Easements

Villanueva v Court of appeals

Facts:

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the twometer wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses

granted to the Espinolas, predecessorsininterest of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. The said easement granted in favor of the Espinolas is permanent and is legally binding. Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the

aforementioned small house that encroached upon the twometer easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil

Case No. Q918703, for easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses Gabriel.

Issue: Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner.

Held: Yes.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a legal easement.

A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code.

The contract of easement is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the public highway.

Woodridge School, Inc., v ARB Construction Co., Inc.,

Facts:

Woodridge is the usufructuary of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T363902 in the name of spouses Ernesto T. Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its copetitioner, Miguela JimenezJavier, is the registered owner of the adjacent lot under TCT No. T330688.

ARB is the owner and developer of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is composed of four phases. Phase I of the subdivision was already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue. To provide the same accessibility to the residents of Phase II of the subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road to link the two phases.

Petitioners properties sit right in the middle of several estates: Phase I of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the north, a creek in the east and Green Valley Subdivision the farther east, a road within Soldiers Hills Subdivision IV which leads to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue in the west and Phase III of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the south.

Initially, petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as indemnity for the use of the road. Adamant, ARB refused the offer and fenced the perimeter of the road fronting the properties of petitioners. By doing so, ARB effectively cut off petitioners access to and from the public highway.

After failing to settle the matter amicably, petitioners jointly filed a complaint in the RTC of Imus, Cavite to enjoin ARB from depriving them of the use of the disputed subdivision road and to seek a compulsory right of way after payment of proper indemnity.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. The appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court stating that

a compulsory right of way exists in favor of petitioners as there is no other existing adequate outlet to and from petitioners properties to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue other than the subject existing road lot belonging to ARB; hence, the need to pay indemnity to ARB for the use of said lot.

Issue: Whether or not there is a legal easement that would justify payment of indemnity to ARB Construction, Inc.

Held: Yes.

The circumstances clearly make out a case of legal easement of right of way. It is an easement which has been imposed by law and not by the parties and it has for (its) object either public use or the interest of private persons.

To be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must concur: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

The appellate and trial courts found that the properties of petitioners are enclosed by other estates without any adequate access to a public highway except the subject road lot which leads to Marcos Alvarez Avenue. Although it was shown that the shortest distance from the properties to the highway is toward the east across a creek, this alternative route does not provide an adequate outlet for the students of the proposed school. This route becomes marshy as the creek overflows during the rainy season and will endanger the students attending the school.

The Civil Code categorically provides for the measure by which the proper indemnity may be computed: value of the land occupied plus the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate in accordance with Article 649 of the Civil Code.

Encarnacion v Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner owns the dominant estate while respondent owns the servient estate which stands between the dominant estate and the national road.

When the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway.

One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked and none was given for the portions constituting the pathway.

It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where he also had his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his customers. Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts.

In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. The request was turned down by the two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.

Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land. During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of another exit to the highway, only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate, hence, dismissing petitioner's complaint.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and rejected petitioner's claim for an additional easement.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of right of way.

Held: Yes.

The Court finds that petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement of right of way, holding that where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time.

When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.

Inasmuch as the additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width of the pathway will reduce the area of servient estate, and the petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to compensate private respondents for their loss, perhaps, it would be well for respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously. But unless and until that option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original path several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code.

Preysler v Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots in the Tali Beach Subdivision and also two parcels of land adjacent to the subdivision. The subdivision was owned by respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc.

To gain access to the two parcels petitioner has to pass through private respondent's subdivision. Petitioner offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way but private respondent refused it for being grossly inadequate. Hence, the latter barricaded the front gate of petitioner's property to prevent petitioner and his family from using the subdivision roads to access said parcels.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary prohibitive injunction against private respondent. The trial court issued an Order for private respondent to remove the barricade and refrain from hindering petitioner’s entry and exit from the subject properties and for the free passage of petitioner in the subdivision of private respondent pending the litigation.

Sometime thereafter, petitioner used the subdivision road to transport heavy equipment and construction materials to develop his property. Consequently, private respondent moved to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction claiming that the petitioner violated its right to peaceful possession and occupation of Tali Beach Subdivision when petitioner brought in heavy equipment and construction materials.

On the other hand, petitioner prayed that his contractors, visitors, and other representatives be allowed access and persons he has authorized be allowed to install power lines over private respondent's property. The trial court amended the writ granting petitioner’s prayer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the amended writ and reinstated the original writ.

Issue: Whether or not the right of passage allowed in the uncontested original writ applies not only to the petitioner and his household, but also to his visitors, contractors, construction workers, authorized persons, heavy equipment machinery, and construction materials as well as the installation of power lines.

Held: Yes.

The Court partially granted the petition. It held that the writ issued by the trial court is to preserve status quo. Necessarily, it does not cover the use of the subdivision roads for ingress and egress of construction workers, heavy equipment, delivery of construction materials, and installation of power lines since there were no improvements introduced then. But under Article 656 of the New Civil Code, if the right of way is indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification of a building, a temporary easement is granted after payment of indemnity for the damage caused to the servient estate.

In the present case, the trial court found that irrespective of which route petitioner used in gaining access to his property, he has to pass private respondent's subdivision. Thus, petitioner may be granted a temporary easement after the payment of the proper indemnity. Hence, the court ordered private respondent to allow the right of passage thru the subdivision by the petitioner's visitors and guests, contractors, construction workers, heavy equipment vehicles, and delivery construction materials. But the Court did not allow the installation of electric power lines because it is a permanent easement which is not covered by Article 656.

Other forms of easements, Nuisance, and the Registry of property

Hidalgo Enterprises Inc., v Balandan

Facts:

Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers.

The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate.

At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."

The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, stated as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.

The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.

Issue: whether or not a swimming pool or water tank is an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little children in play and considered as an attractive nuisance.

Held: No.

The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

Further, the Court cited the explanation of the Indiana Appellate Court which holds that: Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, he is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance.”

As petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner — that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual — needs no further discussion.

Different modes of acquiring ownership; occupation, intellectual creation, donation

Acap v Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the the subject parcel of land and, covering an area of nine thousand five hundred (9,500) meters. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his widow Laurenciana.

When Pido died intestate and on 27 November 1981, his surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre," in favor of private respondent Edy delos Reyes.

Private respondent sought for petitioner (Acap) to personally inform him that he (Edy) had become the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him.

On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years, private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, alleging in the main that as his leasehold tenant, petitioner refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental of ten (10) cavans of palay despite repeated demands.

Petitioner reiterated his refusal to recognize private respondent's ownership over the subject land. He averred that he continues to recognize Cosme Pido as the owner of the said land, and having been a registered tenant therein since 1960, he never reneged on his rental obligations. When Pido died, he continued to pay rentals to Pido's widow. When the latter left for abroad, she instructed him to stay in the landholding and to pay the accumulated rentals upon her demand or return from abroad.

Issue: Whether or not the subject declaration of heirship and waiver of rights is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent over the lot in question.

Held: No.

Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).

In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. A declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.

There is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's name.

It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that there was no unjustified or deliberate refusal by petitioner to pay the lease rentals or amortizations to the landowner/agricultural lessor which, in this case, private respondent failed to establish in his favor by clear and convincing evidence.

Heirs of Seraspi v Court of Appeals

Facts:

The lots in question were originally owned by Marcelino Recasa and are both situated in Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan. When Marcelino died in 1943, and in 1948 his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts to his corresponding heirs in his Three (3) marriages during his lifetime.

In the same year, Patronicio Recasa (the representing the heirs first marriage) sold their share to Dominador Recasa (representing heirs in the second marriage). In 1950, Dominador sold their share to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi.

In 1958, the Seraspis acquired a loan from Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) the subject land being the security, however, they failed to pay the loan and the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder KRBI, and subsequently sold the same to Manuel Rata (brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi) who allowed Quirico to administer the same.

In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa (Marcelino’s heir by his third marriage) took advantage of the fact that Quirico was paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.

In 1983 the Seraspis were able to purchase the lands from Manuel Rata and thereafter filed a case against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands.

RTC ruled in favor of Seraspi, but CA reversed on appeal.

Issue: Whether private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the properties in question through acquisitive prescription.

Held: No.

There was no acquisitive prescription

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. In the case at bar, respondent claim ordinary prescription through adverse possession of the property for more than Ten (10) years under Art. 1134 of the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7) prescription.

Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the property through occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can he base his ownership on succession for the property was not part of those distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which private respondent belongs. It must be remembered that in the partition of the intestate estate of Marcelino Recasa, the properties were divided into three parts, each part being reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the three marriages Marcelino entered into. Since the contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first and second marriages, it follows that private respondent, as heir of the third marriage, has no right over the parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his father, private respondent was co-owner of all of his fathers properties, such co-ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the partition agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino Recasa.

Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof.[6] Private respondent entered the property without the consent of the previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper. Jurissc

Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership. The basis of petitioners claim of ownership is the contract of sale they had with Rata, but this by itself is insufficient to make them owners of the property. For while a contract of sale is perfected by the meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price,[7] the ownership of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the property.[8] Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione dominia dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition transfers the ownership of things).

Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has not been delivered to them. At the time they bought the property from Rata in 1983, the property was in the possession of private respondent. When the property belonging to another is unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter fir the recovery of the property and such right may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property and the transferee can maintain such action against the wrongdoer.

Ocampo v Ocampo

Facts:

The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children. The two of them, Fidela, and Felicidad are respondents herein.

The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they acquired 3parcels of land and, upon their death, left the following properties. Only one of them, lot A is the subject of this case, a parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the Poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur

The 3 parcels of land are actually owned in common by the children of the late spouses although the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property owned in common by all of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties but defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to do so; that the same defendants have been receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs ;and, that because of their relationship, they undertook earnest efforts to amicably settle this controversy but because of defendants’ utterly unreasonable and unjustified actuations, the same failed.

In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition of the properties; ordering defendants Fidela and Felicidad to release or otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances which they had caused to be annotated on the TCT; requiring Fidela and Felicidad to refrain from further encumbering said properties; further ordering Fidela and Felicidad to indemnify plaintiffs .

The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses; that in 1987, the TCT in the name of defendant Fidela and covering the lot described as parcel (a) was cancelled and, in lieu thereof a TCT was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, on the strength of an alleged Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela in their favor.

At the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for registration and when a TCT was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both the donor and donees were notoriously aware that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters, and that the donor Fidela was not the exclusive owner thereof.

The RTC holds and declares that defendant spouses are the true and lawful exclusive owners of the following properties. The CA affirmed with modifications (for damages) the said ruling.

Issue: Whether or not a deed of donation intervivos is valid.

Held: Yes.

Belen presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed on January 13, 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property.

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven -- the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTC’s ratiocination:

"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a written acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in this case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidela’s interest since the alleged acknowledgement was written and executed on 24 December 1985 when she was no longer the owner of the property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had already donated all her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no more properties with which she can have an interest to declare against."

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