dangerous dyads bargaining in the shadow of power
TRANSCRIPT
Dangerous Dyads
Bargaining in the Shadow of Power
Part I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction
A. Why do some pairs of states have dramatically different relationships?
ConflictHostile statementsHostile nonviolent actionsUse, threat, display of forceWar
Positive statementsDiplomatic
recognitionIntercultural
exchangesAlliancesTradeAid
Vs.
B. Example: Six Dyad-Years• US-Iraq 1987: US forgives Iraqi attack
on USS Stark, aids Iraq• US-Iran 1987: US destroys Iranian oil
platforms, ships• Iran-Iraq 1987: Bloody war continues
B. Example: Six Dyad-Years
US-Iraq 2003: War US-Iran 2003: No War Iran-Iraq 2003: No War
Why the differences? No single state has become more or less warlike….but the dyads have!
C. Forms of Cooperation
1. Between Cooperation and Conflict: Bargaining
a. Formal Bargaining: Treaties, etc.
b. Tacit Bargaining: Reciprocal Action
c. Arbitration: Third-party resolution
d. Mediation: Third-party support
2. Alliances: Only 25% reliable at first glance….
War occurs… Allied
Not Allied
Intervene, YES
25%
2%
Intervene, NO
75%
98%
From Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000):
…but examining the fine print reveals a different story!
3. Behavior: ConvergenceExample: Mutual Tariff
Reduction
D. Forms of Conflict
1. War – Standard definition is 1000 battle-deaths
2. Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) – use, threat, or display of force
E. Are Conflict and Cooperation Opposites?
1. The Continuum View
2. High-Conflict Events
3. High-Cooperation Events
Are these mutually exclusive with the conflict list?
3. Sometimes Conflict and Cooperation Co-Exist
Part II. The Spiral to War
InteractionSalienceIssues
Conflict-Producing
Factors
BargainingConflict
CooperationCooperation-
ProducingFactors
Outcomes
A Model of Dyadic Interaction
Part II. The Spiral to War
InteractionSalienceIssues
Conflict-Producing
Factors
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
A Model of Dyadic Interaction
A. Political Relevance
1. Interactiona. Ability to communicateb. Ability to act
Interaction
c. Measures of Interaction
i. Contiguity – Countries that border each other (or narrow body of water)
(Countries surrounded by blue are contiguous to Red)
Interaction
ii. Major power status
State-level finding: Major powers do more of everything – conflict and cooperation
Result = Dyadic effect: If at least one dyad member is major power, increased levels of cooperation and conflict
Interaction
iii. Politically-Relevant International Environments
(PRIE), 1816-2001Criteria Dyad-
Years% of Dyad-Years
% of Wars
% of MIDs
All Dyads 675,015
100% 100% 100%
Land Contiguity 19,723 2.9% 65.9%
50.3%
Land/Sea Contiguity
32,881 4.9% 75.8%
63.7%
Either is major power
71,770 10.6%
51.6%
45.8%
PRIE (Any of these)
86,393 12.8%
94.5%
85.2%
A. Political Relevance
2. Issue Saliencea. Priority relative to other
concernsb. Determines amount of
power appliedc. Low salience = inaction
InteractionSalienceIssues
B. What leads to dyadic conflict?
Conflict-Producing
Factors
1. Opportunity: Contiguity and Proximity
Conflict-Producing
Factors
Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient
Conflict-Producing
Factors
Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distance
Shift in gradient due to technology or development
Wealthy/Advanced State
Poor State
2. Dyadic Balance of PowerConflict-
ProducingFactors
a. Disparity = Peace
b. Parity = War Risk
c. Transitions: Dangerous?Conflict-
ProducingFactors
3. Issue Type: TerritoryConflict-
ProducingFactors
4. Rivalry: Shadow of the Past
Conflict-Producing
Factors
a. Repeated disputes Future disputesb. Easier for diversionary war
c. Question: Is rivalry the cause of conflict?
Conflict-Producing
Factors
i. Rivals fight more wars – or do states likely to fight become rivals?
ii. Repeated crises Use of more aggressive bargaining strategiesiii. Rivals use more forceful strategies – against non-rivals!
iv. Rivals Learn Over Time
5. Arms Racesa. Rivalry +
Arms Race = Risk of War?
b. Most arms races difficult to demonstrate:
Conflict-Producing
Factors
Can You Pick Out the 3 Arms Races?
Canada-Mexico
US-USSR Israel-Syria
Australia-NZ
India-Pakistan
Belgium-Netherlands
Part III. Pathways to Peace
InteractionSalienceIssues
Conflict-Producing
Factors
BargainingConflict
CooperationCooperation-
ProducingFactors
Outcomes
A Model of Dyadic Interaction
Part III. Pathways to Peace
BargainingConflict
CooperationCooperation-
ProducingFactors
A Model of Dyadic Interaction
A. What Leads to Cooperation?
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
1. Joint Democracy
a. Effects of Joint Democracy:i. The “Democratic Peace:” Virtually no wars
between democracies• Alleged Exceptions: US-UK 1812 (UK not democracy), UK-
Germany WW1 (Germany not democracy), Finland-UK WW2 (no real combat), Peru-Ecuador (few casualties), India-Pakistan (civilians left out of the loop)
ii. Fewer MIDs (1/3 to 2/3 reduction)• Shift to covert from overt when force is used• MIDs less likely to escalate to higher levels of violence• Increased reliance on mediation, arbitration
iii. Increased common interests (alliances, UN votes, IOs, etc)
iv. Increased Trade – Why should this be?
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
v. Formal AgreementsCooperation-
ProducingFactors
b. Institutional Explanation
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
c. Norms Explanation
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
2. Shared Interests
Power Transition Theory: Mutual Satisfaction = Peace
Side A Side B Outcome
Satisfied Satisfied Peace
Satisfied Dissatisfied
Conflict
Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Peace or Intense Conflict
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
Evidence for Peace Through Shared
Interests Alliance
portfolios: Similarity generally reduces conflict– Better predictor
than dyadic alliance!
UN Votes: Similar votes = closer economic ties
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
3. Similar Institutions
Even after controlling for democracy / autocracy, similar government mechanisms (executive-legislative relations, etc) increase cooperation / reduce conflict.4. Advanced Economies
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
Joint advanced economies trade, cooperate, ally more / fight less with each other than other dyads
5. Economic Interdependence
a. Mutual gains from tradei. Short explanation: Trade is voluntaryii. Absolute and Comparative Advantage
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
Absolute Advantage
USA Colombia
MissilesOR
20 5
Coffee 10 200
Given 100 resources, what can each country produce?
• Production possibilities without trade
• Trade allows specialization. US buys Coffee at < 10 resources. Colombia buys Missiles at < 20 resources.
• Example: Coffee = 1, Missiles = 10. US trades 5 missiles (50 resources) for 50 coffee (50 resources)
• Result: Both sides can achieve levels of consumption outside of the original production possibilities!
200
20
Missiles
Coffee
10
10010
Comparative Advantage
USA
Britain
Wheat
OR100 20
Cars 10 5
Given 100 resources, what can each country produce? • US has absolute advantage in both
goods – 5 to 1 in wheat, 2 to 1 in cars -- so has comparative advantage (bigger relative advantage) in wheat
• UK has comparative advantage (smaller relative disadvantage) in cars (½ as productive rather than 20% as productive)
• UK buys wheat at < 5 resources, US buys cars at < 10 resources
• Example: Wheat = 1.5, Cars = 9. US sells 24 wheat (36 resources), buys 4 cars (36 resources)
50
10
100Wheat
Cars5
5. Economic Interdependence
a. Mutual gains from tradei. Short explanation: Trade is voluntaryii. Absolute and Comparative Advantage
b. Reinforces democratic peace:
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
5. Economic Interdependence
a. Mutual gains from tradei. Short explanation: Trade is voluntaryii. Absolute and Comparative Advantage
b. Reinforces democratic peacec. Allies trade more than enemies…but
sometimes trade continues during war!
Cooperation-Producing
Factors
Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes
InteractionSalienceIssues
Conflict-Producing
Factors
BargainingConflict
CooperationCooperation-
ProducingFactors
Outcomes
A Model of Dyadic Interaction
Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes
BargainingConflict
CooperationOutcomes
A Model of Dyadic Interaction
A. The Logic of Game Theory
1. Game theory = formal way to represent strategic interaction
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
2. Assumptions of Game Theory
a. Rational choice, unrestricted preferences
i. Connected preferences – Some outcomes preferred over others by the player (subjective utility)
ii. Transitive preferences – If a player prefers outcome A to outcome B, and also prefers outcome B to outcome C, then the player must prefer outcome A to outcome C.
iii. Choice – Pick the option believed to lead to preferred outcome
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
b. Elements of a game
i. Players – In IR, this means statesii. Strategies – The choices players haveiii. Outcomes – The results of the players’ choicesiv. Payoffs – How much each player values each
Outcome
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
Player 2
Player1
Strategy A Strategy B
Strategy A
Outcome 1Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff
Outcome 2Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff
Strategy B
Outcome 3Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff
Outcome 4Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff
c. Where do payoffs come from?
Realism: Power and security (relative gains concerns)
Liberalism: “There’s no accounting for taste” – but money often used (emphasis on absolute gains)
Radicalism: Distribution of wealth (relative economic gains) key
Constructivism: Skeptical of rationalism, but payoffs socially constructed, just like the game.
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
3. Making Predictions: Solving a Game
a. Goal = Find an equilibrium (stable behavior, unlikely to change without change in conditions)
b. Basic tool = Nash Equilibrium Neither player could do any better by unilaterally changing its strategy choice
How to solve a simple 2x2game
Player 2
Player1
Strategy A Strategy B
Strategy A 2,3 3,4
Strategy B 0,0 4,2
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
Player 2
Player1
Strategy A Strategy B
Strategy A 2,3 3,4
Strategy B 0,5 4,2
c. Limitation: No Equilibrium
Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium. Prediction = no stable pure strategy, stability only results from “mixing” strategies (probabilistic prediction)
Example:
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
Player 2
Player1
Strategy A Strategy B
Strategy A 2,5 3,4
Strategy B 0,4 4,5
d. Limitation: Multiple Equilibria
Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria. Prediction = either equilibrium can result
Example:
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
4. Games Nations Play
a. Prisoners’ Dilemma: Used to model “Security Dilemmas” -- Efforts to increase own security make others less secure (arms races, etc.)
b. Both players end up worse, even though each plays rationally!
Player 2
Player1
Remain Silent Confess
Remain Silent
Misdemeanor, Misdemeanor Life, Walk Free
Confess Walk Free, Life Felony, Felony
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
4. Games Nations Play
b. Chickeni. Equilibria: Someone swerves – but who?ii. Used to model nuclear crisesiii. Credible commitment – throw away the steering
wheel!
Player 2
Player1
Swerve Drive Straight
Swerve Status Quo, Status Quo Wimp, Cool
Drive Straight
Cool, Wimp DEAD, DEAD
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
4. Games Nations Play
c. “Battle of the Sexes”i. Equilibria: Both do better than nothing, but someone benefits
moreii. Used to model environmental cooperation, border
demarcation, etc.iii. Incentive to deceive – Convince other player you would prefer
no agreement to getting your wayPlayer 2
Player1
Tearjerker Action
Tearjerker 2, 1 0,0
Action 0,0 1, 2
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
5. Is There Hope for Cooperation in a Rationalist
World?a. Realists and some Radicals argue that
Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) represents the international system “Tragedy of (Great Power) Politics” or “class war”
i. BUT: Tournament of Strategies showed that when playing repeated PD the best strategy is not “Always Defect” – it’s “Tit-for-Tat!”ii. Tit-for-Tat = Cooperate, then Reciprocate: Allows cooperation even in the most hostile circumstances BUT also risks escalation
b. Liberalism argues that few interactions are true PDs and that those that are should be approached with TFT
c. Social Constructivism argues that people create these structures, so they can transform them
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
6. Conclusions from Game Theory
a. Anarchy need not war. Cooperation can evolve even in a world full of PD players!
b. Institutions and “tying hands” can allow credible commitment, allowing cooperation. Cooperative “win-win” strategies (maximize joint payoffs) include:
i. Commit to silence in PD (join a gang that punishes squealers)
ii. Commit to “no play” in Chickeniii. Commit to take turns in Battle of the Sexes,
PD, or Chicken
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
7.Weaknesses of Game Theory
a. Does not independently account for preferences – intuition and other theories do a lot of “work” for game theory
b. Realistic games tend to have an infinite number of possible Nash Equilibria limitations on predictive power
c. Assumes structure of game is “fixed”d. Assumes common knowledge of
rationality – may be problematic (Princess Bride)
BargainingConflict
Cooperation
B. Empirical Outcomes of Dyadic Bargaining
1. Who gets more?a. More powerb. Cost Tolerance: Willing to take lossesc. Salience ● Power predicts better than Power
aloned. “Tied Hands” and Costly Signals: Ability to
convince opponent that further concessions are impossible / unacceptable
2. Will bargaining fail?a. Zones of Agreement: Area of mutually
acceptable outcomes (better than no agreement – which often means war -- for both sides)
b. Expected costs of failure: What happens if there is no agreement?
c. “Shadow of the Future” – Bargaining over future bargaining power (i.e. territory) is most difficult
Outcomes
C. Outcomes of Conflicta. Economic conflict (tariffs)
increased political conflict (and vice versa)
b. Dyadic war is rare and getting rarer:
i. 197 sovereign states 19,306 dyads. Formula = [n(n-1)]/2
ii. Nearly 1 million “dyad-years” over the past two centuries
iii. Less than 1 war per 1,000 opportunities since 1816. 2004-2012 = only 1 interstate war-year out of more than 150,000 dyad-years (Russia vs. Georgia)
Outcomes
c. Who Wins Wars?
i. Total victory uncommon (2/3 end by negotiation)
ii. 59% of wars won by initially stronger side -- BUT: initiators of wars victorious 68% of the time, yet only stronger 59% of the time
iii. Implication: “Which side started it?” better predicts victory than military power, though advantage declines over time
iv. Extension: Democracies win more often, though advantage declines over time (they lose long wars)
Outcomes
3. Outcomes of Cooperation
a. Some evidence that political cooperation economic cooperation (US/USSR)
b. Mediation and Arbitration appear unreliable BUT selection bias probably responsible (they get the tough cases)
c. Foreign aid increases dyadic trade gains increased interdependence
Outcomes
Review: Back to the Model
InteractionSalienceIssues
Conflict-Producing
Factors
BargainingConflict
CooperationCooperation-
ProducingFactors
Outcomes
Part V: Deterrence – or Destruction?
Will nuclear weapons save us from war?
A. Historical Background1. Ancient Greece:
The Melian Dialogue
“The strong do what they will and the weak do what they must.”
Athens demands submission by Melians, even though Melos is insignificant
Why fight a war over something so small?
Melians: It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves?
Athenians: To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation.
Melians: But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?
Athenians: No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness.
2. Masada
Jewish revolt against Rome
Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada
b. Masada
Jewish revolt against Rome
Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada
Rome imports 15,000 laborers from around empire, spends a year building ramp
Why?
3. 1919-1938: Intra-War Deterrence Fails
Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries panic and social collapse– 1922, 1932-4: Attempts to ban
bombers Despite fear of bombers,
Britain actually initiated city warfare in World War II!– Deterrence failed…– Mass killing / city destruction
generally didn’t have the expected effect on civilian morale
B. Nuclear Deterrence Strategies
1. Massive Retaliation: Depended on atomic superiority
2. Mutually-Assured Destruction: “Tripwires”
3. Flexible Response: Credibility at every level
4. Proportional Deterrence: Enter the French….
5. Warfighting: Soviet and US Hard-liners’ doctrine
C. Requirements
1. Clarity: Threat must be understoodFailures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
2. Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed
Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam
3. Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line
Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war
4. Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed
Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America
5. Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefitsPossible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination
No [adequate] attention has been paid to a proposal, extremely important from the military and political point of view, to create a fully automated retaliatory strike system that would be activated from the top command levels in a moment of a crisis.
-- Soviet Central Committee, 1985
The “Dead Hand” System:
Underground command post If communications fail AND nuclear
explosions detected by sensors… Rocket is launched with internal radio Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to
Soviet ICBMs Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and
communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will annihilate the USA
Problem: They didn’t TELL us about it!
Iraq Invades Kuwait, 1990
All evidence suggests that Saddam did not expect opposition from the US – misinterpreted generic statement that US doesn’t take a position on the border disputes of other nations as permission to invade
C. Requirements
1. Clarity: Threat must be understoodFailures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
2. Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed
Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam
3. Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line
Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war
4. Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed
Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America
5. Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefitsPossible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination
Examples: US Nuclear Threats
Year Issue Threat US Nuclear Position
Result
1945
Iran Truman: “We're going to drop it on you.”
Monopoly USSR Withdraws
1955
Quemoy/ Matsu
Eisenhower: “Atomic bombs can be used... as you would use a bullet.”
Dominance
PRC ceases shelling
1961
Berlin Kennedy: “One chance in five of a nuclear exchange”
Superiority
Draw – USSR builds Wall
1969
Vietnam
Kissinger: “USA will take measures of the gravest consequence.”
Advantage
No Effect
C. Requirements
1. Clarity: Threat must be understoodFailures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
2. Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed
Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam
3. Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line
Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war
4. Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed
Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America
5. Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefitsPossible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination
Sanctions on the PRC US Demand: Stop anti-democracy crackdown (i.e.
Don’t preserve Communist government authority) Sanctions:
– Ban on arms sales– Ban on direct high-level military contacts– Ban on some government financing– suspension of export licenses for satellites contracted to
be launched in China– suspension of export licenses for crime control and
detection instruments and equipment– denial of export licenses for any goods or technology
used in nuclear production, if the President finds that such products could be diverted to the research or development of a nuclear explosive device
Outcome: China ignores sanctions, most of which are lifted within a year or two
Iraq Violates the Geneva Protocol, 1982-1983
Iran-Iraq war is intense and bloody Iraq begins using tear gas, then
blister agents, then nerve gas West is silent because Iran is
considered the greater threat Iran retaliates, but lacked enough
chemical weapons to do serious damage
C. Requirements
1. Clarity: Threat must be understoodFailures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
2. Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed
Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam
3. Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line
Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war
4. Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed
Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America
5. Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefitsPossible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination
D. Types of Deterrence
1. General Deterrence: You won’t dare attack me because you know I’m armed and ready
2. Immediate Deterrence: I’m warning you right now – attack and I’ll shoot!
3. Extended Deterrence: Don’t attack my friend either -- or I’ll shoot
4. Existential Deterrence: I don’t have a gun but I could go buy one if needed
E. Dilemmas of Deterrence1. Security Dilemma: Increased costs and
credibility also mean decreased restraint
2. Vulnerability Dilemma: If you don’t attempt to counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to strike first… (Soviet silos)
3. Rational Irrationality: Fait accompli and “The threat that leaves something to chance:” Rationality decreases credibility, but irrationality decreases restraint
F. Does deterrence work?
1. Inherent uncertainty: If opponent does nothing, is deterrence working?
2. General deterrence creates bias: unstated threats may deter. Perhaps having to state a threat means it is unlikely to succeed…
3. Some evidence supports extended immediate deterrence
Part VI: Unanswered Puzzles of Dyadic Relations
Do IGOs promote dyadic peace? Do alliances create peace between
dyads, or do they raise the specter of war?
What bargaining strategy best avoids war and produces cooperation?
A. Do Joint IGOs produce dyadic peace?
A. Do Joint IGOs produce dyadic peace?
1. Unexplained finding: Same IGOs = increased war risk
2. Possible reasonsa. Coincidence (IGOs not associated with war)b. Similar interests (IGOs and war have common
causes)c. Interaction (IGOs cause war)d. Levels of Analysis (Improperly Aggregating to
System Level)e. Differences between IGOs (Let’s study this more)
i. Universal: No effectii. Limited-purpose: Depends
– Regional Political or Social = Increased war risk– Regional Military or Economic = Decreased war risk
3. Another puzzle: Same IGOs = decreased MIDs!
4. IGOs can produce convergence
B. Alliances
1. Statistical evidence: disputed. After controlling for contiguity, alliances seem to make war less likely between the allies
2. Why might allies be more likely to fight each other?
Alliances and PreferencesAllies: Nowhere to go but down
Nonaligned: Equal chance of increased conflict and increased cooperation
Rivals: If not already fighting, nowhere to go but up
3. When have allies fought each other?
4. How do most alliances end?
5. When are alliances broken?
C. Which bargaining strategies promote peace?
1. Known hazards – Bully and Fighta. Bully: one OR both sides respond to
concessions by increasing demands (i.e. appeasement fails)
b. Fight: Reciprocal escalation (BOTH sides respond to conflict with higher level of conflict)
2. Appeasement also fails – Of six known cases in crises, five were diplomatic defeats for appeaser and one led to war
3. Reciprocity: A Strategy for Cooperation?
Yes – But ALSO a recipe for conflict spirals!
D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous
Circle? Most conflict-producing factors
reinforce each other
The Vicious Circle
D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous
Circle? Most conflict-producing factors
reinforce each other So do most cooperation-producing
factors
The Virtuous Circle
D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous
Circle? Most conflict-producing factors
reinforce each other So do most cooperation-producing
factors Which of these two feedback loops is
more powerful in the long run?