BOOK REVIEW

Culture, Mercenaries, and Battlefield Outcomes inAsymmetric Conflicts

Review by Terence Lee

Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore

Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts. By Scott Fitzsimmons. New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2013. 332 pp., $53.56 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-1-107-02691-9).

The privatization of security has become an increasingly popular topic in thestudy of international security. The heavy involvement of private military contrac-tors in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted the key rolethese actors play in contemporary conflicts. Choosing instead to use the morenefarious term mercenary, rather than military contractors, Scott Fitzsimmon’sMercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts adds to this burgeoning genus of scholarship byexamining the efficacy on the battlefield of these armed forces for hire in twosets of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola, from the1960s to the 1990s.Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts offers a new perspective in the study of the

privatization of security. Departing from the typical focus on the perniciouseffects mercenaries have on conflicts, Fitzsimmons develops a “normative theoryof military performance” to explain why smaller, privately funded armed forcesare able to defeat larger, better equipped armies. The book’s central claim isthat when an armed force possesses cultural norms that encourage creativethinking, decentralized decision-making, personal initiative, free transmission ofaccurate military information, technical proficiency, and group loyalty, thesegroups are likely to be more effective on the battlefield and hence prevailagainst their opponents. Testing this normative organizational logic against amilitary capabilities-based argument, which Fitzsimmons terms the “neorealistcombat theory,” the study finds that the quantity of military personnel, alongwith the quantity and quality of the military equipment used by fighting forces,do not predict which combatant is likely to succeed in a conflict.Drawing from prior work on organizational behavioral norms and military cul-

ture, the “normative theory of military performance” suggests that an armedforces’ internally constituted attributes prescribe its specific logic of appropriate-ness, by defining what tactical behavior is appropriate, acceptable, and legitimatefor its members, and what behavior is not. These organizational norms influencebehavior by specifying what soldiers should do and also by delineating what sol-diers imagine themselves doing in a battlefield situation. The military’s normsallow a soldier faced with a tactical situation to understand the circumstances heconfronts and to formulate a response.The first two of Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts lay out the core assumptions

and the theoretical claims of the “normative theory of military performance,”and the book’s alternative explanation, the “neorealist combat theory.” Fitzsim-mons does excellent work in detailing testable predictions for each theory,

Lee, Terence. (2014) Culture, Mercenaries, and Battlefield Outcomes in Asymmetric Conflicts. International Studies Review,doi: 10.1111/misr.12118© 2014 International Studies Association

International Studies Review (2014) 16, 311–313

making it easy for the reader to follow the narratives in the subsequent empiricalchapters.The four empirical chapters evaluate the two theories by analyzing the military

cultures and military effectiveness of four sets of combatants and the balance oftheir military capabilities. Chapter 3 analyzes why 5 Commando, a mercenarygroup operating in Congo between 1964 and 1965, defeated the much largerand better armed Simba insurgents. Chapter 4 examines the Angolan Civil Warin 1976, when Callahan’s Mercenaries were overcome by the Frente Nacional de Li-bertac�~ao de Angola (FNLA). Chapter 5 retains its focus on the Angolan Civil War,but looks instead at the 1993–1995 period, when the 550-strong mercenarygroup Executive Outcomes overcame Uni~ao Nacional para a Independencia Total deAngola (UNITA), which numbered in the tens of thousands. The final empiricalchapter examines the battlefield failure of the White Legion mercenary group,which was unable to overcome the much larger Alliance des Forces D�emocratiquespour la Lib�eration (AFDL) rebels during the 1997 Congo War.Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts examines some of the most significant civil

conflicts in Africa over the past three decades. It is a clearly written and logicallystructured book that is very accessible even for readers without prior knowledgeof mercenaries or the civil wars in Angola and the Congo. Given the ubiquitoususe of privatized security providers in recent conflicts, in tasks ranging from warfighting to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, Fitzsimmons’ work is timelyas it addresses the important question of their operational effectiveness, espe-cially on the battlefield.However, despite the salience and timeliness of Mercenaries in Asymmetric Con-

flicts, the book has several major flaws. First, the book inappropriately pits the“normative theory of military performance” against the military capabilities-based“neorealist combat theory.” Doing so demonstrates an insufficient appreciationof the wider and very rich body of work on asymmetric wars. Seminal work inthis area over the past four decades has already demonstrated fairly convincinglythat military capabilities do not determine outcomes on the battlefield. Fitzsim-mons’ findings are thus not new. There is widespread agreement among scholarsof asymmetric wars that how forces are used better explains and predicts out-comes than how many armed forces are deployed or how well equipped they are.For instance, Stephen Biddle (2004) notes that superior numbers in battle(taken on its own), “are neither necessary nor sufficient for success” (p. 69). Bid-dle suggests that it is the ability of fighting forces to employ a modern system ofwarfare—which entails their ability to reduce their exposure to hostile fire andenable friendly movement, while slowing an enemy’s advances—that explainswhich side prevails in conflicts. Similarly, Ivan Arreguin-Toft (2005) suggests thatit is a combatant’s choice of strategies that matter more in wars.Second, Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts offers a very simplistic application of

constructivism. In arguing that military culture matters, Fitzsimmons infers itsexistence from a few choice statements from the leaders of the investigated mili-tary organizations or mercenary groups, as well as selected deeds of fighters fromthese armed forces. The book’s research design does not distinguish instrumen-tal (consequentialist) logic of behavior or speech from the normative (appropri-ate). To better discriminate between the two logics, the study could have gonebeyond offering snapshots and focused instead on seeking consistent patterns ofbehavior or discourse in order to obtain a better sense of the belief systems ofthe fighters and mercenaries. By selecting only behaviors and statements that fitthe predictions of the “normative theory of military performance,” we are leftwondering if the entire military organizations were indeed imbued with the saidnorms.Herein lies perhaps the principal shortcoming of the book: With just snap-

shots, we are left wondering to what extent mercenary forces, typically an assem-

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blage of fighters of differing nationalities drawn from varying military traditionsand put together in a short period of time, can actually develop a coherent mili-tary culture. Indeed, Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts appears to have misunder-stood the notion of military culture, as used by scholars such as Elizabeth Kier(1997) and Jeffrey Legro (1995). It is widely accepted that military cultureemerges out of regular armed forces because they are considered “total institu-tions.” In such settings, service personnel are removed from society andimmersed in a fully structured environment where they are perpetually moni-tored and shaped through a combination of powerful incentives and punish-ments. These conditions facilitate the transmission of select norms to servicemenand women. It is highly questionable that mercenary groups can be thought ofas hierarchical, disciplined, and regimented organizations, the same way wethink of typical military organizations.

References

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. (2005) How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. New York:Cambridge University Press.

Biddle, Stephen. (2004) Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Kier, Elizabeth. (1997) Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars. Ithaca:Cornell University Press.

Legro, Jeffrey. (1995) Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during WW II. Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press.

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