Dealing with Ideological Diehards and Eclectic Extremists.

The Establishment’s Reactions to Political Extremism in the Netherlands

Paul Lucardie, Simon Otjes & Gerrit Voerman

Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties

University of Groningen

Paper to be presented to the workshop

‘Defending or Damaging Democracy?

The Establishment’s Reactions to Political Extremism in Liberal Democracies’

ECPR Joint Sessions at Salamanca

10-15 April 2014

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Abstract

Six Dutch parties have been analysed in this paper: three of them are considered ideological diehards

with comprehensive, thick-centred ideologies; one started also as an ideological diehard but evolved

gradually into a leftwing social-democratic party with a populist style, too close to the mainstream to

qualify as extremist. Two other parties are regarded as eclectic extremists, as they mixed a ‘thin-

centred ideology’ with mainstream liberalism and conservatism, while concentrating on controversial

issues. We conclude that the interaction between extremist parties and the establishment depends not

only on the ideology of the former, but also on their size, style and strategy as well as on the political

climate, i.e. the configuration of public opinion and positions of established parties with respect to the

issues articulated by the extremist parties.

Introduction: conceptual framework

The term ‘extremism’ is a powerful political weapon. Politicians who are branded as extremists in

mainstream media are rarely destined for a brilliant career. It did not help Senator Barry Goldwater

when he proudly claimed in 1964 that ‘extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice’, he was to suffer

one of the worst defeats in the history of American presidential elections (Perlstein, 2001: 392).

‘Extremism’ is not a completely arbitrary label, but it is not a clearly defined notion either. For

the purpose of this project, we distinguish two types of groups that are portrayed as extremist by

established parties and media: ideological diehards and eclectic extremists. The former openly reject

the prevailing social and political system and its dominant values and advocate a comprehensive

alternative such as Marxist socialism, libertarianism or fascism (Lucardie, 2014: 11-31). The eclectic

extremists focus on certain controversial issues within the context of the existing system and

prevailing ideologies. They see themselves usually as pragmatic and innocent reformers rather than

extremists. In so far as they articulate an ideology, it is a narrow or partial one, or – in the terms of the

British political philosopher Michael Freeden – a thin-centred ideology which challenges elements of

existing ideologies and ingests others (Freeden, 1998a: 485; Freeden, 1998b). Examples may be

feminism, ecologism, nationalism and populism. In the eyes of the establishment, however, these

parties are far from innocent, as they break a taboo and (if successful) might explode the party system.

The ideological diehards may be less dangerous in the perception of the establishment, as they often

remain encapsulated in the periphery of the party system and mobilise only a limited audience – at

least in quiet times when most voters seem satisfied with the prevailing system. So thin-centred

parties might be attacked even more strongly by established parties, media and civil society than

ideological diehards.

The two types of extremist parties might differ also in the way they cope with the reaction of

the establishment against them. The diehards are usually mentally prepared for a long struggle.

Motivated by ideological and identity incentives (as defined by Peter Lange), they act as a prophetic

moral vanguard, fighting dominant ideologies while anticipating a new model of society (Lange, 1977;

see also Lucardie, 2000). By giving a good example and presenting convincing arguments, they try to

proselytize and win the minds or souls of fellow-citizens. This ‘soul-seeking’ function might be more

important to them than ‘policy-seeking’, let alone ‘vote-seeking’ or ‘office-seeking’ (Strøm, 1990).

The ideological diehards are often (but not always) organised like (mini-)mass parties, with a high

member-voter ratio and a network of like-minded organizations. Ensconced in their organised

subculture, they may be almost indifferent to ostracism and boycotts. The eclectic extremists,

however, might be ill prepared for the hostility of the establishment. Often without roots in a

subculture, they will have difficulty in recruiting sufficient members and might attract mainly political

adventurers and social misfits. Without a coherent ideology (or a strong organisation), they may lack

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discipline and may fall prey to internal conflicts. Ostracism might be a deadly weapon against this

type of extremist party. Ostracism is operationalised here through three indicators: (1) no electoral

alliances at any level; (2) no coalition government at any level, or executive positions like mayors (3)

no joint legislative activity. Here we follow Van Spanje and Van der Brug (2007: 1028). Obviously,

the two types are ideal-types rather than clear-cut categories. In empirical reality, they might overlap.

Moreover, eclectic parties might be gradually infiltrated by ideological diehards (an example being the

Dutch Centre Party ’86, as we shall see below). And leading members might express different ideas

‘back-stage’, in closed party meetings, than ‘front-stage’, in parliament or in party programmes (Van

Donselaar, 1991: 16). However, for the purpose of this study, we rely on party publications rather than

on usually inaccessible or at best fragmentary ‘back-stage’ evidence (see also Mudde, 1998: 32).

The reaction of the establishment may be motivated by calculated self-interest or by sincere

moral concern, or both – we leave that open. Thus we do not differ much from Joost van Spanje when

he explains ostracism of extremists by established parties in terms of pragmatic calculations as well as

a defense of highly esteemed values such as human rights or democracy (Van Spanje, 2009: 5-6, 118-

119, 237-238). Ideological distance, anti-democratic views and the size of the extremist party are the

relevant factors in his comparative analysis of 26 anti-immigrant parties and communist parties in

Western Europe. In this exploratory and qualitative study we include two parties analysed by Van

Spanje but add four parties belonging to other political families and do not exclude other possibly

relevant factors.

Case selection

The Dutch party system provides us with sufficient opportunities to explore our hypotheses about

extremist diehards and eclectic extremists Mainly because of its pure proportional electoral system and

low threshold – 0.7 per cent of the popular vote is enough to win a seat in the lower house of

parliament (Tweede Kamer) – quite a few extremist parties have entered parliament.

We have selected six parties that could qualify as extremist (in one sense or the other) in the

postwar period (1945-2014). Three may be considered ideological diehards, at least when they entered

parliament; one was in the process of transition from ideological diehard to mainstream party; two are

arguably eclectic parties with a thin-centred ideology. Three are considered leftwing, three rightwing.

Four of them have been under surveillance of the National Security Service (Binnenlandse

Veiligheidsdienst, BVD; later called General Intelligence and Security Service, Algemene Inlichtingen

en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) at least at some point (Engelen, 2007: 152-154; Hoekstra, 2004: 104,

166). We could have included two or three others, in particular the Farmers’ Party (Boerenpartij) and

the Reformed Political Association (Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond), possibly also the List Pim

Fortuyn; but this would not add much to the substance of our paper in our opinion (Lucardie, 1991:

118-119, 126-129; Lucardie and Voerman, 2013: 188-189). We will first present a short description of

the history and ideology of each party and its relations with the established parties. In the final section

we will analyse empirical data on legislative behaviour of the six parties and draw comparative

conclusions.

The Dutch party system

The extremist parties were or are active in the Dutch party system. The Netherlands can be considered

a traditional consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1999). The political system is dominated by the centre-

left, social-democratic Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), the centre-right, conservative-

liberal Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) and the centrist Christian-

democrats, which between 1977 and 1980 merged into a single party, the Christian Democratic Appeal

(Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA) – before 1977 they were divided between a Catholic Party

(Katholieke Volkspartij, KVP) and two Protestant parties, the Anti-Revolutionary Party (Anti-

Revolutionaire Partij, ARP) and the Christian-Historical Union (Christelijk-Historische Unie, CHU).

These parties form the 'core' of the Dutch party system (Smith, 1989). The proportional election

system without artificial threshold has allowed new parties to enter parliament easily, including the six

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parties studied here. An overview of the electoral developments of the core parties and our six

extremist parties is shown in Table 1.

<TABLE 1>

Six extremist parties in the Netherlands

The Political Reformed (Calvinist) Party (SGP)

The Political Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP) is now the oldest party in the

Netherlands. It was founded in 1918 by orthodox and pietist Calvinists (‘reformed’ implies in the

Netherlands: Calvinist) who did not feel at home in the existing Protestant parties nor in the

mainstream Protestant churches (Fieret, 1990: 27-38). In their opinion, all the other parties had

implicitly or explicitly accepted the secular state, whereas they wanted to restore a pure Protestant

state based on theocratic or bibliocratic principles – bibliocratic meaning: ruled by the Book, i.e. the

Bible. The government should co-operate with the (Calvinist) churches and respect the Dutch

Confession of Faith of 1561. This credo demanded that the Government ‘exterminate any idolatry and

false religion in order to overthrow the Empire of the Anti-Christ’, including Catholicism and (in our

time) Islam (Fieret, 1990: 78-81; Slagboom et al., 2003: 11-17). The government could consult the

people, preferably representatives elected by the (male) heads of families rather than by the individual

citizens – ‘organic suffrage’ (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, [1918, Article 12] 1993: 97). Women

should be excluded from active as well as passive voting rights and would not be accepted as members

of the party. Sovereignty belonged to God and not to the people. The government could pass

legislation in principle without approval from parliament. The SGP hoped that the government would

act as moral guardian, prohibiting sinful activities and places like dancing halls and cinemas,

maintaining strict Sunday observance and banning all meetings that would dishonour God or

undermine the authority of the government (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, [1918, Article 4] 1993:

96-97; see also Fieret, 1990: 78-88). All public schools should teach God's word in line with the

Calvinist doctrine. In socio-economic affairs the SGP defended usually liberal policies .

Until today, the SGP has adhered to these principles with only modest modifications

(Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, 2000). While still opposed to democracy as an ideal, in practice it

has accepted the parliamentary democracy as it has functioned in the Netherlands since 1918

(Slagboom et al., 2003: 41-45). Initially it rejected all international cooperation, including NATO and

United Nations as wel as the predecessors of the European Union, fearing they would infringe upon

the Christian national identity of the Netherlands (Van der Waal et al., 2003: 50). Gradually the party

has accepted the European union, however, while still defending national sovereignty and opposing all

tendencies towards federalism (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, 2000: 6; Van der Waal et al. , 2003:

51-52, 142-143, 161-166). In a similar vein, it has opposed ‘multiculturalism’ and in particular

immigration of Muslims, Hindus and other non-Christians which undermines the Christian identity of

the Netherlands, yet it admits that the government cannot simply abolish multicultural facts (Brouwer

et al., 2000: 121-123, 136-139). This combination of strong principles with moderation – and almost

resignation – in practice seems typical of the SGP. Its ideology might consist largely of ‘inoperative

beliefs’, in the terms of Nigel Harris (1968: 49-50, 128-129). Even so, it can still be regarded as an

anti-system party, as Cas Mudde recently pointed out and Alfons Dölle demonstrated earlier (Mudde,

2014: 219; Dölle, 2006: 109-110).

In the 1920s the SGP gradually expanded its share of the popular vote, from 0.4 per cent in

1918 to 2.3 per cent in 1929, winning its first seat in the lower house of parliament in 1922, its second

one in 1925 and a third one in 1929. Since then its electorate has remained fairly stable, around two

per cent. A large majority of its voters belong to the smaller Calvinist denominations or the most

orthodox section of the main Protestant Church (Janse, 1985: 68-69).

Initially, the SGP was ignored by most established parties. Only the Anti-Revolutionary Party

reacted, in a rather negative way: its supporters disturbed some local meetings of the new party (Fieret,

1990: 131). The ARP was also inspired by Calvinism, but interpreted its principles in a more moderate

way and proved more willing to make compromises. Between 1918 and 1977 (when the ARP allied

itself with the Catholic party and the Protestant CHU) the ARP spent only six years in opposition – the

SGP all sixty-two years. However, even the SGP was willing to join coalitions at the local and

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provincial level. Already in 1919 it made a coalition with the ARP in a village in the South-West of

the country where it had won three of the seven seats in the municipal council (Van Vugt, 1993: 298).

In 1921 a member of the SGP was appointed mayor in another village in the South-West (Van Vugt,

1993: 302).1 In 2013, the party supplied about one per cent of the aldermen and two per cent of the

mayors in the Netherlands (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2013; Nederlands Genootschap

van Burgemeesters, 2014). At the provincial level, the SGP had to wait till 1978 before it could join a

government (Van Vugt, 1993: 309, 317). In 2013, it participated in two provincial governments. At the

national level, it has never had this chance. It came fairly close in 2003, when two informateurs

explored the option of a coalition of Christian Democrats, Liberals and either the leftwing liberal

Democrats 66 or the two Protestant parties, the SGP and the Christian Union (Hippe et al., 2004: 21-

22). The Liberals rejected the option, mainly because of the positions of the SGP regarding the rights

of women and gay rights.

In the same year the SGP was taken to court by a coalition of women’s groups because of its

refusal to grant women the right to join the party and run for elections (Dölle, 2006: 110-117; Hippe et

al., 2004: 118; Post, 2009: 311-360). The court decided in 2005 that the party’s discrimination of

women went against the UN Treaty on Women and would compel the government to stop granting

subsidies to the party. After serious internal debate, the party changed its constitution and agreed to

accept women as party members and eventually even as elected officials. Yet while the pressure on the

party increased, its political position seemed to grow stronger. Since 2010 Dutch governments have

not enjoyed a majority in the Senate. Between 2010 and 2012 the SGP lent occasional support to the

minority government of Christian Democrats and Liberals, but no official agreement between the party

and the government was published (Otjes and Louwerse 2013). Since 2013, it has participated in a

number of formal agreements between government and opposition parties on specific policy areas

(Otjes 2013; De Jong, 2012; Niemandsverdriet, 2014).

Summing up, with its extreme Calvinist conservatism the SGP could be considered an

ideological diehard, even if its practice has been more moderate than its theory. It was not ostracised

or boycotted at the local level. At the national level it has remained an opposition party from 1922 to

the present, but shifted towards government after 2000 through consultation and (informal or even

formal) negotiations about support for the government.

The Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN)

The Communist Party of the Netherlands (Communistische Partij Nederland, CPN) originated in the

schism within Dutch social democracy in 1909, when revolutionary Marxists bolted the Social

Democratic Workers’ Party and founded the Social Democratic Party (Sociaal-Democratische Partij,

SDP) (Voerman 2008). After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, the SDP renamed itself

CPN and joined the Communist International, which soon was dominated by the Communist Party of

the Soviet Union. The CPN accepted the ideological, organisational and strategic conditions the

Russian leaders had imposed. The party wanted to apply the Soviet model in the Netherlands,

abolishing private property and capitalism and setting up a ‘proletarian democracy’ based on councils

of workers, soldiers and peasants (Sterringa, 1921). In the 1930s the CPN was stalinised and became a

tightly organized, highly centralised and dogmatic party, with no room within the party for dissenting

voices. It adhered to Marxism-Leninism, a thick-centred and comprehensive ideology, if there ever

was one. Though it ceased referring to workers’ councils, it continued to defend a ‘democracy for the

people’ in Soviet style: power in the hands of ‘the working class and her organisations’, in other words

‘what the great teachers of socialism, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, called the “dictatorship of the

proletariat”’ (Communistische Partij Nederland, 1952: 20).

In the eyes of the CPN, the Soviet Union was the first country where socialism was realised,

so it served as a model to be followed. Due to its unconditional loyalty and subordination to the Soviet

Union, the CPN was considered a treacherous ‘fifth column’ within Dutch society. From the

beginning, the National Security Service kept an eye on the party. Frequently the police broke up

1 In the Netherlands, mayors are appointed by the Crown, i.e. the national government, even if it

usually follows the advice from the municipal council.

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Communist demonstrations. The electoral support of the CPN was rather weak: in the interwar period

it fluctuated between 1.8 and 3.4 per cent. In some villages the party had a few aldermen (Centraal

Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1936: 8-9).

After the Second World War, the prominent part the CPN had played in the resistance against

the German occupation was rewarded by the voters: in the 1946 national elections the party won 10.6

per cent of the vote. In addition, party membership had increased from 9,000 in 1940 to 50,000 in

1946, while the circulation of the Communist newspaper increased even more spectacularly from

30,000 subscribers before the war to 300,000 in 1945. All of a sudden the CPN, which had previously

led a marginal existence, had become the fourth national party. The party, however, was not really

able to escape from its prewar isolation. Unlike in some other European countries after the end of the

war, the Dutch communists were not included in the government.

Traditional anti-communism in Dutch politics remained quite persistent, and intensified when

the Cold War gathered momentum. The CPN’s warm welcome to the Communist takeover in Prague

in February 1948 gave rise to a number of repressive measures against the party. Communist members

of parliament were banned from the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs. Communists were

denied the right to use radio broadcasting time. Communist aldermen in local councils were dismissed.

The municipality of Finsterwolde, where the CPN had obtained a majority in the council in 1949, was

placed under legal supervision of a commissioner of the national government. In 1951 the cabinet

forbade public servants to be a member of the CPN and its affiliated organisations. The socialist trade

union (again) shut its doors to Communists and even the generally progressive and open Humanist

Association expelled its Communist members. The National Security Service watched closely the

movements of the CPN leadership and issued political advice to government institutions which

recruited new personnel (Engelen, 1995). The result of all these measures was that, on the one hand,

the ‘weaker brothers’ withdrew from the party because of fear or doubt, while on the other hand the

hard core closed ranks and defended its dogmas even more fiercely and fanatically than before (De

Jonge 1984: 98). The CPN's electorate continuously diminished during the 1950s, down to 2.4 per cent

in 1959. The membership plummeted to about 11,000.

In the 1960s, the prospects for the CPN improved. Détente between the Soviet Union and the

United States affected Dutch politics also. The CPN was no longer an isolated political outcast but

became gradually accepted, the more so because the party had dissociated itself from Moscow – very

unusual for a Communist party. In 1963, during the conflict between the Soviet Union and China, the

CPN declared itself ‘autonomous’ within the international Communist movement, and expelled the

emerging Maoist tendency within the party as well as some Moscow loyalists (Verrips, 1995: 384-

404).

Nearly all restrictive political measures stemming from the Cold War period were removed.

The CPN was admitted to parliamentary commissions and allowed access to political broadcasting on

radio and television. Also the prohibition on civil servants’ membership of the CPN was no longer

enforced. However, monitoring by the National Security Service was not suspended completely until

1987 (Engelen, 2007: 228-236). In this period the CPN became more attractive for voters and

members. In 1972 the party received 4.7 per cent of the vote. Since 1962 the CPN again took part in

local and also some provincial governments (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1962: 68; Centraal

Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1967: 72-88; see also Verrips, 1995: 452-459). In 1982 a member of the

CPN was appointed mayor, for the first time in history, against objections from the National Security

Service (Engelen, 2007: 230-231).2

Membership also increased. Many students joined the CPN and its extra-parliamentary

activities. Initially they conformed to the authoritarian structures, but after unexpectedly heavy losses

at parliamentary elections in 1977, they and other intellectuals rebelled against the Stalinist way the

party was run. After a long period of internal strife, the party adopted a completely revised manifesto

in 1984, in which the Leninist concept of the Communist party as the vanguard of the working class

was abolished, and Leninism as an ideology was exchanged for feminism. In this metamorphosis the

last remnants of political extremism within the CPN had faded away; the party could hardly be called

2 For these reasons we do not quite agree with Joost van Spanje, who argued that the CPN was

ostracised until 1986 (Van Spanje, 2009: 87).

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‘Communist’ any longer. Its most orthodox wing left the party and founded an undiluted Marxist-

Leninist, Moscow- orientated party, the New Communist Party of the Netherlands, which won a few

seats in municipal councils but none at the national level.

In 1986, the CPN lost all its three seats in the lower house of parliament. This electoral

shock gave a strong impulse to co-operation with two other small left-wing parties, the Pacifist

Socialist Party (see below) and the Radical Party (Politieke Partij Radikalen, PPR), a split from

the Catholic party which had been an ally of the Labour Party during the 1970s. Both parties were

also suffering electoral decline during the 1980s (Voerman, 1995). Electoral alliances were

formed at the local, provincial and European level, and finally also at the national level. Under

the name ‘Green Left’ this alliance gained 4.1 per cent of the popular vote and six seats in

parliament in 1989. The alliance evolved rapidly into a political party and consequently the CPN

disbanded in 1991 (Voerman, 1991).

The CPN can be considered an ideological diehard. With the exception of the years 1945-

1948, the CPN was seriously ostracised in the first 50 years of its existence, not only because of its

ideological opinions but also, if not more because of its affiliation with a powerful and – in the view of

many – hostile country, the Soviet Union. The result was a profound political and social

marginalisation of the party. In the 1960s the CPN became gradually salonfähig and began to join

local and provincial governments, even if cooperation with other parties remained difficult, due to its

dogmatic and centralist characteristics. After its transformation in the early 1980s the party could not

be called ‘Communist’ or extremist any more.

The Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP)

The Pacifist Socialist Party (Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij, PSP) was founded in 1957 by a rather

heterogeneous company of Christian pacifists, Communists disillusioned by the Soviet Union, Social

Democrats disappointed by the policies of the Labour Party, Trotskists and (former) anarchists (Van

der Land, 1962: 15-23, 88-125). They agreed on a few principles: disarmament and a federal world

government, a classless society based on economic equality and democracy ‘in all areas’ (Pacifistisch

Socialistische Partij, 1957: 4-5; see also Van der Land, 1962: 158-162).

However, the interpretation and application of the principles was a subject of passionate

debate between the various tendencies and factions within the party. During the 1960s and early

1970s, New Leftist and Neo-Marxist tendencies prevailed, but continued to fight among themselves

(Lucardie, 1980: 94-123; Denekamp et al., 1982: 67-70, 87-95, 130-136, 174-199). By 1977, most

Marxists as well as Christian pacifists and leftwing Social Democrats had left the party, whereas many

young New Leftists with libertarian socialist sympathies had joined it. In its 1977 election platform the

PSP called for ‘real socialist policies’, specifically: socialisation of agriculture and of major industries

and banks under workers’ control, workers’ self-management in all companies and direct democracy

in other institutions (Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij, 1977). The Netherlands should become a

socialist council-republic (socialistische radenrepubliek) where popular assemblies would take most

decisions and would elect delegates to central councils who could be recalled if they failed to comply

with the demands of the assemblies (Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij, 1977: 9). Moreover, the PSP

wanted to abolish the army and withdraw from NATO and the European Community. To achieve this

goal, a dual strategy should be pursued, combining direct extra-parliamentary action in companies,

universities and on the street with parliamentary activity. In the 1980s, the extremists gradually lost

their majority in the party and gave way to a more moderate, reformist tendency which preferred co-

operation with other leftwing parties to isolated activism and who began to question the pure socialist

ideal (Lucardie et al., 1999: 41-47, 52-53, 70-75). In 1989 the PSP joined the GreenLeft alliance. By

then, the PSP held only one seat in the lower house of parliament, while it had occupied four seats in

its heydays, between 1963 and 1971 (see Table 1).

When the Pacifist Socialists made their debut in provincial councils and parliament in 1958

and 1959, respectively, reactions from established parties and media were rather hostile: ‘a case of

political pathology’ (PvdA-politician Jacques de Kadt), ‘another invasion route for the Kremlin’

(Catholic newspaper), ‘a Trojan horse ... threatening Western culture and freedom’ (Protestant

newspaper) (Lucardie, 1980: 96-97). The refusal of the PSP to take sides in the Cold War was not

8

appreciated by either side. According to the Communists the PSP was ‘an obstacle in the struggle for

peace’, it had nothing to do with socialism and belonged to the ‘enemies of the working class’ (Haks,

1961: 110, 119, 180). At least one meeting of the PSP was disturbed by supporters of the Labour Party

(Denekamp et al., 1982: 61).

Initially, Pacifist Socialists seemed fairly isolated in the municipal and provincial councils

where they gained seats. Yet in the late 1960s the Labour Party was taken over by a new generation

with New Left ideas; the party shifted to the left and pursued a strategy of polarisation in Dutch

politics, at the national level as well as at the local level. At the national level the executive committee

of the Labour Party initiated talks about a progressive alliance (progressief akkoord) with the PSP and

the PPR (Denekamp et al., 1982: 137-145). After a year the PSP ceased to take part in the talks. The

alliance continued without the PSP; the progressive liberal party D66 joined the alliance (it had

refused participation when the PSP was still involved). The alliance took part in the parliamentary

elections of 1971 and 1972 and entered government in coalition with the ARP and KVP in 1973. In

1974, the PSP joined a permanent deliberative body in which the Labour Party, the Radical Party and

Democrats 66 participated; but this led soon to the dissolution of the body (Klaassen, 2000: 61, 69-

71). In quite a few municipalities it joined ‘progressive alliances’ with Labour and the Radical Party,

occasionally even with D66. Since 1970 less then half of the PSP local councillors were elected on an

independent PSP list (Platvoet, 1986: 24). As a result two Pacifist Socialists were appointed alderman

in 1970 (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1971: 76, 82). In 1974 the party joined the municipal

government in a small municipality in the North East and in Amsterdam – the latter against the wish of

its national political leader, however (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1975: 96-97; Lucardie, 1980:

113-114). Eventually, the alderman in Amsterdam was recalled by his local branch and resigned.

Since the late 1970s the PSP participated in local and provincial alliances with the Radical Party and

after 1981 also with the Communist Party (Lucardie et al., 1999: 41-42). Some of these alliances

entered local government (see for instance Van der Lubbe en Vogel, 2009: 42-43)

In sum, the PSP could be considered an ideological diehard, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.

Though greeted with hostility by established parties, it was not really ostracised. In the late 1960s and

1970s it was involved in alliances with Labour and the Radical Party, in the 1980s mainly with

Radicals and Communists. At the national level it remained isolated of its own free will: it could have

joined the progressive alliance of Labour and the Radicals.

The Socialist Party (SP)

Some Communists regarded the CPN already in the 1960s as ‘revisionist’. Inspired by Mao Zedong

several groups broke away or were expelled. What followed was a process of mergers and new

schisms, in which in 1971 the Communist Party of The Netherlands (Marxist-Leninist) emerged, which

would rename itself Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) a year later (Voerman, 2008, 2012). In its

formative years, the SP followed Mao Zedong and China. The party based itself on Marxism-Leninism,

‘enriched with Mao’s thinking’, and championed the abolition of private ownership of the means of

production (Socialistiese Partij, 1974). It was convinced that socialism could not be realised by way of

peaceful, gradual reforms, but only by a violent revolution. Parliamentary democracy was regarded as

a façade for the dictatorship of capital. In its struggle against capitalism, the SP was guided by Mao’s

strategy of the ‘mass line’. The revolutionaries had to listen to the opinions of the masses, to transform

these into political demands and to mobilise the masses on the basis of these demands.

In its daily practice, the SP was far more radical than the CPN. Due to its small size (in 1973 it

had some 600 members) and its limited radius of activity (a few towns in the south), however, its

existence remained largely unnoticed for a long time – except for the National Security Service, which

naturally monitored all Maoist groups even if they were very tiny and which also infiltrated the SP

(Hoekstra, 2004: 166). Yet in some cities the SP gradually acquired a good reputation, as a result of its

members practicing the ‘mass line’. Party members went from door-to-door in order to gauge the opinions

of the ‘common’ man on problems in his neighbourhood – hence they were called ‘red Jehovah’s

Witnesses’ (Voerman, 1987). These opinions were then aggregated and transformed into a guideline for

subsequent action – e.g. protest against air pollution or increased housing rents. Consequently, the SP

was right from the start always very shy of adopting positions that might isolate it from the people.

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This strategy of ‘closeness’ to the people caused it to embrace controversial views on issues

like women’s emancipation and immigrant labour (Socialistiese Partij, 1983). Manifesting itself as

‘spokesperson’ of what was on people’s minds, the party argued in favour of offering immigrant

workers – with the passage of time – a choice of remigration to their country of origin or assimilation

to Dutch society. This position caused a row. The SP was compared to the Centre Party, which at that

time was regarded as an extreme rightwing party (see below). Other left wing parties such as CPN and

PSP condemned the SP as ‘racist’ (Lucardie and Voerman, 2012: 46).

The SP’s views regarding immigrant workers received more attention than its ideas about an

alternative to capitalism. Around 1980 the party had started a process of ideological transformation, in

order to get rid of its sectarian image. After Mao’s death, the doctrine of the violent revolution faded

into the background, although the concept of the class struggle and the main goal of a socialist society

remained unchanged. After the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet

Union around 1990, the SP broke with Leninism, in terms of ideology (dialectic and historical

materialism) as well as in its organisation (democratic centralism) and strategy (the party’s vanguard

role in the struggle for socialism). In 1999 the party adopted a new manifesto in which the central

socialist tenet – public ownership of the means of production – was jettisoned. The SP still strove for a

‘better world’, but explicitly stated that socialism was no longer a blueprint for a future society nor the

final destination of history. Socialism was from now on only referred to in highly abstract and moral

terms: ‘human dignity, equality, and solidarity between people’ (Socialistische Partij, 1999: 1).

This ideological transformation of the SP was both cause and consequence of its electoral

progress. Despite its aversion to parliamentary activity – a hallmark of its Maoist body of thought –

the SP took part in local elections for the first time already in 1974, arguing that socialist propaganda

in these representative bodies would reach wider audiences and that it would serve to prop up the

party’s extra-parliamentary campaigns. In 1974, the party gained five seats in two municipalities. Till

about 2000, the SP profiled itself as a populist protest party, opposing the political elite which did not

take into account the needs of the common people; its slogan was: ‘vote against, vote SP’ (stem tegen,

stem SP), illustrated by a poster with a splashing tomato. The strategy proved successful. Gradually

the party expanded the number of towns where it put up candidates, as well as the number of seats it

obtained. In 2014 it reached a new zenith: 444 seats in 120 municipalities. In 1996, it was to have its

first two aldermen. After the local elections of 2010, the party had 21 aldermen (in 18 municipalities).

When the SP attained real decision-making responsibilities at the local level the strategy of mobilising

discontent became less useful. The campaign slogan was changed into ‘vote in favour of, vote SP’

(stem voor, stem SP) – stressing the willingness of the party to govern, also at the national level. Even

so, it continued its extra-parliamentary activities. In this period the SP came to accept unconditionally

parliamentary democracy and political parties. Yet it has continued to avoid electoral alliances with

other parties. In 1994 it had entered Dutch parliament, winning two seats (1.3 per cent of the vote) (see

Table 1). In 2006, the party experienced a real break-through with 25 seats (16.6 per cent). For the first

time it participated in negotiations about a new government, but was eventually rejected by the CDA.

This might have disappointed some of its voters. In 2010 the SP obtained only 15 seats, which it

retained in 2012.

In its early years, the SP could certainly be regarded as an ideological diehard. Since the 1990s,

however, the SP has evolved into a leftist social democratic party with a populist style. So its ideology is

still thick-centred, but no longer extremist.

The Centre Party (CP) and the Centre Democrats (CD)

These two parties are treated as one party here, as they had the same leaders and (roughly) the same

ideology. The Centre Party (Centrumpartij, CP) was founded in 1980 by former members of the Dutch

People’s Union (Nederlandse Volksunie, NVU), a marginal nationalist party that was established in 1971

and gradually taken over by national socialists (Van Donselaar, 1991: 143-176). By identifying with the

political centre, the founders of the CP made clear they rejected any association with the extreme right.

Yet few outsiders believed them. Most scholars classified the party as ‘rightwing extremist’, including

some of the authors of this paper (Voerman and Lucardie, 1992; Lucardie, 1998; Mudde, 2000; Husbands,

10

1992). However, in his more recent work, Mudde expresses doubts about this classification and considers

the CP a moderate populist radical right party (Mudde, 2007: 20-22, 259).

The first aim of the CP was the ‘preservation and dynamic expansion of the Dutch culture, as it

has developed in the course of European history according to Christian and humanist norms and values’,

according to the party programme (Centrumpartij, 1982: 1). The Dutch economy should become more

self-supporting, immigrants should be encouraged to return to their mother country and positive

discrimination (of minorities) should be prevented. The second aim was to make the political system more

democratic by introducing the referendum and people’s initiative. Hans Janmaat, soon to be elected

chairman of the party, justified this demand in vaguely populist terms: the established parties pursued their

own interests rather than those of the Dutch people (Janmaat, 1980). In socio-economic questions and

most other policy areas the CP advocated indeed centrist, i.e. moderate conservative or liberal positions; in

its emphasis on environmental policy it resembled leftwing parties (Centrumpartij, 1982: 2-4; see also

Mudde, 1998: 33-39). In so far as the party adhered to any coherent ideology, it was civic or state

nationalism. Moreover, it can be questioned if nationalism should be seen as an independent ideology,

even a partial or thin-centered one, which only deals with specific political problems. As Freeden has

argued, it emerges as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ only in crises when problems like liberation from

occupation, secession, territorial disputes or external threats dominate the political agenda (Freeden,

1998b: 759). Perhaps the CP perceived the immigration of Moroccan and Turkish workers in the 1970s

and 1980s as a serious external threat, but it failed to dominate the agenda. And its nationalism seems

even thinner than many other varieties. The party hardly ever referred to itself as nationalist (the only

reference we found is Giesen, 1981). When it participated in the European elections of 1984, it criticised

the ‘internationalism’ of the established parties yet also insisted it was pro-European and called for

European environmental and immigration policies (Centrumpartij, [1984]: 2-3, 28-29, 41). So if it was a

prophet of nationalism, it was a rather modest one. The CP articulated at best a thin-centred ideology in its

programmes, so we regard it as an eclectic extremist. ‘Back stage’ some of its members might have

voiced more radical and quasi-fascist ideas, but it seems questionable, and at any rate impossible to prove

that these would add up to a coherent and thick-centred ideology (see also Mudde, 1998).

In campaigning against immigration and multiculturalism, the CP definitely touched on a taboo in

the Dutch political and social climate of the 1980s. True, the SGP had also opposed multiculturalism, but

did not focus on it as an issue in its election campaigns. When the CP won one seat in parliament in 1982,

other parties, media and civil society reacted with disgust and even violence. Hans Janmaat, party

chairman and its only MP, was pulled from his bicycle and beaten up in The Hague (Van Donselaar,

1991: 185). In parliament, he would be ignored and isolated (Van Holsteyn, 1998; Schikhof, 1998: 145).

Willem Bruyn, director of the research office of the party, was chained to a bloc of concrete (Van

Donselaar, 1991: 191). Party meetings were often disturbed by activists, or cancelled by the owners of the

rooms rented by the party. Nico Konst, who succeeded Janmaat as party president in 1984, resigned a few

months later in order not to loose his job as history teacher (Koeneman, et al., 1985: 25). The party’s vice-

president, another history teacher, had already been fired by his school.

External pressure may have exacerbated internal tensions. Groups around Janmaat and around

Konst quarrelled about the party’s strategy as well as financial and personal matters. Janmaat left the CP

and joined a new party, the Centre Democrats (Centrumdemocraten, CD) in 1984. The CP failed to close

its ranks after his departure, however. In 1986 it failed financially and was founded under a new name,

CP’86. Gradually it became more radical but failed to regain a seat in parliament – it did win a few seats

in the municipal councils of The Hague, Rotterdam and Amsterdam, however. Ethnic nationalism

replaced civic nationalism (Mudde, 2000: 142-164). Young national socialists gained influence within the

party. In 1998 it was banned by the court because it promoted discrimination and public disorder

(Lucardie, 1998, 22-24).

The CD defended more liberal and conservative positions, similar to that of the early CP. Its

ideology could also be regarded as civic or state nationalism, but it was ‘a shallow ideology’, as Cas

Mudde has shown (Mudde, 2000: 131-133, 140-141). The CD was almost a single-issue anti-immigration

party (Mudde, 1998: 46). In its programmes the party referred to a ‘centre-democratic ideology’ focused

on ‘preservation and development of Dutch political and cultural identity, as well as promotion of national

solidarity’ [our translation] and harmony between conflicting social groups (Centrumdemocraten, 1989:

10; Centrumdemocraten, 1994: 6; Centrumdemocraten, 1998: 1). It wanted to preserve the mixed

economy and promote the use of Dutch products and services by the Dutch government

11

(Centrumdemocraten, 1989: 13, Centrumdemocraten, 1994: 17). The political system should become

more democratic, through introduction of a binding referendum. Only third generation Dutchmen should

be allowed to obtain a public office or employment in the public service and Dutch citizens should have

privileged access to health insurance and social security (Centrumdemocraten, 1989: 12;

Centrumdemocraten, 1994: 8; 23, 25; Centrumdemocaten, 1998: 4). This clearly shows signs of ethnic

nationalism and nativism. Yet foreigners could adapt to Dutch culture, it was argued. Even more:

elements of foreign culture which were not incompatible with Dutch culture should be ‘amalgamated into

an overarching culture’ (een overkoepelende cultuur gevormd door amalgatie van diverse

cultuurelementen) – a rather vague but more a civic nationalist than a nativist or ethnic nationalist position

(Centrumdemocraten, 1998: 6). It may be seen as evidence that the CD was basically a liberal party, as

political scientist Meindert Fennema has argued (Fennema, 1992). Janmaat and other party leaders

cherished liberal values (though coloured by conservative and nationalist ideas) and a liberal view of

human nature: ‘man is a self-creating being, neither determined by his genes nor by his (cultural)

environment’, as the chairman of the party research office wrote (Vierling, 1985: 10, our translation).

However, some less prominent party members might have held other, more extreme racist and even neo-

fascist views, as Van Donselaar asserts (1991: 211-212).

In 1989 Janmaat regained his seat in parliament, in 1994 the number of seats increased from one

to three. At local elections the CD won 78 seats, mainly in the most urbanised Western part of the country.

Some councilors failed to cope with their political duties, the hostility of the environment and the tensions

within the party, while others turned out to have a criminal record (Lucardie, 1998: 24-27; Van Riel and

Van Holsteyn, 1998). Yet even the more competent councillors failed to exercise much influence, as they

remained isolated, were prevented from proposing motions and were never allowed to join a municipal

government and appoint aldermen (Van Riel and Van Holsteyn, 1998: 71). Janmaat faced similar isolation

in the Tweede Kamer, where MPs would leave the room when he started to speak (Van Holsteyn, 1998:

51-52). In 1998 all seats were lost – except one local council seat.

The CD had been boycotted, ostracised and isolated like its predecessor, the CP (Schikhof, 1998).

The media did not ignore it but reported mainly its legal conflicts and party scandals as well as its

xenophobic positions (Schafraad, Wester and Scheepers, 2013; see also Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden and

Van Spanje, 2012). Party members were expelled from trade unions, farmers’ associations and even (in

theory, if not in practice) from the Catholic Church and the main Protestant church (Witte, 1998: 138). In

1986 a common meeting of members of the CD and of the CP – planned to explore a merger or

reunification of the two parties – in a hotel in a small town ended in chaos when ‘anti-fascist activists’ set

fire to the hotel (Schikhof, 1998: 146-147). As a result, the secretary of the CD (and later wife of Janmaat)

lost her leg and was to spend the rest of her life in a wheel chair. Janmaat was convicted twice for

‘discriminatory’ statements and for saying ‘we will abolish the multicultural society’ and ‘Our own people

first!’ (Lucardie, 1998: 26). When he died in 2002, the ailing party died with him.

Dutch scholars disagree about the ‘extremism’ of CP and CD. Some statements of its members

suggest a racist or at least ethnic nationalist ideology, and emotionally many of them seemed to be

‘against the system’. Some members and local councilors used violence against immigrants or were

convicted for possession of illegal arms and dealing drugs (Lucardie, 1998: 25). Moreover, one could

argue that the rejection of the multicultural society and the defence of Dutch culture were in the climate of

the 1980s and 1990s indications of an extremist ideology. Yet apart from their (rather vague)

monoculturalism the CP and CD did not advocate a comprehensive or pure alternative system, neither in

the political realm nor in the socio-economic sphere. Their ‘centrist’ ideology was poorly articulated,

incoherent and very thin. Therefore, it seems more plausible in our eyes to categorise the CP and CD as

eclectic parties that raised a taboo issue rather than as ideological diehards. As a consequence, they were

ill prepared for the ostracism they were to encounter in the political arena as well as in civil society.

The Party for Freedom (PVV)

The Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) was founded by Geert Wilders in 2006. Wilders

had been elected to the lower house of parliament in 1998 – the year when the CD lost practically all

its seats – on the list of the Dutch Liberal Party. He belonged to the rightwing of the party and

regretted the (modest) shift to the centre the VVD had made between 1998 and 2002 (Fennema, 2010:

36-42; Vossen, 2013: 22-29). Initially he distinguished himself by his sharp critique of the Dutch

12

welfare state and its corporatist features, but also by warning against Muslim extremism – two years

before 11 September 2001. Growing tensions with the party leadership led to a break in 2004 –

sparked by the question if Turkey’s membership of the EU had to be prevented under any

circumstances (Fennema, 2010: 81-88). For two years Wilders remained an independent Member of

Parliament. In 2005 he published a ‘declaration of independence’, in which he asserted his own

independence from the established parties but also expressed his concern for independence of the

Dutch nation (Wilders, 2005). In 2006 he founded his own party – literally, as he applied a legal trick

to register it as a party whilst he was its only real member (Vossen, 2013: 177-179).3 The PVV

obtained nine seats in the parliamentary elections of the same year. Four years later it won 24 seats,

but in 2012 it lost nine and retained fifteen.

The ideology of the PVV seems a blend of nationalism and populism, coloured by anti-

Islamism and mixed with liberal and conservative elements. Over the years, the national-populism and

anti-Islamism have grown stronger and the liberalism weaker (Vossen, 2013: 65-110; Lucardie and

Voerman, 2013: 191-194). . In its election manifesto of 2012 the PVV defined itself as ‘pragmatic’

and ‘patriotic’ and accused the other parties of defending ‘EU-nationalism’ (Partij voor de Vrijheid,

2012: 7, 10; see also Bosma, 2010: 37; Schwarz, 2007). From euroscepsis it moved to europhobia: in

2012 the party calls for a Dutch exit from the European Union. Its nationalism was also expressed by

demands for assimilation of immigrants. The PVV advocated radical measures against the Islam

(which it considers a political ideology rather than a religion) such as banning the Quran, closing

Islamic schools, banning and taxing Islamic headscarves and banning mosques from cities and villages

(Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). Its defence of a welfare state with very limited access for immigrants

could be interpreted as welfare chauvinism or a mix of nationalism and ‘One Nation’ conservatism

(O’Sullivan, 1976: 99-106). The emphasis on law and order chimes in with conservatism as well.

Liberal elements are fairly rare in this manifesto: demands for lower taxes, higher speed limits and

fewer environmental regulations. The demands for introduction of a binding referendum and direct

election of the prime minister as well as judges in the Supreme Court reflected its populism, but

received little attention in practice.

Should the PVV be considered a rightwing-extremist party? Scholars as well as politicians

disagree about the answer to this question. The philosopher and theologian Rob Riemen regards

Wilders and his movement as ‘the prototype of contemporary fascism’ (2010: 59). Marija Davidoviç,

Jaap van Donselaar, Peter Rodrigues and Willem Wagenaar describe the PVV as ‘moderate extremist’

– a curious oxymoron – because of its xenophobia and authoritarian tendencies. However, Fennema,

Vossen and Lucardie point out substantial differences between rightwing extremism and the national

populism of the PVV (Fennema, 2010: 135-136; Vossen, 2013: 97-107; Lucardie, 2009). True,

Wilders and his supporters use extreme language and occasionally act as prophets warning for

imminent disasters – ‘we are not just politicians, we are also a bit missionaries’, Wilders’ ideologue

and right-hand Martin Bosma wrote (2010: 226; our translation) . Yet they failed (so far) to develop a

comprehensive and coherent alternative to the prevailing system. Like the CP and CD they reject the

multicultural society and dream of returning to the monocultural and mono-ethnic Dutch society of the

1950s (Bosma, 2010: 187-192). Presumably they hope to realise this reactionary utopia by banning

immigration and encouraging an exodus of Muslims by making life difficult for them (no more islamic

schools, no accessible mosques, no Quran). This may qualify them as dangerous dreamers, but not as

ideological diehards (pace De Ruiter, 2012: 83-91). Like Janmaat, Wilders is in our opinion an

eclecticist with a thin-centred ideology who has focused on two controversial issues: the Islam and the

EU.

Though ideologically similar, Janmaat and Wilders have been treated quite differently by the

established parties, the media and civil society. Whereas the former was ostracised, vilified or ignored,

the latter has received a more respectful treatment – at least by most, but not by all (Vliegenthart,

Boomgaarden and Van Spanje, 2012: 320, 324). Both were accused of discriminatory statements and

incitement to hatred, but Janmaat was convicted and Wilders acquitted (Fennema, 2010: 181-205).

Since 2004, Wilders has received threatening emails – presumably from Islamic extremists – serious

3 Formally there were two members: Wilders and the foundation ‘Group Wilders’ (later: ‘Friends of

the PVV’) he had founded and which he chaired (Bosma, 2010: 26, 216).

13

enough to guarantee him permanent protection wherever he goes and to prevent him from living at

home (Fennema, 2010: 92-96). This may make it harder for his opponents to vilify him, without

allying themselves with Islamic extremists. There are other reasons, too: Wilders did not enter

parliament as a suspicious outsider like Janmaat, but as member of an established party. Through his

rather rigorous control over his party, he has so far prevented Neo-Nazi’s and other extremists from

winning seats in local, provincial or national legislatures – even if he has made quite a few mistakes in

nominating incompetent, quarrelsome and unreliable characters (Vossen, 2013: 145-176). And,

perhaps most importantly, times have changed. Immigration and Islam are still sensitive and

controversial issues, but no longer taboo in the Netherlands. As a taboo it was probably broken by the

rise and violent death of the charismatic Pim Fortuyn in 2002 as well as by the events of September

11, 2001 (Lucardie and Voerman, 2013: 189). And finally – probably also as a result of these factors –

the PVV achieved more electoral successes than CP and CD.

This combination of factors might explain why Wilders was not ostracised and isolated like

Janmaat. Established parties seemed willing to cooperate with the PVV, at all levels. Even so, co-

operation proved problematic enough. When the PVV became the largest party in the municipal

council of Almere in 2010, it failed to reach an agreement with Labour and Liberals and ended up in

the opposition (Vossen, 2013: 155). At the provincial elections in 2011 the PVV became the largest

party in Limburg – its ‘heartland’, where Wilders was born – and joined a coalition with Christian

Democrats and Liberals. Yet after a year the coalition fell apart (Vossen, 2013: 167-172). At the

national level the PVV lent support to a minority government of the same two parties, the Christian

Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the Liberal VVD from 2010 to 2012. In April 2012 it withdrew its

support, according to Wilders because of the effect of austerity measures, required by the European

Commission for pensioners (Vossen, 2013: 172; Lucardie and Voerman, 2013: 199). In 2014 the PVV

risks becoming more isolated and possibly even ostracised due to repeated statements of Wilders that

they wanted ‘fewer Moroccans’ in cities like The Hague (Zuidervaart, 2014).

Summing up: like Janmaat, Wilders can be considered an eclectic extremist rather than an

ideological diehard; unlike the CP and CD, the PVV has not been ostracised or boycotted consistently,

however – at least until very recently.

Voting in Parliament

In order to measure the interaction between established and extremist parties we try to compare the

voting behaviour of parties in parliament. Four different measures of parliamentary behaviour could be

used: the percentage of all votes in which a party votes solitarily (in favour or against a proposal); the

number of proposals per MP per party; the average parliamentary support for the proposal of each

party and the share of the party's proposals that are adopted unanimously.

Each of these measures has its own drawbacks and advantages.

The first one measures the extent to which a party is isolated in parliament, but this has the

drawback that if there are two or more (small) extremist parties they may vote in the same way. Thus

they appear not isolated, whilst one could argue that this is not really a sign of acceptance by the

established parties. On average 12 per cent of votes in the Dutch lower house of parliament has only

one parliamentary party voting against the proposal. The differences between the six parties are

modest here, varying from one per cent for SGP, PSP and SP via two per cent for the CPN, three per

cent for CP/CD and five per cent for the PVV (Louwerse et al., 2013). We did not include this

measure in our table.

A second measure is the number of motions proposed by an MP per year. Formally, the rules

of procedure require MPs to have the support of at least four colleagues when proposing motions. This

rule is almost never applied, except in order to prevent small extremist parties from proposing

motions. On average a Dutch MP proposes five motions or amendments per year.

The third measure is the extent to which a party's proposals are supported in parliament. It has

one major drawback: if the rules of procedure are used against small extremist parties they will have

hardly any proposals to be voted on. On average a parliamentary proposal is supported by 53 per cent

of all MPs.

The fourth measure is the extent to which a party's proposals are adopted unanimously. Again

this has the drawback that we look at a party's proposals, while some small extremist parties may not

14

have been able to submit any. On average 11 per cent of all motions and amendments pass without a

dissenting vote.

<TABLE 2>

In Table 2 we use parliamentary voting data from Louwerse et al. (2013). This data set covers

all parliamentary votes between 1 August 1946 and 25 April 2013 on parliamentary motions,

amendments and bills. We calculate percentages over all votes or motions. Because the number of

votes increases sharply in the period 1970-1980, figures will be dominated by the last 30 years (Otjes

2012).

The SGP, which has been in parliament for 67 years since 1946, voted solitarily in only one

per cent of the votes. In the 1940s and 1950s, this happened more frequently (up to 25 per cent of the

votes) than in recent years. During the entire period, a Political Reformed MP proposed six motions or

amendments per year, which shows that they were not blocked from proposing motions or

amendments. Five out of nine MPs support these proposals; this is higher than the parliamentary

average. Nineteen per cent of the SGP's proposals are adopted unanimously. In general, these figures

indicate that the SGP does not stand isolated in parliament.

The CPN was in parliament for 40 years since 1946. Its MP’s proposed three proposals per

person per year: this shows that they were not prevented from proposing motions; the low figure is

probably the result of the fact the CPN was largest when MPs in general proposed few motions or

amendments. On average two out of nine MPs voted in favour of the proposals of the CPN. Given that

on average the Labour Party held three out of ten seats in parliament during this period, this shows that

the CPN did not always have the backing of the PvdA (let alone of the other major parties). Only two

per cent of the CPN's motions are adopted unanimously. All in all, these figures indicate that the CPN

was not consistently isolated by all of parliament, but was not generally supported either.

The PSP was in parliament for 30 years, from 1959 till 1989. Its MP’s proposed on average

11 motions or amendments per year. On average one in four MP’s voted in favour of the motions and

amendments of the PSP. As the Labour Party held around thirty percent of the seats during these

years, the PSP did not have the consistent support of the Social Democrats. On average one per cent of

the PSP motions were supported by a unanimous parliament. In general, these results indicate that the

PSP did not face a parliamentary cordon sanitaire but that its proposals were not welcomed with open

arms by all parties either.

The CP and CD were in parliament for a total of thirteen years (1982-1986 and 1989-1998).

Over these years, their MP’s proposed only four amendments and one motion. This suggests that they

might have been prevented from bringing proposals to the table in parliament. The average support for

their proposals is only one per cent: it was practically limited to their own MP’s. No motions of CP or

CD were supported unanimously. In general, these results suggest that the Centre Party and Centre

Democrats were isolated consistently: they voted alone relatively often; they made very few

proposals; and their rare proposals were voted down almost unanimously.

The SP has been in parliament for twenty years (1994-2013). The party proposed more

motions than any other party studied here (twenty in all). Yet this is not a sign of parliamentary

support, as except for its first four years, the SP parliamentary party has been large enough to propose

motions by itself. The average support for these motions and amendments is 35 per cent. Given that

the SP and PvdA together had on average 34 per cent of the parliamentary votes, this indicates that the

SP has been able to garner substantial support on the political left. The SP has been less able to also

gain support on the political right, with only two per cent of the party's proposals being adopted

unanimously. All in all, these results show that the SP was not isolated in parliament, but its support

was limited to the left.

15

The PVV has been in parliament for ten years, if we include the years Wilders was an

independent MP. It has voted alone in five per cent of the votes. This is the highest percentage of all

parties studied here. The PVV proposed on average 16 motions or amendments per MP per year, but

except for the first three years when Wilders was in parliament as an independent MP, the PVV was

large enough to bring motions to the table alone. These proposals on average have the support of 29

per cent of the MP’s. As on average the PVV and the VVD held 30 per cent of the seats in this period,

this shows that the PVV had the support of at least the Right in parliament. Besides, four per cent of

the PVV's motions were accepted by the whole of parliament. This is the second highest percentage of

all parties studied in this period. These findings do not show a party that is consistently isolated in

parliament: their proposals were supported by three out of ten MPs and the six parties studied here it

has the second highest share of proposals adopted without opposition. The PVV however often votes

solitarily: instead of being isolated by the other parties, the party has a tendency to isolate itself from

the other parties (see Otjes and Louwerse, 2013).

In sum, there are clear signs that the CP/CD was isolated in parliament, as it was prevented

from tabling motions and amendments. The SGP is on the other side of the spectrum: its motions tend

to garner more support than the average motion, with one out of five motions being carried without a

single dissenting vote. The CPN, PSP and SP find their support especially in one side of the Tweede

Kamer. The PVV does not appear to be ostracised in parliament either, but tends to isolate itself

through its dissenting votes.

Conclusions

Six Dutch parties have been analysed in this paper. Three of them could clearly be considered

ideological diehards with comprehensive, thick-centred ideologies, at least when they entered

parliament: Calvinist conservatism in the case of the SGP, Marxism-Leninism in the CPN and pacifist

socialism in the case of the PSP. The SP started also as a Marxist-Leninist party (even more extreme

than the CPN) but evolved gradually into a leftwing social-democratic party with a populist style,

articulating still a comprehensive ideology, but too close to the mainstream to qualify as extremist. CP,

CD and PVV mixed populist nationalism with mainstream liberalism and conservatism, while

concentrating on controversial issues – immigration, Islam and European integration – hence should

be regarded as eclectic extremists.

We had expected that established parties would react differently to ideological diehards than

to eclectic extremists. To a large extent, our findings confirm our expectations, as Table 3 indicates.

CP and CD were ostracised consistently, whereas the SGP, PSP, CPN and SP were included in

alliances, local government and cooperation in parliament.

< TABLE 3>

However, not all our findings fit this picture. In the first place, the CPN, clearly an ideological

diehard, was ostracised during the 1950s and early 1960s – at the height of the Cold War between the

Atlantic alliance and the Soviet bloc, which the party supported. In the second place, the eclectic

extremist PVV was not ostracised (at least until very recently), though it focused on similar issues as

the CP and CD. Both deviations from the expected pattern could be explained in terms of political

climate or Zeitgeist. Public opinion in the media and the positions of established parties had probably

changed, partly due to external circumstances – the détente between the USA and the Soviet Union,

the 9/11 terrorist attacks – and partly to domestic events, such as the alienation between CPN and

Soviet Russia and the charismatic and dramatic intervention of Pim Fortuyn. In the third place, size

might also explain why the PVV was treated differently from CP and CD. In the fourth place, strategy

and style may be as important as the content of an ideology. The SGP has articulated its extreme (and

anti-democratic) ideology in very moderate language and refrained from political activism – unlike

PSP and SP for instance. This may explain the perfect integration of the Calvinists, in terms of local

alliances and government, appointments of mayors, support for its motions and amendments in

parliament and (recently) negotiations with the governing coalition.

Formatted

16

Summing up: the interaction between extremist parties and the establishment may depend not

only on the ideology and size of the former, as Van Spanje found, but also on their style and strategy

as well as on the political climate, i.e. the configuration of public opinion and positions of established

parties with respect to the issues articulated by the extremist parties.

Table 1. Distribution of seats in the Tweede Kamer (lower house of parliament) 1946-2012

19

46

19

48

19

52

19

56

a

19

59

19

63

19

67

19

71

19

72

19

77

19

81

19

82

19

86

19

89

19

94

19

98

20

02

20

03

20

06

20

10

20

12

CDAb 53 54 51 77 75 76 69 58 48 49 48 45 54 54 34 29 43 44 41 21 13

PvdA 29 27 30 50 48 43 37 39 43 53 44 47 52 49 37 45 23 42 33 30 38

VVDc 6 8 9 13 19 16 17 16 22 28 26 36 27 22 31 38 24 28 22 31 41

SGP 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 3

CPNd 10 8 6 7 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 3 0

PSPd 2 4 4 2 2 1 3 3 1

CP/CD 1 1 3

SP 2 5 9 9 25 15 15

PVV 9 24 15

Others 0 1 2 0 0 4 15 26 25 14 23 12 23 21 41 30 49 25 18 27 25

Total 100 100 100 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 a In 1956 parliament expanded to 150 seats

b Since 1977, before that the three predecessors of the CDA.

b In 1946 the Freedom Party (Partij van de Vrijheid)

d Until 1989, when PSP and CPN merged into GreenLeft.

Source: Kiesraad, www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl

Table 2. Legislative behaviour and cooperation in the lower house of Dutch parliament

(1946-2013)

Party In parliament Party's proposalsa

Average

Support

% Adopted

unanimously

Number of

proposals

per MP per

year

N

SGP 1946-2013 55% 19% 6.4 1162

CPN 1946-1986 22% 2% 2.8 567

PSP 1959-1989 26% 1% 11.1 807

CP/CD 1982-1986

1989-1998

1% 0% 0.2 5

SP 1994-2013 35% 2% 20.2 4486

PVV/Wilders 2004-2013 29% 4% 16.0 1812

Average all

proposals

1946-2013 53% 11% 5.1 48984

Source: Louwerse et al. (2013).

19

Table 3. Relationships between established parties and extremist parties.

Electoral

alliances

Local

coalitions

(aldermen)

Mayors Provincial

coalitions

National

govern-

ment

support

Co-

operation in

parliament

SGP + + +

+ +

(since 2010)

+

CPN ±

(1982-90)

+ ±

(1982-90)

+ - ±

PSP + ±

(1970-78)

- - - ±

SP - +

(since 1998)

- + - ±

CP/CD - - - - - -

PVV - - - ±

(2011-12)

+

(2010-12)

±

± limited in time or in scope

Sources: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1949-1998); Nederlands Genootschap van Burgemeesters

(2014); Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (2013); www.decentraal.bestuur.nl .

20

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