csr and communication strategies during bilateral political tensions: the case of japanese...
DESCRIPTION
AbstractThis thesis aims to broaden the understanding of what happened in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island crisis by providing a descriptive framework that encompasses the following areas:First, the causes of the outbreak and motivations of the troublemakers were analysed by reviewing the history of the Islands and conducting interviews with both, Chinese and Japanese. The major motivation of the Chinese troublemakers, namely animosity towards Japan, was integrated into the resulting framework.Second, crisis responses of Japanese companies are revealed by conducting case studies including interviews with four Japanese companies. Most of the affected companies maintained a low profile strategy to be not targeted by troublemakers, but they had no strategy to tackle the main reason underlying the crisis, namely animosity. After all, most Japanese companies faced only minor problems, whereas the biggest of these was the sales slump. The car manufacturers, who faced a harsh sales slump, neglected their Chinese consumers for years. Thus, in their case, the Island crisis might have only amplified an underlying problem. The Situational Crisis Communication Theory was used to classify the responses to the crisis.Third, the CSR engagement of 30 Japanese companies in China is analysed. Besides a few top performers, the CSR activities of Japanese companies do not match the Chinese “demand” for CSR, i.e. they engage in environmental activities and the Chinese favour philanthropic and social activities, and the Japanese companies seem not to be aware of this issue. Furthermore, the presentation of the CSR activities is insufficient, namely, there is no emphasis on numbers showing their commitment, e.g. how much money they spent, how many trees they planted, since when they engage in CSR in China.By integrating the animosity framework into the Situational Crisis Communication Theory and introducing a number of moderators, a descriptive framework for the Island crisis was created by which further response options are identified.TRANSCRIPT
CSR and communication strategies during bilateral
political tensions:
The case of Japanese companies in China during the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Island conflict
Freie wissenschaftliche Arbeit zur Erlangung des Grades eines
Master of Science am Department für Betriebswirtschaft
Munich School of Management
der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Eingereicht von Referent:
John Joachim Feigs Prof. Dr. Franz Waldenberger
München, den 08.08.2013
II
Table of contents
List of tables ............................................................................................................................ IV
List of figures ........................................................................................................................... V
List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................... VI
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. VII
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Purpose of the thesis .................................................................................................... 2
1.2 What is special about the “Chinese case”? .................................................................. 4
1.3 Narrative of the Island crisis ....................................................................................... 8
1.3.1 Sovereignty claims to the Islands ................................................................... 8
1.3.2 Beginning of the Island dispute ...................................................................... 9
1.3.3 Aftermath and causes of the crisis ................................................................ 11
2 Literature review .............................................................................................................. 14
2.1 Motivation of the stakeholders .................................................................................. 14
2.1.1 Animosity and related concepts ................................................................... 14
2.1.2 The relationship between anger and behavioural intentions ........................ 16
2.1.3 Summary and adaptation to the Island crisis ................................................ 17
2.2 Crisis communication ................................................................................................ 17
2.2.1 Crisis definitions .......................................................................................... 18
2.2.2 Situational Crisis Communication Theory ................................................... 19
2.2.3 Summary and adaptation to the Island crisis ................................................ 22
2.3 Corporate social responsibility .................................................................................. 24
2.3.1 CSR overview .............................................................................................. 24
2.3.2 CSR in China and Japan ............................................................................... 25
2.3.3 Communication of CSR ............................................................................... 28
2.3.4 Summary and propositions ........................................................................... 29
3 Empirical part .................................................................................................................. 31
3.1 Research methodology .............................................................................................. 31
3.1.1 Research strategy and research design ......................................................... 31
3.1.2 Data collection .............................................................................................. 33
3.1.3 Analysing methods ....................................................................................... 35
3.2 Results – Causes ........................................................................................................ 37
3.3 Results – Crisis responses and CSR .......................................................................... 41
3.4 Results – Case studies ............................................................................................... 48
3.4.1 Company I .................................................................................................... 48
3.4.2 Company II ................................................................................................... 48
3.4.3 Company III ................................................................................................. 49
3.4.4 Company IV ................................................................................................. 50
III
3.4.5 Toyota ........................................................................................................... 50
3.4.6 Nissan ........................................................................................................... 52
3.4.7 Car manufacturers’ strategies ....................................................................... 53
4 Discussion and conclusions .............................................................................................. 55
4.1 Theoretical contributions ........................................................................................... 55
4.2 Managerial recommendations ................................................................................... 55
4.3 Future research .......................................................................................................... 58
4.4 Limitations ................................................................................................................ 58
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 59
5 Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 61
5.1 Appendix: Detailed information regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands ................. 61
5.2 Appendix: China sales of Japanese car manufacturers before and after the crisis .... 63
5.3 Appendix: Nationalism in China ............................................................................... 64
5.4 Appendix: Crisis response strategies of SCCT ......................................................... 65
5.5 Appendix: Recommendations for the application of crisis strategies ....................... 66
5.6 Appendix: Outline of the thesis’ research design ...................................................... 67
5.7 Appendix: List of the selected companies ................................................................. 68
5.8 Appendix: List of respondents .................................................................................. 69
5.9 Appendix: Main interview questions ........................................................................ 70
5.10 Appendix: Rival explanations with examples ........................................................... 73
5.11 Appendix: Original and revised propositions ............................................................ 74
5.12 Appendix: Aeon’s message regarding the Island crisis ............................................ 76
5.13 Appendix: Advertisement expenditures of some Japanese car manufacturers in
China .................................................................................................................................. 78
5.14 Appendix: Overview of the fields of CSR engagement of the selected companies .. 79
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 80
List of tables IV
List of tables
Table 3-1: CSR engagement of some heavily affected companies .......................................... 46
Table 5-1: Japanese and Chinese names of the Islands ............................................................ 62
Table 5-2: Car sales data of Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mazda in China from July 2012 to June
2013 ................................................................................................................................. 63
Table 5-3: Primary and secondary crisis response strategies ................................................... 65
Table 5-4: List of the contacted companies ............................................................................. 68
Table 5-5: List of the study’s respondents ............................................................................... 69
Table 5-6: Overview of rival explanations with examples ...................................................... 73
Table 5-7: Areas of CSR the selected companies are engaged in according to their last CSR
reports .............................................................................................................................. 79
List of figures V
List of figures
Figure 1-1: Year-on-year comparison of the Japanese car sales in China in 2012-2013 ........... 1
Figure 1-2: Reaction chain of the Island crisis ......................................................................... 13
Figure 2-1: Research fields overlapping with the studied surrogate crisis .............................. 14
Figure 2-2: Reaction chain derived from the animosity framework and adapted to the Island
crisis ................................................................................................................................ 17
Figure 2-3: Revised and tested crisis situation model of SCCT .............................................. 19
Figure 2-4: SCCT model adapted to the Island crisis .............................................................. 22
Figure 2-5: Relationship between CSR, anger and organisational reputation ......................... 29
Figure 3-1: Yin’s categorisation of case studies ...................................................................... 32
Figure 3-2: Principle of data triangulation ............................................................................... 33
Figure 3-3: Explanation building process ................................................................................ 36
Figure 3-4: Fields of CSR engagement of the chosen companies ............................................ 45
Figure 4-1: Year-on-year comparison of the Japanese car sales in China in 2012-2013 ......... 56
Figure 5-1: Map of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands ..................................................................... 61
Figure 5-2: Map depicting the distribution of nationalism in China ........................................ 64
Figure 5-3: Crisis response recommendations suggested by the SCCT ................................... 66
Figure 5-4: Overview of the research design ........................................................................... 67
Figure 5-5: Comparison of the advertisement expenditures of the top 10 Japanese car
manufacturers in China in 2011 and 2012 (measured in million CNY) ......................... 78
List of abbreviations VI
List of abbreviations
Aeon AEON Co., Ltd.
B2B business-to-business
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CNY Renminbi
COO country-of-origin
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
e.g. exempli gratia (for example)
et al. et allii (and others)
etc. et cetera (and so on)
Honda Honda Motor Company, Ltd.
i.e. id est (that is to say)
JETRO Japan External Trade Organisation
Mazda Mazda Motor Corporation
NGO Non-governmental organisation
Nissan Nissan Motor Company Ltd.
P# proposition
SCCT Situational Crisis Communication Theory
Toyota Toyota Motor Corporation
U.S. United States
US$ United States dollar
Abstract VII
Abstract
This thesis aims to broaden the understanding of what happened in the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Island crisis by providing a descriptive framework that encompasses the following areas:
First, the causes of the outbreak and motivations of the troublemakers were analysed by
reviewing the history of the Islands and conducting interviews with both, Chinese and
Japanese. The major motivation of the Chinese troublemakers, namely animosity towards
Japan, was integrated into the resulting framework.
Second, crisis responses of Japanese companies are revealed by conducting case studies
including interviews with four Japanese companies. Most of the affected companies
maintained a low profile strategy to be not targeted by troublemakers, but they had no strategy
to tackle the main reason underlying the crisis, namely animosity. After all, most Japanese
companies faced only minor problems, whereas the biggest of these was the sales slump. The
car manufacturers, who faced a harsh sales slump, neglected their Chinese consumers for
years. Thus, in their case, the Island crisis might have only amplified an underlying problem.
The Situational Crisis Communication Theory was used to classify the responses to the crisis.
Third, the CSR engagement of 30 Japanese companies in China is analysed. Besides a few top
performers, the CSR activities of Japanese companies do not match the Chinese “demand” for
CSR, i.e. they engage in environmental activities and the Chinese favour philanthropic and
social activities, and the Japanese companies seem not to be aware of this issue. Furthermore,
the presentation of the CSR activities is insufficient, namely, there is no emphasis on numbers
showing their commitment, e.g. how much money they spent, how many trees they planted,
since when they engage in CSR in China.
By integrating the animosity framework into the Situational Crisis Communication Theory
and introducing a number of moderators, a descriptive framework for the Island crisis was
created by which further response options are identified.
Introduction 1
1 Introduction
On 15th
September 2012, thousands of Chinese protesters targeted Japanese government
agencies and businesses, because the Japanese government bought three of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands1, which are claimed by both, China and Japan, and led to many
protests and diplomatic disputes in the last 40 years (Dzurek, 1996; Ho, 2012). The protesters
damaged and destroyed hundreds of Japanese cars and burned down a Toyota car dealership
(Ying, 2012). The protests peaked already on 18th
September, when the protests were carried
out peacefully in dozens of Chinese cities. After that day, the demonstrations faded out
quickly because of a strong police presence. The Chinese protesters wanted to affect the
Japanese government by their actions, but because this was hardly possible due to the few
representative offices of Japan in China, they tried it indirectly by protesting against Japanese
firms. Hence, the Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis can be called a “surrogate crisis”, because Japanese
companies were neither the cause of the Island dispute nor related in any other direct way
(Friedman, 1985; McCurry & Branigan, 2012). As the following figure shows, this was just
the beginning of the problems for the Japanese car manufacturers.
Figure 1-1: Year-on-year comparison of the Japanese car sales in China in 2012-2013
(Carsalesdata)2
Japanese car manufacturers, precisely their Chinese-Japanese joint ventures3, were among the
main targets of the boycott, which followed the anti-Japanese protests (Beamish, 1993;
1 Japanese refer to the Islands as Senkaku Islands, Chinese as Diaoyu Islands and Taiwanese as Diaoyu Tai
Islands. Hereafter the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands will be referred to as “Islands”. More detailed information
including a map regarding the Islands is enclosed in section 5.1 of the appendix. 2 Please find the data in section 5.2 of the appendix.
-5%
-15%
-49% -44%
-22% -16%
24%
-46%
-12%
-7%
0%
9%
-2%
1%
-35%
-41%
-30% -24%
22%
-46%
-16%
3% 2%
-8% -12%
-6%
-35%
-45%
-30% -26%
-16%
-25% -25%
-15% -12%
-31%
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June
Toyota Nissan Mazda
Introduction 2
Harner, 2012a). Figure 1-1 depicts the devastating effects of the Chinese boycott on the
Japanese car manufacturers. The sales increase in January and the decrease in February can be
explained by Chinese New Year, which is a public holiday that was started in January in 2012
and in February in 2013 (GovHK, 2011, 2012). Although other industries were also hit by a
sales slump, the car industry faced the worst decline: “from October 1 to 30, 118 Japanese
companies adjusted their sales expectations, 90 percent of which are in the automobile and
electric motor industries.” (Yang, 2012)
But why do some Chinese overreact like that? In fact, some Chinese are rather excitable and
since protests are forbidden in China their anger will be released whenever there is an
opportunity (Xun, 2012, p.10). Because Japan is still associated with atrocities in the past, it is
even dozens of years after the Second World War still a good “excuse” to take to the street.
China has not forgiven Japan for its war crimes; even more, many Chinese hold strong
animosity towards Japan (Xinhua International, 2013). These and other aspects of the
historical context of the Island crisis will be elucidated within this chapter.
Almost no research has been done on surrogate crises, therefore the causes of the crisis and
the crisis strategies of Japanese companies will be depicted and analysed to fill this void
(Jensen, 2008; Maher & Mady, 2010). Moreover, another void that is addressed by this thesis
are the corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of Japanese companies in China, which
have not received any attention yet, although there has been more research about CSR in
China recently (Moon & Shen, 2010).
1.1 Purpose of the thesis
This thesis is divided into three parts: (A) the motivations and causes of the stakeholders’
reactions to the conflict, (B) the crisis communication strategies of Japanese companies and
(C) their CSR efforts. From an academic viewpoint, it is interesting to study the Island
conflict, because a surrogate crisis is a special case in crisis management that leads to new
insights for existing theories, such as the Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT).
From a managerial point of view, Japanese companies lost billions of Yen due to the sales
slump that followed the protests, thus it would be important to figure out how to avoid such
severe outcomes in the future (carsalesdata, 2012, 2013).
The research questions of the thesis are as follows: What was the motivation of the
“troublemakers” and what were the problems they caused? What were the communication
3 According to the Chinese joint venture law, there are now two forms of joint ventures: an equity joint venture
in which the foreign party has to contribute at least 25% of the capital and a cooperative joint venture in which
the foreign party has no such obligation. Since the Chinese joint venture law was relaxed more than 20 years
ago, foreign companies do not have an obligation to hold 50% of the joint ventures equity anymore.
Introduction 3
strategies of Japanese companies during the Island conflict? Did they actively engage in CSR
in China prior to the crisis and did they communicate their CSR efforts during the crisis?
These questions comprise but are not limited to the following aspects:
• Uncover the underlying causes of the crisis
• Identify the most important stakeholders and the problems they caused
• Reveal the communication strategy the companies pursue to cope with those particular
problems, especially the communication of CSR efforts
• Depict CSR activities prior to the crisis and during the crisis
According to Corley & Gioia (2011) most of the papers today focus on scientific utility and
do not deliver any significant managerial implications. In addition to contributing to theory,
this thesis depicts some possibilities of how Japanese companies could tackle problems
caused by the Island crisis.
According to the mass media, the sample of affected Japanese companies was relatively
small; therefore, a qualitative approach was adopted. Because almost no research about
surrogate crises has taken place yet and no theoretical framework exists, exploration is needed
to understand the underlying structures of this particular issues. As Yin (2003b, p.30) notes,
“any new empirical research study is likely to assume the characteristic of an ’exploratory’
study.” Therefore, exploratory case studies were chosen to answer the proposed research
questions. Although it is not necessary to develop propositions (P) before the data collection
in this type of case study, the researcher’s goal will be more clearly defined and it is more
likely to reach it (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 551-552). Propositions are created to guide the
researcher following the general criteria for writing propositions published by Gerring (2001,
p.89-117).
The thesis is structured as follows: The remainder of this chapter describes differences
between China and Western countries and gives an overview regarding the history and the
most recent events connected to the Island conflict. Thereafter, a literature review presents
theories and concepts in chapter 2. The review focuses on (A) animosity theory, (B)
Situational Crisis Communication Theory, and (C) CSR in China. Chapter 3 first discusses
the methodology of the case study approach, followed by the results of the qualitative
research. The last chapter analyses the results and provides the theoretical implications and
managerial recommendations, shows future paths of research and depicts the study’s
limitations.
Introduction 4
1.2 What is special about the “Chinese case”?
This section points out why China is different from most other countries and elaborates on the
difficult relationship between China and Japan. Furthermore, it answers the question why it is
challenging for Japanese companies to operate in China.
In 1987, Deng Xiaoping emphasised that Japan owes China more than any other country.
Chinese refer to two kinds of debt regarding Japan: On the one hand, they think Japan owes
China because of 2000 years of trade and cultural exchange comprehending art and
knowledge about science and agriculture. On the other hand, there are the Sino-Japanese
wars, particularly the atrocities of the Second World War (Rose, 1998, p.4-5). One of the
cruellest events of the Sino-Japanese wars was the Nanjing Massacre in which more than
100,000 civilians4 were slaughtered and thousands of women were raped and abused (Klein et
al., 1998, p.91; Yang, 1999, p.844). According to a survey conducted in Nanjing by Klein,
Ettenson et al. (1998, p.93), more than 75% of the respondents agreed with the statement: “I
will never forgive Japan for the Nanjing massacre.” The Chinese have urged the Japanese to
issue a formal apology for the cruelties of the Second World War but Japan has refused to
apologise for some cruelties up to now and certain groups of the Japanese society even
repudiate the events instead of coming to terms with their past (Cui, 2012, p.209-210; Rose,
1998, p.84-85).
I want to shed some light on why many Japanese display a lack of understanding for the anger
of Chinese people towards Japan. In his article “What Japanese history lessons leave out” Oi
(2013) claims the Japanese education system does not put much emphasis on the most recent
history, especially on the war crimes of Japan such as the Nanjing Massacre. Many Japanese
have only little or no knowledge about these events, because often only a few sentences in
Japanese textbooks are dedicated to these events (Oi, 2013). After the Second World War,
Japanese conservatives created several war myths, which were supported by the United States
(U.S.), because it wanted Japan to be an anti-Communist state. One of these war myths claims
that only a few top ranking military men were the warmongers of the Second World War,
while the rest of the Japanese, including the Emperor, had been deceived by them. Another
myth shows Japan as a victim and pacifistic nation (Yinan, 2006, p.74-76). In the 1980s,
several initiatives were started in Japan to come to terms with the past, especially with the
atrocities of the Japanese army and the involvement of the Japanese Emperor (Rose, 1998,
p.177). Nevertheless, certain Japanese right-wing groups still try to keep the “victim” image5
4 Other sources claim that up to 300.000 Chinese lost their lives.
5 According to Cui (2012), the reason why Japanese feel rather as victims are the devastating effects of the
atomic bombing.
Introduction 5
of Japan and want to paper over issues such as the Nanjing Massacre, Unit 7316 and the
comfort women7 (Cui, 2012, p.211; Harris, 1992, p.22-43; Schneider, 2008, p.109-114).
Because many Japanese do not know about these war crimes, it is rather easy for right-wing
groups to claim that Chinese anger is completely unreasonable and distorts history (Oi, 2013).
Another part of the problem is the Japanese response to all these issues: Several authors claim
the Japanese government should apologize for the aforementioned wartime atrocities, to calm
down the Chinese anger, instead of provoking further escalation by visiting the Yasukuni
Shrine8 and denying the past
9 in general. In 1993, the first time since 1955 a non-conservative
coalition led the country, apologies for some Japanese atrocities were issued by Prime
Minister Morihiro Hosokawa. Unfortunately, most Chinese do not even know about the
issued apologies and, as mentioned above, the current government intensifies the situation
even more (He, 2007, p.5-8; Joyce, 2007; Kazuyuki, 2011, p.665; Yamazaki, 2005, p.71,
133).
While Western countries are predominantly influenced by Christian values and Western
philosophy, China has its own schools of philosophy, such as Confucianism, Taoism,
Buddhism and many others. In contrast to Western philosophy, the Chinese focuses not on
truth and wisdom, but good ways of living. Chinese philosophers sought to understand
systems as a whole, and unlike occidental philosophers who searched for cause-and-effect
relationships. Harmony is an important goal for the society, according to the teachings of the
influential Chinese philosopher Confucius. This can be achieved by a state that helps the
people to live in peace and prosperity, but the people have to trust in and obey the authority of
the ruler (Kowacsik, 2010, p.4-5, 62). Another part of the Chinese culture is their special
understanding of corruption, which is often referred to as Guanxi. “Guanxi is the process of
social interactions that initially involve two individuals (A and B). A may or may not have
special relationships with B. A asks B for assistance (favour) in finding a solution to a
problem. B may have the solution at hand, or more often, has to seek further assistance from
other connections, i.e. starts another process.” (Fan, 2002, p.549) Guanxi is welcome among
family members, but when the government is involved people think of it as corruption (Fan,
2002, p.556). Another important aspect of the Chinese culture is not to lose face, i.e. doing
something that is below the tolerable requirements of one’s position in society. Losing one’s
6 Unit 731 was a part of the Imperial Japanese Army that tested chemical and biological weapons on Chinese
civilians and thereby killed hundreds if not thousands of people. 7 Thousands of “comfort women” were imprisoned in “comfort stations” and raped by the Japanese Army.
8 Several Japanese Prime Minister regularly visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which has enshrined high-profile war
criminals. 9 For instance, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe denied the existence of comfort women in 2007, although the
Japanese government already apologised for it officially in 1993.
Introduction 6
face means social unworthiness and leads to shame (Bedford, 2004, p.36; Ho, 1976, p.871).
This concept applies even to product purchases, in which people try to buy brands that match
their social position (Lee, 1983). According to some nationalist Chinese, it does not behove
Chinese to buy Japanese products or work for Japanese companies, wherefore they try to
avoid it or keep it as a secret. Thus, one could argue that this is a form of social pressure.
When people think about China, things such as the Chinese Wall or the Chinese Communism,
comes to their mind. According to common sense, the state has total control over the people
in a communist country. However, Cui (2012) proclaims the control of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has gradually decreased since the 1980s due to nationalism. After the
Second World War, both parties10
promoted nationalism and tried to legitimize their existence
with it. The CCP used its power to create the image of the Japanese devils, the “riben guizi”,
in the 1950s and 1960s (Gao, 2012, p.182-183). During that time, the CCP also made up
several myths, for example, that it fought and defeated the Japanese Army alone. The myth
that only some Japanese military leaders were responsible for the war crimes was created by
both sides: Japanese wanted to protect the old structures and the emperor, whereas Chinese
tried to enable business with Japan. Since the 1980s, the Japanese atrocities and the Chinese
suffering took centre stage of the Chinese propaganda. This change led to two things, first,
Chinese started to condemn Japan as a nation, second, they were disgusted by their own
government for not telling them about the Japanese atrocities for decades (Yinan, 2006, p.76-
78, 89-90). In the 1990s, the CCP had to rely more on nationalism and hence promoted it,
because the party had almost abolished its ideological ground, i.e. Marxism-Leninism. The
CCP started a campaign that was supposed to create legitimization by highlighting the victory
over Japan and the humiliation and the suffering11
of the Chinese people during the war
(Downs & Saunders, 1998, p.123). Japanese companies adapted their marketing strategies to
this policy change as two content analyses of Chinese newspapers show: one covers 1979-
1990 and another one is from 2004. Until the 1990s, Japanese firms used Japanese symbols in
advertisements and thereby identified themselves as Japanese. In 2004, this has changed and
their advertisements tried to persuade the readers that the firm is a Western one by using
English headlines and Western models (Ishii, 2009, p.307).
The promoted nationalism soon proved to be not as flexible as foreign policy had to be. For
instance, Japan was the first country that lifted sanctions and showed understanding after the
10
After the Second World War, there were the Nationalist Party also known as Kuomintang and the Chinese
Communist Party in China. 11
The paragon of the campaign was the Nanjing Massacre.
Introduction 7
Tiananmen Massacre12
and when Deng Xiaoping met the Japanese Emperor in 1992, the
Chinese people looked blank and even accused their government to overlook the shadows of
the past to achieve international recognition. Chinese, especially nationalistic oriented ones,
question their government and often consider it as deficient and corrupt. Nevertheless, it is not
reasonable to protest against the government due to its strict leadership, wherefore the
nationalists seize all other opportunities to release their anger (Cui, 2012, p.204-210; Gao,
2012, p.182-184; Kazuyuki, 2011, p.670). This is why even small missteps of foreign
companies, especially Japanese, have recently sparked outbursts of anger. For instance, the
US fast food chain KFC launched a sales promotion in 2010. Customers could download a
limited number of coupons at a certain point of time, but many other websites mirrored the
coupons and thus more coupons than expected were redeemed. As the stores started to reject
coupons claiming they were fake, customers got angry, especially because the explanations
varied slightly from store to store (Madden, 2010). Some Chinese even became violent
because of coupons worth up to US$ 4.65, such as the customers storming “the Kentucky
Fried Chicken at the China World Tower in Beijing […], flipping chairs and tables and
refusing to leave after their coupons were denied” (Shengxia & Jun, 2010). Although such
protests definitely interrupt companies’ business, they tend to be reactive and fade out quickly
(Cui, 2012, p.204-210; Gao, 2012, p.182-184). “Leading nationalists summarize their mission
into two paramount tasks: internally struggle for human rights, externally fight for national
rights” (Gao, 2012, p.182). Because it is very difficult for the nationalists to achieve their first
goal, they focus their efforts on the fight for national rights, such as the territorial rights of the
Islands. They can live out their nationalistic feelings by taking to the streets.
Cui (2012, p.210-211) claims that in contrast to the old form of nationalism, which was
promoted by the government through films and other forms of propaganda, the new form is a
bottom-up nationalism that has a social initiative character. He states the CCP has partly lost
control over the nationalism and thus over the people’s actions. According to Cui (2012,
p.214) the Chinese government acts pragmatic and hence tries to calm down any anti-
Japanese protests in order to keep good bilateral relations to Japan13
. In his article “Who
Engineered the Anti-Japanese Protests in 2005?”, Tam (2007) also argues that the Chinese
government did not set up protests. He explains for example why the government provided
transportation for the protesters. After the protesters marched a while the government sent out
the buses, which carried them without charge to the next public transportation station. After
12
Until the massacre on June 4, 1989, pro-democracy and anti-corruption demonstrations were taking place on
the Tiananmen Square in Beijing and many other big Chinese cities. The protests were initiated by students and
intellectuals and ended very bloody when the Chinese military cleared the square. 13
The author gives various examples in which the Chinese government acted according to his claim.
Introduction 8
all, the Chinese government tries to avoid any instability, but due to years of propaganda and
a gigantic government body, it is not always possible to enforce the official strategy. Other
authors claim that the Chinese government fuels protests to distract from domestic problems
(D'Costa, 2012, p.233; Spegele et al., 2012).
Out of this recent Chinese history and propaganda arises a victim complex, which explains
the distrust regarding the international community as well as the common belief that Japanese
companies treat Chinese consumers worse than others (Gao, 2012, p.182; Schneider, 2008,
p.112). There are many examples for this belief made public by organisations close to the
Chinese government, e.g. Toyota recalled some cars, but did not compensate the Chinese
customers as it is common in the European Union or the United States (U.S.) (Wang, 2010 ).
On the other hand, Chinese also think of Japan as an inferior country by calling it “xiao
riben”, which means small Japan (Kazuyuki, 2011, p.660).
Operating in China as a Japanese company is certainly more difficult compared to companies
from most other countries. Sudden political tensions between China and Japan are often
rooted in their history and the widespread nationalism in both countries. This creates a
dilemma for Japanese companies, because if they accommodate Chinese stakeholders too
much, for instance, by taking a political stance, what will be the reaction of their Japanese
customers?
1.3 Narrative of the Island crisis
The Island crisis began in the 1970s when a report was published that claimed close to the
Islands are oil and gas reserves. Thereafter, both nations started claiming to be the rightful
owner of the Islands. In addition, right-wing groups in both countries began to protest; the
economic impact of these protests became larger over the years, peaking in the most recent
outbreak in September 2012 (McCurry & Branigan, 2012).
1.3.1 Sovereignty claims to the Islands
The Chinese government’s claims date back to the Ming dynasty when the Islands were first
discovered by Chinese, most likely in 1372 during their first investiture mission to the
Ryukyu Kingdom, which consisted of a group of islands in the Pacific Ocean. Unfortunately,
the reports of investiture missions prior to a report written in 1534 have been burned (Shaw,
1999, p.43-44). The Islands were finally incorporated in the Chinese coastal defence line in
1556, and therefore belonged to China since then (Pan, 2007, p.77; Shaw, 1999, p.56). A
document often used to defend the Chinese position is the imperial edict of Empress Dowager
Tsu Hsi issued in 1893 (Su, 2005, p.48). In this edict, three of the Islands were awarded to
Sheng Xuanhuai for making very effective medicine for the emperor and the empress.
Introduction 9
However, there is much doubt about its authenticity of the edict, which might merely be an
advertisement for Sheng Xuanhuais business. Nevertheless, it indicates that the Islands were
known in and very likely belonged to China before 1895 (Shaw, 1999, p. 61-62).
In contrast, the Japanese government claims the Islands were terra nullius14
when it
incorporated them in 1895. However, it was probably difficult for the Qing Empire, which
represented China during that time, to safeguard the Islands or object to the Japanese claim
due to the first Sino-Japanese War; in addition, the Islands seemed to be untouched (Pan,
2007, p.77; Shaw, 1999, p.97-98). There are plenty of inconsistencies regarding Japan’s claim
as Shaw (1999, p.77-85) and Su (2005, p.56) outline in detail such as the fact that the national
markers of Japan were not erected on the Islands before 1969.
After the Second World War, the Islands were administrated by the U.S. according to Article
III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed by the U.S. and Japan among others in 1951
(Dzurek, 1996). China neither signed the treaty nor objected to the arrangement of the Islands
(Shaw, 1999, p. 118; Su, 2005, p. 49). Article II of this treaty states that Japan renounces its
claim to Taiwan, which they controlled since the Chinese signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki15
in 1895. The crux is whether the Islands belonged to the Taiwanese territory and thus are part
of these treaties or not (Su, 2005, p.48).
As one can see, it is certainly not a trivial issue to find out which party has the right to claim
the Islands. On one hand, China failed to claim the Islands until December 1970 when it was
actually the last party that made its claim (Fravel, 2010, p.146). On the other hand, the history
of the Islands shows that China almost certainly controlled the Islands a long time before
Japan claimed them in 1895. Consequently, the Islands were not terra nullius and Japan’s
argument that China has not displayed sovereignty over the Islands for a long time might be
useless because of various cases in which countries did not display state authority for decades,
but won their case before the International Court of Justice (Su, 2005, p.52-53). All in all both
positions have their weak spots and hence one cannot foresee what the result of an
international trial might be (Shaw, 1999, p.133).
1.3.2 Beginning of the Island dispute
The actual dispute over the Islands started to unfold in 1968, when the United Nations
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East published a report suggesting that close to
the Islands is oil and natural gas (Dzurek, 1996). The U.S. Energy Information Administration
assumes that East China Sea has between 60 and 100 million barrels of oil in proven
14
Terra nullius is territory belonging to no one. 15
The Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the first Sino-Japanese War.
Introduction 10
reserves16
and between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet in proven natural gas reserves (eia, 2012,
2013). On 17th
July 1970, the Japanese ambassador in Taipei handed over a note to the
Taiwanese government stating the Islands belong to Japan. Already in September 1970,
protesters planted a Taiwanese flag on one of the Islands. This was the beginning of the first
worldwide anti-Japanese protests. These peaked on 13th
May 1972 when thousands of
students demonstrated because of the execution of the Ryukyu Reversion Treaty. According
to this treaty, the U.S. had to return the control over the Islands to Japan on 15th
May 1972.
Because the Chinese government wanted to be recognized as the legitimate government of
China by the Japan, the Islands were seen as minor issue compared to the international
recognition (Shaw, 1999, p.13-15). Over the following decades, the Islands caused many
times strained diplomatic relations, however usually everything went back to normal after a
few months.
In 2005, two Japanese companies began talks with their government regarding drilling rights
for natural gas in the area (Pan, 2007, p.76). In June 2008, a “consensus agreement between
China and Japan over the development of petroleum resources in the disputed East China
Sea” (Fravel, 2010, p.160) was signed. This displays the ambiguous situation, in which both
governments acted pragmatic and the people did not. The last clash before the outburst in
2012 was the collusion of a Chinese fishing trawler with a ship of the Japanese coast guard on
9th
September 2010 that led to a major diplomatic dispute and sparked again anti-Japanese
protests (Lunn, 2012, p.5; Sakai, 2010).
The current crisis started to heat up when the Tokyo metropolitan government announced on
16th
April 2012 that they consider buying three of the Islands (Unezawa, 2012). On 7th
July
the Japanese Prime Minister Noda announced that it is a part of the governmental policy to
buy the Islands (Harner, 2012b). After the detention of a group of Chinese activists, who
landed on the Islands on 15th
August, protests started on the weekend after that in several
Chinese cities. An interesting fact is that the Chinese media tried to portray the
demonstrations as smaller as they were. The editor of Global Times, which is a rather
nationalistic newspaper with very close ties to the government, tried to calm people down by
saying on a conference a couple of days later that the Islands are not worth a full-scale war
(Bradsher et al., 2012). As one can see on Figure 1-1, these protests had already an impact on
the Japanese car manufacturers’ sales, which increased in August by only 5% in contrast to
those of other foreign car manufacturers sales, which increased by more than 10%. The reason
16
Chinese sources claim that the area has undiscovered oil resources between 70 to 160 billion barrels. This is
quite a lot with respect to the proven oil reserves of Saudi Arabia with around 260 billion barrels.
Introduction 11
stated by the Japanese manufacturers was that due to political tensions they have to reduce
their promotion activities (ChinaIRN, 2012).
The straw that broke the camel’s back was the announcement of the government having
bought three of the Islands on 10th
September 2012. This led instantly to icy diplomatic
relations and the biggest anti-Japanese protests since 1972 (Lunn, 2012, p.5). The protests
started on Saturday 15th
September, when thousands of protesters took to the streets. They
targeted for example the Japanese embassy in Beijing at which they threw eggs and rocks, but
unlike many Japanese stores, the embassy was guarded by Chinese police officers. Sometimes
the Chinese police also intervened when protesters damaged others property, but usually it
waited until the protesters had released most of their anger (Ho, 2012). Some of the protesters
were shouting slogans of the CCP’s propaganda of the 1960s, “We believe we need to declare
war on them because the Japanese devils are evil. Down with little Japan!” (Emphasis added)
(McCurry & Branigan, 2012). In some cities the protesters were fairly violent, for instance, in
Xi’an or Changsha, where protesters damaged more than hundreds Japanese cars, smashed
and ransacked Japanese shops, and beat a driver of a Japanese car until he was paralysed
(Ying, 2012). However, the rage also spilled over to other foreign businesses such as Rolex
and Christian Dior stores, which were smashed and ransacked too. The irony about these
events is that most of the damage occurred to Chinese people, because these usually own the
stores and cars (Ashcraft, 2012). Although little information came to the surface about other
stakeholders of Japanese companies such as their employees, but there is one example of two
factories of Panasonic in Qingdao and Suzhou that have been sabotaged by Chinese workers
causing flames and smoke (Cooper, 2012; IBTimes, 2012). Thus, the question arises whether
similar incidents happened at other firms. The protests lasted four days until 18th
September,
the anniversary of the Mukden incident, when the central government seemed to back away
“from the tacit encouragement of public anger over the territorial row.” (Ng & Lee, 2012) In
some cities protests were banned, protesters were arrested and the police forces were
increased to end the protests (McCurry & Branigan, 2012).
1.3.3 Aftermath and causes of the crisis
Of course, most of the Japanese companies reacted to the protests immediately, e.g. Canon,
Hitachi, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Panasonic, Sony, Suzuki, Toyota halted
production or even closed some or all of their Chinese factories; Aeon, Japan’s Fast Retailing,
and Seven & I Holdings closed the majority of their stores (Sohu, 2012). These measures
were taken up to four days, when the protests faded away. Japanese companies did not close
all of their factories, because in some regions of China the protests were more violent and
harsh than in others. Some companies stated they want to secure their employees from
Introduction 12
damage by closing factories and stores. A few store managers were able to appease their
customers by letting their employees wear armlets with pro Chinese phrases on them and
playing Chinese music. Nonetheless, many store managers just barricaded their stores and put
down all signs that would identify them as Japanese ones (Liu & Lifei, 2012).
By observing the Chinese media, one can draw conclusions about the interests of the Chinese
government because of the government’s control over the media via censorship (Hassid,
2008, p.416). The China Daily wrote, “Yet when people's anger is directed at the wrong
targets and displayed in ways that result in vandalism, physical attacks, and damage to private
property, it is criminal and must be stopped. Therefore, we applaud the timely statement by
local authorities that patriotism is no excuse for criminal offenses.” (China Daily, 2012) The
government seems to calm people down and tries to stop them of causing damage to the
“wrong” targets, probably Chinese. A comment in the People’s Daily, which is the
mouthpiece of the CCP, pled for civilised behaviour and abide the law. Furthermore, the
citizens should not destroy the “property of Chinese or attack Japanese people” (Yong, 2012).
With respect to its wording, the article is doubtlessly ambiguous. In the overseas edition of
the People’s Daily, the tone changed to paying Japan back with China’s “economic gun”
targeting to Japan’s financial and manufacturing industry (Wen, 2012a). Although some of
the articles only praised the protesters’ national pride, others are not so even-tempered.
A protester assumed that the Chinese government is in favour of the protests, because it
“could have stopped all of us when we were approaching at the subway station. The
government has taught us to be anti-Japanese at school, so if they want us to stop it would be
like slapping their own mouths.” (Wee & Duncan, 2012) However, another one gave the
following reason for joining the demonstrations, “We saw the anti-Japan protests online and
joined because China rarely gives people a chance to take part in protests.” (McCurry &
Branigan, 2012) He just found a vent for his pent-up aggressions and thus the nationalism was
not the main reason for joining the protests.
How many people actually took part in these demonstrations? According to the Chinese and
Japanese media, tens of thousands of people marched in more than 100 cities. A survey
questioning 1000 Chinese reports that 24% participated in the protests whereas 74% thought
the protesters crossed the line (Ho, 2012; Japan Times, 2013a; Jing, 2012; McCurry &
Branigan, 2012).
A boycott of Japanese goods followed in the months after the protests. Chinese boycotted
Japanese products for several times over the years and every time the economic effect grew
bigger (McCurry & Branigan, 2012). In addition, there are various reports of Chinese who
Introduction 13
stopped sometimes ostentatiously working for or together with Japanese people and
businesses, e.g. Chinese companies began to switch from Japanese to South Korean suppliers
or a woman’s hospital erected a sign saying that it will not treat Japanese women anymore
(Dreyer, 2012; Sharp & Hamlin, 2013). These examples are rather random, but they reveal
that such things happen on all levels.
Figure 1-2: Reaction chain of the Island crisis
The figure above shows in general how the Island crisis triggered the aforementioned
reactions. The announcement of having bought three of the Islands prompted anger in the
Chinese population. The Chinese media’s voice and thereby the message of the government is
ambiguous, thus its influence is difficult to determine. Although, there are authors who side
with the Chinese government I tend to say it rather fuels up the anger to distract from
domestic problems. Less equivocal is the influence of the Chinese grassroots nationalism;
feelings of superiority and hate towards Japan are generated by this new nationalism, which
grows independently from the CCP within the Chinese population. The anger, released during
anti-foreign protests, is directed on the one hand to Japanese government that insulted the
national pride and on the other hand to the corrupt Chinese government. Because it is difficult
for Chinese protesters to punish the Japanese government, they look for surrogate victims
such as Japanese companies to vent their anger. Social pressure is a common phenomenon in
China. Chinese have as mentioned before a “face” culture, in which, for instance, making
holidays in Japan or buying a Japanese car during the Island conflict might be considered as
below the acceptable requirements for a Chinese (Lee, 1990; Qi & Yin, 2010). Thus, also
people who hold no animosity towards Japan might take actions against Japanese companies,
e.g. cancelling their trips to Japan or buying a German car instead of a Japanese one.
P1: Anger generates social pressure that in turn forces others to join actions against Japanese
companies, such as boycotting.
Literature review 14
2 Literature review
According to my knowledge, no research has yet been conducted on how companies
operating in a foreign country react to a bilateral political crisis with the home country.
Therefore, the state of the art of the literature related to the thesis’ three themes will be
depicted to begin to fill this research gap. After an intensive literature research including
electronic databases, such as ABI/INFORM Complete, EBSCO, and JSTOR, research fields
have been identified that can help to describe and analyse the (A) causes of the crisis, the (B)
crisis communication and (C) CSR of Japanese companies, as depicted in Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1: Research fields overlapping with the studied surrogate crisis
2.1 Motivation of the stakeholders
Some customers and other stakeholders took actions against Japanese firms during the crisis,
but why did they do it? Why were they angry? Researchers came up with several constructs
that explain the attitude of consumers towards foreign countries and firms from these.
Although, the thesis focuses on the animosity model, other related constructs will be briefly
described for the sake of completeness.
2.1.1 Animosity and related concepts
A concept related to animosity is the so-called country-of-origin (COO) effect. COO is
usually defined as the information about the product’s point of origin (Amine, 2008, p.404-
405). In newly industrialised countries, such as China, the COO of a certain brand serves not
only “as a quality halo or summary of product quality (see Han, 1989), but can also possess
an additional dimension that of the degree of foreignness or non-localness” (emphasis added)
(Ramaswamy et al., 2000, p.92). Thus, if a consumer buys a product, he will consider various
attributes including the COO of the brand, which is an important indicator for the quality of
the product.
Another related term is consumer ethnocentrism. According to Shimp & Sharma (1987,
p.280) ethnocentric consumers belief that they will cause damage to their home country’s
Literature review 15
economy if they buy imported products. This concept is in contrast to the other presented
concepts not country specific.
The described concepts were introduced several decades ago and there is plenty of research
on them. Consumer ethnocentrism is useful for determining the opinion of a population
towards foreign countries in general, whereas the COO construct is an indicator for the
product quality associated to a certain country. Because both constructs do not fit to describe
the Chinese hatred towards Japan and their reaction to political events, the animosity
framework is going to be applied.
Klein et al. (1998, p. 90) first introduced the animosity framework and defined animosity as
the “remnants of antipathy related to previous or ongoing military, political, or economic
events”. Examples for such events are the aforementioned atrocities of the Second World War
or the rumour that the owner of French retailer Carrefour would support the Dalai Lama or
when the disabled Chinese torchbearer was attacked by pro-Tibet protesters in France during
the Olympic Games torch relay (BBC, 2008; Spiegel.de, 2008). The authors conducted a
survey in Nanjing among 244 Chinese consumers. They proposed and validated that the latent
construct animosity leads to war animosity and economic animosity. The latter is based on the
feeling of being treated unfair, e.g. Japanese firms are believed to buy and bury Chinese
competitors to help their own brands (Klein et al., 1998, p.91-92). I want to focus especially
on war animosity in this thesis because of the special Chinese-Japanese history that many
Chinese have still in mind when they think of Japan. War animosity explained in the initial
study far more variance than economic animosity. A point that could be criticised about Klein
et al.’s study is that the answers given by inhabitants of Nanjing regarding animosity towards
Japan might differ from other regions in China due to Nanjing massacre. In fact, the Chinese
provinces differ strongly in their degree of displaying nationalism17
. Thereby it is quite likely
that they also display different levels of war animosity towards Japan (Amine, 2008, p.408;
Klein et al., 1998, p.91-93; Lan et al., 2012, p.26).
Ang et al. (2004, p.192) came up with a categorization for animosity, i.e. stable vs. situational
and national vs. personal animosity (Ettenson & Klein, 2005). Stable animosity is based on a
historic event, whereas situational animosity is triggered by a contemporary event. National
animosity is based on the perception how a foreign country treated the home country.
Personal animosity is created when an individual makes bad experiences with the people from
the foreign country or the country itself. Moreover, Leong et al. (2008, p.1003) found that
“feelings of situational animosity were increased by […] stable animosity” due to a
17
Please find in section 5.3 of the appendix a figure that illustrates the different levels of nationalism in China.
Literature review 16
perception bias arising from stable animosity (Leong et al., 2008, p.999-1000). Regardless the
probably rather few cases of personal animosity towards Japan, this study will consider only
the stable/situational dimension. An important antecedent to animosity was found in a recent
study regarding the boycott of Danish products in Kuwait. Describing “group responsibility”
as the responsibility attributed to a group as a whole for a certain incident, the authors argue
that a high level of “group responsibility” is related to a high level of animosity (Maher &
Mady, 2010, p.636). If Chinese people assume the Japanese government represents the will of
the Japanese people, Chinese will attribute the responsibility for the decision to buy the
Islands to the Japanese population and consequently the animosity towards Japan will be high.
The initial study by Klein et al. (1998) also asked the respondents regarding their animosity
towards Japan as a whole and not towards a group of Japanese government officials. For
further studies of animosity please see Riefler & Diamantopoulos (2007), who published an
extensive literature review regarding animosity research.
2.1.2 The relationship between anger and behavioural intentions
After the announcement that several hundred Japanese employees were having an orgy-like
party with hundreds of prostitutes on the eve of the anniversary of Japan’s attack on China in
the Second World War, 30% of Chinese college students’ chat messages were about hate
towards Japan (Gates, 2013, p.254; Tam, 2007, p.285; Tse et al., 2004). “When a major
political event […] occurs, individuals are consumed by anger toward the foreign country and
subsequently transfer this anger to products imported from the offending country” (emphasis
added) (Cui et al., 2012, p.502). Hence, people who feel disadvantaged tend to translate their
anger into actions, which has been empirical validated in the field of psychology (e.g. Birt &
Dion, 1987; Walker & Mann, 1987).
Consumer boycotts are triggered by an egregious act that stimulates negative emotions and
have been the target of most research in the field of animosity (Riefler & Diamantopoulos,
2007). A boycott is defined as “an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain
objectives by urging individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the
marketplace.” (Friedman, 1985, p.97-98; Klein et al., 2004, p.93) Boycotts can be divided
into direct and indirect boycotts. Direct boycotts aim at single products and therefore try to
influence companies’ behaviour, whereas indirect boycotts, also known as surrogate boycotts,
usually address third parties such as governments and thereby all brands with the same COO
(Friedman, 1985, p.102).
Literature review 17
2.1.3 Summary and adaptation to the Island crisis
Figure 2-2: Reaction chain derived from the animosity framework and adapted to the Island crisis
The figure above depicts the reaction chain of an egregious event and thereby summarises the
literature of this section. The event triggers situational animosity, which can be increased by
existing stable animosity such as the Chinese war animosity towards Japan. Because of the
mentioned Chinese propaganda, I assume that in case of the Island crisis the Japanese people
are held responsible as a group for the actions of their government, wherefore the level of
animosity will increase further. The animosity generates anger towards the one who is held
responsible for the egregious act. The anger may translate into some concrete actions, here,
against surrogate victims.
Because most of the extensions of the animosity model, i.e. anger, group responsibility and
the situational/stable dimension, have already been tested in China, only the part about group
responsibility is brought forward in a proposition.
P2: Many Chinese attribute the crisis responsibility to Japanese people as a whole group.
By elucidating the important antecedent group responsibility and the categorisation of
animosity, i.e. stable and situational animosity, in section 2.1.1, a link between the Sino-
Japanese history and the presented theory was established. Chinese history refers to the
aforementioned war crimes, which led to a stable animosity that persisted until today, and the
change in propaganda, namely, that all Japanese are responsible for the war crimes and not
only a few military leaders.
2.2 Crisis communication
The last section presented a model to explain the behaviour of customers and other
stakeholders, whereas this section focuses on the companies’ crisis responses. What are the
mechanisms by which the crisis causes damage to the companies? How can firms prevent this
damage from happening? Answers to these and similar questions shall be given in this
section.
Literature review 18
2.2.1 Crisis definitions
“Crisis has, in many respects, been subject to the same level of ambiguity as the term “art”.
While one person's trash may be viewed as another person's treasure, one person's incident is
often viewed as another's crisis.” (Guth, 1995, p.125)
As Coombs (2005, p.221-222) points out, although a crisis is unpredictable, it can often be
expected, disrupt an organization’s operations and threaten the organization and/or its
stakeholders. Accordingly, the primary goal of crisis management is to decrease the damage
caused by a crisis to the organisation and its stakeholders who may be harmed economically
and/or physically. Thus, during a crisis firms try to protect its stakeholders from damage and
stress. Hence, the Island crisis was more or less over after most of the companies did not face
problems from the crisis anymore, i.e. after two months the crisis was over, though some
companies such as the car manufacturers still had trouble with the aftermath. Furthermore, a
basic assumption of crisis management is that crises threaten an organisation’s reputation
(Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs, 2007, p.163-165).
Organisational reputation can be defined as an “observers’ collective judgements of a
corporation based on assessments of the financial, social, and environmental impacts
attributed to the corporation over time” (Barnett et al., 2006, p.34). It develops and grows
through the information stakeholders receive regarding the organisation; the media and the
internet play an important role in this process (Fombrun & Van Riel, 2004). Reputation is
crucial for a company, because the stakeholders might change their behaviour towards the
company when its reputation changes (Coombs, 2007, p.164). Moreover, Fombrun & Van
Riel (2004) refer to a number of event-based studies finding that companies with a good
reputation before a crisis will suffer less during a crisis due to a “goodwill reservoir”.
Essential for crisis management is to create and implement plans including procedures for
dealing with crises and to learn from them. Companies should redesign or at least adapt their
systems after each crisis to improve them (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008). Thereby, firms
should be able to anticipate potential crises and eventually prevent them (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2011, p.45). During a crisis, the public relations department is crucial, because the
communication with the public and usually most of the stakeholders is carried out there.
However, instead of focusing on the firm’s pre-crisis mechanisms, I will concentrate on the
communication strategies of the companies after or during a crisis. Most of the crisis
communication research has been conducted on the Situational Crisis Communication Theory
or the Image Restoration Theory (Avery et al., 2010, p.190). In this thesis, I will follow
Coombs and his Situational Crisis Communication Theory, because it provides a holistic
Literature review 19
framework in which not only crisis strategies are discussed, but also a link between particular
strategies and the crisis itself is established. Moreover, several crisis communication
strategies of the Image Restoration Theory were integrated into the SCCT (Coombs, 2007,
p.171).
2.2.2 Situational Crisis Communication Theory
Figure 2-3: Revised and tested crisis situation model of SCCT
(Coombs, 2007, p.166; Choi & Lin, 2009, p.201)
SCCT uses the rationale behind Attribution Theory, precisely Weiner‘s framework, which
suggests that (A) individuals look for the causes of incidents and attribute the responsibility.
Central emotions in Weiner’s framework are anger and sympathy; the former is evoked when
an entity is held responsible for the event (Weiner, 1985).
According to the SCCT, three factors determine the threat for the reputation of a firm: (1)
initial crisis responsibility, (2) crisis history, (3) prior relationship history. The core
assumption of the model, which has been validated, is that (B) crisis responsibility is
negatively related to organisational reputation. Thus, the more people attribute a crisis to a
certain firm, the greater is the reputational threat (Coombs, 1998; Coombs & Holladay, 1996,
2001, 2002, 2004).
Coombs started his analysis with the stakeholders, who categorize a crisis by framing it or
adopting the existing frame; the outcome of a framing process is a crisis type. A frame is
Literature review 20
“manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotypical
images, source of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of
facts or judgments” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Thus, framing basically means to categorise an
event based on the available information and create a frame that stresses salient features of the
event. Because framing shapes the attribution of responsibility and most stakeholders will
usually experience and accept the frames reported by the media, companies do not only try to
underline certain cues in their messages, but also try to stay in contact with the media to give
their side of the story. However, if a crisis is mainly discussed over the internet, it will be
much more difficult to influence the frame, even if one can employ prominent celebrities
(Coombs, 2007, p.167-171; Cooper, 2002). SCCT researchers have clustered crises according
to their crisis responsibility attributions and found three different crisis types. The (1) victim
cluster has weak attributions of crisis responsibility and the company is seen as the victim of
the event, e.g. rumours, sabotages, natural disasters. The (2) accidental cluster has minimal
attributions of crisis responsibility and the event is seen as uncontrollable or unintentional,
e.g. technical problems. The (3) intentional cluster has strong attributions of crisis
responsibility and the event is viewed as purposeful, e.g. human error accidents, company did
not fulfil its duties and thereby caused an accident (cf. Coombs, 2007, p.167). Thus,
stakeholders frame and thereby classify a crisis according to the perceived crisis
responsibility.
Two intensifying factors have been identified, i.e. crisis history and prior relationship history.
When a firm has a (C) crisis history, i.e. a similar crisis occurred in the past, it is likely that
there is an ongoing problem in the firm. The (D) prior relationship history refers to how a
firm has treated its stakeholders in the past. Research suggests that the occurrence of these
factors has a (C & D) direct and via crisis responsibility an (E & F) indirect intensifying effect
on the organisational reputation, because companies that have a crisis history or a bad history
with their stakeholders will be attributed more responsibility than otherwise. Furthermore,
research shows the firm’s reputation after a crisis is related to (G) behavioural intentions and
that (H) crisis response strategies can have a positive impact on the firm’s reputation.
Although Coombs (2007) proposes that crisis response strategies have an effect on the
attribution of crisis responsibility, other authors found no relationship between them (Brown
& White, 2010; Claeys et al., 2010; Coombs, 2004a, b; Coombs & Holladay, 2001, 2004).
“Increased attributions of crisis responsibility generate stronger feelings of anger and in some
extreme cases schadenfreude.” (Coombs, 2007, p.168) This is an important fact for the thesis,
because it links responsibility to anger. A recent study revised the SCCT by adding the
“anger” to the model. In a case study about Mattel, a US based toy-manufacturing company,
Literature review 21
customers’ emotions were analysed and the authors found that by integrating anger into the
model the overall fit of the results increases. Anger is related to (I) crisis responsibility and it
has a negative relationship to (J) organisational reputation and to (K) behavioural intentions.
The main weakness of the study is the usage of postings from online bulletin boards as the
only data source and they did neither state how many users wrote the 277 analysed posts or
what kind of online communities they used. This may influence the levels of anger and
preselect certain individuals who like to release their anger (Choi & Lin, 2009, p.200-206).
Coombs (2007, p.170) argues that the aim of crisis response strategies is to restore the
reputation and to prevent any behaviour that would cause damage to the company or its
stakeholders. Primary and secondary crisis response strategies are listed in section 5.4 of the
appendix.
The “Deny Strategies” try to dissociate the firm from the crisis by claiming the crisis does not
exist. When a “Diminish Strategy” is applied, the firm posits that the crisis is not as bad as
people think and it tries to weaken its connection to the crisis. “Rebuild Strategies” shall
improve a company’s reputation by doing positive things and calm down any stirred up
emotions. On a much smaller scale, secondary response strategies can also improve
reputation. These usually support the primary strategies. For all of these strategies it is crucial
that the company supports its claims with new information about itself and/or to remind its
stakeholders of its good behaviour in the past, e.g. a credible long CSR history (Coombs,
2007). Similarly to this, Yuksel & Mryteza (2009, p.257) claim that the most effective action
was publishing unrelated positive information regarding the company after conducting an
experiment with 175 students regarding strategic responses towards boycotts. However,
whether the results of this experiment conducted with students are similar to the reactions of
the Chinese public should be tested. Specific recommendations for response strategies are
displayed in Figure 5-3 in section 5.5 of the appendix.
Some researchers claim the SCCT is too static, i.e. a certain strategy should be chosen
because of the few environmental factors the SCCT consists of. The critics argue that there is
no “one fits all” solution because plenty of special cases exist. Furthermore, they claim that
good relationships to the stakeholders are pivotal for recovering reputation and not the crisis
response strategies (Brown & White, 2010, p.89-90). I would object to their arguments that
the SCCT can be adapted and extended to fit to the special cases and that the SCCT’s
strategies can be mixed as Coombs (2007, p.173) points out. Hence, one should further
develop the theory instead of claiming crises are too complex due to their “humanistic nature”
(Brown & White, 2010, p.89-90).
Literature review 22
2.2.3 Summary and adaptation to the Island crisis
Figure 2-4: SCCT model adapted to the Island crisis
The figure above shows a modified version of the SCCT model in which anger plays the
central role instead of crisis responsibility, because the victims of the crisis are merely
surrogate victims and thereby not responsible for the crisis. If a political event happens, the
stakeholders will categorise the event by (A) framing it or using the dominant frame. As
pointed out earlier in the thesis, Chinese media are closely connected with the Chinese
government and their frames are often a dominant due their reach. As explained in section
1.3.3, it is possible that the (B) Chinese government has influenced the frame of the crisis via
the Chinese media. Moreover, the before mentioned (C) Chinese grassroots nationalism may
also play its part in influencing the frame. The framing of the event served not only as an
explanation for the attribution of responsibility, but was included in the framework because of
the special “framers” and theirs interests. Afterwards, the stakeholders (D) attribute the
responsibility for the event. According to the literature, Chinese tend to condemn all Japanese
people for political tensions with China, thus group responsibility replaces crisis
responsibility in the revised model. Attributing the responsibility (E) lowers the reputation of
the members of the group, i.e. Japanese companies, on the one hand, and (F) sparks anger
against the group on the other hand. Anger in turn is related to (G) behavioural intentions and
Literature review 23
negatively to (H) organisational reputation. Whether a company is affected by actions,
especially boycotts, and how much depends on a firm specific (I) “visibility” and (J)
“Japaneseness”. A possibility to operationalize the first construct would be to follow Wang &
Qian (2011, p.1163), who proposed that the degree of “visibility” depends on the firm’s
advertising intensity and obviously on the industry it operates in. “Japaneseness” could
depend on whether Chinese can easily identify the product as a Japanese one. However, these
are merely suggestions for the operationalization in future quantitative studies. Behavioural
intentions are directed towards (J) surrogate victims in default of the Japanese government as
a target. As stated before, a change in reputation may (K) alter how the stakeholders interact
with a company. Both, (L) prior relationship reputation and (M) crisis response strategies are
related to the reputation of the surrogate victims. Furthermore, (N) prior relationship
reputation is negatively related to crisis responsibility. Thus, people who had a good prior
relationship with the victim will rather not attribute the responsibility. Crisis history seems to
be rather non-relevant to companies during a surrogate crisis, wherefore it does not appear in
the adapted model.
The following propositions are about the untested parts of the adapted SCCT model.
P3: The Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis was framed by the Chinese government via the media.
P4: The Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis was framed by Chinese nationalists.
P5: The higher the degree of “visibility” of a Japanese company is, the more likely it will
become a target of boycotts and protests during a surrogate crisis. “Visibility” is based on the
firm’s advertising intensity and on the industry it operates in.
P6: The higher the degree of “Japaneseness” of a Japanese company is, the more likely it will
become a target of boycotts and protests during a surrogate crisis. “Japaneseness” is based on
whether Chinese can easily identify the firm as a Japanese one.
The variables proposed in P5 and P6 are interconnected, e.g. if a company displays a high
degree of “Japaneseness”, but only a low visibility, it will probably have much less problems,
than the other way round.
P7: The response strategies of most Japanese companies were to maintain a low profile,
because they did not want to draw the attention of the public on them or to create a dilemma
due to the Japanese animosity towards China.
P7 extends the strategies suggested by the SCCT. The low profile strategy fits best to a
surrogate crisis, because it makes sense not to rock the boat when one cannot convince the
other party that he is not responsible for the crisis or calm them down. Furthermore, if
Literature review 24
Japanese companies please Chinese, there is a possibility this might backfire due to certain
right wing groups in Japan mentioned in section 1.2.
The focus shifted in this section to the companies and their reactions to the crisis. The
adaptations of the SCCT to the Island crisis serve as links to the first section of the literature
review, i.e. group responsibility and the “framers”. With the adapted model, I should be able
to depict the points that could be used by Japanese companies to tackle the crisis.
2.3 Corporate social responsibility
The CSR section sets out to answer the following questions: Do companies have to adapt their
CSR approach for China? What kind of CSR activities are commonly used in China? How do
Chinese customers respond to these CSR actions? Should firms communicate their CSR
doings during a crisis? This part begins with a CSR “overview”, followed by a description of
the roots and values of Chinese CSR. Afterwards, recent developments of Japanese CSR
practices will be pictured to see the differences between the approaches in the two countries.
The section concludes by presenting a CSR communication framework for analysing CSR
announcements and CSR reports.
2.3.1 CSR overview
I see CSR from a Western point of view and hence I compare Chinese and Japanese CSR
adaptations to the Western one. One of the most cited CSR definitions is, according to
Dahlsrud (2008, p.7), brought forward by the Commission of the European Communities:
“CSR is a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their
business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” (EU
Communication, 2002, p.3) This definition comprises many dimensions such as economy,
environment, society, stakeholder and voluntariness. Nevertheless, there are plenty of other
definitions, which have different views on CSR and related or subordinate concepts
(Dahlsrud, 2008, p.7).
So what are the roots of CSR? Several authors argue that it emerged from academia, while
corporate citizenship has its roots in companies (Banerjee, 2008, p.62). For instance, some
German and Japanese scholars claim that CSR has a long tradition in their countries which
goes back to the so-called “honourable businessman” in Germany and to corporate principles
that focused on the society and employees in Japan (Klink, 2008, p.72; Demise, 2006, p.6-8).
However, others see the beginnings of CSR in charity and stewardship, consequently there is
no consensus about its origins (Van Marrewijk, 2003, p.98). Nevertheless, most researchers
think of the book “Social Responsibilities of the Businessman”, published by Howard Bowen,
in 1953, as the definite beginnings of CSR literature. For those readers interested in the
Literature review 25
history and evolution of CSR literature, I can recommend the widely acclaimed paper
“Corporate social responsibility evolution of a definitional construct” published by Archie
Carroll in 1999.
In the following, several concepts related or subordinate to CSR are mentioned to give a
comprehensive overview; a subordinate concept to CSR is corporate sustainability (CS).
According to Linnanen & Panapanaan (2002), CS comprises corporate responsibility (CR),
which in turn consists of social responsibility, environmental responsibility and economic
responsibility (Van Marrewijk, 2003, p.101-102). Another term is corporate philanthropy
(CP) that can be seen as a part of CSR and is defined as “an unconditional transfer of cash or
other assets to an entity or a settlement or cancellation of its liabilities in a voluntary
nonreciprocal transfer by another entity acting other than as an owner.” (Financial Accounting
Standards Board, 1993) Corporate citizenship means that a company has not only rights, but
also duties and it should take over unserved governmental functions as well as protect civil
and political rights (Matten et al., 2003, p.116-118). With respect to the use of all these terms
in company reports, e.g. sustainability reports, CR reports, CSR reports, very strict definitions
become less meaningful in practice (Carroll & Shabana, 2010, p.86).
2.3.2 CSR in China and Japan
As mentioned before Confucianism had a huge impact on Chinese culture and thinking. This
impact, although it is becoming weaker, still exists today as one can see by means of the CSR
definition of the Chinese government. Confucius’s teachings were based on “li”, which stands
for rules of the society, and “ren”, which means people and stands for philanthropy (Gao,
2009, p.25-26). And just like Germany with its concept of the “honourable businessman”,
China had 2500 years ago the concept of the Confucian trader who applied the teachings of
Confucius (Wang & Juslin, 2009, p.435).
Today, the Chinese government plays a very important role for CSR in China, because it still
controls various economic resources and it is a major promoter of its own CSR version (Tang
& Li, 2009, p.202). The Chinese Bureau of Commerce defines CSR as “a concrete action
taken by Chinese companies to implement the political aspiration of the new Communist
Party collective leadership – ‘putting people first to create a harmonious society’.” (Emphasis
added) (Ethical Corporation, 2005) One can see that on the one hand the rules of the society,
“li”, which are set by the CCP, are still very important and on the other hand people, “ren”,
are central to create a “harmonious” society (Kowacsik, 2010, p.62).
Assuming that Chinese companies know what CSR activities correspond best with the
Chinese consumers, a study about 29 Chinese companies of the Fortune 100 China list should
Literature review 26
provide insights regarding the “right” CSR activities. More than 80% of them donated money,
the purpose of the donations was usually natural disaster relief and the reason they stated was
philanthropy (Tang & Li, 2009, p.205-206). These findings are consistent with those of an
analysis of Chinese retailers showing that donations for disaster relief are very common.
Furthermore, lists and rankings regarding the total donations made in China or for a certain
event are published to compare the companies’ social contribution (Kolk et al., 2010, p.296;
people.com.cn, 2008).
In another study regarding foreign retailers in China, Xun (2012) found that they exercised a
government-aimed and a consumer-aimed CSR instead of the holistic Western CSR in which
every stakeholder’s interests have an intrinsic value. The government is targeted to engage “in
the political process to interact, communicate and exchange with key legitimacy actors […] as
a way to enhance firm performance.” (Xun, 2012, p.10) The government’s support for foreign
retailers and their expansion plans is crucial because of the government’s power over
resources in China (Xun, 2012, p.11). The same is true for many other industries that want to
operate in China. The author reports that in contrast to consumer-aimed CSR, government-
aimed CSR leads to an increase in firm performance. Since it is so important, what is
government-aimed CSR? Xun (2012) explains it as building up “guanxi”, i.e. relationships
based on doing each other favours, with the government, especially the local government, and
thereby boosting certain officials’ careers by donating money at the right time, e.g. disaster
relief. Nevertheless, retailers also engage in consumer-aimed CSR, because it is also a way to
show the government that the company is a good citizen and it serves “as signal of a firm’s
goodwill, principally to soothe or appease Chinese consumers’ easily escalated negativity (i.e.
boycotts).” (Xun, 2012, p.10) In fact, China has a long tradition of boycotts, Hong et al.
(2010, p.6) list various boycotts that also happened before the CCP came to power. Most of
them had a nationalistic sentiment, targeted products sharing the same country-of-origin and
were surrogate boycotts. Furthermore, Xun states that when Chinese customers become more
sophisticated in evaluating CSR activities, companies may have also some financial
advantages coming from consumer-aimed CSR. Until then firms should not cease their CSR
activities because of the reputation that may protect them from short-tempered customers
(Xun, 2012, p.11).
Ramasamy & Yeung (2009, p.127-128) surveyed consumers in Shanghai and Hong Kong and
found that CSR seems to be more important to them than to Western consumers. The authors
give various explanations for their findings such as the strong Chinese collectivism that
supports the notion of CSR or the Chinese middle class that became wealthier wherefore it
acts more socially responsible. Another insight was revealed by the respondents from
Literature review 27
Shanghai stating companies have no economic responsibilities. Moreover, the philanthropic
and the ethical responsibility are the ones that mattered most to Chinese consumers
(Ramasamy & Yeung, 2009, p.127-129). Another study published in 2011 reports that
Chinese who have been aware of CSR evaluate companies more positively and display a
higher purchase intention. An interesting insight is that instead of caring about how the CSR
activities look like or being concerned about the motives of the companies, Chinese
consumers are much more interested in the results and the sustainability of the CSR activities
(Tian et al., 2011, p.204-208). Yang (2010, p.14-15) reports that Chinese are easily misled by
companies that engage in green washing, i.e. spending more money on advertising the green
image of the company than on the environmental activities. He explains that by the absence of
independent NGOs in China, which would be able to pressure those firms by scrutinising
them and draw the media’s attention to the issue. A study regarding the effects of corporate
philanthropy (CP) on financial firm performance in China shows that the firm performance
significantly increases by engaging in CP. This is caused by a gain in political resources and
positive stakeholder reactions to the CP; the relationship was moderated by the firm’s
visibility18
, its dependence on political resources and stakeholder expectations (Wang & Qian,
2011, p.1167, 1174-1178). All these studies clearly show that Chinese consumers have a
distinct view on what CSR is and hence companies should adjust their CSR strategy.
Most of the studies were limited due to their sampling technique, nonetheless they point
towards the same direction, namely, that Chinese consumers are easily convinced by striking
measures such as donating money. To get a first glimpse on how Japanese companies
approach CSR, the following paragraph presents the recent developments of CSR in Japan.
Fukukawa & Teramoto (2009, p.143-144) argue that it may look like Japan is lagging behind
other developed countries, however “Japanese CSR managers are well versed and indeed
willing to discuss the issues at stake, but that they also reserve the right to be skeptical too.”
One of their interviewees said the firm does not want to dupe its stakeholders by signing
guidelines such as the Global Compact without coming up to it. Other more recent studies
have a more distinguished view on CSR in Japan by classifying it as employee- and
environment-oriented in comparison to, for instance, Chinese or Western CSR. Furthermore,
the authors claim that Japanese companies are among the best in the aforementioned areas
(Witt & Redding, 2012, p.18-21; Sun et al., 2012, p.927-928). They need to adapt their
practices to country specific stakeholder needs. However, D'Costa (2012) claims that up to at
least 2005 the approach of Japanese firms in China did not take the Chinese society into
18
Visibility was indicated by the advertising intensity of the particular companies, which was calculated as the
ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to sales.
Literature review 28
account and that “the social contributions of Japanese companies in China are inadequately
publicised.” (D'Costa, 2012, p.234) Furthermore, the firms should maintain close
relationships with communities and the local government. Although there is no doubt that
Japanese companies engage in CSR activities nowadays, their focus on unappreciated areas in
China may not lead to the desired results.
Argandoña & von Weltzien Hoivik (2009, p.227, 229-230) stated that different cultures have
different CSR models. Although the CSR models may have many things in common, each
model fits to its culture that shaped and will continue to shape its form. After all, foreign
companies in China should definitely engage in CSR, because the benevolence of Chinese
consumers and the government seems to depend on such acts.
2.3.3 Communication of CSR
Du et al. (2010) created a framework to analyse the CSR communication, which will be
explained in detail in the following. Several aspects of a CSR message can be analysed, i.e.
the issue, commitment, impact, motives, and fit of the message. The issue of the message can
be about either the social cause, e.g. being merely a sponsor, or the company’s involvement,
e.g. donating money for every sold product. Although in Western countries it is more credible
for a company to be involved, this seems not to be the case in China as shown in the last
section.
A company can focus the CSR communication on one or several aspects of its activities.
Commitment towards the matter of concern can be communicated in the following ways:
input, e.g. in million RMB, durability, e.g. the program runs since 15 years, and consistency,
e.g. 5% of every sold product (Dwyer et al., 1987, p.19). A company can show commitment,
for instance, by donating money or providing other resources to a charity organisation. The
impact of the specific actions may also be stressed in a CSR message, e.g. what will change if
you buy one crate of beer. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, motives are crucial to the
consumer’s evaluation of CSR activities. Usually, companies should have a CSR fit, e.g. a
paper company supports projects saving the rain forest (Haley, 1996). But there are also
authors who report that a low CSR fit leads to positive reactions, because consumers will
think the firm tries not only to improve things in its own field but also in other areas (Bloom
et al., 2006; Menon & Kahn, 2003).
The findings of a recent study indicate that during a crisis companies with a short CSR
history19
should act differently from companies with a long one. While the latter will face less
consumer scepticism when they use their long CSR history in crisis communications,
19
A short history was defined as less than 1 year and a long one as 10 years or more.
Literature review 29
companies with a short CSR history should not try to utilise it for crisis communication,
because their reputation will suffer even more (Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009, p.275-281).
Although the study was conducted in a Western country, it shows that defending the
reputation during a crisis by pointing at a long CSR history might also be an option for
Japanese corporations in China since Chinese seem to be easily convinced by striking
measures, e.g. earthquake donation and green washing.
2.3.4 Summary and propositions
Although, Chinese consumers are fond of different CSR activities, they seem to appreciate
CSR even more than Western consumers. Companies should not only engage in the activities
Chinese are currently fond of, but also in those that are more sophisticated, i.e. environmental
activities. However, for now Japanese firms should focus the presentation of their doings on
philanthropy and social issues.
Figure 2-5: Relationship between CSR, anger and organisational reputation
Figure 2-5 depicts a possible function of CSR in a crisis such as the Island crisis. As the
literature has indicated, CSR in China is often aimed at two main stakeholders, the
government and the Chinese consumers. By targeting the latter, Japanese firms hope to calm
them down and to prevent a loss of their reputation during a crisis. Japanese firms want to
show their value for the Chinese society to the Chinese government, which might in turn
frame the crisis in a way that does not stir up anger towards the particular company. These
relationships are moderated by their CSR history, i.e. whether they engaged in CSR activities
for a long period of time, and a CSR country fit, i.e. whether the CSR activities were
appreciated by the Chinese stakeholders.
Literature review 30
P8: By targeting Chinese consumers with their CSR activities, Japanese firms might be able
to decrease anger and prevent damage from their reputation in case of a crisis.
P9: By targeting the Chinese government with their CSR activities, Japanese firms might face
fewer problems during a crisis.
P10: The effectiveness of the CSR activities in respect to the goals stated in P8 and P9
depends on the CSR history, i.e. for how many years did the firm engage in CSR activities,
and the CSR country fit, i.e. did it engage in activities that are appreciated by the citizens of
the host country.
Empirical part 31
3 Empirical part
The empirical work of the thesis turned out to be quite a challenge. The difficulties transpired
soon after the first inquiries were made and continued even after the research design had been
adjusted for several times. The topic was too delicate for 26 of the 30 contacted companies,
which refused to answer any questions related to the Island conflict. Nonetheless, it was
possible to depict the problems Japanese companies faced during the Island crisis, the
responses to these problems and their CSR activities in China. In the first part of this chapter
the used methods are presented, which is followed by the results of the investigation.
3.1 Research methodology
One of the thesis’ goals is to get insights into the problems of Japanese companies during
bilateral political crises and to depict the response strategies to these problems. To achieve
this, a case study approach was chosen for several reasons that will be explained in further
detail in the next section. Besides the research strategy, the researcher also should think about
the emic-etic question, i.e. whether the research should be culture specific (emic), e.g. the
Chinese view on CSR, or universally applicable (etic)? Although, parts of the research are
very culture specific, e.g. the government as a framer or “Japaneseness”, the core of it, e.g.
animosity leads to anger, is universally applicable to surrogate crises. Thus, a combination of
an emic and an etic approach was employed in which the universal core concepts were
adapted to the Chinese situation (Pike, 1967).
3.1.1 Research strategy and research design
To conduct the cases studies, I follow Yin (2003b) and his widely acclaimed book: “Case
study research: Design and Methods”.
Beginning with the selection of the research strategy, e.g. survey, case study, experiment etc.,
Yin (2003b, p.5-6) states that the selection partly depends on the type of research question,
e.g. how, why, what and how many. He claims if research questions begin with how or why,
case studies are a suitable research strategy, because other research strategies, such as
surveys, rather focus on one certain point of time in contrast to case studies. In addition,
“what” questions with an exploratory character can also be answered well by case studies. A
study can be classified as having an exploratory character when no research on the topic has
yet been conducted and usually one of its goals is to develop propositions for further research.
Moreover, Yin (2003b, p.7-8) claims that case studies fit to research questions about
contemporary problems that cannot be manipulated. Furthermore, case studies incorporate the
context of the research question and do not deliberately remove it in contrast to surveys and
Empirical part 32
experiments. Because the research topic and the research questions of this thesis fulfil the
stated criteria, case studies are the method of choice.
Figure 3-1: Yin’s categorisation of case studies
The most influential categorization for case studies was created by Yin (2003a, p.5), who
divides them into single or multiple and descriptive, exploratory, or explanatory ones as
illustrated in Figure 3-1. To ensure that a variety of coping strategies will be identified by the
research the case study will consist of multiple cases (3<), which follow a replication logic
instead of a sampling logic. This makes it also easier to generalize in contrast to a situation of
analysing a single case study (Yin, 2003b, p.37, 47). Exploratory case studies were chosen,
because, to my knowledge, no research has yet been conducted on this contemporary topic.
The research design consists of three phases20
. In the first phase, stakeholders of Japanese
firms and problems with the former were revealed by conducting interviews with experts.
These interviews shed some light on the problems and their causes and facilitated the creation
of interview questions for the second phase. In fact, interviews with journalists of newspapers
and magazines, such as Japan Times, Nikkei, Handelsblatt, were also planned, but none of the
contacted journalists was willing to give an interview. One of the reasons mentioned was
again that the topic is too political. In addition to that, newspaper articles and corporate
reports ensure to have multiple sources of evidence. The second phase consisted of four
multiple, exploratory case studies with Japanese companies to uncover company-specific
problems, CSR activities and communication strategies of Japanese firms during the conflict.
Because the car manufacturers refused to support research on this topic, interviews with
managers of car dealerships of Toyota and Nissan were conducted. Although this might
provide only limited insights concerning the CSR strategy of the particular company, the
responses and the rules of conduct issued for a crisis were uncovered. In the final stage, the
20
Please see for an outline of the thesis’ research in section 5.6 of the appendix.
Empirical part 33
findings were summarized and linked to theory. Moreover, implications and future research
directions are presented.
In academic research, several criteria have been identified to judge the quality of a research
design. According to Yin (2003b, p.33-34) the four most common tests for social research are
also relevant for case studies:
Construct validity: Does the instrument measure what it should?
Internal validity: Is the cause-effect relationship based on the proposed conditions?21
External validity: Can the study’s findings be generalized?
Reliability: Is it possible to repeat the investigation and get the same results?
Figure 3-2: Principle of data triangulation
Yin (2003b, p.33-37) lists several tactics to deal with the tests. To achieve high construct
validity, multiple sources of evidence, which is also called triangulation, should be employed.
There are several types of triangulation and the most important type for this thesis is data
triangulation, i.e. to use not only one source of evidence but several sources to support a fact.
This could for instance mean to not only rely on newspapers, but also on reports and
interviews. Thus, whenever possible more than one source is quoted. By doing multiple case
studies, the external validity increases. A high reliability can be ensured by conducting the
case studies in a careful and archival manner and by maintaining a clear chain of evidence, i.e.
to enable an external observer to understand the thoughts and the evidence that led the
researcher to exactly these conclusions.
3.1.2 Data collection
In general, there are several possibilities to retrieve the information needed. Six sources of
evidence are listed by Yin (2003b, p.86): (1) documentation, (2) archival records, (3)
21
Yin (2003b, p.34) states that internal validity has no use for exploratory or descriptive case studies.
Empirical part 34
interviews, (4) direct observations, (5) participant-observation, and (6) physical artefacts. For
this thesis, interviews, documentation and archival records were consulted to answer the
research questions.
Representing the core of this thesis’ work, the data collection process was much more time-
consuming and complicated than initially thought because of various reasons. First, the topic
as already mentioned, is a very political topic that neither Japanese nor Chinese companies
want to discuss in public. Second, as Pearson & Clair (1998, p.21) put it, “organizations are
reluctant to open current or past "wounds" to external examination and speculation.” Third,
unfortunately there is an incredibly significant language barrier for a German student who
wants to interview Chinese or Japanese employees. Due to the support of an interpreter,
conducting interviews with Chinese was not as big a problem as initially thought. However,
most interviews conducted without an interpreter were very time consuming and not as rich in
information as interviews are supposed to be. Fourth, doing research in China is different
from many other countries due to the Chinese culture, especially bureaucracy and guanxi. In
fact, the Chinese researchers I talked to mentioned that they would not even try to conduct
research on this sensitive topic without having very close contact to the right people in the
Chinese branches of the affected Japanese companies.
A list of Japanese companies was compiled based on the following two criteria. Japanese
companies were either chosen when they were mentioned in newspaper articles, because they
were affected by the Island crisis, or when they were listed in a number of very recent CSR
rankings, namely East Asia 30 published by NKSJ Holdings and TOP100 Chinese
Companies’ CSR Ranking report created by Fortune China (Fortune China, 2012; Ju, 2012).
The reason for the first criterion is obvious, whereas the reason for the second may not be so
clear. It was chosen to figure out whether Japanese firms with outstanding CSR practices have
fewer or no problems during a crisis. Companies that do not operate in China or do not release
a CSR report were excluded from the list. The list can be found in section 5.7 of the appendix.
It includes how often the word “China” was used in the particular CSR report; this can be an
indicator for the importance of the Chinese CSR activities.
The Japanese CSR and public communication departments of the companies on the
aforementioned list, and if possible the Chinese departments, were contacted and after
agreeing to cooperate, the interviewees were identified. Table 5-5 in section 5.8 of the
appendix lists the respondents ordered by nationality.
Empirical part 35
Interviews
Interviews are typically a rich source of information because the interviewee usually has tacit
knowledge about the topic and, if necessary, the interviewer is able to dig deeper.
Nevertheless, interviews are only verbal reports that could be heavily biased because both the
interviewer and the interviewee are subjective and may unconsciously influence the results
(Yin, 2003b, p.89-91). Even more, the respondents might wilfully give wrong answers,
because they want to let the interviewer hear what he wants to hear or to cast a positive light
on the company. According to Yin (2003b), open-ended interviews are common in case
studies. However, due to the limited time of the interviewees semi-structured interviews22
were conducted because on the one hand, these are still flexible enough to go into details
whenever necessary and on the other hand this type of interview also ensures that the main
questions will be answered in time (Galletta, 2013, p.24).
Due to the delicacy of the topic, anonymity was granted to all respondents. Thus, only some
general data about the corporations is revealed. The interviews usually lasted between half an
hour and two hours and were often conducted via the telephone. Some respondents did not
want to take part in oral interviews and preferred to reply via email. Although, the
information is not as rich as in interviews, with respect to the difficult topic any valuable
information was included in the analysis.
Archival material and Documents
The other main sources of information were websites, company brochures, annual reports,
and newspaper articles. These were consulted to depict and analyse the CSR activities and the
communication strategy of the particular company. Yin (2003b, p.86-87) warns researchers to
use documentation, such as reports and newspaper articles, without questioning its accuracy.
This might be low due to the purpose and the audience of the records. Nonetheless, in contrast
to interviews, documents are stable and can be reviewed repeatedly.
3.1.3 Analysing methods
According to Yin (2003b, p.111-115), a researcher should choose a general “analytic
strategy” because the strategy will guide the researcher and it is linked to “analytic
techniques”. Yin proposes three general strategies: (1) relying on theoretical propositions, (2)
thinking about rival explanations, and (3) developing a case description. If the researcher
relies on propositions, the data collection will be highly influenced by the propositions, thus
certain things will be in the spotlight while others will be ignored. As depicted in Table 5-6 in
22
Please see section 5.9 of the appendix for the main questions of the interviews.
Empirical part 36
section 5.10 of the appendix, Yin differentiates between two types of rivals, “craft rivals” and
“real-life rivals”, and identifies nine kinds of rival explanations, which can deepen the
understanding of the topic. The last general strategy describes the case in detail and structures
it by developing a descriptive framework. Afterwards it will be easier to analyse the complex
context of the case.
As mentioned before, Yin (2003b) also presents several “analytic techniques” applicable for
case studies: cross-case synthesis, logic models, time-series analysis, pattern matching, and
explanation building. A cross-case synthesis can only be applied in multiple case studies,
because it uses the data of several cases. This data has to be unified to recognise overall
patterns. The underlying idea of logic models are cause-effect-cause-effect patterns, “whereby
a dependent variable (event) at an earlier stage becomes the independent variable (causal
event) for the next stage.” (Yin, 2003b, p.127) Time-series analysis is, simply put, the
comparison of data collected over a certain time with respect to a predicted pattern. Pattern
matching is a very common method in which propositions are formulated and then compared
to the cases.
In explanation building, the researcher stipulates propositions, which will be compared with
the case and, if necessary, afterwards revised and compared with other details of the case or
another case. Figure 3-3 underlines that this method is iterative in contrast to the other
presented ones (Yin, 2003b, p.116-137).
Figure 3-3: Explanation building process
Explanation building was chosen for this exploratory case study, because my knowledge
about the context of this crisis was limited and no literature about the topic of the thesis
existed. Therefore, a more flexible method was picked to ensure that the research would not
be trapped in a dead end. For the thesis, a descriptive framework was created and adapted
according to the findings of the interviews. Because of the focus of the master’s thesis,
propositions were made to limit the scope of the descriptive framework. Thus, a combination
Empirical part 37
of the first and the last general strategy and explanation building was chosen to analyse the
strategic options of the Japanese companies during the crisis.
3.2 Results – Causes
In this section, the results of the interviews regarding the causes of the protests and the
context of the crisis will be presented and linked to theory. The related propositions will be
compared with the findings and will be revised whenever necessary.
Framing of the crisis
A challenging topic was whether the Chinese government or Chinese companies incited the
Chinese citizens, especially the protesters, because almost all respondents hesitated to answer
and during the interviews, most Japanese even wanted to skip questions connected to the
Chinese government. Most of the respondents claimed that the Chinese government framed
the crisis indirectly, because it is assumed to control the mass media, i.e. the newspapers,
radio, television and all the major websites, and via censorship also the information available
on the social media platforms. One informant said, “the Chinese government is encouraging
people to protest by letting the media set up an anti-Japanese atmosphere.” Furthermore, half
of the Chinese interviewees believed that the protesters had acted on their own, whereas all of
the Japanese respondents, who answered the more delicate questions, claimed that the
Chinese government had staged the protests and instigated the protesters. Interestingly, the
Chinese who advocated the latter view had spent several years abroad. This indicates that the
Chinese government seems to have a huge influence even on the more educated population
since some of the respondents are scholars at a university.
Nonetheless, some interviewees differentiated between the central and the local government;
for instance, an expert for Japanese companies said the local government supports Japanese
companies, whereas the central government would incite the protesters. A Chinese scholar
disagreed with the first part and proclaimed that the local government would try to follow the
orders of the central government, but it takes some time to “synchronize all the departments”
and it is sometimes difficult to apply the instructions of the central government, because they
are not very explicit due to sensitive topics. However, the managers of the Japanese
companies stated that the local government usually helps them whenever possible.
Although, the interviewees were explicitly asked about the Chinese grassroots nationalism,
only two respondents viewed it as a major movement that would be able to frame the crisis. A
Chinese manager objected that the Chinese grassroots nationalism could easily be used by the
government.
Empirical part 38
Surprisingly, the grassroots nationalism seems to be not as important as indicated by the
literature. Hence, P423
will be rejected and P3 will be slightly revised to incorporate the
distinction between local and central government.
P3.1: The Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis was framed by the Chinese central government via the
media.
Motives of the troublemakers
Many of the interviewed Chinese characterised the protesters as “uneducated, bored and
unemployed” without any goals in life. This makes them an easy target for manipulation.
Others pictured them as small business owners or freelancers who can spare time for such
activities. Two of the Chinese car dealership managers gave very detailed descriptions of the
boycotters and protesters and their motivations. I consider these descriptions as very valuable,
because these managers are closer to the ordinary Chinese people as most of the other
interviewees.
A manager of a Dongfeng Nissan car dealership said three groups of people join protests
against Japan. The (1) “shouters” are intellectuals who want to tell others about their ideas
and conceptions. They usually do not engage in violence in contrast to the (2) “destroyers”
who were described as bored and inherently violent. They are poor and feel treated unfairly
by the society, especially the perceived gap between rich and poor people fuels their anger.
An interesting insight is that she explicitly mentioned that workers of Chinese car companies
are among this group, but no one ever heard that the competitors encourage their workers to
protest. The last group (3) consists of uninvolved passers-by, who just like to watch what is
happening.
One manager of a Guangqi Toyota car dealership separated the boycotters of cars into two
groups according to their motives. The first one consists of people who hate Japan, but during
the protests this usually rather latent hatred became stronger, wherefore they stopped buying
Japanese products. This perfectly fits the findings of Leong et al. (2008), namely that stable
animosity amplifies situational animosity. The second group of “boycotters” acts more out of
self-interest. These people fear on the one hand that someone might destroy their property and
on the other hand that they lose their reputation if their friends, who might be nationalists,
find out about their Japanese car. While describing the second group, he stated that the
visibility and accessibility of cars is the main reason for this group to postpone their purchase
or to buy a brand with a different country-of-origin.
23
Please see section 5.11 of the appendix for an overview of the propositions.
Empirical part 39
One female respondent asserted that Chinese do not differentiate between the suffering of old
family members and their own suffering due to collectivism. “In contrast to individualistic
countries, it is considered as personal what happened 70 years ago to your grand-
grandparents.” Another interesting statement regarding the motivation of protesters made by a
Chinese was, “Japanese are always an excuse to release pressure, because you will not be
charged.” The Chinese government seems to encourage people by not punishing Chinese
when they target Japanese.
Other reasons stated for joining protests and other actions were the following: Animosity
towards Japan, Chinese nationalism, releasing their anger due to the corrupt government, bad
working conditions, fun, and the wish to be famous at least once in their life. All of these
reasons were at least given by two interviewees. It remains unclear which motives were the
most dominant, where the roots of the protests can be located and which groups merely joined
them.
Social pressure
Many interviewees agreed that social pressure is a reason for Chinese to take actions against
Japanese companies, e.g. some workers are said to be forced by their families and friends to
quit their jobs, although they would like to do so. However, they disagreed that anger causes
the social pressure, because the latter is constantly present and rather part of their
collectivistic culture. One scholar postulated that the degree of social pressure highly depends
on the region, e.g. in Northern China social pressure is more common than in other regions.
Although the scholar could not give any reason for that, P1 will be revised to incorporate this
useful input.
P1.1: Social pressure forces others to join actions against Japanese companies, such as
boycotting. However, the degree of social pressure varies by region.
Group responsibility
According to the Chinese interviewees, Chinese people think that only the Japanese
government is responsible for the most recent outbreak of the crisis in contrast to P2. The
Japanese informants did not agree with that view and claimed that the Chinese would hold all
Japanese people responsible. A Japanese manager said that the Chinese would hold onto a
general animosity towards everything that is Japanese and therefore “Japan” is guilty in
general. Similar answers regarding the Chinese animosity towards Japan were given by all
interviewees. Although there might be a bias due to social desirability, there were more
Chinese than Japanese respondents and the latter have less contact to Chinese people,
therefore P2 will be revised.
Empirical part 40
The proposition was based on the propaganda change in China by which the Chinese should
have started to attribute the responsibility for the atrocities of the Second World War to all
Japanese people. However, the change in propaganda seemed to have no effect on the
attribution of the responsibility. Nonetheless, Chinese obviously tried to put pressure on the
Japanese government by taking actions against the surrogate victims.
P2.1: Many Chinese attributed the responsibility for the Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis to the
Japanese government and therefore took actions against surrogate victims to put pressure on
it.
Thus, there is no direct attribution of crisis responsibility to Japanese firms, because only the
Japanese government was held responsible. Wherefore crisis responsibility replaces group
responsibility again and the link between it and organisational reputation is probably indirect
or does not exist at all, i.e. (E) in Figure 2-4.
Visibility and “Japaneseness”
Only few people came up with answers to the question why certain brands or products were
more in the focus of the Chinese protests and boycotts. For the selection process of the
protesters, it seemed to be important if the destruction of a Japanese product gears towards the
media and if it is accessible by the protesters. Thus, they have burned cars instead of
smartphones. Moreover, visibility influenced the decision not to buy certain products,
especially cars, because others might damage them or, even worse, they might harm the
owners. Besides that, several interviewees stated an international image tends to make
Japanese brands “less Japanese” and thereby less vulnerable to Chinese anger. A Chinese
manager gave the example of Sony that he would consider more international than Toyota.
Another interviewee asserted, “Toyota or Nissan are symbols for Japan.” Thus, there seems to
be a very strong link between certain car manufacturers and Japan.
In consideration of the findings, P6 does not have to be changed. However, P5 has to be
adapted, because visibility rather stands for the physical accessibility of the product by
strangers or if the usage of the product can be observed by acquaintances than for the level of
public attention the product is able to attract.
P5.1: The higher the degree of “visibility” of a Japanese company is, the more likely it will
become a target of boycotts and protests during a surrogate crisis. “Visibility” is based on
whether others can observe the product usage or have unimpeded physical access to it.
At the end of the interviews, the figures of the literature review’s summary sections were
explained to the respondents who were then asked to comment on them. Although, the
Empirical part 41
interviewees agreed that animosity and the resulting anger against Japanese are very
important, most of them stated a multitude of additional reasons for taking actions against
Japanese companies as stated in “Motives of the troublemakers”. Nevertheless, the majority
agreed to the ideas underlying Figure 1-2, 2-2 and 2-4 with the above-described exceptions,
i.e. there is no link between anger and social pressure and Chinese grassroots nationalism is
very likely not a cause for actions against Japanese firms.
3.3 Results – Crisis responses and CSR
Besides the obvious problems, such as the damaged stores and sales slump, there are
numerous other things Japanese companies had to worry about during the crisis. However,
most respondents stated that the majority of these problems had ceased after one or two
months. For example, officers at the Chinese customs started interpreting the subtle messages
of the Chinese central government and hence acted on their own when they slowed down
imports from Japan. After a while, the officers stopped doing that, because their supervisors
did not give them any orders to do something alike. The reason stated for their actions was
animosity towards Japan. Another source said that the government would pressure Chinese
companies to stop them from doing business with Japanese firms. The interviewees
mentioned the following other problems: Chinese workers quit or wanted higher wages,
Japanese employees were threatened or harassed, Japanese companies were excluded from
tendering and had problems to get approvals of operation, Chinese companies changed their
suppliers, and protesters as well as workers destroyed machines and finished products
(Kajimoto & Nakagawa, 2012; Tokyo Times, 2013).
The immediate reaction to the crisis was to close factories and stores at risk as described in
section 1.3.3. A representative of Seven & I said, “there was almost no damage to our stores
because there were barricades by armed police.” (Yamaguchi & Ozasa, 2012) In contrast to
that, an Aeon store had been ransacked for four and a half hours causing damage of US$ 8.5
million (Okudera, 2012). Thus, either the damage prevention strategy of Seven & I is better,
e.g. protection by police and shuttering their stores, or Aeon had had bad luck because the
protesters showed up at their store. As revealed in the interviews, many plants were closed
because suppliers and other firms just saw a sharp decline in demand and some firms wanted
to prevent damage from their equipment as it happened at the two plants of Panasonic.
The reaction of Japanese firms to the crisis was described as “silent”, which means that they
kept a low profile until most of the trouble was over. This is, according to experts for
Japanese business, the only reasonable strategy, because Japanese companies are unable to
influence the key stakeholders, i.e. government and consumers. This is also the opinion
Empirical part 42
among analysts: “public relations crisis management by the companies is expected to have
little effect in reassuring consumers and regaining growth momentum in the short term.”
(Tianyang, 2012). In an interview with Bloomberg, a car expert said that Japan’s car
companies’ future in China “is tied to Sino-Japanese relations, and there isn’t much one
company can do through marketing […]. If consumers generally don’t have a positive feeling
toward them, their market share will only decline further.” (Jie & Hagiwara, 2013) In
addition, an extensive search on the companies’ websites in Chinese, English and Japanese
for news in September and October 2012 showed that only Aeon and Fast Retailing had
published a statement on their websites regarding the protests.
Aeon’s statement was published24
one week after the protests stopped and states that some
stores were closed to protect employees and customers. One particular store, which had been
damaged during the protests, was operated only by Chinese employees. Furthermore, Aeon
emphasised that it has started its operations in China already in 1985, employed many
Chinese, and set its focus on the Chinese market by setting up headquarters in China. “This
strategy “shift to Asian markets” will never change.”24
By stating that, Aeon also highlights
the importance of China and that it will not give up the market because of some protests. At
the end of the press release, Aeon gives examples for their environmental and social
contribution in China with a focus on their CSR commitment, especially on the durability, and
on the impact of their CSR activities, e.g. their 1% program funded 1500 scholarships (Aeon
Co., 2012). This message is an excellent example for good crisis communication from a
theoretical point of view. Aeon told its stakeholders that it is not going to retreat regardless of
what happens, which might be important to demoralise the protesters under the assumption
that they want Aeon to leave the Chinese market. Aeon combined this with a “Reminder
Strategy” pointing to the people who suffered most from the people’s actions and underlining
its long-time CSR efforts in China. The latter is nothing else but unrelated positive
information, which is the most effective way to overcome a crisis according to Yuksel &
Mryteza (2009).
The other statement was made by Fast Retailing only three days after the protests had
stopped. A sign posted in a display window of a Uniqlo store in Shanghai for less than an
hour triggered strong reactions in Japan. Within four days, more than 1,000 complaints were
directed at the headquarters of Uniqlo, whose operator is Fast Retailing, because the
following was written on the sign, “We support the claim that the Diaoyu Islands are
inherently China's territory.” (Fast Retailing, 2012) Fast Retailing explained that the local
24
Please find the Aeon’s statement in section 5.12 of the appendix.
Empirical part 43
police had advised the store manager to put up a sign because of more than 1,000 protesters
were projected to pass the store. This highlights the dilemma of Japanese companies that
arises when they side with the Chinese or the Japanese. In the end, Fast Retailing had to
appease the Japanese claimants. The main message of the statement is that the store manager
disobeyed the company’s policy by setting up the sign. “Going forward, we will strictly
ensure that a similar type of incident does not take place again.” (Fast Retailing, 2012) In
addition, Fast Retailing stated also that it has no intention to change its expansion plans in
China (Fast Retailing, 2012).
Canon merely posted a message to inform its customers that its service centres in Beijing and
Guangzhou were to be closed on 17th
and 18th
September without giving any reason (Canon,
2012). No other company on the list issued a statement regarding the crisis on their website.
Actually, very few companies posted any news in the weeks after the protests on their
English, but especially on their Chinese website.
Another reaction was that many Japanese companies scaled down their advertisement
expenditures. Outstanding in that respect was Canon that almost stopped its spending in
October 2012. The Japanese car manufacturers also decreased their expenditures25
and the
void was instantly filled by other car manufacturers, for instance, Volkswagen and Land
Rover increased their spending by 500% and 1800% compared to October 2011 (Wen,
2012b). The sales of the competitors rose up to 55% in October (Kubota & Sugiyama, 2012).
Furthermore, an official of Toyota admitted that a planned marketing campaign targeting the
bias towards Japanese cars has not been carried out due to the protests (Shirouzu, 2013).
One Japanese interviewee put it this way: “Compared to the Chinese people, Japanese know
when they should be calm.” Tuning down all communications is on the one hand a logical
answer to short-tempered Chinese people who are looking for the next misstep of a Japanese
company. Because there was only little or no communication with the public and the
advertisement expenditures were lowered radically, one can say that the Japanese firms were
pursuing a low profile strategy, hence P7 will not be changed.
After all these protests and boycotts, some Japanese executives seem to have lost their trust in
China. A survey conducted by the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) in January
2013 was able to question almost 2000 Japanese companies regarding the current situation
and their plans in China. The JETRO found that Japanese firms consider the risk of doing
business in China 2013 higher than two years before, especially the extraordinary high
25
Please find a figure regarding the advertisement expenditures of Japanese car manufacturers in section 5.13 of
the appendix.
Empirical part 44
political risk alienated them. Furthermore, the percentage of companies that thought about
downsizing or withdrawing from China increased from 2.4% to 7.5%. Almost 40% of the
surveyed companies operating in China said business would recover to pre-crisis levels by the
end of March 2013 and more than 50% answered that their revenues and/or their profits were
already below their estimations when the survey was conducted (Kajita & Suzuki, 2013). One
could now assume that all kinds of industries were affected by the Island crisis, but it is
uncertain which industries failed to match their expectations, to what extent and what the
reason for that might be. Unfortunately, the authors refused to disclose further information
regarding the results of their survey. As stated in the introduction, it seems that car
manufacturing was the industry that was affected the most.
Many Japanese companies are dependent on the Chinese market. Nonetheless, more and more
Japanese companies consider the so-called “China plus one” strategy due to the animosity
towards them. “China plus one” is a long-term strategy that proposes not to rely too heavily
on China and therefore to look for another Asian country for production and as a local market.
According to the interviewees, there are two reasons for considering this strategy. First,
although the Chinese market is huge and profitable, there is the soaring animosity that results
in boycotts and protests. Second, wages in China have been rising in recent years and, hence,
China is losing its production advantages compared to other Asian countries. Thus, Japanese
companies try to diversify by setting up plants in other countries and thereby expand their
sales markets and lower their costs and risk. Nonetheless, this is not an easy process, because
China already has a good infrastructure and many suppliers, which are particularly important
for car manufacturers, whereas in other countries one would have to start from scratch
(Nakata, 2012; Topham & Nakagawa, 2012).
As mentioned, in the last section, towards the end of the interviews the frameworks and
models were explained to the interviewees who were then asked to review these. In case of
the SCCT, most respondents agreed to most parts of the completed SCCT model depicted in
Figure 2-4. However, three informants raised their concerns about the link between
organisational reputation and behavioural intentions claiming that not all people are
influenced by the reputation of the particular company. Because the actions of a few people
have an effect on the bulk of the “boycotters”, this link might be unimportant. Nonetheless,
the majority of the respondent was in favour of the relationship.
Common CSR activities in China are, according to the CSR experts, donations, reforestation
programs and support programs for employees. These are currently most welcomed by the
population, but one expert already foresees a shift towards environmental CSR activities.
However, it will probably take a decade until the majority appreciates these activities.
Empirical part 45
Furthermore, an employee of an NGO specialised on CSR from an area close to Hong Kong
noticed that after the crisis Japanese companies started advertisements regarding their past
CSR efforts. Thus, at least in Southern China, some Japanese companies seemed trying to use
their CSR history to improve their image.
Figure 3-4: Fields of CSR engagement of the chosen companies26
(CSR Report)
As one can see in Figure 3-4, environmental activities, usually planting trees, are the preferred
options for the selected companies. This fits the descriptions given by the literature, because
Japanese firms engage in China in exactly the same CSR fields as in Japan. Only 66% and
60% of the 30 selected Japanese companies engage in activities linked to philanthropy and
society, respectively. These fields are highly appreciated by consumers and the Chinese
government as was stated in the literature and the official Chinese CSR definition.
Nonetheless, only 11 of the 30 companies engage in both, philanthropy and societal activities,
which is quite low with respect to their importance.
Overall, there are huge differences regarding the impact and longevity of the CSR activities
among the firms on the list and even within industries. For instance, Toyota has an excellent
CSR program in China, which is described in section 3.4.5, in sharp contrast to Honda, Mazda
and Mitsubishi, which conduct their CSR activities on a very small scale. Large multinational
Japanese enterprises tend to engage more intensively in CSR in China, these are Canon,
Hitachi, NEC, Panasonic, Sharp, Sony, and Toyota. These firms also have Chinese CSR
reports, which are not merely translations of their English CSR reports, but contain exclusive
26
Please find a more detailed list in section 5.14 of the appendix.
Empirical part 46
content. However, firms that were hit severely by the protests such as most of the car
manufacturers and the retailers, namely Aeon, Japan’s Fast Retailing and Seven & I, engage
far less in CSR than the aforementioned top performers. An exception of that is Toyota that
engages heavily in CSR, but was also strongly affected. Although most companies have
established headquarters in China, very few have a CSR department in China, e.g. Hitachi,
Honda, Kao, NEC, Sharp, Sony and Toyota (CSR reports). These companies, except Honda,
are also among the top performers in recent CSR rankings (Fortune China, 2012; Ju, 2012)
Table 3-1: CSR engagement of some heavily affected companies
Table 3-1 shows the different CSR areas in which some of the aforementioned companies are
engaged in China. There is no clear focus on societal and philanthropic CSR activities,
although Chinese are very fond of these kinds of activities. According to the interviews, it
seems that Japanese CSR managers are not aware of this situation. They were convinced that
the activities their companies engage in are common in China.
The Chinese CSR report of BMW was chosen to compare the CSR areas it engages in and the
way of presenting the results with the Japanese companies’ reports, because it is also a foreign
car manufacturer operating in China. Overall, the reports of Japanese companies rarely depict
their commitment, as described in section 2.3.3, in China well. However, BMW’s report is
full of its “input” numbers and achievements of the different programs. BMW engages in
employee trainings and environmental, philanthropic, safety activities, and puts a lot of
emphasis on a “harmonious society”. This is exactly what Chinese consumers and the Chinese
government favour the most. The big difference between Japanese and other foreign
companies’ CSR focus in China becomes obvious, if one compares Chinese CSR reports of
the top performers with respect to societal and philanthropic activities; for instance, in
Toyota’s CSR report 15% of the pages are dedicated to the these activities, in contrast to that,
half of BMW’s report features activities about the society and donations (CSR Report BMW
Chinese Version, 2011; CSR Report Toyota Chinese Version, 2012). In Chinese image
Company name
Aeon Environment Society
Honda Environment Society
Japan's Fast Retailing Environment
Mazda
Mitsubishi Motors Employee training Philanthropy
Nissan Environment Philanthropy Society
Seven & I Employee training Environment Philanthropy
Fields of engagement
Empirical part 47
rankings Toyota is usually far behind BMW, which is also due to animosity as well as other
issues (The economic observer, 2010).
The representatives of Japanese companies were also questioned about the CSR related
propositions. However, they avoided giving any statement concerning the Chinese
government and thus regarding P9. Therefore, Chinese CSR experts were questioned via
telephone.
Because the impact of CSR on angry Chinese seems to be too weak to stop them, P8 has to be
adapted. Moreover, if a company does not engage in CSR activities, Chinese have an
“excuse” to attack them. Thus, CSR activities should not be ceased, although they do not have
the theorised effect on Chinese anger as depicted in Figure 2-5. In accordance with Xun
(2012, p.10), the respondents stated that CSR indeed has an influence on the firm’s reputation.
P8.1: If Japanese companies engage in CSR activities only insufficiently or not at all, they are
more likely to be targeted by Chinese protesters during a crisis.
Although it is very unlikely that the whole frame can be changed, the government, especially
the local one, might support the company to a certain degree, thus P9 was adapted as follows:
P9.1: By targeting the Chinese government with their CSR, Japanese firms in China might
face fewer problems during a crisis due to support of the Chinese government.
The respondents agreed unanimously with the idea that the Chinese government officials
would be more in favour of a company with a long CSR history and CSR activities that are in
line with the official CSR definition made by the CCP. Moreover, two of the CSR experts
said that it would be important to advertise the CSR efforts. In Western countries, advertising
CSR efforts might even backfire, but it is very common in China (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990;
sina.com.cn, 2008). Hence, P10 is modified to incorporate these valuable remarks.
P10.1: The effectiveness of the CSR activities with respect to influencing the Chinese
government depends on the CSR history, i.e. for how many years did the firm engage in CSR
activities, the CSR country fit, i.e. did they engage in activities that are appreciated by the
citizens of the host country, and if the companies advertise their CSR efforts.
In summary, the vast majority of the examined Japanese companies seemed to show no public
reaction to the crisis and thereby one might speak of a low profile strategy. The long-term
strategy of an increasing amount of Japanese firms is to look for another country in Asia as a
second pillar. Although China as sales and/or labour market is very important to most
Japanese companies, many of them do not put much emphasis on good CSR practices in
Empirical part 48
China, thus do not engage in cherished CSR activities or issue a CSR report translated into
Chinese.
3.4 Results – Case studies
This section consists of case studies with four Japanese companies that cooperated to a certain
degree. Furthermore, the behaviour of the two largest Japanese car manufacturers in China
was analysed via surrogate agents such as salesperson and industry experts to describe their
responses to the crisis. Car manufacturers were selected for examination, because they faced
the harshest reactions during the crisis according to the media (Yang, 2012).
3.4.1 Company I
The company mainly produces consumer goods, stated revenues of more than one trillion yen
and had several thousand employees in China in 2011. Although the respondent declined to
say whether the firm was affected by the Island crisis, he admitted that it was affected by a
former crisis in 2004/2005. During this crisis, rumours were spread about the company, which
led to a temporary sales slump. During the most recent outbreak of the Island crisis, nothing
was published and the strategy was not adapted. When asked about the stakeholders of the
company during the crisis, the respondent named employees, customers, communities,
suppliers, public, shareholders and the government, but not the media. The latter were
excluded, because these are merely the “intermediary” between the firm and the stakeholders.
According to the interviewee, the firm did deliberately not adapt its CSR approach to China,
because it is difficult to adapt the CSR to a country and the firm wanted to “perform” its own
CSR first and let the Chinese stakeholders evaluate the CSR practices. Hence, the company
has focused on the environmental activities in China just as it has been doing in Japan. When
the interviewee was asked to name common CSR activities in China, he said “eco activities,
especially, the reduction of environmental burden” were common, which are exactly the
activities the firm engages in. Hence, common activities are not well adapted to China.
Chinese customers are, according to him, not only interested in short-term effects, but also in
long term ones, such as a better environment. Unfortunately, the firm did not “deliver” the
kind of CSR specially developed for China, but “imported” the Japanese CSR that is at the
moment less appreciated by the Chinese people. I claim that the company should engage far
more in CSR activities that are adapted to the country with respect to its size and market
share.
3.4.2 Company II
The manufacturing company stated sales of less than 1 trillion yen and has six plants with
several thousand workers in China. Furthermore, among its customers are both consumers and
Empirical part 49
other businesses. China is the company’s most important overseas market with sales of more
than 100 billion yen.
The company halted its production on 18th
September, because the local government
requested the firm to do so. The respondent assumed that the government wanted to prevent
damage from the factory and ensure staff safety, which it successfully did. No other problems
were stated. The only other response of the company was to share information regarding the
crisis with its stakeholders by issuing a president’s message in which he highlighted the CSR
activities of the recent years and encouraged the stakeholders to “contribute to a better life and
a better society”. Unfortunately, the message was not disclosed for further analysis. This can
be categorised as a pure “Reminder Strategy” that focuses on CSR and the firm’s goals.
The firm focuses its CSR activities on philanthropy and it did neither change its CSR strategy
nor suspend any CSR activities. Common activities in China are, according to the respondent,
philanthropy and environmental activities. The firm’s CSR activities are quite limited, also
with respect to its presence in China.
3.4.3 Company III
The company is a B2B manufacturing company with revenues of less than one trillion yen. It
has several thousand employees and twelve plants in China. The interviewee said that in
contrast to earlier crises, the sales went down sharply and the utilised capacity of the plants in
China was only between 50% and 70% from September to December and recovered
afterwards. Because only 10% of the customers are Chinese, the fall in demand cannot be
explained by cancelled orders of Chinese companies, but by the cancellation of Japanese
contractors, which were facing a sales slump. Astonishingly, the sales slump was the only
problem of the company during the crisis, although it has thousands of employees and a dozen
plants in China. On the other hand, being in the manufacturing industry that has only B2B
customers causes fewer problems than, for instance, selling consumer goods in stores
belonging to the company. The firm neither made any announcements nor set up a strategy to
fight the problems underlying the sales slump. It seems that the firm felt powerless in the face
of declining sales.
The interviewee said that the firm created a special CSR approach for China, i.e. scholarships
for Chinese students, donations, and community clean-up activities. As usual, the respondent
considers these kinds of activities as common ones in China. Although, the firm has a CSR
history lasting longer than 10 years, it did not state the beginning of its activities in the CSR
report. The company never suspended its CSR activities and did not release any information
regarding its CSR activities in China during the crisis. With respect to its size, the company’s
Empirical part 50
CSR efforts seem to be reasonable, although it is not a top performer. However, the
presentation of their efforts is inappropriate, because the firm merely lists them in the CSR
report without giving any details about their commitment or the impact.
3.4.4 Company IV
The manufacturing company does mainly B2B transactions, states revenues of more than one
trillion yen, employs several thousand workers and operates five plants in China. Though the
interviewee said the crisis had only a small impact on the firm, he named many different
problems, e.g. some clients had stopped paying their bills or cancelled orders, and workers
protested and destroyed machines. Chinese customers started to hesitate when they considered
buying the company’s products. According to the informant, the motivation of the
stakeholders was mostly animosity and self-interest. The interviewee said that the firm’s most
important stakeholders are the customers, employees, suppliers and the government in exactly
this order. He did not want to explain in detail why the government was ranked last, but he
emphasised that it was a key stakeholder during the crisis and a key addressee of the
company’s CSR. Moreover, the Chinese government has a huge influence on the firm’s
business because of its control of resources, its support of Chinese competitors, and its
influence on consumers and protesters. The firm had no strategy to tackle the problems
caused by the crisis because its impact was only “minor”. In an internal message, the firm
reminded its staff to mind their safety and the Japanese employees to avoid contact with
Chinese whenever possible. The message was not disclosed.
Because no activities were planned in the last quarter of 2012, the company did not have to
suspend any CSR activities. According to the interviewee, donations are a common CSR
activity and the “easy way” to engage in “CSR”. However, the company focuses on
environmental activities because this is how it “understands” CSR and it wants to improve in
areas that are related to its business. Their CSR report puts considerable emphasis on the CSR
fit, such as improving their own factories, and the impact of the activities, i.e. improvements
compared to last year. Although China is the company’s second most important overseas
market, it engages only in very few, rather insignificant, CSR activities in China, compared to
other Japanese companies.
3.4.5 Toyota
Toyota has several thousand employees, 650 car dealerships, and 4 plants in China. In terms
of sold cars, Toyota is number two27
of the Japanese car manufacturers in China behind
27
Please see section 5.2 of the appendix for the detailed sales numbers of Japanese car manufacturers.
Empirical part 51
Nissan, but it is less dependent on the Chinese market than Nissan is28
. As described in 1.3.3,
one of their car dealerships was burned down and the production was scaled down for several
days (ABR, 2009; Fangfang, 2012; Yamaguchi & Ozasa, 2012). However, Toyota did not
disclose whether certain plants were temporarily closed (AP, 2012). In Shanghai, the car
dealerships of Guangqi Toyota, one of the Chinese joint ventures of Toyota, were advised to
protect their cars during the protests. Furthermore, Guangqi Toyota instructed its staff during
the protests not to incite any protesters, for instance by displaying Japanese flags. Toyota did
not change the prices of its cars in Shanghai and the managers of the car dealerships claimed
that their sales went down by roughly 20%, but recovered after a month, which is a sharp
contrast to its overall sales decline in China.
Due to the sales slump as pictured in Figure 1-1, the Japanese car manufacturers had to scale
back their production by half in October 2012 and to some degree as well in the following
months (Kubota & Sugiyama, 2012). To achieve this, they extended the holidays of the
workers (Chua, 2012). Three weeks after the protests ceased, Toyota announced that it wants
to help car owners, who were not reimbursed by their insurance companies, by repairing their
damaged cars for free and by offering a subsidy of US$ 3160 in case they want to replace
their old car by a new one (Beibei, 2012). This move can be seen as a “Compensation
Strategy”, which should be applied in an accident or an intentional crisis according to the
SCCT. However, due to the circumstances, this offer is not a confession of guilt as the SCCT
claims, because there is nothing to admit (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). After all, Toyota faced
the first annual sales drop in China since 2002 and predicted in April 2013 that sales would
fully recover in fall 2013 (Japan Times, 2013b). Both things show that the protests had a huge
impact on the car industry. A Toyota manager who was questioned by Reuters confirmed this:
“Unlike in the past, when sales figures recovered quickly after certain events, the situation
seems different this time. It is difficult to predict the longterm effects. Customers are speaking
of fear of owning Japanese brands, and this is most disconcerting.” (Wittchen, 2012)
A while after the protests had ceased, Toyota started to implement changes regarding its long-
term strategy: renaming “Toyota China” to “China Toyota”, recruiting Chinese for China
Toyota’s top management team, planning to introduce 20 new models in China over the next
three years, changing the warranty policy in favour of the Chinese customers and focussing
on southern China, “where anti-Japanese sentiment is historically weaker” (Shirouzu, 2013)
because it was never occupied by Japan (Zhu, 2012). The protests were like a wake-up call for
the Japanese car industry, which seems to have neglected the Chinese market according to an
28
“Bank of America-Merrill Lynch estimated that operating profit from China accounted for 16% of Honda's
earnings, 21% of Toyota's and 25% of Nissan's.” (Carsalesdata et al., 2012a)
Empirical part 52
analyst of the car industry in China. The analyst claims that Japanese car manufacturers have
to “develop China-specific cars, or use more local designers to better tailor their cars to local
taste” to be successful in the Chinese market (Japan Times, 2013b). Hence, the car
manufacturers would have faced less problems during the crisis, if they had adjusted their
products better to the market. Toyota’s new strategy, to put more emphasis on Southern
China, seems to work out because the sales in Southern China recovered to pre-crisis levels
long before the sales of Northern China did. However, Toyota is also looking for less risky
options to grow as an US$ 1.2 billion investment in plants in Indonesia shows (Shirouzu,
2013). This can be regarded as part of a “China plus one” strategy, which was described in
section 3.3.
As mentioned before, Toyota is among the top performers with respect to their CSR practices.
It has engaged in employee training, environmental issues, philanthropy, safety and societal
issues since 1998. Each CSR activity is described in at least one paragraph of their CSR
report, focussing on its durability, what the impact of it is and, if applicable, how much
money Toyota contributed. Nevertheless, Toyota did not use its long CSR history to fight the
crisis and, thus, stuck to a low profile strategy. In contrast, Honda engages only in
environmental and societal activities, but its sales were slightly better than Toyota’s. A very
interesting fact is that in Toyota’s Chinese CSR reports are the “Diaoyu” Islands depicted as a
part of the map of China from 2010 on (CSR Report Toyota Chinese Version, 2012, p.14;
CSR Report Toyota Chinese Version, 2009, 2010, 2011). This is most likely a reaction to the
protests in 2010 that should appease angry Chinese. According to my knowledge, there was
no response to that change in Japan.
3.4.6 Nissan
Nissan, “Japan's largest-selling auto brand in China” (Yu & Murphy, 2013), operates 408 car
dealerships and 4 plants in China (ABR, 2009; Shiga, 2012, p. 11). Nissan halted production
at its plant in Zhengzhou on September 18th
, but there is no news of serious damages. On 18th
October one month after most of the protests had ended, Nissan promised that it would repair
damaged cars for free or grant a new car under its Chinese brand name and “cover medical
expenses of people if they are injured in the cars during protests.” (Yoshioka, 2012) This can
also be classified as a “Compensation Strategy”. Furthermore, Nissan also claimed that it
would “reimburse customers for damage to vehicles incurred during past and future anti-
Japan protests in China” (emphasis added) (Carsalesdata et al., 2012b). According to a
manager of a car dealership and an expert for the car industry, the guarantee was not enough
to fuel the car sales again, because it did not even attract the “self-interest” boycotters, which
would still have more potential trouble with a Nissan than with a VW.
Empirical part 53
Like Toyota, Nissan introduced new models and extended its warranty, offering a
replacement car within 7 days after the defect occurs (Yu & Murphy, 2013). The company
plans to invest CNY 50 billion over the next five year to increase the number of its car
dealerships (Dongmei, 2012). Although it is not a direct reaction to the most recent outbreak,
Nissan might also favour the “China plus one” strategy, because it recently invested US$ 376
million in new plant in Thailand (Ranasinghe, 2012).
As mentioned before, with respect to their reported CSR activities, the contrast between
Toyota and the leading Japanese car manufacturer in China could hardly be bigger. CSR in
China is according to Nissan’s CSR report merely a side-note. Nissan engaged in only one
minor philanthropic and one social activity as well as several environmental activities closely
related to efficiency improvements of their factories. Though the activities fit the company,
their scope compared to Nissan’s size in China is insufficient. When one compares the sales
decrease of Toyota and Nissan with their CSR engagement, there seems to be no linkage.
However, as one interviewee said, car manufacturers are symbols for Japan and therefore
might face much more pressure than others.
3.4.7 Car manufacturers’ strategies
The car industry was severely hit in terms of slumping sales. Unfortunately, only very few
articles mention the development of other industries and claim that, for instance, the
electronics industry had already faced declining sales the whole year before the crisis broke
out (Chen & Li, 2012). However, the question arises whether the protests are the only cause
for this plunge or if not, the additional neglect of the Chinese market by Japanese
manufacturers could be another noteworthy reason as it was claimed by some interviewees
and analysts. Did the protests just amplify this underlying problem? As indicated in the
section about Toyota, Japanese cars seem not to match the Chinese consumers’ needs.
Moreover, one Chinese interviewee misunderstood a question and told me that she would not
dare to buy a Japanese car for her child, because these are believed to be less safe than others
are. Similar to this statement, a young Chinese questioned by the Wall Street Journal said that
he had heard about “some quality issues with Japanese cars” (Yu & Murphy, 2013). This
seems to be the Japanese car bias Toyota wanted to fight by advertisements (Shirouzu, 2013).
These problems are emphasised by the market share of Japanese car manufacturers, which has
continuously decreased since 200829
(Tianyang, 2012). So, are the protests and the wave of
situational animosity only the stroke that broke the camel’s back? Furthermore, why did the
car manufacturers grant the free repairs so late, e.g. Nissan and Toyota granted it one month
29
The combined market share of all Japanese car manufacturers in China was 31.4% in 2008 and it dropped to
22.6% in 2012 (Jan-Aug).
Empirical part 54
after the protests ceased? Did they not want to draw attention on them or did they want the
insurance companies to pay for the damages first etc. Another question is whether such a late
reply still appeases the customers who might have to wait for a whole month with a damaged
car. The sales slump continued for months, thus their strategy did not work out and they had
to make further changes in their long-term strategy.
Discussion and conclusions 55
4 Discussion and conclusions
This thesis aimed at giving insights regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island crisis. First, the
Chinese and the Sino-Japanese history were elucidated to provide a common background.
Second, theories and frameworks were presented and adapted to the Island crisis to create the
descriptive framework depicted in Figure 4-1. Third, guided by theory and propositions case
studies were conducted to gain first-hand experiences of the problems caused by the Island
crisis and the companies’ responses to it. Within this chapter, the contributions to theory,
recommendations to practice, future research directions and the conclusions of the study are
presented.
4.1 Theoretical contributions
The research is mainly contributing to the field of crisis management and CSR by modifying
and integrating existing theories and models. The SCCT is the core of the resulting
descriptive framework that enhances the understanding of the Island crisis’ context. It is
depicted in Figure 4-1. Although the protesters still attribute crisis responsibility, they cannot
harm the responsible ones during a surrogate crisis. Crisis responsibility cannot explain
anymore which companies are hit by the protesters and hence it is not a central variable in the
descriptive framework. By integrating the animosity framework into the SCCT model via
anger, an important motivation of the troublemakers and the Sino-Japanese history was
incorporated into the resulting framework. Thus, the new framework explains better why
people, who are almost not affected, except of their national pride, get angry. In addition, the
framing process was also included in the framework, because of the special “framers” and
their interests, i.e. the Chinese government might use the animosity to distract from internal
problems.
I theorised that the influence of CSR on organisational reputation and anger in China is
moderated by CSR history and CSR country fit, because the situation in China is different
from Western countries, i.e. the government is the main stakeholder and most of the Chinese
consumers do not yet appreciate more sophisticated CSR than planting trees and donating
money. Although, the moderators are created for the Chinese context, I believe that especially
the CSR country fit can be applied to other new industrialised countries.
4.2 Managerial recommendations
What can Japanese companies do before and during the next outbreak of animosity? After
doing a research on animosity in China, Cui et al. (2012, p.501) claim “regardless of what a
company does, it often cannot overcome the overwhelming negative impact of consumer
animosity” and therefore it should maintain a low profile until the people’s anger cooled
Discussion and conclusions 56
down. That is what most of the examined Japanese companies seemed to have done according
to the interviews, their advertisement expenditures and an analysis of news sections on their
websites. However, other possibilities to cope with a surrogate crisis arise from the
descriptive framework and the literature.
The best-case solution would be to stop situational animosity from coming into existence and
diminish the stable animosity towards Japan, but to achieve the former the crisis should be
framed in a different way and the latter is a difficult long-lasting process. By making anti-
Japanese protests illegitimate, protesters with other motivations than animosity would also
have to look for a different “excuse” than “Japan”.
Figure 4-1: Year-on-year comparison of the Japanese car sales in China in 2012-2013
Prior to a surrogate crisis, Japanese companies in China can make several preparations to be
less or not affected by it. Among other factors, the chances of success of these preparations
depend on the industry the firm is operating in and on whether the usage of its product is
observable, which might lead to pressure from acquaintances and is difficult to change for the
firm. Japanese firms should develop (A) good relationships with all Chinese stakeholders.
This includes particularly the public, the communities, and the government, which are very
important, but were rarely named in the interviews with the companies. A good relationship
Discussion and conclusions 57
with the police and other authorities is especially important. Sumitomo Chemical is a good
example for actively (B) decreasing the stable animosity towards Japan, because it partook in
the celebrations of the 40th
anniversary of Sino-Japanese relationships (CSR Report
Sumitomo Chemical Company, 2012, p.18). Cultural exchange and convincing Chinese that
Japanese are like them helps to further diminish prejudices and animosity. In addition,
Japanese firms should try to adapt themselves to China just as “China Toyota” did, which will
(C) decrease the perceived “Japaneseness” and thus the possibility of being selected as a
target. Japanese firms should even go further and clearly show how “Chinese” they are, e.g.
how many Chinese they employ, how much they invested, how many taxes they pay.
Moreover, the companies should engage in (D) CSR to get the support of the government and
to benefit in the future from having a long CSR history. In addition, if companies do not
engage in CSR the (E) likelihood of being targeted by protesters or boycotters seems to
increase. The CSR activities should be (F) advertised and fit China, i.e. most appreciated by
Chinese are philanthropic and societal activities. Unfortunately, the CSR departments of most
Japanese companies have not adapted their CSR practises adequately to China; they usually
claimed that they engage in what they believe are common practises. However, they focus on
similar things as they do in Japan, namely, environmental activities. This does not mean that
they should stop their environmental activities, but they should also engage in and especially
highlight the ones that are appreciated in China.
Besides these preparations, Japanese companies can also tackle the crisis after it broke out.
The majority of the examined Japanese firms applied a (G) low profile strategy. A part of this
strategy is to reduce the advertisement expenditures and stop making many announcements.
Other companies were doing business as usual, but unfortunately, I was not able to evaluate
which strategy led to better results in terms of sales or reputational damage due to a lack of
data. Because the Chinese government was named by a lot of interviewees as the (H)
“framer” of the crisis and it controls important resources, Japanese firms should communicate
with it, though it remains unclear whether this is doomed useless.
In addition to that, information about the number and motivations of the protesters might lead
to new options for Japanese firms to calm down the troublemakers. As the Uniqlo example
illustrated, making political statements can lead to a dilemma. The companies have to make a
trade-off between the damage to one of the most important markets on the one hand and some
thousand angry customers in the home country who might or might not buy less for a short
period on the other hand. Another option to deal with a boycott is presented by Cui et al.
(2012, p.502), who claim that Chinese customers would make a trade-off between animosity
and price. Although lowering prices is usually considered as a taboo, one might be spared by
Discussion and conclusions 58
the boycott and face no reputational damage that might arise from, for instance, being named
with other boycotted companies by the news media.
Overall, there are more options than to duck one’s head, but there is a risk that such an
untested option backfires.
4.3 Future research
Several directions for future research emerge from this thesis. As a matter of course, the
propositions and the level of fit of the descriptive framework should be evaluated within
quantitative studies. Furthermore, especially the CSR part of the thesis offers plenty of
possibilities for future research, such as the influence on the different stakeholder groups by
using a long CSR history to fight a surrogate crisis or whether the CSR moderators can also
be applied to other countries. Also interesting would be to test how much greater the chance is
to be targeted by troublemakers, if a firm does not engage in CSR activities or whether a
“goodwill reservoir” helps to be spared during a surrogate crisis.
Because the rather severely affected industries, i.e. car and electronics industry had sales
problems for the last few years, the crisis might have merely amplified already existing
problems such as image problems and insufficient adaptations to the Chinese market. Hence,
future work is needed to confirm this.
Many motives for taking action against Japanese firms emerged from the interviews. The
actual impact of animosity on behavioural intentions via anger should be compared to other
motives in future studies. By including other important motivations in the descriptive
framework, one might find more solutions to tackle the surrogate crisis. Another interesting
topic are the reasons underlying the different extent of the protests in different Chinese
provinces, e.g. different levels of nationalism, dissatisfaction with the government, a high
jobless rate, or a former occupation. Most of the selected companies pursued a low profile
strategy and hence waited for the crisis to blow over. A future study could compare the
effectiveness of different communication strategies in a surrogate crisis in terms of sales by
conducting experiments. Thereby, more successful options than the current strategy, which
seems to be far away from perfect, might be identified.
4.4 Limitations
The theoretical basis of the thesis was not developed from scratch and therefore it does not fit
perfectly to the Island crisis. For instance, there are many other reasons for taking actions
against Japanese firms, but animosity seems to be a salient one due to the Chinese history and
surveys (Cui, 2012; Klein et al., 1998; Xinhua International, 2013). As mentioned before
some researchers claim that the SCCT is too static and in fact, it does not offer a low profile
Discussion and conclusions 59
strategy or a surrogate crisis, but this is unnecessary, because it can be extended and adapted
to such special cases (Brown & White, 2010, p.89-90).
Case studies are often criticized for their low generalizability and although multiple case
studies with several companies across various industries were conducted, the generalizability
is still low due to the uniqueness of the setting, which includes a territorial dispute between
two rather nationalistic nations, each with an exceptional culture. The fact that only very few
rather not severely affected companies were willing to “cooperate” is definitely a limitation of
the thesis. Another often-mentioned problem about case studies is the researcher’s lack of
rigour leading to a low reliability. To tackle this, theory was used to force the researcher to
stick to the research inquiry. Moreover, some of the “insights” might be made up by the
respondents due to socially desirable answers or faked by the state-controlled media.
Unfortunately, not all of these might have been identified as questionable, because the data
collection process relied heavily on interviews and newspaper articles (Yin, 2003b, p.10-11,
90, 113, 164). Another limitation causing low reliability was that neither the companies’
names nor the names of any informant could be revealed due to the mentioned problems with
the topic. Overall, the approach to display the communication strategy of the car
manufacturers was very indirect, i.e. interviewing managers of car dealerships and industry
experts. This study faces several limitations, but although it may suffer from these, the overall
goal of exploring the context of the Diaoyu/Senkaku conflict could still be attained.
4.5 Conclusion
This thesis set out to determine the causes of the crisis, the problems and strategies of
Japanese companies and if they used their CSR activities to fight the Island crisis. Because
only very few companies used their CSR history, e.g. Aeon, the research focused more on the
status quo and the problems of the CSR engagement of Japanese companies in China. This
study was able to provide answers to all of the initial research questions as summarised in the
following:
What was the motivation of the “troublemakers” and what were the problems they caused?
Although the troublemakers had various other motivations, animosity towards Japan was the
most salient one. Similarly the caused problems, there were many different trouble spots, but
the biggest problem was the sales slump, which many companies faced to some degree.
Reasons for this decline in sales besides animosity were self-interest and that the Chinese
government put pressure on Chinese firms to stop them from making business with Japanese
companies anymore. Nonetheless, most industries, except of the car manufacturing industry,
were only affected by the Island crisis for one or two months.
Discussion and conclusions 60
What were the communication strategies of Japanese companies during the Island conflict?
Almost all companies maintained a low profile and a few tried to calm down their customers
by issuing statements and internal messages or compensating them for the incurred losses.
Moreover, Japanese companies seem to have no strategy to tackle the underlying cause of the
Island crisis, i.e. animosity. However, as illustrated in section 4.2, there are options for
Japanese companies to approach the crisis such as actively decreasing stable animosity.
Did Japanese companies actively engage in CSR in China prior to the crisis and did they
communicate their CSR efforts during the crisis?
Although some Japanese firms do not engage at all in CSR in China, the majority does so to a
certain degree. Besides some top performers, many companies have rather small CSR
programs compared to their revenues in China, e.g. Nissan. Furthermore, most Japanese firms
did not adapt their CSR practices to China, i.e. they engage predominantly in environmental
activities and only partly in philanthropic and social activities, which are highly appreciated
by the Chinese consumers and the government. In addition to that, most Japanese companies
are not aware of their poorly adapted CSR practices and do not present their activities in a
proper way, i.e. only a few sentences or words about the activities and no focus on the CSR
commitment or impact.
The economic effects caused by bilateral tensions grew stronger with every outbreak and
because the Chinese market is one that can hardly be neglected, Japanese companies have to
find a way to deal with the underlying problems. It is not enough to treat merely the
symptoms, to cede the situation by keeping silent or to focus on other provinces or countries
as sales markets.
Appendices 61
5 Appendices
5.1 Appendix: Detailed information regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
Fig
ure
5-1
: M
ap o
f th
e D
iao
yu/S
enk
aku I
sland
s
(Tag
essh
ow
.de,
20
11
)
Appendices 62
# Japanese names I Japanese names II
Chinese names I
Chinese names II
1 Uotsuri Shima 魚釣島 Daioyu Dao 釣魚島
2 Kuba-shima or Kobi Sho 久場島 Huangwei Yu 黃尾嶼
3 Taisho-jima or Akao Sho or Sekibi Sho 大正島 Chiwei Yu 赤尾嶼
4 Kita Ko Shima 北小島 Bei Xiaodao 北小島
5 Minami Kojima or Minami-ko-shima 南小島 Nan Xiaodao 南小島
6 Okino-kita Iwa 沖の北岩 Da Bei Xiaodao 大北小島/北岩
7 Okino-minami Iwa 沖の南岩 Da Nan Xiaodao 大南小島/南岩
8 Tobi Se 飛瀬 Fei Jiao Yan 飛礁岩/飛岩
Table 5-1: Japanese and Chinese names of the Islands
(Dzurek, 1996; Shaw, 1999, p.10)
Note: Number 6-8 are regarded as rocks and as not Islands due to their size (Dzurek, 1996).
Appendices 63
5.2 Appendix: China sales of Japanese car manufacturers before and after the crisis
2
01
2
20
13
Ju
ly
Au
g Se
pt
Oct
N
ov
Dec
Ja
n
Feb
M
ar
Ap
r M
ay
Jun
e
Sum
Toyo
ta
784
00
753
00
441
00
45
60
0
63
80
0
90
80
0
72
50
0
36
30
0
75
90
0
76
40
0
79
00
0
76
90
0
81
50
00
Y/Y
%
-5%
-1
5%
-4
9%
-4
4%
-2
2%
-1
6%
2
4%
-4
6%
-1
2%
-7
%
0%
9
%
-11
%
Nis
san
9
8100
9
5200
7
6100
6
43
00
7
95
00
9
04
00
1
15
70
0
58
20
0
11
00
00
1
02
80
0
10
30
00
1
01
40
0
10
94
70
0
Y/Y
%
-2%
1
%
-35
%
-41
%
-30
%
-24
%
22
%
-46
%
-16
%
3%
2
%
-8%
-1
1%
Ho
nd
a 5
2000
5
1400
3
3900
2
41
00
4
12
00
6
33
00
4
72
00
3
20
00
6
11
00
6
06
00
5
46
00
6
10
00
5
82
40
0
Y/Y
%
1%
-9
%
-41
%
-54
%
-29
%
-19
%
22
%
-27
%
-7%
-2
%
5%
-6
%
-10
%
Maz
da
143
00
165
00
133
00
95
00
1
22
00
1
73
00
1
91
00
1
04
00
1
57
00
1
24
00
1
39
00
1
11
00
1
65
70
0
Y/Y
%
-12
%
-6%
-3
5%
-4
5%
-3
0%
-2
6%
-1
6%
-2
5%
-2
5%
-1
5%
-1
2%
-3
1%
-2
2%
Tab
le 5
-2:
Car
sal
es d
ata
of
To
yo
ta,
Nis
san,
Ho
nd
a, M
azd
a i
n C
hin
a fr
om
July
20
12
to
June
20
13
(car
sale
sdat
a, 2
01
2,
201
3)
Appendices 64
5.3 Appendix: Nationalism in China
Figure 5-2: Map depicting the distribution of nationalism in China
(Lan et al., 2012)
Note: Only mainland China is included in this study. The straight line in the map is the Hu's
Line. The east side of the line includes 43% of China's territory but 94% of its population
(Lan et al., 2012).
Appendices 65
5.4 Appendix: Crisis response strategies of SCCT
Primary crisis response strategies
Deny crisis response strategies
Attack the accuser Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong
with the organization.
Denial Crisis manager proclaims there is no crisis.
Scapegoat Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the organization for
the crisis.
Diminish crisis response strategies
Excuse Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do
harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis.
Justification Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.
Rebuild crisis response strategies
Compensation Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims.
Apology Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis
and asks stakeholders for forgiveness.
Secondary crisis response strategies
Bolstering crisis response strategies
Reminder Tell stakeholders about the past good works of the organization.
Ingratiation Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good works
by the organization.
Victimage Crisis manager reminds stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the
crisis too.
Table 5-3: Primary and secondary crisis response strategies
(Coombs, 2007, p.170)
Appendices 66
5.5 Appendix: Recommendations for the application of crisis strategies
Figure 5-3: Crisis response recommendations suggested by the SCCT
(Coombs & Holladay, 1996)
Rebuild
Strategy
Victim crisis
Diminish
Strategy
Inform and
adjust
information
No crisis history and/or bad prior
relationships
Crisis history and/or bad prior
relationships
No crisis history and/or bad prior
relationships
Accident crisis
Intentional
crisis
Crisis history and/or bad prior
relationships
Regardless crisis history and bad
prior relationships
Deny Strategy
or victimage Victim crisis Rumours are spread
Appendices 67
5.6 Appendix: Outline of the thesis’ research design
Fig
ure
5-4
: O
ver
vie
w o
f th
e re
sear
ch d
esig
n
Appendices 68
5.7 Appendix: List of the selected companies
Company Name CSR
award Affected
CSR
activities
in China
Chinese
CSR
report
China
word
count in
the CSR
report
Aeon Co. O X X O 103
Asahi Group Holdings X O X O 11
Canon O X X O 19
FUJIFILM Holdings X O X O 41
Hitachi Ltd. X X X X 69
Honda O X X X 15
Japan's Fast Retailing O X X O 34
Kao X O X X 14
Kokuyo X O X O 9
Komatsu X X X O 42
Konica Minolta X O X O 16
Mazda O X O O 29
Mitsubishi Motors O X X O 1
Mitsui & Company X O X O 20
MS&AD Insurance X O X O 11
NEC Corporation X O X X 9
Nissan O X X O 42
NKSJ Holdings X O X X 17
NSK X O X O 36
Omron Corporation X X X O 12
Panasonic O O X X 35
Seven & I O X X O 13
Sharp O X X X 106
Sony Corporation X X X X 32
Sumitomo Chemical X O X O 29
Suzuki Motor Corp. O X X O 27
Toshiba Corporation X O X O 38
Toyota O X X X 19
UniCharm X O X O 11
Yamaha X O X O 9
Table 5-4: List of the contacted companies
(CSR reports; Fortune China, 2012; Ju, 2012)
Appendices 69
5.8 Appendix: List of respondents
Japanese respondents Chinese respondents
1 Expert for Japanese business in
Beijing
1 Scholar of the Tongji University
2 Expert for Japanese business in
Shanghai
2 Scholar of the Tongji University
3 Expert for Japanese business in
Hong Kong
3 Employee of an Asian NGO
4 Employee of a Japanese news
agency
4 Expert for the car industry
5 Employee of a CSR department 5 Manager of a Toyota car dealership
6 Manager of a corporate
communications department
6 Manager of a Toyota car dealership
7 Manager of a CSR department 7 Manager of a Nissan car dealership
8 Manager of a Nissan car dealership
9 Employee in a public relations
department
10 CSR expert (NGO employee)
11 CSR expert (NGO employee)
12 CSR expert (NGO employee)
Table 5-5: List of the study’s respondents
Appendices 70
5.9 Appendix: Main interview questions
Questions related to the CSR department
1. What were the CSR activities in China your company was engaged in before the Senkaku
Island crisis happened? When did the firm start them?
2. Did you create your own CSR approach especially for China? In other words, were the
CSR activities adapted to China, if so how?
3. What are common CSR activities in China?
4. Do you agree with the following statement “Chinese customers are not interested in
sustainable results, but want to see immediate impacts such as donations to earthquake
victims”? Why? Why not?
5. Did your company publish anything about CSR activities during the crisis? Did your
company use past CSR activities to prove that it is a good Chinese “citizens”?
6. Who are the main stakeholders of your CSR engagement? (government, customers,
suppliers, employees, media, shareholders, communities, public e.g. protesters)
7. Would you agree as a CSR manager that CSR has an impact on the people's anger towards
a company? For instance, if a company heavily engaged in CSR activities, will the
company be less likely target of the protesters anger? Will CSR activities have an
influence on the organisational reputation?
8. I created two variables that might influence the relationship between CSR and
organisational reputation and between CSR and anger:
The first variable is the CSR history, i.e. for how many years did the firm engage in CSR
activities, and the CSR country fit, i.e. did it engage in activities that are appreciated by
Chinese.
Do you agree with these variables? If not, why? Is there anything you would like to add or
change?
Questions related to the public relations department:
1. Did the Senkaku Island crisis affect you? If so how was your company affected?
Appendices 71
2. Who are the stakeholders during the crisis? (government, customers, suppliers,
employees, media, shareholders, communities, public e.g. protesters)
With which stakeholders did you communicate during the crisis because of the crisis? Can
you grade them in respect to their importance on a scale from 1-7 (7 means very important
and 1 means not important)?
3. Who are the troublemakers (e.g. Panasonic faced sabotage in its factories, thus the
employees were the troublemakers, other companies had problems with protesters which
damaged their stores), are there any?
4. What kind of problems did they cause? (This question is obsolete if there are no
troublemakers)
5. What was the reaction of your company to the problems? (This question is obsolete if
your company did not experience any problems)
6. Did you communicate with the trouble causing stakeholders? Was there a public
statement? (This question is obsolete if there are no troublemakers)
7. Were you affected by similar previous crises (2004/5, 2010)?
8. Did your company have good relationships with the stakeholders until the Senkaku Island
crisis broke out or were the relationships already strained due to a general anti-Japanese
animosity? Can you rate the relationships on a scale from 1-7, (7 means very good
relationship and 1 means very strained relationship)? (government, customers, suppliers,
employees, media, shareholders, communities, public e.g. protesters)
9. What was the communication strategy within the Senkaku Island crisis?
10. Can you have a look at the appendix and find the strategy your company used in the
Senkaku crisis?
11. Why did you use precisely this strategy?
Questions for those who are familiar with China
1. What kind of feelings do Japanese have towards Chinese?
2. Who framed the Senkaku crisis? How was the crisis framed?
3. What was the motivation of the troublemakers/protesters?
4. May Chinese nationalism or unfair treatment by Japanese companies be a cause?
Appendices 72
5. Is animosity towards Japan or the wish to release anger a reason for them to protest?
6. May social pressure be an issue? For instance, a “good Chinese” should not buy a
Japanese product and because it is important what his neighbour thinks about him, thus he
will not buy it?
7. Did someone incite the Chinese protesters? Is it possible that the central or the local
government or Chinese competitors may fuelled the protests?
8. What kind of problems do Chinese companies usually face in China? (Is anti-Japanese
animosity a common phenomenon in China? If so, can you give examples for this
animosity?)
9. Do Chinese think Japanese companies / Japanese people are responsible for the Senkaku
Island crisis?
10. What kind of problems do Chinese Companies face during and immediately after the
crisis, e.g. employees do not want to work anymore for a Japanese company etc.?
11. Why are some companies more in the focus of Chinese protests/boycotts?
12. This question is about why some companies were affected by the crisis and others were
not. I propose that the higher the degree of “visibility” and “Japaneseness” of a Japanese
company is, the more likely it will become a target of boycotts, protests, etc. during a
surrogate crisis. “Visibility” is based on the firm’s advertising intensity and on the
industry it operates in, whereas “Japaneseness” is based on whether Chinese can easily
identify the firm as a Japanese one.
13. Are there cases in which Japanese companies discriminated against Chinese customers,
e.g. fewer refunds than in Japan etc.?
14. Are there regional differences in the magnitude of protests (in numbers and aggression?)
If so why are there differences?
Appendices 73
5.10 Appendix: Rival explanations with examples
Craft Rivals
The Null Hypothesis The observation is the result of chance circumstances only
Threats to Validity e.g., history, maturation, instability, testing, instrumentation, regression,
selection, experimental mortality, and selection-maturation interaction
Investigator Bias e.g., “experimenter effect”; reactivity in field research
Real-Life Rivals
Direct Rival An intervention (“suspect 2”) other than the target (Practice or Policy)
intervention (“suspect 1”) accounts for the results (“the butler did it”)
Commingled Rival Other interventions and the target intervention both (Practice or Policy)
contributed to the results (“it wasn’t only me”)
Implementation Rival The implementation process, not the substantive intervention, accounts for
the results (“did we do it right?”)
Rival Theory A theory different from the original theory explains the results better (“it’s
elementary, my dear Watson”)
Super Rival A force larger than but including the intervention accounts for the results
(“it’s bigger than both of us”)
Societal Rival Social trends, not any particular force or intervention, account for the results
(“the times they are a-changin”)
Table 5-6: Overview of rival explanations with examples
(Yin, 2000; Yin, 2003b, p.113)
Appendices 74
5.11 Appendix: Original and revised propositions
P1: Anger generates social pressure that in turn forces others to join actions against Japanese
companies, such as boycotting.
P1.1: Social pressure forces others to join actions against Japanese companies, such as
boycotting. However, the degree of social pressure varies by region.
P2: Many Chinese attribute the crisis responsibility to Japanese people as a whole group.
P2.1: Many Chinese attributed the responsibility for the Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis to the
Japanese government and therefore took actions against surrogate victims to put pressure on
it.
P3: The Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis was framed by the Chinese government via the media.
P3.1: The Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis was framed by the Chinese central government via the
media.
P4: The Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis was framed by Chinese nationalists. Rejected.
P5: The higher the degree of “visibility” of a Japanese company is, the more likely it will
become a target of boycotts and protests during a surrogate crisis. “Visibility” is based on the
firm’s advertising intensity and on the industry it operates in.
P5.1: The higher the degree of “visibility” of a Japanese company is, the more likely it will
become a target of boycotts and protests during a surrogate crisis. “Visibility” is based on
whether others can observe the product usage or have unimpeded physical access to it.
P6: The higher the degree of “Japaneseness” of a Japanese company is, the more likely it will
become a target of boycotts and protests during a surrogate crisis. “Japaneseness” is based on
whether Chinese can easily identify the firm as a Japanese one.
P7: The response strategies of most Japanese companies were to maintain a low profile,
because they did not want to draw the attention of the public on them or to create a dilemma
due to the Japanese animosity towards China.
P8: By targeting Chinese consumers with their CSR activities, Japanese firms might be able
to decrease anger and prevent damage from their reputation in case of a crisis.
P8.1: If Japanese companies engage in CSR activities only insufficiently or not at all, they are
more likely to be targeted by Chinese protesters during a crisis.
P9: By targeting the Chinese government with their CSR activities, Japanese firms might face
fewer problems during a crisis.
Appendices 75
P9.1: By targeting the Chinese government with their CSR, Japanese firms in China might
face fewer problems during a crisis due to support of the Chinese government.
P10: The effectiveness of the CSR activities in respect to the goals stated in P8 and P9
depends on the CSR history, i.e. for how many years did the firm engage in CSR activities,
and the CSR country fit, i.e. did it engage in activities that are appreciated by the citizens of
the host country.
P10.1: The effectiveness of the CSR activities with respect to influencing the Chinese
government depends on the CSR history, i.e. for how many years did the firm engage in CSR
activities, the CSR country fit, i.e. did they engage in activities that are appreciated by the
citizens of the host country, and if the companies advertise their CSR efforts.
Appendices 76
5.12 Appendix: Aeon’s message regarding the Island crisis
September 26, 2012
AEON CO., LTD.
Our present situation in China and policy for the future
To the damage that our JUSCO Hungdao Store suffered in recent demonstrations in China,
we have received warm messages of encouragement and thoughtful expressions of concerns
from many customers in Japan and abroad. We would like to express our deepest appreciation
for their support and thoughts with us. It is extremely regrettable that our store is suffered
from the damage. In fact this store of Qingdao Aeon Dongtai Co., Ltd., a Chinese subsidiary
of Aeon Co, Ltd., is operated by local people including the store manager. Furthermore, many
local customers appreciate its convenience and good service and love shopping in the store
every day. It is our sincere wish that such incidents will never take place again in the future.
During and in the wake of the demonstrations against Japan, we temporarily closed some of
our stores in China because the safety of customers and employees is our top priority. All our
stores in China except JUSCO Hungdao Store have already come back to normal operations.
Fortunately, none of our customers or employees suffered any damages or injuries.
Meanwhile, detailed investigation is currently underway to assess the damage to the JUSCO
Hungdao Store. With many local customers expressing their wish to shop at the store again,
all the employees of the store are single-mindedly striving for the resumption of store
operations as soon as possible.
In China, the Aeon Group has steadily developed it soperations since its first entry in the
market in 1985 with the establishment of JUSCO Stores (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. Currently, we
operate in four regions of Hong Kong, Beijing and Tianjin, Qingdao, and Guangzhou with 89
stores in general merchandise stores, supermarkets, convenient stores, and other store formats.
In addition, we are also engaged in shopping center development, financial services, specialty
store operation, and other service businesses, employing approximately 13,000 local Chinese
people across the group.
For the Aeon Group, China and ASEAN markets are the focus of our growth strategy in
accordance with one of our group-wide strategies, “shift to Asian markets”, specified in our
three-year Medium-term Management Plan starting from fiscal 2011. Accordingly, our China
Headquarters began operations in March 2012 to strengthen our management platform in
China, facilitating our strategy for growth, store development, product development,
Appendices 77
recruiting and human resources development and other necessary practices to spur the growth
of our businesses in China.
This strategy “shift to Asian markets” will never change. The Aeon Group will continue and
even accelerate its consolidated efforts toward further growth in China and ASEAN markets.
In addition to business activities, we have been actively engaged in environmental protection
and social contribution initiatives since the early 1990s. Our tree-planting projects to conserve
the country’s rich natural environment are among major examples. Started with a project in
the Badaling area along the Great Wall in 1998, led by Aeon Environmental Foundation, we
have planted a total of 1.15 million trees to date in China.
We also implement various initiatives to promote international cultural and interpersonal
exchange. Under the Teenage Ambassador Program, one of Aeon 1% Club programs started
in 1995 initially as a program with Hong Kong, we have invited high school students from
Qingdao, Guangzhou, and other regions in China, to develop friendships between Japan and
China. Through the Aeon Scholarship, we have provided financial support to more than 1,500
personally funded students from seven Chinese universities.
Under our unchanging philosophy, “pursuing peace, respecting humanity, and contributing to
local communities-with the customer’s point of view as its core,” we at Aeon will continue to
strive to even better serve to our customers and help them enrich their lives.
(Aeon Co., 2012)
Appendices 78
5.13 Appendix: Advertisement expenditures of some Japanese car manufacturers in
China
Figure 5-5: Comparison of the advertisement expenditures of the top 10 Japanese car manufacturers in China in
2011 and 2012 (measured in million CNY)
(Wen, 2012b)
Appendices 79
5.14 Appendix: Overview of the fields of CSR engagement of the selected companies
Company name Employee
training
Environ-
ment
Monitor
suppliers
Philan-
thropy Safety Society
Start of their
earliest
activity
Aeon Co. O X O O O X 1992
Asahi Group Holdings O X O X O O 2004
Canon X X O X O X 1995
FUJIFILM Holdings O X O O O O 2001
Hitachi Ltd. X X X X X O 2005
Honda O X O O O X 2001
Japan's Fast Retailing O X O O O O -
Kao X X O X X X 1993
Kokuyo X O O X O O 2007
Komatsu X X O O X X 2004
Konica Minolta X O O O X X 2007
Mazda O O O O O O -
Mitsubishi Motors X O O X O O 2010
Mitsui & Company O X O O O X 2006
MS&AD Insurance O O O X O O 2008
NEC Corporation X X X X X X 2008
Nissan O X O X O X 2005
NKSJ Holdings X X O X X X 2006
NSK X X O X O O 2002
Omron Corporation X O O X O O 2010
Panasonic X X O X O X 1995
Seven & I X X O X O O 2008
Sharp X X X X X X 2006
Sony Corporation X X X X X X 2003
Sumitomo Chemical X O X X X O 2006
Suzuki Motor Corp. O X O X O X 2005
Toshiba Corporation X O O X O X 2002
Toyota X X O X X X 1998
UniCharm O O O O X X 2008
Yamaha O X O O O X 2010
Chinese report
Table 5-7: Areas of CSR the selected companies are engaged in according to their last CSR reports
(CSR reports)
Notes: Activities were included in “society”, when they benefit certain groups or the society
as a whole. Philanthropy refers to the donation of money or goods. Companies were rated as
environmental, when their activities actually improve the condition of the environment, e.g.
saving energy or planting trees. Safety refers to any measure that increases the safety for
employees above the necessary standards. Training for employees and monitoring the
suppliers in respect to the firm’s CSR criteria does not need further explanations.
Bibliography 80
Bibliography
ABR (2009). "Toyota To Increase Dealer Network In China." Retrieved 29.05.2013, from
http://www.automotive-business-
review.com/news/toyota_to_increase_dealer_shops_in_china_090929.
Aeon Co. (2012). "Our present situation in China and policy for the future." Retrieved
18.05.2013, from
http://www.aeon.info/export/sites/renewal/common/images/en/pressroom/imgsrc/120926R_1.
pdf.
Allen, M. W. & Caillouet, R. H. (1994). "Legitimation endeavors: Impression management
strategies used by an organization in crisis." Communications Monographs 61(1): 44-62.
Amine, L. S. (2008). "Country-of-origin, animosity and consumer response: Marketing
implications of anti-Americanism and Francophobia." International Business Review 17(4):
402-422.
Ang, S. H., Jung, K., Kau, A. K., Leong, S. M., Pornpitakpan, C. & Tan, S. J. (2004).
"Animosity towards economic giants: what the little guys think." Journal of Consumer
Marketing 21(3): 190-207.
AP (2012). "Scores of Japanese Stores Close Over China Protests." Tokyo, The International
Herald Tribune. Retrieved 30.06.2013, from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/business/global/scores-of-japanese-stores-close-over-
china-protests.html?_r=0.
Argandoña, A. & von Weltzien Hoivik, H. (2009). "Corporate social responsibility: One size
does not fit all. Collecting evidence from Europe." Journal of Business Ethics 89(3): 221-234.
Ashcraft, B. (2012). "OK, Tensions Between China and Japan Are Getting Serious."
Kotaku.com. Retrieved 17.04.2013, from http://kotaku.com/5943762/ok-tensions-between-
china-and-japan-are-getting-serious.
Ashforth, B. E. & Gibbs, B. W. (1990). "The Double-Edge of Organizational Legitimation."
Organization Science 1(2): 177-194.
Avery, E. J., Lariscy, R. W., Kim, S. & Hocke, T. (2010). "A quantitative review of crisis
communication research in public relations from 1991 to 2009." Public Relations Review
36(2): 190-192.
Banerjee, S. B. (2008). "Corporate social responsibility: The good, the bad and the ugly."
Critical Sociology 34(1): 51-79.
Barnett, M. L., Jermier, J. M. & Lafferty, B. A. (2006). "Corporate reputation: The
definitional landscape." Corporate Reputation Review 9(1): 26-38.
Baxter, P. & Jack, S. (2008). "Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and
implementation for novice researchers." The Qualitative Report 13(4): 544-559.
BBC (2008). "China online: Tibet and torch reaction." BBC News. Retrieved 23.03.2013,
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7347821.stm.
Beamish, P. W. (1993). "The characteristics of joint ventures in the People's Republic of
China." Journal of International marketing 1(2): 29-48.
Bedford, O. A. (2004). "The individual experience of guilt and shame in Chinese culture."
Culture & Psychology 10(1): 29-52.
Beibei, J. (2012). "Toyota offers to cover losses." Global Times. Retrieved 16.06.2013, from
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/737541.shtml.
Bibliography 81
Birt, C. M. & Dion, K. L. (1987). "Relative deprivation theory and responses to
discrimination in a gay male and lesbian sample." British Journal of Social Psychology 26(2):
139-145.
Bloom, P. N., Hoeffler, S., Keller, K. L. & Meza, C. E. B. (2006). "How social-cause
marketing affects consumer perceptions." MIT Sloan Management Review 47(2): 49-55.
Bowen, H. R. (1953). Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. New York, NY, US,
Harper and Brothers.
Bradsher, K., Fackler, M. & Jacobs, A. (2012). "Anti-Japan Protests Erupt in China Over
Disputed Island." Hong Kong, New York Times. Retrieved 17.04.2013, from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/world/asia/japanese-activists-display-flag-on-disputed-
island.html?pagewanted=all.
Brown, K. A. & White, C. L. (2010). "Organization–Public Relationships and Crisis
Response Strategies: Impact on Attribution of Responsibility." Journal of Public Relations
Research 23(1): 75-92.
Canon (2012). "Notification: Canon Service Center in Beijing (Silver Valley) and Canon
Service Center in Guangzhou (Tianhe Road 385) suspend business ", Canon. Retrieved
20.05.2013, from http://www.canon.com.cn/support/announce/temporary/5890.html.
Carmeli, A. & Schaubroeck, J. (2008). "Organisational crisis-preparedness: The importance
of learning from failures." Long Range Planning 41(2): 177-196.
Carroll, A. B. (1999). "Corporate social responsibility evolution of a definitional construct."
Business & Society 38(3): 268-295.
Carroll, A. B. & Shabana, K. M. (2010). "The business case for corporate social
responsibility: a review of concepts, research and practice." International Journal of
Management Reviews 12(1): 85-105.
Carsalesdata, Dawson, C. & Takahashi, Y. (2012a). "Japanese Car Sales Plunge Amid China
Rage ". Tokyo, Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444024204578045724099165996.html.
Carsalesdata & Kubota, Y. (2012). "Honda cuts forecasts, hopes for China recovery in
February." Tokyo, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/29/us-honda-earnings-idUSBRE89S03J20121029.
Carsalesdata & Kubota, Y. (2013). "Toyota says March China auto sales down 11.7 pct
yr/yr." Tokyo, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/01/toyota-china-idUSL3N0CO04W20130401.
Carsalesdata, Mukai, A. & Lin, L. (2012b). "Honda to Nissan Extend China Sales Plunge on
Islands Dispute." Tokyo, Bloomberg News. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-02/honda-china-sales-plunge-54-in-october-on-
territorial-dispute.html.
Carsalesdata & Shirouzu, N. (2012a). "Mazda Motor Nov China car sales down 30 pct yr-on-
yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/03/mazda-china-idUSB9E8LN00R20121203.
Carsalesdata & Shirouzu, N. (2012b). "Toyota China sales tumble again in Nov, though pace
eases: executive." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/02/us-toyota-china-sales-idUSBRE8B102820121202.
Carsalesdata & Shirouzu, N. (2012c). "Toyota China sales tumble as islands row hits Japan
Inc." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/05/us-autos-china-japan-idUSBRE89404720121005.
Bibliography 82
Carsalesdata & Shirouzu, N. (2012d). "Toyota China sales tumble in October, hit by islands
row." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/01/us-toyota-china-sales-
idUSBRE8A008R20121101.
Carsalesdata & Shirouzu, N. (2012e). "UPDATE 1-Toyota's China sales in August fall 15
percent." Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/09/03/toyota-
china-sales-idINL4E8K31FV20120903.
Carsalesdata & Shirouzu, N. (2012f). "UPDATE 1-Toyota China July sales fall 5 percent
from year ago." Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/toyota-china-idINL4E8J135P20120801.
Carsalesdata & Shirouzu, N. (2013a). "Nissan says Feb China auto sales down 46 percent
y/y." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/nissan-china-idUSB9N0B401720130304.
Carsalesdata & Shirouzu, N. (2013b). "Toyota Dec China sales fall 15.9 percent." Beijing,
Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/toyota-china-
sales-idUSB9N09Y00W20130107.
Carsalesdata, Shirouzu, N. & Takada, K. (2013a). "Toyota says April China auto sales down
6.5 pct yr-on-yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/06/toyota-china-sales-idUSB9N0AM01D20130506.
Carsalesdata & Takada, K. (2012a). "Honda says Nov China auto sales down 29.2 pct yr-on-
yr." Shanghai, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/04/honda-china-idUSB9E8LN00P20121204.
Carsalesdata & Takada, K. (2012b). "Nissan says Nov China auto sales down 30 pct yr-on-
yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/04/nissan-china-idUSB9E8LN00O20121204.
Carsalesdata & Takada, K. (2013a). "Mazda says May China car sales down 11.6 pct yr/yr."
Shanghai, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/03/mazda-china-idUSB9N0AM01S20130603.
Carsalesdata & Takada, K. (2013b). "Nissan says Jan China auto sales up 22 pct yr/yr."
Shanghai, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/04/nissan-china-idUSB9E8LN01J20130204.
Carsalesdata & Takada, K. (2013c). "Toyota says Feb China auto sales down 45.7 pct yr/yr."
Shanghai, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/01/toyota-china-idUSB9E8LN01Y20130301.
Carsalesdata & Takada, K. (2013d). "Toyota says May China auto sales flat yr-on-yr."
Shanghai, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/03/toyota-china-idUSB9N0AM01Q20130603.
Carsalesdata, Takada, K. & Yan, F. (2013b). "Toyota says Jan China auto sales up 23.5 pct
yr-on-yr." Shanghai, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/01/toyota-china-idUSB9E8LN01H20130201.
Carsalesdata & Yan, F. (2012). "Nissan says Aug China auto sales up 0.6 pct yr-on-yr."
Shanghai, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/09/04/nissan-china-idINB9E8J900O20120904.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Bendeich, M. (2012c). "Nissan says China July auto sales down 2pct
on yr ago." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/07/china-nissan-sales-idINB9E8IA01A20120807.
Bibliography 83
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Edwards, N. (2013c). "Honda says March China car sales down 6.6
pct yr-on-yr." Beijing, reuters. from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/honda-china-
idUSB9N0BX00320130402.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Edwards, N. (2013d). "Mazda says Jan China car sales down 16.1 pct
yr/yr." Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/04/mazda-china-idUSB9E8LN01K20130204.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Edwards, N. (2013e). "Mazda says March China car sales down 25.2
pct y/y." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/03/mazda-china-idUSB9N0BX00420130403.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Edwards, N. (2013f). "Nissan says March China auto sales down 16.6
pct yr/yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/nissan-china-idUSB9N0BX00520130402.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Standing, J. (2013g). "Nissan says May China auto sales up 2 pct
y/y." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/04/nissan-china-idUSB9N0DW00620130604.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2012d). "Honda says Oct China auto sales down 54 pct
yr-on-yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/02/honda-china-idUSB9E8J902820121102.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2012e). "Mazda Motor says Oct China car sales down 45
pct yr-on-yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/05/mazda-china-idUSB9E8J902A20121105.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2012f). "Nissan's Sept China auto sales down 34.6 pct,
excluding imports." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/09/nissan-china-idUSB9E8J901620121009.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2012g). "Nissan says Oct China auto sales down 41 pct
yr-on-yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/02/nissan-china-idUSB9E8J902920121102.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2013h). "Honda says April China car sales down 2.4 pct
yr-on-yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/honda-china-sales-idUSB9N0AM01B20130507.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2013i). "Honda says Dec China auto sales down 19.2
pct." ´Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/honda-china-sales-idUSB9N09Y00Y20130107.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2013j). "Honda says Feb China car sales down 27.1 pct
y/y." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/honda-china-idUSB9N0B401820130304.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2013k). "Honda says Jan China car sales up 22 pct
yr/yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/04/honda-china-idUSnB9E8LN0120130204.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2013l). "Honda says May China car sales up 4.6 pct yr-
on-yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/04/honda-china-idUSB9N0DW00520130604.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2013m). "Mazda Motor says Dec China car sales down
26 yr-on-yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/mazda-china-idUKL4N0A93NX20130104.
Bibliography 84
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2013n). "Mazda says April China car sales down 15.2
pct yr-on-yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/03/mazda-china-idUSB9N0AM01A20130503.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Takada, K. (2013o). "Nissan says April China auto sales up 2.7 pct
yr-on-yr." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/06/nissan-china-sales-idUSB9N0AM01C20130506.
Carsalesdata, Yan, F. & Wong, F. (2012h). "Mazda China car sales plunge amid tensions over
islands." Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/china-cars-idUSL3E8L42T120121004.
Chen, L. & Li, N. (2012). "Market share of Japanese electronic appliances shrinks." Retrieved
20.05.2013, from http://www.yicai.com/news/2012/09/2076870.html.
China Daily (2012). "Dose of reason needed." Beijing, China Daily. Retrieved 18.04.2013,
from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-09/17/content_15761402.htm.
ChinaIRN (2012). "The bad effect caused by the diaoyu island becomes more obvious."
Retrieved 05.07.2013, from http://www.chinairn.com/news/20120917/207470.html.
Choi, Y. & Lin, Y.-H. (2009). "Consumer responses to Mattel product recalls posted on
online bulletin boards: Exploring two types of emotion." Journal of Public Relations Research
21(2): 198-207.
Chua, J. (2012). "Toyota, Nissan Halt Chinese Plants, but Analysts Shrug." CNBC. Retrieved
15.06.2013, from http://www.cnbc.com/id/49173868.
Claeys, A.-S., Cauberghe, V. & Vyncke, P. (2010). "Restoring reputations in times of crisis:
An experimental study of the situational crisis communication theory and the moderating
effects of locus of control." Public Relations Review 36(3): 256-262.
Coombs, W. T. (1998). "An analytic framework for crisis situations: Better responses from a
better understanding of the situation." Journal of Public Relations Research 10(3): 177-191.
Coombs, W. T. (2004a). "Impact of past crises on current crisis communication insights from
Situational Crisis Communication Theory." Journal of Business Communication 41(3): 265-
289.
Coombs, W. T. (2004b). A theoretical frame for post-crisis communication: Situational crisis
communication theory. Attribution theory in the organizational sciences: Theoretical and
empirical contributions. Martinko, M. J. Greenwich, CT, US, Information Age Publishing:
275-296.
Coombs, W. T. (2005). Crisis Communication. Encyclopedia of Public Relations. Heath, R.
L. Thousand Oaks, CA, US, SAGE Publications, Incorporated. 1: 221-223.
Coombs, W. T. (2007). "Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The development
and application of situational crisis communication theory." Corporate Reputation Review
10(3): 163-176.
Coombs, W. T. & Holladay, S. J. (1996). "Communication and attributions in a crisis: An
experimental study in crisis communication." Journal of Public Relations Research 8(4): 279-
295.
Coombs, W. T. & Holladay, S. J. (2001). "An extended examination of the crisis situations: A
fusion of the relational management and symbolic approaches." Journal of Public Relations
Research 13(4): 321-340.
Coombs, W. T. & Holladay, S. J. (2002). "Helping Crisis Managers Protect Reputational
Assets Initial Tests of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory." Management
Communication Quarterly 16(2): 165-186.
Bibliography 85
Coombs, W. T. & Holladay, S. J. (2004). Reasoned action in crisis communication: An
attribution theory-based approach to crisis management. Responding to crisis: A rhetorical
approach to crisis communication. Millar, D. P. & Heath, R. L. Mahwah, NJ, US, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates: 95-115.
Cooper, A. H. (2002). "Media framing and social movement mobilization: German peace
protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War, and NATO peace enforcement in Bosnia."
European Journal of Political Research 41(1): 37-80.
Cooper, R. (2012). "Panasonic shuts China plant amid protests." Beijing, Telegraph.
Retrieved 17.04.2013, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/9547309/Panasonic-
shuts-China-plant-amid-protests.html.
Corley, K. G. & Gioia, D. A. (2011). "Building theory about theory building: what constitutes
a theoretical contribution?" Academy of Management Review 36(1): 12-32.
CSR Report Aeon Group (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved 21.06.2013, from
http://www.aeon.info/export/sites/renewal/common/images/en/environment/report/e_2012pdf
/e_full.pdf.
CSR Report Asahi Group Holdings (2011). "Summary of Asahi Group CSR Activities."
Retrieved 05.04.2013, from http://www.asahigroup-
holdings.com/en/csr/report/pdf/2011/summary11_e_all.pdf.
CSR Report BMW Chinese Version (2011). "BMW中国企业社会贡献系列活动2011年度
报告." Retrieved 30.06.2013, from
http://www.bmw.com.cn/cn/_common/shared/insights/csr/img/download/report/2011CSR_A
nnual_report_CN.pdf.
CSR Report Canon Corp. (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved 06.04.2013, from
http://www.canon.com/csr/report/pdf/Canon_Sustainability_Report_2012_e.pdf.
CSR Report FUJIFILM Holdings (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved 04.04.2013,
from http://www.fujifilm.com/sustainability/report/pdf/index/ff_sr_2012_en_all.pdf.
CSR Report Hitachi Ltd. (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved 05.04.2013, from
http://www.hitachi.com/csr/csr_images/csr2012e.pdf.
CSR Report Hitachi Ltd. Chinese version (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved
08.04.2013, from http://www.hitachi.com.cn/micro/csr/download/2012/csr2012.pdf.
CSR Report Honda (2012). "CSR Report 2012." Retrieved 05.04.2013, from
http://world.honda.com/CSR/report/pdf/2012/report_2012.pdf.
CSR Report Honda Chinese Version (2012). "Environmental Report 2012." Retrieved
08.04.2013, from http://www.honda.com.cn/philanthropy/report2012.pdf.
CSR Report Japan's Fast Retailing Co. (2013). "CSR Report 2013." Retrieved 08.04.2013,
from http://www.fastretailing.com/eng/csr/report/pdf/csr2013_e.pdf.
CSR Report Kao (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved 05.04.2013, from
http://www.kao.com/group/en/group_imgs/group/sustainability2012_en_all.pdf.
CSR Report Kao Chinese Version (2012). "Social Responsibility Report 2012." Retrieved
09.04.2013, from http://www.kao.com/cn/zh/corp_imgs/corp_csr/Kao_csr_2012_C_all.pdf.
CSR Report Kokuyo Group (2012). "CSR Report 2012." Retrieved 09.04.2013, from
http://www.kokuyo.com/en/csr/data/pdf/2012csr_en.pdf.
CSR Report Komatsu (2012). "CSR & Environmental Report 2012." Retrieved 05.04.2013,
from http://www.komatsu.com/CompanyInfo/csr/2012/pdf/all.pdf.
Bibliography 86
CSR Report Konica Minolta Holdings (2012). "CSR Bericht 2012-2013." Retrieved
06.04.2013, from http://www.konicaminolta.com/about-
de/csr/csr/download/pdf/2012_de_all.pdf.
CSR Report Mazda (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012 (In-depth Version)." Mazda.
Retrieved 05.04.2013, from http://www.mazda.com/csr/download/pdf/2012/2012_s_all.pdf.
CSR Report Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (2012). "Social and Environmental Report 2012."
Retrieved 06.04.2013, from http://www.mitsubishi-
motors.com/en/corporate/social/pdf/2012e_all.pdf.
CSR Report Mitsui & Company (2012). "Sustainability Full Report 2012." Retrieved
06.04.2013, from http://www.mitsui.com/jp/en/csr/csrreport/pdf/en_csr_detail_2012.pdf.
CSR Report MS&AD Insurance Group Holdings (2012). "CSR in the MS&AD Insurance
Group." Retrieved 05.04.2013, from http://www.ms-ad-
hd.com/en/csr/digest/pdf/csr_report2012_default.pdf.
CSR Report NEC (2012). "CSR Report Digest 2012." Retrieved 05.04.2013, from
http://www.nec.com/en/global/csr/report2012/pdf/CSR-all2012.pdf.
CSR Report NEC Chinese Version (2012). "Annual CSR Report 2012." Retrieved
06.04.2013, from http://cn.nec.com/zh_CN/about/csr/download/CSR2012.pdf.
CSR Report Nissan (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved 06.04.2013, from
http://www.nissan-global.com/EN/DOCUMENT/PDF/SR/2012/SR12_E_All.pdf.
CSR Report NKSJ Holdings (2012). "Corporate Responsibility Communication 2011."
Retrieved 06.04.2013, from http://www.nksj-hd.com/doc/pdf/csr/2011/e_report_all.pdf.
CSR Report NKSJ Holdings Chinese Version (2011). "Corporate Social Responsibility
Report 2011." Retrieved 09.04.2013, from http://www.sompo-
japanchina.com/UserFiles/NC_2012-12-25427ace55-7072-4412-8700-15d8767810f3.pdf.
CSR Report NSK (2011). "CSR Report 2011." Retrieved 07.04.2013, from
http://www.nsk.com/sustainability/pdf/csr2011e_all.pdf.
CSR Report Omron Corporation (2012). "Annual Report 2012." Retrieved 07.04.2013, from
www.omron.com/ir/irlib/pdfs/ar12e/ar2012e.pdf.
CSR Report Panasonic (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved 08.04.2013, from
http://panasonic.net/csr/reports/pdf/sr2012e.pdf.
CSR Report Panasonic Chinese Version (2012). "Corporate Citizenship Leaflet 2012."
Retrieved 09.04.2013, from http://panasonic.cn/csr/reports/upload/pdf/sr2012.pdf.
CSR Report Seven & I Holdings (2012). "CSR Report 2012." Retrieved 09.04.2013, from
https://www.7andi.com/dbps_data/_template_/_user_/_SITE_/localhost/_res/en/csr/csrreport/
pdf/2012_all.pdf.
CSR Report Sharp (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved 09.04.2013, from
http://www.sharp.co.jp/corporate/eco/csr_report/pdf/esr2012e.pdf.
CSR Report Sony Chinese Version (2012). "CSR Report 2012." Retrieved 09.04.2013, from
http://www.sony.com.cn/csr/images/sony.pdf.
CSR Report Sony Corp. (2012). "CSR Reporting 2012." Retrieved 08.04.2013, from
www.sony.net/SonyInfo/csr_report/issues/report/2012/pdf/CSR2012E_all.pdf.
CSR Report Sumitomo Chemical Company (2012). "CSR Report 2012." from
http://www.sumitomo-chem.co.jp/english/csr/report/docs/csr_report_e2012.pdf.
Bibliography 87
CSR Report Suzuki Motors (2012). "Environmental and Social Report 2012." Retrieved
09.04.2013, from
http://www.globalsuzuki.com/corporate/environmental/pdf/2012_enve_all.pdf.
CSR Report Toshiba (2012). "CSR Report 2012." Retrieved 09.04.2013, from
http://www.toshiba.co.jp/csr/en/engagement/report/pdf/report12_all.pdf.
CSR Report Toyota (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved 09.04.2013, from
http://www.toyota-global.com/sustainability/report/sr/pdf/sustainability_report12_fe.pdf.
CSR Report Toyota Chinese Version (2009). "Sustainability Report 2009." Retrieved
10.07.2013, from http://www.toyota.com.cn/corporate/inchina/report2009.pdf.
CSR Report Toyota Chinese Version (2010). "Sustainability Report 2010." Retrieved
10.07.2013, from http://www.toyota.com.cn/corporate/inchina/report2010.pdf.
CSR Report Toyota Chinese Version (2011). "Sustainability Report 2011." Retrieved
10.07.2013, from http://www.toyota.com.cn/corporate/inchina/report2011.pdf.
CSR Report Toyota Chinese Version (2012). "Sustainability Report 2012." Retrieved
10.04.2013, from http://www.toyota.com.cn/corporate/inchina/report2012.pdf.
CSR Report Unicharm (2012). "Corporate Responsibility Report 2012." Retrieved
09.04.2013, from http://www.unicharm.co.jp/english/csr/report/CSRreport2012_full.pdf.
CSR Report Yamaha (2012). "CSR Report 2012." Retrieved 10.04.2013, from
http://www.yamaha.com/about_yamaha/csr/common/pdf/csr_repo2012-e.pdf.
Cui, A. P., Wajda, T. A. & Hu, M. Y. (2012). "Consumer animosity and product choice:
might price make a difference?" Journal of Consumer Marketing 29(7): 494-506.
Cui, S. (2012). "Problems of Nationalism and Historical Memory in China's Relations with
Japan." Journal of Historical Sociology 25(2): 199–222.
D'Costa, A. P. (2012). Globalization and Economic Nationalism in Asia. Oxford, OUP
Oxford.
Dahlsrud, A. (2008). "How corporate social responsibility is defined: an analysis of 37
definitions." Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 15(1): 1-13.
Demise, N. (2006). CSR in Japan: A historical perspective. Eighth World Congress of the
International Federation of Scholarly Association of Management.
Dongmei, L. (2012). "Storm over Diaoyu Islands Dispute Batters Japan's Automakers in
China." CaixinOnline. Retrieved 01.07.2013, from http://english.caixin.com/2012-10-
22/100450355.html.
Downs, E. S. & Saunders, P. C. (1998). "Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism: China and
the Diaoyu Islands." International Security 23(3): 114-146.
Dreyer, J. T. (2012). "The Sino Stranglehold: How badly could the Chinese protests hurt
Japan's economy?", ForeignPolicy.com. Retrieved 19.04.2013, from
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21/the_sino_stranglehold.
Du, S., Bhattacharya, C. & Sen, S. (2010). "Maximizing business returns to corporate social
responsibility (CSR): The role of CSR communication." International Journal of Management
Reviews 12(1): 8-19.
Dwyer, F. R., Schurr, P. H. & Oh, S. (1987). "Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships."
Journal of Marketing 51(2): 11-27.
Dzurek, D. (1996). "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute." Retrieved 10.03.2013, from
http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/senkaku.html.
Bibliography 88
eia (2012). "East China Sea." Washington, DC, US, U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Retrieved 17.05.2013, from http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ECS.
eia (2013). "Saudi Arabia." Washington, DC, US, U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Retrieved 17.05.2013, from http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=SA&trk=m.
Entman, R. M. (1993). "Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm." Journal of
Communication 43(4): 51-58.
Ethical Corporation (2005). "A Chinese definition of CSR." Retrieved 25.03.2013, from
http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content/chinese-definition-csr.
Ettenson, R. & Klein, J. G. (2005). "The fallout from French nuclear testing in the South
Pacific: a longitudinal study of consumer boycotts." International Marketing Review 22(2):
199-224.
EU Communication (2002). Corporate Social Responsibility: A business contribution to
Sustainable Development. Communication from the commission. Brussels, Commission of
the European communities.
Fan, Y. (2002). "Questioning guanxi: definition, classification and implications." International
Business Review 11(5): 543-561.
Fangfang, L. (2012). "Toyota stalls assembly line plans." Retrieved 27.05.2013, from
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/tianjin2011/2012-12/11/content_16030026.htm.
Fast Retailing (2012). "http://www.fastretailing.com/eng/ir/news/1209210900.html." Fast
Retailing. Retrieved 21.05.2013, from
http://www.fastretailing.com/eng/ir/news/1209210900.html.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (1993). Accounting for Contributions Received and
Contributions Made. Norwalk, CO, US, Financial Accounting Business Board.
Fombrun, C. J. & Van Riel, C. B. (2004). Fame and fortune: How successful companies build
winning reputations. Upper Saddle River, NJ, US, Finanical Times Prentice Hall.
Fortune China (2012). "Fortune China announced 2012 TOP100 Chinese Companies’ CSR
Ranking report." Retrieved 28.03.2013, from
http://storage.aliyun.com/fortunechina/attachment_fc/2012China_CSR_Ranking_cn.docx.
Fravel, M. T. (2010). Explaining stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute. Getting
the Triangle Straight: Managing China–Japan–US Relations. Curtis, G., Kokubun, R. & Jisi,
W. Washington, DC, US, The Brookings Institution.
Friedman, M. (1985). "Consumer boycotts in the United States, 1970–1980: Contemporary
events in historical perspective." Journal of Consumer Affairs 19(1): 96-117.
Fukukawa, K. & Teramoto, Y. (2009). "Understanding Japanese CSR: The reflections of
managers in the field of global operations." Journal of Business Ethics 85(1): 133-146.
Galletta, A. (2013). Mastering the Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond: From Research
Design to Analysis and Publication. New York, NY, US, NYU Press.
Gao, Y. (2009). "Corporate social performance in China: Evidence from large companies."
Journal of Business Ethics 89(1): 23-35.
Gao, Z. (2012). "Chinese Grassroots Nationalism and Its Impact on Foreign Brands." Journal
of Macromarketing 32(2): 181-192.
Gates, R. (2013). Mukden Incident: Lytton Report. Japan at War: An Encyclopedia. Perez, L.
Santa Barbara, CA, US, ABC-CLIO: 254-255.
Gerring, J. (2001). Social science methodology: A criterial framework. Camebridge, UK,
Cambridge University Press.
Bibliography 89
GovHK (2011). "General holidays for 2012." Retrieved 15.07.2013, from
http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/holiday/2012.htm.
GovHK (2012). "General holidays for 2013." Retrieved 15.07.2013, from
http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/holiday/2013.htm.
Guth, D. W. (1995). "Organizational crisis experience and public relations roles." Public
Relations Review 21(2): 123-136.
Haley, E. (1996). "Exploring the construct of organization as source: Consumers'
understandings of organizational sponsorship of advocacy advertising." Journal of
Advertising 25(2): 19-35.
Han, C. M. (1989). "Country image: halo or summary construct?" Journal of Marketing
Research 26(2): 222-229.
Harner, S. (2012a). "Hillary's 'Parting Gift' To Japan In The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute Should
Be Left Unopened; Obama and Kerry May Ask For It Back." New York, NY, US,
Forbes.com. Retrieved 17.05.2013, from
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2013/02/07/hillarys-parting-gift-to-japan-in-the-
senkakudiaoyu-dispute-should-be-left-unopened-obama-and-kerry-may-ask-for-it-back/.
Harner, S. (2012b). "The Japan-China Territorial Dispute is Serious, and Escalating." New
York, NY, US, Forbes.com. Retrieved 13.03.2012, from
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2012/07/17/the-japan-china-territorial-dispute-is-
serious-and-escalating/.
Harris, S. (1992). "Japanese biological warfare research on humans: a case study of
microbiology and ethics." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 666(1): 21-52.
Hassid, J. (2008). "Controlling the Chinese Media: An Uncertain Business." Asian Survey
48(3): 414-430.
He, Y. (2007). "History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino–Japanese Conflict."
Journal of Contemporary China 16(50): 1-24.
Ho, C. K. (2012). "China Warns Against Violence as Japan Protests Are Broken Up."
Shanghai, Bloomberg. Retrieved 18.04.2013, from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
09-16/china-japan-island-dispute-worsens-in-blow-for-global-economy.html.
Ho, D. Y.-f. (1976). "On the concept of face." American Journal of Sociology 81(4): 867-884.
Hong, C., Hu, W.-M., Prieger, J. E. & Zhu, D. (2010). "French Automobiles and the Chinese
Boycotts of 2008: Politics Really Does Affect Commerce." The BE Journal of Economic
Analysis & Policy 11(1): Article 26.
IBTimes (2012). "Major Japanese Companies Temporarily Shut Down Across China."
International Business Times. Retrieved 28.05.2013, from http://www.ibtimes.com/major-
japanese-companies-temporarily-shut-down-across-china-792752.
Ishii, K. (2009). "Nationalistic sentiments of Chinese consumers: the effects and determinants
of animosity and consumer ethnocentrism." Journal of International Consumer Marketing
21(4): 299-308.
Japan Times (2013a). "Poll: two-thirds of Chinese boycotted Japanese goods over Senkakus
dispute." Tokyo, Japan Times. Retrieved 19.04.2013, from
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/01/06/national/poll-two-thirds-of-chinese-boycotted-
japanese-goods-over-senkakus-dispute/.
Japan Times (2013b). "Toyota predicts China sales won’t fully recover before fall." Kyodo,
Japan Times. Retrieved 02.06.2013, from
Bibliography 90
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/22/business/toyota-predicts-china-sales-wont-
fully-recover-before-fall.
Jensen, H. R. (2008). "The Mohammed cartoons controversy and the boycott of Danish
products in the Middle East." European Business Review 20(3): 275-289.
Jie, M. & Hagiwara, Y. (2013). "Open Prejudice Shows Depth of Toyota’s Slump in China."
Tokyo, Bloomberg. Retrieved 12.05.2013, from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-
23/no-tee-time-for-japanese-shows-depth-of-toyota-china-slump-cars.html.
Jing, L. (2012). "U.S. Ambassador’s Car Attacked in Chinese Anti-Japan Protests." Beijing,
The Epoch Times. Retrieved 18.04.2013, from http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-
news/anti-japan-protests-and-island-dispute-intensify-in-china-294191.html.
Joyce, C. (2007). "Japanese PM denies wartime 'comfort women' were forced." Tokyo,
Telegraph. Retrieved 23.03.2013, from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1544471/Japanese-PM-denies-wartime-comfort-
women-were-forced.html.
Ju, C.-k. (2012). "East Asia 30 2012." Tokyo, NKSJ Holdings. Retrieved 28.03.2013, from
http://www.alterna.co.jp/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2012-East-Asia-30-press-
release-Eng_HERI.pdf.
Kajimoto, T. & Nakagawa, I. (2012). "Japanese firms say China protests affect business
plans: Reuters poll." Tokyo, Reuters. Retrieved 13.05.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/21/us-japan-china-poll-idUSBRE88J1CH20120921.
Kajita, A. & Suzuki, A. (2013). FY2012 Survey on the International Operations of Japanese
Firms, JETRO International Economic Research Division.
Kazuyuki, K. (2011). "Development of Japan-China Relations since 1972." International
Journal of China Studies 2(3): 647-679.
Klein, J. G., Ettenson, R. & Morris, M. D. (1998). "The animosity model of foreign product
purchase: An empirical test in the People's Republic of China." The Journal of Marketing
62(1): 89-100.
Klein, J. G., Smith, N. C. & John, A. (2004). "Why we boycott: consumer motivations for
boycott participation." Journal of Marketing 68(3): 92-109.
Klink, D. (2008). "Der ehrbare Kaufmann–Das ursprüngliche Leitbild der
Betriebswirtschaftslehre und individuelle Grundlage für die CSR-Forschung." Zeitschrift für
Betriebswirtschaft 60(1): 57-80.
Kolk, A., Hong, P. & Van Dolen, W. (2010). "Corporate social responsibility in China: an
analysis of domestic and foreign retailers' sustainability dimensions." Business Strategy and
the Environment 19(5): 289-303.
Kowacsik, A. (2010). Der Einfluss des Konfuzianismus und Daoismus auf die chinesische
Unternehmensethik im 21. Jahrhundert. Institut für Philosophie. Wien, Universität Wien.
Magister der Philosophie.
Kubota, Y. & Sugiyama, K. (2012). "Japan carmakers to cut China production by half."
Tokyo, Reuters. Retrieved 24.05.2013, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/08/us-
japan-china-autos-idUSBRE89702P20121008.
Lan, X., GSB, C. K. & Li, B. (2012). The Economics of Nationalism. Chestnut Hill, MA,
USA, Department of Economics, Boston College.
Lee, C. (1990). "Modifying an American consumer behavior model for consumers in
Confucian culture: the case of Fishbein behavioral intention model." Journal of International
Consumer Marketing 3(1): 27-50.
Bibliography 91
Lee, K. (1983). "Pattern of Korean way of thinking." Seoul: Sinwon Publish.
Leong, S. M., Cote, J. A., Ang, S. H., Tan, S. J., Jung, K., Kau, A. K. & Pornpitakpan, C.
(2008). "Understanding consumer animosity in an international crisis: nature, antecedents,
and consequences." Journal of International Business Studies 39(6): 996-1009.
Linnanen, L. & Panapanaan, V. (2002). Roadmapping CSR in Finnish Companies Helsinki,
Finland, Helsinki University of Technology.
Liu, J. & Lifei, Z. (2012). "Uniqlo, Aeon Shut China Stores as Island Spat Escalates." Beijing,
Bloomberg. Retrieved 18.04.2013, from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-17/china-
japan-dispute-over-islands-risks-340-billion-trade.html.
Lunn, J. (2012). "The territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands." London, House of
Commons. Retrieved 13.03.2013, from http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN06475.pdf.
Madden, N. (2010). "Chinese Consumers Protest KFC Promotion Fiasco." Shanghai,
AdAge.com. Retrieved 16.04.2013, from http://adage.com/article/global-news/chinese-
consumers-protest-kfc-coupon-fiasco/143292/.
Maher, A. A. & Mady, S. (2010). "Animosity, subjective norms, and anticipated emotions
during an international crisis." International Marketing Review 27(6): 630-651.
Matten, D., Crane, A. & Chapple, W. (2003). "Behind the mask: Revealing the true face of
corporate citizenship." Journal of Business Ethics 45(1): 109-120.
McCurry, J. & Branigan, T. (2012). "China-Japan row over disputed islands threatens to
escalate." Tokyo, Guardian. Retrieved 17.04.2013, from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/18/china-japan-row-dispute-islands.
Menon, S. & Kahn, B. E. (2003). "Corporate sponsorships of philanthropic activities: when
do they impact perception of sponsor brand?" Journal of Consumer Psychology 13(3): 316-
327.
Moon, J. & Shen, X. (2010). "CSR in China Research: Salience, Focus and Nature." Journal
of Business Ethics 94(4): 613-629.
Nakata, H. (2012). "Firms move some eggs out of China basket." Japan Times. Retrieved
08.05.2013, from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/19/reference/firms-move-some-
eggs-out-of-china-basket/#.UbpqFZwp7IV.
Ng, T. & Lee, A. (2012). "Beijing threatens to clamp down on anti-Japan protests." South
China Morning Post. Retrieved 21.04.2013, from
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1039384/beijing-threatens-clamp-down-anti-japan-
protests.
Oi, M. (2013). "What Japanese history lessons leave out." Tokyo, BBC News. from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21226068.
Okudera, A. (2012). "Aeon reopens Qingdao supermarket 70 days after anti-Japan protest."
Qingdao, The Asahi Shimbun. Retrieved 29.05.2013, from
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201211240050.
Pan, Z. (2007). "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending
Controversy from the Chinese Perspective." Journal of Chinese Political Science 12(1): 71-
92.
Pearson, C. M. & Clair, J. A. (1998). "Reframing crisis management." Academy of
Management Review 23(1): 59-76.
Bibliography 92
people.com.cn (2008). "抗震救灾 我们在行动." people.com.cn. Retrieved 26.06.2013, from
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/8215/122548/.
Pike, K. L. (1967). "Etic and emic standpoints for the description of behavior." Language and
thought: an enduring problem in psychology 37: 32.
Qi, H. & Yin, Z. (2010). "公民社会,社会压力与中国治理." Reform & Opening 2010(11): 2.
Ramasamy, B. & Yeung, M. (2009). "Chinese consumers’ perception of corporate social
responsibility (CSR)." Journal of Business Ethics 88(1): 119-132.
Ramaswamy, V., Alden, D. L., Steenkamp, J.-B. E. & Ramachander, S. (2000). "Effects of
brand local and nonlocal origin on consumer attitudes in developing countries." Journal of
Consumer Psychology 9(2): 83-95.
Ranasinghe, D. (2012). "Adapt Now: Japan Firms Heed Message in China Dispute." CNBC.
Retrieved 16.06.2013, from http://www.cnbc.com/id/49546003.
Riefler, P. & Diamantopoulos, A. (2007). "Consumer animosity: a literature review and a
reconsideration of its measurement." International Marketing Review 24(1): 87-119.
Rose, C. (1998). Interpreting history in Sino-Japanese relations: a case study in political
decision making. New York, NY, US, Routledge.
Sakai, T. (2010). "Rekindling China-Japan Conflict: The Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands Clash."
Retrieved 13.03.2013, from http://www.japanfocus.org/-Tanaka-Sakai/3418.
Schneider, C. (2008). "The Japanese history textbook controversy in East Asian perspective."
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 617(1): 107-122.
Sharp, A. & Hamlin, K. (2013). "China-Japan Dispute Takes Rising Toll on Top Asian
Economies." Tokyo, Bloomberg. Retrieved 19.04.2013, from
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-08/china-japan-dispute-takes-rising-toll-of-asia-s-
top-economies.html.
Shaw, H.-y. (1999). "The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of
the Ownership Claims of the PRC, ROC, and Japan." Maryland Series in Contemporary
Asian Studies 1999(3): 1-150.
Shengxia, S. & Jun, Y. (2010). "Customers storm KFCs after coupons rejected ". Beijing,
Global Times. Retrieved 16.04.2013, from http://www.globaltimes.cn/china/society/2010-
04/519906.html.
Shiga, T. (2012). Nissan's global strategy, Nissan Global.
Shimp, T. A. & Sharma, S. (1987). "Consumer ethnocentrism: construction and validation of
the CETSCALE." Journal of Marketing Research 23(1): 280-289.
Shirouzu, N. (2013). "Lingering tensions prompt Toyota to mull shifting focus in China."
Beijing, Reuters. Retrieved 09.07.2013, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/03/us-
china-auto-japan-idUSBRE9621B120130703.
sina.com.cn (2008). "Wong Lo Kat phenomenon: JDB 100 million donation for earth quake
victims triggers sales blitz." Retrieved 21.07.2013, from
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20080609/06174960926.shtml.
Sohu (2012). "People began to crazily sell Yen in New York and London. Japanese
government held meetings to find solutions to react it.". Retrieved 18.06.2013, from
http://business.sohu.com/20120919/n353510388.shtml.
Spegele, B., Barnes, J. & Hayashi, Y. (2012). "Leaders' Struggles in Beijing, Tokyo Escalate
Island Dispute." Beijing, Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 12.05.2013, from
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444450004578003574218898786.html.
Bibliography 93
Spiegel.de (2008). " Internet Users Strike Back: Chinese Call for Boycott of French Goods."
Spiegel Online. Retrieved 23.03.2013, from
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/internet-users-strike-back-chinese-call-for-boycott-
of-french-goods-a-547508.html.
Su, S. W. (2005). "The territorial dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku islands: An update."
Ocean Development & International Law 36(1): 45-61.
Sun, M., Nagata, K. & Onoda, H. (2012). Comparison of Corporate Social Responsibility
both in China and Japan. Design for Innovative Value Towards a Sustainable Society.
Matsumoto, M., Umeda, Y., Masui, K. & Fukushige, S., Springer: 924-928.
Tagesshow.de (2011). Retrieved 12.03.2013, from
http://www.nrhz.de/flyer/media/18324/inselndiaoyu-senkaku.jpg.
Tam, Y.-h. (2007). "Who Engineered the Anti-Japanese Protests in 2005?" Macalester
International 18(1): 281-299.
Tang, L. & Li, H. (2009). "Corporate social responsibility communication of Chinese and
global corporations in China." Public Relations Review 35(3): 199-212.
The economic observer (2010). "中国汽车企业社会声誉指数诞生." Retrieved 07.07.2013,
from http://info.xcar.com.cn/201012/news_171590_1.html.
Tian, Z., Wang, R. & Yang, W. (2011). "Consumer responses to corporate social
responsibility (CSR) in China." Journal of Business Ethics 101(2): 197-212.
Tianyang, H. (2012). "Diplomatic row a blow to Japanese brands." China Daily. Retrieved
05.06.2013, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-10/15/content_15816428.htm.
Tokyo Times (2013). "Senkaku conflict: What is the cost for Japan." Tokyo Times. Retrieved
28.05.2013, from http://www.tokyotimes.com/2013/senkaku-conflict-what-is-the-cost-for-
japan/.
Topham, J. & Nakagawa, I. (2012). "As China tensions simmer, Japan pulls back from
"world's factory"." Tokyo, Reuters. Retrieved 12.05.2013, from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/23/us-japan-china-firms-
idUSBRE89M1GS20121023.
Tse, D. K., Gu, F. F. & Yim, C. K. (2004). National animosity: Conceptualization,
measurement characteristics, and salience in international business decisions. Working Paper.
Hong Kong, School of Business, University of Hong Kong.
Unezawa, Y. (2012). "Ishihara, citing Chinese moves, plans to buy Senkaku Islands."
Retrieved 13.03.2013, from
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201204170071.
Van Marrewijk, M. (2003). "Concepts and definitions of CSR and corporate sustainability:
between agency and communion." Journal of Business Ethics 44(2): 95-105.
Vanhamme, J. & Grobben, B. (2009). "“Too Good to be True!”. The Effectiveness of CSR
History in Countering Negative Publicity." Journal of Business Ethics 85(2): 273-283.
Walker, L. & Mann, L. (1987). "Unemployment, relative deprivation, and social protest."
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 13(2): 275-283.
Wang, H. & Qian, C. (2011). "Corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance:
The roles of stakeholder response and political access." Academy of Management Journal
54(6): 1159-1181.
Wang, L. & Juslin, H. (2009). "The impact of Chinese culture on corporate social
responsibility: The harmony approach." Journal of Business Ethics 88(3): 433-451.
Bibliography 94
Wang, Y. (2010). "丰田的“区别对待”是误读法律." 中国质量新闻网. Retrieved
03.07.2013, from http://www.cqn.com.cn/news/zgzlb/diba/305598.html.
Wee, S.-L. & Duncan, M. (2012). "Anti-Japan protests erupt in China over islands row."
Beijing, Reuters. from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/15/us-china-japan-
idUSBRE88E01I20120915.
Weick, K. E. & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2011). Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance in
an age of uncertainty. San Francisco, CA, US, Jossey-Bass.
Weiner, B. (1985). "An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion."
Psychological Review 92(4): 548-573.
Wen, H. (2012a). "中国何时对日扣动经济扳机." Beijing, People's Daily Oversea Edition.
Retrieved 18.04.2013, from http://haiwai.people.com.cn/n/2012/0917/c232645-
17487683.html.
Wen, S. (2012b). "2012年广告市场大盘点." Nielsen Net Alliance. Retrieved 23.06.2013,
from http://www.a.com.cn/info/domestic/2012/1219/186855.html.
Witt, M. A. & Redding, G. (2012). "The spirits of corporate social responsibility: Senior
executive perceptions of the role of the firm in society in Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, South
Korea and the USA." Socio-Economic Review 10(1): 109-134.
Wittchen, F. (2012). "The economic aspects of the Chinese-Japanese conflict about the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands." Berlin, Diplomatisches Magazin. Retrieved 28.05.2013, from
http://www.diplomatisches-magazin.de/business-11-2012-en/A1/.
Xinhua International (2013). "Foreign media: A survey shows that the majority of Korean
people "hate Japan"." Retrieved 18.07.2013, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-
07/13/c_125002870.htm.
Xun, J. (2012). "Corporate Social Responsibility in China: a Preferential Stakeholder Model
and Effects." Business Strategy and the Environment.
Yamaguchi, Y. & Ozasa, S. (2012). "Toyota Resumes China Operations After Protests."
Tokyo, Busniessweek. Retrieved 21.05.2013, from
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-23/toyota-resumes-china-operations-after-
protests.
Yamazaki, J. (2005). Japanese Apologies for World War II. New York, NY, US, Routledge.
Yang, B. (2010). "On the Harm, Motivation and Governance of Large-retailers’
Greenwashing Behavior." Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies 2010(2): 12-
16.
Yang, D. (1999). "Convergence or divergence? Recent historical writings on the Rape of
Nanjing." The American Historical Review 104(3): 842-865.
Yang, J. (2012). "Japanese electronics companies lower expectations for year." Morning
Whistle. Retrieved 24.06.2013, from
http://www.morningwhistle.com/html/2012/Company_Industry_1101/215009.html.
Yin, R. K. (2000). Rival explanations as an alternative to reforms as experiments.
Yin, R. K. (2003a). Applications of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, CA, US, SAGE
Publications, Incorporated.
Yin, R. K. (2003b). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA, US,
SAGE Publications, Incorporated.
Yinan, H. (2006). National mythmaking and the problems of history in Sino-Japanese
relations. Japan's Relations with China. Er, L. P. New York, NY, US, Routledge: 69-91.
Bibliography 95
Ying, T. (2012). "Japanese Dealerships in China Retrench in Wake of Dispute." Beijing,
Bloomberg. Retrieved 19.04.2013, from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-
06/japanese-dealerships-in-china-retrench-in-wake-of-dispute.html.
Yong, Z. (2012). "人民日报今日谈:用文明法治凝聚爱国力量." Beijing, People's Daily.
Retrieved 18.04.2013, from http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2012/0917/c1003-19021905.html.
Yoshioka, K. (2012). "Nissan venture to repair Nissan cars for free if damaged in protests."
Beijing, The Asahi Shimbun. Retrieved 27.05.2013, from
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201210190071.
Yu, R. & Murphy, C. (2013). "China Weak for Japan Car Firms ". Shanghai, The Wall Street
Journal. Retrieved 01.07.2013, from
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323687604578466782799042870.html.
Yuksel, U. & Mryteza, V. (2009). "An evaluation of strategic responses to consumer
boycotts." Journal of Business Research 62(2): 248-259.
Zhu, T. (2012). "Toyota adjusting strategies in China." MorningWhistle.com. Retrieved
19.04.2013, from http://www.morningwhistle.com/html/2012/Auto_1127/215659.html.
96
Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung
Ich erkläre hiermit ehrenwörtlich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbstständig angefertigt
habe; die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sind als solche
kenntlich gemacht.
Die Arbeit wurde bisher keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt und auch noch nicht
veröffentlicht.
München, den 08.08.2013
____________________
(Unterschrift)