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Decentralisation: instrument for constitutionaldevelopment in South AfricaFame Cloete aa Chief Director: Constitutional Planning in the Department of Development Planning in theCivil Service ,Published online: 24 Feb 2007.

To cite this article: Fame Cloete (1988) Decentralisation: instrument for constitutional development in South Africa, Politikon:South African Journal of Political Studies, 15:1, 16-30, DOI: 10.1080/02589348808704886

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DECENTRALISATION: INSTRUMENT FORCONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSOUTH AFRICAFAME CLOETE*

ABSTRACTAfter a brief introduction focussing on the nature of and reasons for decentralisation, itshistory in developing societies is reviewed. This is followed by a survey of decentralisationas it has been used as a policy option by the South African government over the lastdecade. A distinction is maintained between policies of horizontal decentralisation (thetricameral system, privatisation and deregulation) and that of vertical decentralisation(the fostering of autonomous black "states", the new provincial system, the deregulationof local government and the creation of Regional Services Councils to administer "gen-eral" affairs at the local level). It is concluded that the South African government iscommitted to the overall maximisation of its decentralisation programmes.

Constitutional decentralisation has emerged recently as one of the most significant re-form-orientated policy objectives of the South African government. This phenomenon isin line with developments world-wide where governments in industrial as well as devel-oping countries are increasingly exercising their activities at local or regional levels for avariety of reasons (see Conyers 1984, Smith 1985, Mawhood 1987, Allen 1987, Ron-dinelli 1981, ACIR 1986, and Council of Europe 1981 and 1984 for instance).

In this study the nature of decentralisation is briefly described, its history in developingsocieties summarised and a few variables normally influencing decentralisation identi-fied. The policies and practices of the South African government in this respect arethen described, analysed and evaluated.

1. NATURE OF DECENTRALISATIONDecentralisation can be defined as ". . . the transfer of authority to plan, make deci-sions and manage public functions, from the central government and its agencies to:

- field organisation of those agencies;- subordinate units of government;- semi-autonomous public corporations;- area wide or regional development authorities;- functional authorities;- autonomous local governments; or- non-governmental organisations"

(Rondinelli 1981:137. See also Conyers 1984:187).

This view of the term decentralisation implies a vertical (regional or geographical)transfer of power to subordinate governmental levels as well as a horizontal (function-al) transfer of power to other sectors of society (economic, cultural, social, etc) at thesame governmental level. The functional dimension of decentralisation has in the past,however, frequently been ignored in favour of regional decentralisation which is un-fortunately generally being regarded as the only form of decentralisation.

Decentralisation further consists of the vertical or horizontal transfer of different

* Fanie Cloete is the Chief Director: Constitutional Planning in the Department of Development Planning in theCivil Service.

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degrees of autonomy to subordinate or other units of society (see Page and Goldsmith,1985 for an analytical framework to determine the degree of centralisation or decen-tralisation in society and ACIR 1986:73 for some criteria for this purpose).

Three distinct degrees of decentralisation can be identified (Rondinelli 1981):

1.1 Deconcentration .This type of decentralisation is the least extensive. It typically involves the administrat-ive shifting of workload from one central point to a number of points, without givingthe staff the authority to decide how the function should be performed. Although it hasbeen argued that this change in procedure does not really amount to decentralisation,geographical deconcentration is an important development instrument in developingsocieties and does, in fact, constitute the weakest form of decentralisation.

1.2 DelegationDelegation implies the transfer of different degrees of discretionary powers regardingthe planning and implementation of government policy to organizations that are tech-nically and administratively capable of carrying them out. The degree of autonomy ofthese institutions is higher than that of deconcentrated institutions.

1.3 DevolutionThis is the most extreme form of decentralisation and amounts to the creation ofrelatively independent levels and/or units of government with final decision-makingpowers over policy making and execution. Full responsibility for a function is there-fore transferred to another body.

These different types of decentralised government are not mutually exclusive. Allgovernment administrations consist of some combination of them.

2. REASONS FOR DECENTRALISATIONThere are normally three main reasons for decentralisation.

2.1 Political reasonsDecentralisation promotes grassroots democracy in that local and/or regional interestgroups can participate more directly in decision-making and distributive processes ofgovernment regarding matters pertaining to them.

2.2 Economic and administrative reasonsDecentralisation can also promote more effective and efficient government by utilisingexisting local and/or regional administrative, technical and economic infrastructures(or creating them) to provide a wider range of services fulfilling the specific needs of thecommunity concerned, instead of providing and controlling uniform services directlyfrom the central governmental level. In this way decentralisation can stimulate devel-opment in all regions of a country. This is especially relevant in developing societies.Privatisation and deregulation are important ways of decentralising power to the pri-vate sector.

23 Ethnic or cultural reasonsEconomy of scale further does not always imply a centralisation of services, especiallywith regard to socio-cultural services. Decentralisation can play a very important rolein satisfying the distinctive needs of different ethnic or cultural communities. Demandsby these groups for self determination can partially or fully be met by granting theappropriate degree of autonomy on a local and/or regional basis, depending on thecircumstances of each case. In many cases such autonomy is the only way to achievesocial stability in multi-cultural democracies.

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3. DECENTRALISATION IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIESIn developing countries decentralisation is used primarily to spread the socio-econ-omic benefits of growth more evenly and use scarce resources more efficiently forsociety as a whole on the one hand, and involve the less developed groups in theplanning, decision-making and implementation of policy in order to stimulate respon-sibility and self-help attitudes as tools and capabilities for further development on theother hand (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983 and Conyers, 1983:99 and 1984).

Although scholars still disagree about the necessity of decentralisation for successfuldevelopment (see for example Smith 1985:185, Conyers 1984:187 and Mawhood1983:1) an increasing consensus is developing that decentralisation can be an import-ant instrument of development:".. . in developing countries the over-centralisation ofauthority and responsibility in ministerial headquarters and capital cities is generallyregarded as a formidable obstacle to development" (Heaphy 1971, quoted in Smith1985:4). Rondinelli and Nellis conclude tha t" . . . where strong political and adminis-trative support for decentralisation did exist it had a profoundly positive influence ondevelopment programmes" (1986:16).

From a developmental perspective, decentralisation is "an incremental process of ca-pacity building" which must be seen ". . . not as a general solution to all of the prob-lems of underdevelopment, but rather as one of a range of administrative or organisa-tional devices that may improve the efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness ofvarious levels of government under suitable conditions" (Rondinelli and Nellis1986:20). Decentralisation for example does not automatically overcome shortages ofskilled personnel: It actually creates greater demand for them initially. It also does notitself guarantee that larger amounts of resources will be generated. Initially it may bemore costly because it encourages more groups, communities and levels of administra-tion to undertake developmental activities (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986:19).

Decentralisation is, in other words, only an instrument for development, utilising theparticipation of the masses in democratic structures to achieve the development of thephysical environment as well as human potential. In a developing society it is notalways possible to decentralise government functions to the commercial sector, be-cause the basic socio-economic structure within which development must take placenormally still has to be created. The creation of this infrastructure can seldom be doneon a profitable basis. Once this framework for development has been created, thecommercial sector has an important role to play in the stimulation of economic growthand prosperity in such societies.

In developing societies full devolution of power is normally contra-productive becauseof a lack of sufficient skills, experience and finances at the lower levels of government.In these situations strong initiatives from the central governmental level are normallystill required to maximise the development goal. In such cases devolution is usuallyseen as a form of decentralisation in which local government units are given responsi-bility for some functions, but in which the central government often retains somesupervisory powers and may play a large financial role.

The level of sophistication of the society concerned determines largely the type anddegree of decentralisation which can be successfully implemented. Fully and rigidlydecentralised political systems like federations are generally more stable and effectivein industrial societies than in developing societies. The relative failure so far of ideal-type federations in Africa and Latin America and the fragile and unstable characteris-tics of existing Third World federal type systems like Brazil, Nigeria or India, illustratethis conclusion (Smit 1985:55). The main reasons for this probably are that developingsocieties normally have inter alia serious integration and nation-building crises (Binder,

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1978 and Bendix 1964) as a result of varying degrees of ethnic pluralism (Smith,1985:5). Government policies must therefore normally aim at unifying the nation whilesimultaneously acknowledging and accommodating a diversity of national, regionaland local interests. In many cases unifying objectives lead to strongly centralisingpolicies which consequently cause regional and local autonomy to suffer setbacks.

Despite ideological commitments to decentralisation, political and administrativevested interests in maintaining the status quo have proved in other cases to obstruct theimplementation of decentralisation policies (Smith, 1985:189). Mawhood alleges that". . . the normal picture is that a regime hopes for the advantages of decentralisationwithout paying the costs of power sharing" (1983:252). Smith is more explicit aboutthe discrepancies frequently occurring between policy rhetoric and political practice indeveloping societies: ". . . The participative quality of decentralised institutions hasbeen especially prone to erosion from above. There is a pronounced and widespreadtendency to replace elected bodies with decision-makers nominated by the centre. Thisoccurs even when there is a strong ideological commitment to decentralisation on thepart of the regime . . ." (1985:188/9).

Smith emphasises the tendency that it is rare for significant powers to be devolved toelected local institutions, that they are generally not endowed with adequate powersand autonomy to take effective decisions or mobilize local resources and that a trendtowards greater central control, particularly in financial and personnel matters, can bediscerned despite the rhetoric of politicians and senior civil servants. He also notes thatcentral decision-makers are frequently unwilling to strengthen local institutions forfear of losing power (1985:189).

These experiences indicate that governments frequently have to be persuaded on acontinuous basis to accept the philosophy of decentralisation and its benefits as aviable instrument to achieve the goals of democracy, stability and development. Evenin federal systems like Austria, Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany"creeping centralisation" is a natural tendency, calling for periodic "clearing out"operations, involving repetitive downwards re-transfers of functions (Council ofEurope 1983:207).

In order to achieve an optimal equilibrium between unity and diversity by allowingautonomous or semi-autonomous regional and local power bases to exist within themain political system, any national government must have a high level of motivation,tolerance, moderation and experience of democratic government. Many developingsocieties do not conform to these requirements.

The history of attempts at decentralisation in developing countries, however, leads oneto "cautious optimism" (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). Mawhood has evaluated thisdilemma in an excellent recent analysis of the "pendulum" effect of decentralisation atlocal governmental level in the Third World (1983:8 and 1987:10-22). He found that •the traditional tribal or village autonomy in developing countries prior to and in somecases during colonisation was replaced after independence (during the 1960's) by arecentralisation of government. This was the result of, among other things, an increasein the influence of centralising ideologies like marxism and socialism in thosecountries, a struggle for control among elites and the poor performance of auton-omous local authorities (mostly because of insufficient developmental initiatives andopportunities) (1987:12-13).

Centralised government, however, also quickly failed because it negated the demandsfor more direct participation in the process of government at grassroots level(1987:13). It has been replaced in many cases by a mixed system of deconcentrated field

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administrations ("top down" decentralisation in the French tradition) operating par-allel to elected and relatively autonomous local authorities ("bottom up" decentralisa-tion in the British tradition) (Allen 1987). This too failed in Africa; according to Maw-hood (1987:13) mainly because of management problems resulting from operatingboth systems simultaneously. Today the emphasis is once again on autonomous localauthorities in which the masses can participate directly in some way or another in thedevelopment and government of their communities ("bottom up" decentralisation).The potential for long term stability of such systems is, however, still doubtful(1987:19).

The use of decentralisation as a development instrument by the government was exten-sively tried in East Africa (Tanzania, Kenya and Sudan) where drastic reorganisationof the lower levels of government, ostensibly to decentralise, were attempted. Theresults of all these programmes were disappointing for various reasons. Rondinellianalysed these case studies (1981) and concluded that the ability of governments toimplement decentralisation programmes successfully, depends on the existence of orthe ability to create a variety of conditions, and to provide sufficient resources at thelocal level to carry out decentralised functions (see Mawhood 1983:12-23).

The most important of these conditions are the sincerity of politicians and officials ofhigher and lower governmental levels to allow a transfer of powers to work in practiceand the existence of sufficient infra-structure, knowledgeable personnel and financesat the point of execution to exercise the functions concerned satisfactorily (see alsoCloete 1984 and 1988 for more details about Rondinelli's analysis). Value commit-ments are normally regarded as more important than the availability of physical re-sources. In this context Smith wrote that ". . . decisions that need to be made arepolitical rather than technical. . ." (1985:201).

To be successful, value commitments must be followed up by a determined effort alsoto change priorities for spending in order to put decentralisation policies into practice.In this respect Mawhood categorically states that - " . . . no country is obliged tochoose decentralisation. If that choice is made, it will be better made with a conscious-ness of the whole political commitment - the functions to be given to local bodies, theresources to be provided, and the structural supports and defences for the new system.As always in human affairs, we get what we pay for" (1983:255).

In a later study it was found tha t" . . . decentralisation is more likely to succeed if itis constrained in scope, designed to build on existing administrative capacity, given along period of time to become institutionalised, centres around specific financial func-

- tions, transfers responsibilities and authority incrementally, is sparing of donor in-volvement, and includes a training component. The more of these features that arebuilt in to decentralisation policies, the more likely they are to succeed and to lead tomeaningful local development..." (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986:21).

Similar results with decentralisation were experienced in Europe where the tendency isto carry out reforms gradually in such a way that the effects of each step can be checkedor new or additional pressures introduced to carry reforms forward: ". . . practicalexperience hitherto in the member states of the Council of Europe shows that thereform of various administrative levels is simply carried out in different phases, inother words, when priority is given to the reorganisation of regional structures it isfollowed by the reform of local authorities and vice versa . . ." (Council of Europe1983:196-7).

Mawhood concludes that " . . . successful decentralisation occurs when the politicalweather is good (i.e. the regime is strong and unchallenged) but the economic weather

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is bad (it suffers a painful shortage of resources). At a time of rapid technical changes,centralised regimes face huge difficulties in finding out the most effective ways of doingthings, and their lack of flexibility becomes crippling . . ." (1987:21-22).

4. DECENTRALISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAOnly a brief and superficial overview of the situation in South Africa will be given herealthough, ideally speaking, analyses on the lines suggested by Page and Goldsmith,1985 and ACIR, (1986:73) would be more appropriate.

In 1982 the South African Government announced a comprehensive constitutionalreform programme in an attempt to remedy the monopoly of control which the Whiteminority group had over the process of government in South Africa. It provided for farreaching changes to all governmental levels (See Schedule 1 for a diagrammatic over-view of this programme). Constitutional reform in South Africa centres around bothvertical and horizontal decentralisation of power which at that time was to a largeextent centralised at national level in the hands of the White community. The primaryaims of the government in this regard are to accord the highest degree of self-determi-nation possible to the private sector as well as to each community over what is termedthe community's "own" interests, and at the same time accord every such communityan active and effective role in the planning, decision-making and implementation ofpolicy regarding what is termed interests of mutual concern to everybody in society (orgeneral interests).

4.1 Horizontal decentralisation

4.1.1 The Tricameral SystemMaximal selfdetermination for each ethnic group in the country can, according to the1982 guidelines, only be attained by decentralising power over areas of concern to eachgroup alone, to institutions created for each of these groups. For this purpose, a threechamber parliament was established at national level for Whites, Coloureds and Indi-ans. Each House exercises a high degree of self-determination over matters pertainingto the identity of each group (the so-called own interests of the group), while all threeHouses decide on matters of mutual concern to all groups. The executive regardingmatters of mutual concern is also multi-racial, but consists only of executive membersfrom the group composing each House, when it comes to matters of interest to thatgroup only. Schedule 2 contains a list of functions which have been identified in the1983 Constitution as own affairs for above communities. The system of own affairs isstill being established. It is for example not yet clear which aspects of local governmentare own affairs.

The Government plans to extend this model of power sharing to the Black population.Various initiatives to attain this objective are in progress, all centering around a negoti-ated settlement.

4.1.2 Privatisation and DeregulationAs stated in two important White Papers, a horizontal transfer of functions to theeconomic or private sector is also still in progress:

"In terms of the objectives of rationalisation it is also intended, once the centralgovernment departments have been rationalised, to give attention to the soundness ofthe dividing lines between the spheres of activity of the central government service, theprovincial administrations, the semi-state institutions and the private sector. This willbe done against the background of developments in the constitutional sphere on theone hand and the government's declared policy regarding free enterprise as the basis ofeconomic and financial policy on the other" (Republic of South Africa 1980:1).

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This was confirmed and set out in more detail in the recent White Paper on Privatisa-tion and Deregulation (Republic of South Africa 1987(b)) and in the State President'sspeech at the opening of Parliament on 5 February 1988 (Republiek van Suid-Afrika1988).

4.2 Vertical decentralisationThis is a conventional view of decentralisation and will be treated in more detail.

The 1982 Constitutional Guidelines of the Government also contain the Govern-ment's acceptance of". . . the principle of maximum devolution of power and decen-tralisation of administration at local government level, and of minimum administrat-ive control over local authorities" (Republic of South Africa 1982:8).

The Constitutional Guidelines further specifically provide for changes at the provin-cial level of Government:"In view of changes that may be effected at central and local government levels, it isforeseen t h a t . . .

(a) certain provincial powers will be transferred to local authorities to ensureself-determination within the respective communities;

(b) some other functions may be transferred from the provincial councils to met-ropolitan or rural regional councils; and

(c) yet other matters currently handled by the provincial councils may in duecourse be taken over by the Chambers of the new Parliament where they willbe dealt with either as group affairs or as matters of common interest. . .

. . . The result may be the eventual development of new regional dispensations withinthe existing provincial boundaries . . ." (Republic of South Africa 1982:8).

These policy goals were confirmed and supplemented on 6 May 1985 in an authorita-tive policy statement by the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning inthe House of Assembly, where he said, inter alia:"It has been demonstrated that as a result of the proximity of the provincial authoritiesto the people and communities to whom they are rendering services, these authoritiesare better able to determine the wishes and needs of those people and communities andto manage their activities accordingly. This cannot happen if functions are controlledand implemented at one central point" (Republic of South Africa 1985:4904).

The Minister then announced that the Government has accepted " . . . that govern-ment functions be executed at the lowest possible level of government and that higherlevels of government should as far as possible only be policy making and monitoringlevels of government,. . . that personnel and funds will be transferred together withthe functions, in order to prevent the wastage of manpower and money,".. . and " . . .that, where necessary, rationalisation must take place between the departmental re-gional offices and second tier structures that perform similar functions in order toensure optimal, effective and efficient rendering of services" (Republic of South Africa1985:4907). He reiterated tha t " . . . the Government emphasises once again that it isstriving for a devolution of as many functions as possible, particularly from the centralto provincial and lower levels of administration, and also from the provinces to region-al and local levels" (Republic of South Africa 1985:4908).

4.2.1 Regional decentralisation

4.2.1.1 Self-governing TerritoriesThe existence of six autonomous Black self-governing "states", each with its ownconstitution, legislative assembly, cabinet, separate judicial division of the SupremeCourt and magistrates court system, indicates a substantial degree of regional decen-

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tralisation to those regions of the country. Numerous political, financial, staff andinfra-structural problems still obstruct optimal decentralisation, but the Govern-ment's deliberate policy of decentralisation to these underdeveloped rural regions hasstimulated and is still stimulating development there which probably would not havehappened under a policy of centralised control. Opportunities are in. this way createdfor grassroots community development or "bottom-up" development.

New legislation to increase the autonomy of these regions has recently been introducedin Parliament in the form of the Self-Governing Territories Bill, 1987. This Bill is at thetime of writing, still under consideration in a Parliamentary standing committee.

This is the best example of full political devolution of power to regional level, althoughhampered by the problems mentioned.

4.2.2.2 ProvincesOn 1 July 1986 a new system of Provincial Government was established in the fourprovinces, providing for appointed Administrators and multi-racial executive commit-tees in each province replacing the previous all-White elected provincial councils andtheir executive committees. The new bodies retained the provincial councils' originallegislative powers in the form of proclamations. Since that date these ProvincialGovernments also periodically received extended decentralised executive and adminis-trative powers from the Central Government, in accordance with the policy objectivesin this respect. These include full administration and control of Black welfare, com-munity development, housing and local government, substantial additional powerslike local government training, control over regional services councils, regional guideplans, environmental conservation, preventative health services, and psychiatric hos-pitals, to mention some.

The Department of Constitutional Development and Planning was in this processreduced in November 1986 by transferring 1400 of its 1700 officials to the provinces,while 17000 of the Department of National Health and Population Development'sstaff of 20000 were transferred to provincial control on 1 April 1988. These changes arecontinuing. Other state departments like the Departments of Transport, Works andLand Affairs and Finance, will also come under close scrutiny in order to identifyadditional areas to consider for decentralisation to provincial or lower levels ofgovernment.

This type of decentralisation is of necessity of the "top down" variety (Conyers1983:105). Recently various criticisms have been levelled at this aspect as well as at therest of the programme to the effect that it amounts to centralisation instead of decen-ralisation. This criticism is based on the idea that it only involves administrative decen-tralisation of functions to appointed office bearers and officials instead of politicaldevolution to elected representatives (Heymans 1988:46; Cameron 1986:3 and1988:49).

As explained earlier, full devolution of political power is the most comprehensive andpreferable type of decentralisation. This necessarily goes hand in hand with a decen-tralisation of executive functions like those already implemented at a large scale by theCentral Government. The process of fully decentralising a system as centralised as theunitary South African political system, can, however, not be attained in one step if oneattempts to do it in a constitutional way.

If the Central Government's policy objectives pertaining to decentralisation are fullyimplemented, it will bring about a transformation of South African society of farreaching proportions (Conyers 1983:106). It will substantially change the nature and

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rules of the process of government. Changes of this type require time, effort andvarious phases or stages of implementation (Council of Europe 1983:196-7). We are atpresent in the first phase of this process, viz a deliberate deconcentration, delegationand devolution of executive powers to the provincial governmental, level.

On 6 October 1986 the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning said that". . . when the provincial councils were abolished.I was accused of undermining thedemocratic foundation of second tier government.. . If it had been politically accept-able and appropriate at that stage for the Government, I would gladly have acceptedthe introduction of a more representative provincial legislature. Such a step, however,had and still has,-to be reconsidered in the light of the wider programme of reform andconstitutional development of this country, and in that context, the timing was notopportune. Should the re-introduction of a provincial legislature fit into the unfoldingpattern of constitutional development, the government will give careful thought tosuch a step" (Heunis 1986:7).

He confirmed this viewpoint on 11 September 1987 in Parliament by stating withreference to the kwaNatal Indaba that". . . in principle I am not opposed to a legisla-tive body at provincial level.... The Administrator of Natal. . . would like to see alegislature representative of all the people of Natal and KwaZulu being established.That is also the wish of the Chief Minister. If, after negotiation, it were decided to takesuch a step, the rights of minorities, amongst other things would have to be protected"(Republic of South Africa 1987(a): vol. 13, cols. 5785-5786).

The only conclusion that can be drawn from these announcements, is that the Govern-ment is not in principle against the idea of provincial legislatures but that variousconsiderations have so far delayed the re-introduction of multi-racial legislatures of thisnature.

Other significant developments are the public meetings of the Parliamentary commit-tees responsible for provincial affairs in the respective provincial capitals. In the lightof the Government's stance on provincial legislatures this may be a precursor of suchbodies. The Government further also accepts the principle of regional discussionsabout, and initiatives aimed at "bottom-up" decentralisation. This is illustrated by itsviews towards regional co-operation between KwaZulu and Natal in the form of theJoint Executive Authority Act, 1987 and its acceptance of the principle of negotiationsabout one legislature for the same region in the form of the KwaNatal Indaba. So far,however no compromise had been reached between the Indaba and the Central Govern-ment on the details of the Indaba proposals for a regional government for KwaNatalalthough the basic points of departure of the proposals have been accepted by theGovernment (Republic of South Africa 1987(a): vol. 1, col. 141-42 and vol. 13, col.5783).

The transfer of education and certain cultural and local government functions fromthe provinces to the various own affairs administrations are also seen by some ascentralisation. Although it amounts to regional centralisation it also can be defined ashorizontal functional or ethnic decentralisation to the respective ethnic groups con-cerned. These functions are still exercised in a decentralised way because political andadministrative control over them are held by regional ministerial representatives basedin the various provincial regions and functioning under powers delegated to them bythe respective Ministers' Councils.

The possibility of smaller provinces is also provided for in the 1982 guidelines men-tioned earlier. Although no final decision on this has been taken yet by the Governmentit is an established fact that the size of the Cape Province is hampering effective provin-

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cial administration. In addition the different regional characteristics of the Eastern,Western and Northern Cape and also the PWV area, Western, Northern and EasternTransvaal have already resulted in establishing smaller socio-economic developmentregions taking their differences into account.

In terms of a policy principle laid down by Cabinet, a maximum deconcentration anddelegation of administration also takes place routinely from head offices of state de-partments to regional offices. This deconcentration normally proceeds on the basis ofthe respective development regions.

4.2.2 Local DecentralisationDecentralisation to local government level in developing countries has commandedsubstantially more attention in academic circles than regional decentralisation (Con-yers, 1984, Rondinelli, 1983 and Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). The main reason for thisis the pivotal role local government plays in grassroots development.

4.2.2.1 Local AuthoritiesSouth Africa has a long history of effective British type "bottom up" decentralisationpractices in the form of directly elected local authorities established mostly in a raciallyexclusive basis for the various communities. These local authorities control the ownaffairs of the respective communities.

Recently all four provincial governments started a process to deregulate local govern-ment and to increase local powers. Proclamation 18 of 1988 published in OfficialGazette No. 8 of the Orange Free State (25 February 1988) is an excellent example of aprocess of comprehensive deregulation. It consists of 72 sections either abolishing orsubstantially, diminishing the Administrator's control over local authorities in thatprovince. Similar exercises are still in progress in the other three provinces.

In accordance with stated policy objectives, medium to long term inquiries are alsounderway at Central Government level to consider decentralising additional functionsfrom central level to local government level, to privatise existing local governmentfunctions and to rationalise local government legislation. The principle of communityautonomy to provide for local and regional differences and preferences is becomingincreasingly relevant in all these exercises.

4.2.2.2 Regional Services CouncilsRegional services councils are relatively recent phenomena on the South Africanscene. They consist of representatives of all local authorities in a given area, establishedas a statutory body to co-ordinate and control the provision of joint services and togenerate funds for development of infrastructure in that region. For this purpose theAdministrator of a province can transfer local authority or provincial functions tothem. They do not constitute a new intermediate tier of government but operate as alocal government body exercising general affairs functions affecting more than onecommunity in a specific region. Schedule 3 contains a list of functions which can betransferred to regional services councils.

Criticism has also been levelled at the alleged centralising effect of functions trans-ferred from local authorities to these bodies (Cameron 1987:3 and Heymans 1988:46).The fact that regional services councils consist of representatives nominated by localauthorities and that they operate at the same level and do not exercise control overlocal authorities, indicate that a transfer of functions from local authorities to thesebodies is a horizontal and not a vertical transfer of powers.

More significant, however, is the future potential for a vertical (downwards) trans-fer of functions from provincial level to regional services councils level inherent in

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Schedule 3. This is, largely still future music at this stage because of .the recent introduc-tion of regional services councils in the Transvaal and the fact that only one exists inthe Orange Free State (Bloemfontein), two in the Cape Province (the Peninsula andPort Elizabeth/Uitenhage) while none has so far been established in Natal.

5. CONCLUSIONTime and space preclude one from a full analysis of decentralisation in South Africa. Itis, however, clear from the above superficial outline that the Government is, accordingto its policy statements, committed to decentralise its activities as far as possible. It isalso clear that the proposed decentralisation programmes are comprehensive, consist-ing of various horizontal and vertical decentralisation projects. These projects arenormally medium to long term projects which, if fully implemented, will drasticallytransform the governmental process in the country.

Many conditions conducive to decentralisation presently exist. The most important ofthese are the political commitment of the Government, the incremental nature ofdecentralisation programmes, its utilisation of existing institutions and the transfer ofsubstantial legislative, policy-making, executive and administrative functions to lowerlevels of government including personnel training functions.

Matters which will have to receive more attention in future are possible political andadministrative resistance against further decentralisation of authority to provincial,regional and local levels of government in certain quarters, the establishment of direct-ly elected bodies at provincial level, even more political and financial autonomy atprovincial and local governmental levels and more effective and non-discriminatoryparticipation of all communities in and rationalisation of governmental structures atall levels of government. It is premature to judge the success of decentralisation inSouth Africa after only a few years, because insufficient data for this purpose is avail-able today. Most decentralisation projects are of recent origin (running only since1982) and are still in progress.

Mawhood remarks aptly in respect of decentralisation in developing countries, that". . . patience is needed. It takes time for a new institution to find its feet, to be testedfor its response to the needs of the situation and to be intelligently modified. Many ofthe cases . . . include the story of local government structures planted and hastilyuprooted because they were not producing instant results. The human mind does notwork like this: In a political body, both councillors and officials need time to build uptheir experience before they can begin to work effectively. The period needed will varywith circumstances and cultures, but if the first apprenticeship is passed in as little asten years, that will be a cause for congratulation" (1983:255).

The South African Government is also committed to negotiated change in future. Thisentails ongoing and time consuming persuasion and bargaining which is still in pro-cess. Only time will therefore tell if Central Government will successfully meet thechallenges of decentralisation for development in South Africa.

NOTEThis article is based on a paper delivered at the 198S Congress of the South African Sociological Association(SASA), held in Pretoria.

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SCHEDULE 1: HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL DECENTRALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS

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Schedule 1

Subject referred to in section 14

1. Social welfare, but subject to any general law in relation t o -te) norms and standards for the provision or financing of welfare services;(A) the control of the collection of money and other contributions from members of the public for welfare

services or charity; and(c) the registration of social workers, and control over their profession.

2. Education at all levels, including—(1) instruction by way of correspondence, and institutions providing such instruction;(2) the training of adults in the trades at centres established by the State President acting as provided in

section 19(1X<>); and(3) training of cadets at schools in terms of section 3(1X") of, and subject to, the Defence Act, 1957, and

official school sport,but subject to any general law in relation t o -

te) norms and standards for the financing of running and capital costs of education;(A) salaries and conditions of employment of staff and professional registration of teachers; and(c) norms and standards for syllabuses and examination and for certification of qualifications.

3. Art, culture and recreation (with the exception of competitive sport) which affect mainly the populationgroup in question.

4. Health matters, comprising the following, namely—(1) hospitals, clinics and similar or related institutions;(2) medical services at schools and for indigent persons;(3) health and nutritional guidance; and(4) the registration of and control over private hospitals,

but subject to any general law in relation to such matters.5. Community development, comprising the following, namely—(1) housing;(2) development of the community in any area declared by or under any general law as an area for the use of

the population group in question, including the establishment, development and renovation of townsand the control over and disposal of land (whether by alienation or otherwise) acquired or made availablefor that purpose; and

(3) rent control and control over and clearance of squatting, in such an area in terms of any general law,but subject to—

(a) any genera] law in relation to norms, standards and income groups for the financing of housing; and(A) the provision of the general law referred to in paragraph (2).

6. Local government within any area declared by or under any general law as a local government area for thepopulation group in question, but subject to any general law in relation to matters to be administered on localgovernment level on a joint basis, and excluding—

(a) any matter assigned to local authorities by or under any general law; and(A) the exercise by any local authority, otherwise than in accordance with general policy determined by the

State President acting as provided in section 19(1X6), of any power to raise loans.7. Agriculture, comprising the following, name))'—

(1) agricultural development services, which include research, advisory services and extension;(2) training at agricultural colleges; and(3) financial and other assistance to farmers or prospective fanners, or for the promotion of agriculture.

8. Water supply, comprising the following, namely—(1) irrigation schemes;(2) drilling for water for agricultural and local government purposes;(3) subsidizing of drilling work and water works for agricultural or local government purposes; and(4) financial assistance in relation to water works damaged by flood.

9. Appointment of marriage officers under any general law.10. Elections of members of the House of Parliament in question, excluding matters prescribed or to be

prescribed by or under any general law.11. Finance in relation to own affairs of the population group in question, including—

(1) estimates of revenue and expenditure, but excluding the form in which such estimates shall beprepared;

(2) the appropriation of moneys for the purposes of such estimates, but excluding such appropriation ofmoneys for any purpose other than that for which they are by or under any general law made availablefor appropriation;

(3) levies authorized by or under any general law, on services rendered over and above payments for suchservices;

(4) the receipt of donations;(5) the making of donations not amounting to a supplementation of appropriations contemplated in

paragraph (2); and(6) the control over the collection and utilization of revenue, subject to the provisions of the Exchequer

and Audit Act, 1975,but excluding the levying of taxes and the raising of loans.

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12. Staff administration in terms of the provisions of any general law in relation to staffin the employment ofthe State.

13. Auxiliary services necessary for the administration of own affairs of the population group in question,including the planning of and control over the work connected with the exercise or performance of powers,duties and functions in a department of State for such affairs, and the services provided by or in such adepartment, and the acquisition, alienation, provision and maintenance of and the control over land, supplies,services, buildings, works and accommodation, transport and other facilities for the purposes of the perfor-mance or rendering of such work and services, but subject to any general law in relation to such matters.

14. The rendering of services, either with the approval of the State President acting as provided in section19(1X6) or in terms of arrangements made between Ministers, with such approval, to persons who are notmembers of the population group in question.

Schedule 3: Possible regional services councils' functions

Regional Services Councils Act, 109 of 1985

Schedule 2

Functions referred to in section 3(l)(b)1. Bulk supply of water.2. Bulk supply of electricity.3. Sewerage purification works and main sewerage disposal pipelines.4. Land usage and transport planning in the region.5. Roads and stormwater drainage.6. Passenger transport services.7. Traffic matters.8. Abattoirs.9. Fresh produce markets.

10. Refuse dumps.11. Cemeteries and crematoriums.12. Ambulance and fire brigade services.13. Health services.14. Airports.15. Civil defence.16. Libraries.17. Museums.18. Recreation facilities.19. Environment conservation.20. Promotion of tourism.21. The establishment, improvement and maintenance of other infrastructural services and facilities.22. Other regional functions.

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACIR (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations), 1986: Devolving Federal Programme, Re-sponsibilities and Revenue, Sources to State and Local Governments, report A-104, US Government PrintingOffice, Washington D.C.Allen, Hubert, 1987: "Decentralisation for Development: A Point of View", Planning and Administration, Vol.14(1).Bendix, Reinhard, 1964: Nation-Building and Citizenship, Wiley and Son, New York.Binder, L. et. al. 1978: Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton.Cameron, Robert, 1987: "The Decentralisation Route: Choosing a New Central-Local Relationship for SouthAfrica", Critical Choices for South African Society, No. 3, Institute for the Study of Public Policy, University ofCape Town, Cape Town.Cameron, Robert, 1988: "The Institutional Parameters of Local Government Restructuring in South Africa",Heymans and Tötemeyer 1988:49-62.Cheema, G. S. and Rondinelli, D. A., 1983: Decentralisation and Development: Policy Implementation in Devel-oping Countries, Sage, Beverley Hills.Cloete, Fanie, 1984: "The Private Sector and Constitutional Decentralisation in Comparative Perspective",South Africa International, vol. 14(3).Cloete, Fanie, 1988: "Local Option: Problems and Prospects", Reality, vols. 20 (2 + 3).Conyers, Diana, 1983: "Decentralisation: The latest fashion in development administration?", Public Adminis-tration and Development, vol. 3.Conyers, Diana, 1984: "Decentralisation and Development: A review of the literature", Public Administrationand Development, vol. 4.Council of Europe, 1981: Functional Decentralisation at local and regional level, Study series: Local and regionalauthorities in Europe, no. 26, Strasbourg.Council of Europe, 1981: Decentralisation of local government at neighbourhood level, Study series: Local andregional authorities in Europe, no. 27, Strasbourg.

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Council of Europe, 1983: The Reforms of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe: Theory, Practice andCritical Appraisal, Study scries: Local and regional authorities in Europe, no. 28, Strasbourg.Council of Europe, 1984: Comparative Analysis of Experiences with Regionalisation in respect of relationsbetween the regions and the local authorities, report of the Steering Committee for Regional and MunicipalMatters, Strasbourg.Heaphy, J. J., 1971: Spatial Dimensions of Development Administration, Duke University Press, Durham, NorthCarolina.Heunis, J. C., 1986: Openingsrede by die Administrateurskonferensie op 9 Oktober 1986 gehou te Durban.Heymans, C. 1988: "The Political and Constitutional Context of Local Government Restructuring", in, Hey-mans and Tötemeyer, 1988.Heymans, C. and Tötemeyer, G. 1988: Government by the People, Juta, Cape Town.Mawhood, Philip, 1983: Local Government in the Third World, John Wiley and Sons, London.Mawhood, Philip, 1987: "Decentralisation and the Third World in the 1980's", Planning and Administration,vol. 14(1), pp. 10-22.Page, E. and Goldsmith, M. J. 1985: "Centralisation and Decentralisation: A framework for comparativeanalysis", in Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, vol. 3.Republic of South Africa, 1980: White Paper on the Rationalisation of the Public Service and Related Institu-tions, Government Printer, Pretoria.Republic of South Africa, 1982: Constitutional Guidelines: A new Dispensation for Whites. Coloureds and Indi-ans, Government Printer, Pretoria.Republic of South Africa, 1985: Debates of the House of Assembly, Government Printer, Cape Town.Republic of South Africa, 1987(a): Debates of the House of Assembly, Government Printer, Cape Town.Republic of South Africa, 1987(b): White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of SouthAfrica, WPG 87, Government Printer, Pretoria.Republic of South Africa, 1988: Ekonomiese uitdaging word aanvaar, Buro vir Inligting, Pretoria.Rondinelli, Denis, A., 1981: "Government Decentralisation in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practicein Developing Countries", International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 47(2).Rondinelli, Denis, A., 1983: "Implementing decentralisation programmes in Asia: A comparative analysis",Public Administration and Development, vol. 3.Rondinelli, Denis A. and Nellis, John, R., 1986: "Assessing Decentralisation Policies in Developing Countries:The Case for Cautious Optimism", Development Policy Review, vol. 4.Smith, B. C. 1985: Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State, Allen and Unwin, London.

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