cultural revolution china

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Cultural Revolution

This article is about the Chinese Cultural Revolution.For Iran, see Iranian Cultural Revolution. For Libya, seeCultural Revolution (Libya).

The Cultural Revolution, formally the Great Pro-letarian Cultural Revolution, was a social-politicalmovement that took place in the People's Republic ofChina from 1966 until 1976. Set into motion by Mao Ze-dong, then Chairman of the Communist Party of China,its stated goal was to preserve 'true' Communist ideol-

ogy in the country by purging remnants of capitalist andtraditional elements from Chinese society, and to re-impose Maoist thought as the dominant ideology withinthe Party. The Revolution marked the return of Mao Ze-dong to a position of power after the Great Leap Forward.The movement paralyzed China politically and signifi-cantly affected the country economically and socially.

The Revolution was launched in May 1966, after Mao al-leged that bourgeois elements had infiltrated the govern-ment and society at large, aiming to restore capitalism.He insisted that these "revisionists" be removed throughviolent class struggle. China's youth responded to Mao's

appeal by forming Red Guard groups around the country.The movement spread into the military, urban workers,and the Communist Party leadership itself. It resulted inwidespread factional struggles in all walks of life. In thetop leadership, it led to a mass purge of senior officials,most notably Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. During thesame period Mao's personality cult grew to immense pro-portions.

Millions of people were persecuted in the violent strug-gles that ensued across the country, and suffered a widerange of abuses including public humiliation, arbitraryimprisonment, torture, sustained harassment, and seizure

of property. A large segment of the population wasforcibly displaced, most notably the transfer of urbanyouth to rural regions during the Down to the CountrysideMovement. Historical relics and artifacts were destroyed.Cultural and religious sites were ransacked.

Mao officially declared the Cultural Revolution to haveended in 1969, but its active phase lasted until the deathof the military leader Lin Biao in 1971. After Mao'sdeath and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, reform-ers led by Deng Xiaoping gradually began to dismantlethe Maoist policies associated with the Cultural Revolu-tion. In 1981, the Party declared that the Cultural Revo-

lution was“responsible for the most severe setback andthe heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and

the people since the founding of the People's Republic.”*[1]

1 Background

1.1 Great Leap Forward

Main article: Great Leap Forward

In 1958, after China's first Five-Year Plan, Mao called for“grassroots socialism”in order to accelerate his plans for

turning China into a modern industrialized state. In thisspirit, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, establishedPeople's Communes in the countryside, and began themass mobilization of the people into collectives. Manycommunities were assigned production of a single com-modity—steel. Mao vowed to increase agricultural pro-duction to twice 1957 levels.*[2]

The Great Leap was an economic failure. Uneducatedfarmers attempted to produce steel on a massive scale,partially relying on backyard furnaces to achieve the pro-duction targets set by local cadres. The steel producedwas low quality and largely useless. The Great Leap re-duced harvest sizes and led to a decline in the productionof most goods except substandard pig iron and steel. Fur-thermore, local authorities frequently exaggerated pro-duction numbers, hiding and intensifying the problem forseveral years.*[3]*[4] In the meantime, chaos in the col-lectives, badweather, andexports of food necessary to se-cure hard currency resulted in the Great Chinese Famine.Food was in desperate shortage, and production fell dra-matically. The famine caused the deaths of millions of

people, particularly in poorer inland regions.*[5]The Great Leap's failure reduced Mao's prestige withinthe Party. Forced to take major responsibility, in 1959,Mao resigned as the State Chairman, China's head ofstate, and was succeeded by Liu Shaoqi. In July, seniorParty leaders convened at the scenic Mount Lu to dis-cuss policy. At the conference, Marshal Peng Dehuai,the Minister of Defence, criticized Great-Leap policiesin a private letter to Mao, writing that it was plagued bymismanagement and cautioning against elevating politi-cal dogma over the laws of economics.*[3] Despite themoderate tone of Peng's letter, Mao took it as a personal

attack against his leadership.*[6] Following the Confer-ence, Mao had Peng removed from his posts, and ac-cused him of being a “right-opportunist”. Peng was

1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peng_Dehuaihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_Luhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lushan_Conferencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lushan_Conferencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liu_Shaoqihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_People%2527s_Republic_of_Chinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Chinese_Faminehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pig_ironhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backyard_furnacehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collectiveshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_mobilizationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%2527s_Communehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Leap_Forwardhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five-Year_Plan_of_Chinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Leap_Forwardhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deng_Xiaopinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gang_of_Fourhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lin_Biaohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Down_to_the_Countryside_Movementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Down_to_the_Countryside_Movementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_humiliationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cult_of_personalityhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deng_Xiaopinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liu_Shaoqihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Guards_(China)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Class_strugglehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revisionism_(Marxism)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bourgeoishttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Leap_Forwardhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominant_ideologyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maoisthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_traditionshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_ideologyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_ideologyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Chinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chairmanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao_Zedonghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao_Zedonghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%2527s_Republic_of_Chinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%2527s_Republic_of_Chinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_Revolution_(Libya)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Cultural_Revolution


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2 1 BACKGROUND

replaced by Lin Biao, another revolutionary army generalwho became a more staunch Mao supporter later in hiscareer. While the Lushan Conference served as a deathknell for Peng, Mao's most vocal critic, it led to a shift ofpower to moderates led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaop-ing, who took effective control of the economy following

1959.*[3]By the early 1960s, many of the Great Leap's economicpolicies were reversed by initiatives spearheaded by Liu,Deng, and Zhou Enlai. This moderate group of prag-matists were unenthusiastic about Mao's utopian visions.Owing to his loss of esteem within the party, Mao de-veloped a decadent and eccentric lifestyle. *[7] By 1962,while Zhou, Liu and Deng managed affairs of state andthe economy, Mao had effectively withdrawn from eco-nomic decision-making, and focused much of his timeon further contemplating his contributions to Marxist–Leninist social theory, including the idea of“continuous

revolution”.*[8] This theory's ultimate aim was to set thestage for Mao to restore his brand of Communism and hispersonal prestige within the Party.

1.2 Sino-Soviet Split and anti-revisionism

Main article: Sino-Soviet Split

In the early 1950s, the People's Republic of China and theSoviet Union were the two largest Communist states in theworld. While they had initially been mutually supportive,disagreements arose following the ascendancy of NikitaKhrushchev to power in the Soviet Union after the deathof Joseph Stalin. In 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalinand his policies and subsequently set about implementingpost-Stalinist economic reforms. Mao and many mem-bers of the Chinese Communist Party were opposed tothese changes, believing that it wouldhave negative reper-cussions for the worldwide Marxist movement, amongwhom Stalin was still viewed as a hero.*[9] Mao believedthat Khrushchev was not adhering to Marxism–Leninism,but was instead a revisionist, altering his policies frombasic Marxist–Leninist concepts, something Mao feared

would allow capitalists to eventually regain control ofthe country. Relations between the two governmentssubsequently soured, with the Soviets refusing to sup-port China's case for joining the United Nations and go-ing back on their pledge to supply China with a nuclearweapon.*[9]

Mao went on to publicly denounce revisionism in April1960. Without pointing fingers at the Soviet Union, Maocriticized their ideological ally, the League of Commu-nists of Yugoslavia, while the Soviets returned the favourby proxy via criticizing the Party of Labour of Albania,a Chinese ally.*[10] In 1963, the Chinese Communist

Party began to openly denounce the Soviet Union, pub-lishing a series of nine polemics against its perceived re-visionism, with one of them being titled On Khrushchev's

Phoney Communism and Historical Lessons for the World ,in which Mao charged that Khrushchev was not onlya revisionist but also increased the danger of capitalistrestoration.*[10] Khrushchev's downfall from an internalcoup d'état in 1964 also contributed to Mao's fears ofhis own political vulnerability, particularly because of his

declining prestige amongst his colleagues following theGreat Leap Forward.*[10]

1.3 Precursor

The purge of General Luo Ruiqing solidified the Army's loyalty

to Mao

Mao set the scene for the Cultural Revolution by“cleans-

ing”powerful officials of questionable loyalty who werebased in Beijing. His approach was less than transparent,achieving this purge through newspaper articles, internalmeetings, and skillfully employing his network of politi-cal allies.

In late 1959, historian and Beijing Deputy Mayor WuHan published a historical drama entitled Hai Rui Dis-missed from Office. In the play, an honest civil servant,Hai Rui, is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Maoinitially praised the play, in February 1965 he secretlycommissioned his wife Jiang Qing and Shanghai pro-pagandist Yao Wenyuan to publish an article criticizing

it.*[11] Yao boldly alleged that Hai Rui was really an alle-gory attacking Mao; that is, Mao was the corrupt emperorand Peng Dehuai was the honest civil servant.*[12]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peng_Dehuaihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yao_Wenyuanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiang_Qinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hai_Ruihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hai_Rui_Dismissed_from_Officehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hai_Rui_Dismissed_from_Officehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Han_(PRC)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Han_(PRC)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luo_Ruiqinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Party_of_Labour_of_Albaniahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Communists_of_Yugoslaviahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Communists_of_Yugoslaviahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weaponhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weaponhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_splithttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revisionism_(Marxism)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxism%E2%80%93Leninismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Personality_Cult_and_its_Consequenceshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Personality_Cult_and_its_Consequenceshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Stalinhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikita_Khrushchevhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikita_Khrushchevhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Unionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_Splithttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhou_Enlaihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lushan_Conferencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lin_Biao


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3

Yao's article put Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen*[13] on thedefensive. Peng, a powerful official and Wu Han's di-rect superior, was the head of the "Five Man Group", acommittee commissioned by Mao to study the potentialfor a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he wouldbe implicated if Wu indeed wrote an“anti-Mao”play,

wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was ini-tially only published in select local newspapers. Peng for-bade its publication in the nationally-distributed People's Daily and other major newspapers under his control, in-structing them to write exclusively about“academic dis-cussion”, and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics.*[14]

While the“literary battle”against Peng raged, Mao firedYang Shangkun – director of the Party's General Office,an organ that controlled internal communications – on aseries of unsubstantiated charges, installing in his steadstaunch loyalist Wang Dongxing, head of Mao's securitydetail.*[15] Yang's dismissal likely emboldened Mao's al-

lies to move against their factional rivals.*[15] In Decem-ber, Defence Minister and Mao loyalist Lin Biao accusedGeneral Luo Ruiqing, the chief of staff of the People'sLiberation Army (PLA), of being anti-Mao, alleging thatLuo put too much emphasis on military training ratherthan Maoist“political discussion”. Despite initial skep-ticism in the Politburo of Luo's guilt, Mao pushed foran 'investigation', after which Luo was denounced, dis-missed, and forced to deliver a self-criticism. Stress fromthe events led Luo to attempt suicide.*[16] Luo's removalsecured the military command's loyalty to Mao.*[17]

1.3.1 February Outline

Having ousted Luo and Yang, Mao returned his atten-tion to Peng Zhen. On February 12, 1966, the "Five ManGroup" issued a report known as the February Outline(二月提纲). The Outline, sanctioned by the Party cen-tre, defined Hai Rui as constructive academic discussion,andaimed to formally distance Peng Zhen from any politi-cal implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuancontinued their denunciation of Wu Han and Peng Zhen.Meanwhile, Mao also sacked Propaganda Department di-rector Lu Dingyi, a Peng Zhen ally. Lu's removal gaveMaoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao would de-liver his final blow to Peng Zhen at a high-profile Polit-buro meeting through loyalists Kang Sheng and ChenBoda. They accused Peng Zhen of opposing Mao, la-beled the February Outline“evidence of Peng Zhen's re-visionism”, and grouped him with three other disgracedofficials as part of the “Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-PartyClique”.*[18] On May 16, the Politburo formalized thedecisions by releasing an official document condemning

Peng Zhen and his “anti-party allies”in the strongestterms, disbanding his“Five ManGroup”, andreplacingitwith the Maoist Cultural Revolution Group (CRG).*[19]

2 Early Stage: Mass Movement

2.1 The May 16 Notification

In May 1966, an “expanded session”of the Politburo

was called in Beijing. The conference, rather than be-ing a joint discussion on policy (as per the usual normsof party operations), was essentially a campaign to mobi-lize the Politburo into endorsing Mao's political agenda.The conference was heavily laden with Maoist politicalrhetoric on class struggle, and filled with meticulously-prepared 'indictments' on the recently ousted leaders suchas Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing. One of these documents,released on May 16, was prepared with Mao's personalsupervision, and was particularly damning:*[20]

Those representatives of the bourgeoisiewho have sneaked into the Party, the govern-

ment, the army, and various spheres of cultureare a bunch of counter-revolutionary revision-ists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seizepolitical power and turn the dictatorship ofthe proletariat into a dictatorship of the bour-geoisie. Some of them we have already seenthrough; others we have not. Some are stilltrusted by us and are being trained as our suc-cessors, persons like Khruschev for example,who are still nestling beside us.*[21]

This text, which became known as the “May 16 Noti-

fication,”summarized Mao's ideological justification forthe Cultural Revolution.*[22] Effectively it implied thatthere are enemies of the Communist cause within theParty itself: class enemies who“wave the red flag to op-pose the red flag.”*[23] The only way to identify thesepeople was through “the telescope and microscope ofMao Zedong Thought.”*[23] While the party leadershipwas relatively united in approving the general directionof Mao's agenda, many Politburo members were not es-pecially enthusiastic, or simply confused about the di-rection of the movement.*[24] The charges against es-teemed party leaders like Peng Zhen rang alarm bells in

China's intellectual community and among the eight non-Communist parties.*[25]

2.2 Early mass rallies

After the purge of Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Commit-tee had effectively ceased to function, paving the way fordisorder in the capital. On May 25, under the guidanceof Cao Yi'ou – wife of Maoist henchman Kang Sheng– Nie Yuanzi, a philosophy lecturer at Peking Univer-sity, authored a big-character poster (dazibao) along withother leftists and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie at-

tacked the university's party administration and its leaderLu Ping.*[26] Nie insinuated that the university leader-ship, much like Peng Zhen, were trying to contain revolu-

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4 2 EARLY STAGE: MASS MOVEMENT

tionary fervour in a“sinister”attempt to oppose the partyand advance revisionism.*[26] Mao promptly endorsedNie's dazibao as “the first Marxist big-character posterin China.”Nie's call-to-arms, now sealed with Mao's per-sonal stamp of approval, had a lasting ripple effect acrossall educational institutions in China. Students everywhere

began to revolt against their respective schools' party es-tablishment. Classes were promptly cancelled in Beijingprimary and secondary schools, followed by a decision onJune 13 to expand the class suspension nationwide.*[27]By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined thecapital's major thoroughfares holding giant portraits ofMao, beating drums, and shouting slogans against his per-ceived enemies.*[27]

When the dismissal of Peng Zhen andthe municipal partyleadership became public in early June, widespread con-fusion ensued. The public and foreign missions were keptin the dark on the reason for Peng Zhen's ousting.*[28]

Even the top Party leadership was caught off guard by thesudden anti-establishment wave of protest, and struggledwith what to do next.*[28] After seeking Mao's guidancein Hangzhou, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping decided tosend in“work teams”(工作组) – effectively 'ideological-guidance' squads of cadres – to the city's schools andPeople's Daily to restore some semblance of order andre-establish party control.*[28] However, the work teamswere hastily dispatched and had a poor understanding ofstudent sentiment. Unlike the political movement of the1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new move-ment was focused on established party cadres, many of

whom were part of the work teams. As a result thework teams came under increasing suspicion for beingyet another group aimed at thwarting revolutionary fer-vour.*[29] The party leadership subsequently became di-vided over whether or not work teams should remain inplace. Liu Shaoqi insisted on continuing work-team in-volvement and suppressing the movement's most radicalelements, fearing that the movement would spin out ofcontrol.*[30]

2.3 “Bombard the Headquarters”

On July 16, the 72-year-old Chairman Mao took to theYangtze River in Wuhan, with the press in tow, in whatbecame an iconic“swim across the Yangtze”to demon-strate his battle-readiness. He subsequently returned toBeijing on a mission to criticize the party leadership forits handling of the work-teams issue. Mao accused thework teams of undermining the student movement, call-ing for their full withdrawal on July 24. Several days latera rally was held at the Great Hall of the People to an-nounce the decision and set the new tone of the move-ment to university and high school teachers and students.At the rally, Party leaders told the masses assembled to'not be afraid' and bravely take charge of the movementthemselves, free of Party interference.*[31]

The work-teams issue marked a decisive defeat for Liu

Shaoqi politically; it also signaled that disagreement overhow to handle the unfolding events of the Cultural Revo-lution would break Mao from the established party lead-ership irreversibly. On August 1, the Eleventh Plenumof the Eighth Central Committee was hastily convenedto advance Mao's now decidedly radical agenda. At the

plenum, Mao showed outright disdain for Liu, repeat-edly interrupting Liu as he delivered his opening dayspeech.*[32] For several days, Mao repeatedly insinuatedthat the Party's leadership had contravened his revolution-ary vision. Mao's line of thinking received a lukewarmreception from the conference attendees. Sensing thatthe largely obstructive party elite was unwilling to fullyembrace his revolutionary ideology, Mao went on the of-fensive.

On July 28, Red Guard representatives wrote to Mao,calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the rev-olution. Mao then responded to the letters by writing

his own big-character poster entitled Bombard the Head-quarters , rallying people to target the“command centre(i.e., Headquarters) of counterrevolution”. Mao wrotethat despite having undergone a Communist revolution, a“bourgeois”elite was still thriving in“positions of author-

ity”in the government and Communist Party. Althoughno names were mentioned, this provocative statement byMao has been interpreted as a direct indictment of theparty establishment under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaop-ing - the purported“bourgeois headquarters”of China.The personnel changes at the Plenum reflected a radicalre-design of the party's hierarchy to suit this new ideo-

logical landscape. Liu and Deng kept their seats on thePolitburo Standing Committee but were in fact sidelinedfrom day-to-day party affairs. Lin Biao was elevated tobecome the Party's number-two figure; Liu Shaoqi's rankwent from second to eighth, and was no longer Mao's heirapparent.*[2]

Coinciding with the top leadership being thrown out ofpositions of power was the thorough undoing of the entirenationalbureaucracy of the Communist Party. The exten-sive Organization Department, in charge of party person-nel, essentially ceased to exist. The Cultural RevolutionGroup (CRG), Mao's ideological 'Praetorian Guard', was

catapulted to prominence to propagate his ideology andrally popular support. The top officials in the PropagandaDepartment were sacked, with many of its functions fold-ing into the CRG.*[33]

2.4 Red Guards and the Destruction of the

“Four Olds”

On August 8, 1966, the party's Central Committee passedits“Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian CulturalRevolution”, later to be known as the“Sixteen Points”

.*[34] This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as“a great revolution that touches people to their very souls

and constitutes a deeper and more extensive stage in the

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2.4 Red Guards and the Destruction of the“Four Olds ” 5

Propaganda poster reads: “Destroy the old world; Forge the new

world.”A Red Guard crushes the crucifix , Buddha , and classical

Chinese texts with his hammer; 1967.

development of the socialist revolution in our country.":

The implications of the Sixteen Points were far-reaching.It elevated what was previously a student movement to anationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers,farmers, soldiers and lower-level party functionaries torise up, challenge authority, andre-shapethe“superstruc-ture”of society. On August 18, 1966, over a million RedGuards from all over the country gathered in and aroundTiananmen Square in Beijing for a personal audiencewith the Chairman.*[35] Lin Biao took centre stage at theAugust 18 rally, vociferously denouncing all manner ofperceived enemies in Chinese society that was impedingthe“progress of the revolution.”*[36] Mao personally

mingled with Red Guards and threw his weight behindtheir cause, donning a Red Guard armband himself.*[36]Between August and November 1966, eight mass rallieswere held in which over 12 million people from all overthe country, most of whom were Red Guards, partici-pated.*[35] The government bore the expenses of RedGuards travelling around the country exchanging“revo-lutionary experiences.”*[37]

At the Red Guard rallies, Lin Biao also called for thedestruction of the“Four Olds”; namely, old customs,culture, habits, and ideas.*[36] Lin's speeches, heavy onrhetoric but light on details, did not specify what needed

tobe“destroyed”as part of this campaign. Mao believedthat in creating“great disorder”, the masses should or-ganically steer the direction of the movement rather than

Public humiliation by Red Guards in 1966

rely on the authorities to tell them what to do. As a result,the movement quickly spun out of control.

Some changes associated with the “Four Olds”cam-paign were largely benign, such as assigning new namesto city streets, places, and even people; millions of babieswere born with“revolutionary"-sounding names duringthis period. Others aspects of the Red Guard onslaughtwere far more destructive, particularly in the realms ofculture and religion. Historical sites in every part ofthe country were ransacked and destroyed. The dam-age was particularly pronounced in the capital, Beijing,a city rich in history and full of cultural relics, wherethousands of designated sites of historical interest weredestroyed. Red Guards also laid siege to the Temple ofConfucius in Qufu, Shandong province.*[38] During thisepisode of vandalism, Red Guards from Beijing Normal

University desecrated and badly damaged the burial placeof Confucius himself and numerous other historically sig-nificant tombs and artifacts.*[39] Libraries full of histor-ical and foreign texts were destroyed; books were burned.Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeter-ies were closed down and sometimes converted to otheruses, looted, and destroyed.*[40] Marxist propaganda de-picted Buddhism as superstition, and religion was lookedupon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well asan instrument of the 'ruling class'.*[41] Clergy were ar-rested and sent to camps; many Tibetan Buddhists wereforced to participate in the destruction of their monaster-ies at gunpoint.*[41]

For two years, until July 1968 – and in some places formuch longer – the Red Guards expanded their areas of

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6 2 EARLY STAGE: MASS MOVEMENT

authority, and accelerated their efforts at socialist 'recon-struction'. They began by passing out leaflets explain-ing their actions to develop and strengthen socialism, andposting the names of suspected“counter-revolutionaries”on bulletin boards. They assembled in large groups,held“great debates,”and wrote educational plays. They

held public meetings to criticize and solicit self-criticismsfrom suspected“counter-revolutionaries.”

Red Guards on the cover of an elementary school textbook from

Guangxi

This was one of many quotations in the Little Red Book(Mao's Quotations ) that the Red Guards would later fol-low as a guide, provided by Mao. 350 million copies of

the book had been printed by December 1967.*[42] Itwas the mechanism that led the Red Guards to committo their objective as the future for China. These quotesdirectly from Mao led to other actions by the Red Guardsin the views of other Maoist leaders.*[43] Although the16 Points andother pronouncementsof thecentral Maoistleaders forbade“armed struggle (武斗, wudou)" in favorof“verbal struggle”(文斗, wendou), these struggle ses-sions often led to physical violence. Initially verbal strug-gles among activist groups became even more violent, es-pecially when activists began to seize weapons from theArmy in 1967. The central Maoist leaders limited their

intervention in activist violence to verbal criticism, some-times even appearing to encourage “physical struggle,”and only after the PLA began to intervene in 1969 didauthorities begin to suppress the mass movement.

On August 22, 1966, a central directive was issued to stoppolice intervention in Red Guard activities.*[44] Thosein the police force who defied this notice were labeled“counter-revolutionaries.”Mao's praise for rebellion was

effectively an endorsement for the actions of the RedGuards, which grew increasingly violent.*[45] Public se-curity in China deteriorated rapidly as a result of centralofficials lifting restraints on violent behavior.*[46] XieFuzhi, the national police chief, said it was“no big deal”if Red Guards were beating“bad people”to death.*[47]

The police relayed Xie's remarks to the Red Guards

and they acted accordingly.*[47] In the course of abouttwo weeks, the violence left some one hundred teachers,school officials, and educated cadres dead in Beijing'swestern district alone. The number injured was “toolarge to be calculated.”*[46]

The most gruesome aspects of the campaign included nu-merous incidents of torture, murder, and public humilia-tion. Many people who were targets of 'struggle' could nolonger bear the stress and committed suicide. In Augustand September 1966, there were 1,772 people murderedin Beijing alone. In Shanghai there were 704 suicides and534 deaths related to the Cultural Revolution in Septem-ber. In Wuhan there were 62 suicides and 32 murdersduring the same period.*[48] Peng Dehuai was broughtto Beijing to be publicly ridiculed.

In October, Mao convened a “Central Work Confer-ence”, essentially to convince those in the party lead-ership who still have not fallen in line the“correctness”of the Cultural Revolution. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaop-ing were branded as part of a “bourgeois reactionaryline”( zichanjieji fandong luxian) and begrudgingly gaveself-criticisms.*[49] After the conference, Liu, once themost powerful man in China after Mao, was placed un-der house arrest in Beijing, then sent to a detention camp,where he rotted away, was denied medicine, and died in1969. Deng Xiaoping was sent away for a period of 're-education' three times, and was eventually sent to work ina Jiangxi engine factory.

2.5 1967

1967 mass rally in Shenyang against Communist Party officials

of the Northeast Bureau: Yu Ping (left), head of the Organization

Department, and Gu Zhuoxin, Secretary of the Secretariat. Yu

Ping was accused of being a " capitalist roader " and Gu, a traitor

to revolution. Both men survived the Cultural Revolution.

On January 3, 1967, Lin Biao and Jiang Qing employedlocal media and grassroots organizations to generate theso-called "January Storm", during which the Shanghai

municipal government was essentially overthrown.*[50]This paved the way for Wang Hongwen to take charge ofthe city as leader of the so-called Shanghai People's Com-

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2.6 1968 7

mune, later renamed the Municipal Revolutionary Com-mittee. In Beijing, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping wereonce again the targets of criticism; others attacked VicePremier Tao Zhu, signalling that even central governmentofficials were now 'fair game' for attacks.

On January 8, Mao praised these actions through theparty-run People's Daily, urging all local governmentleaders to rise in self-criticism, or the criticism of otherssuspected of“counterrevolutionary activity”. Many lo-cal governments followed Shanghai's example, with redguards or other revolutionary groups “seizing power”from the established party and government organs.

In February, Jiang Qing and Lin Biao, with support fromMao, insisted that class struggle be extended to the mili-tary. Many prominent generals of the People's LiberationArmy who were instrumental in the Communist victoryin the Chinese civil war voiced their concern and oppo-sition to the Cultural Revolution. Foreign Minister ChenYi and Vice-Premier Tan Zhenlin vocally denounced theturn of events in Shanghai, stating that the movement wasgoing to destroy the party. This group of party leaderswere subsequently denounced as the "February Counter-current". Many of these critics were accused of tryingto sabotage the revolution, and fell into political disgracethereafter.

At the same time, some Red Guard organizations rose inprotest against other Red Guard organizations who randissimilar revolutionary messages, further complicatingthe situation and exacerbating the chaos. In April, atMao's behest, Jiang Qing attempted to rein in Red Guardgroups by issuing an order to stop all “unhealthy activ-ity.”On April 6, 1967, Liu Shaoqi was openly and widelydenounced by a Zhongnanhai faction whose members in-cluded Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng, and ultimately, Maohimself.

The situation was quickly spinning out of control; thereexisted no checks and balances on local revolutionary ac-tivities. As the government and party organizations fellapart all over the country, it was no longer clear who wastruly loyal to Mao's revolutionary vision and who was op-portunistically riding the waves of chaos for their owngain. By July, factional violence had become common-place across the country. On July 22, Jiang Qing directedthe Red Guards to replace the People's Liberation Armyif necessary, as the loyalty of local Armyunits to the“rev-olutionary cause”was no longer assured. After the ini-tial praise by Jiang Qing, the Red Guards began to stealand loot from barracks and other army buildings. Thisactivity, which could not be stopped by army generals,continued through to the autumn of 1968.

In the central city of Wuhan, like in manyother cities, twomajor revolutionary organizations emerged, one support-ing the establishment and the other opposed to it. Thegroups violently fought over the control of the city. ChenZaidao, the army general in charge of the area, helpedsuppress the anti-establishment demonstrators. However,

in the midst of the commotion, Mao himself flew toWuhan with a large entourage of central officials in anattempt to secure military loyalty in the area. In re-sponse, local agitators kidnapped Mao's emissary WangLi in what became known as the Wuhan Incident. Sub-sequently, Gen. Chen Zaidao was dragged to Beijing and

denounced byJiang Qing and the rest of the Cultural Rev-olution Group.

In this same year, Chinese New Year celebrationswere banned in China, it was only reinstated 13 yearslater.*[51]

2.6 1968

In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign began, aimedat promoting the already-adored Mao to god-like sta-tus. On July 27, 1968, the Red Guards' power over the

army was officially ended and the central government sentin units to protect many areas that remained targets forthe Red Guards. A year later, the Red Guard factionswere dismantled entirely; Mao feared that the chaos theycaused—and could still cause—might begin running itsown agenda and be turned against what was left of theparty organization. Their purpose had been largely ful-filled; Mao and his radical colleagues had largely consol-idated their political power.

In early October, Mao began a campaign to purge disloyalofficials. Many were sent to the countryside to work inlabor camps. Liu was“forever expelled”from the Com-

munist Party at the 12th Plenum of the Eighth CentralCommittee in September 1968, and labelled the“head-quarters of the bourgeoisie”, seemingly alluding to Mao'sBombard the Headquarters dazibao written two years ear-lier.

In December 1968, Mao began the "Down to the Coun-tryside Movement". During this movement, which lastedfor the next decade, young intellectuals living in citieswere ordered to go to the countryside. The term “in-tellectuals”was actually used in the broadest sense to re-fer to recently graduated middle school students. In thelate 1970s, these“young intellectuals”were finally al-

lowed to return to their home cities. This movement wasin part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities tothe countryside, where they would cause less social dis-ruption.*[52]

3 Lin Biao phase

3.1 Transition of power

The Ninth Party Congress was held in April 1969, and

served as a means to 'revitalize' the party with fresh think-ing and new cadres after much of the old guard hadbeen destroyed in the struggles of preceding years.*[53]

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8 3 LIN BIAO PHASE

The institutional framework of the Party established twodecades earlier had broken down almost entirely: dele-gates for this Congress were effectively selected by Rev-olutionary Committees rather than through election byparty members.*[54] Representation of the military in-creased by a large margin from the previous Congress

(28% of the delegates were PLA members), and the elec-tion of more PLA members to the new Central Commit-tee reflected this increase.*[55] Many military officers el-evated to senior positions were loyal to PLA Marshal andExecutive Vice Premier of China LinBiao, opening a newfactional divide between the military and civilian leader-ship.*[56]

“We do not only feel boundless joy because we have asour great leader the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era,Chairman Mao, but also great joy because we have ViceChairman Lin as Chairman Mao's universally recognizedsuccessor.”

– Premier Zhou Enlai at the Ninth Party Congress*[57]

Lin Biao was officially elevated to become the Party'snumber-two figure, with his name written into theCommunist Party's Constitution as Mao's “closestcomrade-in-arms”and“universally recognized succes-sor”.*[58] Lin delivered the keynote address at theCongress: a document drafted by hardliner leftistsYao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao under Mao's guid-ance.*[59] The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqiand other “counter-revolutionaries”, and drew exten-sively from quotations in the Little Red Book. TheCongress solidified the central role of Maoism within theparty psyche, re-introducing Mao Zedong Thought as anofficial guiding ideology of the party in the party con-stitution. Lastly, the Congress elected a new Politburowith Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Zhou Enlai,and Kang Sheng as the members of the new PolitburoStanding Committee. Lin, Chen, and Kang were all ben-eficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou, who was de-moted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for Linat the Congress.*[60] Mao also restored the function ofsome formal party institutions, such as the operations ofthe party's Politburo, which ceased functioning between

1966-8 because the Central Cultural Revolution Groupheld de facto control of the country.*[61]

3.2 PLA gains pre-eminent role

Mao's efforts at re-organizing party and state institutionsgenerated mixed results. Many far-flung provinces re-mained volatile as the political situation in Beijing sta-bilized. Factional struggles, many of which were vio-lent, continued at the local level despite the declarationthat the Ninth Congress marked a temporary“victory”

for the Cultural Revolution.*[62] Furthermore, despiteMao's efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress,the factional divide between Lin Biao's PLA camp and

the Jiang Qing-led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed,a personal dislike of Jiang Qing drew many civilian lead-ers, including prominent theoretician Chen Boda, closerto Lin Biao.*[63]

Marshal Lin Biao was constitutionally confirmed as Mao's suc-

cessor in 1969

Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internation-ally, having declared its enmity towards both the SovietUnion and the United States. The friction with the SovietUnion intensified after border clashes on the Ussuri Riverin March 1969 as the Chinese leadership prepared forall-out war.*[64] In October, senior leaders were evac-uated from Beijing.*[64] Amidst the tension, Lin Biaoissued what appeared to be an executive order to preparefor war to the PLA's eleven Military Regions on October18 without passing through Mao. This drew the ire ofthe Chairman, who saw it as evidence that his authoritywas prematurely usurped by his declared successor.*[64]

The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater promi-nence in domestic politics, increasing the stature of LinBiao at the expense of Mao.*[65] There is some evidenceto suggest that Mao was pushed to seek closer relationswith the United States as a means to avoid PLA domi-nance in domestic affairs that would result from a mili-tary confrontation with the Soviet Union.*[65] During hismeeting with U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1972, Maohinted that Lin had opposed seeking better relations withthe U.S.*[66]

After being confirmed as Mao's successor, Lin's support-ers focused on the restoration of the position of State

Chairman,*[67] which had been abolished by Mao af-ter the purge of Liu Shaoqi. They hoped that by allow-ing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role,

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3.3 Flight of Lin Biao 9

whether Chairman or Vice-Chairman, Lin's successionwould be institutionalized. The consensus within thePolitburo was that Mao should assume the office withLin becoming Vice-Chairman; but for unknown reasons,Mao had voiced his explicit opposition to the recreationof the position and his assuming it.*[68]

Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of theNinth Congress in Lushan held in late August 1970. ChenBoda, now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin, gal-vanized support for the restoration of the office of StateChairman, despite Mao's wishes to the contrary.*[69]Moreover, Chen launched an assault on Zhang Chunqiao,a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the CulturalRevolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.*[70] Theattacks on Zhang found favour with many attendees at thePlenum, and may have been construed by Mao as an in-direct attack on the Cultural Revolution itself. Mao con-fronted Chen openly, denouncing him as a“false Marx-

ist”,*[71] and removed him from the Politburo Stand-ing Committee. In addition to the purge of Chen, Maoasked Lin's principal generals to write self-criticisms ontheir political positions as a warning to Lin. Mao also in-ducted several of his supporters to the Central MilitaryCommission, and placed his loyalists in leadership rolesof the Beijing Military Region.*[71]

Graffiti with Lin Biao's foreword to Mao's Little Red Book, Lin's

name (lower right) was later scratched out, presumably after his

death

3.3 Flight of Lin Biao

Main article: Lin Biao incident

By 1971, diverging interests between the civilian and mil-itary wings of the leadership were apparent. Mao wastroubled by the PLA's newfound prominence, and thepurge of Chen Boda marked the beginning of a gradualscaling-down of the PLA's political involvement.*[72]According to official sources, sensing the reduction ofLin's power base and his declining health, Lin's support-

ers plotted to use the military power still at their disposalto oust Mao in a coup. Lin's son, Lin Liguo, and otherhigh-ranking military conspirators formed a coup appara-

tusin Shanghai, and dubbed the plan to oust Mao by forceOutline for Project 571, which sounds similar to“Mili-tary Uprising”in Mandarin. It is disputed whether LinBiao was involved in this process. While official sourcesmaintain that Lin planned and executed the alleged coupattempt, scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as a pas-

sive character manipulated by members of his family andhis supporters.*[73] Qiu contests that Lin Biao was neverpersonally involved in drafting the Outline and evidencesuggests that Lin Liguo drafted the coup.*[73]

The Outline allegedly consisted mainly of plans for aerialbombardments through use of the Air Force. It initiallytargeted Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, but wouldlater involve Mao himself. Were the plan to succeed, Linwould arrest his political rivals and assume power. Assas-sination attempts were alleged to have been made againstMao in Shanghai, from September 8 to September 10,1971. Perceived risks to Mao's safety were allegedly re-

layed to the Chairman. One internal report alleged thatLin had planned to bomb a bridge that Mao was to crossto reach Beijing; Mao reportedly avoided this bridge afterreceiving intelligence reports.

In the official narrative, on September 13, 1971, LinBiao, his wife Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and members of hisstaff attempted to flee to the Soviet Union ostensibly toseek asylum. En route, Lin's plane crashed in Mongolia,killing all on board. The plane apparently ran out of fuelen route to the Soviet Union. A Soviet team investigat-ing the incident was not able to determine the cause ofthe crash, but hypothesized that the pilot was flying low

to evade radar and misjudged the plane's altitude.The official account has been put to question by foreignscholars, who have raised doubts over Lin's choice of theSoviet Union as a destination, the plane's route, the iden-tity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was ac-tually taking place.*[73]*[74]

On September 13, the Politburo met in an emergency ses-sion to discuss Lin Biao. Only on September 30 was Lin'sdeath confirmed in Beijing, which led to the cancellationof the National Day celebration events the following day.The Central Committee kept information under wraps,and news of Lin's death was not released to the publicuntil two months following the incident.*[73] Many ofLin's supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong; those whoremained on the mainland were purged. The event caughtthe party leadership off guard: the concept that Lin couldbetray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Rev-olution political rhetoric, as Lin was already enshrinedinto the Party Constitution as Mao's “closest comrade-in-arms”and“successor”. For several months followingthe incident, the party information apparatus struggled tofind a “correct way”to frame the incident for publicconsumption.*[73]

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10 4 “GANG OF FOUR”AND THEIR DOWNFALL

4 “Gang of Four”and their down-

fall

Main article: Gang of Four

4.1 Antagonism towards Zhou and Deng

Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin Biaoincident. With Lin gone, Mao had no ready answersfor who would succeed him. Sensing a sudden loss ofdirection, Mao attempted reaching out to old comradeswhom he had denounced in the past. Meanwhile, inSeptember 1972, Mao transferred a thirty-eight-year-oldcadre from Shanghai, Wang Hongwen, to Beijing andmade him Vice-Chairman of the Party.*[75] Wang, a

former factory worker from a peasant background,*[75]was seemingly being groomed for succession.*[76] JiangQing's position also strengthened after Lin's flight. Sheheld tremendous influence with the radical camp. WithMao's health on the decline, it was clear that Jiang Qinghadpolitical ambitions of her own. She alliedherself withWang Hongwen and propaganda specialists Zhang Chun-qiao and Yao Wenyuan, forming a political clique laterpejoratively dubbed as the "Gang of Four".

By 1973, round after round of political struggles hadleft many lower-level institutions, including local govern-ment, factories, and railways, short of competent staff

needed to carry out basic functions.*[77] The country'seconomy had fallen into disarray, which necessitated therehabilitation of purged lower level officials. However,the party's core became heavily dominated by CulturalRevolution beneficiaries and leftist radicals, whose fo-cus remained upholding ideological purity over economicproductivity. The economy remained largely the domainof Zhou Enlai, one of the few moderates 'left standing'.Zhou attempted to restore a viable economy, but was re-sented by the Gang of Four, who identified him as theirmain political threat in post-Mao era succession.

In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and

to distance themselves from Lin's apparent betrayal, the"Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" campaign began un-der Jiang Qing's leadership.*[78] Its stated goals were topurge China of new Confucianist thinking and denounceLin Biao's actions as traitorous and regressive.*[79] Rem-iniscent of the first years of the Cultural Revolution, thebattle was carried out through historical allegory, andalthough Zhou Enlai's name was never mentioned dur-ing this campaign, the Premier's historical namesake, theDuke of Zhou, was a frequent target.

With a fragile economy and Zhou falling ill to cancer,Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scene, taking up

the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973, in the first of aseries of promotions approved by Mao. After Zhou with-drew from active politics in January 1975, Deng was ef-

fectively put in charge of the government, party, and mil-itary, earning the additional titles of PLA General Chiefof Staff, Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party, andVice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission ina short time span.*[80] The speed of Deng's rehabilita-tion took the radical camp, who saw themselves as Mao's

'rightful' political and ideological heirs, by surprise. Maowanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the militaryfaction in government to suppress any remaining influ-ence of those formerly loyal to Lin Biao. In addition,Mao had become disenchanted with the Gang of Four'sinability to manage the economy and saw Deng as a com-petent and effective leader. Leaving the country in grind-ing poverty would do no favours to the positive legacy ofthe Cultural Revolution, which Mao worked hard to pro-tect. Deng's return set the scene for a protracted factionalstruggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderatesled by Zhou and Deng.

At the time, Jiang Qing and associates held effective con-trol of mass media and the party's propaganda network,while Zhou and Deng held control of most governmentorgans. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate theGang's influence, but on others, he acquiesced to theirdemands. The Gang of Four's heavy hand in politicaland media control however, did not prevent Deng fromreinstating his economic policies. Deng emphatically op-posed Party factionalism, and his policies aimed to pro-mote unity as the first step to restoring economic produc-tivity. Much like the post-Great Leap restructuring led byLiu Shaoqi, Deng streamlined the railway system, steel

production, and other key areas of the economy. By late1975 however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restruc-turing might negate the legacy of the Cultural Revolution,and launched a campaign to oppose “rehabilitating thecase for the rightists”, alluding to Deng as the country'sforemost“rightist”. Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a move lauded by the Gangof Four.*[81]

4.2 Death of Zhou Enlai

On January 8, 1976, Zhou Enlai died of bladder cancer.

On January 15 Deng Xiaoping delivered Zhou's officialeulogy in a funeral attended by all of China's most seniorleaders with the notable absence of Maohimself, who hadgrown increasingly critical of Zhou.*[82]*[83] Curiously,after Zhou's death, Mao selected neither a member of theGang of Four nor Deng Xiaoping to become Premier, in-stead choosing the relatively unknown Hua Guofeng.

The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous,large-scale popular support for Zhou could turn the po-litical tide against them. They acted through the mediato impose a set of restrictions on overt public displays ofmourning for Zhou. Years of resentment over the Cul-

tural Revolution, the public persecution of Deng Xiaop-ing (seen as Zhou's ally), and the prohibition against pub-lic mourning led to a rise in popular discontent against

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4.4 Death of Mao and Arrest of the Gang of Four 11

Mao and the Gang of Four.*[84]

Official attempts to enforce the mourning restrictionsincluded removing public memorials and tearing downposters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On March25, 1976, Shanghai's Wen Hui Bao published an article

calling Zhou“

the capitalist roader inside the Party [who]wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader [Deng]regain his power”. These propaganda efforts at smearingZhou's image, however, only strengthened public attach-ment to Zhou's memory.*[85]

4.3 Tiananmen Incident

Main article: Tiananmen Incident

On April 4, 1976, on the eve of China's annual QingmingFestival, a traditional day of mourning, thousands of peo-plegathered aroundtheMonument to the People's Heroesin Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou Enlai. Thepeople of Beijing honored Zhou by laying wreaths, ban-ners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Mon-ument.*[86] The most obvious purpose of this memorialwas to eulogize Zhou, but the Gang of Four were also

attacked for their actions against the Premier. A smallnumber of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Maohimself, and his Cultural Revolution.*[87]

Up to two million people may have visited TiananmenSquare on April 4.*[87] All levels of society, from thepoorest peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and thechildren of high-ranking cadres, were represented in theactivities. Those who participated were motivated bya mixture of anger over the treatment of Zhou, revoltagainst the Cultural Revolution and apprehension forChina's future. The event did not appear to have coor-dinated leadership but rather seemed to be a reflection of

public sentiment.*[88]The Central Committee, under the leadership of JiangQing, labelled the event 'counter-revolutionary', andcleared the square of memorial items shortly after mid-night on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners ledto a violent riot. Police cars were set on fire and a crowdof over 100,000 people forced its way into several gov-ernment buildings surrounding the square.*[86] Many ofthose arrested were later sentenced to prison work camps.Similar incidents occurred in other major cities. JiangQing and her allies pinned Deng Xiaoping as the inci-dent's 'mastermind', and issued reports on official media

to that effect. Deng was formally stripped of all positions“inside and outside the Party”on April 7. This marked

Deng's second purge in ten years.*[86]

4.4 Death of Mao and Arrest of the Gang

of Four

On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's sup-porters, his death symbolized the loss of the revolutionaryfoundation of Communist China. When hisdeath was an-nounced on the afternoon of September 9, in a press re-lease entitled“A Notice fromthe Central Committee, theNPC, State Council, and the CMC to the whole Party, thewhole Army and to the people of all nationalities through-out the country”,*[89] the nation descended into griefand mourning, with people weeping in the streets andpublic institutions closing for over a week. Hua Guofengchaired the Funeral Committee.

Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the mes-sage“With you in charge, I'm at ease”, to Hua. Huaused this message to substantiate his position as succes-sor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking inpolitical skill and ambitions, and seemingly posed no se-rious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession.However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influ-ential elders anda large segment of party reformers. Witharmy backing and the support of Marshal Ye Jianying, onOctober 10, the Special Unit 8341 had all members ofthe Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup.

5 Aftermath

Although Hua Guofeng publicly denounced the Gang ofFour in 1976, he continued to invoke Mao's name to jus-tify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded what becameknown as the Two Whatevers,*[90] namely,“Whateverpolicy originated from Chairman Mao, we must continueto support,”and“Whatever directions were given to usfrom Chairman Mao, we must continue to follow.”LikeDeng, Hua wanted to reverse the damage of the CulturalRevolution; but unlike Deng, who wanted to propose neweconomic models for China, Hua intended to move theChinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning of the early 1950s.

It became increasingly clear to Hua that, without DengXiaoping, it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state.On October 10, Deng Xiaoping personally wrote a let-ter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state andparty affairs; party elders also called for Deng's return.With increasing pressure from all sides, Hua named DengVice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him tovarious other positions, effectively catapulting Deng toChina's second-most powerful figure. In August, theParty's Eleventh Congress was held in Beijing, officiallynaming (in ranking order) Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying,Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Wang Dongxing as newmembers of the Politburo Standing Committee.*[91]

In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate hisprotégé Hu Yaobang to power. Hu published an article in

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu_Yaobanghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Dongxinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Xiannianhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ye_Jianyinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eleventh_Congress_of_the_CPChttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_Whatevershttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Security_Bureauhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ye_Jianyinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hua_Guofenghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gang_of_Fourhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiananmen_Squarehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monument_to_the_People%2527s_Heroeshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qingming_Festivalhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qingming_Festivalhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiananmen_Incidenthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wen_Hui_Bao


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12 6 POLICY AND EFFECT

the Guangming Daily, making clever use of Mao's quota-tions while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article,Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng. On July1, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism report of 1962regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Withan expanding power base, in September 1978, Deng be-

gan openly attacking Hua Guofeng's“Two Whatevers”.*[90]

On December 18, 1978, the pivotal Third Plenum ofthe 11th Central Committee was held. At the congressDeng called for “a liberation of thoughts”and urgedthe party to "seek truth from facts" and abandon ideolog-ical dogma. The Plenum officially marked the beginningof the economic reform era. Hua Guofeng engaged inself-criticism and called his “Two Whatevers”a mis-take. Wang Dongxing, a trusted ally of Mao, was alsocriticized. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its verdicton the Tiananmen Incident. Disgraced former leader Liu

Shaoqi was allowed a belated state funeral.*[92]At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, Peng Zhen, HeLong and other leaders who had been purged duringthe Cultural Revolution were politically rehabilitated.Hu Yaobang became head of the party as its General-Secretary. In September, Hua Guofeng resigned, andZhao Ziyang, another Deng ally, was named Premier.Deng remained the Chairman of the Central MilitaryCommission, but formal power was transferred to a newgeneration of pragmatic reformers, who reversed Cul-tural Revolution policies almost in their entirety.

6 Policy and effect

The effects of the Cultural Revolution directly or indi-rectly touched essentially all of China's population. Dur-ing the Cultural Revolution, much economic activity washalted, with“revolution”, regardless of interpretation,being the primary objective of the country. Mao Ze-dong Thought became the central operative guide to allthings in China. The authority of the Red Guards sur-passed that of the army, local police authorities, and the

law in general. Chinese traditional arts and ideas wereignored and publicly attacked, with praise for Mao beingpracticed in their place. People were encouraged to criti-cize cultural institutions and to question their parents andteachers, which had been strictly forbidden in traditionalChinese culture.

The start of the Cultural Revolution brought huge num-bers of Red Guards to Beijing, with all expenses paidby the government, and the railway system was in tur-moil. The revolution aimed to destroy the "Four Olds"(old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas) andestablish the corresponding“Four News”, and this can

ranged from changing of names and cutting of hair, to theransacking of homes, vandalizing cultural treasures, anddesecrating temples.*[93] In a few years, countless an-

cient buildings, artifacts, antiques, books, and paintingswere destroyed by Red Guards. The status of traditionalChinese culture and institutions within China was alsoseverely damaged as a result of the Cultural Revolution,and the practice of many traditional customs weakened.

The revolution also aimed to“

sweep away all the mon-sters and demons”, that is, all the class enemy who pro-moted bourgeois idea within the party, the government,the army, among the intellectuals, as well as those froman exploitative family background or belonged to one ofthe Five Black Categories. Large number of people per-ceived to be “monsters and demons”(牛鬼蛇神, lit-erally “cow ghosts snake spirits”) regardless of guiltor innocence were publicly denounced, humiliated, andbeaten. In their revolutionary fervor, students denouncedtheir teachers, and children denounced their parents.*[94]Many died through their ill-treatment or committed sui-cide. In 1968, youths were mobilized to go to the coun-

tryside in the Down to the Countryside Movement so theymay learn from the peasants, and the departure of mil-lions from the cities has the effect of bringing to an endthe most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution.*[95]

The effect of the Cultural Revolution had been disastrousfor millions of people in China, there were however alsopositive outcomes for some sections of the population,such as those in the rural areas. For example, the up-heavals of the Cultural Revolution and the hostility tothe intellectual elite is widely accepted to have damagedthe quality of education in China, especially at the upperend of education system. However, the radical policies

also provided many in the rural communities with mid-dle school education for the first time, which is thoughtto have facilitated the rural economic development in the70sand80s.*[96] Similarly, a large number of health per-sonnel were deployed to the countryside as barefoot doc-tors during the Cultural Revolution. Some farmers weregiven informal medical training, and health-care centerswere established in rural communities. This process ledto a marked improvement in the health and the life ex-pectancy of the general population.*[97]

After the most violent phase of the 1960s ended, the at-tack on traditional culture continued in 1973 with the

Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Campaign as part of thestruggle against the moderate elements in the party. TheCultural Revolution brought to the forefront numerous in-ternal power struggles within the Communist party, manyof which had little to do with the larger battles betweenParty leaders, but resulted instead from local factionalismand petty rivalries that were usually unrelated to the“rev-olution”itself. Because of the chaotic political environ-ment, local governments lacked organization and stabil-ity, if they existed at all. Members of different factionsoften fought on the streets, and political assassinations,particularly in predominantly rural provinces, were com-

mon. The masses spontaneously involved themselves infactions, and took part in open warfare against other fac-tions. The ideology that drove these factions was vague

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticize_Lin,_Criticize_Confuciushttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barefoot_doctorshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barefoot_doctorshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Down_to_the_Countryside_Movementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Black_Categorieshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Oldshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_culturehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maoismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maoismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Military_Commissionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Military_Commissionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhao_Ziyanghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/He_Longhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/He_Longhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peng_Zhenhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiananmen_Incidenthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Dongxinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_reform_in_the_People%2527s_Republic_of_Chinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seek_truth_from_factshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Plenary_Session_of_the_11th_CPC_Central_Committeehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Plenary_Session_of_the_11th_CPC_Central_Committeehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guangming_Daily_(China)


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6.2 Slogans and rhetoric 13

and sometimes non-existent, with the struggle for localauthority being the only motivation for mass involvement.

6.1 Education

The Cultural Revolution brought China's education sys-tem to a virtual halt for some time. In the early monthsof the Cultural Revolution, schools and universities wereclosed. Primary and middle schools later gradually re-opened, but all colleges and universities were closeduntil 1970, and most universities did not reopen until1972.*[98] The university entrance exams were cancelledafter 1966, to be replaced later by a system whereby stu-dents were recommended by factories, villages and mil-itary units, and entrance exams were not restored until1977 under Deng Xiaoping. According to the documentsfor the prosecution of the Gang of Four, 142,000 cadres

and teachers in the education circles were persecuted,and noted academics, scientists, and educators who diedincluded Xiong Qinglai, Jian Bozan, Rao Yutai, WuDingliang and Zhao Jiuzhang.*[99] Many intellectualswere sent to rural labor camps, and many of those whosurvived left China shortly after the revolution ended.Many survivors and observers suggest that almost anyonewith skills over that of the average person was made thetarget of political “struggle”in some way. The entiregeneration of tormented and inadequately educated indi-viduals is often referred to in the West as well as in Chinaas the 'lost generation'.*[100]*[101]*[102]

Members ofthe Down to the Countryside Movement in Shenyang ,

1968.

During the Cultural Revolution, basic education was em-phasized and rapidly expanded. While the years ofschooling were reduced and education standard fell, theproportion of Chinese children who had completed pri-mary education increased from less than half before theCultural Revolution to almost all after the Cultural Rev-olution, and those who completed junior middle schoolrose from 15% to over two-third. The educational oppor-tunities for rural children expanded considerably, while

those of the children of the urban elite became restrictedby the anti-elitist policies.*[103] However the impactof the Cultural Revolution on popular education var-

ied among regions, and formal measurements of literacydid not resume until the 1980s.*[104] Some counties inZhanjiang had illiteracy rates as high as 41% some 20years after the revolution. The leaders of China at thetime denied any illiteracy problems from the start. Thiseffect was amplified by the elimination of qualified teach-

ers—many districts were forced to rely on selected stu-dents to educate the next generation.*[104]

In 1968, the Communist Party instituted the Down to theCountryside Movement, in which“Educated Youths”( zhishi qingnian or simply zhiqing) in urban areas weresent to live and work in agrarian areas to be re-educatedby the peasantry and to better understand the role of man-ual agrarian labor in Chinese society. In the initial stages,most of the youth who took part volunteered, althoughlater on the government resorted to forcing many of themto move. Between 1968 and 1979, 17 millions of China'surban youths left for the countryside, and being in the

rural areas also deprived them the opportunity of highereducation.*[95] In the post-Mao period, many of thoseforcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of theirhuman rights.”*[105]

6.2 Slogans and rhetoric

Remnants of a banner containing slogans from the Cultural Rev-

olution in Anhui .

According to Shaorong Huang, the fact that the CulturalRevolution had such massive effects on Chinese society

is the result of extensive use of political slogans.*[106]In Huang's view, rhetoric played a central role in rallyingboth the Party leadership and people at large during the

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anhuihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rusticated_Youth_of_Chinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Down_to_the_Countryside_Movementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Down_to_the_Countryside_Movementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhanjianghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shenyanghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Down_to_the_Countryside_Movementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectualhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhao_Jiuzhanghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Dinglianghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Dinglianghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rao_Yutaihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jian_Bozanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xiong_Qinglai


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14 6 POLICY AND EFFECT

Cultural Revolution. For example, the slogan “to rebelis justified”(造反有理, zàofǎn yǒulǐ) became a unitarytheme.*[106]

Huang asserts that political slogans were ubiquitous in ev-ery aspect of people's lives, being printed onto ordinary

items such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and mirrortables.*[107] Workers were supposed to“grasp revolu-tion and promote productions”, while peasants were sup-posed to raise more pigs because“more pigs means moremanure, and more manure means more grain”. Even acasual remark by Mao,“Sweet potato tastes good; I likeit”became a slogan everywhere in the countryside.*[106]

Political slogans of the time had three sources: Mao, of-ficial Party media such as People's Daily, and the RedGuards.*[106] Mao often offered vague, yet powerfuldirectives that led to the factionalization of the RedGuards.*[108] These directives could be interpreted tosuit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in be-ing most loyal to Mao Zedong. Red Guard slogans wereof the most violent nature, such as “Strike the enemydown on the floor and step on him with a foot”,“Longlive the red terror!" and“Those who are against Chair-man Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces”.*[106]

Sinologists Lowell Dittmer and Chen Ruoxi point out thatthe Chinese language had historically been defined bysubtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as well asthe “cultivation of a refined and elegant literary style”.*[109] This changed during the Cultural Revolution.Since Mao wanted an army of bellicose people in his cru-sade, rhetoric at the time was reduced to militant and vio-lent vocabulary.*[106] These slogans were a powerful andeffective method of“thought reform”, mobilizing mil-lions of people in a concerted attack upon the subjectiveworld,“while at the same time reforming their objectiveworld.”*[106]*[110]

Dittmer and Chen argue that the emphasis on politicsmade language a very effective form of propaganda,but“also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes—pompous, repetitive, and boring”.*[110] To distance it-self from the era, Deng Xiaoping's government cut backheavily on the use of political slogans. The practice ofsloganeering saw a mild resurgence in the late 1990s un-der Jiang Zemin.

6.3 Arts and literature

Before the Cultural Revolution, in the year 1958-1966,theatre became part of the struggles in the political arenaas plays were used as to criticize or support particu-lar members of the party leadership. The attack byYao Wenyuan on Wu Han's opera Hai Rui Dismissed

from Office is often considered the opening shot of Cul-

tural Revolution,*[111] and led to the persecution anddeath of its writer Wu Han, as well as others involvedin theatre, such as Tian Han, Sun Weishi, and Zhou

The ballet The Red Detachment of Women , one of the Model Dramas promoted during the Cultural Revolution.

Xinfang.*[112]*[113] During the Cultural Revolution,Jiang Qing took control of the stage and introduced therevolutionary model operas under her direct supervision.Traditional operas were banned as they were consid-ered feudalistic and bourgeoise, but revolutionary opera,which is based on Peking opera but modified in both con-tent and form, was promoted.*[114] Starting in 1967,eight Model Dramas (6 operas and 2 ballets) were pro-duced in the first three years, and the most notable of theoperas was The Legend of the Red Lantern. These op-eras were the only approved opera form and other operatroupes were required to adopt or change their reper-toire.*[115] The model operas were also broadcast on theradio, made into films, blared from public loudspeakers,

taught to students in schools and workers in factories,and became ubiquitous as a form of popular entertain-ment and the only theatrical entertainment for millions inChina.*[116]*[117]

In 1966, Jiang Qing put forward the Theory of the Dic-tatorship of the Black Line in Literature and Arts wherethose perceived to be bourgeoise, anti-socialist or anti-Mao “black line”should be cast aside, and called forthe creation of a new literature and arts.*[118] Writers,artists and intellectuals who were the recipients and dis-seminators of the“old culture”would be comprehensivelyeradicated. The majority of writers and artists were seen

as“black line figures”and“reactionary literati”, andtherefore persecuted, many were subjected to“criticismand denunciation”where they may be publicly humiliatedand ravaged, and they may also be imprisoned or sent tobe reformedthrough hard labour.*[119] In the documentsfor the prosecution of the Gang of Four released in 1980,more than 2,600 people in the field of arts and literaturewere revealed to have been persecuted by the Ministryof Culture and units under it alone.*[99] Many died asa result of their ordeal and humiliation - the names of200 well-known writers and artists who were persecutedto death during the Cultural Revolution were commemo-rated in 1979, writers such as Lao She, Fu Lei, Deng Tuo,Baren, Li Guangtian, Yang Shuo, and Zhao Shuli.*[119]

During the Cultural Revolution, only a few writers who

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhao_Shulihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yang_Shuohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Guangtianhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baren_(author)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deng_Tuohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fu_Leihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lao_Shehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Legend_of_the_Red_Lanternhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_operashttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peking_operahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary_operahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhou_Xinfanghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhou_Xinfanghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_Weishihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tian_Hanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hai_Rui_Dismissed_from_Officehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hai_Rui_Dismissed_from_Officehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Han_(historian)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiang_Zeminhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao_Zedonghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Guards_(China)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Guards_(China)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%2527s_Daily


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6.4 Historical relics 15

gained permission or requalification under the new sys-tem, such as Hao Ran and some writers of worker orfarmer background, may have their work published orreprinted. The permissible subject matter of proletarianand socialist literature would be strictly defined, and allthe literary periodicals in the country ceased publication

by 1968. The situation eased after 1972, more writerswere allowed to write and many provincial literary peri-odicals resumed publication, but the majority of writersstill could not work.*[119]*[120]

The effect is similar in the film industry. A booklet ti-tled “Four Hundred Films to be Criticized”was dis-tributed, and film directors and actors/actresses were crit-icized with some tortured and imprisoned.*[116] Theseincluded many of Jiang Qing's rivals and former friendsin the film industry, and those who died in the period in-cluded Cai Chusheng, Zheng Junli, Shangguan Yunzhu,Wang Ying, and Xu Lai.*[121] No feature films were

produced in mainland China for seven years apart fromthe few approved "Model dramas" and highly ideologi-cal films,*[122] a notable example of the handful of filmsmade and permitted to be shown in this period is TakingTiger Mountain by Strategy.*[123]*[124]

After the communist takeover in China, much of thepopular music from Shanghai was condemned as YellowMusic and banned, and during the Cultural Revolution,composers of such popular music such as Li Jinhui werepersecuted.*[125] Revolution-themed songs instead werepromoted, and songs such as "Ode to the Motherland","Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman", "The

East Is Red" and "Without the Communist Party, ThereWould Be No New China" were either written or be-came extremely popular during this period.“The East IsRed”, especially, became popular; it de facto supplanted"The March of the Volunteers" as the national anthem ofChina, though the latter was restored to its previous placeafter the Cultural Revolution ended.

Some of the most enduring images of Cultural Revolu-tion come from the poster art. Propaganda art in posterswas used as a campaigning tool and mass communicationdevice, and often served as the main source of informa-tion for the people. They were produced in large num-

ber and widely disseminated, and were used by the gov-ernment and Red Guards to educate the public the ide-ological value as defined by the party state.*[126] Therewere many types of posters, the two main genres beingthe dazibao (大字报, big character poster) and“commer-cial”propapanda poster (宣传画, xuanchuanhua).*[127]The dazibao may be slogans, poems, commentary andgraphics often freely created and posted on walls in pub-lic spaces, factories and communes. They were vital toMao's struggle in the Cultural Revolution, and Mao him-self wrote his own dazibao at Beijing University on Au-gust 5, 1966, calling on the people to "Bombardthe Head-

quarters".*

[128] The“commercial”propaganda posterswere artworks produced by the government and soldcheaply in store to be displayed in homes. These artists

for these posters may be amateurs or uncredited profes-sionals, and the posters were largely in a Socialist Realistvisual style with certain conventions - for example, im-ages of Mao should be depicted as “red, smooth, andluminescent”.*[127]*[129]

Traditional themes in art were sidelined the Cultural Rev-olution, and artists such as Feng Zikai, Shi Lu, and PanTianshou were persecuted.*[130] Many of theartists havebeen assigned to manual labour, and artists were expectedto depict subjects that glorified the Cultural Revolutionrelated to their labour.*[131] In 1971, in part to alleviatetheir suffering, a number of leading artists were recalledfrom manual labour or free from captivity under the ini-tiative of Zhou Enlai to decorate hotels and railway sta-tions defaced by Red Guards slogans. Zhou said that theartworks were for meant for foreigners, therefore were“outer”art not be under the obligations and restrictions

placed on “inner”art meant for Chinese citizens. To

him, landscape paintings should also not be consideredone of the “Four Olds”. However, Zhou was weak-ened by cancer and in 1974, the Jiang Qing faction seizedthese and other paintings and mounted exhibitions in Bei-jing, Shanghai and other cities denouncing the artworksas“Black Paintings”.*[132]

6.4 Historical relics

The faces of the Buddhas were destroyed during the Cultural

Revolution.

China's historical sites, artifacts and archives suffereddevastating damage as they were thought to be at theroot of “old ways of thinking”. Many artifacts wereseized from private homes a

cultural revolution china

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