cryptography with dispensable backdoors€¦ · apple vs fbi to lock: • use key to encrypt state...

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Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors Eurocrypt 2018 Rump Session Ching-Yi Lai Academia Sinica Kai-Min Chung Academia Sinica Vassilis Zikas University of Edinburgh & IOHK Marios Georgiou CUNY

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Page 1: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors

Eurocrypt 2018 Rump Session

Ching-Yi LaiAcademia Sinica

Kai-Min ChungAcademia Sinica

Vassilis ZikasUniversity of Edinburgh & IOHK

Marios GeorgiouCUNY

Page 2: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Page 3: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Backdoor your locking mechanism so that I can solve crimes

Page 4: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Backdoor your locking mechanism so that I can solve crimes

No

Page 5: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Backdoor your locking mechanism so that I can solve crimes

No

why not?

Page 6: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Backdoor your locking mechanism so that I can solve crimes

No

why not?

Because leakage of the backdoor allows anyone to unlock every phone. Not worth the risk

Page 7: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Backdoor your locking mechanism so that I can solve crimes

No

why not?

Because leakage of the backdoor allows anyone to unlock every phone. Not worth the risk

Can this be avoided?

Page 8: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBII know how to do this

Page 9: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBII know how to do this

Page 10: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBII know how to do this

Ha! I heard it

Page 11: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBII know how to do this

Ha! I heard it

Meeau too!And it’s the same for all phones

Page 12: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

• Store all (key/phone-ID) pairs

• Upon receiving an ID, output the key and never receive another input

Page 13: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

To lock:• Use key to encrypt state• Throw away key• Store all (key/phone-ID)

pairs• Upon receiving an ID,

output the key and never receive another input

Page 14: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

To lock:• Use key to encrypt state• Throw away key• Store all (key/phone-ID)

pairs• Upon receiving an ID,

output the key and never receive another input

Yields: • Encryption where one out of many keys can be recovered• Only this one! All other keys/encryptions are safe

• Dispensable-backdoor encryption.

Page 15: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Page 16: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Page 17: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Page 18: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Page 19: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Page 20: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Page 21: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Page 22: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Page 23: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Reset the token

Page 24: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Apple vs FBI

Reset the token

Can we do it from stateless tokens?

Page 25: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Stateful From Stateless Token

I want to create information that • Cannot be copied/duplicated• Can encode a lot of keys• Once read it “self-destructs”

Page 26: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Stateful From Stateless Token

I want to create information that • Cannot be copied/duplicated• Can encode a lot of keys• Once read it “self-destructs”

What you seek exists not in the digital world

Page 27: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Stateful From Stateless Token

I want to create information that • Cannot be copied/duplicated• Can encode a lot of keys• Once read it “self-destructs”

What you seek exists not in the digital world

I have exactly what you need!

Page 28: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors

https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/352.pdf

Page 29: Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors€¦ · Apple vs FBI To lock: • Use key to encrypt state • Store all (key/phone-ID) • Throw away key pairs • Upon receiving an ID,

Cryptography with Dispensable Backdoors

https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/352.pdf