dahl robert_a critique of the ruling elite model

8/10/2019 DAHL Robert_A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model

1/8


2/8

A

CRITIQUE

OF THE

RULING

ELITE

MODEL

ROBERT

A. DAHL

Yale University

A greatmany people

seem to

believethat they

runthings: he old

families,

the bankers,

he City

Hall,

machine,

or

the

party

boss behind

the scene. This

kind

of view evidently

has a powerful

nd

many-sided ppeal.

It is

simple,

compelling,

ramatic,

realistic. It

gives one

standing s an

inside-dopester.

For

individualswith

a strong trainof

frustrated

dealism, t

has

just

the

right

touch

of

hard-boiledcynicism.

Finally, the

hypothesis

has one very

great

advantage

over

many

alternative xplanations:

t

can be cast

in a form

hat

makes it virtually

mpossibleto disprove.

Considerthe last pointfor moment.There s a typeof quasi-metaphysical

theory

made

up

of what

might

be called

an infinite

egress

of

explanations.

The

ruling

lite modelcan be

interpreted

n

thisway.

If

the overt eaders

of a

community

o

not

appear

to constitute ruling lite,

then the theory

an

be

saved by arguing

hat behindthe

overt eaders

there s a set

of

covert

eaders

who do.

If subsequentevidence

shows

that this

covertgroupdoes not

make a

rulingelite,

then the theory

can be

saved by arguing

that

behind the first

covert

group

there s

another,

nd

so on.

Now

whatever else it

may be,

a

theory

that

cannot

even

in

principle

be

controverted y empiricalevidence is not a scientificheory.The least that

we

can

demand

of

any

rulingelite

theorythat purports

o be

more

than

a

metaphysical

r polemical

doctrine s,

first, hat

the

burden

of

proofbe

on the

proponents

of

the theory

and not

on its

critics;and, second,

that there be

clear

criteria ccording o

whichthe theory

ouldbe

disproved.

With

these

points

n

mind,

shall proceed

n two

stages.

First,

shall

try

to clarify

he

meaning

of

the

concept ruling

lite

by

describing

very simple

formof what

I

conceive

to

be a ruling

elite

system.

Second,

I

shall indicate

what would be

required

n

principle

s

a

simple

but satisfactory

est

of

any

hypothesis sserting hat a particularpoliticalsystem s, in fact,a ruling lite

system.

Finally,

I

shall

deal

with

some

objections.

I. A

SIMPLE

RULING

ELITE

SYSTEM

If a

ruling

lite

hypothesis

ays anything,

urely

t assertsthat within

ome

specificpolitical

system

there exists

a

group

of

people

who

to

some

degree

exercise

power

or

influence

ver other

actors

n

the

system.

shall

make

the

following

ssumptions

bout

power:'

1.

In

order to

compare

the

relative

nfluence

f

two

actors

(these

may

be

individuals,groups,classes,parties,orwhat not), it is necessary o state the

scope

of the

responses

upon

which

the actors

have an effect. he

statement,

I

See Robert

A. Dahl, The Concept

of Power,

Behavioral cience,

Vol.

2

(July1957),

pp. 201-215.

463

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3/8

464

THE

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

REVIEW

A

has

more

power

han

B,

is

so

ambiguous

s to

verge

on the

meaningless, ince

it does not specify he scope.

2. One cannot

compare

the

relative nfluence f

two

actors who

always per-

form dentical ctionswithrespect o thegroup nfluenced.What thismeansas a

practical matter

s that

ordinarily

ne can test for

differences

n

influence nly

where there

are cases of

differences

n

initial preferences. t

one

extreme, he

difference

ay

mean that

one

group prefers

lternative

A

and another

group

prefers

,

A

and

B

beingmutually

xclusive.

At

the

other xtreme, t may mean

that

one

group prefers

lternative

A to other

alternatives,

nd

another

group

is indifferent.

f

a

political systemdisplayed completeconsensus t all times,

we should

find t

impossible

o construct

satisfactory

irect est

of

the hypo-

thesis that

it was a

ruling

elite

system, lthough

ndirect nd

ratherunsatis-

factory estsmightbe devised.

Consequently,

o know whether

r not we have a

ruling lite,

we

must have

a

political system

n

which there

s a

difference

n

preferences,

rom

ime to

time,

among

the individual human

beings

n the

system.Suppose, now,

that

among

these

ndividuals

here s a set whose

preferences egularly revail

n

all

cases

of

disagreement,

r at

least

in all cases of

disagreement

ver

key political

issues

(a

term

propose

to

leave undefined

here).

Let

me call

such a set of

individuals controlling roup.

n

a

full-fledgedemocracy perating trictly

according

o

majorityrule,

the

majority

would

constitute

controlling roup,

even thoughthe individual membersof the majoritymight changefromone

issue to the

next.

But

since

our model

s

to

represent ruling

lite

system,we

require that the

set

be

less than

a

majority

n

size.

However,

n

any representative ystem

with

single

member

voting districts

where

more than

two candidates receive

votes,

a

candidate

could

win with

less than

a

majority

of

votes;

and it

is

possible, therefore,

o

imagine a truly

sovereign egislature

lected

under the

strictest democratic

rules

that was

nonetheless

overned y

a

legislativemajority epresenting

he

first

references

of

a

minority

f

voters.

Yet I

do not

think

we

would

want

to

call such a political

system ruling litesystem.Because ofthis kindofdifficulty, propose that

we

exclude

from

ur

definition

f a

ruling

lite

any controlling roup that is a

productof rulesthat

are

actually

followed

that s, real rules) underwhich

majority

f ndividualscould dominate

f

they

took certain

ctions permissible

under

the real

rules.

n

short,

o constitute

ruling

lite

a

controlling roup

must not be a pure artifact f democratic

ules.

A

ruling lite,then,

s a

controlling roup

ess

than a

majority

n

size that is

not

a

pure

artifact

f

democratic

rules. It is

a

minority

f

individuals

whose

preferences egularlyprevail

in

cases

of

differences

n

preference

n

key

political issues. If we are to avoid an infinite egressof explanations,the

composition

f

the

ruling

lite must

be

more or ess

definitelypecified.

II.

SOME

BAD TESTS

The

hypothesis

we are

d.1ing-

with wquld

run

aloig these

1ines; Such

and

such

a

political system the

U.

S.,

the

U.S.S.R.,

New

Haven,

or

the

like)

is

a

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4/8

CRITIQUE

OF THE RULING ELITE MODEL

465

ruling lite system

n which

the ruling

elite

has

the

followingmembership.

Membership

would

then

be

specified y name, position,

ocio-economic

lass,

socio-economic oles,

or what

not.

Let me now turnto the problemof testing hypothesis f this sort, and

begin

by

indicating

few tests that are sometimes

mistakenly

aken

as ade-

quate.

The first mproper

est confuses

ruling

lite with

a

group that has a high

potential or

control. et me

explain. Suppose

a set of ndividuals

n

a

political

system

has the

following roperty:

here

s a

veryhighprobability

hat

if

they

agree

on a

key political alternative,

nd if

they

all act in

some

specifiedway,

then that

alternative

will

be

chosen.

We

may say

of such

a

group that it has a

high otential or

ontrol.

n

a

large

and

complex ociety

ike

ours,

there

may be

many such groups. For example, the bureaucratictriumvirate f Professor

Mills

would

appear

to have a

high potential

for

control.2 n

the

City

of New

Haven,

with

which have

some

acquaintance,

do

not

doubt

that

the leading

business

figures ogether

with

the leaders of both

political parties

have

a

high

potential

forcontrol.

But

a

potential

for

control

s

not, except

n

a

peculiarly

Hobbesian world, equivalent

to

actual

control.

f the

militaryeaders ofthis

country

nd

their

ubordinates

greed

that it

was

desirable, hey

could

most

assuredly

establish

a

militarydictatorship

f

the most

overt

sort;

nor

would

they

need the

aid of eaders of business

corporations

r

the

executivebranchof

our government. ut theyhave not set up such a dictatorship. or what is

lacking

re

the premises

mentioned

arlier, amely greement

n

a key politi-

cal

alternative

nd

some set of

specific mplementing

ctions.

That is

to say,

a

group may

have a

high potential

for

control nd

a

low

potential or unity.

The actual political ffectiveness

f

a

group

s

a function

f

ts potentialforcon-

trol

and

its

potential

for

unity.

Thus a

group

with

a

relatively

ow

potential

for

ontrol

ut

a

highpotential

for

unitymay

be

more

politically ffectivehan

a

group

with a

highpotential

forcontrolbut

a

low

potential

for

unity.

The second mproper

est

confuses ruling

lite

with a

group of ndividuals

who have more nfluencehan any others n the system. take it for granted

that

in

every

human

organization

ome

individuals

have

more

nfluence

ver

key

decisions

than do

others.

Political

equality may

well be

among the most

Utopian

of

all human

goals.

But

it

is

fallacious

to assume

that

the

absence of

political equality proves

the existence

f

a

ruling

lite.

The

third mproper

est,

which s

closely

related

to the

preceding

ne,

is to

generalize

from

single scope

of

influence.Neither

ogically

nor

empirically

does it

follow hat a

group

with

a

high degree

of

nfluence

ver one

scope

will

necessarily

ave a

high degree

of nfluence ver

another

cope

within he

same

system.This is a matter o be determinedmpirically.Any investigation hat

does

not take

into account

the

possibility

hat

different

lite

groups

have

dif-

ferent

copes

is

suspect. By

means

of

sloppyquestions

one

could

easily seem to

discover

hat

there exists

a unified

uling

lite

in New

Haven; forthere s no

2

C.

Wright

Mills,,

The

Power

Elite

(New York, 1956),

pa-sim.



5/8

466

THE

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

doubt that

small

groups

of

people

make

many key

decisions.

t appears to be

the case, however,

hat the small

group

that runs urban

redevelopments not

the

same as the small

group

that runs

public education,

and neither

s

quite

the same as the two smallgroups hatrun thetwoparties.Moreover he small

groupthat

runsurban

redevelopment ith

a

highdegree f unitywould almost

certainly isintegrate

f ts activitieswere extended

to either

ducation

or

the

two political parties.

III.

A

PROPOSED TEST

If

tests

ike these are not

valid,

what can we

properly equire?

Let

us

take

the

simplestpossible

situation. Assume

that there have

been

some

number-I

will

not

say

how

many-of

cases where there has

been dis-

agreementwithin hepolitical systemon key politicalchoices. Assumefurther

that

the

hypothetical uling

lite

prefers

ne alternative nd

other ctors

n

the

system refer

ther lternatives.

hen unless t is true

that

n

all

or

verynearly

all ofthese

cases the alternative

referred y

the

ruling lite

s

actually dopted,

the

hypothesis that

the

system

s

dominated

by

the

specified uling lite)

is

clearly

false.

I

do

not

want to

pretend

ither

hat the research

necessary

o such a

test s

at all

easy

to

carry

ut

or that

community

ife ends tself

onveniently

o

strict

interpretationccording

o

the

requirements

f

the test.

But

I

do not see

how

anyone an supposethathe has establishedhedominance fa specific roup n a

community

r a nationwithout

asing

his

analysis

on

the

areful

xamination

fa

series

of

concrete ecisions.

And

these

decisionsmust either

onstitute he uni-

verse or

a

fair

sample

from

he universe

of

key political

decisions aken

in

the

political system.

Now

it is

a remarkable nd indeed

astounding

fact that

neither

Professor

Mills

nor Professor

Hunter has

seriously ttempted

to examine

an array of

specific

ases to test

his

major hypothesis.3

et

I

suppose

these

two

works

more

than

any

others

n

the

social sciencesof

the last

few

years

have

sought

to

in-

terpret omplexpolitical ystems ssentially s instancesofa ruling lite.

To

sum

up:

The

hypothesis

f

the existence

of a

ruling

lite

can be

strictly

tested

only

f:

1.

The

hypothetical uling

lite s

a

well-defined

roup.

2.

There

is a fair

sample

of cases

involvingkey political

decisions

n

which

the

preferences

f

the

hypothetical uling

elite

run

counter to those

of

any

other

ikelygroup

that

might

be

suggested.

3.

In

such

cases,

the

preferences

f the

elite

regularly revail.

IV. DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS

Several

objectionsmight

be raised

against

the test

propose.

First,

one

might rgue

that the test is too

weak.

The

argument

would

run

as

follows:

f a

ruling

lite doesn't xist

n

a

community,

hen the test

s

satisfac-

3

Mills, op. cit.; Floyd Hunter,

CommunityowerStructureChapel Hill, 1953).



6/8

CRITIQUE OF THE RULING ELITE

MODEL 467

tory; that is,

if

every hypotheticalruling

elite is compared with alternative

control roups,

nd in factno

ruling

lite

exists,

hen the test will ndeedshow

that there s no minoritywhose preferences egularly revail on key political

alternatives.But-it mightbe said-suppose a ruling litedoes exist. The test

will

not necessarily

emonstrate ts

existence,

ince we

may

not have selected

the rightgroup

as our

hypothetical uling

elite. Now this

objection

s

valid;

but it suggests

he

point

I made at the

outset

about

the

possibility

f an in-

finite egress f explanations.

Unless we use

the

test on everypossible combina-

tion

of individuals

n

the

community,

we cannot be certainthat there s not

some combination

hat constitutes

ruling

elite.

But since

there s

no more

a

priori

reason

to assume that a

ruling

lite

does exist

than

to assume that one

does not exist, he

burden f

proof

oes

not

rest

upon

the critic fthe

hypothesis,

but upon its proponent.And a proponentmust specifywhat grouphe has in

mind as his ruling lite. Once the group s

specified,

hen the test I have sug-

gested s,

at

least

in

principle,

alid.

Second,

one could

object

that the

test s too

trong.

or

suppose

that the

mem-

bers of

the ruled

group

are indifferents to the outcome of

various political

alternatives. urely one

could

argue)

if

there

s

another

group

that

regularly

gets ts way

in

the

face of

this ndifference,

t is

in

fact the

rulinggroup

n

the

society.

Now

my

reasons for

wishing

o discriminate his

case

from he

other

involve more than a mere question of the propriety f using the term ruling

elite, which s onlya termof convenience.There is, I think, differencef

some theoretical

ignificance

etween

a

system

n

which a small

group dorni-

nates

over

another hat

is

opposed

to

it,

and one

in

which a group dominates

over an indifferent ass.

n

the

second

case, the

alternatives t stake can hardly

be

regarded

s

key political

ssues

if

we assume the

pointof

view

of the

in-

different ass;

whereas

n

the first

ase

it is

reasonable

to say that the alterna-

tives

nvolvea

key political

ssue from he

standpoint

f both groups.Earlier

refrained

rom

defining he concept key political ssues.

If we were

to do so

at this

point,

it

would

seem reasonable to

require

as

a

necessary although

possiblynot a sufficientonditionthat the issue should involve actual dis-

agreement

n

preferences mong

two

or

more

groups.

In

short, the case of

indifferences.

preference would

be

ruled out.

However,

I

do

not

mean

to

dispose

of

the problemsimply by definition.

The

point

is

to make

sure

that the two systems

re distinguished. he test

for he

second,

weaker

system

f elite

rule

would then be

merely modification

of

the

test

proposed

for

the first nd more

stringent

ase. It would

again

re-

quire

an

examinationof a series of cases

showinguniformly hat

when

the

word was

authoritatively assed

down from

he designated

lite,the hitherto

indifferent ajorityfell into ready compliance with an alternative hat had

nothing

lse

to recommend t intrinsically.

Third, one might argue that the test will not discriminate etween

a true

ruling lite

and

a ruling lite togetherwith its satellites.

This objection s in

one

sense true and

in

one sense false.

t is true that on

a series

of key political

questions,

n

apparentlyunified roup mightprevail

who

would, according o



7/8

468

THE AMERICAN

POLITICAL

SCIENCE REVIEW

our

test, therebyconstitute

ruling

elite. Yet an inner

core

might actually

make the decisionsfor

the whole group.

However,

one of

two

possibilities

must

be

true.

Eitherthe nner

ore and the

frontmen always agree at all times n thedecisionprocess, rthey do not. But

if

they always agree, then it follows

fromone

of

our

two

assumptions bout

influence hat the

distinction etween

an

inner core and frontmen has

no operational

meaning; that is, there is

no

conceivable

way to distinguish

between

hem.

And

if

they

do not

always

agree,

then the test

simplyrequires

a

comparison

t

those

points

n time when

they disagree.

Here

again,

the

ad-

vantages

of

concrete

ases

are

palpable,

forthese enable one

to

discover

who

initiates

or

vetoes and

who merely

omplies.

Fourth,

t

mightbe said that

the test

is eithertoo

demanding

or

else it is

too arbitrary.f it requires hat thehypothetical liteprevails n every ingle

case, then t demands

too much. But

if

t

does not

require

this

much, then at

whatpoint

can a

ruling

lite

be

said to exist?When t

prevails

n

7 cases out of

10? 8 out of10? 9 out of

10?

Or what? There are

two answers o

this objection.

On the one

hand,

it

would

be

quite

reasonable

to

argue, think,

hat

since we

are

considering

nly key

political

choices and not trivial

decisions,

f

the

elite

does not

prevail

in

every

ase

in

which it

disagrees

with

a

contrarygroup,

it

cannot properly

be called a

ruling

elite. But

since

I

have

not

supplied

an

independent efinition

f

the term

key political

choices,

I

must

admit that

this answer s notwholly atisfactory. n the otherhand, I wouldbe inclined

to

suggest

hat

in

this nstance s

in

many

others

we

ought

not

to

assume

that

political reality

will

be

as

discrete

nd

discontinuous

s

the

concepts

we

find

convenient o employ. We can

say

that a

system pproximates

true

ruling

elite

system,

o

a

greater

r

lesser

degree,

without

nsisting hat it

exemplify

the

extreme nd

limiting

ase.

Fifth,

t

might

be

objected

that the test

I

have

proposed

would

not work n

the

most obvious

of

all cases of

rulingelites, namely

n

the

totalitarian

dic-

tatorships.

For the

control of

the

elite over the

expression

of

opinion

is so

greatthatovertly here s no disagreement; ence no cases onwhichto base a

judgment

rise. This

objection

s a fairone. But we are not

concerned

erewith

totalitarian

ystems.

We are

concernedwith the

application

of

the

techniques

of

modern

nvestigation

o

American

communities, here,

xcept

n

very

rare

cases,

terrors not

so pervasive hat

the

nvestigator

s barredfrom

iscovering

the

preferences

f

citizens.

Even in

Little Rock,

for

example, newspaper

men

seemed to

have

had little

difficulty

n

finding

iverse

opinions;

and a

northern

political

cientist

f

my acquaintance

has

managed

to

complete

large

number

of

productive

nterviews

with

White and

Negro

Southerners

n

the

touchy

subject of integration.

Finally

one could

argue

that

even

in a

society

ike

ours

a

ruling

lite

might

be so

influential

ver

ideas, attitudes,

nd

opinions

that

a kind

of

false con-

sensus

will

exist-not

the

phony

consensus

f

a

terroristic

otalitarian ictator-

ship

but the

manipulated

and

superficially elf-imposed

dherence

to the

norms nd

goals

of

the elite

by broad

sections

of

a

community. good

deal of



8/8

CRITIQUE

OF THE RULING

ELITE MODEL

469

Professor

Mills' argument an be interpreted

n

this

way, although t

is not

clear

to mewhether his

s

what he

means

to

rest

his case on.

Even more han the

others his

objectionpoints

o

the

need to be circumspect

in interpretinghe evidence.Yet here,too, it seemsto me that the hypothesis

cannot

be satisfactorily

onfirmed ithout

omething quivalent

to

the test

I

have proposed. For

once

again

either

the

consensus s perpetual

and un-

breakable,

n

which

case there s

no conceivable

way

of

determining

who

is

ruler

nd

who

is

ruled. Or it is

not. But

if t

is not,

then

there s

some

point

n

the

process

of

forming

pinions

t whichthe

one

group

will be seen to initiate

and

veto,

whilethe restmerely espond.

Andwe can onlydiscover

hese points

by

an examination f

a

series

of

concrete ases where

key

decisions

are

made:

decisions

on taxation

and

expenditures,

ubsidies,

welfare

programs,military

policy, and so on.

It

would be interesting

o

know,

for

example,

whether he initiation nd

veto

of

alternativeshaving

to

do with

our

missile

program

would confirm

ProfessorMills' hypothesis,

r

indeed

any

reasonable

hypothesis

bout the

existence

f a

ruling

lite.

To

the

superficial

bserver

t would

scarcely

ppear

that the

military

tself

s

a

homogeneousgroup,

to

say

nothing

of

their

sup-

posed

coalition

with

corporate

nd

political

executives.

f

the

military

lone

or

the

coalition

together

s a

ruling lite,

t is either ncredibly ncompetentn

administering

ts

own

fundamental ffairs

r

else

it

is

unconcernedwith the

successof tspoliciesto a degreethat I find stounding.

However

I

do not

mean

to

examine

the evidence here.

For

the

whole

point

of this

paper

is that the

evidencefora

ruling lite,

either

n

the United States

or

in

any specific

ommunity,

as not yet

been

properly

xamined

so

far

as

I

know.Andthe

evidence

has

not been

properlyxamined,

have tried

o argue,

because

the examination

has

not

employed

satisfactory

riteria o

determine

what

constitutes

fairtest

of

the basic hypothesis.

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