cse theme ii lecture 7

Lecture 7

WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNING CHINA?

Introduction

• What are the areas to be covered in this section?

1. Political reforms

2. Central-Regional Relations

3. Cross Straits Relations

1. Political Reforms

• CCP’s logic…

Sustained economic development = Political Stability = Perpetuation of CCP’s rule

• However CCP is facing a Legitimacy Crisis

Widening income gap

Corruption

Rural-Urban inequality

Changes to society and economy faster than adjustments in the CCP

The private sector rapidly growing, has little participation in the CCP

Increasingly sophisticated populace

CCP Losing Legitimacy and

relevance

• To remain legitimate and relevant, the CCP therefore must carry out political reforms

• But what are the challenges that come with these reforms?

• Challenges of political reforms: Pragmatic Reformers vs. Conservatives

Zhao Ziyang

Hu Yaobang

VS.Li Peng

Hua Guofeng

– During Deng’s Era the reformers ascended and loosened the CCP’s grip on the people

– Period known as ‘Beijing Spring’

– Rise of calls for the ‘fifth modernisation’ (democracy) by Wei Jinsheng

• Challenges of political reforms: Calls for Democratization by students

– Student demonstrations in 1986

– Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang’s call for more democratization led to increase student demonstrations

– Culminated in the Tiananmen Incident 1989

– Use of PLA to suppress Tiananmen demonstration

– Impacted negatively on CCP

• Challenges: Systematic Corruption

– Major problem and not accepting system is at fault

– Only a limited number of officials punished

– Reforms both political and economic has perpetuated corruption

What really lies behind corruption– The pursuit of economic riches without genuine marketization

and democratization – Power remains hierarchically structured with information

dependent on position and party membership• The system of intense bureaucratic control of distribution• The concentration of power

– The reform presented officials greater opportunities

The Official Statistics of Corruption

Numbers in officials with

corruption above 1 million RMB￥

Numbers of prosecuted officials with ranks

above County / Division levels

Above City / Prefecture /

Bureau levels

Above Province / Ministry

levels 2005 8,490 cases above

100,000 ￥ 2,799 196 8

2004 1,275 cases above 1 million ￥

2,960 198 11

2003 123 cases above 10 million ￥

2,728 167 4


12,830 N/A N/A


2,760 N/A N/A


2,680 184 7

1999 7,729 cases above 50,000 ￥

2,200 136 3

• Other political challenges: Human Rights and Political Inequality

– Human rights violation will remain a major issue for China to deal with e.g. Falungong

– Offsprings of top officials have privileges

– Wealthy have political protection

– Party members able to avoid legal penalties.

The Case of Xiamen• High-level politics became embroiled in the

spectacular smuggling case of the Yuanhua (远华 ) group based in Xiamen. – Political connections first led to the investigation being delayed and

sidetracked and attempts to protect the image of a Jiang Zeming protégé.

– Senior figures from not only the provincial level but also Beijing and the People’s Liberation Army have been involved deadlocked resolution of the case

• Nave and the General Staff Department • The Ministry of Public Security• The customs• The banks• Various personnel, economic and foreign trade departments

The Case of Xiamen

• The involvement of high level figures– The involvement of the wife of Politburo Standing

Committee member, Jia Qingling （贾庆林）– The patron was a former vice-mayor of Xiamen and

he was allowed to escape to Australia – Several children of senior party officials were allowed

to flee

• Jiang Zeming’s pain– Jia was Jiang’s ally– Jia was selected by Jiang to replace Chen

Xitong （陈希同） , party secretary of Beijing, who was factional in-fighting with Jiang

– Too active pursuit of the case would reach high into the party and undermine party credibility further

The Case of Xiamen

• The results– It took the Politburo 3 years to authorize action on the

case– Only after Premier Zhu Rongji had threatened, in

summer 1999, to resign unless something was done– The case was brought to trial in September-October

2000• 84 people were sentenced• Including 11 sentenced to death

– The case was brought to second round trial in late 2000

– The protection of key central officials raises questions about the impartiality of the investigations

– Some senior leaders have resented Jiang Zeming’s protection of Jia Qinglin and his subsequent elevation

Impact of Xiamen Case

• Many people and officials involved

• Took such effort to clamp down on such a blatant corruption case that one wonders how to tackle the other cases that are less visible.

• New trend in Corruption

• More complex and organised

• But China’s corruption case still not as organized as Russia’s

• The crackdown shows China has the will to curb this issue.

• But the way the case was dealt with in secrecy is contrary to CCP’s attempts to allow more transparency

2. Central-Regional Relations

• Sheng Yumin highlights two important

perspectives on Central-Provincial relations

Decentralization in the reform era = Weakened Beijing

Nomenklatura System = Strong Beijing

• Sheng Shumin’s argument…

– CCP Central Committee is most powerful and it is dominated by central officials. Provincial officials’ membership in the Central Committee is declining.

– Membership in the Central Committee is based on a nonmeklatura system and top leaders can appoint or dismiss provincial officials in the Central Committee (CC)

– Studying the provincial share of membership in the Central Committee can reveal how well the provinces are represented

Understanding China’s Communist Central Committees

• Theoretically speaking,

– the CCP National Congress is the highest authority

– under the ‘democratic centralism’ system, the National Congress ‘elects’ the Central Committee members

The Organizational Structure of CCP Center

CCPNational Congress

Central Committee

Central Discipline Inspection Committee

Central Military Committee

General Secretary: Hu Jintao

Standing Committee of Politburo

Politburo Central Secretariat

Members: Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, Luo Gan

Members: Wang Lequan, Wang Zhaoguo, Hui Liangyu, Liu Qi,Liu Yunshan, Li Changchu, Wu Yi, Wu Bangguo, Wu Guangzheng, Zhang Lichang, Zhang Dejiang,Chen Liangyu, Luo Gan, Zhou Yongkang, Hu Jintao,, Yu Zhensheng, He Guoqiang, Jia Qinglin, Guo Boxiong,Huang Ju, Cao Gangchuan, Zeng Qinghong, Zeng Peiyan, Wen Jiabao,

Secretaries:Zeng QinghongLiu YunshanZhou YongkangHe GuoqiangWang GangXu CaihouHe Yong

Chairman: Hu JintaoVice-Chairmen: Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, Xu Caihou

Secretary: Wu Guanzheng

110-150 alternate

175-210 full

• In reality the situation is like this…POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE

(Usually under 10 members)

POLITBURO

(Of About 20-25 full members 2-3 and alternate members)

POLITBURO

(Of About 20-25 full members 2-3 and alternate members)

NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS (Once every five years and attended by 1500-2000 national

delegates)

Actual lines of authority

Nominal (In name only) Lines of Authority

• This happens as the National Party Congress is held infrequently

Central Predominance of the Central Committee

• According to Sheng Shumin,

– Central officials dominate the politburo and standing committee of the politburo

– Therefore can decide membership of the CC

– Study clearly shows there is a decline in number of provincial officials in the CC overtime

• Sheng Shumin makes distinction between the different forms of CCP membership

– Alternate members (Can express opinions at Congress but cannot vote)

– Full members ( Can vote and only ones who can enter Politburo standing committee)

– CCP Politburo Members

• From the previous table…

– Provincial Full Membership: Fallen sharply since 1978

– Politburo Membership: Tend to fall and rise but no threat to central control as 80% of politburo memebers still central officials

– Alternate membership: Almost the same as 1978. Purpose is to increase symbolic representation of the provinces

Conclusion

• Provincial representation has fallen and their bargaining power has declined as central officials dominate the politburo.

• Limited provincial representation due to Central officials’ dominance in the politburo

• Chinese Central government is resilient

• Proven by studies that the government has contained overheating and united the nation amid transition to the market economy.

• Decline in central grip over the provinces has yet to occur.

Central Regional Relations: Tibet

Central Regional Relations: Tibet• Brief History

– 1751 Qing Dynasty emperor Qianlong installed the Dalai Lama (Spiritual Buddhist leader as the ruler of Tibet)

– Under nominal Qing rule until 1911

– Tibet’s position very problematic under international law between 1911 and 1950

– 1951 Mao’s forces entered Tibet with little resistance

– 14th Dalai Lama signed the seventeen-point agreement recognizing PRC control

– Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959 with American CIA help after an uprising in Tibet

– Formed a government in exile in Dharamshala, India

• Tibet’s government in Dharamshala

– compose of schools, institutions, an elected parliament etc

– About 80000 Tibetan exiles are in this government

– The 14th Dalai Lama traveled widely for support and recognition

Library of Tibetan works and Archive in Dharamshala

Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso

Credentials:

Nobel Peace Prize (1989)

Honorary Citizen of Canada

U.S. Congressional Gold Medal

China worried about his credentials


• Post 1978

– Very little international attention given to Tibet before 1978

– Internationalization of issue took place only from 1989…WHY 1989 What happened?

TIANANMEN SQ. INCIDENT

• Late 1990s

– Tibetan issue became more highlighted in the West

– Dalai Lama gaining awards etc. and worried China

– Therefore at a conference in Beijing….

Ok Lah! Let’s Try and solve this ‘Tibet

Question’ once and for all… But remember Tibet is an inalienable part of

China

Let’s do It!!!!!!!!!!!!!I agree that Tibet is

part of China

LAMA, want to negotiate this problem or not?

No Problem man… I am prepared to recognize

Tibet is part of China FULL

STOP!


• Negotiations in 1998 should have resolved the issue… HOWEVER…. It didn’t…

• What are the problems that have emerged and continued to plague the ‘Tibet Question’ since 1998?

• What are the prospects since 1998?

• Highly anticipated negotiations between Beijing and the Dalai Lama failed to take place

• Why?

• PRC offered only to negotiate outstanding issues in return for Dalai Lama’s acknowledgment of PRC sovereignty… No concessions were to be made.

What are the outstanding issues?

• Autonomy

– Tibet wants a high level of autonomy like Hong Kong

– China views this as possibly spiraling out of control

– In Dharamshala, it is clear Tibet aspeires to be independent


• History

– China wants Dalai Lama to accept that Tibet is Historically a part of China

– Dalai Lama only recognizes China’s rule in Tibet as ‘de facto’--- meaning in existence but not legitimate.


• Territory

– Amdo and Kham

(part of Qinghai, Sichuan

and Yunan)

has many Tibetans

- Dalai Lama wants

them to be part of

Tibet

- China totally disagrees

What are the Prospects?

• China’s Internal Pressures

– China is facing major domestic problems since 1978 (e.g. rural-urban migration, disparities, unemployment)

– China therefore pressured to solve this issue expeditiously.

What are the Prospects?• Dharamsala’s internal pressures

– More educated Tibetans are pragmatic and seeking Preservation of Tibet rather than Independence

– 40 years since Dharamsala populace left Tibet and thus desire to return

– Living in India is as culturally debilitating as in PRC (many in poverty in India as in China)


• International Conditions

– Issue continues to hurt China’s international image

– However, Tibetan émigrés are not getting the support

– U.S. do not recognize the Dharamsala government

– EU and U.N. do not support ‘decolonisation’ of Tibet

– Eastern European states receiving the Dalai Lama never contested China’s rule

– Even Buddhist majority countries do not support the Dharamsala government


Before 1998 1998 onwards

Dalai Lama wanted independence Dalai Lama willing to negotiate without the idea of independence

Dalai Lama cited willingness to completely forego independence

Emigres believed only Tibet’s defense and foreign policy can be controlled by China

Emigres acknowledgement that China can control ‘larger industry and economic questions’

• Change in Dharamsala’s Approach

What are the Prospects?• Change in PRC’s Approach

– More interested in Ethnic affairs

– Jiang could see that economic growth not enough to resolve ethnic issues

– China alarmed by ethnic unrest in Kosovo and Indonesia

– Formed the Central Ethnic Work Conference to looking into representation and development in ethnic minority areas

– Hu Jintao’s porfolio focuses on crisis management

– Hu was once the CCP Party Head in Tibet and Guizhou which has the most ethnic minorities and poorest

– Hu is generally a Tibet Expert

– Won’t compromise on China’s sovereignty but very involved in Tibetan issues

– Lead in bringing Tibet’s party members to Beijing Party School.

Conclusion• Tibet remains a senstive spot in China

• A Major Challenge for the Chinese government

• To be an effective government CCP must deal with this issue

• What is your views? From the outstanding issues and prospects, how do you view the Tibet Question

3. Cross Straits Relations

• Why is this little island called Taiwan so contentious?

• Why is it such a sensitive issue?

• Brief History of Taiwan (Republic of China)

– After WWII: Taiwan Ruled by the Kuomintang

– 1949: Communist victory in China Kuomintang evacuated to Taiwan

– Taiwan declared provisional government of China

• Since 1949 Beijing has attempted to reunify Taiwan with the mainland

• Strategy oscillated between military coercion and peaceful means

• Taiwan seen by PRC as part of China and a renegade province

• 1949-79

– Military coercion phase

– Planned attack of Taiwan halted by American involvement in the Korean War and Taiwan Straits in 1950

– Continued shelling of KMT held offshore islands

– Tensions abated through Beijing taking over of Taiwan’s seat in the United Nations and signing of Shanghai Communiqué and adoption of ‘One-China’ policy after Mao’s death

• Policy of Peaceful reunification since 1979

– Deng’s modernisation agenda needed peaceful Taiwan Straits

– Opened communication with Taiwan (santong and siliu: three links and four exchanges)

– Deng coined the idea of ‘one country two systems’ as a strategy to reunify mainland with Taiwan

• Jiang Zemin’s era

– Eight-Point proposal for peaceful reunification

– Proposal aimed to move towards reunification rather than plan what to do after unification

• 1995-96: Military Coercion – Taiwan Straits Crisis

– Lee Teng Hui elected President

“One Country Two systems” is a trick and a ploy to relegate Taiwan.

We should work towards “phase two Chinas’”

– “Phased two Chinas” = two Chinas over a certain period of time with orientation towards one China

– Adopted ‘Sanbu’ (Three No) policy (No contact, No Negotiation, No Compromise)

– Lee visited U.S. in 1995 and hailed as a ‘diplomatic breakthrough’

– Provoked China who saw this as an attempt to purse independence

– Moreover 1995 signaled Jiang’s paramount leadership in China and his need to consolidate his authority therefore was not willing to compromise

– 150000 PRC troops deployed in Fujian

– Missiles tests

conducted

– U.S. sent aircraft

Carriers near

Taiwan

• Relations after 1996:

– Tensions abated after 1996

– Jiang reaffirmed policy of eight-point

– PRC attempted to prevent pro-independence candidate Chen Shui-bian from winning Taiwan’s elections in 2000 by adopting ‘three ifs’ white paper

– Paper sets conditions for PRC launching attack on Taiwan

– Unfortunately for PRC

– Chen and his pro-independence party Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2000

大家好 ! 我是陳水扁 ( 阿扁 ) !

Chen Shui-Bian

– 2004 Chen used Taiwan independence in his election campaign

– China alarmed and adopted Anti-Secession law in 2005

– Legitimized ‘non-peaceful’ means should Taiwan declare independence

• Main Challenge now

– Reunification is the main challenge for PRC

– Taiwanese people do not want either Taiwan independence or reunification

– They have a wait-and-see attitude

– China wants ‘one country two systems’ reunification

– Taiwan rejects this system and wants unification based on freedom, democracy and equal prosperity

• Possible approach to a peaceful settlement suggested by Chen Qimao

– Firstly Taiwan should acknowledge one China policy

– Not impossible to achieve as both Taiwan and China have adopted this and had overlapping territorial and sovereign claims. BUT BOTH had ACKNOWLEDGE ‘ONE CHINA’

– This would result in a win-win situation

– China can concentrate on economic reforms and Taiwan can PRC’s recognition of her status and jurisdiction over all current territory she holds.

– Secondly comes the conditions of unification the includes

• Reforms• Economic and cultural exchanges• Issue of one ‘country two systems’• Change in public opinion of Taiwan’s

independence• Favourable international situation

Conclusion

• We have discussed three major challenges

– Political reforms– Central-regional relations– Cross Straits relatioins

• Need to assess how has china dealt with these issues and to what extent have they been successful

cse theme ii lecture 7

Documents

political challenges

political stability

political reformsbut

political connections

challenges of governing

democratization power

beijing springrise of

pragmatic reformers