danielle resnick - are there dividends from district proliferation? the case of ghana

20
Are there dividends from district proliferation? The case of Ghana (Preliminary research) Danielle Resnick, IFPRI Washington DC 11.10.2015

Upload: ifpri-sig

Post on 13-Jan-2017

105 views

Category:

Education


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Are there dividends from district proliferation?

The case of Ghana (Preliminary research)

Danielle Resnick, IFPRI Washington DC11.10.2015

Page 2: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

District Proliferation in Africa

At least 25 African countries identify decentralization as a priority in their national development strategies and focus of 10% of democracy and governance foreign aid

Administration divisions are viewed as most basic means of “implementing” decentralization policies

• Zambia (2011 until present): more than 30 new districts and 1 new province

• DRC (June 2015): increased from 11 to 26 provinces • South Sudan (Oct. 2015): increased from 10 to 28 states

Justified as bringing “development closer to the people”“One purpose of the new states is to decentralize power, placing

resources closer to the rural population while at the same time reducing the size of the national government.” (Pres. Salva Kiir, Oct. 2015)

Page 3: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Developmental or Political?

Potential developmental goals • Each district has more resources through inter-governmental

transfers and more expenditures on goods and services (Dollery et al. 2006; Tiebout 1956)

• Downward accountability because administrative units are closer to population

• Upward accountability because citizens can reward/sanction through elections (Brinkerhoff 2010; Rodinelli et al. 1983)

Potential political goals• Vote buying between parties and citizens (Khemani 2010)• Elite patronage (Mohammad 2015) and building majority support

within parliaments (Snyder and Samuels 2001)• Undermine influence of popularly, elected leaders or chiefs

(Lambright 2013; Resnick 2013)

Page 4: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Developmental or Political? Ghana Case

Drivers and consequences of district proliferation are way of looking at trade-offs with decentralization Questions Elements of Analysis

Why are some districts split and others not?

Driven by population, poverty, or politics

What are the consequences of splitting districts?

Politics Voting, Malapportionment Public finance

Revenues and expenditure allocations Public goods and services (2000-2010) Development outcomes (2000-2010)

Page 5: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Why Ghana?

One of most committed democratizers in Africa with extensive decentralization• Began decentralization in 1988, reinforced by 1992 Constitution• Three level structure below government:

1) Regional Coordinating Committees, 2) Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs), 3) Sub-district structures • Fiscal transfers through DACF, Common Fund, and DDF • Devolved health, agricultural, and education responsibilities

Established two-party system• NDC (1992-2000, 2008-today) and NPP (2000-2008)

DCEs are appointed by the President

Page 6: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

From 110 to 216 Districts, 2000-2012

Ashanti Brong Ahafo

Central Eastern Greater Accra

Northern Upper East Upper West

Volta Western0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

30

27

20

26

16

26

1311

25

22

2000 2004 2008 2012

Page 7: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Ghana’s 2012 district creation

The President can, through executive instrument, declare an area to be a district and assign a name to a district• President directs Electoral Commission (EC) to make

recommendations, considering population, geographic contiguity and economic viability of the area • New districts inaugurated in June 2012

Concerned Citizens of Ghana took EC to court • Claimed Government attempting to gain unfair majority in

Parliament • New districts contravened Act 1993, Act 462 whereby there

should be equal representation in local government

Page 8: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Data Sources

Own built database of district splits since 2000

Elections• Electoral Commission of Ghana and civil society sources• Constituency level data aggregated to district level • Available for parliamentary and presidential elections

Population, Poverty, and Development Data • 2000 and 2010 Population and Housing Census • 2012/2013 Ghana Living Standards Survey

Revenues and Expenditures • Composite budgets (2011-2015) from MoFEP • Audit reports of the MMDAs (various years) • DACF allocations from Ghana’s Common Fund

Page 9: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Population as a criteria?

Median population of all districts before 2012 was 111,504

• Median for split vs. non-split was 131,424 and 98,046,respectively

• Statistically significant

pop2008110000

100000

1000000

10000000

Log

of p

opul

ation

Page 10: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Poverty as a criteria?

pov20080

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Pove

rty

Rate

Median poverty of all districts before 2012 was 26%

• Median for split vs. non-split was 25 and 28 percent, respectively

• Not statistically significant

Page 11: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Politics as a criteria?

Results from 2008 elections

Split (%) Not split (%) Total (%)

NPP won 31 50 45.3NDC won 69 50 54.7Total percentage 100 100 100Total districts 45 125 170Chi Square 4.968****P<0.05

Page 12: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Drivers of District Splitting in 2012

Independent Variable

Full sample Excludes metro areas

Log of population

3.129*** 3.768***(0.679) (0.790)

Poverty rate

0.026** 0.028**(0.011) (0.012)

Vote margin favoring NDC in 2008 elections

0.017** 0.015**(0.006) (0.007)

N 170 164

***p<0.01; **p<0.05

Page 13: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Malapportionment

• When the votes of some citizens outweigh those of others

MAL = (1/2)

where si refers to the percentage of total parliamentary seats allocated to district i and vi is the percentage of the total population residing in district I

• Almost 16 percent of seats were allocated to districts that would not have otherwise received• Comparisons: South Africa (3%), Senegal (4%), Botswana

(9%), Malawi (14%), Tanzania (28%)

Page 14: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Is there a rural bias in district allocation?

Region Population (2010)

Share of pop, rural (%)

Actual number of Constituencies

Average population per constituency

Ideal number of constituencies

Change between Ideal and Actual

Ashanti 4,780,380 39.4 47 101,710.21 53 6Brong-Ahafo 2,310,983 55.4 29 79,689.07 26 -3Central 2,201,863 53.0 23 95,733.17 25 2Eastern 2,633,154 56.4 33 79,792.55 29 -4Greater Accra 4,010,054 9.3 34 117,942.76 45 11

Northern 2,479,461 69.9 31 79,982.61 28 -3Upper East 1,046,545 79.0 15 69,769.67 12 -3Upper West 702,110 83.8 11 63,828.18 8 -3Volta 2,118,252 66.5 26 81,471.23 24 -2Western 2,376,021 57.5 26 91,385.42 26 0Total 24,658,823 49.1 275 89,668.45 275 0

Malapportionment of Constituency Size due to 2012 Splits

Population quota = total population by number of constituencies

Page 15: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Electoral Benefits of Splitting in 2012

**p<0.05

Results from 2012 elections

Split (%) Not split (%)

Total (%)

Parent New

NPP won 37.8 21.7 42.4 100

NDC won 62.1 78.3 57.6 100Total percentage 100 100 100 100

Total districts 45 46 125 216Chi Square 6.169**

Page 16: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Characteristics of new districts

Indicates new district in 2012

Page 17: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

New districts are poorer and smaller

Parent District New District Non-Split District0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

29.5

35.3

24.2

Med

ian

pove

rty

rate

Med

ian

popu

latio

n

• 67 percent of the new districts have less than 75,000 people

Page 18: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Preliminary Conclusions

Important political motivations for dividing districts• Targeting seems aimed at securing a parliamentary

majority and elite patronage but it’s also “rewarded” by citizens in subsequent elections

Newer districts are poorer, which maintains dependence on DACF and also violates the “economic viability” stipulation that the government is obligated to follow Possible contradiction in bringing resources closer to people even as others lose representation through malapportionment, supporting suggestions of “rural bias”

Page 19: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Next Steps

Examine whether the results hold up to parliamentary elections and if splitting helps ruling party “consolidate” their hold

Examine the full distribution of expenditures, including the share allocated to administration, within the composite budgets

Analyze over time to trace whether split districts have had substantially different development outcomes by using the 2000 and 2010 Censuses

Page 20: Danielle Resnick - Are there dividends from district proliferation?  The case of Ghana

Intergovernmental Transfer Changes

Years No. Districts

Total population (millions)

Average Population per district

Total DACF, real GHC Millions

DACF per district, real GHC

DACF per person, real GHC

2000 110 18.9 171,818 75.7 688,227 4.0

2001 110 19.3 175,455 70.9 644,340 3.7

2002 110 19.8 180,000 81.1 737,592 4.1

2003 110 20.3 184,545 154.1 1,401,078 7.6

2004 138 21.2 153,623 178.4 1,292,865 8.4

2005 138 21.4 154,855 126.9 919,341 5.9

2006 138 21.9 158,551 139.2 1,008,406 6.4

2007 138 22.4 162,246 149.1 1,080,264 6.7

2008 170 22.9 134,706 155.3 913,331 6.8

2009 170 23.4 137,765 115.7 680,542 4.9

2010 170 24.2 142,529 179.3 1,054,702 7.4

2011 170 24.6 144,765 183.2 1,077,596 7.4

2012 216 25.9 119,769 231.4 1,071,381 8.9

2013 216 26.5 122,593 225.4 1,043,517 8.5

Sources: Calculated from World Development Indicators, 2000 and 2010 Census, and the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF)