day 1 - the use of hazop techniques in applied hazard processes

8/13/2019 Day 1 - The Use of Hazop Techniques in Applied Hazard Processes

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The use of HAZOP Techniques

in Applied Hazard Processes

By

Datuk Ir Ahmad Nordeen SallehLRTS Director/Principal Consultant


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Background

Modern safety legislation places responsibilityon Owners, Operators and Manufacturers toidentify and manage the risks associated with

their operations and products and todemonstrate that they are doing so in aneffective manner.

This has led many of them to appreciate the

benefits of doing formal Risk Assessmentmethods as the starting point in their riskmanaging process.


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Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)Overview

With increased employee, managementand public awareness of Safety, peoplehave become less tolerant of Risks.

This has resulted in increased concernover the Safety, Health and Environmentalimpact of a plant-facility and its activities,

stronger public opinion, higher litigationand stricter Regulations.


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Regulatory Requirements for MajorHazard Installations (MHI)

Factories and Machinery Act (FMA) 1967

- Regular Inspections of Plants and Vessels.

Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)

1994General Duties of Employers.

Control of Industrial Major Hazard Accident(CIMAH) 1996Safety Case, On and Off-siteERP and Information to Public.


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PHA in PETRONAS

As part of PETRONAS HSE/S MS program,

PHA is now made a mandatory for examplePetrochemical complex facility- to provide a

framework for a structured approach toassessing risks, and

Decisions are based on systematic analysis ofrisks and identification to reduce risks as low as

reasonably practicable.


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Course Objectives

Provide an understanding of Process SafetyManagement (PSM) framework and necessaryProcess Hazard Analysis (PHA) requirements in

Applied Hazard Processes.

Introduce commonly used tools and techniquesavailable for Hazard Identification and Risk

Assessment used in conducting HAZOP analysis.

Develop the necessary knowledge to understand whatare the fundamental elements to consider in dealingwith risky activities of Hazardous Installations, by the

review of two major incidents in Oil & Gas Industries.


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Course ObjectivesDay 1

Part 1 - Introduction to hazards, risks, and theirmanagement

Part 2 - Overview of the Process Safety Management(PSM) framework

Part 3Overview of the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)process, in particular HAZOP studies

Part 4 - Linking Controls through the SafetyManagement System (SMS)

Part 5Case Studies


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Part 1

Hazard & Risk, and theirmanagement


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Past Oil and Gas and Processing IndustryAccidents

Flixborough, 1974

Cyclohexane explosion 28 killed

Bophal, 1984

Methyl-isocyanate (MIC)

release More than 2000 killed

Pasadena, 1989

Polyethylene explosion

23 killed Piper Alpha, 1988

Hydrocarbon explosion

167 killed


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Accident Cost Iceberg

From the financialpoint of view, costsresulting fromdeath and injuryare just a fraction

of the overallfinancial impact ona business


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Definitions

HARM - Physical injury or damage to health, damage tothe property or/and damage to the environment

HAZARDA source of harm to human lives

SAFETYFreedom from danger/harm, the inverse of risk

Examples of hazard:

- Ethylene inventory in storage sphere

- High pressure steam

- Heavy vehicle movements onsite

(Note: Loss of containment is the realization of the hazard)


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Examples of NaturalDisasters

Natural DISASTERS

Tsunamis

Earthquakes Windstorms (typhoons, hurricanes, cyclones,

etc.)

Floods

Volcanic Eruptions

Meteor strikes

Man-made DISASTERS can be equallybad.


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Definitions

ACCIDENTSAn event resulting from theactual realisation of a hazard, resulting ininjuries and damages.

They may be due to sudden unintendeddeviations from normal operatingconditions, in which some degree of harm is

caused.

Sometimes a neutral term eventor

incidentis used in place of accident


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Definitions

RISKThe likelihood of a specific undesired event tooccur within a specified period or specified circumstances

Example:

1. Undesired Event: Car breakdown and stranded in remote

area or at nightLikelihood: Once in 5 years

Risk: Stranded in remote area/at night once in 5 years

2. Undesired Event: Gas explosion in congested processing

area and injuryLikelihood: Once in 20 years

Risk: Injury from gas explosion once in 20 years


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Risk - Exercise

Rank the risk(High, Medium or Low) of the following

activities or technologies and compare your ranking withthose of a risk professional

Driving a motor vehicle

Smoking

Driving a motorcycles

Swimming

Working in large construction site

Commercial aviation Fire fighting

Traveling by rail

Working in a nuclear power station

Skiing


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Aspects of Risk

1.Time element involved

2.Two-dimensional (Severity / Likelihood)

3.Ascribed quantity (does not exist as a

measurable quantity)

4.It is a probability and hence associated

with uncertainty


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Understanding Risk Really answering a series of questions:

What can go wrong? (Identification)

How likely is it to go wrong? (Likelihood)

How bad can it get if it does go wrong(Severity)

Do I need to worry about it?

What are my options for the Controlmeasures?

What is my last course of action? ( quickDecision making)

Analysis of actual accidents has shown that oneor more of the questions above had not beenaddressed adequately by an organization.


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How Low is Low Enough?

How do we know that a risk is low enough to beacceptable?

Risk is not an absolute quantity, it is relative. Therefore,we need some measures of risk, so that relative riskscan be compared.

Risk of an event can only be understood in comparisonwith other risks.


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Risk Measurement

Risk measurement can be qualitative, semi-quantitativeor quantitative

Overall process is generally the same, the difference liesin the approaches to frequency and consequenceevaluation

This difference is reflected in how risks are presentedand mitigation measures evaluated


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Objectives of Risk Measurement

To identify and rank risks in the order of importance

To provide an objective comparison of risk

To help decisions about risk acceptability (compareagainst set criteria)

To help capital project decisions.


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Qualitative Risk Representation Risk Matrix Approach

(next slide contains categories)


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Qualitative Risk Representation


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Risk Matrix ManagementPhilosophy

Do not have risks in Very High category.

Reduce to at least High level.

Reduce High risks to lower levels, or at least to

ALARP level.

Reduce Medium risks to Low where possible,

or at least to ALARP level.

Manage residual risk through

effective SMS.


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Part 2

Overview ofProcess SafetyManagement

(PSM)


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Proactive Approach RiskManagement

If you do not manage your risks, theyll

manage you

Need to conduct systematic risk assessment

Need to develop the appropriate risk profile

Need to coordinate and manage a setof activitiesthat control the risks


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Process Safety Management(PSM)

Process Safety Management (PSM) is an OccupationalHealth and Safety Authority (OSHA) standard.

Petronas has implemented a Process SafetyManagement (PSM) framework based upon the OSHAstandard. All Petronas sites are required to comply withand meet the requirements and expectations of thestandard.

The PSM standard contains the requirements for themanagement of hazards associated with processesusing hazardous chemicals to help assure safe and

healthful workplaces.


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Process Safety Management(PSM)

Clarifies the responsibilities of employers andcontractors involved in work that affects or takes placenear processes to ensure the safety of employees,contractors and public

Requires a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) review.The PHA is a thorough, orderly, and systematic reviewof what could go wrong and what safeguards must be

implemented to prevent releasesof hazardouschemicals

The PHA methodology must be appropriate to thecomplexity of the process.


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Process Safety Management (PSM)

Mandates:

1.Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

2.Establishing normal process operating limits -Critical Operating Parameters (COPs) and Key

Performance Indicators (KPIs)3.Procedures for all phases of operation i.e. routine

operation, start-up, maintenance, abnormal andemergency operation and emergency shutdown

4.Employee and contractor selection, training, andcompetency standards

5.Communication and consultation with employees

6.Pre-start-up reviews


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Process Safety Management (PSM)

Mandates (cont.)

7.Management of Change for processes,permit systems, temporary operationprocedures

8.Evaluation of mechanical integrity ofcritical equipment

9.Emergency action planning, drills, andresponse

10.Investigation of incidents involvingreleases or near misses

11.PSM Framework and SMS complianceauditing


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Why Process SafetyManagement (PSM)?

Regulatory requirement

Duty of careto protect the healthand safety of employees and the

public, and the environment from theactivities of the company

Minimise business interruption

Allocate resources in a timely andcost effective manner


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Part 3

Process Hazard Analysis

(PHA) TechniquesTo be considered


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Process Hazard Analysis

A Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a thorough, orderly,and systematic review of what could go wrong and whatsafeguards must be implemented to prevent releases ofhazards chemicals

The Process Hazard Analysis is used to manage processsafety by: Identifying hazards and their control relationships;

Characterizing the hazards in terms of potential consequences, theirlikelihood of occurrence;

Gives insight by providing relative risk levels, and their tolerability asindividual hazards or as a collective against common criteria;

Identifying key control measures used to control these hazar

The PHA methodology must be appropriate to the

complexity of the process.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)


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Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)Process

Risk Assessment

Define the context

Hazard Identification

Risk Analysis

Risk Evaluation

Treating Risk

Mon

itor

andReview

Training,Su

pportand

Commun

ication


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Define Context

The PHA Framework requires The context to beframed. This refers to the following activities:

Involving the appropriate people at the appropriatestages (consultation, involvement of designers,

operators, maintainers, contractors, specialistconsultants)

Defining the exact purpose of the study, the generalapproach that will be taken, and how the results will be

used Gathering and preparation of the necessary information,

and

Identification of plant / activity areas to be assessed

The PHA methodology must be appropriate to the


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Define Context

The following information is generally useful / required atsome point in the process:

Safety Management System Information (corporatepolicies, risk criteria, design philosophies, manning

philosophies, training philosophies) Plant design information (design basis, hazard

registers, civil & mechanical, capacity and inventory)

Process technology information (materials,

flammability, toxicity, process chemistry, materials ofconstruction, P&IDs, electrical classifications,operating procedures)

Process Safety Information (interlocks, detection, or

suppression systems and relief system design


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Hazard Identification (HAZID)

A systematic review of the system to identify the type ofinherent hazards that are present, together with theways in which they could be realised (what can gowrong and under what circumstances)

The Hazard Identification (HAZID) identifies ControlMeasures (CM) both on the prevention and protectionside of the Event Sequence

Documentation and knowledge generated in this phase

of the PHA is crucial for effective Risk Assessment.


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Hazard Identification (HAZID)Hazard Identification has the following

objectives:

Determine the type and range of hazardousconsequences

Determine the Event Sequence that could lead toa Major Accident Event

Initial evaluation of the significance of theidentified hazards including consideration of

existing / proposed safeguards Remember: Unidentified hazards may

undermine the effectiveness of the whole PHAprocess

H d Id ifi i I id


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Hazard IdentificationIncidentEvent Sequence

The incident event sequence consists of:

Initiating eventsequipment or componentfailures / human actions

Hazardous incidents - loss of containment / lossof control

Outcome events - fire / explosion / toxic gasrelease

Incident consequences - immediate physicaleffects / ultimate harm to vulnerable targets

(people, property,environment)

Incident escalation


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HAZARD

IDENTIFICATION

Databases

Previous work

Experience

Site visits Failure casesand consequences

Safety systems

Assumptions

Plant facilities

INPUT OUTPUTPROCESS

Hazard Identification Methodology


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Site Inspection

Brainstorming

What-if Techniques (SWIFT)

Checklists / Scenario based studies (i.e. HAZID)

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); or

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Hazard Identification (HAZID)Techniques


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HAZOPDefinition & History

It is a design review technique used for hazardidentification and design deficiencies which maygive rise to operability problems.

It is commonly applied where the operationsinvolved can be hazardous and theconsequences of failure to control the hazardsmay be significant in term of damage to life, the

property and the environment


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HAZOPDefinition & History

It was developed in the UK Chemical andPetrochemical industries in 1977, in orderto assess the safety of complex plant and

processes which had significant hazardpotential.

It has been used extensively since then insafety studies for industrial, nuclear andchemical plant, including offshoreinstallations.


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It is a systematic technique for identifying hazards andoperability problems;

Consider various deviations from design intent byapplication of guidewords;

Identifies possible causes of these deviations;

Evaluates existing safeguards;

Recommends actions, if necessary, to overcome theproblems identified; and

Record results, including making recommendations.Note that it is not very effective for mechanical failure or loss

of containment hazards, but more effective for processhazards

Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)techniques


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HAZOP Guidewords

NO MORE

LESS

PART OF

AS WELL AS

REVERSE

OTHER THAN

Flow

Temperature

Pressure

Level

Chemical comp.

Physical state

No Less More Reverse

Other

X

X

X

X

X

X

XX

X

X

X

X

X X

Type of use: normal

start-up

shutdown


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The HAZOPMethodology

HAZOP Completed

Repeat for all Sub-Systems

Repeat for other Guide Words

Decide on any required Actions

Assess Safeguards

Examine Consequences

Examine Possible Causes

Deviation

Apply a Guide Word

Select a Sub-System of chosenSystem (e.g. feed line to vessel)

Select a System


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Framework for Risk Acceptability

Unacceptable region

Risk cannot be justified

save in extraordinarycircumstances

Tolerable only if riskreduction is

impracticableor if its cost is grosslydisproportionate to theimprovement gained

Necessary to maintain

assurance that riskremains at this level. Thisis also part of ALARP

The ALARPdemonstration

region(Risk is tolerableonly if ALARPdemonstrated)

Broadly Acceptableregion

(No need for detailedworking to demonstrateALARP)

Negligible Risk

DIVERGING LINES

INDICATING

INCREASING RISK

Intolerable Risk


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Part 4

Linking Hazard Control Measuresto the Safety Management

System (SMS)

Awareness

Elements of a Safety Management System


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Elements of a Safety Management System

A number of different SMS models exist. Almost all ofthem use the same set of elements:1. Organisation and responsibility;

2. Employee selection, competency, involvement & communication;

3. Process safety information documentation and informationmanagement;

4. *Risk management (Hazard Identification, risk assessment andcontrols);

5. Safety and integrity in design, construction and commissioning;

6. Operations and maintenance (associated procedures, inspection,testing and monitoring);

7. Management of change;

8. Emergency preparedness and response;

9. Management of third party services (procurement, contractors,others);

10. Incident reporting, investigation and follow-up;

11. Audits and corrective actions, including health surveillance; and

12. Management review for continual improvement.

Implementation of Process Hazard


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Implementation of Process HazardAnalysis (PHA) into the Safety

Management System (SMS) All Hazards identified by the Process Hazard Analysis

(PHA) must be recorded in Hazard Registers that form partof the Safety Management System (SMS).

All control measures identified by the PHA must be

managed by elements of the Safety Management System(SMS).

Essential control measures identified through the PHArequire Performance Standards, Performance Indicators,

Testing regimes etc. The lifecycle risk management process ensures that this

occurs from project conception through to the end ofoperational life / decontamination.


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Implementation of Process Hazard Analysisinto the Safety Management System

Tools / activities commonly comprising parts ofthe Safety Management System (SMS) include:

Training and skills competency management plans Operating / maintenance procedures

Maintenance management systems

Inspection, Verification, Audits

Emergency Response Plans (ERP)

I l i f SMS


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Implementation of SMS Plan

- Ensure procedures are developed- Ensure work instructions are complete

- Develop training modules

Do

- Conduct training

- Start using procedures

- Provide assistance initially in using the

procedures correctly

Check

- Verify that procedures are understood- Verify procedures are used correctly

Act

- Start using procedures routinely

- Hold feedback meetings and takeremedial actions until system is satisfied.

Do

CheckAct

Plan

Some Problems with Implementation into


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pthe SMS

Safety culture conflicts with managementinitiative

Lack of understanding of hazards

Lack of adequate resources

Lack of adequate skills

Poor perception of the importance of SMS,seen as unnecessary extra work

Not understanding the difference betweenProcess Safety and Occupational Safety

Features of a Safety


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Features of a SafetyManagement System*

* Ref: Safety Case Guidelines, NOPSA, Australia, 2004


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Part 5

Case Studies

Examples


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Case Histories of Past Incidents Lessons can be learnt from the following:

- Case histories of past incidents in the companysfacilities

- Case histories of incidents in the offshoreindustry worldwide

- Investigation reports of past incidents Understand the causes of the incidents and relate to

the appropriate SMS element/ procedure

Identify if recommendations from previous

investigations are applicable to ones own system Take action to ensure these gaps areeliminated

BP Refinery Explosion Texas USA


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BP Refinery ExplosionTexas, USA2006 - 1

March 2006Major explosion in a petroleum refinery

operated by BP in Texas City

15 fatalities, 170 injuries, extensive property damage

US Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Boardinvestigation resulted in the Baker Report

Major Areas of Improvement identified in the Baker

Report

Corporate Safety Culture

- Process safety leadership and accountability

- Employee empowerment and communication

- Lack of resources and high overtime rates- Toleration of deviations from safe SOP.

LESSONS FROM TEXAS CITY


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LESSONS FROM TEXAS CITY23RDMARCH 2005

Baker report findings related to PSM system:

Systemic failures in process risk identification, assessment andanalysis;

Failure in compliance with Safety Standards; Lack of adequate process safety knowledge and competence at all

levels;

Failure to set measurable criteria for process safety management;

Delays in implementation of external good practice.

NOTE: We in LR have global strength as well as localexpertise to help our clients benefit from the lessons ofthe Texas City accident.

LESSONS FROM TEXAS CITY


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LESSONS FROM TEXAS CITY23RDMARCH 2005

Business impacts:

$21 million in fines for safety breaches byRegulator.

$ 2 billions in CAPEX and OPEX toimplement required changes in the first 2years.

Senior managers ( including RefineryManagers, Country Managers, BusinessStream Managers and CEOs ) are no

longer working at BP.


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Case Study: The Piper Alpha

DisasterWorth Noting


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Background In 1988, Britain suffered one of its worst industrial

disasters when the Piper Alpha oil platform wasdestroyed by fire and explosion, resulting in 167fatalities

The catastrophe caused significant changes to the

manner by which safety was regulated and managed inthe U.K. offshore oil industry


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What Happened?

The Piper Alpha platform was operated by OccidentalPetroleum Ltd.

The platform was linked to the adjacent installationsTartan, Claymore and the MCP01 by sub-sea pipelines

Immediate cause of the accident was due tocommunication problems relating to shift handover andPermit to work procedures. Night shift workers unawareof the safety valve of a condensate pump was removed

An ignition of gas leaking from the blank flange causedfire. Fire spread rapidly and later a major explosionoccurred due to rupturing of pipeline carrying gas to Piperfrom nearby Tartan platform

Off h I t ll ti M (OIM) Pi


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Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) on PiperAlpha

The OIM on Piper Platform did not attempt to call inhelicopters; or to communicate with vessels around theinstallation; or with the shore or other installations; or withpersonnel on the Piper

One survivor said that at one stage people were shoutingat the OIM and asking for instructions and procedures.

Reasons for OIM inadequate leadership and poordecision making:

- The OIM would have been under considerable stressas he was in a situation which he had not been properlytrained.

- Smoke inhalation might had weakened hisability totake decisive action and command.

The Response on the Claymore


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The Response on the ClaymorePlatform

The OIM on Claymore Platform refused the OperatingSuperintendents request to shut down the main oilline, the OIM wanted to maintain production

The OIM was reluctant to take the responsibility forshutting down oil production

The delay in Claymores shutdown was deemed to

have exacerbated the situation on Piper

The Response on the Tartan


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The Response on the TartanPlatform

The Tartan OIM failed to shutdown his oil and gasproduction with sufficient speed.

An explosion on Piper was caused by the gas riser

pipeline from Tartan fracturing and pouring morehydrocarbons onto the already blazing platform.

OIM had not been trained in emergency response for

an event of this magnitude.

Crucial Role of an On Scene


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Crucial Role of an On-SceneCommanders

The ability of site managers of remote, hazardoussites to command of an emergency should be good.

Site managers in high-risk industries may haveseveral hundred staff under their charge and therefore

have to act as the on-scene commander should anemergency arise.

Decisions taken in the opening minutes of a siteincident can prevent an emergency escalating into a

crisis.Note that how crucial it is to train the Site Manager as

the On-scene Commander during the EMERGENCY!

Piper Alpha Accident


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Piper Alpha Accident Re-connected a pump still under maintenance without adequate

checks)condensate release

No blast wallonly firewall, which failed in the explosion in moduleC and damaged fire pumps (firewater pumps could not operate,loss of power, control room failure, alarm failure, radiotelecommunication room failure)

Rupture of firewall between modules B & C, and pipe rupture inmodule B, large crude leak and fire

Smoke and gas into living quarters, no order to evacuate

Escalation continuedriser failure (Tartan to Piper Alphanotshut down)

No alternative escape available except jumping into sea. Most ofthose who jumped survived.

Living quarters collapsed into sea

167 lives lost on platform, and 2 rescuers

Piper Alpha Accident (cont )


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Piper Alpha Accident (cont.) Permit to work failure/ not followed

Ad hoc decision to keep production goingno hazard identificationof decisions

Poor designNo blast wall between modules to prevent escalation

Poor designEmergency systems not protected from incidents

Living quarters was the temporary refugeno integrity assessment

(smoke was allowed to ingress) Emergency equipment did not workdeluge nozzles blocked

Emergency response procedures failure, no order to evacuateplatform

A number of new contractorsnot familiar with procedures Auditing was ineffectivedid not identify deficiencies


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Lessons Learnt from Piper Alpha Most of the Piper Alpha workforce made their way to the

accommodation, according to emergency procedures, wherethey expected someone would be in charge and would leadthem to safetybut they were let down

The Public Inquiry chaired by Lord Cullen criticised theperformance of Piper Alpha OIM, as well as the OIMs on duty on

the adjacent Claymore and Tartan platforms, on the night of thedisaster

The Public Inquiry Report recommended:

Safety Management System should include an operatorscriteria for the selection of OIMs and their command ability

A system of exercises should be used to train OIMs and theirdeputies in decision making during emergency situations


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Concluding Remark

As an experienced engineer, I believe that everysuccessful Organizational Enterprise inbusiness, especially those in hazardous andrisky installations, or even Institution of HigherLearning should be able to demonstrate itsexcellence in SMS practices.

After all, it is now a legal requirement.

And there are so much to be gained byimplementing SMS.


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CONCLUSION

END OF PRESENTATION

(Question & Answer Session)

TERIMA KASIH

day 1 - the use of hazop techniques in applied hazard processes

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