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Debate: State Paternalism, Neutrality

and Perfectionism*

SIMON CLARKEPhilosophy, University of Canterbury, New Zealand

THERE has been much debate about neutrality and perfectionism, withmany defences and critiques on both sides. According to the ideal of state

neutrality, government action should not be based on any conception of thegood. This requirement is usually thought to preclude the state from, amongother things, enforcing sexual morality and inculcating a particular religion butnot from protecting and enforcing rights and ensuring a just distribution ofresources. In the abstract, neutrality seems an appealing idea, embodying fairnessand impartiality. Perfectionism, by contrast, rejects the requirement of neutrality,holding that the state may, and perhaps has a duty to, take a stand on what isa worthwhile way of life in order to help people lead good lives. There is anatural case for perfectionism: worthwhile conceptions of the good are whatpeople should be guided by, so what could be more reasonable than governmentbeing guided by the same reasons which should guide people generally? Whetherwe accept neutrality or perfectionism will have significant practical implicationsbecause according to neutrality, if no neutral justification of sufficient strengthfor a policy can be provided, then that policy should not be undertaken.1

In this article I outline one strand of the debate and suggest a possible solution.Section one considers an objection often made against perfectionism: that itseems to provide support for state paternalism. Perfectionists have several repliesthat try to show that perfectionism can avoid these implications. I will raise somedoubts about these replies but my main focus will be to ask what follows if theobjection holds. It may be thought that the objection poses a dilemma: either wemust accept the paternalistic implications of perfectionism or we must reject

The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 14, Number 1, 2006, pp. 111–121

© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published by BlackwellPublishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Strect, Malden, MA02148, USA.

*I thank Joseph Raz, Simon Caney, David Miller, Robert Goodin, and two anonymous refereesof this journal for their helpful comments. I also thank the New Zealand Vice Chancellors’Committee for awarding me the Gordon Watson and William Georgetti scholarships to pursue mydoctoral research. This article is derived from the resulting thesis.

1Among the voluminous literature see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1993) and Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) fordefences of neutrality; and Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)and George Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1997) for defences of perfectionism. The ‘natural case’ for perfectionism is from Joseph Raz,‘Facing up: a reply’, Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989), 1153–235 at p. 1230.

perfectionism. Section 2 suggests a third option, namely a view that requires thatthe state be neutral in its paternalistic policies but may appeal to perfectionistconsiderations in its non-paternalistic policies and outlines some of theimplication of such a view.

I. PERFECTIONIST ARGUMENTS AGAINST PATERNALISM

Perfectionism provides a motivation for a wide range of paternalistic policies.Since people would be better off leading lives in accordance with worthwhileconceptions of the good rather than worthless ones, a perfectionist statemotivated by such conceptions has reason to force people into worthwhileactivities and lifestyles for their own good. This is the objection of many of those opposed to perfectionism. John Rawls for instance writes thatperfectionism would sanction the oppressive use of state power in order toenforce a conception of the good.2 Perfectionists often reply that perfectionismneed not be coercive.3 But this is an ad hoc stipulation that needs some defence,for it is not clear why perfectionism should avoid recommending coercion.Perfectionists have a number of arguments to resist the paternalistic implicationsof their theories.

A. AUTONOMY

Several defenders of perfectionism have argued that even if people are poor judges of their own interests, it is good for them to make their owndecisions, to lead their own lives—in short, to be autonomous. I may not be thebest judge of what job would suit me, but I should be free to choose anyway because it is important to lead an autonomous life. Autonomy may notrule out all paternalism, but many cases of paternalism would conflict withautonomy.4

A difficulty with this argument is that autonomy is only one value, and it isnot clear that autonomy should always have priority over these other values.Since the argument above holds that autonomy is valuable because it contributesto personal well-being, then surely it must be weighed against other elements ofwell-being. And sometimes autonomy may lose out to these other elements,making paternalism justified. One way around this difficulty would be forperfectionists to hold that, while there are other values, autonomy has lexicalpriority over those other values. However, this seems doubtful since it impliesthat a life containing an infinite amount of other goods is worse than one

112 SIMON CLARKE

2Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 37.3Joseph Chan, ‘Legitimacy, unanimity, and perfectionism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29

(2000), 5–42 at pp. 14–5.4For a discussion of the incompatibility of paternalism and autonomy, see Douglas Husak,

‘Paternalism and autonomy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 (1981), 27–46.

containing only a drop of autonomy and nothing else. But is there an argumentfor making autonomy lexically prior to or at least strongly favoured over othervalues?

Steven Wall has argued that autonomy helps people give meaning to their lives,have character in an active sense, makes them more responsible and facilitatesthe achievement of self-development. If true, this would give autonomy greatweighting.5 But the argument faces two difficulties. First, even accepting theseclaims, it is not clear that they are important enough to rule out autonomy beingoutweighed by other elements of well-being. Giving meaning, having character,etc may all be important values but so are worthwhile activities, and sometimesthe value of the latter could outweigh sacrifices of the former. Second, Wall’sarguments do not support the value of autonomous lives that do not embodythese values. Some people lead lives that are not especially meaningful, that donot give them character in the active sense, or make them more responsible, orfacilitate self-development. Wall’s arguments do not rule out paternalism directedat bettering the value of such lives.

An alternative strategy is to argue that autonomy, rather than being one goodamong others, is a condition of other goods, so that activities only have value ifthey are autonomously chosen. Without autonomy, one’s access to the thingsthat determine well-being is blocked. Or as Joseph Raz puts it:

The value of personal autonomy is a fact of life. Since we live in a society whosesocial forms are to a considerable extent based on individual choice, and since ouroptions are limited by what is available in our society, we can prosper in it only ifwe can be successfully autonomous.6

Two concerns with this argument are first, that if sound, it would only succeedin establishing the value of autonomy in certain societies. It provides no reasonfor societies without autonomy-supporting social forms to value autonomy.7

Second, it is not obviously impossible for a non-autonomous person to live asuccessful life in a society dominated by autonomy-supporting social forms.8

Someone who marries out of his parents’ wishes rather than his own choice couldstill find fulfilment in that marriage, and a person forced by social pressures intoa certain occupation could nevertheless successfully engage in that worthwhileoccupation.

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5Steven Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1998), ch. 6.

6Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 394. Wall also argues along similar lines at Liberalism,Perfectionism, and Restraint, p. 168.

7Raz admits this at The Morality of Freedom, p. 189, n. 1. See Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism,and Restraint, p. 172 for the same admission.

8W. J. Norman, ‘The autonomy-based liberalism of Joseph Raz’, Canadian Journal of Law andJurisprudence, 2 (1989), 151–62 at p. 155; David MacCabe, ‘Joseph Raz and the contextualargument for liberal perfectionism’, Ethics, 111 (2001), 493–522 at pp. 506–7.

B. ENDORSEMENT

Another strategy of perfectionism appeals to the thesis that in order for anobjectively worthwhile activity or aspect of a person’s life to advance her well-being, it is necessary that she believe in the value of it. This proposition may betermed the endorsement constraint since it claims that a person’s endorsementof the value of an activity is needed for that activity to improve her well-being.The endorsement constraint is defended by Ronald Dworkin, who claims that‘no component [of a good life] . . . contribute[s] to the value of a person’s lifewithout his endorsement’, Will Kymlicka, and Joseph Raz.9 Like the value ofautonomy, the endorsement constraint, if true, does some work in blockingpaternalism. Forcing someone into a way of life for his own good would notactually be for his good if he does not endorse it.

Is the endorsement constraint a plausible thesis about well-being? We maythink it is implausible to hold that endorsement is simply irrelevant whenassessing a person’s well-being, that certain components contribute to the valueof a person’s life regardless of whether that person wants them or not. But theendorsement constraint makes a strong claim, for as Dworkin points out, thereis an alternative view according to which endorsement is an important good thatenhances the value of a person’s life but without being a necessary condition forwell-being.

Two main arguments for the endorsement constraint are offered by Dworkin.The first is that good life is a skilful performance, a challenge well met, and onsuch a view ‘it is performance that counts, not mere external result, and the rightmotive or sense is necessary to the right performance’.10 However, this leavesopen whether endorsement is the right motive; it could be something quiteseparate from endorsement (and the next section considers some possibilities).Moreover, as T. M. Wilkinson has argued, a skilful performance does not requireor entail endorsement. A skilful writer, for example, may write stories he regardsas trash produced simply to earn money.11

Dworkin’s second argument for the endorsement constraint appeals to thevalue of ethical integrity as part of the good life. Ethical integrity is achievedwhen someone

lives out of the conviction that his life, in its central features, is an appropriate one,that no other life he might live would be a plainly better response to the parametersof his ethical situation rightly judged.12

114 SIMON CLARKE

9Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 248; Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 12, and his Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 203; Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 291–2.

10Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 269.11T. M. Wilkinson, ‘Dworkin on paternalism and well-being’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,

16 (1996), 433–44 at pp. 439–40.12Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 270.

Ethical integrity may fail when people live mechanically without conviction,when they set their convictions aside sensing that they are not living as theyshould, and when made by others to live in a way they regret.13

The problem with this argument is that Dworkin makes ethical integrity soundlike an all-or-nothing view. But it is more plausible to think of ethical integrityas a matter of degree since people can and do sometimes choose to followsomeone else’s advice and pursue an activity against their conviction, therebysacrificing some but not all their integrity. But if so, ethical integrity is a valueto be weighed against others, which implies that endorsement is one good—perhaps an important one—that adds to welfare but without being the necessarycondition that the endorsement constraint says it is.14

C. ACTIVITY AND INTENTION

Closely related to the idea of endorsement, but not identical to it, are the ideasthat well-being is respectively active and inner. According to Thomas Hurka, adefender of perfectionism, perfection is active in the sense that it

involves doing things, forming goals and realizing them in the world. And eachperson’s doing must be largely her own, reflecting her energy and commitment.15

This means that ‘no one can make a success of another person’s life’.16 My lifecan only go well, according to this argument, if I achieve my goals myself ratherthan have others bring about their achievement. An aspiring writer’s goal ofbeing accepted for publication is denied if a friend pays a publisher to accept thewriter’s book. Similarly, flattening mountains to ensure success for mountaineerseliminates the challenge of the activity.17

Well-being is inner in the sense that it ‘involves acting from complex,structured intentions’.18 An activity has more value to the extent that it isperformed with the right intentions and less when those intentions are absent.This is not the same as the endorsement constraint. There can be complex,structured intentions without endorsement, as the example of an author whowrites complex works without believing them valuable illustrates. And there canbe endorsement without complex, structured intentions, as in the case of anapprentice artist who has his hand moved across the canvas by his master. Ifcomplex, structured intentions are needed for an activity to have perfectionist

DEBATE: STATE PATERNALISM 115

13ibid., pp. 270–1.14For further criticism of the endorsement constraint, see T. M. Wilkinson, ‘Against Dworkin’s

endorsement constraint’, Utilitas, 15 (2003), 175–93. For a defense see Colin Macleod, ‘Agency,goodness, and endorsement: why we can’t be forced to flourish’, Imprints, 7 (2003), 131–60.

15Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 64.16Joseph Raz, ‘Duties of well-being’, in his Ethics in the Public Domain, rev. edn (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 8.17The latter example is from Raz, ibid., p. 14.18Hurka, Perfectionism, p. 65. These intentions may be unconscious, pp. 125–6.

value, paternalist laws requiring perfection cannot succeed since people’s innerstates cannot be enforced.19

One concern with these arguments is that they do not rule out as wide a rangeof paternalistic policies as their defenders seem to think. They rule outintervention that will make it impossible for people to achieve their goalsthemselves and intervention that forces a person into an activity that is notaccompanied by the right intentions. But some paternalism may not do either ofthese things. In particular, policies that prohibit some options while leaving manyothers available could avoid undermining activity and intention. Forcing peopleout of worthless lifestyles while allowing them to choose from a (not necessarilywide) range of options, would still allow them to achieve goals themselves ratherthan having the goals achieved for them by others. And such paternalism wouldstill allow people to choose their goals with the rights intentions.

The arguments show, rightly, that as a result of being paternalistically guidedinto lifestyle A, a person would have less well-being than if she had been leftfree and she freely chose to pursue A, because she loses out on the values ofactivity and intention. But, and this is the second concern, that is not the relevantcomparison. The paternalist’s concern is, rather, that without intervention, theperson will choose a different lifestyle B, a lifestyle with very low levels of well-being associated with it. The arguments do not show that the losses involved inthe undermining of activity and intention could not be outweighed by gains inother aspects of well-being.

Finally, the arguments could motivate rather than block paternalism. Thepoint of some paternalistic policies is to target precisely those who are livinglives that lack the active pursuit of goals with the right intentions.

II. NEUTRALITY FOR PATERNALISM ONLY

So far I have briefly outlined the main arguments that perfectionists have offeredto show how perfectionism can avoid paternalistic implications and raised somedoubts about these arguments. These doubts are of course not conclusive; thereare replies and counter-replies to be considered. Moreover, even if the argumentsindividually do not succeed, perhaps together they might. This could be so intwo ways: first, perhaps even though there are exceptions to each argument, theytogether jointly block all paternalism; second, even if they do not, perhaps it isbetter overall for government to be rule-perfectionist and adopt a rule to refrainfrom all paternalism rather than take a piecemeal approach.20

But rather than pursue these lines of argument I wish to instead ask thefollowing question: what follows if the perfectionist arguments do not succeed

116 SIMON CLARKE

19ibid., p. 153. This has an affinity with the Lockean argument that religious conversion cannotbe achieved by the use of coercion since it would not result in genuine belief.

20Hurka makes the latter suggestion at Perfectionism, pp. 155–6. I am grateful to an anonymousreferee of this journal for pointing out the distinction.

in ruling out a lot of the paternalism that seems to arise? Some people might be willing simply to accept that perfectionism supports paternalism and insistthat since we should accept the former the latter is justified as well. But manyperfectionists, especially those who advance the arguments above, seem to tacitlyconcede that it would be a weakness of perfectionism if it were to have suchimplications.

This could be thought to pose a dilemma: either we could accept perfectionismwith all its paternalistic implications; or we could reject perfectionism generallyand accept neutrality. However, I wish to emphasise that there is a third option.We could instead reject perfectionism as the basis for some state actions, that is,paternalistic ones. Conceivably, we could have a view that requires neutrality in the case of paternalistic policies, but permits (and perhaps requires)perfectionism in the case of other state action. Call this view Neutrality forPaternalism Only (NPO). It says:

With regard to paternalism the state must be neutral, but neutrality is not arequirement with regard to non-paternalistic policies.

Neutrality ought to be a requirement when the state acts paternalistically, butperfectionist considerations may legitimately be appealed to in justifications fornon-paternalistic state action. Hence, both neutralists and perfectionists arepartly right. Neutrality is a requirement in one important area of state action.But perfectionism is permissible and perhaps required with regard to issuesoutside this area.

In a similar fashion, Rawls and Barry argue that neutrality is required withregards to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice but thatperfectionism may legitimately be resorted to outside these areas.21 But NPOdiffers from this Rawls/Barry view. It is not the level but the type of state actionthat is the focus of NPO. Whether it is constitutional essentials, matters of basicjustice, or any government decisions that fall outside these rubrics, NPO requiresneutrality for paternalistic acts but permits perfectionism for non-paternalisticacts.

Explaining two features of NPO will help make it clearer: first, what it meansto permit non-paternalistic perfectionism; and second, what it means to requireneutrality for paternalism.

A. NON-PATERNALISTIC PERFECTIONISM

Not all perfectionism is paternalistic. The essence of paternalism is that (1) itaims to close an option or make a choice for a person and (2) it is intended forthe person’s own good. This, I argue elsewhere, is an accurate definition of

DEBATE: STATE PATERNALISM 117

21See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 214–5 and Barry, Justice as Impartiality, pp. 143–4.

paternalism,22 but that is not important here. Even if it does not captureeverything we usually take to be paternalistic and/or even if it captures somepolicies we do not usually take to be paternalistic, I offer it here as a stipulationthat helps define NPO.

Perfectionist policies that do not satisfy the first criterion of paternalism are state actions motivated by perfectionist considerations that expand ratherthan restrict a person’s options, such as making interesting and stimulatingoccupations available to those who would otherwise be restricted to occupationsof drudgery. Such a policy would be ruled out by a general requirement ofneutrality since it rests on a conception of the good that holds some occupationsto be more worthwhile than others, but not by NPO.23

A type of state action where the second criterion of paternalism is not met isstate restriction of one person’s freedom for the perfectionist good of others.Laws that prevent property-owners from destroying buildings and places ofhistoric value are examples of this. Again such laws are ruled out be neutralityin general but not by NPO. Neither paternalistic condition is met when the statehelps artists by increasing their options but for the good of the artists’ audiences.Here again is a type of non-paternalistic perfectionism that is ruled out byneutrality but permitted by NPO. Government may even have a duty to engagein these forms of perfectionism according to NPO.

B. NEUTRAL PATERNALISM

NPO holds that state paternalism motivated by perfectionist considerations isillegitimate. Forcing someone out of his couch potato lifestyle (which he doesnot regret living) would be contrary to his conception of the good. Censoringbad music for the good of those who would otherwise listen to it involvesintervention that is motivated by a conception of the good. Forcing a bloodtransfusion upon a Jehovah’s Witness would violate his own understanding ofhis good as conforming to his interpretation of the teachings of Jehovah.Intervention with a mountain climber who may not fully appreciate the risksinvolved would fail to meet the second condition, so long as embarking on riskymountain climbing even when there is no full appreciation of the risks is part ofhis conception of the good. NPO (and general neutrality) prohibits such policies.

But NPO does not rule out all paternalism. According to what can be calledthe Principle Of Neutral Paternalism (PNP), paternalism is justified only if theintervention would advance a person’s interests in a way that it is compatiblewith the requirement of neutrality. Such a principle is suggested by John Rawls

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22Simon Clarke, ‘A definition of paternalism’, Critical Review of International Social and PoliticalPhilosophy, 5 (2002), 81–91.

23There could be more complex cases: what about interventions that restrict options in one waybut expand them overall? State action might block A but thereby open up B and C. I’m inclined tocount such an intervention as paternalistic, but there is not space here to discuss the issue.

when he says that paternalistic intervention be ‘guided by . . . the subject’s morepermanent aims and preferences, or by the account of primary goods’.24 SimilarlyDavid Richards recommends a principle of paternalism that permits interventionin some cases but restricts that intervention from being guided by perfectionistconsiderations.25

PNP implies two restrictions. First, the intervention must be guided by neutralconsiderations, that is, considerations that are compatible with a wide range ofconceptions of the good. Second, the intervention must not impose a particularranking of neutral goods. Examples of paternalism that meet the first restrictioninclude health and safety legislation. Compulsory hygiene regulations for foodmanufacturers, for example, restrict the option of consumers to buy unregulatedfood (which would probably sell at a cheaper price). Insofar as such regulationsare intended for consumers’ own good, they are paternalistic. They are alsoneutral, since few conceptions would require not avoiding contaminated food.26 Other cases of paternalism that would be permitted by PNP are traffic regulations, food labelling requirements, vehicle and machinery safetyregulations and laws against misleading advertising. These policies all closepeople’s options for their own good. But the goods that these policies protectare compatible with a wide range of conceptions of the good. The paternalisticrationale does not refer to a particular conception of the good. The secondrestriction rules out compulsory transfusions for Jehovah’s Witnesses, lawsagainst junk food, risky leisure activities and other seemingly objectionableinterventions. According to the principle, the state may act paternalistically toprovide neutral goods only when doing so does not override the paternalised’sranking of goods according to his conception of the good.

C. DEFENDING NPO

Recall that NPO is an alternative to two other options: (A) acceptingperfectionism with its paternalistic implications, and (B) rejecting perfectionismcompletely and accepting neutrality for all state action, paternalistic orotherwise. Why not accept A or B? With regard to A, there are powerfularguments for perfectionism and against neutrality. Perhaps we should simplyaccept perfectionism with all its paternalistic implications. Certainly, myarguments will not persuade someone undisturbed by perfectionism’spaternalistic implications. Most defenders of perfectionism, however, especiallythose whose arguments are examined in this article, do not seem to think that

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24John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 250.25David Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 192–3;

‘Commercial sex and the rights of the person’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 127 (1979),1263–81.

26If some people hold conceptions of the good that involve consuming unregulated food, then aneutral state would have to try to find some way of exempting them from the regulations.

the theory should be accepted regardless of any paternalistic policies that it maysupport. They all make efforts to show that perfectionism does not support suchpolicies. If perfectionists are reluctant to bite the bullet and accept paternalism,then NPO is an appealing alternative to general neutrality, considering that thereare strong arguments against the latter.

But is this sufficient reason to accept NPO? It may seem a view constructedto fit certain anti-paternalistic judgements. But surely we need a deeperfoundation for the view. A way of defending it is as follows. Two fundamentalvalues in political philosophy are freedom and well-being. The two valuescoincide when a person freely chooses that which is for his own good, but theymay sometimes conflict.27 We require guidance for how to weigh them againsteach other. Doing so by intuition on a case by case basis seems unsatisfactory,so higher-order criteria are needed.28 NPO provides such higher-order criteria:

• When interference is motivated by perfectionist considerations, thenaccording to NPO, freedom should be respected at the cost of less well-being.The value of people’s freedom to make their own decisions, even though theywill be worse off than they would be with interference to guide them intomore worthwhile conceptions of the good, outweighs the loss in well-being.

• When, and only when, well-being is threatened in some neutral sense, thatis, when intervention can be guided by goods that are compatible with a widerange of conceptions of the good, then a concern for well-being may outweighthe value of freedom. (Neutral Paternalism)

• When well-being can be furthered without restricting liberty, then well-beingshould be furthered. (Non-Paternalistic Perfectionism)

By contrast, neutrality and perfectionism are less appealing in the way they weighthe two values. Neutrality, by ruling out all perfectionism, prevents governmentfrom furthering well-being in non-paternalistic ways. Perfectionism fails tosufficiently respect freedom because it supports paternalism (if the arguments insection 1 do not succeed). NPO provides a better way of weighing freedom andwell-being. This is only a bare sketch of an argument, but provides I hope somereason for adopting NPO over neutrality or perfectionism.

III. CONCLUSION

In Section I, I presented various perfectionist arguments that try to show that itneed not be paternalistic, and I raised some doubts about these arguments.Section 2 argued that even if these arguments do not succeed, this need not resultin a dilemma between neutrality and perfectionism; there is a middle view thatrequires neutrality for paternalistic state action but permits perfectionism for

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27For such a view see Dan W. Brock, ‘Paternalism and autonomy’, Ethics, 98 (1988), 550–65.28See Rawls’s discussion on intuitionism in A Theory of Justice, sec. 7.

non-paternalistic actions. This middle view I have dubbed Neutrality forPaternalism Only. I tried to flesh out some implications of the view: it permitsnon-paternalistic perfectionism and neutral paternalism while ruling outperfectionist paternalism. If neutrality is a requirement in the sphere ofpaternalism, then cases of perfectionist paternalism ought not to be implementedby government. If the only sound justifications for laws against drugs,prostitution, pornography, gambling and euthanasia are perfectionistpaternalistic ones, then there ought not to be such laws.

DEBATE: STATE PATERNALISM 121