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the reality behind QM phenomenal appearances, or any
logically consistent realist interpretation that would satisfy
the requirements that Einstein laid down for a complete
physical theory (Einstein 1935). Thus the choice between
orthodox QM thinking and Bohms hidden-variables
postulate is not one that could be decided by appeal torefuting evidence in so far as such evidence is taken to
consist in the range of empirical data which provideon
the face of itequal support for both interpretations.
Rather it is a choice that involves such further
verification-transcendent criteria as intelligibility, causal-
explanatory power, and inference to the best (most
rational) means of assigning truth-values across the range
of quantum-theoretical statements. But if logic can always
be revised in response to empirical dilemmasas Putnam
contendsthen this solution will always seem the
simplest (least problematical) means of keeping those
dilemmas at bay. In which case any alternative theory that
involves ontological commitments beyond the QM
empirical data must appear an altogether less attractive
option, or one burdened with excess metaphysical
baggage. So there is, after all, some point to Feyerabends
objection that revising logic is just the kind of sly
procedure which, if consistently applied, must lead to the
arrest of scientific progress and to stagnation (Feyerabend
1981: 237). For whatever the problems with quantum
mechanics there can be no prospect of resolving them by
adopting an approachthat of three-valued logicwhich
precludes any rationally motivated choice between
orthodox QM and a rival theory (such as Bohms) with
substantive ontological and causal-explanatory content.
References
Bell, J. S. 1987 Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum
Mechanics: collected papers on quantum philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Bohm, David. 1957. Causality and Chance in Modern Physics.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Bohm, David and Basil J. Hiley. 1993. The Undivided Universe:an ontological interpretation of quantum theory. London:
Routledge.
Cushing, James T. 1994. Quantum Mechanics: historical
contingency and the Copenhagen hegemony. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Devitt, Michael. 1986. Realism and Truth, 2nd edn. Oxford:Blackwell.
Dummett, Michael. 1977. Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.Dummett, Michael. 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas. London:
Duckworth.
Dummett, Michael. 1991. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.London: Duckworth.
Feyerabend, Paul K. 1981. Reichenbachs Interpretation ofQuantum Mechanics. Realism, Rationalism and Scientific
Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gibbins, Peter. 1987. Particles and Paradoxes: the limits of
quantum logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, Ian. 1983.Representing and Intervening: introductorytopics in the philosophy of natural science . Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
Holland, Peter. 1993. The Quantum Theory of Motion: anaccount of the de Broglie-Bohm causal interpretation of
quantum mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kripke, Saul. 1980.Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Popper, Karl. 1982. Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics.London: Hutchinson.
Putnam, Hilary. 1975a. Mathematics, Matter and Method(Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.Putnam, Hilary. 1975b. Mind, Language and Reality
(Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2). Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Realism, Truth and History. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.Putnam, Hilary. 1993. Realism and Reason (Philosophical
Papers, Vol. 3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Hilary. 1987. The Many Faces of Realism. LaSalle, IL:Open Court.
Putnam, Hilary. 1995. Pragmatism: an open question. Oxford:
Blackwell.Quine, W. V. O. 1961. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. From a
Logical Point of View, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press.
Redhead, Michael. 1987. Incompleteness, Nonlocality and
Realism: a prolegomenon to the philosophy of quantum
mechanics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reichenbach, Hans. 1938. Experience and Prediction. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
Teller, Paul (1994). An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum
Field Theory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Wheeler, John A. and W. H. Zurek (eds.), 1983. Quantum Theory
and Measurement. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
z
Manindra Nath Thakur
D ebat ing Rea l ism(s ): M arx ism and Nyaya-V aisesika
Introduction
This paper argues that Marx has provided an adequate
framework for developing a universal philosophy of
liberation based on democratic negotiations among
different philosophical traditions. Critical realist
interpretation of Marx creates space for this to happen. As
these philosophical traditions are deeply rooted in the
social and geographical context in which they have
emerged, such negotiation enhances the possibilities of
Marxs ideas being more widely acceptable. I examine the
case of one of the important streams of Indian philosophy,
Nyaya-Vaisesika. Marxs realism is compared with that of
Nyaya-Vaisesika and the possibilities of democratic
negotiation between the two are explored.
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I think this project has become particularly important
with the collapse of Communist political systems, which
has created major theoretical and practical problems for
the socialist movements. A process of rethinking Marxism
that began in the early 1960s, particularly with Althusser,
Habermas and Cohen, is gaining new impetus. Thetheoretical crisis that Marxism is facing due to the eclipse
of the dominant Soviet interpretation has in fact provided a
creative space for rethinking Marxism. I think it is possible
to enrich Marxs theoretical tools by engaging with
different, other than European, philosophical traditions. It
is in this context that I would like to locate this paper. My
thesis is that Nyaya-Vaisesika realism has potential to
offer several significant ontological and epistemological
formulations for rethinking Marxism. The paper is part of
a larger project to explore the implications of such an
exercise for the philosophy of social science.
Marx and democratic negotiation among philosophical
traditions
What should be our attitude towards different
philosophical traditions available in different geographical
locations and cultural contexts? The standard European
answer to this question has been that philosophy originated
in ancient Greece; it is a unique contribution of the Greeks
to humanity. Other philosophical traditions are considered
insignificant and unimportant as far as serious
philosophical questions are concerned. Many great
Western philosophers and scholars have shared this idea.
Hegel, for example, considered philosophy as the
development of the consciousness of freedom and argued
that this was a Greek invention that reached its apex in the
modern Germanic nation. Consequently, he never took the
contemporary German scholars of Indian philosophyseriously. He conceded that Indian thought was abstract
and had developed its own formal logic. However, he
always believed that Indian philosophy reflects the
childhood stage of development of humanity with nothing
of genuine significance for modern philosophy. This
became the most accepted position among Western
scholars.Generally speaking, Marx seems to have accepted this
trend of rejecting non-European philosophical traditions.
Marx did, however, enter into democratic negotiation with
a wide variety of strands within the Western philosophical
tradition in order to arrive at his own overall position.
Thus his general understanding of dialectics was derived,
via Hegel, from a critical appreciation of the Ionian andEleatic schools of Greek philosophy. The concept of
dialectical contradiction was appropriated from
Heraclitus, dialectical argumentfrom Socrates, dialectical
reason from Plato, and so on (Bhaskar 1983a and 1995;
Engels 1974 and 1975). The rational kernel was
famously extracted from the mystical shell of the
Hegelian dialectic, which had seemed to transfigure and
glorify what exists. In its rational form, Marx himself
stressed,
it is a scandal and abomination to the bourgeoisie [], because
it includes in its positive understanding of what exists a
simultaneous recognition of its negation, its inevitabledestruction; because it regards every historically developed
from as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps
its transient aspect as well; and because it does not let itself beimpressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and
revolutionary. (Marx 1976, 103)
Engels appreciated Hegel for providing a concept of the
worldnatural, historical, and intellectualas in process,
and for his attempt to trace out the internal connections
that made a continuous whole of all this movement and
development. According to Engels, Hegel was the first to
try to demonstrate that there was an evolution, an intrinsic
coherence, in history. His greatest achievement was that he
took up dialectics as the highest form of reasoning
descended from the Greek thinkers (Engels 1975).
Marxs materialism was derived in a similar way from
the Greeks via the modern French and English
philosophical traditions. That Marx was keenly sensitive tothe different historical and national contexts is well
suggested by the following comment in The Holy Family:
The difference between French and English materialismreflects the difference between the two nations. The Frenchimparted to English materialism wit, flesh and blood, and
eloquence. They gave it the temperament and grace that itlacked. They civilisedit. (Marx and Engels 1975, 12930)
Marx saw his work as provisional and open-ended,
destined for revision and possible supercession, and he
fully expected that the process of critical appropriation
would continue. It is thus very much in the spirit of his
work to continue the process of democratic negotiation
with different philosophical traditions available in
different geographical and social contexts. This point
seems important to make because Marxist scholars even inIndia would perhaps object to any possible negotiation
with Indian philosophy. At best, they have explored the
material roots of different Indian philosophical traditions. I
think there is a need to encounter these philosophies
purely at the level of their arguments. This is what I try to
do in this paper in relation to Marxism and Nyaya-
Vaisesika.
Critical realist reading of Marx
How to read Marx? Today there are a number of broad
approaches. Exponents of orthodox Marxism read Marx
as a positivist social scientist. It is argued that Marx was
attempting to develop a science of society, as Newton haddeveloped the science of nature. Marxs achievements
were the founding of a science of history (historical
materialism) and elaboration of the principles of scientific,
as opposed to utopian, socialism. This reading of Marx
could only produce one-dimensional Marxism, which was
deterministic. It failed to see the complexity of society and
the limitations of a positivistically conceived epistemology
of natural science in understanding society. It failed also to
understand that laws of society could not be the same as
the laws of nature. In the case of society, the subject is also
part of the object and therefore influences the social
reality. Failure to understand this complexity led these
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exponents to believe that Marx had discovered the laws of
society, as Newton had discovered the laws of physical
motion, and that they are universal and beyond any change
irrespective of changes in time and space. Such a reading
of Marx is very selective and limited in scope. Several
grey areas of theory are ignored, such as religion,nationalism, etc. It leaves little scope for appropriation of
further developments in science, social science and related
disciplines.
There has been much dissatisfaction with such a reading
of Marx. Particularly since the sixties, several attempts
have been made to read Marx differently. For instance,
Althusser, Habermas, and Cohen have suggested different
readings based on new sets of assumptions. Althusser
suggests a symptomatic reading that can explain
meanings of Marxs writings based on the problematic
he elaborates (Althusser and Balibar 1972). Althusser
wants to deconstruct the naturalist positivism of the
orthodox reading, but himself falls into structuralist
positivism. Althusser talks about the objectivity of the
structural logic and does not pay sufficient attention to the
role of agency. Agency is subordinated to structure, the
objectivity of which is positivised.
In Habermass reading, an attempt is made to turn the
key distinction of critical theory between emancipatory
and instrumental reason and praxis against Marx himself.
However, because Habermass own conception of labour,
and of science and nature, is positivistic, the reading he
gives is ultimately a version of the orthodox account
(Bhaskar 1983b).
Cohen, representative of analytical Marxism, has
suggested that Marxs arguments can be defended if they
are taken as functional explanations. He argues that
functional explanation as an intellectual device is
indispensable to historical materialism. He suggests thatMarx in the Preface to The Critique of Political Economy
has used a number of causally explanatory expressions.
For example, relations of production correspond to
productive forces; the legal and political superstructure
rises on the real foundations; the social, political, and
intellectual life process is conditioned by the mode of
production of material life; consciousness is determinedby
social being. Cohen suggests that Marx distinguishes two
items, the second of which he asserts to be in some way
explanatory of the first. These are functional explanations
in the sense that the character of what is explained is
determined by its effect on what explains it. For instance,
take Marxs statement that structure corresponds to the
achieved level of the productive forces. By Cohens logic,it means the structure provides maximum scope for the
fruitful use and development of the forces, and obtains
because it provides such scope. Similarly, to say that
being determines consciousness means that the character
of the ideas of a society has to be explained by their
natural tendency to sustain the structure of economic roles
called for by the productive forces (Cohen 1978, 2789).
There are several problems with Cohens suggestion that
we read Marxs explanations as functional, all of which
boil down to the fact that he operates with an implicit
positivist model of science and scientific laws and
introduces logical positivism into Marxism. This is what
Cohen inherits from the analytical philosophical tradition.
Cohens argument is further advanced by Elster and
Roemer and developed into Rational Choice Marxism
(RCM) by adapting Marxism to assumptions of neo-
classical economics. RCM argues that Marxs arguments
and theoretical formulations are incoherent and scattered.One has to put them together and reconstruct a theory by
weighing various theoretical statements and formulations
against each other. In this way, logically coherent
formulations can be derived. RCM inherits logical
positivism from Cohen and reads Marx only in that light.
In addition, Cohen and others have no concept of praxis,
whereas Marx always believed theories to be products of
practice, to influence practice and finally to be confirmed
by practice.
Marx conceived reality as a complex totality
constituted of integrated parts in dynamic relationship. The
idea of reality as a complex totality is very crucial.
Developments in modern science, particularly chaos
theory, tell us that even in natural science the positivistic
mechanism of the Newtonian model is no longer
appropriate. In fact, it is not possible to talk about
deterministic causal laws any more in nature. There are
many phenomena in nature which defy explanation in
terms of causal laws conceived as regularity statements.
One can at best talk in terms of possibilities.
In this context, Roy Bhaskars philosophy has made a
significant contribution. His concepts of multi-layered
ontology and epistemic relativity can help us in making
sense of Marx better. He argues that reality is multi-
layered and each layer has its own specificity. Modes of
knowing must address themselves to the specificity of
each layer. We can know some layers with relative
precision. Others, however, are far more open. The
concept of complex totality means that there are layers ofordered reality and chaotic reality and all layers partake of
both. Marxs object of study, society, is far more open
than the non-social world. Further, society itself is
stratified into different layers, some of which can be
known more precisely (e.g. the economy) than others (e.g.
matters pertaining to consciousness). This is why Marx
says that the material transformation of the economic
conditions of production [] can be determined with the
precision of natural science but not the legal, political,
religious, artistic or philosophicin short, ideological
forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and
fight it out (Marx 1975, 426).
The parts of this complex totality are dynamically
interrelated, grounding an array of interlocking generativemechanisms which causally influence but do not
determine events and actions. Marxs project is scientific
in that he seeks to uncover these generative mechanisms
and thereby explain patterns of events and actions. He
develops a science for this purpose that does not take fact
and value as separate, but as integral aspects of social
reality through which one can discover generative
mechanisms underlying appearances. Where appearance
and reality are not very discrepant, it is easy to discover
the mechanism behind the appearance; where there is a
vast difference it is more difficult. Marx uses dialectics to
establish the relation between the different layers of
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reality, different parts of the same layer and their dynamic
interrelationship.
Now, if Marx is read with this assumption in mind, one
would not search for positive laws of society in his work.
At times when Marx deals with relatively closed systems
or relatively ordered layers of reality, it might seem as ifhe is giving a positivist theoretical statement. I think such
statements must be read with caution because these are
statements regarding social reality, which is overall a
relatively open system, or relatively chaotic layer of
reality. At times, Marx has limited his analysis to one layer
and made passing reference to others. Here, I think, lies
the scope for expanding his insights. This is what one can
see in Marxs Capital, Volume I. He is dealing with
capitalist political economy without omitting to give hints
concerning religion, the state, etc. Let us pause to consider
from this point of view other methods of reading Marx.
The problem with orthodox Marxism is that it deploys
Marxs epistemology, which he formulated to understand
one layer, on all the other layers of reality. This leads
orthodox Marxism into reductionism. Althusser commits
the same mistake. His understanding of the interplay of
structures as generative mechanisms of social reality has
some validity. However, he takes the argument too far to
explain anything and everything in society. Habermas does
suggest that Marxism should appropriate developments in
human knowledge. However, he does not have the concept
of multi-layered ontology and relative epistemology. He
even forgoes Marxs gains related to the relatively closed
system of political economy by exorbitating the
epistemology of human psychology and language,
adequate to understand one layer of reality, to all other
layers.
Returning to the discussion on how to read Marx with
non-positivist assumptions, I would like to consider thescattered and at times seemingly contradictory statements
regarding certain phenomena in Marxs writings. I think
this reflects two things. One, that Marx is dealing with a
complex reality having several dimensions and multiple
appearances. At times, he talks about one or the other.
These seemingly contradictory statements are in fact
related to different dimensions and forms of reality.
Instead of being contradictory, they may be mutually
complementary. His comments on phenomena such as
religion are scattered. This is because, when he deals with
one layer of ontology, he keeps on connecting it with other
layers too. This does not mean that he has not considered
such phenomena seriously. The implication of this
argument for reading Marx is that his statements should bebrought together and put in one over-arching framework.
Analytical and Rational Choice Marxists also suggest this.
The problem lies with their test of validity of the
statements. They think that validity depends on logical
coherence. Marx thinks that validity depends on practice.
As Marx explains in the second thesis on Feuerbach, The
question whether objective truth can be attributed to
human thinking is not a question of theory but is a
practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the
reality and power [] of his thinking in practice. The
dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which
isolates itself from practice is a purely scholastic
question(Marx 1975, 422). Therefore, the validity of the
theory should be tested in its capacity to explain the
reality. This is not to undermine the importance of logical
coherence but to place it in correct perspective.
To sum up, an alternative reading of Marx is possible on
the basis of the assumption that Marxs project is toexplore reality, which is a complex totality constituted of
interrelated parts in dynamic relationship. Such a project is
scientific in the sense that Marx wants to discover the
generative mechanisms of the social reality, which
generate the complex diversity of appearances. Therefore,
Marxs writings should be read as a record of his arduous
journey in search of knowledge of this complex social
reality. His theoretical statements are not positivist law-
like statements. They are accommodative, unfinished, and
expandable. This is particularly true in the case of his
engagement with relatively open systems. His scattered
statements may be collected together to give us a more
coherent understanding of multidimensional and complex
phenomena.
Marxism and Nyaya-Vaisesika
If Marx is read in this way, some crucial concepts are
opened for further exploration. His concept of ontology
and epistemology are opened up as crucial issues around
which the process of democratic negotiation among
philosophies might revolve. Marx as a realist believes that
reality exists independently of the subject. The subject
tries to make sense of the reality in the context of
collective consciousness in the form of knowledge.
According to the orthodox understanding, Marx assigns
primary importance to material realitysocial beingdetermines consciousness. Mind is not considered to be
part of reality, and consciousness is considered to bedependent on material reality and insignificant. However,
critical realist reading differs and argues that Marx has a
concept of multi-layered ontology and relative
epistemology. Mind is a part of reality, but does exist at a
different layer from the material reality.
Nyaya-Vaisesikas concepts of ontology and
epistemology seem to be similar to those of Marx. Nyaya-
Vaisesika is a full-scale philosophical system that has
contributed significantly to the realist discourse of the
Hindu philosophical tradition. Nyaya and Vaisesika are
two different schools which are commonly treated together
due to their fundamental agreement on a wide range of
issues. Nyaya deals with epistemological questions and
Vaisesika specialises in ontological issues. There are morethan eighty famous scholars in this tradition. Some source
books of this system, such as Nyaya Sutra and Vaisesika
Sutra, are attributed to Gautam and Kanad. This
philosophy is believed to have crystallised during the third
century BCE. (For a detailed history, see Potter 1995).
In fact, in some senses Nyaya-Vaisesika explores the
concept of ontology more exhaustively than Marx. Nyaya-
Vaisesika argues that the world is made up of a variety of
distinguishable particulars. The basic concern is to search
for the primary categories of what is real. It accepts that
whatever becomes subject to our knowledge is real. Thus
the basic substance of reality ispadartha. The idea is that
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every word exists to connote a real thing. This concept is
thus opposed to what Derrida has argued, that words have
meaning only in the context of discourses. Nyaya-
Vaisesika further divides padartha into eight categories:
dravya (substance), guna (quality), karmana
(action/motion), samanya (universal), visesa (particular),samavayaya (relation of inherence) and abhav (absence).
The five material substances are considered to have
special qualities (vises guna) of their own that distinguish
them from each other. Earth has colour, taste, and touch;
water has colour, taste, touch and fluidity; fire has colour
and touch; and air has only touch. Different combinations
of these dravysas come together to constitute of the variety
of material objects.
Space is a substance that allows the object to move
freely and gives meaning to the locations near and far.
Time is known through our experience of different
temporal modes. It allows us to make sense of all temporal
categories. Time and space have been considered crucial
dimensions of Marxist theory. However, two other non-material categoriesthe self and manas (mind)would
be considered debatable in a Marxist context. Though
Marx can be seen to have operated with adequate
categories of the self and mind, at least if he is read with
the help of critical realism, they have been ignored
significantly by the different Marxist thinkers. Let me
explore the possibilities of these two categories of the real
to argue that they are very crucial to our understanding of
reality in its all dimensions.
In Nyaya-Vaisesika the self is considered to be an
immaterial, eternal and all pervading substance. There is a
plurality of individual souls (atman) and their existence
can be inferred from the quality of consciousness. The
atman also possesses secondary qualities such as desire,aversion, pleasure and pain. All these qualities are non-
material, but very crucial for understanding the nature of
the self. Nyaya-Vaisesika considers atman different from,
but as real as, the body. Atman is also differentiated from
consciousness, sensations and mind. According to Nyaya-
Vaisesika, consciousness is not an essential attribute of the
self, it is only a contingent quality, deriving from its
association with the material world. Therefore, liberation
of atman means liberation from consciousness, pain,
pleasure, desire, aversion, etc. This is the stage ofmoksha
or kaivaly, as also explained by other Indian philosophical
traditions.
I think the self is a crucial category of the domain of the
real. In fact, Marxs concept of the real comprises thehuman being, nature, society and their interrelationship.
The concept of the human being in Marx has a concept of
self inherent in it, particularly when he talks of alienation.
However, this has remained a neglected aspect of Marxs
thinking. There has been a general tendency, particularly
among Indian Marxists, to reject such concepts as
religious and the opium of the people. Thinkers like
Althusser even went to the extent of arguing that such a
concept is to be found only in the early Marx, who was yet
to achieve the epistemological break to overcome these
Hegelian residues. Bhaskars concept of multi-layered
ontology allows us to capture this aspect of Marxs
thinking as it explores different dimensions of human
existence and considers all of them as part of the real.
Thus the individuals self is part of the complex reality yet
retains its visesa qualities. If we can think to make this
concept of self as real an integral component of the overall
project of Marxs understanding of society, it would yieldbetter results in terms of providing explanations for
phenomena like religion, culture and the human psyche.
The other non-material substance I want to discuss is
manas or mind. A statement by a friend of minean ex-
Marxist who had been involved in armed struggle and later
became a professor of sociologywill serve as a point of
entry to the discussion. He was ill and hospitalised for
quite some time. I inquired about the diagnosis. He
replied, there is a problem with my mind and the doctors
are treating my brain. I think this a very crucial difference
he has brought out, of which he was not conscious when
he was a Marxist. The brain is a material substance in
Nyaya-Vaisesika terms, made of a particular combination
of the five material substances; whereas mind is a non-material substance, the existence of which can only be
inferred. To be more specific, according to Vaisesika the
mind can not be directly perceived but its existence mustbe inferred in order to explain the apprehension of sensory
information from the sense organs and account for the
internal perception of the self and a whole host of effective
and mental states (King 1999, 109).
What are the implications of considering mind as part of
the real? Mind or manas does not produce new padartha
but gets involved in its production. It has a significant
impact on the material world. Viewing mind as part of thereal can help solve many problems created by the mind-
body dichotomy in philosophy. For instance, within
Marxism there is debate over whether consciousness can
be false. Marxs statement that being determines
consciousness has been interpreted in terms of a crude
base/superstructure model: changes in being issue in
automatic changes in consciousness, and therefore
consciousness has no autonomy and is sometimes false. If
mind were considered part of the real it would be possible
to argue that no consciousness can be wholly false as it is
product of the interaction between our mind and other
substances. Of course, there can be consciousness (or its
absence) of different levels depending on deepening
interaction and further exploration of the different layers
of the real. I think such a formulation has possibilities for
expanding Marxs explanatory horizons. It would be
possible to understand phenomena like religion, culture,
human interaction, and psychology better.
I would like to discuss two more categories of
substance: samanya (universal) and visesa (particular).
Nyaya-Vaisesika subscribes to the notion that every word
connotes a real thing, either material, non-material, or
relational. There are several words denoting universal
categories like horse, cow etc. What constitutes theseuniversal categories? How real are such categories? This
issue has been discussed in most philosophical traditions.
For instance, Plato considers only the universal, existing at
the level of timeless Idea(l)s, to be real. For him
particulars are manifestations of universals, and the latter
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are more real than the former. Buddhists reject the status
of universals as real. They argue that universals are only
mentally imputed categories. Universals are not intrinsic
properties of entities but, in contrast, conceptual constructs
deriving their validity from conventional acceptance and
past usage (ibid., 112).Nyaya-Vaisesikas position rejects both the Platonic and
the Buddhist concept of universals. It proposes a staunch
realism. It considers universals and particulars as
differentiated and of equal ontological status. It argues that
there are common characteristics and they get reflected in
particular examples. For instance, the class term horse
having some specific characteristics is distinguished from
a particular horse, in which these qualities are of course
available. According to Nyaya-Vaisesika the universal is
as real as the particular. The universal is not material but
like time, space, self and mind it is revealed to us through
perception, inference and experience. Nyaya-Vaisesika
accepts the Platonic concept of universals as real and the
Buddhist concept of particulars as real. The universal
exists without being dependent on the particular. However
it only exists in a visible form in particulars. Matilal
explains:
Nyaya-Vaisesika universals exist nowhere but in this world ofours, and particulars do not copy them but manifest them, or
allow the universals to reside in them. We can say, in
accordance with Nyaya, that the particular provides a homefor the universal. The only mystery in this is that when the
home is destroyed, the universal is rendered homeless, but itis not destroyed thereby! It maintains a homeless, i.e.
unmanifest, existence. It is spatially locatable and observable,
provided the relevant particular is observable. (Matilal 1986,
383)
Matilal makes it clear that in the Nyaya-Vaisesika systemuniversals are not present in a concrete form separately but
are always present in the existence of a particular.
According to Nyaya-Vaisesika every substance has its
own particularity (visesa) by which they are distinguished
from each other. For instance, all souls are characterised as
substrata of consciousness, but they are not identical. Each
soul is different from others and distinguished by its visesa
qualities. Similarly, minds are unique particularities and
should not be reduced to each other. In our everyday life
we do differentiate things on the basis of differences in
their nature. These particulars have some samanya
(general) qualities but also have some specific qualities.
Therefore, samanya and visesa are real and irreducible to
each other. Even the particular has its individual visesaand is therefore irreducible to other particulars.
I think this relation between samanya and visesa should
be acceptable to Marxism. What are the implications of
accepting this formulation for our understanding of
society? We must accept that there are some general
characteristics of society as well as specific qualities of
each society. Society cannot be defined as an
agglomeration of individuals, rather it is an ensemble of
social relations which is reproduced and changed by the
activities of individuals but is not reducible to them; it is
an emergent or higher level of existence having its own
specific qualities. At the same time individuals also have
their specific, emergent qualities, and they cannot bereduced to each other, or to society (or to their
neurophysiological drives). The individual as a samanya
and as a visesa category are irreducible to each other;
likewise, society as a samanya and as a visesa category.
They constitute the different layers of the real world. To
argue in this way also means to defend the individuality or
visesa ontological status of all these layers of reality.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude from the above discussion thatthere are possibilities of democratic negotiations between
different philosophical traditions in general and between
Marxism and Nyaya-Vaisesika, mediated by critical
realism, in particular. Through such negotiations we canaspire to arrive at a universal philosophy of liberation for
the contemporary world. I have argued that Nyaya-
Vaisesikas concept of ontology can contribute to Marxs
concept of ontology in a definite way. It can open up
Marxist theory to explore several new layers of the real
world. A similar exercise can also be carried out in the
context of epistemology and criteria of knowledge. Nyaya-
Vaisesika not only contributes to the field of logic, whereit represents an advance over Aristotelian formal logic, but
also combines logic with empirical evidence, and as such
has the potential to make significant contributions to the
field of Marxist epistemology.
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