrimeMinister’s pronouncement that the Chaplains-General had been unanimous in theiracceptance of the new order of service andclaimed that Roman Catholics “have receivedan undue measure of consideration to thedetriment of the much larger Protestantcommunity and the nation as a whole”.45 TheMinister for the Army, J.O. Cramer however,stood his ground.

It is instructive to now consider that whileService drill and ceremonial publicationsprovide the early and usually proud Britishhistories of many of the customs associated

with the Colours, why three Chaplains nowparticipate in their consecration is not.46

Curiously, it was suggested to Menziesafterwards that copies of the correspondencebetween he and Mannix over the Duntrooncontroversy not be given to other departmentsbut be kept only in Menzies' personal files.47

Mannix however had the two main documents,his letters of the 9th and 16th of February toMenzies along with his version of events,published in the Catholic press at the earliestopportunity.

On 4 March 1954, Mannix received acongratulatory telegram from the Queen on theoccasion of his 90th birthday.

NOTES1. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act,

s. 116.2. Defence Act 1903-1912, Part X –

Miscellaneous, s. 123B.3. The literature on Mannix is vast, but

unfortunately most of it is, as thehistoriography on Mannix himself, biased.(There was even considerable controversysurrounding James Griffin’s entry in theAustralian Biographical Dictionary). A fairbiography is that by Brennan, and another byGilchrist. The most detailed account of his life(it includes Mannix’s diary entries while he wasin Australia), but least reflective and entirelyuncritical, is the hagiography by Ebsworth.

4. The legislation made no provision for the ageretirement of a Chaplain-General.

5. Mannix believed his stance was vindicatedbecause Australian soldiers in Francethemselves voted against conscription.

6. Wilson was later shot by two Irish ex-servicemen on the steps of his London home.

7. Walter A. Ebsworth, Rev., Archbishop Mannix,H.H. Stephenson, Melbourne, 1977, p. 239.

8. Michael Gilchrist, Daniel Mannix: Priest andPatriot. Dove Communications, Melbourne,1982. p. 47.

9. In gathering ideas for this article, I am deeplyindebted to Bishop John Aloysius Morgan whowas Catholic Deputy Chaplain-General at thetime of the 1954 Royal Tour and whosucceeded Mannix as Chaplain-General. In aninterview, Bishop Morgan provided valuableinsights into the role and organisation of theChaplains-General and the conduct and liturgyof the Colour consecration ceremony.


10. This policy was liberalised in the Services, aselsewhere, following Vatican II, whichtransformed the liturgy, image and attitudes ofthe Catholic Church and made ecumenismacceptable.

11. Apparently, and ironically for an Air Forceoccasion, McKell’s aircraft, an RAAF Dakotahad been unable to leave Canberra because ofengine trouble.

12. The RAAF Chaplains involved were E.F. Cooper(Anglican), and R.C. Russell (Presbyterian). Bothwere serving as Principal Chaplains inMelbourne.

13. Gilchrist, op. cit., p. 208. Gilchrist here citesMgr Ken Morrison, who was senior CatholicChaplain in the RAAF at the time.

14. ‘Impressive Parade at Duntroon: Queen Followsin Her Father’s Footsteps’, Age, 18 February1954.

15. A biographer recorded that one of the firstthings Mannix asked for following his arrivalin Australia was a copy of the AustralianConstitution. See Frank Murphy, DanielMannix: Archbishop of Melbourne, TheAdvocate Press, Melbourne, 1948.

16. Although no reference to any ongoing talksappears in the correspondence betweenMenzies and Mannix held in Menzies’ personalcorrespondence files in the National AustralianArchives (NAA), the background to the“Duntroon Controversy” including the twoletters Mannix sent to Menzies appeared inmost Catholic newspapers after the ceremony.See for example the 4 March 1954 edition ofThe Catholic Leader, p. 9 or that of 18 February1954 (NB the day after the parade) of TheAdvocate.

17. Letter from Bishop McCarthy to Chaplain Hoaredated 24 May 1953. Army Historical Unit.Henceforth AHU.

18. “Church Stand Worries Army: Cadets’attendance at service undecided”, Argus, 10February 1954, p. 6.

19. Menzies to Mannix, 27 January 1954, CRSM2576/1, Item 112, NAA.

20. Letter from Bishop McCarthy to Chaplain Hoaredated 11 February 1954. AHU.

21. Demi-official letter from Major GeneralHopkins to Chaplain Hoare dated 11 February1954. AHU.

22. “Church Problem Arises Over Royal Ceremony”,Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 9 February1954.

23. Mannix to Menzies, 9 February 1954, ibid.24. “Intervention By Menzies in Duntroon Dispute”,

SMH, 10 February 1954, p. 7, “Hope of Solving

Church Problem at Parade”, Age, 10 February1954, p. 5.

25. “Government Statement Awaited”, SMH, ibid.26. “Duntroon Row: PM steps in”, Melbourne Sun,

10 February 1953.27. SMH, 12 February 1954, p. 2.28. Telegram Menzies to Mannix, 10 February

1954, CRS M2576/1, op. cit29. Menzies to Mannix, 11 February 1954, ibid.30. Telegram Mannix to Menzies, 12 February

1954, ibid.31. “Presentation of Colors Controversy”, Age, 13

February 1954, p.8.32. “Dedication at Duntroon”, Age, 14 February

1954, p.233. Howard Sydney to Menzies, 17 June 1954, CRS

M2576/1, op. cit.34. J.S. Hayes to Menzies, 30 November, ibid.35. Mannix to Menzies, 16 February 1954, ibid.36. There is a lengthy legal brief on the Duntroon

matter in the Menzies files in the NAA;however, neither its author nor origins arespecified. It recommended the separation of thereligious and military elements of theceremony, by for example, consecrating theColours in a church or churches, andconducting the presentation later. This had aprecedent in Malta. It was not the solutionsubsequently worked out for the Australianmilitary. CRS M2576/1, op. cit.

37. Gilchrist, op. cit., p. 211. In Morrison’s account,as told to Gilchrist, the 9 February letter wastyped by the owner of the hotel at Portsea,which judging by its quality gives credibility tothis version.

38. “Catholics Upset Parade: leave ranks to joinpriest”, The News, 2 March 1954, p. 3.

39. According to the legal brief in the Menziesrecords in the NAA (see Endnote 36), the fallingout of Catholics from parade while theconsecration was underway is also untenableunder Section 116, because it differentiates. Italso deems that the imposition of any religiousobservance by the military and that strictlyspeaking (as opposed to its acceptability),would have to include the consecration serviceas subsequently agreed upon by the Chaplains-General, to be unconstitutional, a point thatshould be borne in mind.

40. Bishop Morgan believed that within the Army,through the manner in which the ChaplaincyBranch was organised and the Chaplainpositions distributed throughout Brigade andBattalion levels and amongst the threedenominations, with representatives from eachof the three readily accessible, and through the


necessities of working together especially inwartime, that in the exemplary and cooperativeconduct of all Chaplains, sectarianism withinthe Army was a dead issue. Interview withBishop Morgan, St Christopher’s Presbyter,Canberra, 10 April 2000.

41. Bishop C.L. Riley, Bishop Morgan and ReverendBrooke (representing the ProtestantDenominations) jointly conducted theConsecration.

42. The full service can be found in any of theService drill manuals, e.g. DI (AF) AAP5135.002 Manual of Drill and Ceremonial andthe Army’s Ceremonial Manual.

43. “Consecration of the Colours”, Department ofthe Army, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, 7March 1956, CRS M2576/1, op. cit.

44. Mackay subsequently entered FederalParliament as Liberal MHR for Evans (1963-72),and served under McMahon as Minister for theNavy (1971-2). In 1956, he was minister at theScot’s Church, Sydney.

45. ‘Colours Ceremony Change Sought by ChurchLeaders’, SMH, 12 April 1956.

46. In addition to Bishop Morgan, I am indebtedfor their assistance in preparing this article toWing Commander (Chaplain) Paul Goodlandwho arranged for me to meet the Bishop, to

David Wilson, Executive Officer HistoricalRecords-Air Force and to Bill Houston of theArmy Historical Unit especially for materialfrom the RMC archives.

47. From a note of uncertain authorship inMenzies’ personal files.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brennan, Niall. Dr Mannix. Rigby, Adelaide, 1964. Ebsworth, Rev. Walter A. Archbishop Mannix.

H.H.Stephenson, Melbourne, 1977.Gilchrist, Michael. Daniel Mannix: Priest and

Patriot. Dove Communications, Melbourne,1982.

Hogan, Michael. The Sectarian Strand: Religion inAustralian History. Penguin Books, Ringwood,1987.

McLeod, A. (ed). Australia Speaks. An Anthology ofAustralian Speeches. Wentworth Books,Sydney, 1969.

Murphy, Frank. Daniel Mannix: Archbishop ofMelbourne. The Advocate Press, Melbourne,1948.

Santamaria, B.A. Daniel Mannix: The Quality ofLeadership. Melbourne University Press,Melbourne, 1984.

Wing Commander John Steinbach is presently Manager, Defence Corporate Support Office – Amberley. He haspreviously contributed to the Australian Defence Force Journal.

27

Over the past decade both the Revolution inMilitary Affairs (RMA) and Information

Operations (IO) have excited militariesworldwide in general and the ADF inparticular. There are several causal factorswhich led to this interest in the RMA; it isuseful to list these briefly to better understandthe causes of, needs for, as well as the differentperceptions of, the RMA. These factors include:

First, the collapse of the Soviet Union andits Eastern Bloc satellites. Remaining the solesuperpower, the USA needed to formulate apost-Soviet Union, post-nuclear militarystrategy and an associated restructuring of itsforces to match the security and defencerequirements posed by the post-Soviet Union“New World Order”, including dealing withseveral new “rogue states” (generally ex-clientsof the former Soviet Union) and with local andregional conflicts increasingly based on ethnicor religious differences.

Second, a wide spectrum of conflictsoccurred: the 1990-91 Gulf War, several UN-sponsored Operations Other Than War (OOTW),even the recent “humanitarian war” inKosovo.1 The Gulf War, conducted by a US-ledCoalition against Iraq, was preceded by aprecision strike air war which neutralised Iraq’scommand and control (C&C) and surveillancesystems, resulting in a short, high-tech 100hour-long ground war (the “Desert Storm”

phase) which annihilated Iraqi ground forces.The Gulf War has sometimes been called the“First Information War” and, by the then-USArmy Chief-of-Staff, a “Knowledge War”;2 itslessons learned have shaped new US strategies,new warfighting concepts and doctrine (e.g.“C4I for the Warrior”, “Joint Vision 2010”with its emphasis on “joint-ness”, “InformationSuperiority” etc.). On the other hand, OOTWand Humanitarian War provided other “lessonslearned”, inter alia, the need to conductoperations in “information space” (or “virtual”or “mind” space) to “win the hearts and minds”of local populations who have beentraumatised by armed people in uniform; andto influence the minds and perceptions of othertarget populations, such as regional and worldopinions, who may question whose interest thepeacekeepers are representing.

Third, the ubiquity of computers,information networks and IT-based systemsand weapons increasingly began to underpinthe full spectrum of critical military businessprocesses, such as C&C, surveillance, battlefieldlocation and navigation, coordination,precision weapon targeting and delivery, andlogistics. By extension and integration of thelatter, networked, distributed “systems-of-systems” (SOS) began to be conceived tosupport and continuously deliver in a hostilebattlefield environment, information and

Information Operations:Cornerstone of an RMA?

By V.C. Sobolewski, Head, Information Warfare Studies Group, DSTO

A number of recent developments, several information – and computer-based, have ledstrategists to conclude that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is in the making. In particularInformation Operations (IO) and related concepts are seen as being central to such an RMA. Thisarticle critically examines this proposition, describes the current views on forms of IO and assesseswhether these satisfy RMA criteria or whether IO are an EMA (“Evolution in Military Affairs").Additional forms of IO, including a linkage to Knowledge Warfare, are proposed which could bettermatch the characteristics and outcomes of a true RMA.


services provided by the aggregate of systemsunder the (awkward) collective abbreviation,“C4ISTAREW”.3 In turn this has resulted in therecent, more refined concepts of “NetworkCentric Warfare” (NCW) or “Network EnabledWarfare” (NEW).4

Fourth, this ubiquity of the PC andparticularly its connectivity in LANs and,globally via the Internet, has led to threefurther major developments. First, thecomputer is increasingly a source ofinformation (and hence also of disinformation)and a means of mass communications. Second,the workings of most sectors of modernsocieties rely now on computers and “criticalinformation-based infrastructures” (such aspower generation and distribution, transportcommunications, telecommunications, bankingand finance, emergency services etc.). Third,both the global and national computernetworks are increasingly significant enablersof national wealth creation. Consequentlynational information-based infrastructures arepotential targets for individuals, organisationsand states hostile to the national interest, whowish to inflict serious economic and societaldamage to achieve some political, economic ormilitary advantage.5

Fifth, two consequences of the “Revolutionin Business Affairs” (RBA) of the late 80s havebeen, (a) the (ongoing) review of core/non-coremilitary roles and services and the resultantoutsourcing of some of these to the privatesector – for cost-cutting reasons and Defencebudget economies; and (b) the increasingreliance on commercial quality COTS(Commercial-off-the-shelf) products andservices, particularly IT-based. Theconsequences of this are increasedvulnerabilities of key C4ISR processes and sub-systems due to IT-based COTS developmentand implementation by untrusted third parties,software implementation complexities notlending themselves to credible compliance toadequate standards and, increasingly,monopolistic, single-source suppliers.

Sixth and last, some philosophicalunderpinnings have been formulated, assertingthat modern and successful societiesnecessarily are transitioning into “InformationSocieties” – from the earlier “Agrarian” and“Industrial” societies - and that accordingly,conflicts and war need to match the “age” inwhich they are conducted. Thus, kinetic,mechanical war in physical space isappropriate to the Industrial Age, and“information war”, conducted in cyber- orvirtual space, is appropriate to the InformationAge.6

This recent confluence of geo-political,military, technological, societal and evenphilosophical factors has led some strategists toconclude that a dramatic change in militarystrategy and warfighting is necessary, givingthose militaries that are recognising this, andreorganising themselves accordingly, a decidedcomparative advantages over those lagging –in much the same fashion that in the businesssector, the prize goes to those that take rapidadvantage of new innovative enablingtechnologies, new business processes and neworganisations. Following the Revolution inBusiness Affairs, comes the Revolution inMilitary Affairs! A further consequentconclusion was that the central driver of anysuch RMA is information and associated IT-based processes and operations.

To assess this, particularly the importance -even the centrality – of information andinformation-based operations (IO) to the RMA,what constitutes an RMA needs examination.This article considers and discusses whether aninformation-based RMA is in fact in themaking; what has, or needs, to be done for itto be a “true” RMA – as distinct from a natural“Evolution in Military Affairs”; and examinesthe promise and role of IO in contributing to –even enabling – such an RMA.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS: CORNERSTONE OF AN RMA? 29

Characteristics of an RMAThe literature on the RMA is extensive,7

with (sometimes) widely varying viewpoints onthe nature of RMAs and their characteristics.But most agree that “military revolutions”, towarrant the label, have several necessarycomponents, namely:8

1. technological change;2. operational innovation;3. organisational adaptation; and4. systems development to integrate the above

into an effective and efficient whole.To this one should also add:5. a demonstrated, successful “first use” in

conflict by an innovative commander.Individually, the above are necessary, but

not sufficient, conditions for an RMA.Additionally, outcomes are required: gains andchanges resulting from a candidate RMA,when applied in conflict, must be sofundamental and dramatic that they makeprevious key elements of military powerobsolescent - weapons, doctrine, organisations,and the way conflict is conducted.Consequently it is a big ask for anyone to statewith conviction whether this or thattechnological development or confluence ofseveral new developments qualify as an RMA.Hindsight, backed by factually-based outcomesof battles, campaigns and wars, and post factoanalysis, make this possible. Consequently listsof past RMAs are common.9 But ante factopredictions of new RMAs are more difficult.This is the position of the current “RMA”predicated on IT-based technologies. Anexample of an a priori predicted RMA, that ofair power and specifically strategic bombing, isa case in point: the similarities between thepromises of strategic bombing and IT-based/Information Operations as militaryrevolutions are strikingly similar.

The Cautionary Tale of Strategic Bombing, aMilitary Revolution

An earlier putative RMA, strategicbombing, provides useful and cautionary

lessons for an IO-based RMA. In the early 20s,a number of visionary theorists, led by ItalianGeneral Guilio Douhet, proposed the formationof independent air forces as the lead arm offuture national military forces, based on theirobservations of the impasse by, and slaughterof, mass armies bogged in trench warfare, andon some limited examples of successes ofGerman bombing of England and on the use ofaircraft on the Italian front in WWI.10 Byhurdling over massed land forces locked intrench warfare, they argued, a strategic bomberforce would attack the adversary’s mostimportant war-making capabilities - industries,farming, communications and morale ofcivilian populations - creating mass disruptionand panic among the population andGovernment. Victory would be swift andcertain - after all, “the bomber would alwaysget through”.11 Experience did not followpromise. The German Air Force during theBlitz on England in 1940, the “1000-bomber“raids by the RAF and the USAAF on Germanindustry and cities, and the great USAAF airraids on Japanese cities neither broke civilianmorale nor closed down any war industries.12

Only with the advent of the bomber as a long-range delivery platform for nuclear weaponsdid strategic bombing achieve its potential.Douhet et al., like many military prophetsbefore them, saw the benefits only, ignoringthe practical difficulties of long-rangebombing, including, inter alia: accurate long-range navigation to the target, targetidentification in weather or at night, deviationsfrom aim-points of free-falling, “dumb” bombsand so on. And, if strategic bombing was soefficacious as claimed, the development ofcounter-measures to strategic bombers (such asfighter defences, early warning detection(implemented in the event by surveillanceradar), the development of air defence systems(such as implemented by the RAF by late 1939and later by the Germans13), and the later(electronic warfare) counter-measures, or theirequivalents, should surely have been


anticipated. These were ignored by theprophets of strategic bombing; while the willand resilience of civilian populations inadversity and during continuous bombing,seem not to have been factored in at all.14

The similarities between the promises ofstrategic bombing and Information Warfare(IW) and Information Operations (IO) asmilitary revolutions are striking and worthnoting. First, strategic bombing andindependent air forces extended conflict intothe then-new, third dimension, aerospace;IW/IO are to be undertaken in the new, fourth,dimension of conflict, that of virtual or cyber-space. Second, the objectives of both strategicbombing and (strategic) IW are mass disruptionto critical strategic, economic, and societal(infra) structures (see later). Third, the problemof precision targeting of, say, a specific factoryin strategic bombing – and its difficultieswhich necessarily led to the less precisepractice of “area bombing” – has its IO/IWanalogies, namely the (current) difficulties oftargeting precisely specific targets, be theyindividuals, specific computers or specificinformation. And last, there are the dangers ofignoring the certainty of adversariesdeveloping and deploying defensivecountermeasures to IW/IO, and not factoringsuch into IW/IO cost-benefit studies, as theywere not, earlier, for strategic bombing.

Information Operations (IO) and its ComponentsThere are numerous definitions of IO.15 At

its simplest, IO are deliberate, integrated andcoordinated information-centered activities andactions undertaken to achieve a militaryadvantage.16 More formally, the ADF (interim)definition of IO is … “actions taken to defendand enhance one’s own information,information processes and information systemsand to affect adversary information,information processes and informationsystems”.17 The activities or actions include:a. Targeting and exploiting or impairing an

adversary’s information,18 information/

C4ISREW systems and information-basedmilitary and defence business processes.Broadly these are offensive IO activities oractions.

b. Protecting our/friendly information,information/C4ISREW systems andinformation-based military and defencebusiness processes from an adversary’soffensive IO activities and actions. Theseare defensive IO activities or actions.

c. Enhancing the quality of our/friendlyinformation and the performance of ourinformation/C4ISREW systems andinformation-based military and defencebusiness processes, through effectiveinformation and knowledge management.More recent considerations have extended

the ADF IO role to protect and attack the keyprocess of decision-making, thus: “IO consistsof the systematic coordination of a range ofinformation related activities to produce aplanned or tailored effect on the decisionmaking of an adversary and to protect our owndecision superiority”.19 This casts ADF IO as theensurer of Decision Superiority, a key ADFwarfighting concept and a force multiplier,offsetting comparative disadvantages in forcesize or equivalence in weapons technologies.20

This ADF IO role differs somewhat from the USDoD envisaged role; there the key outcome ofthe effective conduct of IO activities is“Information Superiority”, a comparative andcompetitive advantage bestowed to theopponent who both practices IO moreeffectively and better utilises the resultantinformation advantage during peacetime,rising tension and during military conflict.Information Superiority is defined as “thecapability to collect, process and disseminatean uninterrupted flow of information whileexploiting or denying an adversary’s ability todo the same.21 As seen later, InformationSuperiority is seen as central to the (US) RMA.

ADF IO is partitioned into three majorcategories or branches: IO-Offence, IO-Defenceand IO-Support, which follow from the ADF IO


definition; each category has a number ofcomponent elements, as shown in Figure 1.22

The order of the component elements in eachbranch are such that offensive, defensive andsupport aspects of each component (e.g.Electronic Warfare (EW), Navigational Warfare,Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) etc.) alignhorizontally. The meaning of each componentelement in Figure 1 is self-explanatory and willnot be defined further.

The IO components, EW, PSYOPS, MilitaryDeception, Operations Security (OpsSec) etc.betray the paternity of IO. IO, in the firstinstance, are aggregated information-centredactivities and actions that militaries havepractised since the dawn of conflict23 –particularly deception, PSYOPS and OpsSec -augmented by newer computer network-centred and precision navigation activities,selected, coordinated, and deconflicted into anintegrated whole, to provide synergisedbenefits to the conduct of military operations.

Different IO components are conducted indifferent dimensions or environments. For

example, EW and NavWar are conductedprimarily in free space (the “ether”) at the RFsignal level: RF signals are intercepted,jammed, their sources located etc.“Destruction” and its associated physical andpersonnel security are conducted in physical,3-D space. Computer Network Attack andDefence are conducted in cyber-space. Militarydeception is more complex: it can beundertaken in physical space (such ascamouflage of military assets and facilities); infree space/ether (such as platform or facilitysignature modification); in (human) “mind”-space, for PSYOPS, disinformation etc; or in alldimensions, for integrated, grand deception.

The aforementioned underlines the fact thatthe above decomposition of IO into itsconstituent elements is only one of severalpossibilities; the decomposition of Figure 1follows from the ADF IO definition. Otherdecompositions of IO include: by “proactiveIO” and “reactive IO”; by Battlespacedimension or environment in which IO isconducted; by IO targets; by IO “weapons”;

Figure 1. The Branches of IO and their Component Elements


and so on. Figure 2 captures some aspects ofalternative decompositions of IO. In particularit brings out and emphasises the importance ofthe virtual “mind/decision” space as alegitimate and increasingly importantdimension of current and future Battlespacesand of IO targets, both of which are notimmediately apparent in or from Figure 1.

Types and “Flavours” of IOIO are still evolving and hence it is not

surprising that there are multi-views of IO anddifferent “flavours”. It is convenient to considerthe variants of IO from two aspects:a. Battlefield IO in direct support of military

operations;b. Strategic IO and other forms of non-

military forms of IO.

Battlefield IO in Support of Military Operations

IO Component Warfare

This is the ad hoc employment of IOcomponents (EW, NavWar, PSYOPS, MilitaryDeception, OpsSec, Destruction) in support ofconventional military operations. With thetraditional weak coordination and little or noattempt at deconfliction between the individual

components, this flavour of “IO” is includedunder the rubric of “IO” for completion’s sakeonly.

Information Enhanced Warfare (IEW)

Information Enhanced Warfare iswarfighting based on the coordinated use ofC4ISTAR assets and OpConcepts linkingsensors, decision-makers and responseelements (“shooters”). It relies on precisionsurveillance, precision command and control(C&C), precision location and navigation,precision weapons, synchronised/precisionmanoeuvre, resulting in “precision warfare”.Information Enhanced Warfare is underpinnedby Information Superiority (mentioned earlier),which delivers the right information, at theright time to the right people, in an assuredmanner. Other associated key concepts are“Shared Battlespace Situation Awareness” (theidentification of patterns in the battlefieldsituation),“Battlespace Knowledge” (theextrapolation from Battlespace SituationAwareness of enemy intent and likely futuresituation), Information Richness (the quality ofinformation relating to the Battlespace) andInformation Reach (the degree to which

Figure 2. Decomposition to Emphasise Battlespace Dimensions and Targets


information is shared). Additional key conceptsunder development include Network CentricWarfare (NCW) or Network Enabled Warfare(NEW) which are the “translators ofInformation Superiority into Combat power”24

by linking information sources (sensors),decision-makers (C&C centres) and responseelements (shooters) by means of networks (orby the earlier concepts of purpose-assembled“system-of-systems”).

The objectives and implementation ofInformation Enhanced Warfare is to supportand complement conventional militaryoperations: its metrics of effectiveness arehigher enemy casualties, in a shorter time,fewer combat platforms, over a greaterBattlespace area.25 It is currently the mostfavoured form of IO by US DoD and “thefoundation upon which Joint Vision 2010 is tobe built”.26

Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

During military conflict, Command andControl Warfare is the targeting of, andexploiting and impairing of the adversary’sCommand and Control (C&C) processes andC4ISTAR systems, assets and associatedprocesses, while protecting own/friendly C&Cprocesses and C4ISTAR systems, assets andassociated processes from similar adversaryactions. Effective C&C is a necessary – but byitself not a sufficient condition- for successfulconflict outcome. Consequently an adversary’sC&C system is a high-value objective in itsown right and as the associated processes,systems and assets are either information or IT-based and quite properly fall under the IOrubric, C2W can be considered as an IO in itsown right. C2W evolved from C3I processesand systems, countermeasures (C3ICMs) andcounter-countermeasures (C3ICCMs) of the80s; was the IO “flavour-de-jour” of the early90s; and now has been subsumed undergeneral IO.

Military IO

Military IO are integrated, coordinated,synchronised and deconflicted Defensive-IO,Offensive-IO and IO-Support actions andactivities undertaken during rising tensionsand conflict, either in support of conventionalmilitary operations or as missions in their ownright.

Military IO utilises all the IO componentelements shown in Figure 1 necessary toachieve the (Theatre) Commander’s intent andthe desired “end-state” in the Theatre Area ofOperations.

Information Campaigns

Information Campaigns are the integrateduse of mass media, Public Information, CivilAffairs, plain, old fashioned public relationsand related “soft IO” measures to influencelocal and other stake-holder populations,particularly during Operations Other Than War(OOTW) to achieve the desired end-state in thequickest, efficient and effective way consistentwith the OOTW Chief Authority. Operationsmay include peacekeeping or peaceenforcement. Information Campaigns are anincreasing and highly-leveraged activity formilitaries. “Winning the hearts and minds” oflocal civilian populations who have beentraumatised (earlier) by armed people inuniform is a delicate art, requiring knowledgeof, and displaying sensitivities to, local culture,customs and immediate past history, whilesimultaneously being sensitive to other targetpopulations, such as adversary, regional andworld opinion, who will question the motivesand interests the peace-keepers/enforcers arerepresenting. Recent examples include theseveral conflicts in the Former Republic ofYugoslavia, and by the ADF, in East Timor andin the Solomon Islands.27

Strategic and Other Non-Military Forms of IO

Information Warfare

Information Warfare (IW) is an omnibusterm - often inexact - covering a wide


spectrum of hostile activities, predominantlytargeting computer networks and informationsystems. It includes hacking activities, cracking(computer-based criminal actions), all the wayto sophisticated, structured attacks oncomputer networks. Motives are varied: peer-pressure bravado, boredom etc. by hackers;monetary, or for other, gain by criminals;revenge and like malicious motives bydisgruntled employees or insiders; industrialespionage or for competitive gain by or onbehalf of competitor companies; achievingpolitical objectives by issue-motivated groups,terrorists etc; intelligence gathering activitiesby Foreign intelligence Services; and so on. Incases where the targets are Governmentcomputer networks or information systems,“IW” is an increasing form of asymmetricalwarfare against information-rich or computernetwork-rich nations.

Infrastructure War

Infrastructure Warfare are “random” orcoordinated attacks by issue-motivatedindividuals or groups, terrorists or foreignstates or their agents on a nation’s key orcritical information-based infrastructures tocreate disruption, fear and like effects toachieve political, military objectives or extractsome political gains. The target infrastructuresinclude power generation and distribution,physical communications and traffic control(air, rail, road, shipping), telecommunications,

electronic mass media (radio, TV), banking,ATMs, and finance, emergency andGovernment services and so on. Weapons canbe computer-based, HERF (high-energy RFweapons) and “plain, ole” physical destruction.Infrastructure warfare is another potentialfuture form of asymmetric warfare.

Strategic IO/IW

An extended form of InfrastructureWarfare, conducted by one state againstanother and targeting, in a synchronised andcoordinated manner, a nation’s criticalinformation-based infrastructures, to createmass societal disruption and gain a strategicadvantage, even to forestall future or extendedconflict (whence the term “electronic PearlHarbor”).28 When the capabilities of twoadversaries to conduct Strategic IW are similar(“symmetrical”), Strategic IW will haveanalogies with the nuclear arms race: IWdeterrence, pre-emptive IW strikes, MAD(mutually assured destruction) ofinfrastructures and so on.

“Soft War”, a Higher Form of Warfare

A postulated form of non-physical andnon-violent form of strategic IW whichimposes one nation’s will on another nationthrough targeting its leadership andpopulation, their perceptions, beliefs anddecision-making processes, by influencing,manipulating and controlling the adversarynation’s information and information flows.

Figure 3. Application of IO Branches/Components across the Conflict Continuum


The objectives are to deter or delay hostilitiesbetween the two nations, or disrupt thepreparation for such by the targeted nation.“Soft War” has the potential of being a higher,softer form of conflict resolution by conflictavoidance, or conflict delay, or conferring abenefit to the successful practitioner, byextending the preparation and mobilisationtime if conflict appears to be unavoidable.Consequently it, if the capability for such isimplemented, is a form of IO/IW whichsatisfies better the characteristics necessary toqualify as an RMA, than the previouslydescribed forms of IO.

Application of IO/IW Figure 3, often reproduced, shows the

conventional application of the variouscomponents of IO undertaken during thedifferent phases of the conflict continuum.Thus both Defensive IO and IO- Support areundertaken continually in peacetime, duringconflict and after, while Offensive IO is appliedduring rising tensions and during conflict only;the intensity of each IO component depends onthe particular instant within the phase of theconflict continuum.

An important unintended consequence ofFigure 3 however is the implicit association ofIO/IW with conflict: each of the three branchesof IO are presented as, and associated with,applying to or supporting military operationsacross the conventional conflict continuumonly. The consequence of this is theconventional wisdom that IO/IW in all itsaspects necessarily apply to and are undertakenduring conflict only. More important, thepotential of proactive IO/IW outside conflictdoes not readily flow from Figure 3, northerefore, does the potential for any other newapplications or creative roles for IO becomeimmediately apparent.

Potential of IO to Manage Rising Tensions andConflict

From Figure 4 which shows a typical“conflict intensity curve” and its dependenceon the phase of the conflict continuum, boththe costs of engaging in, and damage due to,conflict can be considered to be(approximately) proportional to (ConflictIntensity x Conflict Duration).29

However, due to a number of factors suchas the ubiquitous presence of transnational

Figure 4. Possible Conflict Outcomes due to Efficacious Use of IOFigure 4. Possible Conflict Outcomes due to Efficacious Use of IO

Figure 5. Successful Conflict Management Rests on Selection of COA (Course of Action) which MinimisesArea under Corresponding Conflict Curve


media, of global media networks and their rolein shaping of mass and world opinion, theincreasing influence of NGOs,30 an increasinglyinterventionist UN and regional alliances suchas NATO, increasing sensitivities tohumanitarian values and, despite popularperceptions, the sensitivity of governments toall of the aforementioned, there is increasingpopular aversion to physical destructionassociated with conflict, and particularly toimages in the mass media of dead civilians orsoldiers in bodybags. Consequently there isuniversal pressure to minimise both theintensity of conflict and its duration – andsimultaneously the overall cost of conflicts.

Only the irrational will argue with SunTzu’s maxim: “to subdue the adversary withoutfighting him is the acme of skill”.31 Thenational ends for conflict i.e. the “desired end-state”, are more important, than the means, ofwhich engaging in (successful) military conflictis but one means. Figure 4 shows two possible

conflict curves, both starting at the same“peace” start point and both terminating at thesame end-state of residual (low)level/absenceof conflict. The upper curve represents theachieving of the desired end-state throughconflict. Implicit in this curve is the failure ofdiplomacy, possible ineffective mass mediapresentation of the issues, the sending ofwrong signals to adversary leadership, or totheir opinion-making elites or to theadversary’s population and so on. Or perhapsthe “Information Campaign” that was mountedduring rising tensions “to win the hearts andminds” of the adversary population, was poorlyplanned; or poorly targeted; or possibly nottried at all.

In comparison, the second/lower curveshows initially a rising curve corresponding torising tensions, peaking and then rapidlytrending towards the desired end-state. Conflictwas avoided, as diplomacy was successfullyengaged and implemented, an information


campaign effectively targeted relevantaudiences and the media presented themes andmessages successfully, all effectivelycoordinated and synchronised in a Softwar-centred campaign. This second curve is clearlymore desirable: conflict has been avoided,physical damage and destruction avoided,dollar costs have been negligible. The assertionhere is that the difference between the twopossible courses of action (CoA) facingNational Executive Authorities, conflict orSoftwar, to achieve the end-state is theeffective application of IO (of the “Softwar”-flavour) during the rising tensions phase, theregion where actions - appropriate or mistaken- are highly leveraged. Another difference fromthe IO hitherto discussed is that “Softwar”needs necessarily be a whole-of-Government(WOG) approach and not related toDefence/ADF only. Yet another difference isthat active application of IO would be in therising tensions phase, even preceding this; thisdoes not strictly accord with current views ofthe application of “Offensive IO” during risingtensions and during conflict only. Thus a bettercategorisation of IO may be “proactive-IO” and“reactive-IO” in lieu of Offensive-IO andDefensive-IO.

One deduction from the above is that thefuller potential of IO may be realised outside ofconflict than during conflict; in other words, IOmay have a more important and cost-effectiverole in managing rising tensions and inavoiding conflict than as a provider andensurer of Information Superiority duringconflict, even if it reduces the duration, or levelof intensity, of conflict!

Figure 5 illustrates this point further.The figure shows a potential conflict is in

the making (time = ”now”). Say, seven possibleCoAs exist. CoA “1”, “3” and “4” have differentIO strategies applied, in different mixes, atdifferent times, with different intensities (i.e.different IO resources allocated). The IO appliedfor CoA1 is most effective, applied effectivelyduring rising tensions; IO/”Softwar” is

effective, conflict is avoided. For CoA3 andCoA4, IO is applied conventionally in supportof military operations after conflict has brokenout; the desired end-state is achieved butconflict costs and physical damage (indicatedby the area under the conflict curve) arenevertheless substantial. CoA7 has no IOapplied; not only is the desired end-state notachieved, the conflict is lost and damage andcosts are excessive.

Figure 5 illustrates the potential ofIO/Softwar. To give the concept morecredence, the targets for IO/Softwar duringpre-conflict/rising tensions phases need beidentified and the feasibility of their successfulimpairment commented on. Such targets arethe adversary’s information-centred political,Defence and military processes and associateddecision-making used by the adversary duringthe pre-rising tension, rising tension phasesand transitioning into the conflict phases.Without being too prescriptive, these couldinclude: a coherent, consistent and truth-based set of themes relating to the pretext, orissue(s), which are shaping up as the potentialcasus belli, and their presentation to ouradvantage to the various target populationsvia public diplomacy, to the media andconflict-mediating international bodies;actions based on or targeting processes whichenhance credibility of our capabilities anddeter (or delay) the adversary’s processesdirected towards conflict, to our advantage;actions based on or targeting processes whichprevent, delay or impair the adversary’sformulating and selecting CoAs to ouradvantage, including the targeting by PSYOPSor other means of the adversary leadershipand decision-makers and opinion-shapingelites; actions based on or targeting processeswhich prevent, delay or impair the adversary’smobilisation to our advantage; actions basedon or targeting processes which prevent, delayor impair deployment of the adversary’s forcesto our advantage; and actions based on ortargeting processes which, in general, buy


time to our advantage. There is a progressionfrom “proactive IO” actions to “offensive IO”actions requiring appropriate Intelligencesupport to characterise the adversary’sprocesses, assess their robustness andvulnerabilities, and to match appropriateSoftwar techniques against the indicated orknown target process or system vulnerabilitiesso that the impact of their deploymentmatches the previously assessed and(previously simulated) predicted damage.

The “True” Role of IO: Defence and MilitaryBusiness Process Impairment

Both what is being targeted by IO and thereal objectives of IO deserve closerexamination.

The previous section, in suggestingappropriate IO targets during the pre-conflictand rising tension phases, identified Defenceand military processes and the associated,embedded decision-making as targets. Onreflection this is commonsense and is evenidentified in the ADF IO definition (…”defendand enhance one own’s... information processes(and) affect adversary ... information processes...”). A specific computer network or aninformation channel is not protected ortargeted for attack because it costs say $XK toreplace if destroyed or disabled but because, bydestroying or disabling it, the military businessprocess it directly supports is delayed orcorrupted and further, by the “ripple effect”, itdegrades or possibly unhinges thesynchronisation between it and a number ofother military business processes, degradingthe quality, or possibly even the execution of amilitary operation which relied on the processwhich had been targeted by IO. (The benefit ofdegrading or preventing the effectiveexecution of the adversary’s military operationclearly would be much greater than $XK; andthe costs incurred by the adversary in planningand deploying for that operation would alsoclearly have been orders higher than $XK!)

The targeting – and defending – ofprocesses as central to IO have been implicitlyrecognised in several flavours of IO. Thus inthe C&CW flavour of IO, the objectives are toenhance the performance and quality ofour/friendly OODA loops,32 while degrading theadversary’s OODA loops, thereby gaining acomparative Command and Controladvantage; the OODA loop consists of severalkey sub-processes the critical one beingdecision-making - whence decision-making isoften presented as the key target of IO. Themore recent formulations of IO (such asInformation Enhanced Warfare) to ensure ownInformation Superiority have, as the eventualobjective, the underpinnings of NCW/NEW andtheir associated processes “to increase thetempo of operations, the speed of commandand (to) achieve greater lethality andsurvivability”.33

The assertion is made here that the targetsfor IO are wider than just decision-makingprocesses or those that primarily ensureInformation Superiority. a. The targets for IO are an adversary’s

political, defence and military businessprocesses.

b. The objectives of IO are to impair orunhinge an adversary’s business processeswhile protecting our/friendly political,defence and military business processesfrom like actions by adversaries; and

c. Decision-making still remains the criticalprocess, requiring to be protected by, andtargeted by, IO. As decision-making isembedded in, and integral to, everybusiness process it needs be differentiatedfrom the specific defence and militarybusiness processes with which it is a part ,since it is these major processes – and thedecision-making within these – that arebeing targeted for impairment.Military operations – or even wider still, the

business of national Defence – consists of thecarrying out of a number of “businessprocesses”, supported by associated business


process support tools and facilities, directed,managed and coordinated by assigned andappropriately empowered military andofficials/staff. A (business) process is asystematic series of actions or operationsundertaken for some specified end; itnecessarily includes decision-making withinitself. Military business processes range fromthe simplest Standard Operating Procedure(SOP) to the single-Service and Joint UniversalTask Lists (UJTL),34 which formalise the step-by-step activities necessary to plan andexecute various military operations. Businessprocesses embody culture, custom, organi-sation structure, doctrine etc and takecognisance of the support tools andinfrastructure that the organisation relies on.Very importantly, business processes embodyand reflect organisational knowledge. Therapidity of action, efficiency of execution andeffectiveness of Defence and militaryoperational outcomes is dependent on theknowledge contained in the business processesemployed and in their executors, with

knowledge encompassing training, experience,professional mastery, these in turn based onrelevant, past military experience and lessons.

It follows that disrupting and unhinging anadversary’s military and Defence processes is avery high-value activity and, as now shown,the key objective of IO.

Figure 6 shows a representation(“architecture”) of the formulation process ofmilitary operations (the output at the top)through a sequence of high-level businessprocesses, shown in a series of layers, eachlayer showing a number of related, constituentmilitary business processes. (Similar layereddiagrams for the management and conduct ofDefence or the management and conduct ofdiplomacy can likewise be formulated).Underpinning this whole process is the “u-“shaped layer representing the armed forcesresources and the related information- andknowledge-sources available to them, theDefence Information Infrastructure (DII), theNational II (NII) and the Global II (Allies etc.).The first layer proper contains the ISTAR

Figure 6. Disruption of Adversary’s Military Business Processes and Military Operations due to SelectiveApplication of IO and their Elements


(Intelligence, Surveillance Target Aquisitionand Reconnaissance) and relevant System-of-Systems processes and systems, provides thesituation picture within the area of operations.The information and intelligence therefrom,through fusion, reasoning, and evaluationprovides understanding of the situation i.e.“situation assessment” – whence the secondcorresponding layer. Given the resourceconstraints, ROEs (Rules of Engagement),desired end-state and so on, the collective ofbusiness processes labelled “Appreciation andPlanning Processes” is undertaken, to selectCoAs, undertake planning, and issuecommands, orders, directive and tasking. Theseare then executed, in the top layer, as themilitary operations processes in an integrated,coordinated manner through appropriatebattlefield warfighting business processes.Where not explicitly stated, each of the abovemeta-business processes consists of a numbersof separate military business processes,decomposable into “tasks” such as listed inUJTLs. The decomposition of the abovemilitary operations formulation process intothe above four layers should be recognised asanother instance of the universal OODA loopprocess, with the ISTAR layer corresponding to“Observe”; the Situation Awareness layer, the“Orient”; the Appreciation and PlanningProcesses layer, the “Decide”; and the MilitaryBusiness Process Layer, the “Act”.

When selecting and targeting anadversary’s particular business process toimpair or disrupt, the specific business sub-process sequence needs be identified andappropriate IO techniques executed inappropriate sequences and amounts. Some ofthese IO techniques are indicated against thecorresponding process layer. The “starbursts”represent a degree of successful impairment;these propagate across from business layer tolayer and aggregate the effect, so that thequality of the output, the aggregated militaryoperations plan and, possibly, its ability to be

executed, are impaired (indicated by thequalifier “quality of ...”)

The potential of IO targeting criticaladversary military business processes (andlikewise adversary Defence and diplomacybusiness processes) across the conflictcontinuum phases need be accepted as themain objectives of developing and acquiring IOcapabilities and using them operationally.

Military Business Process Impairment: A TrueForm of Knowledge Warfare?

Finally it is important to note that businessprocesses embody the knowledge specific tothe roles, functions and objectives of theorganisations that employ them. Exploiting,impairing, disrupting or unhinging anadversary’s critical military businesses whileprotecting our military business processes fromlike adversary actions, through appropriate IO,is sensibly equivalent to attacking, exploitingimpairing and disrupting applied knowledge-based processes. It follows that IO directed atimpairing Defence and military businessprocesses is a true form of “KnowledgeWarfare”.

In Dibb (99)35 it is suggested that the ADFconcept of “Decision Superiority” is enabled by“Knowledge Operations”(KO) analogousperhaps to the US concept of InformationSuperiority being ensured by IO, discussedearlier. The reasoning underpinning, anddevelopment of, this concept is not mature andthe distinctions between KO and IO blurred.But it is suggested that Decision Superiority –and hence KO – “need to be paralleled bydecision superiority at the national strategiclevel”.36 The concept of Knowledge Warfareproposed here, as conflict between adversariesexploiting, attacking, and defending eachothers’ military, Defence and diplomaticbusiness processes across all phases of theconflict continuum, is consistent with “KOparalleled at the national strategic level”.

Since then, the ADF concepts of DecisionSuperiority and the “Knowledge Edge” have


been clarified.37 Making rapid and high-qualitydecisions is a necessary condition forconducting successful military operations. Theability to make such decisions depends onseveral factors:a. Provision of pertinent, accurate

information, information services andassociated infrastructure;

b. Command and control structures anddoctrine;

c. Appropriate leadership and commandauthority;

d. Level of education, training andprofessional mastery;

e. Decision-making and learning cultures ofthe organisation; and

f. Team cohesion and morale. Militaries which have a comparative

advantage over adversaries across this range offactors have a “Knowledge Edge”. And thisKnowledge Edge directly facilitates and enablesDecision Superiority.

Knowledge Warfare gives a focus for IO –whether called “Offensive” IO or “proactive” IO– to be planned and undertaken in its ownright, targeting critical diplomatic, Defence ormilitary business processes and theirassociated, embedded decision-making, duringpre-conflict or rising tensions, includingprocesses supporting preparation, mobilisationor deployment for conflict. And if conflictnevertheless breaks out, the better-developedforms of IO to support conventional militaryoperations will still need to be available andoperationally used.

The Intelligence Support requirements incharacterising and validating the criticalmilitary, Defence and diplomatic businessprocesses of potential or actual adversariesmay take time and resources, as will analysesto determine their vulnerabilities and thematching of appropriate IO techniques toimpair them. But by their nature, militarybusiness processes change far less frequently,and hence last longer. Although militarybusiness processes may, on the surface, have

generic similarities38 and hence be capable ofsatisfying generic models, quality Intelligenceon the key military business process ofadversary decision-making is necessary, inparticular on those culture-dependent methodsof reasoning, inferring, deducting etc.39

IO/Knowledge Warfare is ripe for furtherdevelopment but is outside the scope of thisarticle.

IO: A Cornerstone of an RMA?So, after describing the present and

potential forms of IO, we return to thequestion: Are IO a cornerstone of an RMA? Toanswer this we apply the generalcharacteristics required of an RMA, listedearlier.

Information Enhanced Warfare resulting in“precision warfare” and its associated variants,NCW and NEW with IO integral to them andprimarily to ensure Information Superiority, donot qualify, in the opinion of the writer, as anRMA or as cornerstones of an RMA. Thesuccessful conduct of war has always relied oninformation to reduce the commander’suncertainty regarding the battlefield situation,the intent of the enemy, or the enemy’sdecision-making. Formalising and centralisingthe collection, assessment and distribution ofinformation, and orders, directives and taskingby networking ISTAR and C&C assets andresponse/”shooter” elements is a naturalevolution and utilisation of technologicalopportunities; these forms of IO moreappropriately satisfy an “Evolution in MilitaryAffairs” (EMA). IEW, NCW, NEW, InformationSuperiority and so on meet the RMA criteria oftechnological change and systemsdevelopment, partly meet operationalinnovation, but have yet to demonstrate anysignificant organisational adaptation let alonethe formation of a specialist “InformationCorps” or equivalent to implement and conductoperations.40

The several, various forms of InfrastructureWarfare and Strategic IW are postulated forms


of new forms of warfare. Discussions - in theprofessional literature - on these concernthemselves with defences against these formsof warfare, rather than how to organise for,resource and conduct them.

However the remaining forms of IO,Command and Control Warfare, InformationCampaigns and “Softwar” do qualify, - againin the opinion of this writer - as candidates fortrue RMAs, once they are better defined,developed and accepted. • Each form and, in particular, the general

“Softwar”, target a (or several) specificmilitary business processes, and areextendable to target the wider Defence,diplomatic and OOTW business processes.

• Softwar, in particular, takes IO out of thelimited choice “conflict box” and extends“proactive IO” across the whole conflictcontinuum, in particular, to the pre-conflictstages; and exposes Softwar’s potential forconflict management and conflictavoidance. It affords a nation a graduatedresponse to developing crises or conflictsand more choices.

• Each of these forms of IO target“processes”, and not objects such asfacilities, computers and networks,communications links, InformationSystems, or even just information (althoughall of the latter may be targeted to achievethe higher objective of impairing theprocess they support).

• Each of these forms of IO minimises,potentially eliminates, physical damage ordestruction, in keeping with popularexpectations.

• Initially beginning with OOTW, effectiveSoftwar will necessarily require a “whole-of-Government” (WOG) effort. Any futureInformation Corps/Regiment/ Battalion orequivalent to conduct IO/Softwar willlikewise be drawn from necessarilyappropriate WOG expertise and resources.

• Being about attacking, exploiting,impairing, disrupting and unhingingadversary, or defending friendly, businessprocesses, which inherently contain thedomain knowledge of the roles, functionsand objectives of the organisations beingtargeted, these forms of IO qualifyas Knowledge Warfare. Successfullyimplementing IO will increase ourcomparative military advantage andincrease our (comparative) KnowledgeEdge. Developing, acquiring capabilities,and organising militaries – or WOGentities - to plan and conduct KnowledgeWarfare in the virtual space where suchprocesses reside, qualifies as a RMA. Figure 7 shows the bi-polar Clauzewitzian

paradigm, that “war is mere continuation ofpolicy by other means”.41 If traditionaldiplomacy, through its repertoire of persuasion,shows of force, threats etc. is not successful inavoiding conflict, then conventional or“kinetic” war, conducted in physical space, to

DOMAIN PATTERN EFFECT OUTCOME

HUMAN MIND;REGIONAL,

INTERNATIONALARENAS

PERSUATION,THREATS, SHOWS of

FORCE etc.

AVOIDANCE ofCONFLICT. POLITICAL

OBJECTIVESACHIEVED

PHYSICAL ATTRITION ANNIHILATION

TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY

CONVENTIONAL/KINETIC WARFARE

CONTROL

DISINTEGRATIONif not, then...

Figure 7. Traditional (“Clausewitzian”) View of War: War is a mere continuation of (a nation’s) policy byother means, leading to Limited Choices for Nations.


achieve national objectives, often leading todisintegration of the adversary’s leadership andpolicies, results. A nation’s choices to pursue itsnational aims are thereby limited.

IEW, NCW, NEW fall into this traditionalpattern. They provide modern, high-technologysupport to conventional, albeit precision, high-lethality kinetic warfare-based militaryoperations.

Figure 8 illustrates the additional choicesoffered to nations with a future operationalSoftwar capability.42 The top layer, as inFigure 7, relates to impending crises beingmanaged by diplomacy and supporting mediaand Information Campaigns. If diplomacy isnot successful and tensions continue to rise,“pre-conflict phase” Softwar/IO isimplemented (Layer 2), targeting adversarymilitary and Defence business processesapplicable to this phase (adversary’smobilisation, transportation, pre-deploymentetc. activities); possibly even - depending on

the adversary’s societal, economic andinfrastructures and own capability –implementing Infrastructure Warfare andStrategic Information Warfare.

Again if this phase of Softwar activitiesare unsuccessful, and conflict is imminent,the “conflict phase” of Softwar IO areimplemented (Layer 3), attacking criticalmilitary and Defence business processes, suchas C4ISTAR processes, and adversaryCommand and Control in particular (i.e.through Control and Control Warfare). Mostlikely, in parallel, conventional militaryoperations (bottom, Layer 4) will be engagedin with Information Enhanced Warfare in itsparticular modern forms (e.g. NCW, NEW ortheir equivalents). The four levels of applyingIO widen the choices open to nations with aSoftwar capability to manage potentialconflict. The level of sophistication, as well aspublic and world audience acceptance, risesfrom the bottom (conventional war with great

SO

PH

IST

ICA

TIO

N O

R C

ON

FL

ICT

MA

NA

GE

ME

NT DOMAIN PATTERN EFFECT OUTCOME

HUMAN MIND;CULTURAL

SPACE

PERSUATION;CHANGE IN

BELIEFS

AVERSIONTO

CONFLICT

DIPLOMACY, SOFT POWER, CULTURAL/MEDIA WARFARE

CONTROL

DISRUPTIONand

CONTROL

DISINTEGRATION

CYBER orVIRTUALSPACE

CYBERSHOCK INACTION;PARALYSIS

PRE-CONFLICT SOFTWAR; INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS; STRATEGIC IW

CYBER orLOGISTICAL

SPACE

C&C andDECISION

MANEOUVRE

PARALYSIS;EXHAUSTION

CONFLICT SOFTWAR; C&C WARFARE; ASYMMETRIC WARFARE;

PHYSICAL ATTRITION ANNIHILATION

CONVENTIONAL/KINETIC WARFARESO

PH

IST

ICA

TIO

N O

R C

ON

FL

ICT

MA

NA

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ME

NT

if not, then...

if not, then...

if not, then...

Adapted and augmented from J.J. Schneider, JFQ, Spring, 1997.

Figure 8. Future IW and Knowledge Warfare Widen Warfare/conflict Resolution Choices, leading to“Gentler Forms of Conflict”.


physical damage, and human casualties etc.)to the top (diplomacy backed bymedia/information campaigns with little orno physical damage and few if any humancasualties). Because Softwar/military businessprocess warfare/ Knowledge Warfare offer thepromise of not only degrading the quality ofconventional military operations, but moreimportantly, offer the potential for managingrising tensions and even avoiding conflict, itdoes qualify, if it realises this potential, as atrue RMA.

IO/Softwar/Knowledge Warfare: The Way AheadAccepting that IO/Softwar/Knowledge

warfare as described above has the potentialto be an RMA, and wishing to avoid thehyperbole of the early proponents of andindependent Air Arm and StrategicBombing, and the consequent mistakes (andarguably, national mis-investments instrategic bombing capabilities) what is asensible “way ahead”?

First, comprehensive and objectiveanalyses are needed, including:• The feasibility of, and methodologies for,

characterising key adversary military andDefence business processes.

• Assessment of vulnerability methods formilitary/Defence/diplomatic businessprocesses.

• Formulation of an integrated IO/KWCONOPS, based on a WOG approach.

• Development of realistic, do-able andusable IO/KW planning process andsupport tools.

• Formulation of sound analytically-basedand measurable metrics for each targetedbusiness process.

• Evaluation of concepts using appropriatewargaming.

• Investigation, and as necessary,development of roles, responsibilities andfunctions for a Joint/WOG IO/Cyber Force.

• Formulation and joint development ofCoalition IO/KW requirements.

Second, undertake the development andacquisition of an IO/KW capability, including:• Undertake a census of ADF IO/KW assets• Undertake costings and cost-benefit

analysis of a phased IO/KW capability;undertake comparative tradeoff benefit/capability foregone for conventionalcapabilities.

• Develop a phased acquisition plan basedon: IO/KW performance, phasing andschedule.

• Structure and test IO/KW underappropriate test and exercise conditions.

• Formulate strategies for and demonstratecredible IO/KW capabilities for deterrenceto potential adversary audiences/decision-makers.

NOTES1. “Humanitarian war” is fought not for national

interests but for moral, humanitarian values;in the case of Kosho, to protect the humanrights of the Kosovars.

2. “The First Information War”, ed Alan D.Campen, AFCEA Int Press, Fairfax, VA, 1992,pp. ix.

3. C4ISTAREW: Command & Control, Comm-unications, Computers, Intelligence, Sur-veillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissanceand Electronic Warfare.

4. The objectives of NCW are “ … to increase thetempo of operations, the speed of command andcontrol and as a result, achieve greater lethalityand survivability …”. (“Information Superiorityand Network Centric Warfare”, D.S. Alberts,OASD(C3I), US DoD, June 1999, slide 8).

5. The issue is further bedevilled by the greyareas of legal responsibility for theprotection of what are sensibly private, orprivately managed, infrastructures; the greyarea of domestic law; non-existentinternational law in this area; and thechanging nature of, and demands on,military aid to the civil power.

6. This in particular has been propounded by thefuturist Alvin Toffler in his books, The ThirdWave, Collins, 1980, Power Shift, Bantam,1990. and (with wife, Heidi), War and Anti-war, Little, Brown & Co, 1993.

7. For example, “Information-Age Warfare: AWorking Bibliography”, Military Review, T.L.Sanz, March-April, 1998 and Sept-Oct 1998,


available on http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/MarApr98/sanz.htm

8. For example, “Cavalry to Computer- ThePattern of Military Revolutions”, A.F.Krepinevich, The National Interest, 37, Fall1994, pp. 30-42

9. ibid, lists, for example, ten RMAs, from the“Infantry Revolution” of the 14th century withthe “cheaper” (i.e. more cost-effective)infantry, archers and pikemen, triumphingover the “expensive” armoured knight; to therecent “Nuclear Revolution”, a military shift soradical that the only “rational” utility ofnuclear weapons was not as a new method toconduct war but to deter war!

10. Some figures provide useful comparisons. Overthe 4-year period of WWI, Germany droppedsome 280 tons of bombs over England, byZeppelins and bombers. Some 1400 civilianswere killed, 3400 wounded; material damagewas some £3M. By comparison, historianRobert Hingham notes, the material damage inEngland due to rats was estimated at £70M perannum! (JL Stokebury, A Short History of AirPower, William Morrow & Co, New York,1986, pp. 78).

11. Phrase used by England’s then-PrimeMinister, Stanley Baldwin, in the House ofCommons, 10 November, 1932. “... the man inthe street (must) realise that there is no poweron earth that can prevent him from beingbombed. Whatever people may tell him, thebomber will always get through.” There wereunintended PSYOPS consequences to thisphrase which “... propagated the psychologyof fear very widely among his countrymen(and) contributed to the British public’s initialacclamation of the policy of ‘appeasement’ ofthe dictators” (A Time for Courage: The RAFin the European War 1939-45, Terraine, J.,MacMillan, NY, 1985, pp. 13).

12. Germany’s aircraft production reached itspeak around September 1944, despite it beingthe RAF’s and USAAF’s highest prioritybetween May 1943 and July 1944 (DMacIsaacs ed., The United States StrategicBombing Survey, Garland Publishing Inc,1976, Vol 1, pp. 16-18). The latter, a 10-volume work, with Vols 1-6 describing thebombing of Germany by the USAAF andRAF, and Vols 7-10, the bombing of Japan bythe USAAF, lists by table, statistics, analysis,narrative and minutiae, the destruction ofstrategic, war-making and urbaninfrastructures, the costs to the Allied AirForces in men, aircraft, and materiel, the

exchange ratios etc. Despite this unrelentingand almost total destruction, Germanysurrendered a week after the collapse of itspolitical and military leadership, being prettywell totally overun and its territory occupiedby Allied land forces; Japan likewisesurrendered about a week after the droppingof atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasakiand the Soviet Union declaring war againsther.

13. Night fighters, radar and GCI, integrated in the“Kammhuber Line”.

14. And seemingly forgotten again during theNATO bombing campaign against Serbia inMarch-May 1999.

15. This multiplicity of definitions is bedevillingthe understanding, occasionally theacceptance, of IO.

16. We restrict ourselves at this point to theDefence domain.

17. “Provisional Guidance on IO in Defence”, (R),VCDF, Dept of Defence, Canberra, April 1999.The current US DoD definition is similar butexcludes “enhance”. US single-Service and theUK’s definitions are longer and more detailed,as are those of other countries.

18. “Impair” covers the following: degrade, delay,disrupt, deny or destroy, singly or incombination.

19. “The Knowledge Edge and InformationOperations: A Plain English Version”,C4ISREW Staff, Defence HQ, Canberra,February, 2000.

20. ibid, pp. 1.21. Joint Publication 3-13,US DoD, Washington,

DC, 1999.22. IO components elements shown in Figure 1

differ in some detail, mainly through theinclusion of Navigational Warfare, from thoseshown in Figure 1 in, “What Are InformationOperations? Why Should I take Any Notice”,Brian Alsop, Australian Defence ForceJournal, 140, Jan-Feb 2000, pp. 31-35.

23. Exemplified by the numerous, almostmandatory, quotes from Sun Tzu, strategicconsultant and mentor to numerous Chineseemperors, c. 500 BC.

24. See Note 4, “Information Superiority andNetwork Centric Warfare”, slide 30.

25. ibid, slides 55, 60, 68.26. ibid, slide 5.27. “The Road to Peace: Aspects of Information

Operations Applied to Peace monitoringOperations on Operation BEL ISI, Bougainville1997-98”, Clark, P.M. (MAJ), Combat Arms,2/98, CATDC, Puckapunyal, pp. 61-71.


28. “Strategic Information Warfare: A New Faceof War”, R.C. Molander et al, MR-661-OSD,National Defence Research Institute,Washington, DC, 1996 (a Rand InstituteStudy).

29. More correctly, the total (physical) damage,DT, inflicted on the adversary is ∫tiC iDi dt,where in the time interval dt, damageinflicted is Di with a replacement cost Ci; thecorresponding Total Cost, CT, of inflicting thisdamage is ∫tiK iRi dt, where in the time intervaldt, the resources used are Ri withcorresponding costs Kl, which takes intoaccount capital costs, training costs,maintenance costs to date and, if applicable,opportunity costs. By evaluating these foreach adversary, exchange ratios and othermeasures of (economic) effectiveness of theconflict can be derived. The difficult issue ofcosting public goods such as of nationaldefence and national security and ofsovereignty – at risk, reduced or lost if thewar is lost – let alone of the dead, maimed,injured etc. is clearly not one for accountantsor economists or of just dollars, only.

30. NGO: Non-Government Organisation such asRed Cross, World Vision, Amnesty etc.

31. The Art of War, Sun Tzy, translated andedited by Griffith, S.G., Oxford UP, New York,1963, p. 77.

32. The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop isthe fundamental human decision-makingparadigm and governs our everyday decision-making and actions. It has many variants.“Orient’ corresponds roughly to “situationassessment”.

33. See Note 4.34. Universal Joint Task List, V 3.0, 3500.04A,

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington,DC, Sept 1996; “Army Tactical Task List”,(draft), Training Command, November 1998,

35. “The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge”, DibbP., Australian Defence Force Journal, 134,Jan/Feb, 1999, pp. 37-48.

36. ibid, pp 43.37. op cit., “The Knowledge Edge and Information

Operations”.38. Militaries being militaries the world over!39. Recognised as “cognitive mapping” and

“providing the ultimate knowledge edge”, inDibb (99), op cit., pp. 46.

40. Examples include: “Do we need anInformation Corps?”, Libicki, M., Hazlett, J.A.,Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, pp. 88-97; “Information Corps”, Berenson, P.J., HQTRADOC, Ft Monroe, VA, April, 1997.

41. On War, edited and translated by A.Rabinowitz, Penguin Books, NY, 1968, pp. 69.

42. Adapted and augmented from, J.J. Schneider,“Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity and thePromise of Information Warfare”, Joint ForcesQuarterly, Spring, 1997, pp. 21-28.

Vic Sobolewski, Principal Research Scientist, is Head, Information Warfare Studies Group (HIWS), IT Division, DSTO.His career in DSTO of over 25 years spans a number of defence R&D areas: radar, including radar targetcharacteristics; radar guided missile modelling and simulation; Electronic Warfare including the early performance andsystem-level studies of the joint RAN/USN Nulka anti-ship missile decoy, and communications EW; more recently thenature and definition of ADF C3I systems; and currently Information Warfare and Information Operations. He hasbeen posted overseas, including to Marconi Defence Systems and British AeroSpace on the Rapier/DN181 Air DefenceSystem in the early 70s and as Defence Science Attache/CONDS-A at the Australian Embassy in Washington, DC in1988-90. He graduated from Adelaide University, South Australia, in 1965 with a BE (Elec Eng) (Hons) and wasawarded his PhD (Elec Eng) in 1972. He can be contacted at: [email protected]

47

Performance Improvement: the next imperative

The ADF is increasingly pressured to “domore with less" whilst adapting itself to the

complex post-Cold War world. Up to now, thefocus of change has been on efficiency andstructural change. This has put great pressureon units and individuals. Many membersprobably feel that they are working harderthan ever before and that they have reachedtheir limits to improve; and they are almostcertainly correct on the first point, if not thesecond. This, however, cuts no dice in thenever-ending quest for organisationalimprovement. (And nor should it: the Serviceshave as much obligation to deliver increasingvalue to the nation as any other publicagency.) The next logical step for Defencetherefore is to find different, innovative and“smarter" ways to manage individualperformance, by re-structuring careers and bybetter management of the “softer" aspects oforganisational behaviour.

This is the first of two articles dealing withways of meeting this challenge. This articleanalyses how job performance is affected bythe Services’ approach to job rotation. Asecond article will deal with performancemanagement, in terms of how to develop and

sustain organisational situations that areconducive to high performance (“highperformance cultures").1 Both articles will showthat individual productivity can besignificantly improved by “smarter" ways ofmanaging human resources.2

Job Rotation: benefits, certainly . . .Job rotation is a practice so ingrained in

the military institution that its benefits aretaken for granted and any possible adverseeffects are rarely considered. One tellingindication of this is the paucity of seriousstudies, or critical comment, of how the jobrotation affects professional effectiveness.Implicitly or explicitly, policy makers andscholars alike have accepted that developingmilitary executives alongside combat leadersrequires both a sophisticated military educationsystem and job rotation to enhance an officer’sadaptability.3 And virtually all of the literaturethat exists is concerned with officers: perhapsit is assumed that the traditionally more stableOther Rank (OR) career pattern provides therocks around which the fast-current officerstreams flow.

In regard to Australian officers, the currentrate of job rotation is high, and has scarcelychanged in the last two decades. In the surveys

Job Rotation and Military Capability:Benefits, certainly – but is anyone counting

the cost?By Nick Jans and Judy Frazer-Jans, Management Consultants

Job rotation is a practice so ingrained in the military institution that its benefits are taken forgranted and adverse effects are rarely questioned. There are, however, a number of reasons toquestion the benefits of this long-practised policy, at least in its current form. This article showsthat job rotation carries a cost in terms of “foregone” job performance at middle and junior careerlevels. High rates of job rotation may be justifiable for some appointments, such as for unit or sub-unit commanders, but it is less viable for staff officers and for OR. This may negate at least some ofthe advantage gained from developing members by exposure to a variety of appointments andperspectives. A more thoughtful approach to using job rotation is needed.


which provided the data for the study reportedbelow, it was shown that officers routinelymove about every two years, often with littlecontinuity in their assignments except for theirprimary military speciality. Middle levelofficers in our first survey (major to coloneland equivalents) had occupied an average ofsix different appointments in the previousdecade, not including long training coursessuch as staff college. And, contrary to whatscholars might have assumed about OR, theirjob rotation rate is also high. More than 80 percent of the Senior OR in our second survey hadhad at least three different appointments in theprevious six years, with 25 per cent having hadmore than four appointments in that time.Over half of the Senior OR had been in theircurrent appointment for less than a year andonly 18 per cent were in the third year of anappointment.

Some disadvantages of high job rotationhave always been acknowledged, especially interms of family disruption. But the unspokenassumption is that these are outweighed bytheir career development benefits. The first ofthese relates to the military’s need to groom itssenior officers for their undeniably complexroles. The complexity of a modern militaryinstitution is indicated by its hundreds ofemployment streams and jobs. In a modernbusiness, a very large company might haveseveral dozen different jobs, clustered around acomparatively few core employments; butmost business would comprise fewer than ten.This complexity of function is furthercomplicated by the scope of the roles that aninstitution like the ADF must be capable ofperforming, and the uncertainty of what,when, how, where and with whom it will doso. Nor are peacetime, peacekeeping and wardistinct and separable conditions, so all forcesmust be able to operate within a “conflictspectrum". The executive teams that lead suchan institution plainly need better-than-averageawareness levels of the component functionsand how they interconnect. Because there is

virtually no lateral recruitment into the mostsenior levels, the argument goes, most officersmust begin to gain generalist skills in theircareers from an early stage, in order toestablish the pool from which the futurecommanders and policy leaders are drawn.

The second benefit of job rotation is alsorelated to career development. Throughouttheir existence, the Australian Services havebeen characterised by “hollowness".4

Hollowness, especially for the Army, pertainsto the maintenance of an ostensibleorganisational structure that is actually not areflection of its true size. Such organisationsmust be capable of expanding rapidly to meetoperational liabilities; and this requires theirofficers to be competent in skills that are notnecessarily performed in their normal duties(which are in themselves often quite broad).One way of giving them an expanded skillportfolio is to rotate them across a range ofdifferent jobs in which they will, at the least,develop an awareness of what they might haveto do if such expansion is necessary. This hasled to a highly structured career system basedon well-ingrained policies and expectationsthat are difficult for a military culture toamend or discard.5 Thus the situation of theaverage experienced Service officer issomewhat analogous to that of a child playingwith Lego: he/she is issued with the basic kit ofblocks to play with, and must be also familiarwith the “advanced kits” if needs be – but mustgenerally use only Lego sets, without recourseto other play material like “mecchano” sets orplasticine.

Job rotation is also said to contribute tocareer satisfaction. The Services implicitlyrecognise the need to share the “good" and“bad" assignments, and there is a desire to givemembers and their families the variety ofexperience that has been a traditional benefitof Service life.

And, finally, the need to fill vacancies is inany case fundamental to an institution whichattempts to maintain an “optimum" flow-

JOB ROTATION AND MILITARY CAPABILITY: BENEFITS, CERTAINLY – BUT IS ANYONE COUNTING THE COST? 49

through of personnel and where prescribedretirement ages are comparatively low.6

. . . but at what cost?There are, however, a number of reasons to

question the continuation of this long-practised policy, at least in its current form.The downside is that high rates of job rotationcontribute to the stress on Service families,lead to expensive Service removals budgets,hamper the institution’s capacity fororganisational change, and limit thecontribution a member can make in each jobin terms of day-to-day job performance.

The effect of job rotation on families,especially on partners’ employment/careerprospects and children’s educational andpersonal development, has been a major issuein Service lifestyles for a generation or more.The emergence of “dual career families" as amiddle-class norm has made paid employmentfor the partner economically andpsychologically central to an increasingnumber of Service families. In the surveywhich provided the data for the study reportedbelow, 43 per cent of the partners of middle-level Australian Service officers were in full-time paid employment in 1999 (compared to31 per cent in 1989 and 1984). Half of thepartners had post-secondary qualifications,almost double the level of 1984; and theircareer orientation is commensurately higher.7

However, the rate of geographic mobility ofService families had scarcely changed over thelast 15 years, with about 60 per cent havingbeing required to move at least twice in theprevious five years. The number of officers’partners indicating that they have a very goodto good chance of getting an equivalent job ifthey were to relocate has fallen by about athird in the last 15 years (from 65 per cent to41 per cent). Similar issues apply to the qualityof the education received by children inService families.

The second reason to challenge thecontinued high rate of job rotation is cost,

primarily the cost of geographic relocation. Arecent study in the Australian Defence Forcefound that, in an active duty force of 52,000,40 per cent relocate annually, at an averagecost of about $8,000 per relocation. When thecosts of providing government housing areincluded, the average cost per removal morethan doubles.8 It was inevitable that eventuallysuch costs would be called to account,especially in times when (in Australia, at anyrate) government budgets are under increasingpressure.

The third disadvantage of job rotation is itseffect on the institution’s capacity fororganisational change. Job rotation isintended to make middle level and seniorofficers more sensitive to the big picture andmore adaptable but, paradoxically, it can alsoimpede this. Arguably, the continual movefrom appointment to appointment breedsconformity and a reliance on standardoperating procedures.9 Knowing that they haveonly a limited time to spend in anappointment, many officers are likely to followthe precedents that guided the previousincumbent and will be reluctant to initiate anysignificant program that would take more thanabout a year to see through. And with limitedtenure in any one posting and thus a limitednumber of opportunities to make their mark,officers must make their impact quickly.10 Insuch career situations, it is hardly surprisingthat many give priority to the immediate andobvious issues, where outcomes can be readilymeasured and noticed by superior evaluatingofficers. After many years of following thisimplicit personal career strategy, many willfind it difficult to move from the “tactical"mode of professional behaviour (involvingoperational activities and structural change) tothe “strategic or building/improving" mode(involving strategic and cultural change)needed for more senior levels.11

A recent article in the US periodicalDefense News highlighted this issue.12 “Thisbusiness [of] rotating officers every two or


three years… is not healthy fortransformation", according to the retiring headof Joint Forces Command. Most of theauthorities quoted in the article maintain thateven three years is too short, for an officer toget on top of the learning curve for the role,develop a strategy and a program, to overcomethe lethargy and bureaucracy of the sytem andto signal to the bureaucracy that suchproposals and transformations cannot be“waited out". In fact, the article argues that, inorder to drive through major changes inmilitary organisations, senior officers must beplaced in key positions for as long as a decadeor more. The examples of the pioneers of navalaeronautics and nuclear-powered ships arecited in support of this argument.

The final reason to challenge the continuedhigh rate of job rotation is its effect on jobperformance. The 1985 Careers in Conflictstudy – one of the very few that haveaddressed the performance effects of jobrotation in the military – suggested that sucheffects are not trivial, especially for certainprofessional roles.13 The Careers in Conflictstudy indicated that, whatever theirprofessional role, officers became increasinglyeffective as they progressed through anappointment term, with much of the first partof any posting being a “learning" phase. Thisparticularly applied to Defence HQ staffappointments. In such appointments,performance levels were consistently belowthat of their counterparts in operational units.The study suggested, in fact, that manyDefence HQ staff officers really gained little interms of useful experience and contributedwell below their potential.

Most of these issues have been raised asserious policy questions over the past twodecades, but the effect on Service practices hasbeen minimal. In the late 1970s and 1980s,two major Service studies did question thepractice (particularly the Army’s RegularOfficer Development Committee in the mid

1970s and the Navy’s Regular Officer CareersStudy in the late 1980s) and evenrecommended some slowing of the rate of jobrotation in mid career. In 1989, all threeServices were directed to make greater use ofthree-year appointments and back-to-backpostings, so that officers could use their skillsmore consistently and families have morestability. As the statistics above show, this hasnot worked out. It never really could, becauseit had to be grafted onto career systems that,among other things, required officers at middleand senior levels to get certain “experienceprofiles" to be competitive for promotion; this,in essence, required maintenance of theexisting rate of job rotation.

The relationship between organisationaleffectiveness and job tenure is underlined bycontrast with practice in other kinds oforganisations. Business executives change jobsfar less frequently than do military officers.The average for Australian senior executives,for example, is around five to six years in eachsignificant job.14 The rate of job rotation in thecorporate world is, if anything, slowing,because managers are perceiving that jobrotation and organisational change do not sitwell together.15 For example, the UScorporation GE, long regarded as an exemplarof corporate change management, had“learned that rotating executives quicklythrough new jobs, long a proud practice at thecompany, created problems in new-productintroductions, which go more smoothly whenmanagers have long tenure".16 A systematicstudy of “best practice" career developmentconcluded that “a major assignment takes threeyears to master because on-line learningfollows several distinct stages": fixing theimmediate problems; then, as experienceheightens awareness of the “real issues",addressing those which are more subtle; andwith the final stage of consolidation.17

Items Scale

I do my current job well 1=Strongly disagree;I am one of the better performers in my current work group/directorate 5=Strongly agreeOverall, my work team produces high-quality services and outputsI can deal with just about any problem that arises in my current jobThe work I do in my current job is consistent with my overallprofessional background

How would you rate your performance in your current job? 1=Barely adequate,5=Outstanding

How well has your professional training and experience prepared 1=Very poorly,you for your current job? 5=Very well

* Coefficient alphas: 0.75 for middle-level officers, 0.71 for junior officers, 0.69 for Junior OR,0.74 for Senior OR.


The Study

Research QuestionsThis article addresses the fourth of the

issues discussed above: whether and how jobperformance is affected by high rates of jobrotation.

This article reports on the following twoquestions: 1. Do members who have spent relatively

lengthy periods in a job out-perform thosewith less job tenure; and, if they do, is themargin enough to bother about?

2. Is a high rate of past job rotation a help, ahindrance, or neutral in enhancing jobperformance in subsequent appointments.

Sample and Method

The data were gathered by twoquestionnaire surveys: of 280 middle-levelofficers from all three Services (major(E) tocolonel(E))18 and of nearly 1300 Other Ranksand junior officers (defined here as beinglieutenant/captain/major(E)) from all Services.19

The middle-level officers was divided into two“job type" sub-samples: those in Units andthose on the Staff, of about equal size.

The key measure was a seven item JobPerformance scale, in which members assessedtheir own effectiveness and performance, using5-point response scales, of the “Strongly agree-Strongly disagree" type. Examples of the itemsinclude “I do my current job well", “I am oneof the better performers in my current workgroup/directorate" and “Overall, my work teamproduces high-quality services and outputs".Scores on each item were summed andaveraged to give a Job Performance score.Table 1 shows the details of the scale.

Most members rated themselves on thehigh end of most items, so the job performanceratings tended to be high. In the middle-levelofficer sample, 57 per cent scored at or above amean of 4.00, with only 4 per cent scoringbelow 3. In the larger sample, the equivalentstatistics for junior OR, senior OR, and officerswere 32 and 8, 41 and 4, 21 and 5 and 47 and5. In the middle-level officer sample, those inUnits had markedly higher scores than thoseon the Staff: 69 per cent of the Unit sub-sample scored at or above a mean of 4.00,compared with 53 per cent of Staff officers.

Table 1. Performance Measure


Job performance has been statisticallyexpressed in two ways. The primarycomparisons – and the more powerfulstatistically – use the mean scores of themembers in each category for each of the threejob tenure zones (i.e. those in the first, secondand third years of an appointment). Inaddition, a “Job Performance Grade” score wasdeveloped by allocating subjects to a top,middle and bottom third “grade” for eachcategory, on the basis of the average JobPerformance scores for the relevant category.For example, Unit and Staff officers had to

score at or above 4.33 and 4.00 respectively onthe Job Performance scale to be allocated tothe “above average” grade. (Because of thesmall samples, we could not always find cut-off points on the scale for the respectivecategories that precisely allowed “one third-one third-one third” distributions. Thepercentages of those in each upper third/aboveaverage category are shown in Table 2.)Validity checks for both measures suggest thatthey effectively discriminate between levels ofperformance.20

Table 2: Job Performance by time in job

Time in job (months)Job Performance mean & SD for category/

Rank Statistical significance/category 0-12 13-24 >24 N/

% “above average” in category

Mean Job Performance score 3.60 3.78 3.90N 309 78 81 3.69, .53/

Junior % 66 17 17 F=12.24, p<.00/OR % “above average” for each 25 41 49 468/

time-in-job level 32/


Senior % 57 24 18 F=7.27, p<.00/OR % “above average” for each 23 42 47 310/



Junior % 68 24 8 F=3.37, p<.04/officer % “above average” for each 34 41 49 464/


Mean Job Peformance score 4.06 4.12 4.22Mid N 58 34 17 4.10, .51/level % 53 31 16 Not significant/officer % “above average” for each 28 35 59 109/(Unit) time-in-job level 35/

Mean Job Peformance score 3.73 3.92 4.04Mid N 83 61 27 3.85, .53/level % 49 36 16 F=4.53, p<.02/officer % “above average” for each 30 34 59 171/(Staff) time-in-job level 36/


Findings

Performance and appointment tenureAs would be expected, the longer a person

spends in a given job, the better his/herperformance in comparison with others in thesame career category.

Table 2 has the details. Looking at thefindings for junior OR in Table 2, for example,we find that those in their first year of tenurehave an average Job Performance score of3.60, compared with 3.90 for those in theirthird year. (The differences are highlystatistically significant.) The likelihood offinding above-average performers risessubstantially as one moves from the second tothe third year of appointment tenure. For thejunior OR category, 25 per cent of those intheir first year of an appointment were in thetop-third of performers for their job type,compared with 41 per cent in their second yearand 49 per cent in their third year of the job. Inother words, junior ORs in a third year oftenure are almost twice as likely to beperforming at the above average level as their

counterparts in the first year of anappointment.

The only category of the five where jobperformance does not improve with tenure isUnit officers: the statistics for this categorylook different but are not statisticallysignificant (possible reasons for this non-effectare discussed below). For the other categories –middle-level officer Staff group and for OR andjunior officers – the differences are statisticallysignificant. Those in their second year scoreslightly higher than those in their first, withthose in their third having appreciably higherperformance levels. In the third year, it seemsthat the foundation of hands-on experienceenables most members – through more skilledperformance, more sophisticated perceptions ofthe area’s real issues, or both – to breakthrough to a much higher performance level.At least in their own eyes, they feel morecompetent at and comfortable with what theydo in their third year.

Figure 1 shows the comparisons of eachcategory in the top Job Performance Grade

Figure 1: Performance by time in job

Note: Differences are significant.


(i.e. performing at an “above average” level),for each year in the job. Except in the case ofUnit officers, the chance of being “aboveaverage” increases appreciably as a membermoves from the first to the second to the thirdyear of tenure.

Few members reach the third year of anappointment, however. Only 16 per cent ofmiddle level officers were in a third year.Similar levels apply to the other fourprofessional categories.21

In the middle-level “Unit officer”category, the performance differences atdifferent levels of job tenure are notstatistically significant. It is possible that this“non-effect” may be due to the small samplesize, suggesting that, with a larger sample,significant relationships would be observed.It does make some sense, however, to expectthat the differences in performance acrosstime in job will be less marked for Unitofficers (in contrast to those on the Staff).

Table 3: Job Performance by career stability

Career stabilityJob Performance mean & SD for category/

Rank Statistical significance/category High Med. Low N/

% “above average” in category


Junior % 46 34 21 3.54, p<.03/OR % “above average” for each 27 39 33 468/

career stability level 32/


Senior % 19 55 26 F=4.38, p<.01/OR % “above average” for each 40 28 30 310/



Junior % 23 49 29 Not significant/officer % “above average” for each 29 40 39 464/


Mean Job Peformance score 4.18 4.13 3.97Mid N 34 44 31 4.10, .51/level % 32 40 28 Not significant/officer % “above average” for each 38 38 26 109/(Unit) career stability level 35/

Mean Job Peformance score 3.94 3.83 3.77Mid N 49 71 51 3.85, .53/level % 28 42 30 F=4.53, p<.02/officer % “above average” for each 46 35 28 171/(Staff) career stability level 36/

• Career stability levels for Junior and Senior enlisted, and Junior officers are based on the numberof appointments occupied in the last 6 years: High=1 or 2; Medium=3 or 4; Low=>4. Mid levelofficers are similar, but the period was the last 10 years: High<5; Medium=5 or 6; Low=>6.


The former are returning to professionalspecialisations that were probably acontinuation of those they held at an earlystage in their professional careers; and mostwill be commanding either their unit or oneof its subunits so they will usually have beenchosen because of their past proficiency inmore junior roles (i.e. we would expect thatthey will already be “above average”performers) and, equally importantly, havingcolleagues at all levels who are equallyskilled.

Performance and career stability To investigate the relationship between an

officer’s performance and past rate of jobrotation, we compared the performance ofmembers across three levels of career stability:“High”, “Medium” and “Low”. For Junior andSenior OR, and Junior officers, these categoriesare based on number of appointmentsoccupied in last 6 years: “High” career stabilitymeant having occupied 1 or 2 appointments,“Medium” was 3 or 4 and “Low” was greater

than 4. Mid level officers were treated in asimilar fashion, but the career period was thelast 10 years: “High” stability was fewer than 5appointments in this period, “Medium” was 5or 6, and “Low” was greater than 6.

Table 3 and Figure 2 show the results ofthis analysis. For Senior OR and mid level Staffofficers, those with the highest employmentstability out-perform those who had had manydifferent jobs in the previous 6 or 10 years. ForJunior officers and mid level Unit officers,career stability does not affect currentperformance. For Junior OR, there appears tobe an optimal level of career stability: thosewho had had 3 or 4 jobs in the past 6 yearsperform best. (This might reflect a tendency tochoose the better performers from this categoryfor special career development that includesjob rotation assignments.)

Summary of findingsDo members who have spent relatively

lengthy periods in a job out-perform those withless job tenure? The analysis shows that

Figure 2: Performance by career stability

Note: Differences are significant.


performance rises slightly between the first andthe second year of an appointment, but thatthe small minority who stay for a third yearsignificantly out-perform their colleagues. Theonly exception to this is for the middle-levelofficers who command units and sub-units:their performance levels are high throughouttheir appointment tenure.

Is the performance margin enough to botherabout? Given that those few members whoreach a third year are about twice as likely toperform at “above-average” levels than theircolleagues in their first year, the answer is anunequivocal “yes”.

Is a high rate of past job rotation a help, ahindrance, or neutral in enhancing jobperformance at mid and senior career levels?For some career categories, job performanceappears to be enhanced by employmentstability. For others, higher rates of jobrotation may be justified as an investment infuture performance within those fields.

Discussion

ImagineThis study suggests an important

opportunity for the ADF in its managementof organisational effectiveness. Aconsiderable investment in human capital issimply not being exploited in terms of thesuperior individual and organisationalperformance that the ADF needs right now.ADF members are unusually well-skilled bycommunity standards.22 More sensible jobrotation policies – perhaps with moreemphasis on the quality rather than thequantity of successive assignments – woulduse these talents better, for the benefit ofboth individuals and organisation. Withappropriate changes, a situation could becreated where “above average” performancebecame “normal”.

OK for some streams, less so for others?High job rotation may be justifiable for

sub-unit and unit commanders, in that theperformance-degradation cost is low comparedwith the benefit of developing mastery in themilitary’s core business. It is not surprising thatthe differences in middle-level Unit officers’performance across time in job are not somarked. But few of the “performance-conducive” conditions that apply in unitsapply to other roles. Since this is unlikely to beactually an indication of members’ trueabilities, it follows that the “performance edge”in Units is due to career and organisationalcircumstances.

This performance edge is very muchrelated to the pervasive “bias” in careermanagement towards much more care forpostings for the primary militaryspecialisation than for other employmentfields. Career managers would never think ofappointing a non-Seaman to captain a ship,a non-infantryman to lead an infantrybattalion or a non-pilot to command afighter squadron; yet they seem quitecomfortable with the notion of appointingofficers without formal qualifications andexperience to senior roles in the various non-operational programs – and then movingthem to another staff area two years later.

The remarkable thing is how well mostStaff officers cope; but “cope” may be aboutits extent in the majority of cases. Few wouldclaim to be a master of his/her craft. Most areplaced in a situation almost the opposite tothat associated with Unit appointments.Many lack experience in their Staff field – asituation exacerbated if (as often happens)their boss and their colleagues are similarlyinexperienced. The career officer, as he/shemoves through a succession of increasinglysenior staff appointments, is like a sportsmanwhose primary sport is rugby, but who isthen required to captain a soccer team,followed by coaching in hockey, finallytaking over executive management of the


AFL. (When we used this analogy in anaddress at JSSC once, some wag in theaudience remarked that the final “sportingdestination” is “water polo at Russell Offices– and none of us can swim!”)

The findings are less equivocal for OtherRanks. Those few who continue into a thirdyear out-perform those in the first year by aconsiderable margin and those in the secondyear by a lesser but still significant margin.Less than half of Senior OR in our survey hadbeen in their current job for more than a year,and their performance was substantiallysuperior to those of their colleagues whosetenure was shorter. Senior OR who hadchanged jobs frequently in the previous sixyears are out-performed by those with greatercareer stability. Given the ADF’s reliance onthese personnel as the “bedrock” of uniteffectiveness, such a finding should be causefor concern.

For junior officers, performance also tendedto improve with job tenure. However, their pastrate of job rotation did not affect their jobperformance. This suggests that careerdevelopment by job rotation is a viable policyfor junior officers, as long as they spend atleast two years in each appointment.

Time spans of discretion and tipping pointsThe current practice of frequent officer job

rotation with little continuity of specialisationapart from “primary” employment might beacceptable for a stable organisationalenvironment, but it is hardly conducive toeffectiveness and adaptability in an era ofturbulence. In his classic study of executivebehaviour, Jacques argues that a leader’sdesired tenure is a function of a job’s “timespan of discretion”23: the period it would takefor a wrong decision to be noticed as beingwrong or, alternatively, the delay betweenmaking a decision and getting feedback on itsoutcomes. Junior military leadership roles havea time span of discretion of, at most, a fewweeks, so a junior officer can learn much in a

year and thus may be moved reasonablyfrequently to the mutual benefit of individualand organisation. The time span of discretionat the top of the organisation, in contrast, canoften be measured in years; and hence seniorofficer tenure should be of commensurateduration.

But a slower rate of job rotation need notapply for all members in all employmentstreams. Organisational effectiveness wouldalmost certainly be improved if, say, twice asmany members were able to remain in theirjobs for a third year as do now. Surely such isattainable. In this way, ADF career managerscould take advantage of a social phenomenonknown as “tipping point” theory, which positsthat organisational change tends to developslowly and then come in a rush, after reachinga “tipping point” or critical mass level.24 IfADF career patterns gave members moreopportunities to reach a third year in moreappointments, the improvement in overallperformance would provide a “tipping point”mechanism for both unit and staffemployment. This would have significantflow-on to many aspects of organisationalbehaviour: to improvements in command andstaff effectiveness and teamwork; to careerswhere a consistent and challenging corpus ofwork awaits at all stages; and to a favourableoverall effect on organisational productivity,innovation, corporate management, morale,middle level officer job satisfaction, and thejob satisfaction and commitment of allmembers. (The process by which unitcapability is enhanced by greater leadershipcompetence is the subject of our next article(see footnote 1).

The challengeNone of the above necessarily negates the

policy of using job rotation as a careerdevelopment strategy. Indeed, it is difficult toimagine how middle and senior officers andORs could be developed without it. But theseresults suggest that a more thoughtful


approach is needed. It surely makes little senseto prepare officers and OR for senior ranks bymethods that hinder the contribution that canbe made by the teams of these very samesenior people. Business “best practice” ismoving away from high rates of planned jobrotation. Whilst the ADF has no need to apethe practices of business, it does have aresponsibility to apply the same kind ofthinking to the issue as has plainly been donein the corporate world. In the post-Cold Warera, the professional effectiveness of the ADFis more important than ever. If high jobrotation is degrading performance, it deservesto be taken seriously as a policy question andnot simply taken as an un-addressable “given”of Service life.25

NOTES1. This second paper has been submitted to the

ADFJ. In the meantime it can be found on theweb at www.sigmaconsultancy.com/papers.

2. The analyses on which this article is basedwere derived from ADF surveys in 1999 and2000. In mid 2000, changes to senior officerpolicy on job tenure were announced that arelikely to result in longer times-in-job forService Chiefs. This does not, however, yetapply to middle-level officers who are thesubject of these studies. Hence the issues raisedin this article remain relevant.

3. J. W. Masland, and L.I. Radway, Soldiers andScholars: Military Education and NationalPolicy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1957; R.A. Vitas, “Civilian Graduate Educationand the Professional Officer", Military Review,VOLUME LXXXIX, No 3, May-June 1999.

4. JSCADT report, From Phantom to Force:Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army,Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,2000, Chapter 2.

5. Hollowness is still very much as part of theArmy make-up, as the JSCADT report remindsus with its recommendations.

6. This was the main argument used by seniorofficers to sink the recommendation for“secondary streaming” by the Army’s RegularOfficer Development Committee in 1979 and bythe “Facing Up To the Future” study a decadelater. (See N.A. Jans, and J.M Frazer-Jans,“Facing up to the future: proposals for

career/personnel issues to assist in staffing theADF in the 1990s and beyond”. Report to theChief of the Defence Force.)

7. See also N.A. Jans, “Careers in conflict: Serviceofficers’ careers and families in peacetime”.Defence Fellowship report, 1985; N.A. Jans,“The career of the military wife”, HumanRelations, 1989, 42, 337-351.

8. PTRT DEFEX May 15, 2000.9. N.A. Jans, “Generalism, specialism and career

development of Army officers”, in F. AMedianski, (Ed.) The Military and Australia’sDefence. Melbourne: Longman-Cheshire, 133-152, 1979; N.A. Jans, “Options for ADF HumanResource Management: Part of the Solution orPart of the Problem?” in D. Ball, (Ed.)Maintaining the Strategic Edge: The Defence ofAustralia in 2015, Strategic & Defence StudiesCentre, Australian National University, 2000,381-406; W.F. Jnr, Ulmer, “Military leadershipinto the 21st century: another ‘Bridge TooFar’?” Parameters, Spring 1998, pp. 4-25.

10. Ulmer, op. cit.11. ibid.12. Robert Holzer, “Stability at top is critical to

JFC’s Pentagon clout”, Defense News,September 4, 2000, 1, 36.

13. Jans, 1985, op. cit.14. L. Schmerling, “Making those executive

decisions”, The Age, 15 August 1998, F6-7, 1998.15. See, for example: B. Ettorre, “There’s A

Downside to Those Big Salaries”, ManagementReview, Vol. 86, 1997; and M. Rimmer, J.Macneil, R. Chenhall, K. Langfield-Smith, & L.Watts, Reinventing competitiveness: achievingbest practice in Australia. Pitman, SouthMelbourne, 1996.

16. T.A. Stewart, “Managing: GE keeps those ideascoming”, Fortune, 12 August 1991.

17. M.W. McCall, M.M. Lombardo, & A.M.Morrison. The lessons of experience: howsuccessful executives develop on the job.Lexington Books, Lexington MA, 1988.

18. The survey had a 67 per cent response rate,with equal representation from each Service.Officers were randomly selected for inclusion inthe survey, according to a stratified samplingscheme. Questionnaires were delivered andreturned by mail. See Sigma Consultancy,1999, The Services Officers ProfessionalEffectiveness Study (consultancy project for theHead of the Defence Personnel Executive).

19. The survey was administered in supervisedsessions of a number of unit locations aroundthe country. See Sigma Consultancy, 2000,Posting Turbulence Review Team Project Survey.


20. We developed a number of indication of thevalidity of the Job Performance scale. Firstly, JobPerformance correlates strongly with rank: bycomfortable margins in each case, Senior ORoutscore Junior OR and major(E) outscore morejunior officers (F=17.00, p<.0000). Secondly, JobPerformance Grade correlates strongly withpersonal assessments of marketability. Thisapplies to all rank categories. For the totalsample, for example, among those with a meanscore of 3 (out of 5) for marketability, 29 percent were in the “top-third” Job PerformanceGrade, compared with 46 per cent of those witha mean score of 5 for marketability (Chi-square=68.70, df=8, p<.000). Thirdly, JobPerformance correlates with educational level(but only for junior OR): among those withoutpost-secondary school qualifications, 27 per centwere in the “top-third” Job Performance Grade,compared with 43 per cent of those with post-secondary school technical or tertiaryqualifications (Chi-square=14.66, df=4, p<.005).Finally, for middle-level officers, 45 per cent ofthose who had attended staff college were in the“top-third” Job Performance Grade, comparedwith 29 per cent of those who had not (Chi-square=10.24, df=2, p<.006); and 43 per cent ofthose with advanced degrees were in the “top-third” Job Performance Grade, compared with 33per cent of those with first degrees only (Chi-square=10.00, df=4, p<.04).

21. This may explain why these performancedegradation effects have not been fully

acknowledged by senior policy makers. Becauseonly a small minority move into a third year,those who have had few “third years” would nothave experienced any feeling of “performancebreakthrough”. And this would especially applyto senior policy makers who, in the main, willhave been groomed for senior rank at an earlyage and may have had a higher job rotation ratethan the average officer.

22. Three-quarters of officers in the two surveyshad at least a bachelor’s degree (on top of theirmilitary professional qualifications) with nearlyhalf of middle-level officers having advanceddegrees. One-third of OR in the survey hadpost-secondary qualifications, with 5 per centhaving a bachelor’s degree.

23. E. Jacques, Requisite Organisation. Cason Hall,Arlington, 1989; A. Mant, IntelligentLeadership. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1997.

24. M. Gladwell, The Tipping Point. Little, Brown,1999.

25. A model to follow, for example, is the US ArmyOPMSXXI policy of allocating officers tospecialist streams at mid career and thenemploying them largely in those streams. TheAustralian Army is in the process of adopting asimilar practice in the near future. In fact,Australian military career managers have anadvantage over their American counterparts inthat they are not constrained by law (the USGoldwater-Nichols Act) to equip officers with agiven career “profile" as a prerequisite forsenior employment.

Dr Nick Jans is an academic and management consultant whose work in the past 15 years has been largely concernedwith strategic human resource management and organisational capability. He is a Principal of Sigma Consultancy, anAustralian firm which specialises in strategic and organisational research. Sigma’s clients have included businessesand government agencies in many countries, including the US, Australia and New Zealand.Ms Judy Frazer-Jans is the Managing Principal of Sigma Consultancy. She has been the producer or co-producer of anumber of studies for the Commonwealth SES, the Australian Taxation Office, ASIO and National Australia Bank,together with a decade of similar studies for the ADF.

60

ReviewsBooks

REMEMBERING KOREA – AUSTRALIANSIN THE WAR OF 1950-1953 (INCLUDESTHE NAMES OF ALL THOSE WHOSERVED) by George Odgers, published byLansdowne Publishing, Sydney, 2000.Reviewed by Bruce Turner, Royal New ZealandNaval veteran of the Korean War 1951-1953(Frigate HMNZS Rotoiti, F625)

It is a privilege to be asked to reviewthis fine book, one of a number by adistinguished Australian war historian,George Odgers, a Korean War veteran.

The author brings great expertise andin-depth knowledge of the Korean conflictto this book.

Right from the outbreak of the war inKorea when Australian Army and RAAFunits on occupation duty in Japan joinedthe conflict, Australians played adistinguished and notable part in theKorean War. Eighteen thousand Australiansserved in Korea, Army, Navy and AirForce. The statistics tell their own movingstory, 341 Australians lost their lives.Seven hundred and eighty-five wereawarded decorations.

The writing is descriptive, theillustrations support the text very wellwhile the statistics provided guarantee thebook will always be a worthwhile book ofreference. The names of all thoseAustralians, their Army, Navy and AirForce Units are all given.

Together with the recent dedication ofthe Australian Korean War memorial inCanberra, this book will go some way Ihope to recognise the service of Australianveterans of the “Forgotten War” (Korea). Itis a book I think all Korean War veteransand their families would wish to own.

Highly recommended. An excellent book.

ACQUISITION FOR THE 21ST CENTURYby Michael D. Williams. Published byNational Defense University PressWashington D.C. No price given. Softcover of 190pp with illustrations on frontand back cover.Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant (Retired) H. S.

Brennan, RFD JP

This book, which could be called a textbook, is the story of, and development ofthe F22 fighter aircraft which began backin the 1980s and goes through to thepresent day. One of the principal objects ofthe exercise was to create a jet fighterwhich could exceed the speed of sound inlevel flight without the use of afterburnersand could project a very slim outline whenin flight. In this area it resembles a scaleddown version of the stealth bomber, itcarries two jet engines which makes forthe aforementioned speed and projects avery slim outline when in flight.

Throughout the book, reference is madeto many very senior American servicemenwho were involved in the make up of thisproject. Each chapter or section deals witha certain aspect of the ultimate design ofthe aircraft in complete detail, in myopinion nothing has been left out, therebeing eleven chapters or sectionscontaining information in great detail ofcertain parts of the aircraft together withlots of block diagrams and numerousphotos in each chapter to give the readeras much information as possible. However,no results of a service nature such asultimate speed or armament are given,possibly because the object of the exercisewas to develop a modern fighter whichwould out-perform any other comparative

REVIEWS 61

aircraft of other nations not friendlytoward the United States.

The last section of the book is devotedto four appendices which cover a briefhistory of the advanced technical fighterthrough to source selection, concepts andlessons learned. As I said above, this is atext book on aeroplane manufacture andhas been written to try and explain thenumerous problems which arise and fromexperience how to solve them before theactual aeroplane is built and test flown.One shudders to think just how muchmoney and materials have gone intodeveloping the prototype F22. The bookcontains numerous block diagrams whichto me were complicated to understand butto anyone trained by today’s technicaluniversity as the author and hiscompatriots were, it is all very simple.

THE SHORES OF GALLIPOLI: NAVALASPECTS OF THE ANZAC CAMPAIGN byTom Frame, published by Hale &Iremonger, 2000, 256 pp.Reviewed by Roger Marchant

Tom Frame, Rector of Bungendore andRAN (retired) is a man of parts, well knownto those interested in Australian navalhistory.

This, his fifth book to do with navalaffairs, offers the reader two honourableapproaches to historical subjects –revisionism supported by hard evidence(Anzac landings), and the revelation ofworthy subjects that otherwise wouldremain largely uncelebrated (AE2 ) orunremarked (the RAN Bridging Train).

Of most general interest is a fascinatingreconsideration of possible reasons forCommander Charles Dix’s agonised shoutat Anzac Cove: “Tell the Colonel that thedamn fools have landed us a mile too farnorth!” Dix was Senior Naval Officer incharge of the 12 steam pinnaces that

towed the first parallel lines of boats tothe Gallipoli shore on 25 April 1915.However, he was on number 12, thenorthernmost steamer, whereas the officerin charge of navigation, LieutenantCommander Waterlow, was aboardpinnace number one.

So what went wrong? Did Waterlowlead them all astray and in doing so assurethe soldiers of a confused and disorganisedlanding in the wrong place? Or were thereother reasons?

Frame comprehensively refutes the“unknown current” theory and offersothers in its place, principally that theguideship for the fleet, HMS Triumph hoveto in the wrong position (although perhaps“on station”) and that the 1875 charts inuse by the RN were up to half a mile inerror. Other inviting possibilities arediscussed but are discarded as unlikely.Sufficient detail regarding the non-existence of a current (the author himselftried to find it in 1990) is included, as is afull discussion of map and chart error.

I don’t think the last word has yet beensaid on the debacle (if so it was), but anychallenge to Frame’s thesis will need to bevery well worked out.

Many people know something of theAustralian submarine AE2. Many more willbe enthralled by the story detailed here –what she tried to do, the panic she causedthe enemy by forcing the Dardenelles, herdemise and, not least, the personality ofher captain, Lieutenant Commander HenryStoker.

The RAN Bridging Train, which waspart of the landing at Suvla Bay, had as itsresponsibilities the very quick replacementof destroyed bridges and construction ofnew crossings, a role first identified on theWestern Front as a need for engineeringunits when the fighting became bogged

62 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 146 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2001

down. The Train comprised horse drawnvehicles loaded with pontoons.

Just as the invasion at Suvla itself, thestory of the Bridging Train is long,confused and remarkable. Frame dealswith the contemporary myths surroundingthe exploits of the unit, but includesCharles Bean’s observation to the effectthat the Bridging Train “…cut off fromtheir own force…made a harbour at SuvlaBay”. After many adventures the Train waseventually disbanded under dubiouscircumstances.

Nobody really knows who was first tohit the beach at Anzac. Without doubt,though, the Bridging Train was last toleave. Something to be proud of,particularly as each member hadvolunteered for duty (as reservists the RANBrigade could not be compelled to serveoversesas).

The Shores is a most satisfying book,perhaps best as a good read. There is plentyof “burrowing” but to good effect as Framedemonstrates that Gallipoli belongs notonly to the boys in khaki.

THE MEKONG by Milton Osborne,published by Allen & Unwin, 294 pages,including 24 pages of notes and indexes.Reviewed by Alistair Pope

Although I have an interest in bothhistory and geography and readextensively on both I thought it unusualthat someone would write a book on theMekong River. Why this thought occurredto me is probably for the very reason theauthor himself ascribes to the Western lackof interest in the region: the Mekong wasremote from the English-speaking worldand therefore its exploration by Europeans(particularly the French) was ignored. Incomparison to the Nile (and the oftpublicised search for its source by RichardBurton and other explorers) and the

Amazon, with the romance of simplybeing the greatest r iver of all , theexploration by Europeans was late anddesultory. In fact, it was not until 1994that the actual source in Tibet was finallysettled. This adds to the curiousnessbecause, although the Mekong River ispopulated by civilised peoples for most ofits length, it was not properly exploredand mapped until a French Expeditiontravelled its length in the late 1860s – lessthan 150 years ago and long after moreremote great rivers had been fullyexplored! In fact, the Mekong wouldprobably have remained in the shadows ofEuropean and Australian consciousnesshad it not been for the prominence andstrategic significance of its delta duringthe war in Vietnam. As a result of thatconflict, everyone still knows its name,even if they know little about the riveritself.

The Mekong is a giant on a world scale.It rises in Tibet, is a prominent river insouthern China, the central feature of twocountries, Laos and Cambodia, and isof great economic and geographicsignificance to the southern tip of Vietnam.It is one of the world’s great rivers andsupports a large population along its banksand tributaries. For eons, long before thearrival of the first European explorers, theMekong provided a fertile economic basefor the rise of several civilisations amongthe communities who settled along itslength. These communities used thewaterway for travel and trade and as asource of abundant food. Only the greatfalls at Khone on the border of Cambodiaand Laos prevented the Mekong from alsobeing one of the great inland waterways,navigable from the sea to the formercapital of Laos, Luang Prabang. But it is aseasonal river which also has a significantrise and fall between the wet and the dry

63REVIEWS

seasons, resulting in an ever-changingseries of navigable channels as the fertilesilt is annually washed from the hinterlandto the sea, once more building andextending the delta as the water exitsthrough the river ’s many mouths inVietnam.

Osborne has had a fascination with theriver extending over more than fourdecades, since he first glimpsed its majestyfrom a plane taking him to Cambodia inthe early 1960s. His love of this river hasengrossed him in a study of its historyfrom the earliest times to the present. Butthe key to enjoying this book is inappreciating his description of the earlyFrench explorations of the river through tothe end of the Indo-Chinese wars of 30years ago. He has studied and researchedthis period thoroughly and is able to bringit to the reader. The author is so close tothe people whose exploits he studied thathe brings them alive. So many admirableand brave men, risked everything toexplore this great river and open to thewider world the regions through which itmeanders. Their explorations wereintended to bring trade, development,religion and the “benefits" of Frenchcolonial conquest to those along its banks.It is easy to condemn their attitudes now,but those were different t imes anddifferent views held sway. For the esotericidea of the glory of France and her Empiremen willingly gave their lives on theMekong.

For much of its length the bookrecounts the history of the French colonialexpansion into Indo-China and their use ofthe navigable lower reaches of the Mekongto facilitate access to the principalities theywished to control. The motivation of theFrench was that of their Age, the age ofcolonialism. While the "Great Game" forthe control of the North-West Frontier in

India was being played by agents of Russiaand England (and documented inadventure story form by Kipling and othersof his ilk) the Prime Minister of France,Jules Ferry was moved to declare that“nations without colonies were dead" andthat the failure of France to vigorouslypursue an active policy of colonialismwould see “Germany in Cochinchina,England in Tonkin, in other words thebankruptcy of our rights and hopes" (Page131). Apart from the possible economicbenefits that may accrue from controllingforeign territory, there was the almostsacred duty to bring to the “less civilised"peoples of the world France’s missioncivilsatrice. There is no doubt that theriver and the French aims of thisfascinating period of history areinextricably linked. Osborne describesthem well and makes it an enjoyable read.

More recently the population growthand uncontrolled exploitation of the riverand the forests along its banks have seen amarked and noticeable degree ofdegradation along its length. Afterthousands of years of sustaining greatcivilisations the health of the Mekong as asustainable provider of food and resourcesis now in doubt. So much damage in sucha short period of time is staggering!However, it seems to be the way of theworld at present and a problem that goesfar beyond the Mekong River alone.Proposals for numerous dams, blasting ofnavigation passages through the gorgesand rapids, more bridges, etc. – all seem tobe geared to making the river even moreproductive and useful to mankind. But thismay not prove to be the case. Manyenvironmental and long-term economicquestions concerning the effect of thesechanges are not being asked, far lessanswered. The blasting of the Mekong’srapids in China and Laos could deepen the


channels and cause the faster emptying ofthe upper reaches of the river during thewet season, causing considerable andhighly detrimental flooding in the delta athousand kilometres downstream. Theeffect on the fish population on which somany people are dependent is anotherunanswered question. Dams pose thebiggest threat of all as they may controlnot only the flow of the river, but maycause river levels to drop too low in thedry seasons to sustain downstreamagriculture at its present levels ofproductivity. It seems the lessons of theAral Sea are either unknown to the latestgeneration of bureaucrats or are seen asbeing of little relevance in advancing thecareers of individuals with a personal stakein promoting these developments,irrespective of the cost. Who today knowsthe name of the architect of the Aral Seadisaster?

Along the banks of the Mekongcivilisations have risen and fallen, butthen life has always been uncertain andturbulent in Asia. But, as Osborne says,after thousands of years, for the first timeit is the future of the river itself that isuncertain. Osborne’s book is informativeand enjoyable to read – he brings itscharacters and its nature alive. It is awell-researched book and adds to ourknowledge of a region well worth the timeand effort to understand. I have but onemajor criticism, there is no definitive mapof the complete river. A NationalGeographic style map may have added tothe cost but would have been an immenseboon to the reader and a great reference.The history of the Mekong River is aspecialized subject and some would bebemused by this book as it is noteveryone’s ideal present. But, for a coupleof people in my circle of friends it solvedthe Christmas present problem.

TRUST BUT VERIFY: IMAGERY ANALYSISIN THE COLD WAR by David T. Lindren,Naval Institute Press, USA, 2000, 248pages, 12 photographs, Bibliography andIndex.

Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant David Glerean

This book documents the use ofImagery Analysis during the Cold War andhow that information influenced USpolicy. It focuses on US efforts to assessthe Soviet Union’s strategic economic andmilitary capabilities and how imageryanalysis was used to monitor Sovietbomber and missile development.

Initial efforts to photograph Sovietterritory was with manned aircraft whichprovided limited success though proved tobe highly provocative. This led to thedevelopment of imaging satellites whicheventually were able to accurately appraisethe military forces of the Soviet Union andthe Warsaw Pact.

Mr Lindren argues that the accurateassessments made by imagery analystshelped stabilise relations between the USand the Soviet Union while imagingsystems ’ monitoring capabil i t ies leddirectly to arms control and ultimatelyarms reduction agreements.

This is a great read for anyone with aninterest in the Cold War and imageryanalysis. It goes through how imageryhelped monitor the Cuban missile crisisand how imagery was used to verify SALT1 and SALT 2 in the Soviet Union. It alsodelves into the politics behind decisions tophotograph foreign countries, the politicsof what to do with the information once itwas obtained and the polit ics of theUS reorganisation of their imageryorganisations.

defence force journal · 4 australian defence force journal no. 146 january / february 2001 it is...

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