crozier appeal brief

8/20/2019 Crozier Appeal Brief

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15-572-cr

United States Court of Appeals

Case 15-572, Document 25, 07/16/2015, 1555985, Page1 of 57


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………………………..1, 2TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................3

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................5

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.......................................................................6

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..........................................................7

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES............................................................................8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...............................................................................9

A. Count One - 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. §1956(h) – Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments.................................................9

B. Count Two - 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B) – Attempt to Launder Monetary

Instruments............................................................................................................9

STATEMENT OF FACTS....................................................................................12

A. Facts as to Count One - 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C.

§1956(h) – Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments............................13

B. Facts as to Count Two - 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B) – Attempt to Launder

Monetary Instruments........................................................................................16

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS .................................................................18

ARGUMENTS........................................................................................................20

I. The trial court erred in striking the pro-se appearance of Mr. Crozier, a

practicing attorney, on his own behalf as co-counsel to his retained private

attorney. ...............................................................................................................20

a. Standard of Review ...................................................................................20

b. Argument....................................................................................................21

II. The trial court erred by failing to grant Crozier’s Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal as to County I – Conspiracy to Launder Monetary

Instruments, after the close of the Government’s case, because the

Government failed to prove and the evidence was insufficient to show that:

1) a conspiracy to launder monetary instruments existed between Messrs.

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2

Crozier and Bruce Yazdzik, Crozier’s alleged co-conspirator; 2) Mr.

Crozier had the requisite specific intent to launder monetary proceeds; and

3) Mr. Crozier knew that the proceeds were from drug transactions. .......... 25

a. Standard of Review ...................................................................................25

b. Argument – Lack of Conspiracy and Specific Intent ............................ 26

c. Argument – Lack of Knowledge concerning the source of the proceeds.

.....................................................................................................................39

III. The trial court erred by failing to grant Mr. Crozier’s Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal as to Count II – Attempt to Launder Monetary

Instruments, because the government failed to prove and the evidence was

insufficient to show that: 1) the transaction was designed to disguise or

conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of property

believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and 2) Mr. Crozierhad the requisite specific intent to launder monetary proceeds. .................... 45

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................54

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................55

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................56



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Table of Authority

Cases:

United States v. Crozier, 3:13cr113 (JCH)........................................................12, 23United States v. Swinton, 400 F.Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)….....…20, 21, 22United States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied ,355 U.S. 957, 78 S.Ct. 542, 2 L.Ed.2d 532 (1958)…………………..……………20Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)…..….20U.S. v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1025 (10th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 96 S.Ct. 1676(1976)……………………………………………………………………………...21United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125 (2dCir. 1988) ………..............….......20, 21O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 869 (2dCir.1982)………….21, 22United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S.

1059, 96 S.Ct. 794, 46 L.Ed.2d 649 (1976)……………………………….………21United States v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1996).........................................22United States v. Parker, 2009 WL 5342774, 2 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)...........................22United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d. Cir. 2004)..........................25, 26, 28United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 233 (2d Cir. 2010)...................................25Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ................................................25, 26United States v. Rodriquez, 392 F.3d 539, 544 (2d Cir. 2004)……………...……26Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993)…………………………………26United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180, (2d Cir. 2008)………………27, 50, 51

United States v. Monaco, 1964 F. 3d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1999)……………………27United States v. Geibel, 369 F.2d 682, 692 (2d Cir. 2004)……………………….27United States v. Rosenblatt, 54 F.2d 36, 38 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1977)…………….27, 28United States v. Rulido, 699 F.3d 192, 209 (7th Cir. 1995)……………………….27Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947)………………………….27United States v. LaSpina, 229 F.3d 165, 174 (2d Cir. 2002)……………………..27United States v. Salamaeh, 152 F.3d 88, 147 (2d Cir 1998), cert. denied , 526 U.S.1028 (1999)………………………………………………………………………..27United States. v. Carter, 966 F.Supp 336, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1997)…………………..28U.S. v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, (7th Cir. 1993) cert. denied , 508 U.S. 913, 113

S.Ct. 2350, 124 L.Ed.2d 259 (1993)……………………………………....28, 39, 40United States v. Saunders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991)……………………….28 United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993)………………….29United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir.); cert. denied , 506 U.S. 858,113 S.Ct. 171, 121 L.Ed.2d 118 (1992.)………………………………………….29Glasser v United States, 315 U.S. 60,80,62 S.Ct. 457,86 L. Ed 680 (1942)……30United States v Stephenson, 183 F. 3d 110,120-122 (2d Cir.1999)…30,36,37,38,39

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United States v. Dobbs, 63 F 3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1995) ………………….…….37United States v. Rockelman, 49 F 3d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1995)……………………37 Mobil Oil Corp v. Karbowski, 879 F 2d 1052, 1055 92d Cir. 1989)……………..38United States v. Yip, 930 F 2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1991)…………………………..38 Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550,128 S Ct. 1994, 170 L. Ed. 2d 942 (2008)...……………………………………………………………………………… 49, 51United States v. Garcia, 587 F. 3d 509, 517 (2d Cir.2009)……………………….50United States v. Cromitie, 2011 WL 1842219 at p. 7 (2d Cir. 2011)……………..51United States v. Ness , 565 F. 3d 73 (2d Cir. 2009)………………………… .51, 52United States v. Roberts, 650 F. Supp. 2d 219 221(E.D. New York 2009)………52United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F. 3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2000)………… ..53

Statutes:

18 U.S.C. §1956 (a)(1)(B)(i)...................................5, 7, 9, 16, 26, 36, 37, 38, 39, 4118 U.S.C. §1956 (h)...........................................................................................5, 7, 918 U.S.C. §1956 (a)(3)(B).....................................................5, 7, 9, 10, 17, 19, 29, 46, 5018 U.S.C. §1956 (a)(1)(B)(i)...........................................................30, 31, 36, 38, 39Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 29(a)......................................................4Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 4 (b)(1)(A)(1).......................................628 U.S.C. §1291........................................................................................................6

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This brief is submitted in support of the appeal of Ralph Crozier from his

conviction after trial on one count of Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. §1956(h) and one count

of Attempt to Launder Monetary Instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§1956(a)(3)(B). This appeal by Mr. Crozier also includes an appeal from the order

of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.) to the

extent that this order denied Mr. Crozier’s motion made pursuant to the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 29(a) – Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. The

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was made at the close of the government’s case.

Mr. Crozier was sentenced to a term of 30 months of incarceration followed by 36

months of supervised release.

There are no reported decisions in this case. After trial, judgment was filed

on 17 February 2015 (Appendix No. 1) and Mr. Crozier filed his notice of appeal

on 26 February 2015 (Appendix No. 2).

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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This appeal from final judgment is timely pursuant to Rule 4(b)(1)(A)(1) of

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellate jurisdiction from the final

decision of the United States District Court exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

After trial, Mr. Crozier was convicted of violating:

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) – Laundering of Monetary Instruments

(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction

represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts of attempts to

conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of

specified unlawful activity—

(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part—

(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, theownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful

activity;

shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000.00 or twice the value of the

property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not

more than twenty years, or both.

18 U.S.C. §1956(h) – Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments

(h) Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or

section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the

offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B) – Attempt to Launder Monetary Instruments

(a)(3) Whoever, with the intent—

(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or controlof property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;

conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property

represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property used to

conduct of facilitate specified unlawful activity, shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than 20 years; or both.

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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. Did the trial court err in striking the pro-se appearance of Mr. Crozier, a

practicing attorney, on his own behalf as co-counsel to his retained

private attorney?

II. Did the trial court err by failing to grant Mr. Crozier’s Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal as to County I – Conspiracy to Launder Monetary

Instruments, after the close of the Government’s case, because the

Government failed to prove and the evidence was insufficient to show

that: 1) a conspiracy to launder monetary instruments existed between the

Messrs. Crozier and Bruce Yazdzik; 2) Mr. Crozier had the requisite

specific intent to launder monetary instruments; and 3) Mr. Crozier knew

the proceeds were from drug trafficking?

III. Did the trial court err by failing to grant Mr. Crozier’s Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal as to Count II – Attempt to Launder Monetary

Instruments, because the government failed to prove and the evidence

was insufficient to show that: 1) the transaction was designed to disguise

or conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of property

believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and 2) Mr.

Crozier had the requisite specific intent to launder monetary proceeds?

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defendant/Appellant Ralph Crozier is an attorney admitted to practice

in the State of Connecticut and in the Federal District Court for the District of

Connecticut. In his capacity as an attorney, Mr. Crozier represented Bruce

Yazdzik in several matters including the start-up of a limited liability company that

bought and sold automobiles and in an investment in Brightside Solar, LLC, an

energy company. It is Mr. Crozier’s representation of Mr. Yazdzik that forms the

crux of the Government’s case against Mr. Crozier.

A. Count One - 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. §1956(h) –

Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments

As part of his investment in Brightside Solar, Mr. Crozier represented Mr.

Yazdzik in negotiating and entering into a promissory note and a written contract

with Brightside Solar that centered on Mr. Yazdzik’s investment of $30,000.00 in

the company. Based on these transactions, Mr. Crozier was indicted on June 11,

2013 under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. §1956(h) – Conspiracy to

Launder Monetary Instruments.

B. Count Two - 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B) – Attempt to Launder Monetary

Instruments.

Sometime after Mr. Yazdzik’s investment in Brightside Solar, in a wholly

unrelated matter, Mr. Yazdzik was convicted in federal court of violating narcotics

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trafficking laws and incarcerated. Subsequent to Mr. Yazdzik’s incarceration, Mr.

Yazdzik’s mother, Debra Rost, in an effort to curry favor for her son, began

working as a confidential informant for federal agents. In furtherance of her

efforts, Ms. Rost met with Mr. Crozier on two occasions. During the second

meeting, Ms. Rost produced $11,000.00 in cash that Mr. Crozier took receipt of.

Based on this transaction, Mr. Crozier was indicted on June 11, 2013, under 18

U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B) – Attempt to Launder Monetary Instruments.

Prior to the start of trial, Mr. Crozier filed an appearance so that he could

represent himself along with privately retained co-counsel, Attorney Michael S.

Hillis. Mr. Crozier has been practicing law for over 40 years and has extensive

trial experience. Mr. Crozier claimed that his unique trial experience was a

compelling reason for allowing the hybrid representation. The District Court (Hall,

J.) sua sponte struck Mr. Crozier’s appearance without a hearing, ruling that it

would be confusing to the jury.

Mr. Crozier went to trial in the Federal District Court for the District of

Connecticut at New Haven. At the conclusion of the Government’s case, Mr.

Crozier through counsel made an oral Motion for a Judgement of Acquittal

claiming, as to Count One, that the government failed to establish that a conspiracy

existed between Mr. Crozier and Mr. Yazdzik and that Mr. Crozier had the

requisite specific intent to conceal or disguise the proceeds at issue. Also, as to

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Count Two, that the government failed to establish that Mr. Crozier knew the

$11,000.00 to be drug proceeds and again that Mr. Crozier had the requisite

specific intent to conceal or disguise the money. This motion was also denied by

Judge Hall.

At the conclusion of the trial Mr. Crozier was found guilty of violating both

counts contained in the indictment. The trail court sentenced Mr. Crozier to a total

prison term of 30 months to be followed by 36 months of supervised release.

Mr. Crozier now appeals the striking of his Appearance to Appear as Co-

Counsel, the denial of his Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal, and his conviction.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The appellant, Mr. Ralph Crozier is an experienced attorney admitted to both

the Connecticut and Federal Bars. As part of his law practice, Mr. Crozier

represented Mr. Bruce Yazdzik in several matters, including the opening of several

businesses and Mr. Yazdzik’s investment in an energy company, Brightside Solar,

LLC. Mr. Crozier’s representation of Mr. Yazdzik in this investment in Brightside

Solar was the basis of Count One of Mr. Crozier’s conviction for Conspiring to

Launder Monetary Proceeds.

On June 11, 2013, Mr. Crozier was indicted on two criminal counts in the

United States District Court for the District of Connecticut at New Haven.

Attorney Michael S. Hillis (Hillis) filed an appearance on Mr. Crozier’s behalf.

Subsequently, Mr. Crozier also filed an appearance as co-counsel to Attorney

Hillis. Prior to trial, Attorney Hillis argued that Mr. Crozier’s substantial trial

experience was a compelling reason to allow this generally prohibited hybrid

representation. United States v. Crozier, 3:13cr113 (JCH), Trial Transcript, Day

one of Trial, Page 6, Lines 21 through 25 and Page 7, Lines 1 through 8

(September 16, 2014)(A – 18 through 25). The District Court noted that Mr.

Crozier was not “represent[ing] that he’s dissatisfied with his counsel”, (A-24), and

that “if Mr. Crozier represented himself pro se . . . with representation by counsel,

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it becomes more confusing to the jury . . .” (A-24) The District Court then ruled

that, “there is no Sixth Amendment right to be represented by retained counsel as

well as to represent yourself when you are an attorney or even non-attorney . . .

[and] the proper thing is to strike the appearance of Mr. Crozier.” (A-25) ( see also

A-21 and A-22. ) Mr. Crozier’s trial followed immediately.

A. Facts as to Count One - 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C.

§1956(h) – Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments

Mr. Crozier represented Mr. Yazdzik in negotiations with Brightside Solar.

Brightside was seeking start-up funds in the amount of $30, 000.00 and Mr.

Yazdzik was willing to invest that sum of money in the company. Mr. Crozier

drafted a promissory note (A-92) and a contract (A-95) between Mr. Yazdzik,

Brightside Solar and the individual members of Brightside. The transaction was

open and notorious as both the note and contract were in the name of Bruce

Yazdzik (A-92 and 95) and during negotiations Mr. Yazdzik met with the

principals of Brightside and was introduced as Bruce Yazdzik. (A-47, 48) In fact,

Mr. Crozier even made the principals execute a personal guarantee to Mr. Yazdzik

in Mr. Yazdzik’s name. (A -38, 92 and 95)

Mr. Yazdzik’s testified concerning this contract and his intention in entering

into it as follows:

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“He explains to me that he was going to – it was good, okay. This is

all here. Sign the contract. We did the whole deal. He told me he was

going to have to take the money down. He was going to have to put

$9,000.00 in his account. He was going to put the rest in a safety

deposit box. He couldn’t pull out $30,000.00 to give to the company.

He couldn’t deposit $30,000.00 into the account because the IRS

would start to notice the type of money coming in. He said he would

put nine grand. Take the $30,000 out of his account and put the rest of

the money into a safety deposit box and take the money out gradually

and put it into his account.” (A-33)

On direct examination, Mr. Yazdzik testified:

“A. Yeah, we talked about the meeting and there was two ways for

the contract basically. I invested $30,000 and they had the option to

give me back $33,000 which would be a 10 percent on your 10 percent

that would come back or they have the option -- I have the option of

owning 10 percent of the company, keep the revenue coming. I said

I wanted the revenue come in. I didn’t want the $3,000 that wouldn’t

do me no good. 30,000 and 3000 back wouldn’t have did me any good.

I told them that. They said they can see what they can do. Either way it

was going to be good because even if they gave me back the $33,000. I

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get that back in a check from the company so it will still be legitimate

money.

This testimony shows that the loan to Brightside Solar was a loan to make

money on an ordinary commercial transaction. Mr. Yazdzik testified that the

contract was in his name, with the appropriate commercial guarantee and that the

transaction was just the contract, no “money was hidden”. (A-40) The only

reference to conceal was the inference that Mr. Crozier didn’t want the IRS

involved. (A-33)

Mr. Yazdzik testified that he purposefully portrayed himself as a used car

dealer to appear legitimate. Mr. Yazdzik also testified that he created false pay

stubs from the used car business to show legitimate income to both Mr. Crozier

and the Courts. Mr. Yazdzik testified that he hid his identity from Mr. Crozier as a

drug dealer.

Mr. Yazdzik never told Crozier that the $30,000.00 was drug proceeds. Mr.

Yazdzik testified that Mr. Crozier learned about his drug dealing when Mr.

Yazdzik turned in “Mike” (A-40).

In the government’s case in-chief, no evidence was adduced to prove that

Mr. Crozier knew Mr. Yazdzik’s investment into Brightside were proceeds from

narcotics trafficking as charged in the indictment. The government has not set

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forth sufficient evidence to support Mr. Crozier’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. §

1956 (a)(1)(B)(i). As such, the District Court should have granted Mr. Crozier’s

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal after the government rested.

B. Facts as to Count Two - 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B) – Attempt to

Launder Monetary Instruments.

Sometime after his investment in Brightside Solar, Mr. Yazdzik was

convicted and incarcerated on federal drug charges. In an effort to curry favor for

her son, Ms. Rost began working as a confidential informant for federal agents. (A-

80, 81) Ms. Rost met with Mr. Crozier on two occasions and it is these two

meetings between Ms. Rost and Mr. Crozier that form the basis for Count Two of

Mr. Crozier’s conviction. During their second meeting, Ms. Rost claimed to have

found $11,000.00 of Mr. Yazdzik’s money hidden in the basement of her home.

Unbeknownst to Mr. Crozier, the $11,000.00 was provided to Ms. Rost by federal

agents as bait money in a sting operation designed to catch Mr. Crozier in a money

laundering case. Ms. Rost was wearing an electronic listening/recording device

when she met with Mr. Crozier and gave him the $11,000.00. (Transcripts from

recordings at A- 98, 106) At no time during this meeting did Ms. Rost ask Mr.

Crozier to launder the money or to otherwise conceal or disguise the source of the

funds. Mr. Crozier accepted the money, gave Ms. Rost a receipt in Mr. Yazdzik’s

name (Copy of receipt, A-112), and put the money in a desk drawer. Shortly after

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Ms. Rost left, federal agents arrested Mr. Crozier for attempting to launder money

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B).

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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

I. The trial court erred in striking the pro-se appearance of Mr. Crozier, a

practicing attorney, on his own behalf as co-counsel to his retained

private attorney.

The District Court abused its discretionary power by striking Mr. Crozier’s

appearance as co-counsel to his privately retained counsel. Mr. Crozier’s extensive

experience as a trial attorney is a compelling reason to allow him a hybrid

representation. The trial court’s concern of jury confusion could have been limited

or negated by limiting Mr. Crozier’s ability to cross-examine certain witnesses.

This error by the trial court violated Mr. Crozier’s right to counsel as contained in

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

II. The trial court erred by failing to grant Mr. Crozier’s Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal as to Count I, after the close of the Government’s

case, because the Government failed to prove and the evidence was

insufficient to show that a conspiracy to launder monetary instruments

existed between Messrs. Crozier and Yazdzik; that Mr. Crozier had the

requisite specific intent to launder monetary proceeds; and that Mr.

Crozier knew that the proceeds were from drug trafficking.

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The government failed to prove that a conspiracy to conceal or hide

proceeds from unlawful activity existed between Messrs. Crozier and Yazdzik and

that Mr. Crozier possessed the specific intent to launder money. The government

also failed to prove that transaction was designed to hide or conceal the subject

proceeds.


Judgment of Acquittal as to Count II because the government failed to

prove and the evidence was insufficient to show that: 1) the transaction

was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source,

ownership or control of property he believed to be the proceeds of

unlawful activity; and 2) Mr. Crozier had the requisite specific intent to

launder monetary proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B).

The government failed to prove that Mr. Crozier had the intent to hide or

conceal the cash given to him by Ms. Rost or that Mr. Crozier had the intention of

hiding or concealing the money. In fact, Mr. Crozier put the money back into the

purported rightful owner’s name, Mr. Yazdzik and, in effect, publishing the

identity of the source and owner of the subject cash.

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ARGUMENTS

I. The trial court erred in striking the pro-se appearance of Mr.

Crozier, a practicing attorney, on his own behalf as co-counsel to his

retained private attorney.

a. Standard of Review

“[T]he Second Circuit’s rule . . . is [that] it is within the discretion of the trial

judge to determine whether the defendant may act as his own counsel in

conjunction with representation by an attorney.” United States v. Swinton, 400

F.Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see United States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d

554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied , 355 U.S. 957, 78 S.Ct. 542, 2 L.Ed.2d 532

(1958). “Moreover, Faretta ratified a consensus within the federal judiciary

favoring a constitutional right to pro se status; and that consensus has existed side

by side with another finding that a defendant’s appearance as co-counsel lies

within the discretion of the trial court.” Swinton, 400 F.Supp. at 806, referencing

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In

reviewing a trail court’s striking of an appearance by a defendant to represent

himself and retain private counsel, the appellate court shall determine if the trial

court abused its discretion and if there was in fact a compelling reason to “justify

an exception to the normal mode of representation in a criminal trial . . .” Swinton,

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400 F.Supp. at 807; see also U.S. v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1025 (10th Cir. 1975)

cert. denied 96 S.Ct. 1676 (1976)

b. Argument

It is well established that where a compelling reason exists a trial court may

permit a criminal defendant to utilize a hybrid representation where he both

represents himself and has co-counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d

1125 (2dCir. 1988); O’Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 869

(2dCir.1982); Swinton, 400 F.Supp. 805. In Swinton the Court noted that, “[i]t is

settled law in this Circuit that a criminal defendant has no Sixth Amendment right

to act as his own counsel where he is also represented by an attorney.” Id. at 807,

citing United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied , 423

U.S. 1059, 96 S.Ct. 794, 46 L.Ed.2d 649 (1976). However, the Swinton Court did

note that in the Second Circuit “it is within the discretion of the trial judge to

determine whether the defendant may act as his own counsel in conjunction with

representation by an attorney.” Id. More recently in Tutino, 883 F.2d. 1125, 1141,

the Second Circuit Court also held that “[t]he decision to grant or deny ‘hybrid

representation’ lies solely within the discretion of the trial court.” Id. citing

O’Reilly, 692 F.2d 863, 869.

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In United States v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second

Circuit addressed the issue of what constitutes a compelling reason to grant a

hybrid representation. In Stevens, the Court denied Stevens’ contention that the

trial court had abused its discretion by refusing his request for hybrid

representation holding that the trial court had properly concluded that “1) []

Stevens was not claiming either that his counsel was not adequately representing

him, or that he would be unduly prejudiced by not being permitted to serve as co-

counsel, and 2) that Stevens’ appointment as co-counsel would be disruptive.” Id.

Also, in a pretrial report and recommendation in United States v. Parker,

2009 WL 5342774, 2 (W.D.N.Y. 2009), the report of Payson, J. recommended the

District Court deny Parker’s pro se motions because Parker was represented by

counsel. Judge Payson wrote, “[a] court need not permit hybrid representation if a

defendant does not offer a compelling reason (citing O’Reilly, 692 F.2d at 869 and

Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1141), or show that ‘the interests of justice [would be] served

by a defendant’s supplementation of legal services provided by his retained

counsel.” (Citing Swinton, 400 F.Supp. at 806.)

In applying Swinton, Stevens, and Parker to the instant case, Mr. Crozier

stands well apart from these lay criminal defendants based on his extensive

experience as a practicing lawyer who has tried over 100 cases in his almost 38

years of practice. Mr. Crozier’s trial experience is likely unmatched in

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Connecticut and the interests of justice certainly would have been served in

allowing him to use his experience to assist in his own defense. It is, after all, Mr.

Crozier who suffered the consequences of his conviction. Mr. Crozier is not only

familiar with the intricacies of the trial process, he likely could school both judges

and lawyers on the same. Even Judge Hall, while striking Mr. Crozier’s

appearance, stated, “I have no reason to question Attorney Hillis’ representation

that his client is an extremely experienced trial attorney, who would be excellent at

representing someone in this court. I would be happy to have him with that

experience represent someone in this court .” United States v. Crozier, 3:13cr 113

(JCH), Trial Transcript, Day one of Trial, P. 10, L. 12 -16 (emphasis supplied)(A-

24). Yet, incredulously, Judge Hall then stated that she could “see no compelling

reason” to allow Crozier’s hybrid representation. (A-24)

While it is true that Mr. Crozier did not allege that Attorney Hillis was not

adequately representing him, certainly Mr. Crozier’s unprecedented experience as

a trial attorney would have benefitted his private counsel in this case. This is a

compelling reason to allow Mr. Crozier a hybrid representation. The trial court’s

concern that such a hybrid representation would be confusing to the jury is

misplaced. The District Court could have allowed Mr. Crozier’s hybrid

representation and perhaps limited it in areas where such confusion might have

been greater, as in cross examining Mr. Yazdzik, a former client, and Ms. Rost.

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But the court did not do that and instead struck the appearance sua sponte based

solely on some perceived jury confusion. (A-19)

By striking his appearance without a factual basis, Judge Hall abused her

discretionary power and violated Mr. Crozier’s Sixth Amendment Right to

Counsel. Mr. Crozier’s unprecedented legal experience is a compelling reason to

allow him hybrid representation and his familiarity with the trial process ensured

that such a representation would not have been disruptive of the legal process. In

the interest of justice, Mr. Crozier should have been permitted to represent himself

as co-counsel to Attorney Hillis.

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II. The trial court erred by failing to grant Crozier’s Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal as to County I – Conspiracy to Launder

Monetary Instruments, after the close of the Government’s case,

because the Government failed to prove and the evidence was

insufficient to show that: 1) a conspiracy to launder monetary

instruments existed between Messrs. Crozier and Bruce Yazdzik,

Crozier’s alleged co-conspirator; 2) Mr. Crozier had the requisite

specific intent to launder monetary proceeds; and 3) Mr. Crozier

knew that the proceeds were from drug transactions.

a. Standard of Review1

Challenges to the sufficiency of evidence are reviewed de novo. United

States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d. Cir. 2004). Although the burden on the

defendant is heavy, it is not an impossible burden. Id. The Appellate Court can

confirm only if “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond reasonable doubt.’” Id., quoting United States v. Samaria, 239

F.3d 228, 233 (2d Cir. 2010) quoting in part Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979). Although the Appellate Court defers to a jury’s assessment of credibility,

1 This de novo standard of review will apply to issues II and III.

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conflicting testimony and competing inferences, specious inferences are not

indulged. Jones 393 F.3d at 111. To convict, a jury must “reach a subjective state

of near certitude of the guilt of the accused . . .” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315.

Jackson recognized that “a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even

when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt . . .” Id. at 317. It “remains axiomatic that,[i]t would not satisfy

the [Constitution] to have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty.”

United States v. Rodriquez, 392 F.3d 539, 544 (2d Cir. 2004), quoting Sullivan v.

Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993).

b. Argument – Lack of Conspiracy and Specific Intent

Mr. Crozier was charged in Count I of the indictment with conspiracy to

Launder Monetary Instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a) (1) (B) (i): 18

U.S.C. § 1956 in pertinent part:

(a) (1) Whenever, knowing that the property involved in a financial

transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,

Conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in

fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity -- …

(B) Knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part –

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(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful

activity; or

“To prove conspiracy, the government must show that the defendant agreed

with another to commit the offense; that he knowingly engaged in the conspiracy

with the specific intent to commit the offenses that were the object of the

conspiracy; and that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed.

United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180, (2d Cir. 2008) citing United States v.

Monaco, 1964 F. 3d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1999).

The law of conspiracy partakes of the law of contract – it requires a

“meeting of the minds.” See, e.g., United States v. Geibel, 369 F.2d 682, 692 (2d

Cir. 2004), citing United States v. Rosenblatt, 54 F.2d 36, 38 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1977);

see also, United States v. Rulido, 699 F.3d 192, 209 (7th Cir. 1995)(“[a]n

agreement among two or more individuals to commit a criminal act, like a contract,

involves a ‘meeting of the minds.’”)

Although the prosecution need not prove that the conspirators agreed on the

details of their criminal enterprise, it must prove the “essential nature of the plan.”

Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947); see also United States v.

LaSpina, 229 F.3d 165, 174 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Salamaeh, 152 F.3d

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88, 147 (2d Cir 1998), cert. denied , 526 U.S. 1028 (1999). The essence of

conspiracy is agreement, and the prosecution must prove that “an agreement was in

fact made.” United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2004); Rosenblatt,

584 F.2d at 39.

Because Mr. Crozier was indicted for Conspiracy to Commit Monetary

Laundering, along with the essential nature of the plan amongst conspirators, the

government also had to prove that Mr. Crozier intended to launder money. In a

prosecution for money laundering, ‘the government must prove that [the

defendant] had the specific intent to conceal or disguise the nature, location,

source, ownership, or control of property he believed to be the proceeds of

unlawful activity.” United States. v. Carter, 966 F.Supp 336, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1997),

citing U.S. v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, (7th Cir. 1993) cert. denied , 508 U.S. 913,

113 S.Ct. 2350, 124 L.Ed.2d 259 (1993) (emphasis supplied).

In United States v. Saunders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991), the defendant,

a narcotics dealer, successfully appealed her conviction on money laundering

charges predicated on her purchase of a vehicle she had titled it in her daughter’s

name. The Saunders Court held that “the titling of an automobile in a family

member’s name was insufficient evidence of a design to conceal where other

actions of the purchaser served to identify the relationship between the true buyer,

the property and the cash.” Saunders, 929 F.2d. at 1472-73.

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In United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993), the

Appellate Court held that a, “[c]onviction for attempt requires culpable intent and a

substantial step toward the commission of the crime strongly corroborative of that

intent.” Id. citing United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir.); cert.

denied , 506 U.S. 858, 113 S.Ct. 171, 121 L.Ed.2d 118 (1992.) The Court found

that McLamb’s actions in accepting multiple checks under $10,000 for the

purchase of a car, agreeing to title the vehicle in another’s name, and telling the

undercover agent about the “clean way” to conduct the transaction were enough to

support a conviction under § 1956 (a)(3)(B). Id. at 1287. The Court also wrote

that McLamb’s “negotiations with [the federal agent] and his conduct on the day

[the agent] arrived at the dealership ostensibly to pay for and pick up the car went

far beyond mere preparation and were certainly substantial steps toward

conducting a transaction, steps which strongly corroborate the necessary culpable

intent.” Id.

Here the government has failed to show both that Mr. Yazdzik had an

agreement with Mr. Crozier to launder money and that Mr. Crozier had the specific

intent to launder the proceeds. The government’s evidence adduced at trial was

solely centered on the testimony of Mr. Yazdzik, the purported drug dealer that

turned to Mr. Crozier for legal representation. Assuming, arguendo, that the

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$30,000.00 Mr. Yazdzik gave to Mr. Crozier was drug proceeds, Mr. Yazdzik’s

testimony supports a judgment of acquittal for Mr. Crozier.

At no time during the direct examination did Mr. Yazdzik intimate that he

agreed with Mr. Crozier to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source,

ownership or control of purported drug proceeds. In fact, Mr. Yazdzik’s testimony

construed most favorable to the government (Glasser v United States, 315 U.S.

60,80,62 S.Ct. 457,86 L. Ed 680 (1942)) only suggests an attempt to avoid a

transaction reporting requirement in violation of 18 U.S. § 1956 9a)(1)(B) (ii) for

which Mr. Crozier was not charged.

In United States v Stephenson, 183 F. 3d 110,120-122 (2d Cir.1999), this

court held [a]bsent proof of intent to conceal, an ordinary purchase made with ill-

gotten gains does not violate the money laundering statute. (Id. at 121).

The purchase in this matter was a note given to Mr. Yazdzik by Brightside

Solar, LLC for the investment by Mr. Yazdzik of $30,000.00. The transaction was

open and notorious. The note was in the name of Bruce Yazdzik. (A-34) Mr.

Yazdzik met with the principals of Brightside and was introduced as Bruce

Yazdzik, (A-47). In fact, Mr. Crozier even made the principals execute a personal

guarantee to Mr. Yazdzik in Mr. Yazdzik’s name. (A-38). As in Stephenson, Mr.

Yazdzik’s interaction with Brightside Solar, LLC was “open and notorious” (Id. at

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121) as a result of Mr. Crozier’s representation. The only intent to conceal that was

possibly shown by the government was to avoid IRS scrutiny, a reporting crime

not charged by the government. (See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1)(B)(ii)).

Mr. Yazdzik’s testimony on direct fails to establish a violation of intent to

conceal and forecloses any conspiracy, as there was no agreement with Mr.

Crozier, Mr. Yazdzik’s testimony on cross examination forecloses both conspiracy

and intent to conceal. Mr. Yazdzik explained the transaction as follows:

“He explains to me that he was going to – it was good, okay. This is

all here. Sign the contract. We did the whole deal. He told me he was

going to have to take the money down. He was going to have to put

9000 in his account. He was going to put the rest in a safety deposit

box. He couldn’t pull out $30,000.00 to give to the company. He

couldn’t deposit $30,000.00 into the account because the IRS would

start to notice the type of money coming in. He said he would put nine

grand. Take the $30,000 out of his account and put the rest of the

money into a safety deposit box and take the money out gradually and

put it into his account.” (A-33)

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There is nothing in Mr. Yazdzik’s testimony that evidences an agreement

that Mr. Yazdzik had with Mr. Crozier to launder proceeds of Mr. Yazdzik’s

narcotic trafficking.

On direct examination, Mr. Yazdzik testified:

“A. Yeah, we talked about the meeting and there was two ways for

the contract basically. I invested $30,000 and they had the option to

give me back $33,000 which would be a 10 percent on your 10 percent

that would come back or they have the option -- I have the option of

owning 10 percent of the company, keep the revenue coming. I said

I wanted the revenue come in. I didn’t want the $3,000 that wouldn’t

do me no good. 30,000 and 3000 back wouldn’t have did me any good.

I told them that. They said they can see what they can do. Either way it

was going to be good because even if they gave me back the $33,000. I

get that back in a check from the company so it will still be legitimate

money.

Q. Who told you it was going to be legitimate money?

A. Mr. Crozier.

Q. What was your understanding when he said legit money?

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A. I was going to get a check from the company. I can put that in the

bank. I can do anything I want with it. It is legitimate money. I can

take that 33,000 and buy another company with that 33,000. It would

be legitimate. It would be clean money. (A-27, 28)

Nothing in Mr. Yazdzik’s testimony proves that Mr. Yazdzik agreed with Mr.

Crozier to launder the money. Mr. Yazdzik wanted to make money on his money

and that is insufficient to show an agreement with Mr. Crozier to conceal the source

or identity of the money.

The government introduced a note with Mr. Yazdzik’s name on it (A-92).

Mr. Yazdzik testified that his name was on the note as a lender (A-30) and that his

signature was on the note (A-31).

On cross examination Mr. Yazdzik testified that government’s exhibit 2 was

a “promise to pay”:

Q. That’s just where someone is promising to pay you money,

right? And the note is given to you by the Brightside folks who owned

Brightside. You give them money. They give you a note, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And that’s in your name, correct?

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A. Yes.

Q. It’s not in your mother’s name?

A. No.

Q. Not in Gaudiosi’s name?

A. No.

Q. Not in anybody’s name but yours, right?

A. Yes.

Q. So you would agree with me, sir, that certainly isn’t hiding your

name on a document, right?

A. Yes. (A-34)

In fact, Mr. Yazdzik testified that Mr. Crozier made the principals of

Brightside Solar give Mr. Yazdzik a personal guarantee on the note:

Q. You understand that Ralph, Mr. Crozier, Attorney Crozier,

forced them to put their personal guarantee on this agreement. Do you

remember that?

A. He said there’s a personal guarantee on it.

Q. That was again to protect you, correct?

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A. Yes.

Q. Because you understand, sir, that if the company goes bust, and

they don’t have a personal guarantee, you don’t get paid, correct?

A. Yes. (A-38)

After a review of all of Mr. Yazdzik’s testimony it is clear that there was no

agreement to hide or conceal the source; nature; control or ownership of the subject

$30,000.00 (assuming for argument that it was unlawful proceeds) and, more

importantly, it was a commercial transaction which had Mr. Yazdzik’s name on it,

open and notorious.

Q. Was there any time during that – was there any time during that

interview of February 16, 2012 that you told the government that

Ralph Crozier was money laundering for you?

A. I just told them he was my lawyer.

Q. But you didn’t say – you would agree that you did not tell him

that he was money laundering?

A. I don’t know exactly what money laundering entails.

Q. Right. So you never told him he was a money launderer?

A. I can’t make that decision where I don’t know what it entails.

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Q. Let me rephrase my questions better for you. I apologize. You

never told them, yes or no, that Attorney Crozier was money

laundering for you, correct?

A. I don’t know what money laundering is, so no.

Q. So the answer would be no, right?

A. I told him my dealings.

Q. You also didn’t tell him that Ralph Crozier was helping you

hide money in Brightside, did you?

A. No. There was a contract. There was no money hidden.

(A-39, 40)

Here, as in Stephenson, the evidence produced by the government was

inadequate to establish that Mr. Yazdzik’s loan to Brightside Solar, LLC was

designed to disguise or conceal drug proceeds. Mr. Crozier was only charged with

subsection (i) of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(i)(B), and not subsection (ii) which prohibits

transactions “to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal

law”.

Examination of government witness Mr. Yazdzik’s own testimony supports

the fact that the loan to Brightside Solar, LLC was a loan to make money on an

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ordinary commercial transaction. Mr. Yazdzik testified that the contract was in his

name, with the appropriate commercial guarantee and that the transaction was just

the contract, no “money was hidden”. (A-40)

Joining a number of other circuits, we hold that

Subsection (i) of the money laundering statute does not

criminalize the mere spending of proceeds of specified

unlawful activity. See, e.g. United States v. Dobbs, 63 F

3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1995) (“where the use of the money

was not disguised and the purchases were for family

expenses and business expenses … there is …insufficient

evidence to support the money laundering conviction”);

United States v. Rockelman, 49 F 3d 418, 422 (8 th Cir.

1995) ( money laundering statute should not be interpreted

to criminalize ordinary spending of drug proceeds). By its

express terms, the statute requires proof that a financial

transaction involving drug proceeds was designed “to

conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified

unlawful activity .” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Thus,

absent proof of intent to conceal, an ordinary purchase

made with ill-gotten gains does not violate the money

laundering statute. (Stephenson at 120, 121).

The only reference to conceal was the inference that Mr. Crozier didn’t want

the IRS involved. (A-33)

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Mr. Crozier may have intentionally split up the $30,000.00 given to him by

Yazdzik in order to avoid triggering federal transaction reporting requirements.

However, here as in Stephenson, the Court held that “we hold such purpose is not

sufficient to satisfy the “intent to conceal” requirement of Section 1956

(a)(1)(B)(i). “Conceal” implies conduct entailing deception that goes beyond

merely acting in a way that avoids compulsory disclosure”. (Stephenson at 121).

Respectfully, this distinction wasn’t made by the District Court. 18 U.S.C. §

1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) proscribes conduct distinct from 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

Arguably, from the government’s evidence a violation of the money laundering

statute regarding reporting requirements to the IRS may have been shown. But this

evidence cannot be used to satisfy the “intent to conceal” element found in 18

U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

Moreover, Subsection (ii) expressly criminalizes

transactions designed to evade state or federal reporting

requirements. A statute should be construed so that all of

its parts are given effect, see Mobil Oil Corp v. Karbowski,

879 F 2d 1052, 1055 92d Cir. 1989), and “a construction

ascribing to two separate statutory provisions the same

meaning and scope is [therefore] disfavored.” United

States v. Yip, 930 F 2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1991). In light of

these customary guides to statutory interpretation, the

government’s view that an intent to avoid government

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reporting *122 requirements by itself establishes intent to

conceal must be rejected. To give effect to both

subsections 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (B)(ii), each must

proscribe conduct distinct from the other. See id. Evidence

of intent to evade a reporting requirement cannot,

therefore, in and of itself satisfy the “intent to conceal”

element of subsection (B)(i). The evidence proffered in the

instant case thus failed as a matter of law to satisfy the

scienter requirement of Subsection 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

(Stephenson at 121, 122).

c. Argument – Lack of Knowledge concerning the source of the proceeds.

The trial court also erred in not granting Mr. Crozier’s Motion for Judgment

of Acquittal after the government rested because the evidence was insufficient to

establish that Mr. Crozier knew the $30,000.00 Mr. Yazdzik invested were

proceeds from Mr. Yazdzik’s narcotic trafficking. In Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884,

the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of knowledge of the

source of the proceeds. Kaufmann, a car dealer, had been told that a marijuana

dealer wanted to purchase a vehicle. Kaufmann agreed to accept $40,000 in cash

for a Porsche and to title the vehicle in a name that was not the purchaser’s. Id. at

887. On appeal, Kaufmann claimed that there was insufficient evidence to show

the he in fact believed the cash was drug proceeds. Id. at 892.

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The Kaufmann Court noted that although no express statements were made

to Kaufmann that the money was drug proceeds, “there were, however, statements

of various facts from which a reasonable person would almost certainly infer that

drug proceeds were involved.” Id. at 893. These statements included that

Kaufmann was told “that the man interested in purchasing the $40,000 Porsche had

to pay cash, and that he wanted the car titled in a name other than his own.” Id.

The CI also told Kaufmann “that this man was a marijuana dealer” and provided

Kaufmann “with a letter purported to be from the interested buyer . . . stat[ing]

‘that the purchase in cash and the titling in another’s name were more important

considerations than price.’” Id. The Court concluded that “the evidence, taken as

a whole, sufficiently demonstrates that [the CI’s and agents’] assertions gave

Kaufmann or any reasonable person in his position a firm basis to believe that the

money derived from drug sales.” Id.

In applying Kaufmann’s reasonable person test to the instant case, although

Mr. Crozier may have been somewhat aware of Mr. Yazdzik’s criminal history

there are very few other assertions that would give a reasonable person a firm basis

to believe that the money was derived from drug sales. Mr. Yazdzik testified that

he purposefully portrayed himself as a used car dealer to appear legitimate. Mr.

Yazdzik also testified that he created false pay stubs from the used car business to

show legitimate income to both Mr. Crozier and the Courts. Mr. Yazdzik testified

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that he hid his identity from Mr. Crozier as a drug dealer. Mr. Yazdzik never told

Crozier that the $30,000.00 was drug proceeds. Mr. Yazdzik testified that Mr.

Crozier learned about his drug dealing when Mr. Yazdzik turned in “Mike”. (A-

40)

In the government’s case in-chief, no evidence was adduced to prove that

Mr. Crozier knew Mr. Yazdzik’s investment into Brightside were proceeds from

narcotics trafficking as charged in the indictment. The government has not set

forth sufficient evidence to support Mr. Crozier’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. §

1956 (a)(2)(B)(i). As such, the District Court should have granted Mr. Crozier’s

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal after the government rested.

Q. Can you answer my question?

A. No.

Q. I’m not trying to be rude, I’m just trying to get you to focus on

that question, please. And you never told them that he knew he was

hiding drug money, did you?

A. He knew it was drug money.

Q. You never told him that he knew that he was hiding drug

money for you? Just listen to my question. You never told him that,

correct?

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A. No.

Q. You never told them that you came to Attorney Crozier and

said, hey, I have drug money to hide, would you hide it for me? You

never said that, correct?

A. No. (A-40)

Q. turning your attention back to the proffer of 1-18-12 that we

talked about yesterday. You never told the agents that Attorney

Crozier was hiding drug money for you, did you?

A. No. (A-43)

Q. As you sit here today, you don’t recall whether you told the

government that Mr. Crozier knew that the money you gave him was

from the sale of drugs?

A. I don’t recall. (A-44)

Q. Do you recall whether you had told the government that Mr.

Crozier knew that you gave him drug money to help you invest in

Brightside Solar? Do you recall telling the government that?

A. I don’t recall.

Q. You were debriefed by the government?

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A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall telling the government that Mr. Crozier

helped you launder money at that time?

A. I never said that.

Q. Pardon?

A. No, I didn’t say that.

Q. Okay, You didn’t say that. And you didn’t tell them that Mr.

Crozier in this 12-16 proffer session was trying to hide money for

you? You never told them that, correct?

A. No.

Q. How about on the 1-18 session, you never told them that

Attorney Crozier was trying to hide money for you, did you?

A. No.

Q. That was a 1-18 session. I’m sorry.

A. No.

Q. Then on the February session, you never told them that

Attorney Crozier was trying to hide money for you, did you?

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A. No. (A-45, 46)\

Q. And the paperwork that you signed was paperwork that had

Bruce Yazdzik’s name on it, right?

A. Paperwork, this paper?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. You also signed an agreement which had Bruce Yazdzik’s

name on it, the two documents you signed?

A. Correct.

Q. That had Bruce Yazdzik’s name on it as well?

A. Yes. (A-53)

However, during cross examination Mr. Crozier’s counsel pointed out that

Mr. Yazdzik also owned a car dealership and that he had “shipments” made to this

legitimate business. (A-86) Based on the limited evidence used in convicting

Mr. Crozier, it was not sufficient to show that Mr. Crozier was aware of the

circumstances from which a reasonable person would infer that the property was

drug proceeds

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Judgment of Acquittal as to Count II – Attempt to Launder

Monetary Instruments, because the government failed to prove and

the evidence was insufficient to show that: 1) the transaction was

designed to disguise or conceal the nature, location, source,

ownership, or control of property believed to be the proceeds of

specified unlawful activity; and 2) Mr. Crozier had the requisite

specific intent to launder monetary proceeds.

The basis for Count Two of Mr. Crozier’s conviction was two meetings he

had with Mr. Yazdzik’s mother, Debra Rost. During these meetings, Ms. Rost, in

her role as a confidential informant, wore an electronic listening/recording device.

(Transcripts of the recordings from these meetings are at A-98 and A-106) At the

first meeting, Ms. Rost inquired about the Brightside, LLC investment and

informed Mr. Crozier that Mr. Yazdzik needs money in jail. (A-98)

RC: What they, what they, if he doesn’t want the ten percent, which

I assume he doesn’t he needs money, so basically I – what I’ll do is

I’ll have them pay the interest that’s due which should be three

thousand thirty six hundred already due, because its been well over a

year, um I will find out what I can get, send it off to him, open up a

channel with him. (A-105)

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DR: … you know the feds took everything I don’t want the feds to

get it, I don’t know (A-98)

DR: But like I said, I don’t want people looking at me seeing I got

money from him (A-100)

DR: Okay.

RC: Which is what you’re here for me to do I assume.

Analysis of the first recorded conversation established that Mr. Yazdzik

wanted his money from Brightside, LLC, Mr. Crozier was going to talk to the

principals at Brightside and that Ms. Rost wanted Mr. Crozier to send Mr. Yazdzik

money in prison.

No evidentiary inference can be drawn that Mr. Crozier’s intention was to

conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership and control of

property believed to be proceeds of a specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956

(a)(3)(B). Mr. Crozier never agrees to hide Mr. Yazdzik’s Brightside, LLC

investment.

The second recorded conversation between Crozier and Rost took place on

April 11, 2013. (A-106)

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RC: Yes I contacted people with regards to the Solar energy, I’ve

gotten them to agree to meet with me no later than April the thirtiet

(sic) and to bring the account current at which time I will be funding

your son’s account in the federal prison so that he has money.

DR: Okay, now I did talk to Bruce

RC: Um Huh

DR; Okay I told him that you know I did finally make it here and all

that

RC: Good

DR: and he said, well I told him you told me you know, about

hiding his money from shipments. So he said okay. And you know he

is paranoid.

RC: Hiding his, hiding his money from …

DR: His shipments. You know when he’s doing the thing.

RC: Right (A-107)

Ms. Rost then informs Mr. Crozier that she found Mr. Yazdzik’s money

hidden in the basement and she wants to give Mr. Crozier the $11,000.00 cash, so

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that she will not get in trouble. Later on in the conversation Mr. Crozier and Ms.

Rost discuss putting the money into Mr. Yazdzik’s name.

RC: I will not only help him, I’m gonna make out this receipt to him

DR: Okay

RC: Okay?

DR: Yup

RC: And I’m going to put in eleven thousand, but I’m going to put

down, to be counted, all right? Because I (stutters)

DR: Yeah no problem

RC: You understand what I am saying I’m not going to sit and count

it (voices overlap)

RC: All right give it to me let me see what you got. And what I’m

going to do I’m going to give you a receipt maam um then I gotta

deposit it. Hello? Give me two seconds.

DR: Yeah, yeah, no problem (A-108)

RC: To be counted, um okay, I don’t want to put your name on

anything

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DR: Okay

RC: Cause I don’t want you involved with hiding things from the

feds.

DR: Okay. (A-110)

Mr. Crozier then gave Ms. Rost a receipt for the $11,000.00 in Bruce

Yazdzik’s name. . (A-112) In effect, putting the funds back into the alleged drug

dealer’s name. Moreover, Mr. Crozier informed Ms. Rost that he would have to

deposit the cash. Presumably, Mr. Crozier would have had to file a cash

transaction report on the $11,000.00 but the government arrested him prior to the

cash going to the bank.

The government’s only plausible argument can be that Mr. Crozier took the

money from Mr. Rost to conceal the nature, source or ownership of the cash and

thus “launder” the proceeds of Mr. Yazdzik’s drug business. The only source or

ownership of the $11,000.00 that could be concealed, is that of Mr. Yazdzik.

Instead of concealing Mr. Yazdzik’s name from the funds, Mr. Crozier issued a

receipt of the funds with Yazdzik’s name on it.

In Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550,128 S Ct. 1994, 170 L. Ed. 2d 942

(2008), the Supreme Court confirmed that a “conviction for transaction money

laundering, like a conviction for transportation money laundering requires proof

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that the purpose or intended aim of the transaction was to conceal or disguise a

specified attribute of the funds.” Huezo, 546 F. 3d at 179, 565 F. 3d 73, 78 (2d Cir.

2009). “Although Cuellar arose in the context of transportation money laundering,

we found it holding equally applicable in the context of transaction money

laundering, in light of the identical language in the two provisions”. United States

v. Garcia, 587 F. 3d 509, 517 (2d Cir.2009) citing , Huezo, 546 F. 3d at 179).

The “ruse” concocted by the government was to send Ms. Rost to Mr.

Crozier, who informed Mr. Crozier that the $11,000.00 was drug money or at least

money from unlawful activity, derived from her son, Mr. Yazdzik. If Mr. Crozier

gave the receipt to Ms. Rost in Ms. Rost’s name, after being so informed, there

may be an argument for a violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 1956 (a)(3)(B). Instead of

concealing the source or ownership of the “dirty” money, Mr. Crozier put it in the

source and owner’s name. Absolutely, no intent to conceal Mr. Yazdzik.

Ms. Rost was informed by Mr. Crozier that he had to deposit the cash. The

implication is that the deposit would have been in the name of Mr. Yazdzik as

well. Unfortunately, the government arrested Mr. Crozier soon after his

conversation with Ms. Rost and before the cash could be deposited. If Mr. Crozier

put the cash in his trustee account and filed a Cash Transaction Report in Mr.

Yazdzik’s name, there would have been no trial. Instead we are left to conjecture.

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Mr. Crozier’s intent to protect Ms. Rost from being “involved with hiding

things from the feds” (Appendix 9) is not a crime. Putting the funds back into the

name of Mr. Yazdzik, the drug dealing owner and source of the funds, is an action

that protects Ms. Rost, not an action designed to conceal the nature, source or

ownership of the $11,000.00 in cash. “Thus, Cuellar confirms that a conviction for

transaction money laundering, like a conviction for transportation money

laundering, requires proof that the intended aim of the transaction was to conceal

or disguise a specified attribute of the funds.” ( see Huezo at 179).

Mr. Crozier’s intent was to make sure Ms. Rost was not involved with

hiding things from the feds”, that’s why he put the cash into Mr. Yazdzik’s name.

“Actions do, indeed, speak louder than words…” United States v. Cromitie, 2011

WL 1842219 at p. 7 (2d Cir. 2011).

Similarly, in Ness , the Second Circuit applied Cuellar in a case involving

“the proceeds of drug sales that were being transported to people in Europe and

commingled with jewelry and other valuables that [defendant] Ness declared to be

part of his business of transporting such valuables internationally” 565 F 3d at 77.

In Ness , the government introduced testimony by (1) the defendant’s business

partner that the defendant stated that he “sells confidentiality” and (2) testimony

from an ecstasy trafficker who had delivered drug money to defendant’s company

because “he didn’t want a paper trail saying anything about the money that [he]

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dropped off” Id. at 78. The Second Circuit found that although the evidence

showed “how” defendant moved the money, it failed to establish “why” he moved

it. Id. The testimonial evidence, in conjunction with evidence of defendant’s

“avoidance of a paper trail, hiding of the proceeds in packages of jewelry, and use

of code words[.] show only that he concealed the proceeds in order to transport

them.” Id. Accordingly, the government’s evidence was not sufficient to support a

finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s purpose in transporting the

narcotics proceeds was to conceal one or more of their attributes. Id. see also

United States v. Roberts, 650 F. Supp. 2d 219 221(E.D. New York 2009) citing,

United States v Ness, 565 F. 3d 73 (2d Cir. 2009).

In fact, by putting the proceeds into Mr. Yazdzik’s name with the intent to

deposit the cash into a bank, Mr. Crozier revealed the source and ownership of the

allegedly unlawful proceeds from criminal activity. This effectively would protect

Ms. Rost from any inference that she was hiding money from the “feds”. No one

would have known that Ms. Rost was in possession of her son’s ill-gotten proceeds

until Mr. Crozier brought it into the light.

Mr. Crozier was not the source of the proceeds, Mr. Yazdzik was, at least

according to Ms. Rost in her CI role. As such, where Mr. Yazdzik was the source

of the proceeds, the relevant question is not Mr. Crozier’s purpose, but Mr.

Crozier’s knowledge of Mr. Yazdzik, the drug dealer’s purpose. United States v.

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Campbell, 977 F. 2d 854, 857, 858, (4th Cir. 1992), cert denied , 507 U.S. 938, 113

S. Ct 1331, 122 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1993). “Where the defendant is someone other than

the source of the illegal proceeds … the statute is concerned with his knowledge of

the source’s intent in the transaction”. United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F. 3d

1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2000).

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CONCLUSION

Based on the violation of Mr. Crozier’s right to counsel, his conviction

should be overturned and, if this Court does not reverse Mr. Crozier’s convictions

on both Court 1 and Count 2, this Court should order a new trial on any remaining

count(s) and that Mr. Crozier be allowed to assist in his defense as co-counsel to

his private retained attorney.

Based on the insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction for

Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Proceeds and Attempt to Launder Monetary

Proceeds, Mr. Crozier’s conviction should be overturned, his conviction reversed

and he should be acquitted on all counts.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

DEFENDANT RALPH CROZIER

By: ___________________________MICHAEL S. HILLIS

DOMBROSKI HILLIS LLC129 Whitney Avenue

New Haven, Connecticut 06510203.624.9096203.624.1308 facsimile

[email protected] Bar No.: ct 11867

Attorney for Ralph Crozier

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/s/ Michael S. Hillis



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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. This brief complies with the type volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.32(a)(7)(B) because:

This brief contains 9592 words, excluding the parts of the brief

exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because:

This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using

WordPerfect in Times New Roman 14-point type for text and 12-pointtype for footnotes.

Dated: July 16, 2015

By: ___________________________MICHAEL S. HILLIS

DOMBROSKI HILLIS LLC129 Whitney Avenue New Haven, Connecticut 06510203.624.9096203.624.1308 [email protected] Bar No.: ct 11867

Attorney for Ralph Crozier

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the original and six copies of the foregoing Brief for

Defendant-Appellant were dispatched to RECORD PRESS, this 16TH

day of June,2015, for delivery to the clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit this day.

I hereby certify that on June 16, 2015 a copy of the foregoing was filed

electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing.

Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court’s

electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as

indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through

the Court’s CM/ECF System.

___________________________

MICHAEL S. HILLIS



crozier appeal brief

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