current trends in developmental theory

Anrer. J . 0rrhop.s.vchirnr. 5 / ( 4 ) , Ocroher 1981

THEORY AND REVIEW

CURRENT TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY Alexander Thomas, M.D.

Professor of Psychiatry. New York University School of Medicine

Cirrrerrt trends in de~dopnrentul theory ure e.rcrmined in the light of the explosion of new knobrdedge und ideas in the pust 25 yeurs in the hiologictil, behavioral, and sociul sciences. The findings of early childhood reseurch und long-term longitudirrul strrdies (ire emphasized. Old theories (ire re- erwluuted and new' approuches suggested.

he daily work of all mental health T professionals rests upon some system of theoretical formulations as to the nature of human psychological development. As of today, the theories and practices of psychoanalysis and behaviorism, as derived respectively from Freud and Pavlov, continue to dominate the fields of developmental psychology and psychological medicine. Other concepts have come and gone, many modifications in theory and practice have been introduced into psychoanalysis and behaviorism, but the central theoretical and practical thrusts of both continue to reflect the fundamental formulations of their founders.

Psychological theory has also been enormously enriched and influenced by the monumental studies of Piaget on the

processes of cognitive development, an area ignored in the main by both Freud and Pavlov. Piaget, however, did not concern himself with issues of social and emotional development and did not formulate a general theory of normal and deviant behavioral development. Others, such as Koh1be1-g.~~ have used Piaget's concepts ofcognitive stages as a basis for more general ideas of social development.

Increasingly, in recent years. dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the basic conceptual frameworks of both psychoanalysis and behaviorism has been expressed not only by outside cri- tics, but by authorities in each of these fields2. H4. lox. I " Attempts to integrate the concepts of psychoanalysis and be- haviorismXZ and of psychoanalysis with

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ALEXANDER THOMAS 581

Piaget’s work on cognition’4s have had only limited success. But dissatisfaction with traditional theory is in itself insufi- cient to produce new concepts. What is required is the accumulation of a body of thought and research data that can provide the basis for new theory. This is now more feasible as the result of the explosion in the past 2S years, and especially in the past ten years, of knowledge and new ideas concerned with human psychological development-from neurochemistry and neurophysiology to psychology and psychiatry, to epidemiology and sociology. Child development research has uncovered a richness and complexity in the infant’s behavioral repertoire previously un- imagined. A number of long-term longitudinal behavioral studies have made important contributions to our understanding of individual patterns of psychological development. Contemporary biology has provided new conceptual approaches to the analysis of heredity- environment relationships and stimulated attempts to apply the evolutionary principle of natural selection to human behavior.

Our new knowledge now makes i t possible to modify and even revise fun- damentally a number of the traditional theoretical formulations that have proven increasingly unsatisfactory. These involve questions that are basic to developmental theory. What are the biological characteristics of the human being which contribute significantly to the processes of behavioral development? Similarly, how can the contribution of social experience and learning be conceptualized? What is the dynamic of the mutual influence on each otherofthe biological and the social? How can the goals of behavior and the structures of

behavior be conceptualized? What is the developmental significance of early life experience? Is there continuity and predictability of behavior over time?

To address these questions, a brief evaluation of traditional theories and their recent modifications will first be undertaken. Current research findings that bear on the above questions will then be reviewed and their implication for developmental theory considered.

Several considerations are basic to any theoretical formulation of the processes of human psychological development. A biopsychosocial model is required, in which the influence of the biological, the psychological. and the social are all given sufficient emphasis. Further, these three factors cannot be considered in isolation from each other. The mutually interactional influences of the biological, the psychological, and the social at all age-stage levels of development must be appreciated. Fi- nally, primary emphasis must be given to the special and unique human characteristics in the evolution of individual psychological characteristics. In Eisen- berg’s words, human development must be understood in terms of “the Irumcin nature of human n a t ~ r e . ” ~ ’

FREUD AND PAVLOV

The beginnings of the scientific study of human psychological development and its pathological deviations were fashioned nearly a century ago by the creative seminal work of Freud and Pavlov. They came to the study of human behavior from two different backgrounds-Freud as the neurologist and clinician. Pavlov as the research physiologist. Their methods and conclusions were different, but both con- tributed basic creative insights into the

582 DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY

dynamics of human psychological development. Both emphasized the process of the interaction of the biological and the environmental in the formation of behavior patterns. Both traced the effects of life experience in transforming simple patterns to more complex ones. Both provided methods for the study of human psychological functioning which proved to be enormously productive in their hands and for succeeding generations.

Freud pointed up the meaning and purpose to be found even in behavior that appears accidental or trivial. He showed how much of behavior can be determined by motivations that lie outside of awareness, and how anxiety, conflict, and defense mechanisms influence and shape human actions, goals, feelings, and thoughts. He elaborated a system of treatment of a host of psychological disorders through the techniques of free association, dream interpretation, and the analysis of transference.

Pavlov, for his part, discovered one basic neurophysiological mechanism, the formation, modification, and ex- tinction of conditioned reflexes, through which learning takes place. His dis- coveries of the physiological laws of conditioning have proven very useful in developmental psychology, learning theory, and certain psychopathological formulations. Pavlov's work also provided a conceptual basis for the field of behavior therapy.

But neither Freud nor Pavlov, no matter how great their genius and insights, could transcend in their theoretical formulations the primitive state of the basic neurosciences as well as the psychology, psychiatry, and sociology of their time. Especially lacking were

data on the human neonate and methods for the systematic study of early infant development. The attitude of psychologists of the time toward the newborn infant was epitomized by William James's characterization,

. . . the baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, . . . feels that all is one great blooming, buzzing confusion.56

Essentially, therefore, both Freud and Pavlov had to rely on animal models for their conceptualization of human psychology. For Freud, it was the unfolding of a hypothetical predetermined sequence of instinctual drives; for Pav- lov, it was individual variations in conditioned reflex structures. In a recent volume, S ~ l l o w a y ~ ~ ~ has made a painstaking, scholarly analysis of the highly significant biological influences on Freud's fundamental concepts. He traced in detail the impact on Freud's thinking of such formulations as instinct, drive-reduction, Haeckers bio- genetic law, early Darwinism-all based on the animal biological studies of the period.

Pavlov did propose the existence of a special additional system of conditioned reflexes in humans, which he called the second signaling system, and which he postulated to be the basis of language and thought. The basic conditioned reflex, found in all higher animals, results from the linkage of a concrete environmental stimulus with an innate, i . ~ . unconditioned reflex. The conditioned reflex, therefore, Pavlov pointed out, represented a primary signaling system of external reality. Human beings alone are capable of substituting a word or other abstract symbol for the concrete environmental stimulus in the conditioned reflex structure. Language and

ALEXANDER THOMAS

thought thus become a second signaling system of reality. However, in his ex- cursions into human psychology and psychiatry, Pavlov's hypotheses rested primarily on reflex systems and presumed complex instincts.9R* 99

In the light of contemporary developmental knowledge and concepts, the application of these animal models to human psychology is clearly inadequate. The influence of genetically predetermined instinctual patterns dwin- dles as one ascends the evolutionary scale from organisms with simple to those with complex nervous systems. The more highly developed the nervous system, the greater the capacity for learning and modification of genetically given behavioral pattern; i . e . , the capacity to modify behavior as a consequence of previous experience: Because of the prolonged dependency of wolf pups combined with the cohesive social organization ofeach pack, a young wolf has great opportunity to modify its behavior via its experience. In contrast, after hatching from its egg, a young spider is likely to float away on the first good breeze and will have to function independently. Spiders must therefore possess fully developed behavioral blueprints; reliance on instincts is more adaptive for them than it is for wolves. . . . Simi- lor1.v. humons rely eb-en less on (Em- phasis added)

Also, the conditioned reflex in the human is not the same as in the dog or other animals. In the latter, once established, the conditioned reflex remains essentially unchanged over time. It may become linked with other reflexes, it may become attenuated or reinforced, but the association with the original environmental stimulus which led to the conditioned reflex formation remains essentially unchanged. In a three-year- old boy a water phobia may start, as it might in a dog or other animal, as a sim-

ple conditioned reflex after a frightening experience at the beach. But very quickly the anxiety symptoms create reactions in the parents, sibs, and other children and adults, which modify the original conditioned reflex and give it symbolic meaning. A sequential interactional process is set in motion. When the boy is ten years old, the same phobia has developed new aspects, new meanings, and new influences on his functioning and social relations. And again, at 20 years, or 40 years, the same phobic symptom may be present, but its significance for the individual and his family and friends will be different at these ages.

RECENT TRENDS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORISM

With the passing decades, two cur- rents of developmental theory have been evident in both psychoanalysis and behaviorism. One group of psychoanalysts has remained firmly committed to Freud's instinct and drive-reduction formulations, with minor modifications at most. Others, such as Adler, Jung, Horney, Sullivan, Erikson, and Rado, have provided more radical revisions, with special attention by most to the sociocultural factors neglected in traditional Freudian theory.

Similarly, one group of "radical behaviorists'' has followed the stimulus- response conditioned reflex model developed by Pavlov. As described by B a n d ~ r a , ~ Exponents of radical behaviorism have always disavowed any construct of self for fear that it would usher in psychic agents and divert attention from physical to experiential reality. . . . Internal events are treated simply as an intermediate link in a causal chain . . . one can explain behavior in terms of external factors without recourse to any internal determinants.


Bandura and other behaviorists dis- satisfied with this approach, which cannot deal with many of the most significant human psychological attributes, have focused on social and psychological factors in learning. Studies by this "social learning theory" group have indicated the significance of imitation, "vicarious reinforcement .** and other social factors in learning, which cannot be encompassed by traditional behaviorist concepts.5 Another group, led by Skinner,ll5 has expanded the classical conditioned reflex model to include the concept of operant conditioning. In this expansion, the process of conditioning involves not only the effect of an adven- titious environmental stimulus preced- ing the stimulus for the unconditioned reflex, but also the effect of the organism's behavior resulting from reflex activity. The operant conditioning formulation, however, retains the stimulus-response model as the basis for conceptualizing human development.

The psychoanalytic revisionists and the social learning theorists have con- tributed valuable data and insights as to the dynamics of human development. Their ideas and research approaches have stimulated important studies into the sociocultural influences on human psychological development and into the processes of learning. However, these approaches have not provided significant alternatives to two other basic limitations in the theoretical systems developed by Freud and Pavlov: the animal models for the biological aspect of development, and the limited application of an interactional approach to the conceptualization of the dialectical interplay of the biological. the psychological. and the social at all age-stage levels of development.

In the psychoanalytic movement, revisionists have either remained committed to Freud's biological model, as in the case of Er iks~n : '~ substituted mysti- cal concepts, as in the case of Jung; made limited modifications, as in the case of Adler or Rado: or ignored the issue, as in the case ofSullivan, Horney, Fromm, and others. The social learning group has also in the main avoided the demand of elaborating alternative biological models to the conditioned reflex and signaling system formulations

In addition, these workers have in the main avoided the challenge of develop- ing interactional models that can conceptualize the mutual influence of the biological, the psychological, and the social at sequential age-periods. Where such an interactionist approach has been utilized, it has been primarily limited to the early childhood years.

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ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY

Two other, more sophisticated animal models of behavior have been formulated in recent years, ethology and sociobiology, and applied to human psychological development.

The discipline of ethology, which has been concerned with comparative studies of animal behavior, has formulated hypotheses such as "fixed action pattern." "innate releasing mechanism." and"action specific energy,'' very much in line with instinct theory.3h These formulations have found favor with a number of psychoanalysts, as a refined and presumably scientific basis for Freudian instinct theory." The ethologists have also emphasized the decisive permanent effects of early life experience through the concepts of "imprinting.' and "critical periods."54. 7 7


The ethological interpretation of animal behavior studies in terms of instinct theory has been challenged by Lehrman.Oh* O7 Beyond this, the validity of a direct extrapolation by analogy from animal to human behavior is open to serious question. In his volume, On Aggression, lor en^,^^ the dominant figure in ethology, dealt with human aggression by analogy with animal behavior, with many references to"instinctua1 urges" and "aggressive drives." and asserted that human social behavior . . , is still subject to all the law\ prevailing in all phylogenetically adapted instinctive behavior.

Tinbergen , I M anot her ethologist, en- dorsed Lorenz's views on war and innate aggression and advocated as a prime necessity . . . the biological study of animal behavior for clarifying problem\ of human behavior of such magnitude a s that of our aggression.

Marmorx5 has decisively criticized this concept of a fundamental instinct toward destructive aggression in man: It is meaningless to talk ofmodern war as though it were merely the sum total of countless human aggressions. Modern war is a complicated social institution-the resultant of the intermeshing of many intricate factors: social. economic, political and psychological. I t involves large and complex social organizations which we call nations. It re- quires armies. weapons. wpplies. scientific research. advanced technology, recruitment and propaganda. Like any other social institution. it is capable ofevolution and change. . . . Other wide- spread social institutions of man's past. like slav- ery, dueling, ritual human sacrifice and can- nibalism. which in their times and milieus seemed equally rooted in human nature and destiny, have been, in the course of history, almost entirely eliminated. I t is also a fact that variou\ societies have existed without recourse to war for many generations.

The evidence for the ethological concept of "imprinting" as a unique form of

early learning from one experience that has irreversible and permanent effects has been challenged in a number of recent articles and reviews.u* sz Beyond this. the evidence for this type of learning in human infants is entirely lacking. Similarly. the ethological concept of "critical periods,'' which asserts that the young organism must be exposed to a given learning opportunity at a specific age or forever suffer some degree of deficit,-'j has not stood up under critical scrutiny. Thus, W O I ~ F ~ ~ has reviewed the studies related to this hypothesis, and concluded that the "available evidence does not support" the concept. In another review, ConnoIly3I has also advocated that the term "critical period'' be abandoned. He emphasized that "early experience has far-reaching consequences for an organism's development." but that "development is an extremely complex set of processes which are often oversimplified."."

Certainly. there may be optimal periods in life for different kinds of learning. But this is a far cry from asserting that the optimum period is always in early childhood, or that learning at a less than optimal time cannot be successful.

A new synthesis of disciplines, sociobiology, has asserted that various aspects of social behavior are genetically rather than culturally transmitted. The basic concept is that natural selection has operated to favor the genetic transmission of randomly produced genetic variations in social behavior which have superior adaptive value. The data are derived primarily from animal studies and applied ingeni- ously to human behavior. Even complex social phenomena such as altruism are subjected to this type of evolutionary analysis.49* I 3 I The leading figure in


sociobiology, Wilson, whose textLqo is authoritative in the field, did give serious attention to the importance of cultural influences in his latest volume,L41 but asserted that: The genes hold culture on a leash. . . . Human behavior-like the deepest capacities for emotional response which drive and guide it-is the circuitous technique by which human genetic material has been and will be kept intact. Morality has no other demonstrable function.

He then asserted that altruism, incest taboos, and various phobias are genetically determined. Sociobiology has come under severe attack from a number of social scientists for intro- ducing a new and more sophisticated concept of the biological determinism of human culture.109

Sociobiology does make it possible to explain the capacity of the newborn infant for social behavior, a capacity that precedes actual social experience. This capacity for social behavior rests on the biological equipment for the formation of conditioned reflexes, for perception, for communication, and for learning. Such social functioning is certainly an adaptive asset for the neonate in ce- menting a bond for his nurturing caretaker and in communicating his needs. That this behavior arose randomly by genetic variation and was favored by natural selection appears a plausible hypothesis. The issue is different, however, once experience and learning take place and increasingly elaborate social functioning evolves. To ascribe such complex forms of behavior to genetic inheritance would 'appear dubious. That such behavior can be ex- plained by evolutionary theory does not in any way constitute proof of the hypothesis. To reason by analogy with the

behavior of other animal communities is hazardous and likely to b highly unreli- able: Man has something that is essentially new and which makes him human, culrurt-. . . . Culture affects not only the general structure and dynamics of a society but also the nature of in- terindividual relationships. Thus while social status and social role in the lower primates are determined by individual skill and biological structure, in human societies status and role are determined by genealogy, property or other in- stitutional forms. Because ofthese differences it is inadvisable to seek for direct analogues of human social life in primate society."

a

A HUMAN DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL

If we reject animal models as insufi- cient, what then is a human model for psychological development?

On the biological side, a human model must emphasize those structural and functional characteristics of the brain that are special and even unique in the human being-those attributes that make learning, language, the use of tools, and abstract thought possible. These characteristics will have emerged through the evolutionary process of natural selection: Natural selection can select for specific ways of being sensitive to experience, or for phenotypic structures that make experience possible, just as readily as it can for any other characteristic^.^^

The geneticist D o b ~ h a n s k y ~ ~ spelled out this fundamental concept: We do not inherit culture biologically. We inherit genes which make us capable of acquiring culture by training, learning, imitation of our parents, playmates, teachers, newspapers, books, advcr- tisements, propaganda, plus our own choices, de- cisions and the products of reflection and spccula- tion. Our genes enable us to learn and to deliber- ate. What we learn comes not from the genes but from the associations, direct and indirect, with other men.


A human model must also emphasize the second system of inheritance unique to humans, the extragenetic inheritance of culture. Cultural evolution, unlike biological evolution, is transmitted immediately and cumulatively to succeeding generations through social institutions. Biological change is slow and gradual. Cultural change can be rapid, sometimes gradual and sometimes dramatic in its sudden shifts.

It is fruitless to pose the question of whether biology or culture is more important in individual psychology, just as the argument over heredity versus environment is fruitless. Psychological development occurs in a biosocial matrix through a continuous dynamic interaction of the biological and social. Mental functioning, whether adaptive or maladaptive, is always simultaneously biological and cultural. Operating as a dialectical unity of opposites, one cannot be separated mechanically from the other: Human evolution is now the resultant of the interaction between biological and sociocultural forces, and it involves a constant feedback between them. In this respect also man differs qualitatively from the rest of the animal creation.”

It is now possible not only to conceptualize such a human developmental model, but also to spell out and elaborate the formulations in terms of empirical research data. These findings come from a number of sources, most impor- tantly from early child development research and from a number of long-term anterospective longitudinal studies.lzn The data and their implications will be considered from a number of viewpoints basic to developmental theory: the neonate as a human being: plasticity of human development: early life experi-

ence and its developmental significance; the concept of interactionism; and continuity, change, and predictability.

The Neonate us u Humun Being In the past,

. . . it was thought that in the early weeks of life a baby‘s senses were not yet capable oftaking in any information from the outside world. so that to all intents and purposes he was blind and deaf. Un- able to move much either, he seemed a picture of psychological incompetence, of confusion and disorganization. Only the regularity of his experience, provided principally by his parent, was thought to bring order to the baby‘s mind. Until that was achieved, all he could do was feed and sleep.112

Research studies of the last 20 years have dramatically changed this view of the neonate’s functioning. Careful, detailed, naturalistic observations and inductive content data analysis, combined with the use of new experimental techniques, have by now provided convinc- ing evidence of the neonate’s capacities. A leading researcher summarized the conclusions to be drawn from the recent explosion of knowledge: A newborn thus begins life as an extremely competent learning organism, an extremely competent perceiving organism.”

The research data that demonstrate the competence of the neonate have been reviewed in a number of recent publica- tions.I3* 6 1 * 70 They will be summarized very briefly at this point.

The newborn infant not only recog- nizes visual patterns, but gives prefer- ential attention to such patterns and to complexity, movement, and three- dimensionality over plain visual stimuli.43 The neonate is responsive to sound, can localize the direction from which a sound comes,137 and demon-


strates a capacity for "a spatially relevant, functional relation between audition and vision."88

Bra~e l ton '~ ' I R has studied the neonate's range of behavioral integrative processes, and found significant evidence of cortical control and respon- siveness with 22 items. which now com- prise the widely used Brazelton Neonatal Behavioral Assessment Scale. These items include, among others, response decrement to repeated sensory stimuli, orienting responses to inani- mate stimuli and to examineis face and voice, quality and duration of alert periods, responses to being cuddled, defensive reactions to a cloth over face, consolability, and self-quieting activity. Turkewitz and Birch13z have also reported a series of studies indicating a wide range to the neonate's level of neurobehavioral organization. The findings included responses to simple and complex auditory stimuli, habitua- tion to auditory and somesthetic stimuli, and correlation between intensity of auditory stimulation and direction of eye movements.

Learning, as demonstrated by the formation of conditioned reflexes, starts actively at birth.3z. 7s* 9h (There is some evidence that conditioning can occur in prenatal life, but reliable data are diffi- cult to obtain.) L i p ~ i t t ~ ~ was so impressed by neonatal competence in learning that he has asserted that new- borns can learn better on the first day of life than ever again.

Learning by imitation has also been demonstrated in the first week of life:

If the baby's mother, or some other adult. sticks out her tongue at the baby, within a relatively short time the baby will begin to \tick his tongue back at her.''

This same sequence of imitation can be demonstrated with the adult's fluttering her eyelashes or opening or closing her mouth. As early as two weeks ofage, the infant can differentiate between two live female faces, discriminate between voices, and begin to associate face with voice.z'

Recent research has also revealed that the newborn is capable of active social communication, that most basic element of social exchange. Condon and Sander'" used a refined technique of mi- croanalysis of sound films of interaction between neonate and caretaker to dem- onst rate that . . . as early as the first day of life, the human neonate moves in precise and sustained segments of movement that are synchronous with the articu- lated structure of adult speech.

The precise synchrony occurred with both American and Chinese speech, but not with disconnected vowels or tapping sounds. Condon and Sander suggested that their study . . . reveals a complex interaction system in which the organization oft he neonate's motor behavior is entrained by and synchronized with the organized speech behavior of adults in his environment.'O

This interactional synchrony between neonate and caretaker has also been identified in sucking behavior.6" The infant's cry, in addition, is an active and effective form of social communication from the moment of birth on, and this receives powerful reinforcement with the development of the smile in the first weeks of life.

Thus, the biological endowment of the newborn infant provides the perceptual and learning capacity for the neonate to begin immediately to claim its cultural nongenetic inheritance. With


the first fondling, the first feeding. the first perception of the human face and human voice, the newborn responds to and integrates inputs from the environ-

sorimotor significance. In turn, the active responses of the infant influence the character of the caretaker's attitudes and handling. The nature of this influ-

The human newborn's social being is qualitatively different from that of social organisms such as bees and ants, who are born with an elaborate, fixed. preprogrammed, instinctual structure of social functioning. How different the human being is at birth from other municat ion and learning. mammals can be a matter for debate.

newborn] must necessarily be physiologic (including motor development) or bi~chemical. '"~

Such speculations and conclusions are now unnecessary. ~h~ infant is a

his functioning and development can be studied p s y c h o ~ o g ~ c a ~ ~ y and cul tura l ly , as well as biologica\~y. ~h~ only relevant debate i s whether psycho~ogica~ pro-

birth or in intrauterine life.uo Whether the fetus can be considered a being, however, is another matter. It is only at birth that the human organism begins to function as an independent biosocial organism capable of com-

The newborn.s psychological devel-

merit that have both CUltUral and Sen- psychobio~ogica~ organism at birth, and

ence is again culturally determined. cesses should be considered to begin at

What is clear, however. is that the opment does not involve the shedding of human aspects Of in- such hypothetical presocial and antiso-

teraction begin to operate at birth so that cial characteristics-egocentricity, nar- the human infant very quickly becomes cissism, omnipotence, etc.-in order to a different social being from other become a human being. The neonate is

From an evolutionary point Of view? the perceptual* learning* and

competence Of the human nee-

already a human being i n the ofits fundamental capacity for social ]earning. The progression through childhood,

nate is intimately linked to the long pe-

infancy and childhood. These neonatal capacities make possible the maximum transmission of the cultural heritage of humanity, the adaptive mechanism that

adolescence, and adult life is a

ing continuously intertwine-a biosocial process ofcontinuity combined with quantitative and qualitative change.

riod Of nurturdnce and dependency Of process i n which maturation and learn-

is so uniquely developed in homo sa- piens.

Previous assumptions about the neonate gave rise to all kinds of speculations and debates as to when the human infant developed from a biological into a psychobiological organism.R2 These assumptions regarding the primitive neurobehavioral level of neonatal functioning also led to conclusions that . . . hecause of the inhnt'h incapiicity to communicate at a verbal level . . . data collection [in the

P /as t i c i t y of Ilirmcin Der~c~loprnent

The special capacity for learning is linked to an attribute of the human brain of the greatest developmental significance. namely flexibility and plasticity. This characteristic has vital evolutionary advantages for human- kind: The sociologically as well as the biologically most advantageous trait is a developmental plitsticity of hehavior. In any culture, a person meet5 in his

DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY

lifetime a variety of challenges and a variety of opportunities. To be able to respond successfully to various challenges is better than to be spe- cialized for just one. To be able to acquire competence in any one of several functions or profes- sions is more useful than to be fit for a single one.”

The developmental plasticity of behavior must derive from the biological characteristics of the brain, as expressed in interaction with the variety of opportunities and expectations that the social environment provides. This potential of the brain is dramatically evident in the developmental course of children with severe physical handi- caps. Also evident in these children is the futility and destructiveness of the hierarchical judgment that there is only one norm, with deviations from such a norm being of necessity unsatisfactory and inferior.

A longitudinal study of deaf children showed a significant improvement in intellectual test performance level between the preschool and middle childhood years.** Approximately 50% of those classified as retarded in the preschool period moved to either a lesser degree of retardation or into the normal range. A similar upward trend was strikingly evident in those scoring in the average, dull normal, or borderline range at three to four years of age.

How do we explain the rising adaptation of these deaf children? The answer appears to lie in the development of communication skills that make language, thought, and conceptualization possible. Deaf children are deprived of the possibility of learning to communicate, as hearing children do in early childhood, through the spoken word, and this is reflected in retarded cognitive and adaptive functioning. But they then develop their system of communica-

tion through visual cues such as ges- tures, sign language, and lip reading- what is called “Total Communication.” Once they make up in this way for earlier inability to communicate and conse- quent retardation in learning, deaf children can move ahead rapidly in cognitive and adaptive functioning.

These findings, and similar ones from other studies, decisively challenge long-held assumptions that there is only one road to the development of language and abstract thinking-that taken by the normal hearing child. Sign language was labeled as inferior and incapable of stimulating cognitive development. As a result, until very recently the vast majority of the schools for the deaf used only oral training, that is lip reading and voicing. But the weight of accumulating evidence shows quite clearly that oral training by itself is inadequate.26* 1 1 3

Sign language is a true language with all that this means for learning and abstract thinking, thanks to the plastic potential of the brain.9’

Congenitally blind children show de- lays in achieving a number of motor developmental landmarks in infancy. They do not raise up their heads to visualize the world around them as other infants do-they can hear quite as well prone or supine. Their sitting, standing, and walking occur later than in their seeing peers-visually beckoning objects cannot stimulate the blind child to move into a better position to see or to come closer to grasp. But as they mature, these children catch up in neuromuscu- lar skills and cognitive capacity, often in different sequences from sighted

Thus, for example, in a careful, detailed study of the development of ten babies blind from birth on. F ~ i b e r g ~ ~ reported that these infants


showed the ability to search for a hidden object when they were eight to I 1 months of age. This is the same age at which sighted babies show this particular ability.

The blind child does not respond to the caretaker's face and voice by smil- ing. The sighted baby who fails to respond to these stimuli with a smile may very well be showing the beginning of a disorder of affective and social development, such as autism. All too often the same interpretation is given to the blind baby's failure to smile, with a judgment that failure of affective functioning exists. Those who work with blind children are quite familiar with how many psychiatrists and psychologists overdiagnose autism in such children. However, just as a deaf child is capable of normal language development, so a blind child is capable of normal affective and social development. Such a child cannot see, but can hear, smell, taste, feel, and be aware of kinesthetic stimuli; the child can grasp, learn to cuddle and kiss, to play games identifying parts of the body, and then go on to more and more complex play and social activities that do not require vision.

Fraiberg described the special developmental sequences and patterns of blind children and emphasized their adaptive value. However, she failed to see that her own data confirm the key concept that the plasticity of the brain makes it possible to have more than one normal adaptive sequence of development. Committed to the theoretical position that there is only one normal biological program for behavioral adaptation, she commented that . . . what we have seen in this typical profile of a blind baby at five months of age is a biological

program that has been derailed and for which adaptive solutions have not yet been found. . . . In the biological program it is "intendeb' that vision and prehension evolve in synchrony."

Once one assumes that there is only one biological program that is "intended," the different developmental sequence of the blind infant does represent a "de- railment." If one views the data without such an a priori assumption, the behavioral patterns that enable the blind child to develop affectively and cognitively and cope with the environment become a dramatic tribute to the plasticity of the human brain-a plasticity that makes possible a host of alternative adaptive developmental pathways, depending on the characteristics of the child and the nature of the environment.

The infant with a motor handicap suffers from diminished sensorimotor experience. Depending upon the nature of the disability, a corresponding lirnita- t i m on the exploration of the world will be present. The handicapped infant may not be able to touch or hold objects with ease, move them from hand to hand, take them from or give them to nurturing adults.

In Piaget's theory of cognitive development,lOO*lO1 the first stage is that of sensorimotor intelligence in infancy. In this period, the infant learns to coordi- nate sensory data and motor experiences, leading to an awareness of the external world as a permanent place, with objects having properties that are independent of one's own perceptions. Piaget designates the development of the basic psychological units as schemutu. A primary schema is that of prehension, which evolves out of the progressive modification of the neonate's grasping reflex by the infant's contact with different shapes, textures,


temperatures and weights, as he grasps and handles one object after another.

For the infant with a severe motor handicap, difficulties in grasping, hold- ing and handling objects will make impossible the usual sequence of the formation of primary schemata. This sequence Piaget considers the essential first stage in the progressive development of cognition, as indeed it is for the nonhandicapped child. Yet, it is clear that the person born with a handicap which seriously limits sensorimotor experience finds alternative pathways to normal cognitive development. The host of such individuals who attain a superior intellectual level which they use productively and creatively are again a vivid testimonial to the inherent capacity of the human brain for plasticity of development.

The deaf child, the blind child, the motorically handicapped child-each can find a developmental pathway consonant with individual capacities and limitations, thanks to the plasticity of the brain. By the same token, the envi- ronmentally handicapped child is not in- evitably doomed to an inferior and ab- normal psychological developmental course. Whether the handicap comes from social ideology, poverty, a pathological family environment, or special stressful experiences, the plastic potential of the brain offers the promise for positive and corrective change.

Euriy Lift Experience Psychoanalytic and behaviorist the-

ories, as much as they might disagree otherwise, are united in insisting on the decisive role of early life experiences. Thus, Freud put it in his last overview volume4h that

. . . neuroses are only acquired in early childhood (up to the age of six). even though their symptoms may not make their appearance until much later. . . . The events of the first years are of paramount importance for . . . [a childs] whole subsequent life.

WatsonIZ5 stated a similar view even more dramatically from the behaviorist stand point : But once a childs character has been spoiled by had handling. which can he done in a few days. who can say that the damage i5 ever repaired?. . . Some day the importance of the first two year5 of infancy will be realized.

This thesis was buttressed by Bowlby's influential report14 on the mental health of homeless children. He concluded that . . . mother love in infancy and childhood is as important for mental health as are vitamins and proteins for physical health.

Though Bowlby modified some of his early formulations in later writings, he continued to reaffirm the thesis that the loss of the mother figure in early life has a decisive influence on psychological development. I h

Other formulations have come from different conceptual frameworks, but each has subscribed to the thesis that individual psychological characteristics and structures are determined in the first few years of life. The psychosocial life cycle concepts of Erikson4' emphasize the decisive attributes found in the preschool period. Family pathology and dynamics are considered by others to determine the ontogenesis of schizophrenia in the young child, as well as other pathological develop- ments.1. 7 2 . 1411 Concepts of minimal brain dysfunction1'" and a continuum of reproductive causality9' focus on the permanent consequences of early brain damage. Early malnutrition is seen as


producing irreversible psychological effects.Iz2 Socioeconomic influences on the disadvantaged young child are presumed to cause profound, permanent behavioral and cognitive consequences, usually subsumed under the labels of "cultural deprivation"'.' and the "culture of p~ve r ty . " '~ The ethologists have emphasized the decisive permanent effects of early experience through the concept of "imprinting" and "critical periods."s4 Bloom" and White'.'" have asserted the all-important significance of the first few years of life for later cognitive levels of functioning.

Though this view of the special, even unique importance of the first few years of life did not go completely unchal- lenged."'6 until recently the thesis appeared invulnerable to all criticisms. In fact, the child often does seem to be "father to the man," whether in physiog- nomy, musculoskeletal structure, apptitudes. interests, IQ level, temperamental characteristics, perceptual skills, or psychodynamic defense mechanisms. In addition, the influential psyc hodynamic developmental concepts make it possible to identify later behavior with earlier behavior even when they appear to be strikingly dis- similar. The passive, clinging three- year-old has not really changed if he becomes an aggressive adult who refuses all help. He is only displaying a reaction formation against the same unconscious dependency needs that determine his behavior now as they did in the past. The youngster who behaves cruelly toward his younger sibs and peers and then becomes a dedicated surgeon is only sublimating his sadistic drives. Within this closed conceptual scheme, continuity over time is guaranteed.

adult is ips0 fact0 evidence. Change in behavior is interpreted as the effect of a psychodynamic mechanism, and not as a qualitative alteration in psychological characteristics. If the IQ level changes, this does not mean that the individual's intellectual capacities have changed. These capacities are the same, fixed from infancy but modified in their expression by anxiety, avoidance reactions, or compulsive needs for "over- achievement ."

In the past ten years, however, there has been a progressive shift in the weight of professional judgments and evaluations of the significance of early life experiences. Much of the evidence on which this reevaluation is based has been presented in a recent volume by the Clarkes.z* They have brought together an impressive array of reports documenting the fact that bad care in early life does not necessarily cause permanent, irreversible damage, whether for isolated and neglected children, mentally retarded youngsters, abused infants, children reared in deprived environments, or young children suffering a death of a parent. Given a positive change in care and overall environment. these studies consistently find an amazing resiliency and dramatic improvement in later functioning.

A number of other studies have confirmed this phenomenon of flexibility in development and potential for change in older children and adults. Winick and his associate^'^' found that the effects of early malnutrition could be overcome by a later enriched environment. Similar conclusions have been reported by Richardson.In3 Both studies emphasized that the effects of early malnutrition are permanent only when an unfa- -

Similarity in behavior from childhood to vorable environment persists. In the


cognitive area, the validity of the widely quoted statement12 that 50% of a child's intelligence is developed by the age of four has been sharply criticizedz7. 87 as showing an imperfect understanding of the meaning of correlation coefficients. In fact, a number of studies have demonstrated the frequent occurrence of significant change in intellectual functioning from early childhood to later 1ife.28. 5 5 . 6 2

Significant data bearing on the importance of early experience for later development have come from the major long-term longitudinal studies. With an impressive unanimity, these studies have reported the unpredictability of later functioning from early life experience and behavior.s9* 79- 9 3 * 1 3 3 A typical statement is that of Kagan,s9 in his review of the Fels Longitudinal Study data: . . . there was little relation between important aspects of the motheis treatment of the child during the first three years of life and a variety of psychological dispositions displayed during adolescence or adulthood.

In our own New York Longitudinal Study,Ir7 the evidence is clear from a number of directions that simple linear prediction from early childhood to later childhood, adolescence, and early adult life is not possible. The evolving child- environment interactional process was affected by many emerging unantici- pated influences-changes in basic function, new talents, new environmental opportunities or stresses, changes in family structure or attitudes, and possibly late-emerging genetic factors. In some cases, the sequence of behavioral development was affected quantitatively; in many other instances, the changes were qualitative and even dramatic.

Much emphasis has been given in both the research and clinical literature to the mother-infant bond and the negative reaction of infants to strangers. Certainly, as indicated by the findings on the social competence of the neonate summarized above, the human infant develops an active social attachment to the primary caretakers from the moment of birth onward. An increasing body of data, theory, and controversy has re- sulted from these studies. Spitz's original concept of "eight-month anxiety"117 has been found wanting, as the behavior may be manifested as early as the fourth month or as late as the fifteenth month.Io7 The assumption that the negative reaction represents anxiety is speculative, and the more appropriate term is "wariness." There is great individual variation in the strength and distribution of attachments, and the bonds may be multiple.106 Infants may show strong positive reactions to strangers, as well as wariness, and both may occur in the same exposure.118 Some workers question the actual usefulness of the concept of stranger wariness because of its inconsistency and instability;102 others feel strongly that it remains an important construct in spite of its inconsistency and contextual and procedural variability.' l a

As to the significance of the mother- infant bond for later development, here too the data are inconclusive. At one extreme is the position of Sroufe and his coworkers, who have asserted that the nature of this bond decisively influences later competence in problem-solving and task performance.n6 An opposite position has been taken by K a g a d 0 M y personal view is that the majorconsequenceof an undiluted and emotionally close parent-child bond is to make the child receptive to adopting the


values o f the family. If those values happen to be consonant with those o f society. all i s well. I f not, a close mother-infant bond may not be an advan- tage.

Overall, it should be no surprise that early life experience does not determine later psychological development and functioning. The unique capacity of the human brain for learning and for plasticity in developmental pathways would be wasted if the individual’s potential for mastery and adaptation were frozen, or even severely limited, by his early life experiences. EmdeJ9 made this same point in commenting on the infancy studies using the Brazelton Neonatal Behavioral Assessment Scale, which have reported lack of predictive power with regard to developmental outcome: 1s it not likely that what i s especially adaptive i s a \wriiihi/iry trnd rtrtigc oj’bchu1~ior:’ In other words,, would not these features provide selective ad- vantage during evolution and therefore be preprogrammed in our species‘! I would think that an individual newborn characterized by sufficient variability o f behavior would he favored. with more opportunities for matching or synchronizing such behavior with a caretaking environment-an environment which toa considerable extent would be unpredictable. Indeed. the vulnerable infant may he one who i s consistently ”modal” or who otherwise has a narrow range o f behavioral variability over time.

On the practical side, the judgment that early life experiences are all- important has had serious, far-reaching consequences. The mother, as the most important influence on the young child, became the all-powerful determinant of her infant’s future. Those of us who had to come to the rescue of parents tor- mented by the guilt, anxiety, and confusion produced by the pronouncements of the ”experts” can testify to the suffering this ideology produced for so many.19* 2 5 With the increasing chal-

lenge to the concept of early life determinism in recent years, the influence of the parental guilt stereotype has begun to recede. A much more optimistic view of the developmental process is now possible: As we grow from childhood to maturity, all o f us have to shed many childhood illusions. As the field o f developmental studies has matured. we now have to give up the illusion that once we know the young child‘s psychological history. subsequent personality and functioning i s ipsofircfo predictable. On the other hand, we now have a much more optimistic vision o f human development. The emotionally traumatized child i s not doomed, the parents’ early mistakes are not irrevocable, and our preventative and therapeutic intervention can make a difference at all age-periods.z’

A healthy start in life is better than a sickly childhood, both psychologically and physically. But the healthy six- year-old is not invulnerable to future illness, and the frail youngster is not doomed to a life of chronic mental or physical illness.

The Concept of Interactionism

In the past, concepts of development were dominated, as were other areas of thought, by Aristotelian categories, in which opposites were mutually exclusive. Behavioral phenomena were as- cribed either to heredity or to environmental influences, depending on which theory was dominant at the time. The newborn infant was considered either a homunculus, an adult in minia- ture who already possessed all the physical and psychological attributes that would characterize him as an adult, or a ttrhi4lu rusu, a clean slate on which the environment would inscribe its influence until the adult personality was etched to completion. Where opposites operated together, as heredity and environment in shaping an individual’s char-


acteristics. it was presumed that the contribution of each category could be parcelled out-so much for heredity and so much for environment, so much for biology and so much for culture.

Such linear, static models, in which biology and culture are dichotomized, have proven increasingly inadequate as frameworks for developmental theory. For human psychological development, both Freud and Pavlov formulated the beginnings of an interactionist approach. One of the major achievements of the psychoanalytic movement has been the demonstration of how much that had previously been labeled as he- reditary or constitutional was really the result of the interaction between the young child and his effective environment. Pavlov, on his part, showed how biology and life experience are inte- grated in the formulation of the conditioned reflex. But neither Freud nor Pavlov could develop the logic of a dynamics of interactionism. Within the limitations of their biological positions, only the first steps were possible.

In subsequent years, a number of developmental psychologists suggested conceptualizations that gave some emphasis to an interactional y 2 * I l 4 * I z l Perhaps the most defini- tive statement came from V y g ~ t s k y ’ ~ ~ in the early 1930s:

We helieve that child development i s a complex dialectical process characterized by periodicity. unevenness in the development of different functions, metamorpho\is or qualitative transformation of one form into another. intertwining of external and internal factors, and adaptive processes which overcome impediments that the child en- counters.

Over the past decade this emphasis on an interactional model (or transactional, as some prefer to call i t ) has swelled to a

consensus among leading research workers in human developmental psychology and longitudinal behavioral

I ” The interactional concept

. . . demands that behavioral attributes must always he considered in their reciprocal relationship with other characteristics of the organism and in their interaction with environmental opportunities. demands and stresses. This process produces con5equences which may modify or change behavior. The new behavior will then affect the influence of recurrent and new features of the environment. New environmental influences may develop independently or a s a consequence of previous o r ongoing organism-environment interactive process. At the same time. characteristics of the organism. either talent\ and a b motive\. behavioral stylistic characteristics. o r psychodynamic defenses. may be modified or altered a s the result of this continually evolving reciprocal organism-environment influence. De- velopment thus hecomes a fluid dynamic process which can modify and change pre-existing psychological patterns. At the same time the potential for reinforcement of the old exists with the sameor greater strength as does the possibility for change. Continuity over time does not imply that a reified \tructure, insulated from change, exists intrapsy- chically. Such continuity can be more parsimoni- ously conceptualized as the result of consistency in the organism-environment interaction.z’

s t u d i e s . Y . ’ K . ~ K . 4 7 . S K . ~ 7 . Y ~ . 106. 1 1 0 . 116. 127.

This interactionist view of behavioral development has been reinforced by data from the fields of neurobiology and neurochemistry on the reciprocal relationships among brain, behavior, and environment. Mammals raised without exposure to patterned visual stimuli are subsequently deficient in the ability to learn visual discrimination habits.lo5 Rats kept in a lively environment show distinct changes in brain anatomy and chemistry compared with animals kept in isolation.“) Psychosocial processes can influence the susceptibility to some infections, to some neoplastic processes, and to some aspects of humoral


and cell-mediated immune processes, and these psychosocial effects may be related to hypothalmic activity.lIy There is impressive evidence that behavioral events can alter neurochemical function and that altered neurochemical function can change behavior.' These findings. of necessity, come primarily from animal studies, but they do affirm the validity of the interactionist conceptualization of development.

Central to the interactionist formulation is the thesis that the child is neither trihrrlu rusli nor homoncrrlris. As indicated above, the human infant is an active agent from the moment of birth in the organism-environment interactional process. At the same time, the capacity for learning and for plasticity of development results in the constant possibility of the modifiability or change of psychological patterns in response to new life experiences.

This approach to development is il- lustrated by our own studies of the significance of temperament for normal and deviant psychological development. Temperament can be defined as the style, or / I O H , . of behavior, as con- trasted to the ~ h c i t (abilities and talents) and the ~ 4 . v (motivations) of behavior. From the beginning of our study of the functional significance of temperament, it was clear to u s that conceptually an interactionist approach was required. Thus, in our first paper,lZ5 we suggested that

. . . total personality characteristics at any age- period develop out of the interaction of the specific reaction pattern (i.e. temperament) with all other determinants of psychological development.

In our New York Longitudinal Study, and our other long-term studies, we have found that temperament plays a

significant role in the individual- environment interactional process at sequential age-stages of development. The child's temperament influences significantly the behavior and attitudes of peers, older children, parents, and teachers. At the same time, the effect that these individuals' behavior and attitudes have on any child or adult is markedly influenced by that individuars specific temperamental attributes. Furthermore, temperament, motivations and cognitive characteristics enter into a mutually reciprocal interactional process in helping to shape the process of development at each age-period. These findings have now been abun- dantly confirmed by a number of other investigators. This work, both from our own unit and from other centers in this country and abroad, has been reported in a number of professional papers and summarized in our latest vol-

I t is important to emphasize that, for human development, the interaction of the organism from birth onward is most significantly with the soc~iul environment. This basic principle is all too often overlooked. As Lamb" put i t ,

umes.lZ7. I ? R

I cannot helpheingdiuppointed by the propensity of the developmental psychologists to ignore the fact that neither individual persons nor individual dyads exist apart from their social context. The index unit (whatever it i s ) i s irretrievably anchored in i ts social context. The nature and relevance of the interaction5 within any target system are determined by the societal structure and i t s demands-in short. the unit can be umkrsrood only in i t s social context.

And. we might add, this propensity to ignore social context is just as rife among psychiatrists as among developmental psychologists.

Social context is most obviously


overlooked in those theories that conceptualize the developmental process as the unfolding of invariant sequences of maturation. Whether the emphasis is on the maturation of instincts, neuromus- cular patterns, cognition, or subjective psychological attributes, the assumption of an invariant and inherent sequence must of necessity ignore or minimize the role of the social environment in the developmental process.

Also common is the formulation that narrows the social context to an individual, the family, or some special aspect of society at large. In this regard, a recurrent theme in all too many studies is the dominant or even exclusive focus on the mother-child dyad. Whether the phenomenon at issue is the development of social bonding and attachment behavior in the infant, task mastery and academic achievement in the older child, delin- quent behavior, neurosis, or schizophrenia in the adolescent or adult. the responsibility is heaped on the mother’s head.25. I z 7

Finally. there are those formulations that distort the social context by as- suming one psychological norm-that of the white, male, middle class-with deviations from this norm being ips0 facto evidence of pathology. (An exception is made for the upper class, where behavioral differences from the middle-class norm are tolerantly labeled as “eccen- tricity.”) Such distortions feed on the social ideologies of sexism and racism, as we witness in all the professional pronouncements of the inferiorities and pathologies of women, underprivileged minorities, and the

Conrirrrriry, Chonge, und Predicruhiliry The concept of interactionism neces-

sitates the view that all psychological

u9* lz4* I z 9

attributes can show both continuity and change over time. This is true at all stages of the life cycle. Change and continuity become intermeshed in a dialectical unit of opposites. Continuity emerges from change, but can itself become an agent of further change. For example, a five-year-old boy may develop temper tantrums as an effective technique of gaining his immediate de- sires with easily intimidated parents. The same tantrums may then alienate him from his peer group. Their rejection may then lead him to develop ingratiat- ing techniques, such as buying their favor, to reinstate and maintain himself with his peers. A six-year-old girl may learn to accept help cheerfully from her parents, older sibs, and nursery school teachers. The consistent task mastery which then ensues may lead to self- confidence in approaching new demands and challenges and to her be- coming a constructive leader in her peer group, to whom others may turn for help.

Depending on the nature of the individual-environment interaction, change or continuity may be dominant over time. If the environment remains stable and if the individual’s behavior serves to reinforce those environmental influences that were instrumental in shaping this behavior to begin with, then continuity will be maintained. The continuity may even appear immutable, determined, and fixed by some presumed intrapsychic state, if the dynamics of the interactional process are overlooked:

I wggest that we err when we attribute the apparent consistency and continuity in personality to internal psychological structures alone. What de- termines the similarity between my behavior last yearand what i t is likely to beduring the next is not


nearly so much a matter of that which is"f' as it is ofthesocial fieldsofforcein which that"T'moves. That is, having acquired a repertoire of behaviors. I maximize their adaptive utility by seekingout the familiar and avoiding the strange in the social world around me. The apparent consistency in the self is the result, not merely of what has gone before, but the continuation into the future of the same social forces that have given rise to it.'"

In our New York Longitudinal Study population, marked and even dramatic change over time has been evident in a number of cases, initiated through the emergence of new abilities, or deviations in the individual, or new opportunities or demands in the environment. In other subjects, consistency over time was striking. In some instances this consistency had a favorable influence, in other cases an unfavorable effect on development. Consistency in temperament over time also showed great variability. In general, five patterns could be defined: I ) clear-cut consistency; 2 ) consistency in some aspect of temperament at one period and in other aspects at other times; 3 ) distortion of the expression of temperament by.other factors, such as psychodynamic patterns; 4 ) consistency in temperament, but qualitative change in temperament- environment interaction; and 5 ) change in a conspicuous temperamental trait. Any individual might show a combina- tion of several of these possibilities.lZ7

The data indicate clearly that temperament, like other psychological characteristics, cannot be expected to show linear continuity over time. The categorization of temperament in any individual is derived from the constellation of behavior exhibited at any one age. These behavioral traits are the result of all the influences, past and present, that shape and modify the individual's behavior in a constantly evolving

interactive process. Consistency of a temperamental trait or constellation in an individual over time, therefore, will require stability in these interactional forces, such as environmental influences, motivations, and abilities.

In developmental theory, it has been tempting to look for invariant sequences of behavioral development, in which one stage would follow another in some fixed order. Such invariance would in- troduce a basic structure of continuity and stability in the process of psychological change from one age-period to another.

The studies of Piaget on cognitive functioning have provided the most substantial and solid conceptualization of a single sequential scheme of development. Out of his empirical studies, PiagetIo1 has postulated sequential periods of cognitive growth, which follow each other in an invariant order: sensorimotor (birth to two years), preoper- ational (two to seven years), concrete operations (seven to twelve years), for- mal operations (twelve years and on). The age-periods are not fixed; the sequences are.

However, a serious question has been raised as to the validity of Piaget's formulation of a "linear, sequential, uni- directional conception of cognition behavior and de~e lopmen t . "~~ Flavell's own studies led him to conclude that more cognitive activity and development may be characterized by a process that is"tortuous and spiral-like, cyclical and recursive, sequence-violating and sequence-tran~forming,"~~ which, as he pointed out, is similar to the continuing process of reciprocal interaction that is such a general phenomenon of psychological development.

Freud, like Piaget, also concep-


tualized development in terms of invariant sequential stages, in which de- finitive progress from one stage to the next depended on the mastery of the demands and tasks of the earlier stage. The dissatisfaction within the psychoanalytic movement with the classical Freudian formulations of developmental stages in terms of orality, anality. and genitality, and preoedipal. oedipal, postoedipal, and latency, has led to many proposed modifications of this conceptualized scheme of sequential stages. The most influential formulation is that of E r ik~on .~ ' While ac- cepting Freud's outline of instinctual transformation and the genetic stages of psychosexual development, Erikson has attempted to incorporate a social dimension within this outline, and emphasized that each stage ofdevelopment is influenced and directed by some basic elements in society. In his developmental chart, the first five stages (basic trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, and identity) have their corresponding phases in Freudian theory. His last three stages (intimacy, generativity. and ego integrity) reach into adult life and go beyond traditional psychoanalytic formulations:

Erikson's developmental syctem represents in es- sence an elaboration ofthe stages of psychosexual development proposed by Freud. with a notable amplification at the adult end.'44

Erikson's system has also been criticized as neglecting personality attributes that may be just as important as his selection. and for remaining committed to a system of psychosexual stages based on shifts in 7 1

Mention may be made of two recent efforts at the elaboration of systems of invariant sequences of psychological

developmental stages. L~evinger '~ has proposed a model of "ego.' development as proceeding through a series of se- quentially ordered stages in a fixed order. Kohlbergh4 has formulated the concept that moral judgment develops through invariant sequences. Both Loevinger's and Kohlberg's concepts have been subjected to severe criticism on methodological and substantive

Development does proceed sequen- tially. Learning, maturation, and continuing genetic influenceI4l all serve in their mutual interaction to shape the emergence of new and more complex psychological attributes over time. Whether in overt behavior, affect, language, or cognition, as development proceeds, simpler levels are replaced by more highly organized and complex patterns of psychological organization. I t is also clear that development does not stop with adolescence and that new psychological stages emerge in adult life. E r i k ~ o n ~ ~ has emphasized this point with his, general. broad characterizations of adult life in terms of generativity versus stagnation, and ego identity versus despair. LevinsonhR has recently made a beginning with a systematic inductive study of mid-adult life. Data from larger samples, but ones studied less intensively than Levinson's group. have also indicated that active development characterizes adult life as well as childhood and adoles-

The identification of sequential developmental stages can provide important insights into the nature of the general laws that govern the processes of development from the simple to the more complex. However, several ca- veats are necessary. Individual differ-

grounds.SO. 1.13. 144. 147

cence.48. 94. I20

ALEXANDER THOMAS 60 1

ences in the quality, timing. and transition from one stage to another for any psychological function are substantial and wide~pread .~" Also, given the degree of individual variability that exists in biological capacities, vicissitudes of genetic influence, temperament. maturation, life experience, environmental demands, and expectations of different cultures and social classes, as well as the complexities of the interactional process among these variables, it is not possible to expect predictable invariant linear sequences of development for any behavioral pattern. Group trends can be defined for a population of similar sociocultural background, but marked individual variability that is normal will still be evident.

Beyond this, i t is questionable whether stable sequences of development can be defined, even for specific group trends, for behavioral categories that do not show a clear hierarchial progression from the simpler to the more complex. Thus, in Freud's scheme "orality" is not necessarily a simpler pattern than "anality." though the first is assumed to precede the second. The same is true of Erikson's formulation, in which the earliest stage of "basic trust" is not necessarily simpler than "autonomy." and the latter is again not necessarily simpler than the presumed later stages of "initiative" and "industry." I t is much more likely that Freud and Erik- son's characterizations reflect sequences of demands and expectations of a specific environment rather than any preprogrammed maturational sequence.

OVERVIEW

As summarized above, the weight of recent developmental research has made it clear that the human infant is a

biopsychosocial organism from the moment of birth onward. Further, the biology of the neonate is human, the psychology is human. and the sociology is human. Animal models, and reason- ing by analogy from the human infant to other animal species, are both unnecessary and invalid. A truly human behavioral science is now possible, which was not true in Freud and Pavlov's time.

Central to a human psychology are the neonate's biological inheritance of capacities for social interaction and task mastery. the plasticity of the brain, the unique capacity for learning. the extragenetic cultural inheritance. The dynamics of interactionism determine the processofdevelopment. so that both continuity and change occur over time. Early life experience may be important in getting a good start in life, but does not fix subsequent development. The mother-infant bond is established and consolidated by the interaction between mother and infant from birth onward, but so is the bond between infant and father, infant and sibs, and infant and strangers. The complexities of the interactional process over time make linear prediction over time unrealistic, and cast doubt on the concept of invariant sequential changes.

These findings and concepts make a number of basic formulations derived from Freud and Pavlov's animal models untenable. Development is not shaped by the conflicts between drives for instinctual gratification and the repressing forces of social reality. The human infant is not infrahuman, to be characterized by such speculative formulations as "normal autism." "primitive hallucinatory disorientation," and "normal symbiosis."x' Classical or operant conditioning may explain some


elements of human behavior, but cannot deal with the richness of learning, the complexities of the interactional process, and the significance for the human being of language, thought and emotion, symbolism, and the plasticity of the brain.

How can we now conceptualize the goals of behavior in human terms, rather than in theories of the drive for instinct gratification or the reflex mechanisms of stimulus-response reinforcement or inhibition? We have suggestedlZ8 the goals of human behavior, starting at birth, as social competence and task mastery. Both are specially developed through the human being's unique capacity for learning. Both proceed devel- opmentally, as the individual's capacities mature, as learning takes place, and as the environment makes success- ive new demands and presents new opportunities. Both proceed by a constant reciprocal interaction. Task mastery facilitates social relationships, and in- creased social competence promotes the capacity to master the environment. Most activities, such as play, learning, sex, and athletics, contain both social and task features. Other developmental theoristsz0* have also emphasized the significance of these goals for human behavior. Freud himself put the aims of "work and love" as central for the healthy adult.

Task mastery and social competence are central to later levels of development as well as to early childhood. For the older child, both goals are in- tertwined in the central activities of school and play. As it emerges at pu- berty, sexuality presents the adolescent with a complex new biosocial task, which also demands a new level of social functioning. As with sexual functioning,

different societies and socioeconomic classes present wide variations in the opportunities and restrictions for school, work, athletics, and family life. The goals are basically the same in all areas; the setting, the complexity, the contradictions, the degree of facilita- tion and inhibition of goal achievement which the specific society or class offers to the individual-these may vary, and often tremendously.

One possible exception to the task mastery and social competence model is the truly creative individual, whether as artist, scientist, or philosopher. Creativity is qualitatively different from other cognitive, affective, and social human activities. It may very well involve goal-directed capacities and functions that cannot be fully encompassed within the task mastery and social competence model. Many have pondered over this question, including creative individuals themselves, but this most intriguing issue still rests on a speculative level.

At the other end of the spectrum, we have been impressed, in our own longitudinal studies of handicapped individuals, by the usefulness of the task mastery and social competence model in the analysis of developmental sequences and crises.z3- 2 h , The impact of increasingly complex environmental demands and expectations on these vulnerable individuals has been especially evident. Mentally retarded, brain- damaged, or deaf youngsters may cope more or less adequately with the cognitive task demands and the ground-rules for peer social relationships in early and middle childhood. But many, though by no means all, find their limited resources and capacities insufficient to cope with the increasingly complex situations and


expectations of later childhood and adolescence.

By contrast, some nonhandicapped subjects in the New York Longitudinal Study showed an opposite developmental sequence. They were youngsters who had difficulties in coping successfully with family, school, and peer relationships in early childhood, to the point where clinical symptoms emerged. In later childhood and adolescence, however, new talents and abilities emerged that dramatically en- hanced school and social functioning, and the earlier behavior disorders dis- appeared.

In our own commitment to the interactionist model of development, we have found the concept of"goodness of fit" and the related ideas of consonance and dissonance to be very useful. Good- ness of fit results when the properties of the environment and its expectations and demands are in accord with the organism's own capacities, motivations, and style of behaving. When this conso- nutice between organism and environment is present, optimal development in a progressive direction is possible. Con- versely, poorness of fit involves dis- crepancies and dissonances between environmental opportunities and demands and the capacities and characteristics of the organism, so that dis- torted development and maladaptive functioning occur. Consonance is never an abstraction, but is always goodness of fit in terms of the values and demands of a given culture or socioeconomic group.

It should be emphasized that goodness of fit does not imply an absence of stress and conflict. Quite the contrary. These are inevitable concomitants of the developmental process, in which new

expectations and demands for change and progressively higher levels of functioning occur continuously as the child grows older. Demands, stresses, and conflicts, when in keeping with the childs developmental potentials and capacities for mastery, may be constructive in their consequences and should not be considered as an inevitable cause of behavioral disturbance. The issue involved in disturbed behavioral functioning is rather one of cJxcessi\Te stress resulting from poorness of tit between environmental expectation and demands and the capacities of the child at a particular level of development.

The concept of goodness of fit has also been applied by Dubosj4 as a measure of physical health:

Health can be regarded as an expression o f fitness to the environment, a5 a state ofadaptedness. . . . The words health and disease are meaningful only when defined in terms of a given person functioning in a given physical and social environment.

The goodness of fit concept does not in any fashion imply some modification of the basic interactionist position. Rather, it is a formulation that facilitates the application of the interactionist conceptual model to specific counseling. early intervention, and treatment situations. The formulation structures a strategy of intervention that includes an assessment of the individual's motivations, abilities, and temperament; behavioral patterns and their consequences; and the expectations, demands, and limitations of the environment. The specific potential or actual dissonance between individual and environment can then be proportioned. Thus, for example, if consultation is re- quested for a girl who stands passively at the periphery of a group, and if as-


sessment reveals a slow-to-warm-up temperamental pattern. then attention can be focused on whether the parents and teachers are making a demand for quick, active group involvement. If a boy disrupts his class with bizarre behavior, the assessment may show a severe reading difficulty, with defensive avoidance behavior. Ifwe know that the handicapped youngster may have special difficulties in mastering new complex demands and expectations in adolescence, this can provide a guide to preventive intervention to ensure continued goodness of fit.

Huniun Di,qersitg

Human beings show wide diversity in their physical characteristics. Even more remarkable are the range and variety of individual differences in psychological attributes-temperament, goals, abilities, language, emotions, ideas. ethical systems, etc. Any individual will be part of many groups, based on ethnic, cultural, socioeconomic class, reli- gious, sex, political, and other considerations. Not only are the groups di- verse, but within each group there is a wide range of individual differences.

This phenomenon of human diversity undoubtedly has a positive evolutionary adaptive significance.2v I t ensures that, in any community as a whole, there will be individuals who can respond effec- tively, no matter what the specific environmental stimuli and demands may be. Beyond this, diversity makes for the variety, scope, and richness of different cultures and of individual social relations that are so precious in human life.

Unfortunately, the meaning and significance of human diversity has all too often been negated by rigidity of hierarchical formulations. in which dif-

ferences in any category are ranged in a spectrum from the best to better to average to inferior or worst. Whether it be skin color, sex. nationality, religion, social class, style of life, or material pos- sessions, humanity has been cursed for thousands of years by the judgmental quantification of characteristics that in- trinsically have no such hierarchical distribution.

Developmental theories, for their own part, have all too often been straightjacketed by formulations that cannot do justice to the scope and significance of human diversity. Animal models. concepts of linear continuity, the all-importance of early life experience, invariant stage sequences, or of personality traits as fixed or global, all make it impossible to encompass the subtleties, complexities, and richness of individual psychological development. So many person and situation variables are influential in the developmental process, so many different outcomes are possible, so many different traits can be the significant ones for different individuals, so much differentiation and so many different roles can be evident, and differently from one person to another-that the search for simple formulas and categorizations would appear to be totally unrealistic. And yet it is just this kind of complexity. am- biguity, and unpredictability that makes the search for simple global answers so tempting to so many.

The poets. playwrights. artists. and philosophers have always marveled at the many different ways there are to be a human being. Developmental research of recent years has begun to illuminate the dynamics of this phenomenon. The human capacity to learn, the plasticity of developmental pathways. the indi-

ALEXANDER THOMAS

vidual differences in temperament, the active role played by each person in interaction with the environment from the moment of birth onward, the enormous variability in the cultural influences brought to bear on the developmental process, the subtleties and complexities of the relationships among language, thought, and emotion-all promote a diversity of human psychological functioning from one individual to another. MischelYo has summed up nicely our present state of knowledge, noting that recent research gives us a view of: . . . the person as so complex and multihceted as to defy ea\y classification and comparisons on any single o r simple common dimension. as multiply influenced by a ho\t o f interacting determinants. as uniquely organized on the basis o f prior experiences and future experiences. and yet as rule- guided in systematic, potentially comprehensible ways that are open t o study by the methods of science. I t i s an image that has moved a long way from the instinctual drive-reduction models, the static global traits, and the automatic stimulus- response bonds oftraditional personality theories. I t i s an image that highlights the shortcomings o f all simplistic theories that view behavior as the exclusive result ofany narrow set ofdeterminants. whether these are habit.;. traits. drives, reinforc- ers, con\tructs. instincts. or genes and whether they are exclusively inside or outside the perbon. I t will be exciting to watch this image change as new research and theorizing alter our understanding o f what i t i s to be a human being.

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