critical review of existing definitions of information operations (io)

8/4/2019 Critical Review of Existing Definitions of Information Operations (IO)

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Critical Review of Existing Definitions of IO

By: Damian Niolet

The views expressed in this paper belong solely to the author and do not reflect the views of the USAF.


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INTRODUCTION

This too shall pass. Those simple words, it is believed, were intoned several centuries

ago and were intended to console a king during troubled times. As the story goes, it worked. 1 In

a way, those words could have invoked sentiments of consternation just as much as solace for

that king. The inevitability of change, a fact to which the opening phrase points, while

reassuring in troubling times is conversely troubling in reassuring times, particularly for certain

individuals. The individuals in question are associated with nations, specifically those

individuals are concerned with and responsible for the security of the nations to which they

respectively belong, such as a king. The king who received the aforementioned phrase might just

as easily surmised his eventual demise, the demise of his reign and even his nation.

The individuals that comprise the Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States (US)

are such individuals from today and these individuals more than likely exemplify the notion that

the consistency of change induces discomposure rather than its opposite. The IC is in an ongoing

struggle to perfect itself, ultimately with the aim of preventing what may very well be inevitable

- the complete dismantling of the security of the US. It may seem a fools errand to attempt to

prevent the inevitable, but to not act, especially in this case, would be even more foolish. If

change is inevitable, the only feasible action on the part of those whom change affects is to meet

the pace. However, at times, it is imperative to ask whether changes to practices and procedures

(doctrine) is warranted, or simply the result of fighting fire with fire (i.e.: change yourself before

someone else does) over-zealously, in the end proving to stifle the very endeavor which the

change originally sought to strengthen - securing a nation.

1 Keyes, Ralphs, The Quote Verifier: Who Said What, Where, and When (New York:Macmillan, 2006), 160.

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One area of US national security that is under frequent scrutiny and reevaluation is

Information Operations (IO). Recently, a new definition of IO was proposed, which is to be used

in forthcoming joint doctrine. The old definition is derived from doctrine published on February

13th, 2006. After a little less than five years, has the old definition proven to be so inadequate as

to threaten the USs national security, requiring a new definition be postulated? Is the propose

change simply an example of change for changes sake, and therefore, of little significance or

indeed a hindrance to the act of securing the nation? Most important, which definition better

serves IO practitioners, to include support elements such as the IC, in conducting IO? This essay

will answers these questions and by its end show that the change to the established definition of IO is a warranted change and the resulting definition an acceptable one in connection with

guiding, for their particular part, the IC in helping to secure the US through IO.

BODY OF EVIDENCE

The established definition for IO as abstracted from Joint Publication 3-13,

Information Operations , is as follows:

IO are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PYSOP), military deception(MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting andrelated capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human andautomated decision making while protecting our own .2

The new definition currently in staffing, from USD (I) is as follows, Information Operations

(IO) are the integrated employment of capabilities in the information environment to affect the

human and automated decision making of adversaries and as appropriate, neutrals, while

protecting our own. 3

2 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations , (D.C.: GPO, 2006), I-1.3 New definition currently in staffing from USD(I), (2010).

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First and foremost this essay will examine how these two definitions of IO differ. There

are two major differences which stand out after careful examination, all else is relatively

unchanged. The first that this essay will explore has to do with the descriptiveness of the

definitions. It is important that definitions be highly descriptive of that which they are defining

to the point that all possible aspects of the object being defined are invoked in the minds of those

individuals who are receiving the definition. The best definitions are those that can present the

most comprehensive set of terms that define the object in question using the fewest words.

Definitions must be descriptive, but conciseness - comprehensive, yet brief - is the key to a

worthy definition.At first glance it is apparent that the old definition is more descriptive, while the new

definition is less so; after all, the old is 45 words long, while the new is merely 30 words long.

The old definition, by Chicago style writing standards, requires that it be in block quotations

(five lines or more), while the new definition must exist as a run-in quotation. 4 It would appear

then that the authors of the new IO definition desired to streamline the old definition, keeping the

descriptiveness, but making it more concise. However, the fact that the new definition is briefer

than the old does not necessarily entail that it is concise. Some descriptiveness may have been

lost and indeed that is the case.

After taking the definitions apart, piece-by-piece, it becomes clear that the new definition

is simply abridged, not concise. The authors consolidated the sub-components of IO from the

old definition into a single phrase, capabilities in the information environment in the new

definition. Other components of the old definition were consolidated as well. The affects

intended through the employment of IO from the old definition, in the new definition are

4 Turabian, Kate, A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, andDissertations , (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 350.

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encapsulated by the phrase to affect. These new phrases are not very descriptive; the first says

nothing of the sub-components of IO, which are integral to an understanding of IO. The second

does not specify what affects, each of which have very different end-states, are being sought

through the utilization of IO. As such, the new definition cannot be considered comprehensive,

yet brief, in another word, concise.

The fact that the new definition is not concise does not necessarily doom the definition as

far as this author is concerned. While conciseness is the key to a worthy definition, concise

definitions are truly only ever a requirement when there are involved apprentices to a field. So

that apprentices to a field might learn all aspects of a field, their curriculum must be concise;however, so that experts in a field might pave the way ahead in a field, their guiding doctrine

need only be abridged. IC practitioners, those with some years of experience in particular, will

likely and appropriately conjure up for themselves all of the aspects (sub-components) of IO just

upon mentioning the abbreviation IO. Upon hearing the phrase, capabilities in the

information environment, the result would likely be no different. It is the short in the tooth

individuals, young airmen for instance, who would have difficulty grasping the full scope of IO

from the new definition. For them there would need to be much more amplification of the new

definition over the old.

In the end, who this new definition was written for must be well understood for this

essays assertion to carry weight. Essentially, the two definitions are saying the exact same thing

(except for one addition, which will be articulated below), just with more or less descriptiveness.

From the point of view of this author, the new definition is geared towards seasoned practitioners

of IO. When it comes to writing the doctrine that guides such practitioners, bloated definitions

are not ideal. The goal of doctrine is to get everyone on the same page quickly and to move

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ahead with a plan; abridged definitions are more appropriate for use in doctrine, since the more

quickly planners can move forward the greater their chances of surpassing the proverbial enemy.

It is the job of textbooks writers, not doctrine writers, to be concise with definitions. They are

the ones who are charged with presenting every possible aspect of the object being defined in

order to train up the young apprentices in a field. Doctrine writers, on the other hand, should by-

all-means abridge wherever possible, as they have done with the new definition of IO.

The second difference between the two definitions, of which this essay is concerned,

focuses in on an addition made to the old definition. That addition relates to against whom IO

is practiced. The old definition explains that IO is practiced against adversaries only. The newdefinition explains that IO is practiced against adversaries and, as appropriate, neutrals. The

stance that this essay will take on this addition is not expert; this author has not the full spectrum

of understanding of IO throughout history and in todays environment to speak authoritatively.

The following examination of the reasons for this addition and the ensuing implications

surrounding the addition come strictly from this authors particular understanding.

There are several examples in history where nations, which were initially neutral at the

onset of a war, were incited into said war. The US during WWI is a notable example. To speak

concisely on the history, President Woodrow Wilson had every intention to keep US neutral

throughout the war. German U-boat campaigns against Britain placed US shipping interests in

the cross-fire. A series of sinkings of British and US ships, while provocations to declare war on

Germany was not the straw that broke President Wilsons back. It was a letter written by

Germany intended for Mexico (the Zimmermann Telegram) promising several forms of aid in

return for Mexico declaring war on the US should the US declare war on Germany. Germany

was attempting to influence Mexico, a neutral nation during WWI, seeing how it was

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unavoidable to provoke the US into the war. Germany wanted to keep the US too occupied with

Mexico to devote significant resources to fighting Germany. 5

Even today, there are no international laws in place declaring that IO campaigns against

neutral nations are prohibited; therefore, the proverbial enemy may very likely use this loophole

as an advantage. As such, the US must anticipate this fact and initiate its own IO campaign

aimed, not necessarily at inciting neutral nations into a war, but at ensuring that the neutral

nation be more aligned with the US than the proverbial enemy. How such a campaign might

play out would be both of an offensive and defensive nature. The US would have to feed

positive IO, intended to lead to positive relations, into neutral nations. The US would also haveto ensure that neutral nations are equipped with the means to defend against adversarial IO

campaigns, otherwise the proverbial enemy could successively turn the neutrals against the US

and its allies.

The authors of the new definition, by adding in this potential target of IO campaigns,

seem to be taking a queue from history and are better enabling IC practitioners for future

engagements by defining this portion of the definition of IO more comprehensively. The

presence of neutral nations on the the IO playing field, though always present, was, perhaps, only

present on the peripheral, but has now been added as a focal point as far as doctrine is concerned.

IO campaigns need not be constructed with only the proverbial enemy in mind; in fact, IO

campaigns, by way of this doctrine, should make every effort to include neutral nations as center

pieces of any IO campaign.

CONCLUSION

In the quest for national security, a nation might be simultaneously heartened and

disheartened by the notion that change is inevitable. During its troubled times a nation can find

5 Tuchman, Barbara Wertheim, Zimmermann Telegram , (S.l.: Scribner, 1966)

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comfort knowing that the moment will pass, but at the same time find discomfort knowing that

security is most often only a sense of security, and a false one at that. However, nations cannot

insist on riding the waves that are change with only with hopes that they will not to be taken by

the undertow. Nations must adapt according to real and perceived changes if they are to survive.

The US IC is one such organization that is struggling to keep ahead of the inundating

power that is change. One area wherein change is on the horizon is IO. A new definition has

been proposed that is intended to guide future joint taskings for years to come and do so in a

manner that better supports the IC in conducting its part of that process than the old definition

previously had. This essay has painstaking shown why the new definition is a welcomedchanged over the old definition. It began by revealing how the new definition is more

appropriate for the audience to whom doctrine is written. The new definition is abridged in its

descriptiveness, but not inordinately so. Seasoned IO practitioners should comprehend the full

scope of the object being defined with ease and move to planning stages more readily.

This essay then pointed out the fact that within the new definition a potential target has

been added. Neutral nations, while having always been susceptible to IO campaigns by both

allies and enemies in the absence of international laws, by way of the new definition, are now put

on the table as potential targets for future IO campaigns. IO practitioners should now plan to

exploit IO against neutral nations accordingly, either offensively or defensively, as part of the

core of their campaign, taking queues from history. The new definition of IO more appropriately

streamlines comprehension as well as describes the full spectrum of potential targets. In all, this

is a welcome change to a critical component of the ICs purview in defense of the US.

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

REFERENCES

Keyes, Ralphs. The Quote Verifier: Who Said What, Where, and When . New York:Macmillan, 2006.

Joint Staff. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations . D.C.: GPO, 2006.

New definition currently in staffing from USD(I), 2010.

Tuchman, Barbara Wertheim. Zimmermann Telegram . S.l.: Scribner, 1966.

Turabian, Kate. A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, andDissertations . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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