david lloyd george ; 'memoirs of the peace conference'; 1939; chapter xxiii; the turkish treaty -...

8/10/2019 David Lloyd George ; 'Memoirs of the Peace Conference'; 1939; Chapter XXIII; The Turkish Treaty - Palestine.

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THE AUTHOR AT WORK

Memoirsof the

Peace ConferenceBy

David Lloyd George

VOLUME11

W IT H R W NGO h :lt1 College

Goo d L ib rary

F E B 2 6 Q 9

NEWHAVEN Per iod ica lsAuth .

YALEUNIVERSITYRESS

1939


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CHA PT ER XXII I

THE TURKIS H TREATY continued )

PA L ESTINE

T HE inte n tion of t h e All ied Powers regarding t h e future ofPa lestine up to t h e end of 1916 are prac tica ll y e m bod iedin the Sykes -Pico t Ag ree m en t. T h e co un try was to bemuti lated and torn i nt o sectio n s. There wo ul d b e no m ore Pa les -ti n e. Ca n aan was to be draw n and q u arte red. B ut 1917 saw acom pl e te change in th e at titud e of the nat io n s towa rd s thi shistoric land. It was no longer t h e end of a p ip e -lin e h ere , th eterminus of a ra ilway t h e re , a hu dd led col lec ti o n o f shrin es ov e rwhich Christian and Mosle m sec ts wrang led und e r th e p ro tec tion

of three great powe rs in eve ry q u arte r . It was a h is toric and asacred land, throb b ing fro m Dan to Be e rshe b a wi th immor tal


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722 MEMOI R S O F T HE P EA CE C ONF ER EN CE

Palestine, if recaptured, must be one and indivi sible to renewit s g rea tness as a li vi n g ent it y.

The next factor which produced a momentous change was th edec is ion t o co m e to ter m s w ith J ewry, w h ich was clamouring foran opportun it y to make Canaan once more the homeland of t h e irrace. T h e re a re more Ir is hm en living o u tside Ireland tha n dwe ll

in t h e old coun try . S till , I reland is the homeland of the Ir ishp eo pl e. No o n e imag ined th a t th e 1 4 00 0 0 00 of Jews sca tt e redover th e g lobe cou ld find room and a l iving in Pa lestine. Ne v e r-th e less thi s race o f wanderers soug h t a national hearth an d are fu ge fo r th e h un ted c hil d ren o f I srael in t h e country w hichth e splendour of the ir s pi ritual genius has made for ever g lori o us.

It seems s trap 'ge to say th at the Germans were the fi rs t torea lise t h e wa r value of t h e Jews of the dispersal . In Po land itwas th ey w h o h e lp ed th e German Army to conque r th e Cz a risto ppr essor who h ad so crue lly persecuted thei r race. T h ey hadth e ir i nf lue n ce in ot h er lands-notably in America, w h er e someof t h ei r most powerful leaders exerted a retarding influen c e onP res iden t W ilson's impu lses in the direction of the A llie s . TheGe rman General Staff in 1916 urged the Turks to conce d e thede m ands of t h e Zionists in respect of Palestine. Fort un ate ly theTurk was too stupid to understand or too sluggish to move.T h e fact t h at Brit a in at last opened her eyes to t h e o pp or tunityafforded to the Allies to rally this powerful people to the i r sidewas attributab le to the initiative, the assiduity and t h e f e rv ourofone of the greatest Hebrews of all t ime: Dr. Chaim Wei zm ann.He found his opportunity in this War of Nations to adva nc e thecause to whichhe had consecrated his life. Dr. Weizmann e nlistedmy adhesion to his ideals at a time when, at my request , h e was

successfully applying his scientific skill and imagination t o sav eBritain from a real disaster over the failure of wood alco h o l fo rthe manufacture of cordite. In addition to the gratitude I f e ltfor him for this service, he appealed to my deep reverence for th egreat men of his race who were the authors of the sub lime lite ra-ture upon which I was brought up. I introduced him to M r.Balfour, who was won over completely by his charm, hi s p e r-suasiveness and his intel lectual power. Dr. Weizmann t hen

T HE T UR KI SH T REATy -P ALEST I NE 7 23

brought to his aid the eager and active inf lu ence of L or d M iln e r ,Lord Robert Cecil, and Genera l Smuts.

During the summer of 1917, Mr. Balfour, wit h my zealousassent as Prime Minister, entered into nego ti a ti o n s w ith LordRothschild on the subjec t of the Zionist aims. Ul tim ately it isrecorded that the War Cabinet on September 3 rd, 1917, h ad

under consideration correspondence w h ich had passed b e tw ee nthe Secretary of State for Foreign Affai rs and L o rd R ot h sc hild o nthe quest ion of the pol icy to be adopted towards th e Zioni s tmovement . That po licy was afte r pro longed e nquir y a nd r e fl e x-ion decided by the Cab in e t on m er its, an d I h ave no doubt inmy mind that some suc h p rov is ion wou ld b y co mmo n con se nt ofall the Allied Powers h ave b ee n in ser ted i n th e P eace Tr eaty ev enhad there been no previous p ledge o r p romi se . But th e ac tualtime of the declaration was de te rmi ne d by co n s id e ration s of warpol icy. It was part of our propaga nd is t s tr a tegy for mobi lizingevery opinion and force throug hout th e w orld w hich wouldweaken the enemy and improve t h e All ied cha n ces. Propa g andaon both sides probably p layed a g rea te r part i n the last warthan in any other . As an illustrat io n I mi g ht tak e the publicdeclarations we made of the A lli ed int entio n to libe ra te and con-fer self-government on nationa li ties in s id e th e en emy Empire s, -Turkey, Germany, and Aus tr ia. T h ese a nnounc ements w ere in-tended to have a propagandist e ff ec t, n o t on ly a t hom e , but alsoin neutral countries and per h a p s m os t of a ll in enemy countri e s.

On principle, the democrat ic P owe rs of Europ e and Americahad always advocated emancipa tion of th e s ubject rac es h el ddown by the great Empires. But we were a lso awa re that th eproclamat ion of l iberat ion as part of our war ai m s wou ld h e lp

to disintegrate the solidarity of the enemy coun tr ies, and so i tdid. It would have the effect of detaching f rom the governingraces in those countries Poles, Alsace-Lor rainers, Czechoslo-vakians, Croat ians, Roumans and Arabs dwel ling wi thin t h eboundaries of the Central Empi res.

The Alliesredeemed the promises made in these dec la rati o n s tothe full. No race has done better out of th e fid e li ty wi th w hichthe Allies redeemed their promises to the o ppr es sed races than


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MEMO IRS O F THE PEA C E C ON FE RE NC E

th e Arabs. Owing to the trem e ndous sacrif ic e s of the Alliedn ations, and more particularly of Britain and h er Empir e, th eArabs ha ve alr e ad y won ind e p e n de nc e in I r a q , A rab ia , Sy ri a, a ndTran s- Jordani a, althou g h mo s t of t h e A ra b r aces fo ught through -out th e War for their Turkish oppr es sor s . Arabia wa s the onlyexception in that r es p e ct . Th e Pal esti n ia n A ra bs fought forTurkish rul e.

Th e Balfour D eclaration repr e sented th e convinced policy ofall parti es in our countr y and also in Am e ric a, but the launchin gof it in 1917 was du e, as I hav e s aid , to prop ag andist r easons . Ishould like onc e more to remi n d the British public , who may behe s itating about th e burdens of our Zioni s t D e clar a tion to-da y,of th e actu a l war po .non at th e time of that D e claration. W e ar e

now looking at the War through the dazzling glowof a triumphante nd, but in 1917 the i s sue of th e W ar w a s s till v e ry much indoubt . W e w e re con v inced -but not all of u s-that w e wouldpull through victoriously , but the G e rmans wer e e qually per-suaded that victory would r e st on th e ir bann e rs, a nd th ey h a dmuch r e a so n f o r c o min g to that co n clusi o n . Th ey h a d sm as h e dth e R o umanian s. Th e Ru ss ian A rm y w as compl e tel y demor a lisedby its num erou s d e fe at s . Th e Fr e nch Arm y was ex haus ted a ndte mpor ar il y un e qual to s trik in g a g rea t bl ow. T h e It a l ia n s hadsustai ne d a s hatt er in g d e feat at C apor e tt o. T h e u n lim ited s ub-

marin e c ampai g n had sunk millio ns o f t o n s o f o u r sh ipp in g . Th erewe re no Amer ican div is ions a t th e f ront, an d w h e n I say at t h e

front , I mean avai lab le i n th e t re n c h es . For th e A ll ies th ere we retw o p ar am o unt problems a t that tim e. Th e fir s t was that th eCe ntral P owe rs s ho u ld b e bro ken b y th e blocka de b efo re ou rsu ppli es of fo od an d esse ntial ra w m a te r ia l we re cu t o f f b y sin k in g so f o ur o wn ship s. Th e oth e r w as that the w a r pr e par a ti ons in theU nited Sta tes s h o ul d be s p ee d ed up t o su ch an extent as to ena b leth e A lli es to b e ade q ua te ly re in fo rce d in th e c rit ical c am paign of

1918 by A m e ri c an t roops . In the s o luti o n of th ese tw o prob le ms ,pub l ic o p in ion in Russ ia a nd America pl ayed a gr eat par t, andwehad every reason at that t im e to be lieve t h a t in both cou n tr iesth e f riend liness o r h o st ility of t h e Je wi sh ra ce m ig h t m a k e aco n sidera bl e dif ferenc e .

T h e so lut ion of Ge rm a n y's f ood and raw mat e rial difficultiesde p end ed on the a ttitude of Russia and the goodwill ofits peopl e .W e -re ali se d , a nd so di d th e G e rman s, that Rus sia could take nofurth e r part in th e Wa r w ith h e r a rm y, but the q u estion was:wh e n w o uld sh e c onclud e p e ac e with G e rmany and what manner

of p eac e w ould it b e ? Tim e count e d for both sides , and the condi-tions a nd th e te mper o f th e peace b e twee n G e rmany and Russiac ounted e ven mor e . Would th e peac e b e of a kind which wou lda fford f ac iliti es fo r th e G e rman s to sec ur e s uppli e s of grain , oil,a nd copp e r from the imm ea surable natur a l r e sources of t h at vastand rich country , or would it b e a sulky pact which wou ld a lways

stand in the w a y of Germany 's att e mpt to replenis h her st or esfrom Russian resource s? In th e former cas e, we cou ld not h opefor a bett e r issue of the War than a stalemate after a n o th e r yea ror two of carna ge . In the latter case, the strang leh o ld of ourfleet would b e ef fective , and the Central Powers wo ul d bedeprived of es sential food and material and the ir wil l and powerof resi s tance would b e weakened to a breaking-poi n t. T h e G er - r _mans w ere e quall y alive to the fact that the Jews of R u ssiawielded considerable influence in Bo lshev ik c ircl es. T h e Z io n istMovement was exceptionally strong in Russia a nd Ame ri ca . Th eGermans wer e, th e refore , e ngaged actively in courting favour withthat Mov e m e nt all over the world. A frien dl y R u ss ia wou ld meann ot onl y mor e food and raw mate r ial for Ge rm a n y and Aus tria,b ut f e w e r G e rman a nd Austrian troops on t h e Eastern front and ,th e re for e, mor e ava ilabl e fo r the W e st . These cons iderations wer O J

b rou g ht t o our notic e by the Foreign Office, and re p orted to theWa r Cabi n e t.

T h e s upport of the Zioni s ts f o r th e cause of the Ent e nte wouldme an a g re a t d ea l a s a w a r measure. Quite naturally Jewishsym p at h ies we re to a g rea t exte nt a nti -Ru ssi a n , a nd th ere for e infavou r of t h e Ce ntr a l Po we rs . N o a ll y of Rus s ia , in fact , couldesc a pe s h a rin g th a t imm e diat e a nd in ev itable pen a lty for thelo n g and savage Ru ss ian per secution o f th e Jewi sh ra ce. Inaddition to t hi s, th e G erm a n G e neral Staff , w ith their wid e out -lo ok on p oss ib iliti es, ur g e d , e arly in 1916, th e advantages ofpro m isi ng J ewis h r est oration to Pal e stin e und e r an arra n gemen t

TH E T U R K ISH TRE A Ty-P A LESTINE


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MEMO IRS OF THE PEACE CON F ERENCE

to be made between Zio nists and Turkey, backed by a Germanguarantee. The pract ical difficult ies were considerable; the sub-ject wa s perhaps dangerous to German relations with Turkey;and t he Ger man Government acted cautiously. B ut the schemewas by no means rejected or even shelved, and at any momen tthe Allies might have bee n forestal led in offer ing this supreme bid.

In fact in Septe mber, 1917, the German Governme nt were makingvery seri ous efforts to captu re the Zionis t Movement .

Another most cogent reason for the adoption by the Allies ofthe policy of the declara tion lay in the state of R ussia herself.Russia n Jews ha d been secret ly active o n beha lf of the Ce ntralPowe rs from the first; they had become t he chief age nts of Germanpacifist propaganda in Russia; by 1917 they had done m uch inpreparing for that' general disintegration of R ussian society,later recognised as the Revolution. It was believed that if GreatBrit ain dec lared for the fulfilment of Zio nist aspirations i nPalestine under her own p ledge, one effect would be to bring

Russian Jew ry to the cause of the Entente.It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have apote nt influence upon wor ld Jewry ou tside Russia, and sec ure forthe Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. In America,their aid in this respect would have a special value when theAllies had almost exhausted the gold and marketable sec uritiesavai lable for American purchases . Such were the chief considera-tions which, in 1917, impel led the Brit ish Government towardsmaking a cont ract with Jewry.

Men like Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil , andmyself were in whole-hearted sympathy with the Zionist ideal .The same thing applied to all the lea~rs of public opinion inour country and in the Dominions, Conservative, Liberal, andLabour. The re were only one or two who were no t so favourab lyinclined to the policy. One, in particular, doubted the wisdo mfrom the lewish point of view; that was Mr . Edwin M ontag u.Lord Curzon , whilst p rofess ing a certain measure of inte rest inZioni st d reams, was anxious not to exc ite una ttainable hopes inthe breasts of Jewish zealots . He doubted the feasibility of anysubstanti al achievement because of the bar renness of the Pales-

T HE T UR KI SH T RE ATy - PAL E ST INE 2

tinian soil . He prepared a careful statement of his o pinion, whichcan be read with interest to-day in view of developmen ts inPalestine since the War. It is written in Lord Curzo n's best andmost charac terist ic style . There is a great fund o f detailedknowledge of his subject, acquired by a study of the a uthorit ieson the matter; stimu lated by a flying visit thro ugh the country

in his youthful days. But he had, by instinct and i nheritance,profo und distrust of t he success of any bold exper iment designedto change exist i ng conditions . The wr iting has much dis tinctionof phras ing. I t is also l ig htened by some amus ing pass ages.

THE FUTURE OF PALEST INE

I am not concer ned to discuss the question in d ispute betw een the '---- __Zion ist and anti-Zion is t Jews, viz ., whether i t is pos sible to reconcilethe reco nstitution o f a nat ional home for the Jew ish race in Palestinewith the co nten ted ass imilation of many millions of Jews in othercountries w here they have acq uired natio nality and made a home.

I am o nly intereste d in the more immediately practical quest ions : a What is the meaning of the phrase a N ational Home for t he

Jewis h Race i n Palestine, a nd what is the nature of the ob ligationthat wesha ll assume ifwe acce pt thi s as a principle of Brit ish po licy?

b If such a po licy be pur sued what are the chances ofi ts s uccessfulrealisatio n?

For i mportant as may be the political reasons (a nd they seem to mealmost exc lusively po litical) for adopt ing such a l ine of action, weought at least to consider w hether we are encouraging a pra cticableideal , or preparing the way for d isappo intment and fai lure .

I f I seek guidance fro m the latest collection of circulated pap ers(The Zionist Movement, G.-I6 4 ) I f ind a fundamental disagreeme ntamong the authori ties quoted there as to th e scop e and nat ure of theiraim . A Nationa l Home for the Jewish race or peo ple w ould seem ,if the words are to bear their ordinary meani ng, to i mply a place w herethe Jews can be reassembled as a na tion, and whe re they wi ll enjoythe privileges of an independent national existe nce. Such is clear y t~econcept ion of those who, l ike Sir A. Mond, speak of the creation mPalestine of an autonomous Jewish State, words which appear tocontemplate a State, i.e. a politica l entity, composed of Jews, governedby Jews, and administe red mainly in the in terest s of Jews. Such aState might natural ly be expected to have a capital , a form ofgo vern-ment , and institutions ofits own. It wou ld possesst he soi lo r the greaterpart ofthe soilofthe country. It would take its place a mong the small ernations of the earth.


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M EM OI RS O F T HE P EA CE C ON FE RE NC E

The same conception appea rs to u nde rlie several other of the phrasesemp loyed in t h ese papers, e.g., when weare to ld that Pales tine is to be -come a h o m e for the Jewish nation, a n ationa l home for the Jewishrace , a Jewish Palestine, and when we read of ' the resettlementof Pa lest ine as a natio n a l centre, and t h e restorat ion of Palest ine tothe Jewis h peop le . A ll these p hr ases a re variant s of t h e sa m e idea ,viz., the recr eat ion of Pa lestine as i t was before the days of t h e di s-

pe rsi o n .On t h e other hand, Lo rd Rot h schi ld, w h en h e speaks of Pa les tin e as

a home w h ere the Jews co u ld speak the ir own lang u age, h ave t h eirown e d ucat io n , their own civ il isation, a n d re ligi ous instit u tio n s u nd erthe p rotect io n of A lli ed Gove rnme n ts, seems to post u la te a mu c h l essd efin ite form of po lit ical ex istence, o n e, in deed, which i s q ui te co m -p ati bl e with th e existence of an al ien (so long as it is no t a T u rkish )Gover nm ent. ~

At t h e ot h er extreme the la te Lord Cro m er, w h o favo u red the Zion-ist c au se, ex pl a ins th at the res u sci tated Pa les tin e is on ly to be thespi ri tual cen tre of the Jews a n d a reservoi r of Jewish c ul tu re-a spi rat io n s wh ich are whol ly di fferent f rom t h ose w hi ch I h ave ju stre co rded, a nd w h ich appear to b e incompati bl e with t h e evol ut io n o f ac om p arat ive ly smal l and for the most part agric ul tural or past o ral

community.I cal l attention to these contradictions because they suggest so m e

hesita n cy in espousing a cause whose advocates have such very d if-ferent ideas of what they mean.

B u t I must proceed fur ther to point out that, whichever inte rpre ta-tion weadopt, Palestine would appear to be incapacitated by physica land other conditions from ever becoming in any real sense the natio n alhome of the Jewish people.

That people number, we are told, about 12 mil lions , sca ttered in a llpar ts of the world . Of this total, 9t mil lions are in Europe ( incl u di n g6 mi llions in Russia) and 2 millions in North America. The number i nthe United Kingdom is 245 000; the number a lready in Palestine was,before the war, 125 000 .

Now what is the capacity as regards populat ion of Pales tine wi th inany reasonable per iod of t ime? Under the Turks there isno such p laceor country as Palestine, because it is divided up between the sanjak o fJerusalem and the vilayets of Syria and Beirut . But l et us assume t h atin speaking of P a lestine in the present context we mean the oldScript ural Palest ine, ext endi ng from Dan t o Beersheba, i .e ., fromBani a s to Bir Saba . This is a country of less than 10 000 square miles,including 4 000 to the east of the Jordan, i .e ., it is a country which,excluding desert lands, is not muchbigger than Wales . Now Wales, in

T HE T UR KI SH T RE ATy- P ALEST I NE

spi te of having one city of nearly 200 000 p eop le, a n d t wo ot hers of200 000 between them, on ly supports a pop ul ation o f 2 000 000 per-

sons.Palestine, on the other hand, before the war contained a popul a tion

the highest estimate of which was between 6 00 0 0 0 and 7 00 000. per-sons, of which less than o n e-quar ter were Jews and th e rem ainder(exce p t for sma ll Chris t ia n communities or settlements) Mo sle ms . T~ e

Jews were to a large exte n t cong regated in the few tow ns , e .g. , mJer u sa lem , where, out of a total popu latio n of 8 0 000 5 5 000 wereJews-for t h e most par t l iving on al m s or chari ty,?r ol d me n co~e toend t heir days i n t he H o ly C ity. The Jewish col omes , a b o ut which somuc h h as b ee n sa id, co n ta ine d a p o pu la tion o f o n ly II,OOO. The re-mai n de r o f th e Jews w ere in the o th er towns a nd pa r ts of the countr y .

Sin c e t h e War th e T u rks h ave red u ce d th e co untr y t o a conditionof ab ject d eb ase m e n t. T h e Je w is h co loni es h ave eit her been di s-loca ted o r br o k e n u p , t h e var ious m is sio n ary est ablishments , exceptthe Ger m an a n d S pani sh , ha ve di sa ppe are d , the local inhabitants have _~ ~

been co n scripted an d to a la rge ext ent des troyed on the front, theurba n po p ula tio n s ha ve b e en re d uced to begga ry, and colonies ofTurk om an s, Circ ass ia rr s, K u rd s, a nd ot h er savage races have beenpla n te d ab o ut to h o l d the count ry in subjection .

Before th e W ar it was calcul a ted b y competent authorities who hadlived fo r ye ar s in the co untr y th a t for many years i t could not suppor tan increase d po pul a tio n . A fter the d ev as tation wrought by the War i twi ll be many deca d es bef o re we can contemplate a populat ion thatwi ll eve n r e mot e ly a pp ro x im at e t o t hat of Wales. This i s a positi on 1due n ot m erely to t he rava g es of wa r, but to the present physicalconditio n s of t h e cou nt ry, brough t about by centur ies of neglect and misrule. Before any c on si d erab le revival . can be expected there mustbe a colossal expe n dit ur e o n a ffo resta tion , on irr igat ion, on the re - ~bui lding of t h e broken-down te rrace s which former ly suppor ted the . -cultivation. The Scrip tu ral phrase, a lan d flowin g wit h mi lk andhoney, which suggests an abounding fertili ty, m us t b e rea d in relationto the deser t fea t u res of Sinai, to which it stood i n g lowi ng con trast ,and loses somewha t o f it s pi cturesque charm when we r eali se t h a t .~

the mi lk was that of t he fl ocks of goats that roamed, a nd s ti ll roam, - '- -------the hi lls, while the honey was the juice of the sma ll grape that wasused as a substi tute for sugar and sti ll makes a palatab le wine.

Furt her, let it be borne i n mi nd, when we speak o f thi s de v asta te dcountry as a natio n al home for a great peopl e , that in the s teamyJordan val ley no Europeans can live o r rear c h il dr e n , t ha t o nly thehigher parts of the country are suited for settle rs w h o co mefrom mor enortherly climes, that malaria, fever, oph tha lmi a, a n d o ther ailments


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MEMOI R S OF THE P EACE CONFERENCE

a?ound, not to be eradicated save by great outlay and after a longtime,

Palesti ne is, in fact, a poor land, containing no mineral wealth nocoa l, no iron ore, no copper, gold or si lver. I t depends ent irely on ' livestock ( i. e. ~ainly, goats, which cr op the bar e hills) and agriculture. I np~rts, b ut m parts only, where the re is sufficient water and a goodclimate, excellent crops of wheat and barley ar e pr oduced. Olive oil,sesame, and oranges are the chief expor ts .

.Suc h is the co u~try-a country calli ng for pr olonged and patienttoil from a peop le mured to agricu lture-and even so only ad mittin gafter gene rations of a relat ively sma ll pop ulation-that we are invited(if we ca n get hold of it, whic h we have not yet done) to convert i ntothe natio nal home of a people, num be ring many millions , brought f romother and different c limates, and to a large exte nt trained in ot her in-dustries and pro fessions .

There ar ises the -f~rt her question, w hat is to become of the peop leof thi s countr y, ass umin g the Turk to be ex pelled, and t he inhab itan tsnot to have been exterminated by t he Wa r? There are over hal f amill ion of the~e , Syr ian Arabs-a mixed co mmu nity wit h Arab, He-brew, Canaa mte, Greek, Egyptian, a nd possib ly Cr usaders' b lood.

They and their forefat hers have occupied the co untry for the bes t partof 1 50 0 years. They own the soi l, which belongs either to individ uallandowners or to v illage communities. They profess the Moham-medan faith. They wi ll not be content either to be expropriated forJewish immigrants, or to act merely as hewers of wood and drawersof water to the latter.

Further, ther e ar e other settler s who will have to be reckoned with .There are 100 000 Chr is tians , who will not wish to be disturbed ' eas tof the . Jor dan ar e large colonies of Cir cas sian Moham medans, fi rmlyes tablis hed; ther e ar e als o set .tlements of Druses and Moslems fro mAlgeria, Bulgaria, and Egypt .

~~ doubt a prodigal expenditure of wealth will secure the expro -pnation of some of these. But when we ref lect that the existing Jewi sh

colo~ies, in the most favoured spots, after a prodigious outlay, ex -tendmg over many years, have only in a few cases as yet become se lf-supporting, it is clear that a long vista of anxiety vicissitude an d. expense l ies before those who des ire to rebui ld the national home.

I spoke ~arlier of the dreams of those who foresee a Jewish Stat e,with possibly a Jewish capi ta l a t Jerusa lem. Such a dream is renderedwholly incapable of realis ation by the conditions of Jerusalem itself.It is . a city in which too many peoples and too many r eligions have ap~sslOnate and permanent inter es t to render any such solution eve ndimly possible . The Pr otestant communities are vitally interested in

/ THE TURKISH TR E ATy- P ALESTINEthe chur ches and in the countr y as the scenes of the most sacred eventsin history. The Roman Catholics co llect a nnually large s ums andmaintain extensive establishments at Jer usalem and Bet hlehem. TheGreek Orthodox Church regards the Holy Places with a n almostfr enzied reverence. Gr eat pilgrim ages come annually fr om t he Slavcountr ies and Russia . I recall a f lourishing Russ ian monas te ry onMount Tabor. The Hellenic c le rgy have la rge properties in the co untr y.

Finally, next to Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem is the most sa credcity of the Mohammedan faith. The Mosque of Oma r, on t he site ofthe Temple of Solomon, is one of t he most hallowed of t he shrines ofIslam. It contains the great rock o r stone, f rom whic h Mo hammedasce nded o n the back of his rilirac ulous steed to Heave n, and which isregar ded with so m uch awe in the Moslem wo rld that when, a fewyears ago, a n Englishma n was al leged to have been digging under i t,the uproar s pread throug hout the M oslem wo rld. It is impossible tocon template a ny future in which the Mo hamm edans should be ex-clude d from Jerusalem. H ebron is a sit e sca rcely less s acr ed to I slam.It is no dou bt fr om a full consciousness of the se fact s that the wisestof the Zion ists forgo any c laim to th e recovery of Jeru salem as thecentre a nd capita l of a revive d Jewish State, and hop e only that itmay remain as a so rt of enclave in intern ational, if not in British ,hands.

But is it not obvious that a c oun try w hich c annot within any ap-proximate period contain anyt hing but a small population, which ha salr eady an indigenous pop ulation of its own of a different race andcreed, which can possess no urban centre or capital, and which i ssuited only to cer tain f or ms of ag ricultu ral and pastoral dev elopment,cannot , save by a very elast ic use of the term, be d esignated as th enational home of the Jewish peop le? It may become the home of aconside rably larger number of Jewish' settlers than now, mainlybrought from the eastern parts of E urope ( though th e chance of theircoming in large numbers or being sent for po litica l reaso ns fro m Austriaand Germany is by no means to be igno red); this co lonisat ion may be ~ _

supported by the expenditur e of large sums of money; the pr od uctive-ness and health of the countr y may be s low ly improved by the a pplica-tion of enterpr is e and s cience ; a Jewish community, f reed fro m th emisrule of the Turks and enjoy ing e qual rights with ot her sec tions ofthe populat ion, may become prosperous and even powerf ul. Bu t againI ask , i s th is what we contempla te when we say in our proposa l formul athat His Majesty's Governme nt view w ith favo ur the estab lishmentin Palestine of a national home for t he Jewis h race ? I f we contemplateno more, is it wise to use language w hich sugge sts so much more?

In reality is not the maximum po licy tha t we can pos s ibly hope to


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7 32 MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

realise one w hich, if the Tu rks are defeated and turned out of Pales tine ,will:

a Set up some form of European administration (it cannot beJewis h administratio n) in that country. .

b Devise a machinery for safeguarding and securing order both inthe Christian and in the Jewish Holy Places.

c Simi larly gua rantee the integrity of the Mosque of Omar andvest it i n some Moslem body.

d Secure to the Jews (b ut not to the Jews alone) equa l civil andreligious rights with the other e lements in the populat ion .

e Arrange as far as possib le for land purchase and sett lement ofreturn ing Jews.

H this is Zionism there isno reason why we should not al l be Zionists,and I would gladly give my adhesio n to such a pol icy, al l the more thatit appears to be reco ll,1mended by considerations of the highest ex-pediency, and to be urgently demanded as a check or counterblast tothe scarcely co ncealed and s inister political desi gns of the Germans.But in my judgment it is a po licy very widely removed from the ro-mantic an d ideali st ic aspi ra tions of many of the Zionist leaders whose

literature I have studied, and, whatever it does, it wi ll not in my judg-ment provide either a national, or material, or even a spiritual homefor any more than a very small section of the Jewish people.

C. of K .October 26, 1917.

His objection, it will be seen, is not so much to a systematicsettlement of Jewish emigrants in Palestine, but rather to theextravagant expectations formed by extreme Zionists as to thepossibilities of Jewish settlement in so small and arid a land . Hewas clearly of opinion that the population of Palestine had alreadyreached its possible limits of expansion , certainly on anything

like a big scale . The evidence given by the Zionists at the PeaceConference completely destroyed his arguments in this respect,and the success of Jewish colonisation since then, despite thetimidities of successive governors, has neutralised his anticipa-tions.

Mr. Montagu' s objections were of a different order. He belongedto a small and dwindling minority of Jews-mostly wealthy-who had no desire that Israel should be r egarded as a separaterace and a distinct nationality . Such of them as still professedtheir adhesion to Judah regarded it as a definite religion and not

/ THE TURKISH TREATy-PAL ES TINE 733as a peculiar people. Mr . Montagu had not even t hese rel igiouspredilections . As he himself once mournfully said t o the lateLord Morley , I have been striving all my life to es cape fro~t he Ghetto . He was therefore a convinced and a bitte r anti-Zionist. This was his statement i

It was suggested that a question raisi ng such importar:t iss ues as. tot he future of Pa lestine o ught, in the first instance, to be d iscussed withour Allies, and more particularly with the United States. .

On the question o f submi tting Lord Milner's draft fo r the considera-t ion of the United States Government ,. Mr . Mon;;g u urg e? that t~euse of the phrase t he home of the jewis h people wo uld VItally prej-udi ce t he position o f every Jew elsew here and expa nd the argumentcontained in his Memorandum. Against th is it was . urg :d that ~heexistence of a Jewish State or a utonomo us commumt y I? Palestl?ewould streng then rather than weaken t he sit uat ion ~f Jews m countn~swhere they were not yet in possession of eq ual ngh .ts, and that mcountries like E ngland, w here t hey p ossessed s ~:h nghts ,. and ~:reidenti fied with the nat i on of whic h they were C ItIzens,. thei r pos lt l .onwould be unaffec ted by the existe nce of a n~tional JewI.sh com~umt yelsewhere. The view was expressed that, w hile a smal l inf luent ia l sec-tion of English Jews were opposed to ~e idea, larg .e numbers weresympathetic to it but i n the inte rests o f Jews who Wished to go fromcountries whe re they were less favo urably situated, rather than fromany idea of wishing to go to Pa lestine themselves. .. .

Mr. Montagu urged st rong obj ections to an y declarat ion m wh~chit was stated that Palestine was the national home of the JeWIshpeople. He regarded the Jews as a relig ious communit y a?d ~~mself asa Jewish Englishman . He based h is argum ent on the preJ~dlclal. e ffe~ton the status of Jewish Britons of a s tatement th at HIS .MaJest y s

Government regarded Pales tine as the nat iona l home of jewish p eo ?l:.Whatever safeguarding words might be use~ in t~e form ula, the civilrights of Jews as nationals in the country m w hich t hey we re bornmight be endangered. How would he negotiat~ with t he peo ple~ ofIndia on behalf of His Majesty's Government If the wor ld had J ustbeen tol d that His Majesty's Government regarded his national homeas being in Turkish territory?

But urgent diplomatic and military reasons at last ensu redcomplete unanimity on the subje ct. Even Mr. ~on tagu s~:-rendered his opposition, and accepted the declarati on as a mili - --- . ...... tary expedient .


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734 MEMO IRS OF T H E PEACE CONFERENC E

Mr. Balfour had been in communication with Lord Rothschild who was t he head of the Z ionist Movement in this country, and

who was pressing on be h alf of his fellow Zionis ts for a declaration

wh ic h co ul d be iss u ed to the Jews throug h out the wor ld, gua ran-

tee in g th at th e Allies would make it one of the condit ions of the

Pea ce Se tt lement with Turkey t h at there should be a Nationa l

Home for t h e Jews i n the land from which they had been d riven

as a p eo p le, b u t with which their name would a lways be associa ted.

W h en t he m atter was brought to the attention of the Cabi n e t on

th e 3 rd o f Se p te mb er, I9I7, i t was dec ided to com mu nicate w ith

Pre s ide nt W il son inform ing him that the Governmen t were be in g

pr e ss ed to m ake a dec lara tion in sympathy with t he Zio nis t

M ov em en t, and seekiag his views as to the a dvisab ili ty o f such a

declar ati on be in g m a' de. It took some weeks to obtain his person al

o p in io n on t h e subject, but, when it arrived, Mr . Balfour repo rt ed

th a t Pr esiden t Wilson was extremely favo urable to the Move-

ment. He a lso informed the Cabinet that the German Gover n -

ment were maki n g great efforts to capture the sympathy of t he

Zionis t Movement. He and Lord Milner urged the Cabinet t o

issue a declaration in favour of the Zionist demand . Mr . Ba lfo ur ,

in support of it, said:

This movement, though opposed by a number of wea lthy Jews inthis country, had behind it the support of a majority of Jews, at a llevents in Russia and America, and possibly in other countries. H esaw nothing inconsistent between the estab lishment of a Jewish n a-tional focus in Palestine and the complete assimilation and absorp ti o nof Jews into the nationali ty of other countries . Just as English emi-grants to the United States became, either in the first or subseq u en t

generations, American nationals, so, in future, should a Jewish citize n ------ ship be established in Palest ine, would Jews become either Eng lish -

men, Americans, Germans, or Palestinians. What was at the back ofthe Zionist Movement was the intense national consciousness hel dby certain members of the Jewish race . They regarded themselves asone of the great historic races of the world, whose original home wasPalestine, and these Jews had a passionate longing to regain once morethis ancient national home . Other Jews had become absorbed intothe nations among whom they and their forefathers Iiad dwelt formany generations . Mr . Balfour then reaa a very sympathetic declara-

___ J tion by the French Government 'which had been conveyed to the

I735HE TURKISH TREATy-PALESTINE

Zionists, and he stated that he knew that Preside n t Wi lso n wa s ex- ~tremely favourable to the Movement .

The question came up for final decision before the War C abi-

net . By that time Lord Curzon had withdrawn h is ob je ction .

Mr . Balfour then proposed the now famous declarati on o f s y m - athy with the Zionist aspirations:

His Ma jes ty's Govern m ent views with favour the estab li shm e nt inPalesti n e of a nationa l ho m e for the Jewish people, a n d will use i tsbest endeavo u rs to fac il i tate the achievement of th is o b ject , it be ingclear ly u nders tood that n o th ing sh a ll be done w h ic h m ay pre judicethe civi l an d re lig iou s rig h ts of exist ing non-Jewis h communities inPalestine, or the ri gh ts a nd p ol itical s tat us e n jo ye d b y Jews in anyother co untr y .

In supp or t of it he stated

that he ga ther ed that ev e ryone was now a gr eed that, from a purely

diplomatic a nd po lit ica l po int of vi e w , it w as d es irable that some dec-laration favo ur a bl e to t h e as p ira tio ns of the Jewish nationalistsshould n ow b e mad e. T h e vast m aj o ri ty o f J ews in Russia and America,as, indeed, a ll o ve r th e w or ld, now a ppeared to be favourable to Zion-ism. If we c ould ma ke a d ec la ration f avourable to such an ideal, weshould be a bl e to ca rry o n ex tre mel y usefu l propaganda both in Russiaand America. He gat h e red th at th e main arguments still put forwardagainst Zionis m we re two fo ld:

a That Pa lest in e was ina d equ a te to form a home for either theJewish or any ot her peop le.

b The diffic ul ty fe lt with rega rd to th e future p o sition of Jews inWestern countries.

As to the meaning of the words natio n a l h ome, to wh ic h the

Zionists attach so much importance, he 'understood it to m ean so meform of British, American, or other protectorate, under w h ic h fullfacilities would be given to the Jews to work ou t their own salvat ionand to build up, by means of education, agriculture, and ind u stry, areal centre of nationa l cu lture and focus of national life. It di d no tnecessarily involve the early establishment of an independent JewishState, which was a matter for gradual development in acco rd a nc e w iththe ordinary laws of political evolution. .

L O R D CURZON stated that he admitted the force of t h e diplomaticarguments in favour of expressing sympathy, and ag reed that thebulk of the Jews held Zionist rather than anti-Zionist o pinion s. He


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~Al l the representat ives of the Dominions, and the leaders of

pu b lic opinion in ou r country of every party, welcomed the------, de cl aration and pronounced themselves wholeheartedly in favour

of the policy. The French Government gave their ready andcordial assent before the declaration was issued , and the samething applied to the Italian Government.

There has been a good deal of discussion as to the meaning of

the words Jewish National Home and whether it involved thesetting up of a Jewish National State in Palestine . I have alreadyquoted the words actually used by Mr. Balfour when he sub-

itted the declaration to the Cabinet for its approval . They

were not challenged at the time by any member present, and

there could be no doubt as to what the Cabinet then had in theirminds. It wasnot thei r idea that a Jewish State should be set up

immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishesof the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand i t was con-templated that when the time arrived for according representative

institutions to Palestine , if the Jews had meanwhile responded tothe opportunity afforded them by the idea of a National Homeand had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, thenPalestine would thus become a Jewish Commonweal th . Thenotion that Jewish immigration would have to - be artificiallyrestricted in order to ensure that the Jews should be a permanentminority never entered into -the heads of anyone engaged in

MEMOI R S O .F THE PEACE CONFE RENCE

added that he d id not agreewith the attitude taken up by Mr . Mon-ta gu . O n t h e other h an d, he couldnot share the optimistic views heldre g ardi n g the f u tu re of Palestine. These views we re not merely theresul t of his own personal experiencesof travel in that country, but?f careful investigations from persons who had lived for many years th e count ry. He feared tha t by the suggesteddeclaration we shouldb e rais in g false expectations which could never be realised. He at-ta c hed g reat importa n ce to the necessityofretaining the Christian andMosl em H ?ly Places in Jer u sa lem and Bethlehem, and, if t h is wereto b e effe c tiv e lydo n e,he did not seehowthe Jewishpeop lecou ldhavea p o li ti cal cap ital in Palestine. However, he recognisedthat someex-p ression of sympathy with Jewishaspirations wouldbe a valuable ad-junct toourp ropaganda, thoughhe thought that weshouldbe guardedin the la ngu ag e used in givingexpressionto such sympathy.

THE TURKISH TREATy-PALESTINE 7 7

framing the policy . That would have been regarded as un just

and as a fraud on the people to whom we were a p peali ng .President Wilson thus interpreted the declarat io n in hi s

explanat ion to the American public: I am persuaded tha t th eAllied nations , with the fullest concurrence of our Gove rn m entand our people ; are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid th e

foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth.The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if t h e A ll ie s

committed themselves to giving facilities for the estab lishmen t of L

a Nat ional Home for the Jews in Palest ine, t h ey wo u ld do th e irbest to rally to the Allied cause Jewish senti m ent a nd supportthroughou t the world. They kept thei r word in t h e le tt e r and th e

spirit, and the only question tha t remains n o w is w h e th e r w emean to h o n our ours. Im m ediate ly the decla ra tion w as agreed to,

millions ofleaflets were circ u la ted ineve ry tow n and ar e a through -out the world whe re there were known to be Je wi sh communities .

They were dropped from the air in German a nd Au strian towns ,

and they were scattered throughout R ussia a nd Pol and. I c?uldpoint out substantial and in one case d ec is ive a d ~ antages den~edfrom this p ropaganda amongst the Jews . In RUSSiath e Bolsh e vlksbaffled all the effo rt s of th e Ger man s to b en e fit by th e harvests ofthe Ukraine and the Don, and h un d red s o f thou sands of German

and Austrian troops had to b e m a int a in ed to th e e nd of the Waron Russian soil , whilst the Germans we re s hort of m en to r e placecasualties on the Western front . I do n o t sugg est that this w asdue enti re ly, or even mainly, to Jew ish ac ti v ities . But we ha v e

good reason to believe that Jewish p ropaga nda in Russia had . agreat deal to do with the difficulties created fo r th e Germans mSouthern Russia after the peace of Brest-Litovsk . The Germ ansthemselves know that to be the case, and the Jews in Germanyare suffering to-day for the fidelity with which their brethren inRussia and in America discharged thei r obl iga tions under the

Zionist pledge to the Allies.Through Sir Mark Sykes and Colonel Lawrence weinformed t h e

Arab leaders, King Hussein and his son, Feis a l, of our propos al s.We could not get in touch with the Palestinian A rabs a s th ey

were fighting against us.


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MEMO IRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

There is no better proof of the value of the Balfour Declarat ionas a military move than the fact that Germany entered intonego tiations wit h Turkey in an endeavour to provide an alterna-t ive scheme whic h would appeal to Zionists . A German-JewishSociety, the V.] .O.D.,* was formed, and in Ja nuary, 1918, Talaat,the Gra nd Vizier, at the instigation of the Germans, gave vaguepromises of le gislation by means of which a ll just if iable wishesof the Jews in Palest ine wo uld be able to fi nd their ful filment.

In January, 1916, the British Government's po licy ' in regardto Pal estinian Holy Places and Zionist co lonisation was official lycomm unicate d in the following message to Hussein:

That so far as .Palesti ne is co ncerned, we are de termined that nopeople shall besubjected to another, but in view of the fact: a thatthere are in Pales tine, Shri nes, Wakfs, and Ho ly Places, sacred in somecases to Mos lems a lone, to Jews alone, to C hristians alone, and i nothers to two or all three, and inasmuch as these p laces are ofinterest

to vast masses of people outside Palestine and Arabia, there must bea spe cial regime to deal with these places approved of by the world; b that as regards the Mosque of Omar, it shall be considered as aMoslem concern alone, and shall not be subjected directly or indirect lyto any non-Moslem authority .

That since the Jewish opinion of the world isin favour of a return o fJews to Palestine, and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constantfactor, and further, as His Majesty's Government viewwith favour therealisa tion of this aspirat ion, His Majesty's Government are deter-mined that in sofar as is compatible with the freedom of the exist i ngpopulation, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put inthe way of the realisation of this ideal .

The Arab leaders did not offer any objections to the declara -tion , so long as the rights ofthe Arabs in Palest ine were respected .Pledges were given to the non-Jewish populat ion of Palest ine whoconstituted the great majority of its inhabitants, as well as to theJews. These were the result of conversations which we had withsuch Arab leaders as we could get in touch with . There was atwofold undertaking given to them , that the establishment of a

Vereinigung Jiidischer Organisation en Deutschlands zur Wahrung der

Rechte des Osten . (Alliance of the Jewish Organisations -of Germany for theSafeguard ing of the Rights of the Orient .)

I


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THE TURKISH TREATy- P ALESTINE 7 39

Jewish N ational Home would not in any way, firstly, af fect the

civil or reli gious rights of the general population of Palestine ;seco ndly, wo uld not diminish the general prosperi ty of thatpopula tion. Those w ere the only pledges we gave to the Ar abs .

Aft er the A rmistice, the position of Palestine in reference to theSyk es-Picot A greement, the Balfour Declaration, and the man -

date an d mandato ry for Palestine was very thorough ly di scussedat m eetings of the War Cabinet Eastern Committee. At a mee tingof that Committee, held in December, 1918, Lord Cu rzon s tatedthe posit ion very fully .

The Zionis t declaration by our Government has bee n followed by a

very consider able immigration of J ews. One of t he d ifficul ties of thesituatio n arises from ' the fact that t he Zionists have taken full ad -vantage-and are disposed to take even fu ller a dvantage-of the op-portunit y which was then offered to the m.

The Zionist programme, and the ene rgy with w hich it is being carriedout, have not unna turally had the consequence o f arousing the keensuspic ionsof the Arabs. By the Ara bs I do n ot merel y mean Feisaland his followers at Damascus, b ut the so-called Arabs who inhabitthe coun try. There seems, from the tele grams w e receive, to be growing


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74 MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFE RENCE

~o doubt we shall hea~ a good deal of that in the future, and, indeed, inIt we may find a so lut ion of our diffic u lties .

Now, as regards the f u ture of Palestin e : I said just now that one ofthe ? len; ishes of th~ Syk~s -Picot Agreement was the imperfe c t andu n.s CI ent lfic manner m which the boundaries had been drawn. I irn-ag m e th at, w h .atever a rrangeme n ts we m ake abo u t Syria in the f u tu re,we mu s t p ut ng h t and define upon some scientific basis the boundarieso f P a lest i~e i tself: If .you look . at the S y k es-Picot map you will see ap u rel y ar bi tra ry li ne ISdraw n m the north whic h ru ns from a place o n~ e c o~s t so ut hwards t h rough the Sea of Ga li lee to the Jordan f rontier.I ima gi ne we s h all a ll agree that we mu s t recover for P a l est ine it s o ldbo un dar ies. The old p hr ase Dan to Beers h eha s ti ll prevai ls. What -eve .r t h e adm inist rat ive sub -divis ions, we m u st recover fo r Palesti n e,be It H e br ew, or Arab, o r bot h , t h e bo u nda r ies u p to the Litani on thecoast, and a cr oss to .IB a nias, t h e old Dan , or Huleh in the inter ior . Som uch fo r th e n orthern boundary. Then we must have some defini t iono f easte rn b oun dar y. The Zion ists are n a tura ll y looking eas twar d sto th e tra n s- Jordan terr itor ie s, where there i s good cult ivat ion andgr eat poss ibi lities in the future. Everybody wants to get out of the

stea m in g Jor d an Valley an~ o n to the uplands beyond, and we a reundoubted ly ac~ to face WIth a. movement which is g rowing on thepart of th: ZIOl llSt s , that Pa les tme is now to include what ce rt ainlyIt has not i n cluded for many centur ie s, if it ever did, and what wouldbe regarded by t h e Arabs as part of thei r domain . Final ly, there is t h esouthe rn boundary of Palestine. Here a number of different cons idera-ti on.s come in. On the one hand there a re those who wi ll s a y that thecul ti vable areas south of Gaza ought to be par t of Pal est ine beca u sethey are necessary to the subsis tence of the peop le. On the other handthere are those who say: Do not complicate the Palest ine question bybringin~ in . the Bedouins of the dese rt, whose face lo o ks readily to -wards Sinai, and who ought not to be associated with Pa lestine at a ll. I therefore suggest , in passing , when we are deal ing with Pales ti ne

and wher: we go to the Peace Conference, that we sha ll have to makeup our minds as to what is the kind o f policy we propose for the nort h -ern, eastern, and the southern boundaries of Palestine .

Now comes the quest ion of . the future administration. I quoted justnow the terms of the Sykes-Picot Ag reement under w hich the schemethe~ in cont emplatio? was int ernationa l ad~inis tr at ion to t ie agree dup?n between t ;heAllies and the Arabs . I do not suppose you wi ll find~ s.mglepe:son m an ~ ~ount~ y now in f av our of that solut i o n. Not onlyISinternational administration wher ever it has been tried in Orientalcountr ies a fai lur e, but it is s ingula rly unsui ted to the cond itions ofPalestine . I doubt if at the Peace Conference a single voice will be

THE TUR KISH TREATy- P ALEST INE 7 4I

raised in its favour. If I am right in that, and if a t u telar P owe r i s tobe appoint ed, e ither by a League of Natio n s u n der G en era l Smuts'scheme, or by the Peace Conference itself, o r by t h e se lf- d eterminationof the people , there then arises the quest ion who t h at P owe r should be .Only three ar e really deserving of consideration: F ranc e, A mer ic a , andourse lves. I do not think I need seriously disc u ss the case of Fr a nc e ,because, whateve r may be h er own feelings , nobody e lse wa nts herthere . Her presence there would be quite intolerable to o ur se lves, and itis clea r i t wou ld be eq u ally unwe lco m e to the peop le. T h ere re main theUni ted Stat es and Grea t Bri tain. Whe n the ma tter was brought be-fore the Imperi al War Ca b inet , a good many of us , anxious to curtailour respo n sibility in t h a t part of t h e world as much as w e could, andfille d wi th a des ire, s tro ngl y reco mm en de d b y S ir Robert Borden, tointerest America in resp on sib il it ies i n ot h er pa rt s o f th e world thanth e American Continent, fe lt disposed to u rge t h at A m erica should bemade t h e c u stodian of Pa lestine. I b e li eve I m yse lf ex pressed a v iewin i ts favo u r. T h e m o re I th in k o f i t t h e m o re d ou b tful I am whetherthat i s r ea ll y a wise so lut ion. I ask t h e C o mmitt ee t o contemplate theposit ion of t h e Ame ri cans p laced, as t he y wo u ld b e i f the French am-bitio n s as rega rd s Syr ia ar e ful f ill ed , m id way b e twe en the French andourselves. I t w ould b e a p osit ion th at wo uld almost cert a inly resul t i nfric tion with bot h parties . Look at i t ag ai n fr o m the point of view ofPalestine itse lf. I i m agi n e th at we h av e not c o nquered this countr ymerely in orde r to recove r it f ro m th e Crescent ; we have conquered i tin order t h at it m ay pros p e r and flourish under the Cross.

Discussing th e idea of an A m erican mandate , he sa id :

Remember the Americans h av e n o ex perienc e of thi s sort of wo rk orthis kind of people . The ir sta n dar d s o f ad ministration, their meth o dsofwork, are entirely different f rom o ur own . Their method ofhandlingEastern peop le would be different from o urs , a nd I sugg est that the

A mer icans in Pale st ine might be a so u rce not of as sistan ce bu t ve rymuch the reverse to ourselves in Egypt.

Has not the who le history of the wa r sh own u s-I h es ita te to s p ea kupon i t because i t is a s tr ategical point -t hat Pal est ine is rea ll y t h estr a tegical buffer of Egypt, and that the Canal, which is the weakside of Egypt, . if it has to be defended in t h e fut u re, will h ave to b edefended-as it has been in thi s war -from t h e Palesti n e sid e ? We wer ete mpted into Palestine by our position upon the Canal and b y thethr eat of a Turkish invasion that inevi tably dr ew us fo rwar d upon theC anal, drew us across the Sinai Pe ni nsu la, and i n vo lved us in P a lestineitself. Therefore, from the strategica l poi nt o f view t her e is a close


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742 MEM OIRS O F TH E P EA CE ~ CONFERENCE

comm unity of interest between Palestine and Egypt. Another consid-erat ion is this. Ought we not to try and keep the Arabs of Palestine inclose to uch w ith the Arabs of the country both to the east and to thenorth? If you, so to speak, segregate them under the charge of aseparate Power wh ich has no interest in those regions, you wi ll reallysterilise them and ar rest their growth. On the other hand, our positionand inf luence in t he surround ing Arab areas must be always so great

that the Arabs o f Palestin e would have, I think, a much bett er chancein ou r hands than in tho se of any others.

The final consideration is this, that, from all the evidence we haveso far, the Arabs and Zioni sts in Palestine want us. The evidence onthat poin t seem s to be conclus ive . Our most recent telegrams includetwo, in on e of which the Zionists propose to General Clayton thatGreat Brit ain shoul d-assume a pe rmanent tutelage over Pales tine unt ilboth the Je ws and t he Arabs decide otherwise by decisive major it ies.General Clayton, in ' his te legram of the arst November, proposed aform of declaration as follows: That it is desirable at an early date toissue a decl aration to the effect that the tutelage of Palestine shal lcontinue u ntil both Jews and Arabs in Palestine agree mut ually thatit should cease. Agreement would necessitate a majority of bothJews a nd Arabs respectively in favour of complete autonomy, andtutela ge wou ld continue if either party refused to agree . GeneralAllenby agrees that a declaration in the above sense would have agood effe ct, provided it came from the Entente Powers . Obvious ly i t i simposs ible t hat any such declaration should come from us. It mightcome at a later date from the Conference . The point I wish to putbefore the Committee is this, that when we go into the Conference weshould for our part drop altoget her the idea of international manage-ment of Palestine in the future, that we should make the best arrange-ment we can for its boundaries, and then, if it becomes a question ofAmerica and ourselves, believing in our own mind that it is best forthe interests of the people of both parties that we and not Americashould be the Power, we should give every encouragement to thisview I have put forward, namely, that under - t he principle of sel f-

. determination both the Zionists and the Arabs should be left to speakfor themselves.

At the same meeting of the War Cabinet Eastern Committeeat which Lord Curzon made the above statement, Lord RobertCecil dealt with the question of the mandatory power :

The French are entirely out of the question, for the reasons givenby Lord Curzon, and al so because the Italians would really burst if yousuggested it- e-and the Greeks too. Therefore there is no question at all

THE TURKISH TREATy-PALEST INE 743

of the French, and it is entirely a question of the Americans or theBritish . I should be glad to see the British there. At t he same timeI should not like to rule out the Americans. The re are a dvantages inhaving the Americans t here. Upon the strategical aspect I do not ex -press an opinion, but I am not much impressed by the argu ment thatin order to defend Egypt wehad to go to Palestine, be cause in order todefend Palestine we should have to go to Aleppo or so me such place .You always have to go forward; at least, I gat her so. Yo u could notstand st ill in Palestine any mo re than you could a nywhere else . As tothat, I think our policy ought to be to say that, as far as we can do sodecen tly, we think we are the b est peop le to do i t for the League ofNations, but t hat if they wi ll not let us do it we would rather theAmerica ns did it than any body el se. I do n ot believe t he French willallow us to do it.

LORDCURZON: I do not fe el at a ll clear that the Ameri cans wouldbe wi lling to do it.

LORDROBERTCECIL:That i s a different mat ter. They may wish usto do it unde r the pres sure of the Arabs and the Jews.

GENERA LWILSON: If we do think that w e would be the best people

there, I think we had better go there. It lies between us and theAmericans.LORD ROBERT CECI L: The re is n ot going to be any great catch

about i t.GENERALW ILSON:No.LORD ROBERTCECIL: Beca use we shall simply keep the peace be-

tween the Arabs and the Jews. We are not going to get anything outof it. Whoever goes t here will have a poor time .

GENERALSMUTS:It wou ld affect Jew ish national opinion, and na-t ionally they are a grea t people.

LORDROBERTCECIL: They are likely to quarrel with the protectingPowers.

GENERALWILSON:If well handled I do not think so.GENERALMACDONOGH: suggest the most i mportant t hing in the

considerati on of the position of Palestine is not i ts topograph ical rela-tion to Syria or anything else, but its being, as M r. Balfour says, thehome of the Jewish people, and therefore interesting t he whole of theJews all over the world. I see a good many of the Zio nists, and o nesuggested to me the day before yesterday that if the Jewis h people didnot get what they were asking for in Palestine, we sho uld ha ve thewhole of Jewry turning Bolsheviks and supp orting Bol shevism in allthe other countries as they have done i n Russia.

LORDROBERTCECIL: Yes. I can conc eive the Roths childs leading aBolshevist mob .


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744 MEMOI R S OF THE PEA CE CO NFERENCE

The off icia l memorandum supplied to the Cabinet by theForeign Office D ep artment dealing with the East, outlines the

suggested Bri tish proposals:

The problem of Palestine cannot be exclusively solved on the princi-p les o f se lf -deter m in ation, beca us e there i s one el ement in the popula -

tion-t h e Jews-which, for historical and religious reasons, is en-tit led to a g rea ter i n fluence than wou ld be given to i t i fnumber s wereth e so le t es t. It is necessa ry, t h erefore, to dev ise some scheme ofGove rnm ent w h ich w il l a t once protect Arab inte res ts , and g ive effect

. to the n at io na l asp ir ations of t h e Jew ishrace.U nd er th e a gr ee m ent wi th France an inte rna t ional administratio n

is to be esta b lish ed . ih lt t h i s does n ot m ean tha t any form of condo-minium n eed be se t u p. S u c h a method of Government , w h erever i t h asb ee n tri ed in Or iental ' co un tr ies, has p rove d a fai lu re; and it is si n g u -larl y unsui ted to th e cond itions of Pa lest in e. T h e provisio n s of t h eag ree m e nt w il l b e s u ff iciently sa ti sf ied if a tu te lary Power be appointedby th e Tr ea ty of P eace, charged with t h e d u ty of deve loping the co u n-try i n the inte res ts of the inhabitants, and o f giving effect to the ad-

mitt ed pu rpo se of providing there a nationa l home for the Jewishp eop le .

The actual form of the Government to be set up is to be decided,a ccording to the agreement , in consultation with Russia, and subse-quently in consultation with the other Allies , and the representativesof t h e She rif of Mecca; Russia is no longer in question, and the de-tails may, perhaps , be bet ter l ef t to the prot ect ing Power , subject tothe control or veto of the League of Nat ions. The dif fi cul ty wil l be todevise some form of constitution which will give sufficient opportunityfor Jewi sh na tional aspir ati ons without unduly enc roaching on ther ights of the Arab major it y. In the Zionis t t alk of a Jewish Stat e, theArab portion ofthe population iswell-nigh forgotten. Their programme,and the energy with which it is being carried out, have not unnatural ly~ad tJ;teconsequence of arousing the keen suspicion of the Arabs whoinhabit the country, and the posit ion is becoming rather cri tical .

It is clear that there must be a tutelary Power, and this conf lictbetween the Jews and the Arabs makes i t all the more necessary . T h equest ion i s as to the Power who is to be entrust ed with these ' dut ies.Only three are really deserving of consideration,-France, America,and Great Britain . France may be put on one side, if for no otherreason , because the inhabitants of Palest ine would decl ine to accepther . Further , her presence would be a source of certain . friction, with .this country , and would arouse fierce opposition in Italy and in Greece .

THE TURKISH TREATy-PALEST IN E 745

The proposal that the Uni ted Stat es shou ld undertake the se dutieshas me t wi th a sympatheti c recept ion in some qua rt e rs. But it is atleast doubtful whether they would be will ing to accept the responsi-bilities. Their difficulties would be great, situated as they wo uld be be-tween France on the north, and Egypt on the south, and ad minist e r-ing a country which must depend for i ts commercial develo pment onconnec tion wi th the Arab count ri es of the inter ior and w ith E g y pt .Further, it may be doubted whether t h e Americans possess e i ther theexper ience or the apti tude that wou ld qua lify them for h andling anOriental prob lem of suc h ex ceptio n a l co m plexity. The on ly o ther a lter-nat ive a p pea rs to be that Grea t Br it ain s h o ul d h ers e lf b e in vited tounderta k e t h e d u ties. T h e Foreig n O ff ic e are do ubtfu l of the advan-tages o f ad op ting t h is co ur se, and th ink i t mig ht b e w is e to keep anopen m ind on t h e q u es ti o n unt il i t i s se en h ow the g ener a l discussionof t h e Middl e East e rn se ttl em ent goes , a n d to tak e the general situa-ti on i nto ac count in eve ntu a ll y co ming to a d ecision .

Th ere are c o ns id e rat ions of w e ight which s eem t o point to the con-clusion tha t Grea t Br ita in o ug h t to be the t u tel a ry Power. In the firstplace, as h as bee n poin ted o u t, t h e comm e rcia l de vel opment of Pales-

t ine wi ll, in t h e m ain, depe n d on the Eg y pti an factors in the case;nothi n g c o n side rab le can be ma d e out of the ports of Palestine, andtrade will come from t h e d irecti on of the Sue z Canal and probablyf rom Kanta ra, t h e n ew por t w hich ha s de v eloped there.

Again, t h ere are reasons of s trat eg y w hich point to the same con-clusion. The Wa r h as show n th a t P a le st ine i s reall y the strategicalbuffer of Egypt, and the prese nce of a foreign Po w er in Pales ti nemight seriously affect the posi ti on of Great Brit a in both on the Sue zCanal and in the adjacent A rab a re as . And there is the final-andprobably, at the Conference, t h e co n c lu siv e-consideration, that fromall the evidence we have so far, t h e A ra b s a nd Zioni st s in Pale s tineare united in desiring the protection of t h is co unt ry. If s e lf-determin a-ti on be the t est , e ach of these two com mu nit ies wo ul d, it is confidentl y

believed, unhesitatingly vote for Great Bri tain.In one of the telegrams that report the views of Fe isa l, we a re t o ld

that, so strong ly is he of opinion that if a G rea t Power re main s in thebackground of Palest ine, i t should be o u rselves, that , if he is as sure di t will be Great Britain, he will be prepared to support th e i nf iltra ti onof the Zionis ts on a reasonable sca le; b u t, ot h erw ise , if we a re to goout of the mat ter and some othe r prote ct ing Powe r is t o co me in , hewil lback the Arabs by al l t he means a t h is d isposa l.

The conc lusions of the East ern C o m m ittee a re summed up inthe fol lowing resolut ions. They are g enerally of opin ion that in no


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M EM OI RS O F T HE P EA CE C ON FE RE NC E

circumstanc .esshould any.claim by Turkey to share the sovereignty,real or nom in al, of P a lestine be ad m itted ; and

(r) T h e Co m mittee is opposed to the institution of an internationaladmi n istration in Palestine . .

. (2)The C ommittee favours the nomination of a singleGreat Power,ei th er b y t h e Leag ue of Nat ion s/o r otherwis e, to act as representativeof t h e n atio n s in Pa lesti ne.

(3) S.uchPower shou ld not be France or Italy, but shouldbe eitherthe U m ted States of America or Great Britain.

(4) W hi lewewould not object to the selectionof the United Stateso f A m erica,yet if t h e offerweremade to Great Britain weo ug h t no tto de clin e . .

5: T h e ch oi ce, whateve r form it may take , sh ould be, as far asp ossi bl e, in acco rda n ce with the expressed desires a of the Arabp op u lation, b of t h e Z ionist community in Palestine.

(6) Every ef fo rt sh d u ld bemade at the Peace 'Conference to sec u rean equit a ble r ea dju stme nt o f the boundar iesofPa les tine , both o n th en o rth an d eas t and sout h .

(7 ) In a n y casethe pledgesas to the careof the Holy Placesmust beeffectivelyfulfil led .

T h ese d iscussions will explain why, when I met Clemencea uin L ondon, I p laced united Palestine in t he forefront of therequests I made to him . Clem e nceau 's read y assent saved a severeconf lict on the subject with his successors . They would have

p referred the Sykes-Picot partition which would, now that Russiah ad retired from the Alliance , have given France an equal voicewith Britain in the control of the whole of Palestine except anenclave around Haifa. Th e Millerand Go v ernment would nothave agreed to surr e nder the French shar e in this joint adminis-tration . This was clearly se en, when we came to the drafting of

the Turkish Treaty . They then put up a persistent fight t orecover a measur e of that condominium in Palestine.

The Am erican s, wh en sounded on the subject of the mandatefor Palestine , w ere not incli ne d to accept the responsibility.Franc e was mainly anxious to s e cure the Syrian mand~te forh ers e lf . Italy put in no claim . It was therefore assumed thatBr it ain w ould b e the mandatory .

W h en t h e Emir F ei sal app ear e d b efore th e Supr e me Council onF e bruar y 6, 1 9 1 9 , h e s aid : P al es ti n e , in con sequence of its

TH E T UR KI SH TR EATy -PALESTINE 74 7

universal character, he left on one side for t h e co ns ide ration of allparties interested. With this e xception, he asked fo r the inde-pendence of the Arab ar e as enumerated in h is mem orandum .

The Zionist Mission , repres e nting T h e Zionist O rga ni sationand t h e Jewish pop u lation of Pal e stine, wa s recei v ed by theSupreme Council on February 27th , 19r9. M. So k o low rea d the

following extract from a memorandum whic h he h ad cir cu lat e d :

The Zionist Organisation respectfully submits t h e fo llow ing draftresolut io n sfor t h e cons iderationof t h e Pea c e C onf e renc e:

(r) Th e H igh Co nt ract ing Parties recog ni se th e hist o ric title of theJewis h people to Pa lestine and the right o f the J e ws to reconstitutein Palesti n e t hei r National Home .

(2) T h e bo unda riesof Palesti ne s h all bea s dec lar ed in the Scheduleannexed h ereto.

(3) Th e sove reig n possessio n of P a le sti n e s ha ll be vested in theLeag ue ofNa ti on s and the gover nmen t en tru ste d to Great Britain asMandatory of t h e League .

(4) (Provision to be inserted re lati n g t o t h e ap pl ica tion in Palestine

of suc h ofthe ge n era l condit io n s a tt ac h ed to m andates as are suitableto the case.)

5 Th e m and a te s ha ll be subject al so to the following specialconditio n s:

( r) Palesti n e s ha ll be p lac e d under su c h political administrative andeconomic condit ions as wil l se cure the establishment there of theJewish Natio n a l H o m e, and ul tim ate ly render possiblethe creation ofan autono m o u s Co mm o n w eal th , i t being clearly understood thatnothing shal l bedonew hic h may p re judi c e the civiland religiousrightso f ex isting non-Jewish comm u n ities i n P a le stine , or the r ights andp ol iticalstatus enjo y edby Jewsi n a ny o ther c o untr y .

Dr . Weizmann, in the course of his s p eec h said :

Th e Zionist Association demanded, in the nam e o f the peo ple whoh a d sufferedmartyrdom for eighteen centuries, that t h ey s h o uld beable , immediatel y peace w as signed , to tel l their co- religio n ists in th eUkraine , in Poland, and in other parts ofEastern E u rope, t h at so m eofthem would be taken to Palestine to be estab lished o n th e land, a ndthat there was therefore a hopeful prospect for Jew ry. Th a t wa s th ees senceof what the Zionists required, and with that objec t in v iewth ey had taken the liberty of drawing up the following reso lution :

To this end the Mandator y Power shal l int er a lia : a Promote je w ishimmigration and clo se settleme nt on the land ,


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MEMO IRS O F TH E PEA C E CO N FERE N CE

the est ablished right s of the pr e sen t non-J ewis h p o pul a tion b eingequit a bly safeguard ed.

C b Accept the c o-o perat ion in such measur es o f a Co un c il r e pre -sentat ive of the Je w s of P a lestine, and o f th e w o rld .th at m ay b e e stab -l ished for the dev e lo pm e nt of the J ewish N a ti o n al H om e in Pal es tineand entrust the organis a tion of J e wish educ a tion to such Council .

c On being satisfied th a t the con st itut ion of such C ouncil pr ec ludes

the making of priva te pr o fi t, offer t o th e Counc il in priorit y an y con -cession for the development ofnatural r eso u rces w hich it ma y be founddesirable to grant.

Later:

MR . L A NSINGasked Dr . Wei z mann to cle ar up some confu s ion whichexisted in his mind as to the correct meaning of the w ord s JewishNational Home. Did ,th at mean an autonomous Jewi o v ernm st?

DR . WE IZMANNep lie d in the neg a tive . T e Zi o nist Organisationdid not want an autonomous Jewish G overnm e nt , but merely to estab -l ish in Pale s tine, under a Mandat o ry P ower , an ad ministration , notnecess arily Jewish , which would rend er i t po ss ibl e to se nd into P ales-

tine 70 000 to 80 000 Jews annuall y. T he Org a n isa ti o n w ould r e quireto hav e permis s ion at th e sa me ti m e to build J ewis h school s, w h e reHebre w w ould be t a ught , a nd to deve lop i n stit u tions of eve ry kind.Thus it wo uld buil d u p gr ad u all y a n atio na lit y, a nd so m ake P a le s tineas Je w ish as Americ a is A m e ric a n o r Eng la nd E ngl ish. L ate r o n , w h enthe Je w s formed th e la rg e ma jori ty, th ey w ould b e ripe to e s tabli shsuch a G ove rnmen t a s wo uld an sw e r to th e s tate o f th e dev elopm ent ofthe country and to th eir i dea ls .

Th e ev id e nce which was giv en on be half o f th e Z ioni s ts com -

pl e tely di spo sed of w ha t I w ill cal l t he Cu rzon ob je ction as to

th e ext rem ely lim ited poss ib ilit ies o f d eve lopment in Palestine .

Wh en Lor d C urz on vis it ed th e c oun try th e tota l population ofP alest in e was on ly a bou t 6 00 000 . Ou t o f t h ese h alf a million

we re A ra bs a nd 100 000 Je ws and C hri s tians . Th ese n umbers

we re reduce d b y th e en d of th e W a r. B ut, a s th e Zioni s t Declara-

ti on pointed out :

T h e popu lat ion of Pa lest in e in th e days of Chri st, befo re th e pr esentscientific meth o ds of cu ltivat ion were thou ght of, and wh e n th e ex -ternal tr a de was not comparab le to that now enjoyed by Pa les tin e,amo u nted to fo ur millions. Evidence was g iven at the Peace Con fere ncethat the populat ion of Lebanon, which resembled Pa lest ine in m an y

TH E T U RKI S H TREATy-PALESTINE 749

res pe cts, h ad a de ns ity of 160 pe r square k ilometre. The populati~ nof P alesti n e to -day is o nl y a b out 5 p er square kilometre. On that basis,there is ro om in P ales tin e fo r an i ncre ase of three millions witho u ten cr oa ching o n th e legitimat e in te rests o f the people who are t he re .H ungar y has a po pulation of more than doubl e that of Palest ine to-da y . It a ly, wh e re t he conditions ar e not unlike those of Palest in e, inth at it is a ver y mountainou s country w ith no minerals, has a popu la-

tio n p er square mil e three times that of P a lest ine. On the Ital ian bas is ,Pa les tine ought t o provide accommodation for a population of fo u r

mi llion s.

In order to sho w that the Peace Conference had every po in t

o f v ie w present e d to it , I would quote a passage from a Re por t

of an American Commission which was sent there to inves tiga te

th e conditions:

There is a further considerat ion that cannot just ly be i g no red , if th ewo rld is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definit e ly JewishS tate , however gradually that may take place. T ha t c on s ide rationgrows out of the fact that Palestine is the Holy L a nd fo r Jews ,

Ch ris ti a ns and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians a nd Mos le m s allove r the w orld are quite a s much concerned as t he Jews w ith cond i-tio ns in Palestine , especiall y with those conditions w hi ch to uch uponre ligi ous feeling a nd rights . The relations in these m a tte rs in Pa le s tin ear e most delicate and difficult . With the best possib le i n ten tio ns , i t m ayb e d o ubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to eit he r C hris ti an sor M oslems proper guardians of the Holy Places, or cus to di a ns of th eH o ly Land as a whole . The reason is this : th e pl a ces w hich ar .e mos tsac red to Chri s tians -those having t o do with J e su s-and wh ich arealso sa cred to Moslems , are not only no t sacred to Jews , b ut ab h orrentto t h em . It is simply impossible, under those c irc um st a nc es, fo rMo slem s and Ch ristians to feel satisfied to have t h ese p laces in Jewis hhands o r u n d er th e c ustod y of Jews. There are sti ll other p laces a b o ut

whic hMos lems must ha ve the sa m e feeling. In fact , from this point ofview, t he Mo sl ems, j ust be ca use the sacred p lac es ofall three religionsare sacre d t o them , ha v e m a de v er y nat u rall y much more satisfactorycusto d ian s of the H oly Plac es t h a n the Je w s could be. It must be be-liev e d that the pr e c ise me an ing, in this r espect , o f the complete Jewishoc c up ati o n of P alest ine has n o t bee n fully sens ed by those who urge theex treme Zionist programme . For it would in tensify , with a certai nl ylik e fa te , t he anti -Jewish feel ing both in Palest ine, and in all ot her po r-tio ns of the w orld w hich l ook to Palestine as the Holy Land.

In v iew of all these consider ations, and with a deep sense of sym pa -thy f or the Jew ish cause , the Commissioners feel bound to rec om m e n d


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75 0 MEMO IRS O F TH E P EA C E CO N FERE NC E

that only a greatly reduced Zioni st programme be attemp ted b y thePeace Conference, and even that , only very gradually initiated . Thiswould have to mean that Jewish immigrati on should b e definitel ylimi ted, and that the project for making Palestin e .distinctl y a Jewishcommonwealth should be giv en up .

There would then be no reason wh y Pale stine could not be includedin a united Syrian St ate, just as o ther portions of the country , the Holy

Places being c ared for by an Internation al and Inter -relig ious Com-mission, somew hat as at present, under the oversight and approval ofthe Mandatory a nd of the League of Nations . The Jews , of course,wou ld have representation upon this Commission .

The Commissioners stated that from the point of view of the'people concerned ,' the mandate should clearly go to America . The mandate for all-Syria was to in clude Palesti ne.

But, in conclusion, they w ere not certain that the Americanpeople would be wil ling to take the mandate: that it isnot certainthat the British or French would be willing to withdraw, andwould cordial ly w elcome America 's coming ; that the vague but

large encouragem ent given to th e Zionist aims might proveparticularly embarrassin g to Ameri ca, on account of her largeand influential Jewish population ....

They recommend ed that if Am erica could not take the man -date for all S yria , it should be g iven to Great Britain.

The voting , such as i t was, gave ov er 60 per cent. first choicefor America , out of the I,I52 petit ions pre sented; of this numberther e were I,0 73 petitions for Gre at Britain as mand atory, ifAmeri ca did not take the mand ate.

Inasmu ch as Pr esident , :~son mad e it clear that Americahad no desire to undertak e the Palestinian mandate , it is inter -

esting t o note tha t the pleb iscite indicated that, fai ling Amer -ica a s a manda tory, t here was an overwhelming d emand forGreat Britain.

Whe n M. Clemenceau retired from the Premiership ea rly inI920, there was, as I have pointed out, a percepti ble change inthe outlo ok of the Frenc h Govern ment, which was re flected intheir att itude towards t he idea of a Br itish man date for P alestine.There was an a ttem pt to treat the Sykes-P icot Agreeme nt as ifit had never been scra pped. The Fre nch, m oreover, cl aimed an

TH E T UR K ISH TRE 1 TY-PALESTINE 751

especia l position in referen ce to the pro tection of the Holy Place s,and the ir attitude towards th e establishm ent of a Nat iona lHome was de finite ly critical and even hostile .

The fight on the question of the abrogation of the Sykes-Picotarran gement was left, as were the S yrian negotiat ions, to M. Ber-thel ot. He contended for the Syk es-Picot line and said t hat

he was quite s ure that M . Clemenceau had not been prepare d toyie ld on that po int. He was ve ry scornful of the idea of a Jewi shNational Home . When Lord Curzon firmly adhered to t he Cle-menceau arrangement, the French ultimately accepte d the B ritishmandate, but stated that they would ask that t he Britishwould respect the traditiona l rights of the French a nd pay regardto the interests of those in habitants who were o f the C atholi creligion , and especially to the Catholic Miss ions. T he rais ingof this last question subsequently led to a very prolonged dis -cussion, at which M . Millerand was present. Sig nor Ni tti inte r-vened very emphatically on behalf of Italy:

He f ully recognised that the questio n involved was o ne of a spiritualnatur e; but in his opinion the Holy P laces s houl d be so administered asto e nsure complete equa lity to all the natio ns conce rned. He had nopartic ular defin ite proposals to put forward, but he m aintained tha teach formof worship should berespected, a nd that each countr y shouldenjoy e qual rights .

M. BERTHELOTaid that he was not spec ially qualifi ed to deal withthe religious quest ion, and that he m ust leave it to be dealt with b yM. Jules Cambon .

M. CAMB ONxpressed the viewthat the ques tion of the prote ctorat eof the Holy Places was one which mere ly concerned the A lliedPow ers,and it s hould f ind n o place in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey . TheHoly Places had been in th e hands of the French since the fifteenthcentury . The Vatican ha d always recognised that fact , and everyFrench Gov ernment , even those wh o had broken with Rome , hadaccepted t hat respons ibility. Even during the war, the Vatican hadacknowl edged the right of Franc e to a protector ate over the Ho lyPlaces. T he question was one of the greatest import ance to FrenchCatholics . Consequentl y, should a mandate in Palestine be granted toGreat Br itain, France would 'be bound to make cert ain reservation sin rega rd to the Holy Pla ces. Otherwise it would be difficult to i nducethe Fr ench Senate to accept the arrangement .


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7 M EM OI RS O F TH E P EA CE C ON FE RE NC E

MR. LLOYDGEORGEre q ues ted Signor Nitti to state the views heldby Italian Cat h ol ics o n that po int .

M. NITT m ai n taine d that no useful object would be served byst ud yi n g or by layi ng s tr ess o n exis ting rig h ts . The existing rights hadbeen crea ted by th e n ecessities of a Moham m edan occupation . TheMo h a mm eda n occ up atio n was a b o ut to cease, and he agreed thate qu a l r ig ht s s h oul d be g ranted to a ll Christian faiths, and tha t nodifferen ce co ul d be made be twee n the rights of the various Catholicc ount rie s . I ta ly had never recog n ised the Fre n c h protectorate overth e Ho ly P lac e s, a nd o n t h is acco un t special agreements had beenentered int o fr om tim e to tim e. I n his opinio n , in t h e future no materialp rote c tio n w ould b e re qui red, si n ce Grea t Bri tai n would accept themand at e . It al y a lso a tta c h ed great i m porta n ce to that question be-c a us e th e Ca th o lic Pa rty i n th e I ta li a n Pa rliame nt had since the laste lec tion gr ea tl y in c reased, a nd it n ow too k a g reat interest in all reli-g iou s m at ters . Fo r-the se reasons h e main tai n ed t hat Ita ly should begrant ed the sa m e rig h ts as t h ose granted to a n y other Catho lic country.

M R. L L OYDGEORGEe n q uir e d whether the Council would acceptSig nor N itt i 's p rop osa l that comp lete equality s h ou ld exist and thateac h country s h oul d pro tec t its own Catholics and its own religions.

M. CAMBON d id n ot object that each Government should protect :its own natio n alists. Indeed, France had always objected to protectany b u t French citizens in a civi l capacity; but it was essential thatFrance should preserve her tradit ions in respect of the protectorate ofth e H oly Places. Should Mr . L loyd George agree, he proposed thatth e Fren c h representatives should discuss the question with the Italia nrepresentatives, and endeavour to arrive at a mutually sat isfactoryag reement .

M . NITT said that he had no objections to offer M. Cambon'sproposal that they should discuss the quest ion together. On the otherhand , it should be realised that a new s ystem ofgov ernment was aboutto be introduced into Palestine which, up to the present, had been in

the hands of Mohammedans . He thought, therefore, it would be neces-sary to consider how the new situation would affect the question underreference . In his opinion, each Christian nation should receive the sametreatment . It was not a question of civil protection by one or anothernation . Each religious order , of whatever nationalit y , would receive fullpr o tect ion . Thus the Italian Capucines settled in Palest ine wouldbe perm itted to refer their grievances to their own repr e sentatives .U p to th e present , o wing to the Mohammedan occupation of Palestine,po litica l and religious questions had been mixed up, but in the futureit w as o bvio us that the nationals of each country wo u ld , if necessary,have to tur n to their own representat ive for such rel igious protect ion

T TURKISH TREATy-PALEST I NE 7

as they might require . For the se re asons a sp e cia l positio n is to b e g u a r-a nteed to the Holy Places . No country shou ld have a n y s p ec ia l p riv-il ege in reg ard to them as well as to religious comm u nit ies. E achco untry must p ro tect its own nationals quite independe n tly f ro m theirre ligious status . I t ismoreover necessary to take i nt o consideratio n th ev indicat ions of the Latins fo ll owing the usurpations unde rgon e in pa s tce nturies .

MR. LLOYDGEORGEpoin ted o u t that Great Britai n also p o ssessedc ertain interests in the matter . T h ere were some mi llion s of Ca th o licsin Great Britain whose interes ts co ul d no t be over loo ked . In the pa st ,when Palestine had been u nder Mo hammeda n sovereign ty the pro-tection of the Holy P laces b y France m ig ht h ave b ee n n e ce ssar y . Butcould it now be sugges ted that Great Brita in wo uld in th e future re -quire to be watched b y c rea ti ng a specia l protect orat e o f the HolyPlaces? Did he r A lli es wis h to im ply t h a t they no lo n ge r trusted GreatBritain to treat t h e ir na tionals fa ir ly in t h at ma tt e r? H e fa iled to seewhat advantage t here co ul d be in an A ll ia n ce i f G rea t Brit a in was con-sidered to be i ncompete n t to p ro tec t Fre nc h a nd Italian citi z ens on avisit to the Ho ly S h rines

david lloyd george ; 'memoirs of the peace conference'; 1939; chapter xxiii; the turkish treaty -...

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