criterion vol 5 no 3 final vol 5 no 3 final.pdf · maulana abul kalam azad was one of the most...

CriterionJuly/September 2010Volume 5, Number 3

Maulana Azad A.G. Noorani 3

Religious Ideology and Lethality Aneela Salman 46

Economic Cost of Pakistan’s Participation Sultan M. Hali 82in Wot

EssaysA Counter-Radicalization Strategy Mushfiq Murshed 107

Framing National Interest of Pakistan: Ashraf Jehangir Qazi 120Foreign Policy and Assurances of Peace

The Emerging New Nuclear Order Ali Sarwar Naqvi 133and Pakistan

Wmds: The Term and Its Political Riaz Muhammad Khan 142Implications

The Ingredients of Good Governance Shahid Kardar 151

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CRITERION – July/September 2010

MAULANA AZAD

A. G. Noorani*

Abstract(In all the annals of predictions of dire consequences which came true there is scarcely any parallel to Azad’s in its wealth of detail all of which came true and haunt us to this day. Only a truly great intellect and a man whose erudition gave him those insights could have spoken thus.

Dr. Zakir Hussain considered him the most intelligent man he had ever met (interview to the writer in July 1967). Even after Azad’s faults and failings are reckoned in a fair balance, his greatness stands out. It was left to Zakir Hussain to strike that balance in his funeral oration as Azad was laid to rest near the Jamia Masjid in Delhi: Unki Khamia hum sub men hai, unki khoobian hum kisi mey nahi – “We all have his failings; none of us has his qualities.” Author).

“Maulana Azad was in the Congress and with it throughout his political career, but he never thought it a moral obligation to agree with the Congress as a party. Particularly in the years after independence he stood out as one who could be relied upon for absolute impartiality of judgement and for an unimpeachable integrity. He was too aloof to concern himself with persons, too intellectual to relish political small talk, too proud to think in terms of alliance, affi liation or opposition. He was a statesman who would not accept the normal functions of a politician, and he was so engrossed in principles that he could not become an effi cient administrator. He had to be taken for what he was, with no credentials other than his personality.” – M. Mujeeb; The Indian Muslims; George Allens & Unwin; 1967; p. 442.

* A.G. Noorani is an eminent Indian scholar, legal expert and columnist.

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CRITERION – Volume 5 No.3

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was one of the most complex personalities India produced in the last century. He was a truly learned man, a devout Muslim, a consistent champion of freedom from British rule and an advocate of Hindu Muslim unity. Both as a man of learning and a politician he had grave failings and his contradictions in each fi eld did not make it easier to understand him.

In perhaps the only defi nitive study in English of this towering fi gure, Ian Henderson Douglas, an English Christian missionary who served in Lahore and as Director of the Henry Martyn Institute of Islamic Studies, now at Hyderabad, in India,- has struggled to grapple with his personality and writings (Abul Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography, Oxford University Press; 1988). It is edited by Gails Minault, and an erudite missionary Christian W. Troll, S. J., who wrote an able work on Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. (Sayyid Ahmed Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology; Vikas, New Delhi; 1978). To him is owed credit for presenting to English readers his translation of Azad’s essay on Sarmad the Martyr which he wrote in 1910. It reveals a lot of Azad (Christopher Shackle (ed.) Urdu and Muslim k; South Asia; SOAS, London, 1989; pp. 113-128).

Besides Douglas’ book, there are many works in English on Azad’s writings on Islam including translations of his magnum opus Tarjuman al-Qur’an by Syed Abdul Latif; (Asia, Bombay, 1962 and 1967, Vols. 1 and 2; Vide a critical essay by S.A. Kamali of the Institute of Islamic Studies, Montreal entitled Abul KIalam Azad’s Commentary on the Qur’an; The Muslim World; Vol. XLIX, 1959; pp. 5-18).

Ali Ashraf and a few others contributed refreshingly original papers, at a conference in New Delhi in 1989, which are published in Islam and Indian Nationalism, (edited by Mushirul Hasan, Manohar, 1992). Ali Ashraf held that the Tarjuman “remained incomplete. The third volume was not published, even though there is defi nite evidence (mostly in his correspondence) to show that the translation and commentary had been completed. Part of it was even calligraphed” Azad suppressed it. (ibid; p. 116).

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The fi rst volume was published in 1931 covering Surahs 1 – 6 including his magnifi cent commentary on Surat-al-Fatiha which Azad considered as the epitome of the entire Qur’an. Volume 2 concerning Surahs 2 – 23, was published in 1936. In prison (1942-45); Asaf Ali and Syed Mahmud begged of him to complete the work; unaware of its suppression apparently. (Douglas; 201).

Azad’s personality has been the subject of much comment and he provided considerable grist to the mills of detractors. Read this from his Preface to the First Edition of the Tarjuman which he wrote in District Jail, Meerat on 16 November 1930. “The subject has engaged my mind seriously over a long period of 27 years. Every chapter of the Qur’an, every part of it, and indeed every verse and every word of it has obliged me to traverse innumerable valleys and to counter numerous obstacles. .. there is not, I believe, any corner of the Qur’anic knowledge and of all that has been written so far on the problems which it raises, which I have left unsearched and unnoticed. Distinction is, no doubt, usually made between the old and the new learning. But, in my search for truth, this distinction has never counted with me. The old I have received as my heritage, and the new is as familiar to me as the old, and I have delved in both:

“I have been in life a libertine and a man of piety too. One by one, I can easily recognize – alike the pious and the libertine.

“What my family traditions, my education and my social environment had offered me in the making of my mind, I was from the very beginning of my life, reluctant to rest content with. The bonds of inherited dependence on the past could not hold me under. The zest of search for truth never forsook me. There is hardly a single conviction in me which has not had to bear the stings of doubt, or a single belief which has not faced the test of denial. I have gulped in poison, mixed with every draught applied to my lips, and have also administered to myself Elixir coming forth from every quarter. Whenever I felt thirsty, my parched lips did not resemble the lips of others who were equally thirsty, and when I quenched my thirst, it was not from the same fountain as others did.” (Vol. 1; pp. xlii – xliii)

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This is of a piece with Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s claim that he was a “cold blooded logician” implying that emotions which swayed lesser mortals left him alone. Jawaharlal Nehru’s vanity and arrogance are legendary. M. K. Gandhi’ professions of humility were deceptive. He revelled and relished being called a Mahatma “Let them not put up with it because I am Mahatma…(Collect Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWMG); Vol. p. 89 p. 458 and 238) and his intolerance of dissent wrecked democratic functioning of the Indian National Congress.

Azad’s monumental ego was little different from that of his contemporaries. In consequence South Asia suffered a lot. His gravitas was as belatedly acquired as that of the very clubbable Jinnah once he became the Quaid-e-Azam. Azad “was apparently in social relationships, jovial and good humoured.” His talent in giving persons apt nicknames suggests that. Nehru, an admirer, noted mischievously that he had “specially cultivated a look of venerable age to give a suitable background to his great learning” (Autobiography; Oxford University Press; p. 175).

Nehru’s assessment of Azad recorded in his Prison Diary on Christmas Day 1942 is a delight to read: “How different we are from each other – a varied assortment of Indian types! Maulana is in many ways an astonishing person. His fund of knowledge is truly vast. His mind is keen as a razor’s edge and his commonsense strong. He and I are in some ways – in outlook, approach on life &c – as the poles apart. Yet I get on very well with him and there are very few persons whose opinion & advice on public or private matters I would value more. He is diffi cult to get into, and has a thick superfi cial covering which conceals the inner contents. Glimpses of the inner person surprise one continually. He is a curious combination of the old & the new. Perfectly familiar with the new world, in so far as one can be so through books, his background is still eighteenth century or thereabouts. He adopts that to modern conditions, and does so remarkably well, but that background remains. There is something big in him – both as a scholar and man of action – Still there is something lacking which prevents him from bearing rich fruit as he should. Fine thinker and magnifi cent writer as he is, with vast stores of information at his disposal, he should have turned

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out a host of splendid books. Yet his record is a very limited one. As a man of action also his record would have been a far more dominating one but for that lack of something. Is he too philosophical or too cynical or too sensitive? He is all that and yet the lack is of something else. I do not quite know what …

“Perhaps it is a certain vital energy, the force of life that must out, that Maulana lacks. Perhaps he grew up too soon and was much too precocious. He is not old now by any means and yet there has always been a ripe maturity about him and it is diffi cult to think of him as a wild and passionate youth. When he was fourteen he was considered an accomplished scholar and, I think, he delivered lectures on logic & philosophy at that age! His intellect grew at the expense of other aspects of his nature. Not that he is at all austere or stoically indifferent to the world’s ways. He is human & full of humour.

“It is passion that he lacks. He is too intellectual, too cultured, to be carried away. Life must become rather a tame affair without passion.” (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, First Series; Vol. 13, pp. 38-39). If Nehru had read Azad’s Tazkira he would not have found it diffi cult to think of him as a passionate youth. Azad almost revelled in confessing to his pursuit of carnal pleasures.

Azad was against launching the Quit India Movement. Yet went along with the party. Events proved Gandhi’s folly. Nehru wrote: “During all this period how splendidly Maulana has behaved, like the perfect and very gallant gentleman he is – and that is more than can be said about myself. He has never complained, never found fault with others and always tried to cheer up people. Having taken a step deliberately, he is fully prepared to accept all the consequences that fl ow from it, without murmur or complaint, even though that step was, in some ways, against his own judgment. Later happenings have justifi ed him. Every criticism he made, during our long deliberations from May to August last, is now seen to have been correct. Yet he never points this out or even refers to it.” (ibid. pp. 89-90).

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Traits such as these infl uence conduct. This is not an essay on Azad’s outlook on Islam. One point is in order. It is submitted that in the last century there was a remarkable surge of global interest in Islam. Iqbal received more attention than anyone else from South Asia. Azad did not receive much. (However, vide J.M.S. Baljon; Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation, (1880-1960); E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1968 and Kenneth Cragg, The Pen and the Faith : Eight modern Muslim writers and the Qur’an; George Allen & Unwin, 1985; pp. 14-32 on Azad).

This is an essay on Azad’s politics. His personality and, indeed, his worldview are relevant only in so far as they explain his politics. The essay on Sarmad reveals a traditional background, a rebel and a romanticist; a poet at heart blessed with a keen intellect. Read this on Sarmad: “Throughout the thirteen centuries of Islam the pen of the jurists has been an unsheathed sword and the blood of thousands of truthful persons stains their verdicts (fatwa). From whichever angle you study the history of Islam, countless examples will illustrate how whenever a ruler came to the point of shedding blood, the pen of a mufti and the sword of a general rendered him equal service. This was not confi ned to the Sufi s and nobles for those ulema who were close to the seers of the mysteries of truth and reality also had to suffer misfortunes from the hands of the jurists and in the end obtained deliverance in giving their lives. Sarmad, too, was martyred by this same sword. ….”

He was summoned before the ulema and asked to recite the kalmia. “The emperor (Aurangzeb) said this because it had been brought to his notice that one of Sarmad’s strange habits was to pronounce, in reciting the kalima only the fi rst half of it: la ilaha. So, when the ulema asked Sarmad to recite the kalima, he recited, as usual with him, only la ilaha, which is a negative statement. When the ‘ulema became excited over this, he said: ‘I am still absorbed in negation. I have not yet reached the stage of affi rmation. If I pronounce illa llah, it will be as lie, and how can what is not in the heart pass on the tongue?”

On this Azad makes the perfect comment “Witness (shahadat) in the true sense is the appearance of Truth itself. That had not yet been granted to Sarmad. So why should he have declared ‘it exists’ concerning

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Maulana Azad


something he had not yet seen. All those who are on their way to this realm have to traverse this station. Sarmad’s crime was that he drank that cup in public which others drink in private. This earned him the censor’s whip …

“Deeper refl ection shows that this public declaration was necessary. Since the fi nal station on this journey was martyrdom, it was the duty of the camel-rider to direct the camel which might go astray anywhere in that very direction:

“When they gave Mansur the permission to declare (the Truth), It was on condition of punishment and harsh imprisonment.” (Shackle; pp. 124-125).

Jinnah and Azad began their political journeys from opposite poles. They met mid-way in the mid-twenties but parted company a decade later. Jinnah began with the Congress and went on to lead the Muslim League. Azad began with the Muslim League and twice became President of the Congress; but never led it. Neither in his writings on Islam nor in his politics was Azad free from contradictions, except on two fundamental on which he never wavered. One was uncompromising opposition to British rule; the other was Hindu-Muslim unity.

For quite some time, Azad’s journal Al-Hilal shunned politics. The fi fth issue of 8 September 1912 carried a long article entitled “Reply to a Letter Concerning The Objections and Political Teachings of Al Hilal.” It stated: “You observe that political questions should be kept separate from religion. But if they are separated what will remain with us? We have learnt our political ideas also from religion. .. We believe that every idea which is derived from any source other than the Qur’an is sheer heresy, and this includes also politics … Islam has given to man a complete and comprehensive law, and there is no problem of human life for which it does not provide a solution... According to our belief, a Muslim who is in his practice and faith accepts any party or teaching other than the Qur’an as his guide, is a heretic and not Muslim...”

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Earlier in January 1904 while editing Lisan-al-Sidq he had dubbed the Congress a Hindu body (Ali Ashraf, Mushirul Hasan, pp. 105 and 110). This was the Pan-Islamist phase “No movement confi ned to a country, no local movement can today benefi t Islam; (or) the Muslim... nation, which is spread from the deserts of Arabia to the Chinese Wall. In fact whatever ‘local endeavours are being made today whether in Egypt or Turkey, or in this land of darkness that is India, are all according to my belief made under the spell of that great sorcerer, the Satan.’” (ibid. p. 107).

Ali Ashraf records “Carried away by the spell of his own words, Azad had proposed that the three million rupees collected for the (Aligarh Muslim) University Fund be diverted in aid of the victims of Italian aggression in the War of Tripoli.” (ibid., p. 107).

He advocated establishment of an Imarat (leader of the State). He held “The Book (i.e., the Qur’an) and the Traditions of the Prophet teach us three fundamental principles of collective life: 1. All should unanimously agree on a learned and enterprising Musalman to make him their Imam; 2. They should truly and sincerely accept all his teachings; 3. They should unquestioningly obey and implement all his directives based on the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Traditions.

“The tongues of all should be speechless, only he, the Imam, should be speaking. The minds of all should be closed, only his mind should operate. The people should have neither tongues, nor minds, but only hearts which should accept (what is told) and hands and feet to toil and work and run about.” (ibid., p. 111, citing Khutbat-e-Azad, Malik Ram d(ed.); Sahitya Academy, New Delhi; 1974; pp. 130-131).

But this consolidation had a purpose not dissimilar to Jinnah’s efforts after 1937 to organize the Muslim League in order to forge a pact with the Congress in emulation of the Lucknow Pact 1916 which he had co-authored with Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Even when he dubbed the Congress a Hindu body this very goal was very much present in Azad’s mind. (Douglas; p. 60 and 141).

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Maulana Azad


With the lack of realism, characteristic of his politics at this stage, Azad encouraged moves to install him as Imam al-Hind ignoring the presence on the scene of ulema far more senior to him. He appointed provisional khalifas to accept baiat (pledges of loyalty) on his behalf. (Douglas, p. 171).

The demagogy had unfortunate consequences. Mohammed Sarwar, biographer of Ubaidullah Sindhi and a staunch critic of Abul Ala Maudoodi bemoaned the fact that Azad’s writings during this phase had strengthened the Jamaat’s ideas. (Mushirul Hasan, p. 117; citing Mohammad Sarwar, Maulana Maudoodi ki Tahreek-e-Islami; Sind Sagar Academy, Lahore; vide the Chapter on Azad).

In later years Azad’s writings acquired a vogue in Pakistan where critics denied his claim that he was always an Indian nationalist. (Douglas; p. 142). In truth, consistency was not his forte; as Douglas remarks “The fact is that, during the al-Hilal period, Azad tried to have it both ways” (ibid., p. 151).

He was present at the Muslim League’s foundation meeting at Dacca on 31 December 1906. His name fi rst occurs in the record of the proceedings of the League’s Fifth Session at Calcutta in March 1912 when he spoke in support of a motion that sought to accept G. K. Gokhale’s Elementary Education Bill, which Mohammed Shafi opposed. He objected to Azad’s remark that “only title-holders and members of the Council were opposing the Bill in order to show their loyalty.” Azad’s heart was in the right place; not so, his tongue. (Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.), Foundations of Pakistan; National Publishing House; 1969; Vol. I p. 254).

At the League’s Agra Session in 1913 Azad made a strong speech in Urdu demanding the immediate repeal of the Press Act. He is described as “Editor of al-Hilal” (ibid., p. 314). Jinnah participated in the proceedings though he formally joined the League only in 1913. The famous Lucknow session held in 1916 criticized orders of internment against Azad.

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Contemporaries’ assessment of Azad during this period was refl ected in a speech by Abdul Latif Ahmad as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Calcutta Session of the League in January 1918. “Like his father of revered memory, the Maulana also had devoted himself solely to the life of a teacher and preacher of Islam. For politics he never cared, and so far as I am aware, he never allowed himself to be dragged into it. His activities were mainly confi ned to the compilation of works on religion and imparting religious instruction to his disciples. But the all-knowing C.I.D. suddenly discovered that his presence here in Calcutta was dangerous. A memorial signed by over 70,000 Musalmans of Bengal was sent to the Government for the cancellation of the order.” (ibid., p. 403).

When he next actively participated in the League’s Session he had acquired greater fame. In December 1913, when the Congress met in Karachi, Azad criticized the Muslims for their past aloofness from it. He commended the previous year’s League session in Bombay and urged Muslims to cooperate with Hindus (Douglas; p. 145). Till 1936, the Congress permitted dual membership of the members of the League and the Hindu Mahasabha.

Azad met reverses on several fronts. The Khilafat Movement fi zzled out and was sunk in scandals of fi nancial irregularities. His project for imamat got nowhere. In his presidential address to the Jamiat ul-Ulema-e-Hind he urged the ulema as a body to fulfi ll the functions of a union. But he was not elevated Imam ul-Hind. All that the Jamiat did was to appoint a sub-committee to consider the election of an Amir al-Hind. (Douglas; p. 172). He had toyed with ideas of jihad, an armed rebellion – which never left him even in 1942 – as well as hijrat, migration to Afghanistan.

As with Gandhi’s trial and imprisonment in 1922 after a foolish prosecution, Azad’s trial and imprisonment in 1922 added cubits to his stature. (Vide A.G. Noorani; Indian Political Trials; Oxford University Press, New Delhi; 2005, for accounts of both trials, respectively at 223-237 and 213-222).

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Azad was prosecuted for sedition in respect of two speeches delivered on 1 and 15 July 1921 and was sentenced, on 9 February 1922 to a year’s imprisonment. Azad’s written statement was not made in defence to the charge but in defi ance of the regime he detested. Published in Urdu under the title Qaul-e-Faisal (The Last Word) even in an English translation, imperfectly attempted by this writer, the magnifi cence of this neglected masterpiece, one of the best ever by any accused in a political trial, stands out, as these excerpts show. “History bears witness that whenever the ruling powers took up arms against truth and justice, the Court-rooms served as the most convenient and plausible weapons. The authority of courts of law is a force which can be used for both justice and injustice. In the hands of a just government it becomes the best instrument for attaining right and justice. But, for tyrannical and repressive government, there is no better weapon for wreaking vengeance and perpetrating injustice.

“Next to battlefi elds it is in the court-rooms that some of the greatest acts of injustice in the history of the world have taken place. From the holy founders of religions to inventors and pioneers of science, there is no movement for piety or truth which was not arraigned before criminal courts. Doubtless, the revolution which time has brought about ended any excesses. I accept that in modern times we have none of the terrible outrages of 2 AD in the Courts of Rome or the tortures perpetrated during the Inquisition in the Middle Ages. But I am not prepared to accept that our times are free from the emotions which moved those courts. Fort sure, their edifi ces have been pulled down here were preserved dreadful weapons of torture. But who can change those hearts in which are buried the fearful secrets of human selfi shness and injustice?

“The list of injustices committed by courts is a very long one. History continues to mourn them to this day. In that list we fi nd a holy personage like Jesus Christ who was made to stand with thieves before a strange Court of his times. We fi nd it in Socrates who was sentenced to drink a cup of poison for no other reason than that he was the most truthful person in his country. We fi nd also the name of the great martyr to truth of Florence, Galileo, who refused to belie what he knew and

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learnt from his experiments, though their avowals a crime in the eyes of the court of his time. …”

Islam enjoined rejection even of a Muslim government which is not brand or the will of the people. “I fi nish my statement in the words of Gardino Brono, the famous martyr of Italy, who was also made to stand before the court like me: ‘Give me the maximum punishment that can be awarded without hesitation. I assure you that the pain that your heart will feel while writing the order, not a hundredth part of it will be felt by me while hearing the judgment.’

“Mr. Magistrate, I will not take any more time of the Court. It is an interesting and instructive chapter of history in which both of us are together engaged. The dock has fallen to our lot and to yours the magistrate’s chair. I admit that this chair is as much necessary for this task as this dock. Let us fi nish this memorable job. The historian waiting for us and the future has long been waiting for us. Allow us to come here often and you may also continue to write your judgments. This will go on for days till the doors of another court are fl ung open. It will be the Court of the Law of God. Time will be its judge and will write its judgment. And its verdict will be fi nal.” (Noorani; pp. 217-220).

By then he had cast his lot with the Congress leaders Gandhi and Nehru. After a year in prison he accepted an invitation to preside over the Congress’ special session in Delhi on 15 December 1923; the youngest to preside over that body. In his presidential address Azad made a stirring appeal and a false claim; neither the fi rst nor the last of its kind. He said: “Today, if an angel were to descend from the heaven and declare from the top of the Qutab Minar, that India will get Swaraj within twenty-four hours, provided she relinquishes Hindu-Muslim unity, I will relinquish Swaraj rather than give up Hindu-Muslim unity. Delay in the attainment of Swaraj will be a loss to India, but if our unity is lost, it will be a loss for entire mankind.”

But referring the Muslims’ aloofness from the Congress he claimed: “Those of you who have been studying changes in Muslim corporate life during the last twelve years know that mine was the fi rst voice raised in

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1912 against this attitude. I invited the attention of my Muslim brethren to the fact that by persisting in the policy of aloofness they were making themselves an impediment to the freedom of the country. I said, they should trust their Hindu brothers, abandon the policy of communalism, join Congress, and make the country’s freedom their ultimate goal. At that time my message was not well received by my Muslim brethren. I found strong opposition to my views. But not long after that the Muslims recognized the truth. In 1916, when I was interned at Ranchi, I heard that a large number of Muslims were entering the fold of Congress.” (Syeda Saizzyidain Hameed; India’s Maulana, Indian Council of Cultural Relations, Vikas Publishers 1990; Vol. 1 pp. 145-146). Signifi cantly there was not a word about Jinnah’s role in this transformation. “He found it hard to tolerate Muslim rivals,” Douglas records (p. 258), a trait which lasted all his life. Saifuddin Kitchlew resented it as did Dr. Zakir Husain. Douglas adds “His response to Jinnah’s growing political success was to try and ignore him” (p. 258).

Douglas makes a valid point about the change such as it was. Its seeds very much lay in Azad’s earlier outlook. He was always opposed to British rule and as relentlessly advocated Hindu-Muslim cooperation. Yet the shift was unmistakable.

“Co-operation with Hindus had always been a part of Azad’s political thought, but it only entered the realm of action after 1920. His readiness in 1923 to take his place in the Congress political machinery represented a distancing of himself from his former desire to become the Imam of Indian Muslims, and a new awareness of the signifi cance before God of daily participation in political affairs. Azad was accepted in the councils of the Congress as a devout Muslim, not because he had any large block of supporters, but because of his personal wisdom, moral courage and integrity. This was religion in politics in a new sense, not the claim of al-Hilal that the Qur’an gives specifi c guidance for all political decisions, but contribution to political life by a man who was deeply motivated by religion.” (Douglas; p. 192).

Within the Congress, Azad cut a vastly diminished fi gure in comparison to the highly respected Dr. M .A. Ansari. The Ali Brothers,

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though estranged from the Congress, nevertheless counted for a lot in Muslim affairs. Not till the mid-thirties did Azad acquire a political role of any signifi cance. In the crucial debate on the Nehru Report, he did not count for much.

Meanwhile he had continued to participate in the League’s deliberations even after he had become the Congress’ President; but even more actively in the Congress whose leaders gave him greater prominence. He toured extensively with Congress leaders. On 31 July 1926 Azad and Motilal Nehru issued a Manifesto which proposed the establishment of an “Indian National Union” (S.A.l Tirmizi; Maulana Azad, Commonwealth Publishers, Delhi, 1991; p. 16). In 1930 he published a Manifesto jointly with Dr. M. A. Ansari on behalf of the “Nationalist Muslim Party” (Mushirul Hasan (ed.) Muslims and the Congress; Manohar, 1979; p. 91).

The Muslim League was not neglected; though. Azad was a nominated member of a Committee “to formulate the Muslim demand” regarding representation in the legislature and public services. The resolution was proposed by Jinnah and adopted unanimously. Among those who were present on the dais were Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, Annie Besant, Vallabhai Patel, Justice Shah Mohammad Suleman Sharif Devji Canji was Chairman of the Reception Committee (Pirzada; Vol. II; pp. 1 and 28).

At the Calcutta Session of the League in December 1917, Barkat Ali, who was close to Jinnah, moved a resolution to authorize the Council to set up a sub-committee to confer with the Working Committee of the Congress on the basis of certain proposals set out in the resolution. It may be recalled that, to secure a better deal for Muslims in the minority Provinces, the Lucknow Pact had reduced their representation in Punjab and Bengal.

Azad delivered a speech which bears recalling. The records reads: “Maulana Abul kalam Azad declared that by the Lucknow Pact they had sold away their interests. The Delhi proposals of last March opened the door for the fi rst time to the recognition of the real rights of Musalmans

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in India. The separate electorates granted by the pact of 1916 only ensured Muslim representation, but what was vital for the existence of the community was the recognition of its numerical strength. Delhi opened the way to the creation of such a state of affairs as would guarantee them a proper share in the future of India. Their existing small majority in Bengal and the Punjab was only a census fi gure; but the Delhi proposals, for the fi rst time, gave them fi ve provinces of which no less than three (Sind, the Frontier Province and Baluchistan) contained a real overwhelming Muslim majority. If the Muslims did not recognize this great step, they were not fi t to live. There would now be nine Hindus provinces against fi ve Muslim provinces; and whatever treatment Hindus accorded Muslims in the nine provinces, Muslims would accord the same treatment to Hindus in the fi ve provinces. Was not this a great gain? Was not a new weapon gained for the assertion of Muslim rights?”

Jinnah also supported the resolution as did Sarojini Naidu. (ibid.; p. 122). Azad’s support to the Nehru Report widened the divide between him and the League which had become weaker after the split in 1927. Two Volumes of the Tarjuman were published in 1930 and 1936. When on 10 May 1936 Dr. Ansari breathed his last, Azad became the principal spokesman of Congress Muslims. The Government of India Act, 1935, which conferred autonomy and responsible government on the Provinces, came into force on 1 April 1937. General Elections followed and the Congress assumed power in most of the major Provinces. Douglas is not the only one to note that Azad began to play a “conspicuous role in politics” after 1937. (p. 196).

From that year till 1946 his energies were directed towards breaking up the Muslim League - besides, of course, his opposition to foreign rule – and by means which were far from lofty. There are two major errors of recollection in his posthumously published memoir India Wins Freedom (Orient Longmans; 1959; pp. 160-161). Both concern the Congress’ arrogance of power; in 1937, when it refused to share power with the League in the U.P. and in 1946 when it acted likewise in wrecking the Cabinet Mission’s Plan. For both Azad blamed Nehru (pp. 160-161). On both, he was privy to the decision.

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Prof. Reginald Coupland reproduced a document in his classic Report on The Constitutional Problem in India (Oxford University Press, 1946, Vol. II; p. 111) which establishes that inebriation with power did not spare the Maulana, accustomed famously to other potent intoxicants. The document is reproduced in full with Coupland’s comments: “The League, it appeared, would be admitted to the Ministry only on terms, and, after lengthy discussion behind the scenes and in the Press, these terms were communicated to the Provincial League leader, Mr. Khaliq-uz-zaman, not by the presumptive Premier, Pandit Pant, but by Maulana A.K. Azad, a Bengali Moslem member of the Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee. They were as follows:

‘The Moslem League group in the United Provinces Legislature shall cease to function as a separate group.

‘The existing members of the Moslem League Party in the United Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party, and will fully share with other members of the Party their privileges and obligations as members of the Congress Party. They will similarly be empowered to participate in the deliberations of the Party. They will likewise be subject to the control and discipline of the Congress Party in an equal measure with other members, and the decisions of the Congress Party as regards work in the legislature and general behaviour of its members shall be binding on them. All matters shall be decided by a majority vote of the Party; each individual member having one vote.

‘The policy laid down by the Congress Working Committee for their members in the legislatures along with the instructions issued by the competent Congress bodies pertaining to their work in such legislatures shall be faithfully carried out by all members of the Congress Party including these members.

‘The Moslem League Parliamentary Board in the United provinces will be dissolved, and no candidates will thereafter be set up by the said Board at any by-election. All members of the Party shall actively support any candidate that may be nominated by the Congress to fi ll up a vacancy occurring hereafter.

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Maulana Azad


‘All members of the Congress Party shall abide by the rules of the Congress Party and offer their full and genuine co-operation with a view to promoting the interests and prestige of the Congress.

‘In the event of the Congress Party deciding on resignation from the ministry or from the legislature the members of the above-mentioned group will also be bound by that decision.’

To the published statement of these terms Maulana Azad appended a short note:

‘It was hoped that, if these terms were agreed to and the Moslem League group of members joined the Congress Party as full members, that group would cease to exist as a separate group. In the formation of the provincial Cabinet it was considered proper that they should have representatives.’ ” Chaudhry Khaliquzzam’s memoirs belie Azad’s claims. (Pathway to Pakistan; Longman, Pakistan, 1961; pp. 160-3).

Azad next tried to wean away Punjab’s Premier, Sikandar Hyat Khan and others from the League. In July 1940 this formed the subject of an acrimonious correspondence between Jinnah and Sir Sikandar. The League’s executive had decided on 16 June that no member should hold discussions with any Congress leader without the permission of the President. Jinnah wired to the Premier at Delhi on 7 July that he could not agree to his seeing V.D. Savarkar “as a go-between.” This was published in the press. On 8 July Sir Sikandar wrote “Your telegram, to put it mildly, shows an utter lack of decency and sense of proportion.” Jinnah replied on 1 August citing repeated disclosures by “Mr. (sic.) Abul Kalam Azad” about his talks with Sir Sikandar. (S.Qaim Hussain Jafri (Ed.) Quaid-i-Azam; Correspondence with Punjab Muslim League; Aziz Publishers, Lahore, 1977, pp. 366-369).

Azad was disturbing an already rudely disturbed hornet’s nest when he wired to Jinnah on 12 July 1940 and received a savagely insulting reply, which no provocation can justify. “Confi dential. Your July 19 statement ; The Congress Delhi resolution defi nitely means by National Government a composite Cabinet not limited to any single party. But

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is it the position of the League that she cannot agree to any provisional arrangement not based on the two-nation scheme? If so, please clarify by wire.” Jinnah replied “Your telegram. Cannot reciprocate confi dence. I refuse to discuss with you, by correspondence or otherwise, as you have completely forfeited the confi dence of Muslim India. Can’t you realize you are made a Muslim ‘show-boy’ Congress President to give it colour that it is national and deceive foreign countries. You represent neither Muslims nor Hindus. The Congress is a Hindu body. If you have self-respect resign at once. You have done your worst against the League so far. You know you have hopelessly failed. Give it up.” (S.S. Pirzada (ed.) Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah’s Correspondence; East and West Publishing Companys, Karachi, 1977; p. 33).

Jinnah’s instant publication of the wire ensured swift assassination of character – the epithet “showboy” stuck – and diminished Azad’s standing in the eyes of his admirers in the League.

To his great credit, Azad never retaliated. The Congress made him President a second time and he delivered a Presidential address at the Ramgarh session in March 1940 – around the same time as the League’s historic session at Lahore where it demanded Pakistan. It was, as one might expect, an oratorical tour de force. Politically it carried little weight. The president attributed to his party principles it had rejected after the 1916 pact; most notably on the Nehru Report. Azad could not have been unaware of the fact. He, nonetheless, claimed: “Congress has always stood by two basic principles, and every step it has taken has accorded to them, clearly and categorically. 1. Any constitution that is framed in future for India, must contain the fullest guarantees for the protection of the rights and interests of the minorities. 2. What are the necessary safeguards for the protection of the rights and interest of the minorities? This judgement rests with the minorities and not the majority. The safeguards must, therefore, be formulated by their consent, and not by majority vote.” (Hameed; p. 156.).

Azad opposed Gandhi’s Quit India movement, in 1942 but, incorrigibly romantic, advocated that as “the British army withdrew towards Bihar, the Congress should step in and take over the control of

21

Maulana Azad


the country … to oppose the new enemy (Japan) and gain our freedom” (Azad; p. 73).

Common to the pleas of both Gandhi and Azad was the relegation of the League to an irrelevance. Once in power, the Congress would decide what to offer to the minorities.

Prison life and personal proximity brought home to Azad and colleagues like Asaf Ali and Syed Mahmud that Vallabhbhai Patel distrusted them profoundly and had no use for them. In 1942, Azad joined Nehru in opposing any talks with Jinnah (For details vide M. Asaf Ali; Memoirs: The Emergence of Modern India edited by G.M.S. Raghavan; Ajanta, 1994; p. 315). Once out of prison in 1945, Azad made a bold move; not for talks with Jinnah, but for a unilateral declaration by the Congress which should undercut Jinnah’s position. In doing so he showed an appalling lack of realism in two respects; the Congress leaders would have no truck with his proposals and Jinnah was too securely established as the Quaid-e-Azam to be weakened by anything the Congress or Azad said or did. One encroaches on the reader’s – and the editor’s – patience in reproducing those revealing documents; but for reasons not hard to understand, they have received little publicity. They are reproduced in full here with prefaces and the rest:

Sir Evan Jenkins was the Viceroy Lord Wavell’s Private Secretary. George Abell was his deputy who succeeded him as Private Secretary after his appointment as Governor Punjab. On 25 August 1945 Jenkins wired to Abell “I have just seen copy of intercepted scheme for Hindu-Muslim compromise sent by Azad to Gandhi on 2nd August. In covering letter Azad says Congress must fi nd means to remove Muslim suspicious and must have defi nite policy on Muslim question. He thinks an Arbitration Committee feasible, but as a preliminary “all the Muslim organizations that are outside the Muslim League should fully organize themselves and come to a decision about the future constitution.” The Congress should then accept this decision and with these Muslim organizations should stand fi rmly by it. Azad encloses a memorandum in which he sets out his own ideas emphasizing that he gives them in his personal capacity and not (repeat not) as Congress President.

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“Introductory paragraphs of memorandum admit existence of communal problem and say that it is useless to enter into the causes of it or to apportion the blame for it. The Muslims are afraid and their fears can be removed only by devising a scheme under which they will feel secure. Any attempt to form a unitary government will fail. Partition will also fail and is against the interests of the Muslims themselves.” As an Indian Muslim Azad regards partition as a defeatist policy and cannot accept it.

The memorandum then gives the following “rough outline”:-

Begins.

(a) The future constitution of India must be federal with fully autonomous units in which the Central subjects must be only of an all-India nature and agreed upon by the constituent units.

(b) The units must be given the right of secession.

(c) There must be joint electorates in both the Centre and the Provinces with reservation of seats at such differential franchise as may be needed to make the electorates refl ect the strength of population of the communities.

(d) There must parity of Hindus and Muslims in the Central Legislature and the Central Executive till such time as communal suspicion disappears and parties are formed on economic and political lines.

(e) There should be a convention by which the Head of the Indian federation should in the initial period be Hindu and Muslim by turn. Ends.

“With reference to this outline, memorandum observes that belief in strong Centre as essential for unity is no longer tenable as example of Soviet Union shows. Joint electorates would probably be accepted both by Hindus and Muslims in the Provinces as the majority community

23

Maulana Azad


has nothing to fear and the minority community is able to infl uence the decision of the majority. Muslims might be afraid of joint electorate at the Centre, but with parity in the Central Legislature and Executive and the grant to Provinces of the right of secession, their fears would be groundless. Azad expresses the belief that on careful consideration, Muslims would accept his scheme.

“Memorandum ends with appeal to Azad’s Hindu friends “to leave entirely to Muslims the questions of their status in the future constitution of India.” If Muslims are satisfi ed that a decision is not (repeat not) being imposed upon them by non-Muslim agency, they will drop partition and realize that their interests are best served “by a federated and united India.” Azad adds that once Indians acquire power, economic, political and class interests will oust communal interests.

I am sending copy of papers by tomorrow’s bag. Azad is clearly uneasy and perhaps fears that unless Hindu Congress leaders take a new line, nationalist Muslims will desert them. The suggestion which appears both in the letter and in the memorandum that the status of Muslims in the future constitution of India must be left to Muslims is a version of Jinnah’s claim for self-determination. I am sure that in the present state of communal feeling Muslims would not accept joint electorates at the Centre or in the Provinces. Otherwise Azad’s scheme goes a long way to meet Muslim demands though it will not satisfy Jinnah or the League.”

On 28 August Jenkins wired to Abell, Gandhi’s reply: “Following is text of intercepted letter dated August 16th from Gandhi to Azad.

Begins. On receipt of your letter today I sent you the following wire: “Your letter I think should not be published. Writing fully.”

“I do not infer from your letter that you are writing about my Hindus. Whatever you have in your heart has not appeared in your writing. But don’t worry, we will talk the matter over when next we meet, if you so desire. Whatever you want to say about the communal problems should not be said without consulting the Working Committee. I also am of the opinion it would be better to keep quiet. The party can give its opinion

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after consultations with you. They have the right to do so. Besides it is their duty. My opinion differs from your (sic). I cannot say if I attach any importance to the Hindu and Muslim (convention). What the Congress may do is another matter. I don’t like the idea of a Hindu and a Muslim alternately (acting as Head of the State). It means that members of other communities will be barred. All this needs careful pondering over. I do not feel the urge to do anything hastily. Ends. Copy follows by bag. This is not very encouraging for Azad.” (Transfer of Power 1942-1947; Vol. VI; pp. 155-157 and 172).

Azad wrote to Patel as well, on the same lines on 13 August 1945 – concede the right to secede from the Union. He intended to place the idea before the public and the Congress executive. Patel asked him to desist from doing so and convene a meeting of the Working Committee. Azad told Patel: “time has now come when the Muslim nationalists should reorganize themselves and place their point of view before the Muslims in general. This, however, they will be able to do only when this point is made absolutely clear.” He cited the Congress 1942 resolution in his support. (G.M. Nandurkar (Ed.); Sardar’s Letters – Mostly Unknown-I, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Nidhi; 1977, pp. 171-2).

The move could not have failed to deepen the distrust which Gandhi and Patel had for him. Party discipline scotched the President’s move. Note that he did not urge conciliation with Jinnah but an appeal to Muslims over his head. Azad was largely responsible for drumming up the opportunistic Congress-Unionist – Akali Coalition in Punjab in 1946 which Nehru found distasteful. (Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana; Curzon 1996; p. 148). The League was the largest single party with 75 seats in a House of 175. A League Ministry could not have lasted. The best course was Governor’s Rule. It would have avoided the deep bitterness created by Azad’s coalition and controlled the carnage in 1947 much better.

Azad resented Jinnah’s ascendency, as if he had deprived him of his leadership. He resented Gandhi calling him Quaid-e-Azam and was out to defeat Jinnah by wooing the Muslims over his head; not to settle with him which was the only way to avert partition. Azad had persisted cautiously. This time he went public. In a statement issued on 15 April

25

Maulana Azad


1946 he criticized the two-nation theory and the demand for Pakistan, focusing on Muslims in the minority provinces. “They have had their homelands in these regions for almost a thousand years and built up well-known centres of Muslim culture and civilization there. They will awaken overnight and discover that they have become aliens and foreigners. Backward industrially, educationally and economically they will be left to the mercies of what would then become an unadulterated Hindu raj.

“On the other hand, their position within the Pakistan State will be vulnerable and weak. Nowhere in Pakistan will their majority be comparable to the Hindu majority in the Hindustan State. In fact, their majority will be so slight that it will be offset by the economical, educational and political lead enjoyed by non-Muslims in these areas. Even if this were not so and Pakistan were overwhelmingly Muslim in population, it still could hardly solve the problem of Muslims in Hindustan.”

He offered his recipe “full autonomy to the provincial units and vesting all residuary power in the provinces. It has also provided for two lists of Central subjects, one compulsory and one optional, so that if any provincial unit so wants, it can administer all subjects itself except a minimum delegated to the Centre.” (Azad; pp. 143-144).

The Congress’ stand in the parleys with the Cabinet Mission and on its Plan of 16 May 1946 belies his assurance. But the Maulana’s greatest disservice to history lies in fathering the legend that it was Nehru’s famous outburst on 10 July 1946 which led to the collapse of the Cabinet Mission’s scheme. A gullible public has come to accept this, abetted by indolent students of the period.

But the Maulana presided over the Working Committee which passed a resolution on 24 May 1946 placing its disingenuous interpretation of the grouping formula of the Mission’s scheme. The letter of 24 June conveying to the Mission the Congress’ acceptance of the scheme, but as interpreted by itself, went over his signature. Finally, on 26 June the Maulana publicly and defi antly declared, “I am convinced that the

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Congress interpretation cannot be challenged.” To ascribe the scheme’s collapse to Nehru’s statement is to falsify history. Much before that, both the Cabinet Mission (25 May) and Jinnah (27 June) had taken exception to the Congress interpretation. (Vide P.M. Chopra (Ed.) Maulana Azad: Selected Speeches and Statements 1940-1947, Reliance Publishing House, New Delhi; 1990, p. 154-7 for the text of his statement of 27 June 1946 in support of the Congress’ “interpretation”. Vide also Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India 1946, Manager of Publications, Delhi for texts of the other documents).

Azad’s ire was at the loss of his Congress Presidency which he tried to retrieve later but was stopped by Gandhi. The collapse of the Mission’s Plan led inevitably to the partition of India which Azad dreaded and Jinnah tried to avert. But Azad unwisely lent himself to a stratagem in concert with Nehru which affected his standing. Gandhi’s Secretary Pyarelal wrote a series of articles in Indian Express (12 August 1967) entitled “The Mahatma’s emissary – a rejoinder”). It was a reply to one Sudhir Ghosh.

Pyarelal all but accused Azad of deception. “It would appear that even before the Cabinet Mission’s letter of invitation (to the Simla Conference in 1946) had come up before the Working Committee, Maulana Saheb, whom they had consulted, had on his own and without the knowledge of his colleagues sent off a letter to the Cabinet Mission in which he said that he was confi dent of being able to carry the Congress Working Committee with him in regard to the proposal (an embryo of their Plan). And to this they had also replied in writing.

“Taking it for granted that Maulana Azad’s colleagues must know about it, they mentioned casually to Gandhiji that it was only after receiving Maulana Azad’s letter that they had issued their invitation. … Early on the morning of April 29, Gandhiji wrote a letter to Maulana Saheb which he said: “Last night I heard from Pethick Lawrence that you had written to them suggesting some changes in their letter and that they had also sent you their written reply. What is this? …” He then went on to the question of the Congress Presidentship for which no election had been held since Maulana Saheb had presided over the session at

27

Maulana Azad


Ramgarh in 1940. Someone had sent Gandhiji a press clipping in which it had been hinted that the Maulana Saheb was bent upon continuing as Congress President but that he (Gandhiji) stood in the way. Enclosing it to Maulana Saheb, as early as April 20, Gandhiji had written to him that though he had not made public his opinion, he had told a couple of members of the Working Committee who had asked him about it that he did not consider it desirable that the same person should continue as President so long. …

“But Maulana Saheb, it would appear, wanted on his own authority to extend the life of the existing Working Committee with himself as President, till the following November. Referring to it Gandhiji wrote: “Even if you have to continue (as President) it would be improper to do so by a ruling. To carry on by a ruling is dangerous. If to continue (as President) becomes a duty, a fresh election will be necessary. This is a matter for deep thought.”

The truth was revealed only in 2002 when Peter Clarke published his biography The Cripps Version The Life of Sir Stafford Cripps, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press). He wrote “Azad called to admit that he had not shown the Working Committee his fi rst reply to the invitation to Simla; nor, therefore, could he show them the Delegation’s subsequent response to him on the proposed agenda without revealing his earlier omission. … His (Cripps) own unguarded references at the round pool to a correspondence with Azad had alerted Gandhi to its very existence – letters which Azad then solemnly told the Mahatma he had never written. Gandhi was naturally upset at this discrepancy. .. Cripps now determined to reveal all – whatever the embarrassment to Azad. … Cripps acceded, moreover, to Gandhi’s request to be shown the correspondence with Azad. … This letter from Azad has survived in Cripps’s papers. It is handwritten – by Nehru, as Cripps must immediately have recognized, though signed by Azad. By the same token, it must also have dawned on Cripps that, if Azad had been acting behind the back of Gandhi and the Working Committee, so too had Nehru, at least to the extent of trying to cover up for his friend.

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“Not the least revelation for Gandhi, for whom Nehru had often acted as amanuensis, must have been this demonstration of his protégé’s complicity in the process. Little wonder that Nehru was out of sorts …” (pp. 421-2).

In retrospect, Azad tried desperately, if vainly, to get the Congress to accept some alternative to partition, but failed. As late as in April 1947 he begged Viceroy Mountbatten to revive the Mission’s Plan. It “could be made to work” but “a truncated Pakistan would spell disaster for the Musalmans” (ToP; Vol. X, p. 215).

It was not Gandhi but Azad who was the most consistent and ardent opponent of the partition of India. On 24 July 1947 Gandhi gave vent to his pent up resentments and urged Nehru to exclude Azad from the fi rst Cabinet of free India, adding, as if it fortifi ed his view, “Sardar is decidedly against his membership.” So, “name another Muslim for the Cabinet.” Nehru wisely rejected this advice (Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 88, p. 408). Nehru used Azad but did not heed his advice. As H.M. Seervai records by mid 1946. “Azad ceased to have an effective voice in shaping Congress policy.” (Partition of India; Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005; p. 64). It is doubtful if he ever did.

India was partitioned and its two parts, India and Pakistan, won independence not only amidst strife and bloodshed but with dire prospects of continued estrangement. This could have been averted had the Congress led by Gandhi not sabotaged the Cabinet Missions Plan. This is not to say that Jinnah was blameless (Vide the writer’s Jinnah and Tilak; Oxford University Press; Karachi; 2010 for a detailed appraisal).

The record shows that Azad’s main exertions since 1940 lay in undermining the League. He was against a rapprochement with it. In the negotiations with the Mission, he, with Nehru’s support, sought in April 1946, just prior to the Simla Conference, to by-pass the rest and press on for its nascent formula. But he still did not support the crucial element, the grouping of Muslim provinces. There is nothing to suggest that he did so even within the Congress leadership. The formula he put forth in April 1946 stood no chance and he asserted that the Congress’ dishonest

29

Maulana Azad


interpretation of the Mission’s Plan was beyond “challenge.” He had by now been even more marginalized. All the same, he never, even for once, pleaded for a settlement with the League. When the consequences of the Congress’ arrogant folly became apparent, he turned to Mountbatten in desperation, hoping against hope, that the partition, now imminent, could be stalled.

It is important to remember all this in any fair appraisal of Azad’s politics. Critics and admirers have no use for nuances. But no student of his politics should ignore them. It is not an easy task to strike a fair balance. How does one explain this record of the one person who saw it all coming? Do not the deep insights render the inaction more culpable? And there was more than inaction; he supported the Congress stand. The attempt in his memoirs to pin the blame on Nehru alone is disingenuous.

Azad’s assessments were truly deep and they were expressed in a notable interview with brilliance and prophetic insights. It was in a long interview to Shorish Kashmiri which Covert magazine (Delhi) published in an English translation and Friday Times (Lahore) reproduced under a wrong date April 1946. We owe it to Rajendra Sareen, an Indian journalist from Lahore, who knew Azad, for fi rst drawing attention to the document in an article in The Tribune of 20 August 1990. He records three meetings. The fi rst was in March or April 1946 at Faletti’s Hotel in Lahore. Azad listened to a group of “non-League Muslim admirers” who mentioned the Muslims’ grievances which were the rationale of the two-nation theory. He replied “What you have said makes it clear that there is absence of communal understanding, but the question that must be faced is whether it is desirable or not.” (Apne jo farmaya us se zahir hai ki Hindu-Musalman ittehad mafqood hai. Magar ap ne yeh nahin farmaya keyeh maqsood hai ya nahin). His interlocutors had no answer. Second, a group of Ahrar leaders led by Shorish Kashmiri called on the Maulana at New Delhi in late June 1947, after the decision to partition India had been fi nalized. They asked what would be the result. The Maulana said: “Muslims would suffer a social and political setback in India; Islam, as it has grown in India over the last so many centuries, would lose its character in Pakistan. (Hindustan main mussalman aur

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A.G. Noorani


Pakistan main Islam ka Ganga Jamuni dhara majrooh hoga)…

“On the point that partition had become inevitable given the hostility among the Hindus and Muslims, the Maulana observed that all that the partition would achieve is that the domestic antagonisms would acquire an international character. International animosities become long lasting and turn fatal. It was his view that the situation would be tailor made to attract expansionist powers to intervene and aggravate tensions between India and Pakistan. (Taqseem se sirf yeh hoga ki adavaten jo aj dakhli hai kal bainul aqwami ho jayengi. Beinul aqwami adavaten bahut muhlak aur der pa hoti hain. Is halat mein Hindustan aur Pakistan istaimari taqton ki amajgah ban jayenge).

“It was in May 1948 or thereabout that I asked Maulana Azad as to why he decided to go along with partition, given his fi rm conviction that it was wrong. His answer was that his being right would have lost all meaning if it were to become instrumental in disrupting the cohesion and unity of the national leadership. He recalled that he had equally strong feelings on Gandhiji’s view of the Second World War as India’s opportunity and Pandit Nehru also had agreed with him. But they would not let that create a cleavage in the national movement.”

That explains his efforts with Nehru in April 1946 and his acquiescence in Gandhi’s gamble in 1942. Excerpts from the June 1947 interview bear recalling today – I list the predictions for good reason.

1. “If we use the Muslim League terminology, this new India will be a Hindu state both practically and temperamentally. This will not happen as a result of any conscious decision, but will be a logical consequence of its social realities. How can you expect a society that consists 90 percent of Hindus, who have lived with their ethos and values since prehistoric times, to grow differently? The factors that laid the foundation of Islam in Indian society and created a powerful following have become victim of the politics of partition. The communal hatred it has generated has completely extinguished all possibilities of spreading and preaching Islam. This communal politics has hurt the religion

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Maulana Azad


beyond measure. Muslims have turned away from the Qur’an. If they had taken their lessons from the Qur’an and the life of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and had not forged communal politics in the name of religion then Islam’s growth would not have halted. By the time of the decline of the Mughal rule, the Muslims in India were a little over 22.5 million, that is, about 65 percent of the present numbers. Since then the numbers kept increasing. If the Muslim politicians had not used the offensive language that embittered communal relations, and the other section acting as agents of British interests had not worked to widen the Hindu-Muslim breach, the number of Muslims in India would have grown higher. The political disputes we created in the name of religion have projected Islam as an instrument of political power and not what it is – a value system meant for the transformation of human soul.

2. “The way the leadership of Muslim League is conducting itself will ensure that Islam will become a rare commodity in Pakistan and Muslims in India.” (He was wont to say Muslims will become exiles in India and Islam will become an exile in Pakistan). “You will see that despite the increased role of Ulema, the religion will lose its sheen in Pakistan.”

3. “Pakistan, when it comes into existence, will face confl icts of religious nature. As far as I can see, the people who will hold the reins of power will cause serious damage to Islam.”

4. “Now as I gather from the attitude of my own colleagues in the working committee, the division of India appears to be certain. But I must warn that the evil consequences of partition will not affect India alone, Pakistan will be equally haunted by them.”

5. “This hatred will overwhelm the relations between India and Pakistan. In this situation it will not be possible for India and Pakistan to become friends and live amicably unless some catastrophic event takes place. The politics of partition itself will act as a barrier between the two countries. It will not be

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A.G. Noorani


possible for Pakistan to accommodate all the Muslims of India, a task beyond her territorial capability. On the other hand, it will not be possible for the Hindus to stay especially in West Pakistan. They will be thrown out or leave on their own.”

6. “The prominent Muslims who are supporters of Muslim League will leave for Pakistan. The wealthy Muslims will take over the industry and business and monopolize the economy of Pakistan. But more than 30 million Muslims will be left behind in India. What promise does Pakistan hold for them? The situation that will arise after the expulsion of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan will be still more dangerous for them.”

7. “Pakistan itself will be affl icted by many serious problems. The greatest danger will come from international powers who will seek to control the new country, and with the passage of time this control will become tight. India will have no problem with this outside interference as it will sense danger and hostility from Pakistan.”

8. “The other important point that has escaped Mr. Jinnah’s attention is Bengal. He does not know that Bengal disdains outside leadership and rejects it sooner or later. During World War II, Mr. Fazlul Haq revolted against Jinnah and was thrown out of the Muslim League. Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy does not hold Jinnah in high esteem. Why only Muslim League, look at the history of Congress. The revolt of Subhas Chandra Bose is known to all. … The environment of Bengal is such that it disfavours leadership from outside and rises in revolt when it senses danger to its rights and interests. The confi dence of East Pakistan will not erode as long as Jinnah and Liaquat Ali are alive. But after them any small incident will create resentment and disaffection. I feel that it will not be possible for East Pakistan to stay with West Pakistan for any considerable period of time.”

9. “The language, customs and way of life of East Pakistan are

33

Maulana Azad


different from West Pakistan. The moment the creative warmth of Pakistan cools down, the contradictions will emerge and will acquire assertive overtones. These will be fuelled by the clash of interests of international powers and consequently both wings will separate. After the separation of East Pakistan, whenever it happens, West Pakistan will become the battleground of regional contradictions and disputes. The assertion of sub-national identities of Punjab, Sind, Frontier and Balochistan will open the doors for outside interference.”

10. “The incompetent political leadership will pave way for military dictatorship as it has happened in many Muslim countries.”

11. “By demanding Pakistan we are turning our eyes away from the history of the last 1,000 years and, if I may use the League terminology, throwing more than 30 million Muslims into the lap of “Hindu Raj.” The Hindu Muslim problem that has created political tension between Congress and League will become a source of dispute between the two states and with the aid of international powers this may erupt into full scale war anytime in future.”

12. Azad told a group of Muslims from UP who were about to leave for Pakistan: “You are going away from your motherland. Have you refl ected on its consequences? Your fl eeing from here will weaken the Muslims of India and a day might well come when the present people of Pakistan will rise to assert their individual identities. Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Baloch, and Pathan will claim separate nationalities. Will not your status in Pakistan then become precarious and helpless as that of uninvited guests?” (Wattan, Delhi, March 1948; reproduced in Kamalistan (Delhi), Special issue on Maulana Azad; March 1986).

Twelve precise predictions all of which came true. This says a lot for Azad’s wisdom, surely. He admitted that Muslims alone were not to blame and paid a tribute to Jinnah publicly for the fi rst line. “Muslims alone are not responsible for it. This strategy was fi rst adopted by the

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A.G. Noorani


British government and then endorsed by the political minds of Aligarh. Later, Hindu short-sightedness made matters worse and now freedom has become contingent on the partition of India.

“Mr. Jinnah himself was an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. In one Congress session Sarojini Naidu had commended him with this title. He was a disciple of Dadabhai Naoroji. He had refused to join the 1906 deputation of Muslims that initiated communal politics in India. In 1919 he stood fi rmly as a nationalist and opposed Muslim demands before the Joint Select Committee. On 3 October 1925, in a letter to the Times of India he rubbished the suggestion that Congress is a Hindu outfi t. In the All Parties Conferences of 1925 and 1928, he strongly favoured a joint electorate. While speaking at the National Assembly in 1925, he said, “I am a nationalist fi rst and a nationalist last” and exhorted his colleagues, be they Hindus or Muslims, “not to raise communal issues in the House and help make the Assembly a national institution in the truest sense of the term.”

“In 1928, Jinnah supported the Congress call to boycott Simon Commission. Till 1937, he did not favour the demand to partition India. In his message to various student bodies he stressed the need to work for Hindu Muslim unity. But he felt aggrieved when the Congress formed governments in seven states and ignored the Muslim League. In 1940 he decided to pursue the partition demand to check Muslim political decline. In short, the demand for Pakistan is his response to his own political experiences. Mr. Jinnah has every right to his opinion about me, but I have no doubts about his intelligence. As a politician he has worked overtime to fortify Muslim communalism and the demand for Pakistan. Now it has become a matter of prestige for him and he will not give it up at any cost.”

Azad always had a healthy contempt for the mullah and his exploitation of religion. “Strictly speaking, Muslims in India are not one community; they are divided among many well-entrenched sects. You can unite them by arousing their anti-Hindu sentiment but you cannot unite them in the name of Islam. To them Islam means undiluted loyalty to their own sect. Apart from Wahabi, Sunni and Shia there are

35

Maulana Azad


innumerable groups who owe allegiance to different saints and divines. Small issues like raising hands during the prayer and saying Amen loudly have created disputes that defy solution. The Ulema have used the instrument of takfeer (fatwas declaring someone as infi del) liberally. Earlier, they used to take Islam to the disbelievers; now they take away Islam from the believers. Islamic history is full of instances of how good and pious Muslims were branded kafi rs.”

He explained the change that came over to him. “Al-Hilal had served its purpose and a new age was dawning. Based on my experiences, I made a reappraisal of the situation and decided to devote all my time and energy for the attainment of our national freedom. I was fi rm in my belief that freedom of Asia and Africa largely depends on India’s freedom and Hindu Muslim unity is key to India’s freedom. Even before the First World War, I had realized that India was destined to attain freedom, and no power on earth would be able to deny it. I was also clear in my mind about the role of Muslims. I ardently wished that Muslims would learn to walk together with their countrymen and not give an opportunity to history to say that when Indians were fi ghting for their independence, Muslims were looking on as spectators.”

Azad had left Pan-Islamism behind him but his commitment to the faith survived as deep as ever. “Islam is a universal call to establish peace on the basis of human equality. They know that Islam is the proclamation of a Messenger who calls to the worship of God and not his own worship. Islam means freedom from all social and economic discriminations and reorganization of society on three basic principles of God-consciousness, righteous action and knowledge. In fact, it is we Muslims and our extremist behaviour that has created an aversion among non-Muslims for Islam. If we had not allowed our selfi sh ambitions to soil the purity of Islam then many seekers of truth would have found comfort in the bosom of Islam. Pakistan has nothing to do with Islam; it is a political demand that is projected by Muslim League as the national goal of Indian Muslims. I feel it is not the solution to the problems of Muslims are facing. In fact it is bound to create more problems.”

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Amarnath Jha, the scholar, wrote of Maulana Hasrat Mohani that he gave to politics what was meant for poetry. Would it be right to say of Azad that he gave to politics what was meant for the faith? Had he chosen that path, Indian politics would have been the poorer for his absence. But a thought does arise. What if he had opted out of the Congress and spoken as “truth to power” to both parties? In all probability, neither would have listened to him, for Azad’s besetting weakness was lack of a mass base compounded by his own lack of qualities of political leadership and a narcissism that verged on the pathetic.

Lovers of Urdu acclaim Azad’s oration to the Muslims of Delhi at the Jamia Masjid on 23 October 1947. No leader taunts a demoralized people who depend on him to show a way out of their plight. Azad could not resist the temptation. “Do you remember? I hailed you, you cut off my tongue; I picked my pen, you severed my hand; I wanted to move forward, you broke my legs; I tried to turn over, and you injured my back. When the bitter political games of the last seven years were at their peak, I tried to wake you up at every danger signal. You not only ignored my call but revived all the past traditions of neglect and denial. As a result, the same perils surround you today, whose onset had previously diverted you from the righteous path.

“Today, mine is no more than an inert existence or a forlorn cry; I am an orphan in my own motherland. This does not mean that I feel trapped in the original choice that I had made for myself, nor do I feel that there is no room left for my aashiana (nest). What it means is that my cloak is weary of your impudent grabbing hands. My sensitivities are injured, my heart is heavy. Think for one moment. What course did you adopt? Where have you reached, and where do you stand now? Haven’t your senses become torpid? Aren’t you living in a constant state of fear? This fear is your own creation, a fruit of your own deeds.” Self-indulgence in excess is. No real leader speaks thus.

So he went on in this strain. His language was often fl orid. “Today, you fear the earth’s tremors; once you were virtually the earthquake itself. Today, you fear the darkness; once your existence was the epicenter of radiance. Clouds have poured dirty waters and you have hitched up your

37

Maulana Azad


trousers. Those were none but your forefathers who not only plunged headlong into the seas, but trampled the mountains, laughed at the bolts of lighting, turned away the tornados, challenged the tempests and made them alter their course. It is a sure sign of a dying faith that those who had once grabbed the collars of emperors, are today clutching at their own throats. They have become oblivious of the existence of God as if they had never believed in Him.

“Brothers! I do not have a new prescription for you. I have the same old prescription that was revealed to the greatest benefactor of mankind, the prescription of the Holy Qur’an: ‘Do not fear and do not grieve. If you possess true faith, you will gain the upper hand.’” (Vide A.G. Noorani, The Muslims of India : A Documentary Record 1947-2000; Oxford University Press; New Delhi; 2000; pp 52-55 for the text). He was clearly not cut out for political leadership.

Presiding over the Indian Union Muslim Conference at Lucknow on 27 December 1947 he urged Muslims to dissolve the Muslim League and asked the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind to abjure politics as well. (ibid; pp. 63-4). On 29 February 1948 the Muslim League Party in the Constituent Assembly met under Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan’s presidentship and decided to dissolve itself. (ibid., p. 69).

Azad withdrew from active politics. His credentials were impugned by both sides. The All India Muslim League met in Karachi for the last time on 14 December 1947 and decided to split itself into two bodies, over the protests of Leaguers from India. Hussain Imam from Bihar, said “People here do not know the diffi culties the Muslims are facing in India. They should be left free to decide their future according to the circumstances.” No one supported him.

A member interrupted and asked the Quaid-i-Azam if he would, once again, be prepared to take over the leadership of the Muslims of India in the present hour of trial. The Quaid-i-Azam replied that he was quite willing to do so if the Council gave its verdict in favour of such a proposal. He recalled his statement at the time of the achievement of Pakistan that his job had been done, and with the achievement of

38

A.G. Noorani


Pakistan, the cherished goal of the Muslim nation, he wanted to lead a retired life. But if called upon, he was quite ready to leave Pakistan and share the diffi culties of the Muslims in the Indian Union and to lead them. This defi es belief.

But he urged: “There must be a Muslim League in Hindustan. If you are thinking of anything else, you are fi nished. If you want to wind up the League you can do so; but I think it would be a great mistake. I know there is an attempt. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and others are trying to break the identity of Muslims in India. Do not allow it. Do not do it.” (ibid., p. 56).

In India Vallabhbhai Patel addressing a meeting at Lucknow on 6 January 1948 attacked Azad. “I want to ask the Indian Muslims only one question. In the recent All-India Muslim Conference why did you not open your mouth on the Kashmir issue? Why did you not condemn the action of Pakistan? These things create doubt in the minds of the people. So I want to say a word as a friend of Muslims because it is the duty of a good friend to speak frankly. It is your duty now to sail in the same boat and sink or swim together. I want to tell you very clearly that you cannot ride on two horses. You select one horse whichever you like best.” (ibid., p. 67).

Azad protested to Gandhi who, predictably, backed Patel. “I can testify that his heart is not like his tongue” adding “Let them (the League Muslims) prove that they can be trusted” (CWMG.; Vol. 90; L. 416).

Only one man relied on Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Azad stood by him S. Gopal records that “Nehru could not rely on the unqualifi ed support of his Cabinet. Some of the members, such as Azad, John Matthai, Kidwai and Amrit Kaur, were with him; but they carried little infl uence with the masses. The old stalwarts of the Congress, however, such as Patel and Rajendra Prasad, with the backing of the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, Syama Prasad Mookerjee, (now in the Cabinet) believed not so much in a theocratic state as in a state which symbolized the interests of the Hindu majority. Patel assumed that Muslim offi cials, even if they had opted for India, were bound to be disloyal and should be dismissed;

39

Maulana Azad


and to him the Muslims in India were hostages to be held as security for the fair treatment of Hindus in Pakistan. He, therefore, resisted Nehru’s efforts to reserve certain residential areas in Delhi for Muslims and to employ Muslims to deal with Muslim refugees. Even more non-secular in outlook than Patel was Rajendra Prasad, the meek follower of Gandhi but untouched in any real sense by the spirit of Gandhi’s teachings. One sided action, he wrote to his Prime Minister, could not bring the desired results but would in fact lead to most undesirable and unexpected consequences. There was no use in bringing in the army to protect the Muslim citizens of Delhi, if the Hindus and Sikhs were expelled from the cities of Pakistan. Our action today is driving the people away from us.” This is the situation which Azad faced – as did Nehru for which Nehru has received little credit. (Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru; Oxford University Press, Delhi; 1979; Vol. 2, pp. 15-16).

Azad, whom Jinnah painted as an enemy of Muslims out “to break the identity of Muslims in India,” continued to serve, as best as he could, as a tribune of the people. He would write letters on their behalf urging redressal of their grievances on matters of employment in public service, education, Urdu, forcible occupation of mosques and the like. One such letter is particularly relevant. It was addressed to Jagjiwan Ram, Minister for Communication. “As many as 53 persons from Jammu and Kashmir apply for a clerical post, only one is appointed; the rest are from outside the state. This baffl es me. Obviously those in charge of recruitment are not sensitive to the fact that such instances complicate our stand on the question of Kashmir.

Of the three subjects, communications and defence have been transferred to the Centre. We are asked mockingly if this is the way Kashmir Muslims are going to be treated by the communications and defence ministries, then what hope will there be for these people if other departments are transferred to the Centre? How do we respond to this charge? In another letter to Jagjivan Ram, he repeats his complaint: “You should know how important it is to win the hearts and minds of Kashmiri people in favour of the Government of India. By our actions we should remove from their minds whatever doubts they may have about us. But unfortunately, no attention is paid to this important

40

A.G. Noorani


fact: steps are taken which become problems in Kashmir and which strain our relations with that part of the country. Communications is the Union subject. The Kashmir state Posts and Telegraphs department therefore is the responsibility of the Centre. The state government has been complaining repeatedly that Kashmir Muslims are not recruited by the state Posts and Telegraphs department. Jobs are given only to non-Muslims. Recently an examination was held for the recruitment of clerks in the northern circle. There were 73 non-Muslims and six Muslims who applied. After this examination, 60 non-Muslims were recruited and only three Muslims.

“Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues inform me that an overwhelming majority of educated Kashmiri Muslims are unemployed and there is nothing that the state can do to fi nd work for them. If these clerical posts had been properly advertised, then 200 or 300 Kashmiri Muslims would have applied and not just six. But the Government of India probably made the announcement in the offi cial gazette or it devised such ways as to be able to entertain the applications of 73 non-Muslims and the Muslims did not even know that these vacancies had arisen. The result is that 60 non-Muslims from Kashmir and only three Muslims were given employment. If this is the result of a department having been transferred to the Centre, then how will Kashmir even have the confi dence that its future is secure with India?” (R.K. Parti; Asar-e-Azad; National Archives of India; 1990; pp. 102 and 131).

Azad faced many such obstacles and defeats; most notably on Urdu. He poured his heart out in a speech in the Constituent Assembly. He said “So far as language is concerned, this has been admitted on all hands that the language spoken in northern India can only be made the lingua franca. But it has got three names – Urdu, Hindi, and Hindustani. Now, the point of dispute is as to what name should be given to it. … the language spoken all over northern India is one and the same, but in its literary style it has got two names – a style resplendent with Persian is called Urdu and a style leaning towards Sanskrit is known as Hindi. The term ‘Hindustani’ has developed a wider connotation; it embraces all forms of the language spoken in northern India. It includes ‘Hindi’ as well as ‘Urdu’… By adopting the name of ‘Hindustani’ we have tried

41

Maulana Azad


to do away with the differences that separated Urdu and Hindi, because when we try to speak in or write easy Hindi and easy Urdu, both become identical, and the distinction of Hindi and Urdu disappears.

“As you are aware, in the party meeting this question was thrashed out for several days, but they could not arrive at any conclusion… At last, the question was left to the Drafting Committee… I attended the fi rst meeting of the Committee, but I felt that the majority of members had a particular type of preconceived notion and they could not agree to adopt ‘Hindustani’ in place of ‘Hindi,’ nor were they prepared to accept any such interpretation which can widen the scope of ‘Hindi.’ In the circumstances, I could not associate myself with this Committee. Therefore, I resigned and severed my connection with the Committee.

“… Of all the arguments employed against ‘Hindustani,’ greatest emphasis has been laid on the point that if ‘Hindustani’ is accepted, Urdu also will have to be accommodated. But I would like to tell you that by accommodating Urdu, the heavens will not come down. After all Urdu is one of the Indian languages. It was born and brought up in India and it is the mother tongue of millions of Hindus and Muslims of this country…Today you will decide that the national language of the Indian Union will be ‘Hindi.’ You may decide that. There is nothing substantial in the name of ‘Hindi.’ The real problem is the question of the characteristics of the language. We wanted to keep it in its real form by calling it ‘Hindustani.’ Your majority did not agree to it.” A Sanskritised Hindi became the offi cial language while Urdu was subjected in the entire north to linguistic genocide.

Worse was in store for him – a snub from Nehru. On 15 February 1954, a deputation of the Anjuman-e-Taraqqi Urdu led by Dr. Zakir Husain and comprising men of the eminence of Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru and Krishen Chander, met President Rajendra Prasad and presented a memorandum signed by over 2,700,000 persons. They invoked Article 347 of the Constitution of India which reads thus: “On a demand being made in that behalf the President may, if he is satisfi ed that a substantial proportion of the population of a state desire the use of any language spoken by them to be recognized by that State, direct that

42

A.G. Noorani


such language shall also be offi cially recognized throughout that state or any part thereof for such purpose as he may specify.”

However, the president can issue a directive under Article 347 only on the advice of his Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Nehru’s letter to Azad dated 12 March 1954 reveals that he was against exercising the power not because it would ‘create some kind of constitutional crisis,’ by a perfectly valid exercise of power which the Constitution conferred on the Union, but because Nehru did not wish to alienate Uttar Pradesh and create a political crisis. He wrote: “This collection of signatures on behalf of Urdu has been going on for many months past, or possibly a year or two. I spoke about this matter to the chief minister of UP. At his instance, I asked some of the sponsors of this memorial to go and see him and discuss the matter, but apparently they never thought it worthwhile to do so. This is rather surprising, because the proper course would have been for them to approach the local government or the chief minister, discuss the matter with him, and then come up to the president.

“It is, of course, a serious matter to suggest that the president should issue any directive, as suggested. That might well create some kind of a constitutional crisis, and, in addition, it would make the controversy even more acute and bitter, and thus actually injure the prospects of Urdu. It seems to me that the right way to tackle this question is in a friendly, cooperative way.” He softened the blow by seeking his advice. (Noorani, The Muslims of India; p. 305).

Azad’s counsel was sought and sometimes offered unsought but effectively; such as resignation of a delinquent Minister. On Kashmir his was not a sage counsel. He was privy to the fraud perpetrated on Sheikh Abdullah when the agreed provision guaranteeing the State’s autonomy (Article 370) was adopted with a unilateral amendment. He was also privy to the Sheikh’s arrest and dismissal on 8 August 1953. (Vide the writer’s essay Article 370: Law and Politics, in Citizens’ Rights, Judges and State Accountability; Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002; pp. 371-384).

43

Maulana Azad


Azad’s constant affi rmations of consistency refl ected a deep consciousness of the change. Jinnah could easily explain his transformation by citing changed circumstances and the Congress’ policies under Gandhi. Azad had a more diffi cult task because he always justifi ed his policies in Islamic terms even citing the Qur’an. He tended at times to be extreme, unrealistic and impractical. In the issue of Al-Hilal of 29 December 1912 he remarked in reply to a correspondent that; “…. I regret to say that people like you have never studied Islam in its real greatness. Otherwise, it would not have been necessary either to knock at the door of the Government or to follow the Hindu line … We consider it a great political blunder of the Muslims that they have always kept two ideals before them: either to rely on the Government or to join the Congress and Hindus.”

Earlier; in the issue of 9 October 1912 he wrote: “… There can be nothing more degrading and disgraceful for the Muslims than to bow down before the political preachings of other people. They need not join any other party. They are ordained to invite the world to join their party and to lead the world…”

He suggested that the Muslim League too should adopt the same straight way that he had shown. In an interview to The Statesman of 19 February 1940, he advised Muslims not to mistrust the Congress because “their rights are safe in the hands of the Congress” and in his Presidential address to the Congress’ Ramgarh Session in 1940 he said: “… I am addressing them (Muslims) from the same place where I addressed them in 1912…”

Hafeez Malik, a Pakistani Scholar based in the United States, made a sympathetic analysis of Abul Kalam Azad’s Theory of Nationalism in The Muslim World (Vol. L III, No. 1, January 1963). He ably explained, both, Azad’s transformation and his decline in the esteem of the Muslim masses. “Mawlana Azad’s infl uence was considerable and he remained quite popular with certain segments of Muslim society, such as that represented by the Deoband school and Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind. However, he became decidedly unpopular among the multitude of the Muslim nation. Muslims who had looked upon him at the turn of the century as

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a beacon of hope and a savior turned away from him disillusioned in the forties. Jawaharlal Nehru, who knew him intimately, put the matter in a nutshell when he observed that “he (Azad) is essentially the scholar whom circumstances have forced into a life of action.”

“Azad maintained a scholar’s indifference to the opinions of the common men, yet he hoped that the Muslim nation would harken to him as it had before the Caliphate Movement. He did not try to feel the pulse of the nation that had developed intense feelings of Pakistani nationalism. While Muslims, under the leadership of Jinnah, passed the Pakistan Resolution in 1940 at Lahore, Azad, in his presidential address to the Ramgarh session of the All India National Congress in the same year, reiterated his pride in being an Indian. “I am part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality,” declared Azad. “I am indispensable to this noble edifi ce and without me this splendid structure of India is incomplete. I am an essential element which has gone to build India. I can never surrender this claim.”

“Azad was unjustly accused by many Muslims of hypocrisy; this was unjust because there was no dichotomy in his pronouncements and actions at any given time. Azad was guilty only of expecting the Muslim nation to follow his change of heart. The pathos of the situation lies in the fact that after the 1920’s he and the Muslim nation ceased to recognize each other.”

The breach was not healed even in 1947 as the Muslims of India lay helpless in the trauma of the partition. Azad proved unequal to the challenge which was political and ideological. He helped them whenever he could but made no effort at reaching out to them sympathetically to uplift their spirits by building up a group of Muslims within and outside Congress who could galvanize them on the social and economic front and infuse an Islamic ideology relevant to the time. For all the shifts and contradictions throughout his career, Azad consistently held a noble vision. He stood out for sagacity on strategy, on the tactics he was like any other politician, shortsighted and opportunistic; veering from romantic impracticality to the convenient gambit, baffl ing admirer

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Maulana Azad


and critic alike and rendering a balanced assessment none too easy to make.

It is not easy to sum up so complex a personality which had so varied a career, a career that ended in a tragedy whose pains were writ all over his face. Amidst the festivities on Independence Day 1947, Leonard Mosley wrote “only the sad, sad face of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to whom this occasion was something of a tragedy, sticking out from the sea of happy faces like a gaunt and ravaged rock” (Last Days of the British Raj; p. 240).

In all the annals of predictions of dire consequences which came true there is scarcely any parallel to Azad’s in its wealth of detail all of which came true and haunt us to this day. Only a truly great intellect and a man whose erudition gave him those insights could have spoken thus. The same insight was in evidence when, in reply to Chaudhry Muhammad Ali’s question about what he thought of Pakistan, he said: “Pakistan is an experiment, make it succeed.”

Dr. Zakir Hussain considered him the most intelligent man he had ever met (interview to the writer in July 1967). Even after Azad’s faults and failings are reckoned in a fair balance, his greatness stands out. It was left to Zakir Hussain to strike that balance in his funeral oration as Azad was laid to rest near the Jamia Masjid in Delhi: Unki Khamia hum sub men hai, unki khoobian hum kisi mey nahi (We all have his failings; none of us has his qualities).

46 CRITERION – Volume 5 No.3

Aneela Salman

RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY AND LETHALITY- DOES RELIGIOUS SECT HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE

LETHALITY OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION?

Aneela Salman*

Abstract:(There is a gap in research focusing on religious ideology and lethality of a terrorist organization. Determining the ideology of a group is problematic, as many terrorist groups have overlapping ideologies. This paper is a case study analysis of two lethal organizations that base their actions and decisions clearly on religious grounds. Hezbollah is a terrorist organization following Shi’a1 Islam and Al Qaeda declares Sunni2 ideology. Both organizations have an Islamic ideology with important and signifi cant divergences that need to be understood for effective counterterrorism strategies. Ideology plays a critical role in constructing a world-view of the members of the terrorist organizations but as seen in both the case studies i.e., Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, ideology is not a stagnant or dormant point of reference, but rather it is constantly developing and evolving. Author).

The best available quantitative data on terrorism (i.e., data from Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base) provoked the author to investigate the links between religious ideology and terrorism. This paper builds on the fi ndings of Asal and Rethemeyer (2008), who argue that the lethality of a terrorist organization can be predicted by the organizational size, ideology, * Aneela Salman is a PhD student, Department of Public Administration & Policy,

University at Albany, State University of New York. [email protected]

47CRITERION – July/September 2010

Religious Ideology and Lethality

territorial control and networks. Although we cannot assume a direct causal link between the two without investigation, growing literature on religion and terrorism implies a strong relationship, which deserves further study (Hoffman 2006). There is a gap in research focusing on religious ideology and lethality of a terrorist organization. Ideology is one domain within terrorism literature that has not been delved in deeper to fi nd how the fundamental ideology behind a religious group, impacts the level of lethality the group has.

In the MIPT dataset, out of 395 terrorist organizations, 117 groups have ideology (ies) that contains a religious component. And out of 117 terrorist organizations with any element of religious ideology, 109 organizations are inspired by some sect of Islam. Of the 395 terrorist organizations operating in the world only sixty-eight have killed more than 10 people and only twenty-eight have killed more than 100 people from 1995 to 2005 (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008). Out of the 68 lethal organizations (who killed more than 10 people in 1995 to 2005), 34 have some element of Islamic ideology. And out of 28 lethal organizations (who killed more than 100 people in 1995 to 2005) 18 have Islam as part of their ideology, drawing attention to the fact that ideology has an impact on the decision of a terrorist organization to kill people. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) found that religious organizations are much more lethal than non-religious ones.

Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) establish that ideology is one of the determining factors and good predictor of the lethality of a terrorist organization. They use the MIPT dataset, of 395 terrorist organizations operating throughout the world from 1998-2005. This is the most comprehensive and global dataset available on domestic and international terrorism. But MIPT ideological classifi cations are overlapping and extensive, and do not clearly show how ideology based on different religious sects impacts the lethality of a terrorist organization.

The MIPT dataset provides comprehensive information about the lethality trends of an organization. But determining the ideology of a group is problematic, as many terrorist groups have overlapping ideologies, ranging from religious, ethno-religious, nationalist or a mix


Aneela Salman

of all. About 116 organizations have some element of religion in their ideology. It is challenging to separate the fi ne lines of ideology because even the most prominent organizations in recent history, such as Al Qaeda, refrain from announcing a clear-cut group ideology. Researchers trying to determine the ideological foundations of a group rely on the declared goals, group history and development, state sponsorship, networks and affi liations. Literature on religious ideology is meager, but suggests that there is a signifi cant difference between Sunni and Shi’a terrorist groups (Lynch, 2008).

To go deeper into the ideology aspect, this paper will do a case study analysis by focusing on the religious sects of two organizations who base their actions and decisions clearly on religious grounds. Hezbollah is a terrorist organization following Shi’a3 Islam and Al Qaeda declares Sunni4 ideology. I have selected Hezbullah to see how having ideological roots in Shi’a teachings affects the decisions regarding how lethal it would be. On the other hand Al Qaeda helps us understand what is embedded in their particular ideology, which makes them decide to kill. Broadly speaking Al Qaeda belongs to the Sunni ideological camp, and within that more particularly to the Salafi movement (Hoffman, 2006; Sageman, 2004).

Hezbollah and Al Qaeda may not share the same ideology but their particular ideological background explains their use of violence. Both organizations claim an Islamic ideology with important and signifi cant divergences that need to be understood for effective counterterrorism strategies. But including Al Qaeda in the analysis, affects the overall analysis as Al Qaeda alone killed almost 3000 people on September 11, 2001. According to the MIPT data during 1995-2005, Hezbollah killed 10 people and Al Qaeda 3505. This paper does not explore the number of casualties but looks into the motivating impulse that impels an organization to kill as well as how ideology prompts that decision.

The most contested and debated issue regarding terrorism is its defi nition. The MIPT defi nition which has been used in this study is: ‘Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear or alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others



into action, they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take’ (MIPT 2006 quoted by Asal and Rethemeyer 2008: p3)

For this paper, ideology is understood as a ‘coherent and systematic whole of ideas’ which provides a rationale for political and social action of any social group. It provides a worldview of that group to justify their actions. Ideology is subject to re-description and reformulation and need not be accepted in its entirety (Alagha, 2006). Ideology is important because it provides the moral framework within which organizations operate (Drake 1998). There are two particular characteristics of any ideology that make it lethal compared to others i.e., the ideology’s audience and its capacity to clearly defi ne an ‘other’ (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008).

According to Geertz (1973), social action is structured by ideology in some ways. ‘An ideology explains the worlds’ conditions and offers a blueprint for action. Ideology helps individuals formulate, consider and respond to political problems’ (p 41). Ideology offers a “model of” and “model for” action. (Geertz quoted by Byman 2006). In studying Islamic terrorist movements, ideology emerges as the cover term for beliefs, values and goals associated with a movement which offers a rationale for individual and collective action (Snow and Byrd, 2007).

Terrorism and Religious Ideology

Violence and religion seem to be tied in a mutual bond of need, especially when some adherents to a faith believe in a divine mandate for violence with unquestioned certainty. Though religion does not ordinarily lead to violence but within a particular set of political, social and ideological circumstances it has the potential of extreme violence. Terrorism is rarely an isolated act as it usually involves community support and, in many instances, a large organizational network thereby making it a collective decision with ideological and moral underpinnings (Juergensmeyer, 2000). Although some religions incorporate beliefs that seem more prone to violence, it is widely accepted that all religions have a potential to inspire violence and incorporate notions of martyrdom


Aneela Salman

and sacrifi ce (Fox, 2002). Religion is at times a double-edged sword that encourages both peace as well as violence depending on how the tenets are used to justify a group’s acts. Thus religion can be employed to legitimize acts that would otherwise be unthinkable. Murder can become a holy war and suicide seen as martyrdom (Fox, 2002).

In the present war on terror there is a tendency to view all Islamic terrorist movements as a homogeneous wave which is ideologically equivalent and coherent (Snow and Byrd, 2007). For example statements like ‘rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder’ and ‘a new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a proud religion,’5 apply a monolithic lens to understand the concept of ideology. This monochromatic approach is of limited analytic utility as it overlooks ideological variations and ignores a discursive approach needed to articulate and elaborate the possible links between ideas, events and actions (Snow and Byrd, 2007). This paper builds on the assumption employed by Snow and Byrd (2007) i.e., there is no generic and single Islamic terrorist movement driven by ‘an evil ideology.’6 Instead there are a variety of such movements, which taxonomically might be similar, and share some ideas yet differ in other respects (Snow and Byrd, 2007).

There are serious fl aws in treating ideology descriptively rather than analytically, statistically rather than dynamically (Snow and Byrd, 2007). It is problematic to view ideology as a bundle of ideas and meanings that are derived from a sacred text, traumatic experience or cultural narrative. The use and application of ideology is seen in a mechanistic manner rather than a social production that evolved out of interactive processes among members, activists, targets and world events (Snow and Byrd, 2007).

Why Islamic sect is important?

The early history of Islam is essential to understand the contemporary Muslim world and the role of violence, particularly terrorism, in Islamic politics. The spilt in Islam resulting in two broad sects i.e., Sunni and



Shi’a, dates back to early days of the religion. The rift arose after the death of Prophet Muhammad, when Sunni’s took over power but the Shi’ites claimed to be his true heirs (Jaber, 1997). The fi rst civil war between Caliph Ali7 and General Mawiyah was followed by a second round of violence between Mawiyah’s son, Yazid and Ali’s son, Hussain (the grandson of the holy prophet) in the battle of Karbala in 680. The slaughter / martyrdom of Hussain and his family gave rise to the movement of political protest which became the foundation stone of Shi’a Islam (Capitanchik in O’Sullivan, 1986).

The violent deaths of Ali and his son Hussain instilled an admiration of martyrdom, worthy of emulation, amongst Shi’as. This also defi ned the major themes of Shi’a Islam i.e., the battle of the forces of good (Shi’a) against the forces of evil (anti-Shi’a). Both sects have different interpretations of history. For Sunni historians, power and success were the determinants of a faithful community and validation of Islam. For the Shi’as, history is the struggle for a ‘righteous remnant in protest and opposition against the forces of evil in order to realize its messianic hope and promise, that is, the righteous rule of the Imam’ (Capitanchik in O’Sullivan, 1986: p 122).

The divergence from the Sunnis is that the latter consider only the Qur’an and the Traditions as the primary sources of the Shari’a. 8 Shi’as, on the other hand, believe religion can only be perfected by following the exoteric (Qur’an and Traditions) and the esoteric (the Imam). They believe that Islam is not revealed to man fi nally as the Qur’an but it is a continuous process linked with the rise of Imams. The Imam is seen as the guardian of the Shari’a and is the hujja (apodictic proof) of God to mankind, implying mandatory obedience on the part all Shi’as (Alagha, 2006). The Shi’ites believe in the Hadith:9 ‘The Imams will not confer upon an error’ and that ‘Islam is still a fortress of the Twelve Imams’ whereas the Sunnis abide by the Hadith that says ‘the umma will not confer upon an error’ (Alagha, 2006).

In Islamic theocracy, a government would be based on the Shari’a, revealed law, with sovereignty resting with God. The Jurist governor as ‘trustee of the Prophet’ would exercise the same powers as the prophet.


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With the Islamic revolution of 1979, Khomeini sought to restore this religious activism in Iran causing disquiet amongst its neighbors in the Persian Gulf, and inspired fanaticism in the Shi’a fi ghters in Lebanon. Khomeini called upon his followers to ‘create suitable conditions to facilitate the emergence of a generation of believers who would destroy the thrones of despots, just as Imam Huseyn attempted to do at Karbala in 680’ (Capitanchik in O’Sullivan, 1986: p 127).

Global Salafi Movement

The Sunni ideology is further divided into many sects, including the Salafi movement and the Takfi ri10 belief. Sageman (2004) develops the concept of a global Salafi movement based on the ideological roots of 172 terrorist groups gathered from open sources. To understand Al Qaeda, it is important to understand the Salafi movement. What sets this movement apart from other terrorist organizations is its violence against foreign non-Muslim governments and their populations. The Salafi s believe that over the centuries Muslims have deviated from the pure message of Islam. To rectify this deviance, Salafi s prescribe a strict return to the fundamentals of Islam and are intolerant of any behavior not specifi cally supported and enjoined by the prophet Muhammad (Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2001). The Islamic radicals waging ‘jihad’11 against the United States share a worldview and their own understanding of religious purifi cation (Wiktorowicz, 2001). The Salafi s are one of the fastest growing Islamic movements with a vast global outreach to almost all countries (Wiktorowicz, 2001).

The term ‘Salafi ’ derives from the Arabic Salaf which means ‘to precede.’ Salaf refers to the companions of the prophet Muhammad, who learned about Islam directly from him, and thus had a purer understanding of the religion. Salafi s believe that subsequent interpretations and understanding of Islam were distorted by the introduction of innovations (bida) as well as the emergence of schisms in the religion. Deviations occurred over the passage of time as local customs were incorporated into Islam as it spread outside the Arabian peninsula (Wiktorowicz, 2001).



The Salafi s have devised a method ‘manhaj’ to foster purifi cation, whereby all decisions and actions in life are to be based on the direct sources of Islam i.e., the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Based on manhaj, Salafi s hope to establish a transnational community of ‘true believers whose immutable adherence to the faith’ (Wiktorowicz, 2001: p21) would be rewarded with salvation. They believe they are the only group destined for salvation on Judgment Day and base this on various hadith such as: “And this Ummah [Muslim community] will divide into 73 sects all of which except one will go to Hell, and they [the saved sect] are those who are upon what I and my Companions are upon.”12

Salafi revivalism found expression in the creation of Salafi political parties and movements notably that of Hasan-al-Banna (1906-1949) who established the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. Later, based on similar beliefs, Maulana Maududi (1903-1979) founded the Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic society) in India in 1941 (Sageman, 2004). The Salafi movement was also greatly infl uenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian ideologist for the Muslim Brothers. Some of the founders of Al Qaeda for instance Ayman al Zawahiri, Ali Amin Ali al Rashidi, and Subhi Muhammad Abu Sittah were Qutub’s disciples who had previously fl ed political persecution in Egypt and joined the Afghan Jihad (Sageman, 2004).

Qutb insisted on Jihad to establish the true Muslim state, as dawa, or preaching could not by itself achieve God’s dominion on earth. This struggle is against any jahili society. Jahili society is any society (including so-called Muslim societies) that ‘does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas, in its observances of worship, and in its legal regulations’ (Sageman 2004: p 13). With the notion of all societies being jahiliyya, Qutb provided a rationale to Muslims for rejection of and revolt against nominally Muslim regimes, of not fi ghting Muslims but idolaters (Sageman 2004). Muhammed Abd al Salam Fajar (1954-1982), Qutb’s disciple built on his argument by giving priority to the strategy that ‘to fi ght an enemy who is near is more important than to fi ght an enemy who is far’ (Sageman, 2004: p 16). Transforming the Salafi movement as a Muslim revivalist movement advocating the violent overthrow the ‘near enemy’ i.e., the local Muslim government, to establish an Islamist state (Sageman, 2004).


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The Afghan war against the Soviet Union can be regarded a watershed in militant Muslim revivalist movements giving militant groups from the entire Muslim world a platform to interact over lengthy periods of time. Sheikh Abdullah Azzam was one of the fi rst Arabs to join the Jihad in Afghanistan. He advocated a traditional jihad to push Christian encroachments out of all Muslim lands. Osama bin Laden (Azzam’s deputy) created a common enemy against whom jihadi efforts were to be focused. Thus US troops in Saudi Arabia and later Somalia, provided the embodiment of that common enemy, thereby changing the focus of salafi jihad to the ‘far enemy’ (the United States and the West in general) (Sageman, 2004; Byman, 2003)

Relation between Religious Ideology and States

Religious sect affi liations become a major factor that propels state sponsorship of terrorism. Byman (2006) defi nes state sponsorship of terrorism as a ‘government’s intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain the organization’ (p8). Why do states sponsor terrorism? One reason is the ideological basis that both the state and the terrorist organization share (Byman, 2006).

Ideology plays a vital role in a state’s initial decision to support terrorism and later strategic concerns become equally important. Iran’s support to Shi’a militants in Iraq had ideological and intellectual roots in the religious seminaries in Iraq which later transformed into strategic motivations. Disqualifying the notion of Al Qaeda being a non-state actor, Byman (2006) asserts that the Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas, and the Kashmiri Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, are some of the many successful terrorist organizations thriving on state sponsorship. Al Qaeda has had links with the Sudanese government and was protected by the Taliban’s Afghanistan since 1996.

At the same time leaders often masquerade strategic concerns as ideology. Syria propagates an ideology of Arab brotherhood to explain its support for the Palestinian cause, but has repeatedly crushed Arab nationalist movement within its borders. A group’s ideological orientation



might determine many of its actions even though they do not have an obvious strategic gain. Thus, the Taliban imposed strict restrictions on Afghan women and music without that serving any strategic purpose. But these actions were based on ideological grounds that also infl uenced violence as a strategy (Byman, 2006).

States provide safe havens to terrorist groups that match their ideological orientation. Also states inspire political groups to take up arms, an inspiration which later translates to the creation of terrorist groups (Byman, 2006). But states reduce or stop their support to a terrorist group with changes in their own goals, either responding to outside pressure or because the terrorist group itself changed. For different states there is a different mix of motivations ranging from strategic, ideological and domestic, with no single or overarching reason. For example Pakistan had strategic interest in supporting groups in Kashmir, whereas the Taliban had strong ideological and domestic reasons for supporting Al Qaeda. And Iran supported groups for all three reasons. Iran backed Shi’a radicals in several of its neighboring countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (Byman, 2006).

Often regimes seeking to spread their ideology support a terrorist group following the same ideology, to infl uence its neighbors and attain strategic advantage. States use terrorist groups as a proxy to export their ideology. Terrorism is supported in conjunction with other means, to advance ideological cause. States sponsor terrorist groups because ideology assists the export of a political system and enhances a country’s international prestige. Ideologically the states supporting terrorism, support perpetration of war crimes by non-state actors but with a degree of deniability, which reduces chances of retaliation from powerful states (Byman, 2006). Being a ‘weapon of the weak’ and a ‘poor man’s air force’ (Hoffman, 2006: p34) states can engage in harming the enemy without waging full fl edge war. Hezbollah in Lebanon is the most important example of Iranian state sponsorship groups against its enemy i.e., Israel.


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Jihad and Cosmic wars

Exploring the relation between religion and terrorism draws attention to the concept of ‘Jihad.’ It would be wrong to conclude that September 11, 2001 had nothing to do with religious ideology. Jihadist ideology stimulates a new movement called Jihadism (Habeck, 2006). The term is often translated as ‘holy war’ and is understood as a struggle /effort on behalf of Islam. It includes ‘Jihad of the heart’ (inner struggle), ‘Jihad of the tongue’ (propagation) or ‘Jihad of the sword’ (Holy war) (Wiktorowicz, 2001). The greater Jihad is the individual non-violent strife to live a good Muslim life and the lesser Jihad is the violent struggle in Islam. Although Jihad is a central and common belief in Islamic ideology, there is lack of consensus on its interpretation and understanding (Sageman, 2004).

The Muslim concept of Jihad is used both for personal salvation and political redemption. If violence is more empowering then to be in a state of war serves ones interest (Juergensmeyer, 2000). Modern Jihad came to full force in the Shi’a and Sunni worlds with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Murawiec 2008). ‘It is a refl ection, a result, and a concentrate of all the main political pathologies of the twentieth century, led by the parade of motley totalitarian ideologies, but transformed by its absorption into the Islamic cultural Matrix’ (Murawiec 2008: p324)

The Shi’ite manual of Jihad defi nes and lists the circumstances under which military Jihad becomes a religious duty for Muslims making it their natural right for the defence of the faith as well as for the honor, pride, dignity and wealth of the community. Negligence on the part of believers in carrying out this duty would entail divine punishment in the form of the occupation of their lands by non-Muslims who would establish despotic rule and control the social, political, economic, military, and all other aspects of their lives. Furthermore, Muslims who do not undertake Jihad would be severely punished on Judgement Day for abandoning their faith (Alagha, 2006)

Terrorist violence in the name of religion is carried out in a dramatic fashion. This is a part of a strategic plan for achieving political ends



(Juergensmeyer, 2000). Strategic thinking can be construed in a broader sense to include not just immediate political gains but also an internal logic that instigates a group into perpetuating terrorist acts (Crenshaw, 1981). Strategy implies not only a degree of calculation in the expectation of achieving a clear objective but also for making a symbolic statement, which is intended to illustrate or refer to something beyond an immediate target, a ‘grand conquest’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000). Religious terrorist organizations set a stage for the dramatic performance of violence with a symbolic signifi cance. Terrorism is the ‘language of being noticed’ (Don DeLillo quoted by Juergensmeyer, 2000: p 139) but for religious terrorism the audience is not ordinary mortals but the Divine. Juergensmeyer (2000) uses the image of ‘cosmic wars’ to explain the larger than life symbol of this particular kind of terrorism.

The idea of cosmic war in religion transcends human experience. ‘What makes religious violence particularly savage and relentless is that its perpetrators have placed such religious images of divine struggle - cosmic war - in service of worldly political battles’ (Juergensmeyer, 2000: p146). The cosmic war concept is evoked as a defense of basic identity and dignity, where the idea of losing the struggle is unthinkable but at the same time the struggle is seen as hopeless in human terms and the possibility of victory is in Divine hands (Juergensmeyer, 2000).

Terrorism and Sunni vs. Shi’a Ideology

There are two major ideological camps within terrorist groups claiming Islamic ideology i.e., the Sunni and the Shi’a. Most Sunni extremist groups have become affi liated with Al-Qaeda, and draw their main ideological inspiration from Sayyed Qutb under the banner of Salafi - Jihadist ideology. In the last two decades, Al-Qaeda has played a pivotal role in transforming Salafi -Jihad as the central ideology providing impetus to Sunni extremist groups (Lynch, 2008). Sunni terrorists, especially Salafi -Jihadis have xenophobic tendencies, making their outlook and approach intolerant of moderate /liberal Muslims. This insularity is featured in the terrorist operations carried out by them during 1981 to 2006. Their insular and intolerant world generates almost all their plotters, planners and executors. They bank on sympathy vote


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from the Sunni Muslim community in general, built on the assumption of the Sunni community being systematically oppressed by the western world and corrupt Islamic oligarchs.

Lynch (2008) highlights signifi cant yet little appreciated differences between Sunni and Shi’a extremist terrorism. According to him they differ in their overall approach and main objectives for using terrorism. Sunni extremists have a continuous, mid-to-high intensity manner, and view war against infi dels and apostates as a permanent condition featuring overlapping waves. Shi’a groups on the other hand have carried out relatively discrete terrorist activity. The pattern of recruitment and developing terrorist campaigns also differs in the two sects. Shi’a extremists enjoy direct state support and are likely to originate from Iranian embassies and consulates, compared to Sunni groups, especially Salafi -Jihadis who rely on support extended by co-religionist expatriate communities. Terrorism by Shi’a actors has been more successful, as is evident from the confi dence of Iranian and Hezbollah leaders as well as their capacity to base future decisions on the use of terrorism to achieve strategic gains. Shi’a terrorist groups have a greater tendency to kidnap innocents in order to bargain, whereas Sunni groups tend to abduct to kill. Abductions by Shi’a groups are fewer in number and are more likely to end in the release of hostages (Lynch, 2008). According to Lynch about 24 percent of Shi’a-inspired terrorism from 1981 to 2006 in non-combat zones featured kidnapping or hostage taking. Almost all these incidents occurred in Lebanon, with 10 percent of the victims dying in captivity; assassinations were about 35 percent and bombings around 30 percent (Lynch 2008).

Terror activity # Non combat zone events

% Non-combat zone events

Targeted Assassinations 55 35%Bombings/ Explosive Detonations 47 30%Kidnappings/ Hostage Taking 38 24%Airplane Hijackings and All others 18 11%Total 158 100%

(Taken from Lynch 2008)



A higher incidence of targeted assassinations for political gains is apparent amongst Shi’a groups. There is also a propensity towards killing of individuals and minimizing collateral damage. Sunni groups, particularly the Salafi -Jihadis, on the other hand have a track record of high-causality killings. The specifi c targets of Sunni groups are more ambiguous, with blurred lines between targeted killings and more generic attack against a hated group. The Salafi -Jihadis are identifi ed by their immediate media transmission and attack glorifi cation using the latest technology (Lynch, 2008). Further differences are seen in information management; Sunni groups amplify a terrorist event and take immediate credit, compared to their Shi’a counterparts who adopt a low key approach. Sunni terrorist groups are more likely to attack businesses that serve alcohol across the Islamic world while Shi’a outfi ts are more prone to target members of the print and electronic media (Lynch, 2008).

With regard to suicide terrorism, Lynch (2008) believes13that it is neither unique nor exclusive to Islamist terrorism. However, since its fi rst use by Hezbollah in 1983, it has incrementally been employed by Islamic groups. Lynch argues that Shi’a actors resort to suicide terrorism when this tactic is feasible and in the past decade and a half has been primarily used against Israel. Sunni groups especially the Salafi -Jihadists have engaged in martyrdom operations since the 1990s, and have acquired particular notoriety for the prolifi c use of this form of terrorism. Lynch also warns that Shi’a terrorist outfi ts have the capacity to carry out such attacks with effi ciency.

A major reason for this difference could be that the Shi’as are far fewer in number. Compared to some 1.3 billion Sunnis, there are only 280 million Shias worldwide and are mainly concentrated in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Azerbaijan (Lynch 2008). A majority of Iranian Shi’a expatriates are refugees from the Iranian revolution and are bitterly opposed to the clerical dispensation in Tehran. Similarly, nearly all Lebanese Shi’a expatriates are hostile towards Hezbollah.

The Salafi -Jihadist movement working within the rubric of reactionary Sunni Islam, aspires towards a stateless, Sunni Islamic


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Caliphate across the Muslim world, even if it entails employing unbridled violence and terror. Since Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa, the unswerving objective has been to drive out the ‘far enemy’ from Muslim lands and to expose and topple the corrupt ‘near enemy’ i.e., the leadership in Islamic countries (Lynch, 2008). In contrast, Shia terrorist groups do not display such a deep ideological grounding the exception being Hezbollah’s Iran-backed onslaught against Israel.

Hezbollah – The Party of God

Maya the wife of Salah, a Hezbollah member explains why her husband committed suicide bombing:

‘He had only one goal at the end and that was to kill the largest number of the enemy. You see he had been pleading and asking the leadership to allow him the privilege of carrying out a mission of this type for the past three years. He believed he had to defend and fi ght for his land and countrymen and this was the best way for him to do so’ (Jaber, 1997: p 3).

Thinking these men as poor, desperate or even stupid enough to be fooled by promises of paradise and eternity misses their understanding of the ‘deep rooted sacred tradition of martyrdom.’ Poverty does not explain Salah’s last wish for his son to become a resistance fi ghter and Maya’s agreement to let their son follow his father’s footsteps (Jaber 1997). Hezbollah justifi es such acts through its interpretation of Qur’anic verses such as:

‘Permission for warfare is given to those upon whom war is made because they are oppressed and most surely Allah is well able to assist them’ (Surat-al-Hajj, 39, The Qur’an quoted by Jaber 1997).

Lebanese Shi’ite history and Hezbollah:

Hezbollah, which translates as the “Party of God,” was established by Iran with Syrian support in 1983 supposedly on the principles of Islam.



It drew its membership from the Lebanese Shi’a Muslim community with the objective of establishing an Islamic state through an ‘Islamic Revolution in Lebanon’ (Alagha, 2006).

Israeli’s 1978 ‘invasion’ of Lebanon (Jaber 1997) was followed by the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, which became a Shi’ite stronghold in the region. Actually in the sixteenth century, the Safavids assumed power in Iran and adopted Shi’ism as the offi cial religion, thus Iran has a unique tie with Lebanese Shi’as.

Shi’ite history is a mix of revolutionary spirit and political withdrawal. Their fi rst leaders are considered martyrs who died for their inheritance rights. Later the Shi’ites developed the survival strategy of taqiyya, religious dissimulation, which allowed them to hide their religion. In spite of being the majority community in Iraq they faced oppression during the rule of Saddam Hussein in the 1970s and 1980s (Jaber 1997). A sense of alienation and the need for far-reaching changes in the world order is apparent in the works of many Shi’ite theologians (Hoffman 2006, Byman 2006)

Lebanese Shi’as are partly from Lebanon proper while some migrated from Iran. Their existence can be traced back to ninth century (Alagha, 2006; Jaber, 1997). The Shi’ite community in Lebanon was concentrated in the Bekaa valley, and was mostly a backward rural community. By the 1960s it grew into the largest sect in Lebanon amongst eighteen different religions (Alagha, 2006). Even after many years, the Shi’ites continued to trail behind the rest of the country, neglected by the government and disowned by their own feudal class. They were traditionally under-represented in politics which, in turn, limited their access to the basic necessitates of modern life (Byman 2006; Jaber 1997).

Shi’ite political awakening in the region was brought about by a charismatic Lebanese Shi’a leader, Musa Sadr. He was born in Qom, Iran and educated in Najaf, Iraq; both are pivotal theological centers of Shi’a Islam. Sadr was a friend of both Ayatollah Khomeini as well as President Assad of Syria (Alagha, 2006; Jaber 1997). He championed


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the Shi’ite’s sense of communal identity in Lebanon and founded the Lebanese Shi’ite Islamic Higher Council ‘Majlis al-Shii al-Aala’ along with an associated militia, Amal (Byman 2006). The Council provided a political platform and a basis for offi cial representation of the Shi’ites (Jaber 1997). Later Sadr created a socio-religious movement of the deprived, the ‘Harakat al-Mahroumeen’ which compelled the Lebanese government to grant Shi’ites full recognition as a separate community (Alagha, 2006, Jaber 1997).

With a large Shi’ite community, Lebanon was a natural ground for Iran’s revolutionary passion. Further, Lebanon’s civil war and borders with Israel, convinced Iran’s clerical leadership that this was a strategic ground to hurt their mortal enemy i.e., Israel (Byman 2006). But even before the Iranian revolution, Lebanon was a house divided against itself where its eighteen different religious factions and ethnic groups competed against each other and were backed by several of Lebanon’s neighbors. The situation was further complicated by the infl uence of Palestinian militias and the Palestine Liberation Organization used Lebanon as their base for anti-Israel operations (Byman 2006). Iran’s intervention was targeted towards leading the Shi’a movement in the latter’s resistance against Israel. Amal was infl uenced by Islam but had a secular orientation, designed to unite Lebanese Shi’a on communal rather than ideological lines. It was more inclined towards the Israeli backed National Salvation Authority rather than Iran (Byman 2006; Alagha, 2006). In 1978, Sadr disappeared mysteriously while on a visit to Libya, and his less charismatic and religiously unqualifi ed deputy i.e., Nabih Berri, took over the movement (Byman 2006).

Hezbollah, a ‘motley assortment of small Shi’ite organizations’ (Byman 2006: p 83) was created to counter Amal and to export Iran’s revolution to Lebanon (Byman 2006). Iranian clerics and paramilitary forces helped train and indoctrinate new Shi’ite members in the Bekaa Valley, and also developed a social services and fund-raising network there.



Hezbollah ideology:

Hezbollah religious ideology is based on the belief in Shi’a Islam of Wilayat al-Fiqih (guardianship of the jurists) and Jihad fi sabili Allah (struggle in the way of God). The basic Shi’ite religious ideology is based on Imama (Doctrine of the imamate), taqiyya (expedient dissimulation - a quietist practice of self-protection) and ta’bi’a (mobilization - an activist practice for defending the self (Alagha, 2006).

Although Hezbollah is vague about a specifi c date its foundation, Alagha argues that it was established in 1978, as an Islamic movement of socio-political protest by the Lebanese Shi’ite religious leadership in alliance with and infl uenced by the Iranian ideological movement (Alagha, 2006). On its offi cial website Hezbollah clearly acknowledges its ideological ties with Iran:

‘The revolution against the Shah in Iran undoubtedly carried much inspiration for the Shi’a community in Lebanon, but it’s modern historic roots go back to the Islamic revival at the centers of learning in Najf, Iraq in the 1960s.’14

Hezbollah perceives itself fi ghting an entirely self-defensive struggle, with divine sanction (Hoffman 2006; Snow and Byrd 2007):

“We are an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God wanted to be fulfi lled by the Seal of the Prophets, i.e., Muhammad. This is why whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim umma of which we are an integral part. . . . We see in Israel the vanguard of the United States in our Islamic world. It is the hated enemy that must be fought until the hated ones get what they deserve.”(Hezbollah Program 1985: 1 quoted by Snow and Byrd 2007, p 8)


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Ever since Hezbollah’s birth, the Shi’ite ulema (Muslim religious scholars) have played a pivotal role in the party (Bryan Early 2006). Hezbollah claims Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah as its spiritual leader15 but the latter has repeatedly stated that he has no organizational role, ties or link with Hezbollah. However, it is Fadlallah who unhesitatingly justifi es Islamic terrorism on the grounds of self-defense. ‘Jihad [literally “striving”, but in this context “holy war”] in Islam is a defensive movement against those who impose violence’ (quoted in Hoffman 2006: p 91). For Hezbollah, the struggle against Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon is nothing short of being divinely ordained ‘directed by the tenets on Islam’ (Hoffman 2006: p91) Hezbollah remains faithful to its Islamic ideology and at the same time operates as a social service provider to a large section of Lebanese society (Bryan Early, 2006).

Hezbollah’s identity:

In the past two decades Hezbollah has gained the reputation of the world’s most lethal and effective guerilla/terrorist organization and the organization has evolved from an Iranian-led terrorist group to the largest party in the Lebanese parliament. With two faces i.e., a terrorist organization and a social and a political actor, it becomes diffi cult for US foreign policy to differentiate between the two (Bryan Early 2006).

Hezbollah’s goals include the establishment of a Shi’ite theocracy in Lebanon, the destruction of Israel and the elimination of western infl uence in the Middle East. 16 The US is depicted as the “great satan” and Israel the “little satan.” These are further linked to the concept of oppressor and oppressed and provide the motivating impulse for anti-Zionism, Pan Islamism, anti-imperialism, jihad and martyrdom (Alagha, 2006). It does not give specifi c examples of Sunni-Shi’a disagreements as it aims to unite all Muslims. Efforts to unify Muslims have been more at a theoretical than a practical level. It intends to convey superiority of the Islamic order over the materialistic outlook of West. Over the last two decades Hezbollah has professionalized its military capacity, established itself in the Lebanese political process and meshed into the Lebanese social fabric (START).



Hezbollah’s identity construction over the years has focused on three key components i.e., religious ideology (1978-84/5), political ideology (1984/5-1990) and political program (1991-2005). Its religious ideology is embedded in the Shi’ite jihadi struggle/movement emerging in a specifi c social, political and economic context within a Lebanese, Arab and Islamic framework (Alagha, 2006). It has developed from a religious movement to a social movement and fi nally to a full-fl edged political party with a parliamentary, municipal and governmental presence. The question arises what the role of Hezbollah’s Shi’ite ideology is in its development spectrum? Or has it sacrifi ced its ideological principles in bargaining with other political parties by including mainly Lebanese Christians and Sunnis in its election lists (Alagha, 2006)? Has this change affected its decision to kill people?

Hezbollah- Jihad:

Hezbollah religious ideology depicts Jihad fought only in the way of God as a fulcrum of Islamic belief. The audience, therefore, is not an earthly one. Hezbollah explicitly identifi es suicide bombers as martyrs, being inspired by and emulating Imam Hussain. Martyrdom is considered a key to heaven but Hezbollah has shifted its religious-ideological justifi cations of Jihad to a more political-ideological one (Alagha, 2006). It has restrained itself from suicide attacks against Israeli civilians and focused instead on Israeli military and intelligence personnel occupying Lebanese soil (Alagha, 2006). It has observed the civilian/military divide by targeting combatants in the Israeli-occupied ‘security zones’ to legitimize its claim of a resistance group against foreign occupation (Early, 2006)

Hezbollah jihad has a contractual dimension with a tacit consent from God based on paying homage and pledging allegiance to Him, to enter heaven in return for this sacrifi ce. “Allah has bought from the believers their lives and their wealth in return for Paradise; they fi ght in the way of Allah, kill and get killed [yuqtalu]. That is a true promise from Him in the Torah, the Gospel and the Qur’an; and who fulfi ls his promise better than Allah? Rejoice then at the bargain you have made


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with Him; for that is the great triumph” (Qur’anic verse quoted by Alagha, 2006)

The Shi’ites believe that Jihad is one of the doors to heaven and cite the following verse from the Qur’an (9:88-89):

“But the Apostle and those who believe with him struggle [jahadu] with their wealth and their lives. To those are the good things reserved, and those are the prosperous. Allah has prepared for them gardens beneath which rivers fl ow, abiding therein forever. That is the great triumph!” (Quoted by Alagha 2006: p 83).

Hezbollah records lethality as a major strategy that has yielded results:

‘what caused most political consternation were the quite spectacular actions against various foreign occupants by its predecessors. The bombing of the barracks of the US Marines and French headquarters in 1983 killed 300 soldiers of the Multinational Force that by then had lost its semblance of neutrality of intervention in the punishing Israeli siege and occupation of West Beirut. That humiliation led the US to lose its nerve in trying to police the confl ict, which no longer was restricted to an Israeli - Palestinian matter, with force. The subsequent bombing of the “Israeli Defence Forces” headquarters in Tyre with 75 soldiers lost took its toll on Israeli resolve and led to it’s retreat to the present occupation zone in the south.’ 17

Thus Hezbollah ideology is based on the concept of Jihad and martyrdom which are demonstrated in its acts of suicide terrorism. On 11 November 1982 Hezbollah’s fi rst suicide bomber, Ahmed Qasir, detonated himself in the Israeli military headquarters killing 76 (the Hezbollah website claims 75) offi cers. The day continues to be commemorated by Hezbollah as ‘Martyrdom day’ in Qasir’s honor (Alagha, 2006).



Till 1984 Hezbollah was mainly an underground movement and remained mostly anonymous. It subsequently made several political declarations and established a politburo. It established its offi cial mouthpiece and weekly newspaper ‘al- Ahd’ in June 1984 (Alagha, 2006). It has its own radio station and satellite television ‘al-Manar’ which is the primary propaganda engine for anti-Israel and anti-US programs to the Islamic world in multiple languages (START).

The existing literature tends to overlook the nationalist thrust propelling many terrorist movements. In the case of Hezbollah, there is excessive emphasis on its Shi’ite identity and ideology as well as a tendency to see it in the same light as Al Qaeda. The sectarian emphasis is probably due to its origins in the mid-1980s as a Shi’ite resistance movement supported by Syria and Iran and touted in the ideological preaching of Ayatollah Khomeini (Snow and Byrd 2007). Yet over the years, Hezbollah has become more nationalist in orientation by seeking a prominent and legitimate role in the Lebanese government, politics and society (Snow and Byrd 2007, Early 2006). Till now Al Qaeda does not have similar aspirations for participatory politics. Hezbollah’s strategy of establishing good relations with other Palestinian resistance groups including Hamas, is aimed at strengthening its liberation movement against regional injustices perpetuated by its perceived enemies, namely, Israel and the US. This strategy of forging alliances is not only of concern to Israel and the US but has also induced Sunni groups aligned to Al Qaeda to attempt merging the Palestinian struggle under the umbrella of their global network. This resonated in a video statement by Ayman al-Zawahiri18 in which he addressed the Hezbollah-Israeli confl ict:

‘The whole world is an open fi eld for us. As they attack us everywhere, we will attack them everywhere. As their armies got together to wage war on us, our nation will get together to fi ght them. . . . The shells and missiles that tear apart the bodies of Muslims in Gaza and Lebanon are not purely Israeli. Rather, they come from and are fi nanced by all countries of the Crusader alliance. Thus, all those who took part in the crime should pay the price. We cannot just stand idly by in humiliation while we see all these shells fall on our brothers


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in Gaza and Lebanon’(BBC 2006: 1 quoted by Snow and Byrd 2007: p 8).

Here al-Zawahiri is not only focusing on winning the hearts and minds of Palestinian organizations but is also pledging common cause with Hezbollah and, at the same time, bracketing ‘all countries of the crusader alliance’ under one heading (Snow and Byrd 2007).

Hezbullah is investing in building a domestic image by running a number of social programs in southern Lebanon, that provide schooling, medical care and welfare to Lebanese Shi’a (Alagha, 2006). It wants to project an international image of itself as a pan-Arab, pan-Islamic movement. Hezbollah seems to be pursuing practical politics in a religious garb. Its relations with Iran are based on political-ideological, strategic-policy terms (pan-Islamism) and with Syria on ethno-national identity (pan-Arabism) (Alagha, 2006).

Training other Sunni groups and even non-Islamic outfi ts such as the Tamil Tigers has been part of Hezbollah strategy to spread the schemes of martyrdom into other territories. Addressing the organization’s military units in December 2002, the Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, said:‘Martyrdom operations - suicide bombings - should be exported outside Palestine. I encourage Palestinians to take suicide bombings worldwide. Don’t be shy to do it.’19

Hezbollah lethality is inspired by Shi’a terrorism, which is Iranian focused. Its organizational goals contrast with the Sunni extremist focus on broad messianic objectives thereby drastically limiting Shi’a terror propaganda (Lynch, 2008)

Al Qaeda and its Ideology

The brainchild of Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda has its genesis in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of 1979. Osama bin Laden formed Al Qaeda around 1988, as an international terrorist network seeking to rid Muslim countries of the profane infl uence of the west and to establish a fundamentalist Islamic regime. Afghanistan became the



headquarters for recruiting, training and fi nancing thousands of foreign ‘mujahadeens’ holy warriors from more than fi fty countries (Rueda, 2001; CFR, 2008). Many believe that Al Qaeda is a group of ‘religious fanatics, lunatics, mad mullahs or even fascists—embodiments of ‘pure evil’ which corrupts and misrepresents Qur’an’(Hellmich, 2005).

To understand Al Qaeda and its ideology it is pertinent to refl ect on the background of Osama bin Laden. It is thought that bin Laden’s experiences during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a logistical coordinator and fi nancier of the Afghan and Arab resistance reaffi rmed his belief in the collective Muslim armed struggle, inspired by Islamic principles. His exposure to the preaching of conservative Islamic scholars and militants laid the theological and ideological foundations for his belief in ‘defensive jihad’ as well as his desire for a puritanical Salafi st Islamic reform in Muslim societies (Blanchard, 2004).

According to Sageman (2004), Al Qaeda is the vanguard of the global Salafi movement, which includes many sister terrorist groups that share the same ideology. The ‘Salafi movement determines its mission, sets its goals, and guides its tactics (Sageman 2004; p1). Salafi ideology makes the Saudi Arabian government an un-Islamic regime, which needs to be purged of its present leaders.

Unhappy over the introduction of foreign military forces in Saudi Arabia after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the 1991 Gulf War, bin Laden renewed his commitment to defensive jihad and advocated violence against Saudi Arabia and the United States (Blanchard, 2004). He publically criticized the Saudi royal family for inviting foreign troops into the holy lands. Later he was expelled from Saudi Arabia and this increased his hatred of the US. Bin Laden issued a declaration of jihad against the US in 1996, signaling his emergence on the world stage. In his declarations he adopted the historical imagery of Islamic resistance to the European crusades, describing the enemy as ‘the alliance of Jews, Christians and their agents’ and holding them responsible for “massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Fatani [as transliterated], Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina” (Blanchard, 2004: p 3). Bin Laden projects


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the image of the Islamic world as one seamless community in which Muslims are obliged to defend themselves against foreign invaders. He exhorts the Muslim Umma to unite under a ‘pious caliphate’ that would be governed by Islamic law and principles. He perceives Afghanistan under the Taliban as a model Islamic state (Blanchard, 2004).

Al Qaeda in Arabic means ‘the base.’ It is led by bin Laden and administered by a council that discusses and approves major terrorist operations. The head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the top deputy of bin Laden, is Al Qaeda’s ideological advisor. Another prominent leader was Abu Musab al Zarqawi who established the Sunni Muslim extremist group Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and planned deadly terror attacks including beheadings of kidnapped foreigners. Praised by bin Laden as the ‘prince of al-Qaeda in Iraq’ he was later killed in a US air strike near Baghdad in 2006 (CFR, 2008).

Today Al Qaeda is a ‘networked transnational constituency rather than the monolithic, international terrorist organization with an identifi able command and control apparatus that it once was.’ Since 9/11 is has emerged as a ‘nimble, fl exible and adaptive entity,’ demonstrating remarkable resilience and durability and claims to be stronger and more capable (Hoffman 2006: p282). With a hydra-headed network, Al Qaeda shares Sunni Muslim fundamentalist view with many Islamic terrorist groups around the world (CFR, 2008). It depends on its local cells for its pan-Islamist ideology (Hoffman 2003).

‘The current Al Qaeda therefore exits more as an ideology that has become a vast enterprise - an international franchise with like-minded local representatives loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base but advancing the remaining center’s goals at once simultaneously and independently of each other’ (Hoffman 2006). Al Qaeda attacks American and Western interests, Jewish interests and Muslim states it considers impious/corrupt including the Saudi monarchy (CFR, 2008), which refl ects on its ideological foundations:

“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who



can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosques from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “And fi ght the pagans all together as they fi ght you all together,” and “Fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevails justice and faith in God.” (Fatwa20 issued by Osama bin Laden and others in al-Qaeda, published in al-Quds al-Arabi, 23 February 1998, taken from Wiktorowicz, 2001)

Here bin Laden is referring to America as the embodiment of evil and oppression, a mythical monster, which has to be battled, and which only divine power can subdue. The process of creating satanic enemies is part of the construction of an image of cosmic war (Juergensmeyer, 2000). Following the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998), Laden argued that it was the retribution of US policy for massacres of Palestinian civilians and Muslims. All the grand declared threats to the US were enacted on September 11, 2001. The attack on the twin towers made Al Qaeda the number one enemy of the US. Bin Laden declared his support for the hijackers and threatened future attacks as a defense motivated response (Blanchard, 2004).

There is a distinction between pre and post-9/11 bin Laden statements. In many pre-9/11 pronouncements he appeals to non-Arab Muslims engaged in confl ict in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir and Philippines. In the post-9/11 period, bin Laden’s appeal shifted to national groups facing counter-terrorism operations, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq and Palestinian territories (Blanchard, 2004).

Interestingly Al Qaeda propounds an intellectual concept that is not based on main schools of Islamic theology, but constructs a new ideological starting point by the application of Islamic principles to sociopolitical change. Its political goals are reinforced by the teachings of the Qur’an, the organization creates a powerful imagery that is embedded in the collective consciousness of the Muslim community.


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Thus it inspires its followers to commit violence and convinces them that these acts of destruction are ordained by Allah (Hellmich, 2005).

Bin Laden projects Jihad as an individual responsibility incumbent on all Muslims, to avenge the innocent Muslim blood, especially that of Muslim children in Iraq and Palestine (Hoffman, 2003). “Those [Westerners] who talk about the loss of innocent people didn’t yet taste how it feels when you lose a child, don’t know how it feels when you look in your child’s eyes and all you see is fear. Are they not afraid that one day they [will] get the same treatment?” (Laden quoted by Hoffman 2003).

Al-Qaeda’s ideology has developed over the years in response to its geopolitical and geostrategic activities (Rueda, 2001). It sees the world as its stage, carrying out terrorist attacks in diverse places like Tunisia, Pakistan, Jordan, Indonesia, Kuwait, Philippines, Yemen and Kenya. Its targets include German, Australian and Israeli tourists, French engineers and American diplomats and servicemen. It has continued to employ suicide bombing tactics at sea, on land and in the air (targeting commercial aviation) (Hoffman 2003). The main challenge for this organization is to promote and ensure durability of its ideology and concepts (Hoffman, 2003).

There has been a shift in bin Laden’s stance, towards more moderate political rhetoric and emphasis on economic effectiveness of Al Qaeda, to broaden its appeal, and draw inspiration for more ‘spectacular’ attacks.’

The elimination of several of its key leaders and the ongoing Afghanistan war has not ended Al Qaeda’s campaign. It was able to launch seven successful suicide attacks from April to December 2002, killing 250 western civilians (more than the three years combined before 9/11) (Pape, 2003).

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to fi nd a link between ideology, terrorism and lethality. For this purpose religious ideology and specifi cally



Islamic ideology i.e., Sunni and Shi’a infl uencing terrorist organizations was examined by looking at two ideology-driven Islamic terrorist organizations i.e., Hezbollah and Al Qaeda.

Ideology plays a critical role in constructing a world view of the members of the terrorist organizations but as seen in both the case studies i.e., Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, ideology is not a stagnant or dormant point of reference, but rather it is constantly developing and evolving. Hezbollah in the last twenty years has evolved into a robust political entity from its original religiously-driven militant character. Looking at the Shi’a-Sunni variation of terrorist targets and operations, within Islamic terrorist organizations it becomes clear that they cannot be bundled under one heading of a ‘Global Jihadi movement’(Habeck, 2006) or’ Global insurgency.’ Religious ideology, along with political and nationalist agendas and goals, shapes the lethality policy of a certain group. Islamic fundamentalism is too broad a category to capture the complex and varied nuances of ideological dissimilarities within the Islamic terrorist groups. While looking at Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, we see a development of ideological ideas, although grounded in religious understanding but defi nitely not limited to it. Infl uenced by social, political, geographical and economic settings, the ideology(ies) motivating these terrorist organizations are not frozen in time.

Both organizations in this study are lethal, but their strategies and approach towards carrying out operations is different (Lynch, 2008). Religion for both the organizations consists of socio-cultural symbols that convey a conception of reality and construe a plan around it (Hellmich, 2005). Al Qaeda has a particular political view about the situation in Muslim societies in general and at the same time, its religious ideology of Salafi revivalism and violence infl uences its political worldview. The decision to kill is greatly infl uenced by the worldview and shared ideology of a certain terrorist group but it is not the sole factor.

Keeping the organic ideologies and the variety of Islamic movements in mind, there is need for more fl exible counterterrorism strategies by addressing and understanding a particular terrorist organization in the light of its ideological worldview, rather than bundling them under broad


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counter-insurgency global efforts. There are certainly some overlaps in the ideological framing of Al Qaeda and Hezbollah but they are defi nitely not identical or ‘isomorphic ideologically’ (Snow and Byrd 2007: p8). Caution needs to be taken in assuming that there is ideological coherence within these various movements. Iraq the present battle ground of Shi’a-Sunni tensions clearly demonstrates the ideological heterogeneity between and within Islamic militant and terrorist organizations, which suggests that ideology is much more elastic and malleable than often assumed (Snow and Byrd 2007).

The terms ‘Global Insurgency’ or ‘Global war on terror’ dangerously simplifi es the character and course of terrorist movements. Global terrorist datasets and quantitative studies do give a broad overview of patterns emerging in the terrorist operations but they lack the capacity to understand the highly complex nuances that separate one terrorist organization from the other. There is need to understand their worldview, their approach, grievances, goals and also the highly pertinent question; why some terrorist organizations kill more than others? An alternative and discursive conceptual scheme is required to understand the ideological motivations driving terrorist organizations (Snow and Byrd 2007).

Pape’s (2003) ‘strategic logic’ approach to explain the suicide terrorism tactic in fact corroborates the role of ideology in the decision to be lethal. Religious fanaticism is not irrational, but it’s a rational understanding from the point of view of the terrorist and his organization, and that rational understanding emerges out of the ideological framework the individual and his organization work within. The experiences of terrorists and their worldview is embedded and generated by the ideological understanding of that individual and his organization. Pape (2003) argues that among Islamic suicide attacks, groups with secular orientations account for about a third of these attacks. First of all if those groups are Islamic, then some part of their ideology is infl uenced and drawn from religious ideas. How can Pape (2003) neatly categorize some Islamic groups as being secular? The problem with identifying and labeling ideology is that in many cases it cannot be neatly packaged as being religious or secular.



Killing more people, being more violent even if it means killing the perpetuator in the process becomes a rational choice because it gives results (Pape, 2003). During April to December 1983 Hezbollah carried out six suicide terrorist against US and French forces in Lebanon, resulting in 384 casualties and also the complete withdrawal of their targets (Pape 2003).

Religious ideology makes the lethality decision easier to understand and justify. Al Qaeda defi nitely constructed an essential ‘other’ drawing on Salafi teachings whereby anyone not waging jihad for the puritanical return of true Islam belongs to the enemy camp. Victims of religious terrorism are easily dehumanized in the minds of individual terrorists and their organizations. Although their audience is larger than life (Hoffman 2006), but their potential recruits are very much human, and ideology plays a critical role in recruiting ‘rational’ individuals who are in line with the rationality of the organization i.e., ideology. It is naïve to believe that Al Qaeda’s ideology had no role to play in its ‘spectacular’ display of carnage on 9/11 killing almost 3000 people. It was indeed a rational decision for Al Qaeda, reinforced by its ideological foundations, of ‘othering’ and ‘satanizing’ the US (Juergensmeyer, 2000)

Piazza argues that Al Qaeda and its affi liated groups fi t a typology as ‘universalist/ abstract’ while other Islamist terrorist groups are more properly categorized as ‘strategic’ based on their critical organizational and goal structure differences that determines their tactical behavior of using suicide terrorism and attacking soft targets which helps determine their lethality. But what Piazza calls ‘universalist’ and ‘strategic’ is again embedded in certain ideological frameworks, which have evolved over time. Such clear-cut categorization of Hezbollah or Al Qaeda is problematic, as both organizations’ ideological foundations have developed over time. Bin Laden with his shift to more ‘moderate, political rhetoric’ and growing emphasis on economic effectiveness of Al Qaeda’s campaign to broaden the movement’s appeal (Blanchard, 2004), refl ects on the potential metamorphosis of ideological motivations. A straightjacket approach to categorizing an organization as ideologically arrested greatly hampers the real understanding of the role ideology plays in its lethality.


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State sponsorship is based on shared ideology but it is not limited to that sphere as political and strategic goals take preference over time. But the initial shared ideological basis is essential to understand the lethality patterns of a terrorist organization. Hezbollah would certainly not be such a professional militant organization, if it was not supported by Iran and Syria. Within the ideology and lethality paradigm, the state sponsorship links play a crucial role in predicting a certain group’s capacity and willingness to kill someone. Al Qaeda though not restricted to one geographical location enjoys open or tacit approval in many countries including elements in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Byman 206, Bloom 2005) that allow its operations within its borders.

Hezbollah has had links with various organizations, even though it does not share the same ideology with them. For instance it has been willing to train the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka and terrorist groups in Japan in terrorist militancy and especially suicide terrorism operations. Sharing the same ideology does not affect their assistance and training program. Al Qaeda on the other hand has a vast network of organizations, which are affi liated with it and mostly the source of affi liation is the sharing of the same ideology. The invasion of Iraq posed a dilemma for Al Qaeda, as the majority population in Iraq is Shi’a, which Sunnis consider heretics. Al Qaeda is also reported to have developed ties with Hezbollah for some terrorist operations (Byaman 2003), proving that ideological fl exibility is subject to strategic gains.

Ideologically the Islamic notion of Muslim Umma defi es national boundaries. Pape (2003) suggests that the US should emphasize on domestic security by enhancing and strengthening border controls making it diffi cult for suicide attackers to enter the US. Pape is assuming an ‘outsider’ who is exposed to the ideology outside the US, but with the rapidly growing technologies preaching and promoting their world view, sharing ideology is not limited by national boundaries. Many of the Al Qaeda’s suicide terrorists and affi liates have lived in the US and western democracies.

Understanding the ideological foundations of Al Qaeda is critical for designing effective counterterrorism strategies (CTS). Building CTS



on wrong assumptions and faulty understanding of ideology inspiring terrorist attacks can lead to more killings. Looking at both the case studies discussed above, we need to be extremely cautious while brushing aside and ignoring ideology, especially religious ideology (Pape, 2003), as a motivating factor for terrorist organizations to decide to kill more people.

Concessions, as a possible counterterrorism strategy (Pape 2003), would be ineffective if the terrorist organization is performing for a divine audience (Juergensmeyer 2000) and has a larger than life time frame in mind. Al Qaeda believes God would win wars for them. Any concession to an enemy who aspires for divine rewards and sees himself part of ‘cosmic wars’ has a dramatically different worldview than his target. In an increasingly globalized world, no country can adopt an isolationist approach. Pape (2003) suggests energy independence for the US, to curtail its reliance on Gulf energy sources and reduce recruitment of suicide terrorist in that region. But indirectly he is proposing an isolationist policy, which has the potential to aggravate rather than curtail lethal attacks on the US. In a way he corroborates bin Laden’s stance that energy dependence was a major reason for US troops to be in that region.

For any counterterrorism strategy to be effective, I argue that winning an ideological war should be an integral part of US strategy, whereby the peaceful face of religion is highlighted rather than alienating representative populations as potential members of terrorist organizations. Otherwise the US would be unintentionally pushing itself into a cosmic war model and reinforcing the ideological ‘othering’ process, which stimulates recruitment of individuals following that particular ideological thinking. Furthermore, for the success of any CTS, it is important to build relations with communities in terrorist prone regions, as local people are the real center of information and resistance.


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Bibliography

Alagha, Joseph Elie.The shifts in Hezbullah’s ideology :religious ideology, political ideology and political program, [The Netherlands]: Amsterdam University Press, c2006.

Asal, Victor and Rethemeyer, R. Karl (2008), “The Nature of the Beast: Terrorist Organizational Characteristics and Organizational Lethality.” Journal of Politics 70(2): 437-449.

Blanchard, Christopher M. (2004) Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS21973, November 16, 2004

Bloom, Mia (2005) Dying to kill, The Allure of Suicide Terrorism’ New York: Columbia University Press.

Byman Daniel (2006) Deadly Connections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Byman, Daniel L. (2003), Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?, World Politics, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Oct., 2003), pp. 139-163

Crenshaw, Martha (1981) “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics 13 (4):379-399.

Drake, C. J. M. 1998. “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection.” Terrorism & Political Violence 10(2): 53-85.

Early Bryan R.. 2006. Larger than a Party, yet Smaller than a State:’ Locating Hezbollah’s Place within Lebanon’s State and Society. World Affairs 168(3): 115-28.

Fox, Jonathan (2002) Ethnoreligious Confl ict in the Late Twentieth Century: A General Theory, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, (2002).

Habeck Mary (2006) Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006.

Hafez, Mohammed M. (2007) Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, United States Institute of Peace Press (USIP Press), July 2007

Hellmich, Christina (2005), Al-Qaeda—terrorists, hypocrites, fundamentalists? The view from within. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp 39 – 54, 2005



Hoffman, Bruce (2003) Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An Assessment. published 2003 by RAND

Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jaber, Hala (1997) Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Juergensmeyer, Mark (2000) Terror in the Mind of God. Berkley: University of California Press.

Lynch, COL Thomas F. III (2008) Sunni and Shi ’a Terrorism-Differences that Matter, Combating Terrorism Center, at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, 2008

Murawiec, Laurent (2008), The Mind of Jihad, Cambridge University Press, NY. O’Sullivan, Noel (ed) (1986) Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution, Published in 1986, Wheatsheaf Books, Distributed by Harvester Press (Brighton, Sussex)

Pape Robert, (2003) “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” American Political Science Review 97(3): 1-19.

Piazza ,James A. (___) Is Islamist Terrorism More Lethal?: An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization and Goal Structure, Submitted to Comparative Political Studies

Rueda, Edwin O. (2001) New Terrorism? A Case Study of al-Qaida and the Lebanese Hezbollah, Available at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2001/Dec/01Dec_Rueda.pdf

Sageman, Marc (2004) Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Slavin, Barbara (2008) Mullahs, Money, and Militias, How Iran Exerts Its Infl uence in the Middle East, United States Institute of Peace. Special report 206 , June 2008.

Snow, David A. and Byrd, Scott C. (2007) Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review 12(1): 119-136

Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2001), The new global threat: Transnational Salafi s and Jihad, Middle East Policy, vol. Viii, no. 4, December 2001

Wittes,Tamara Cofman (2008) Three kinds of movements, Journal of Democracy


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Volume 19, Number 3 July 2008

Other sources

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Al Qaeda profi le: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9126/

Hezbollah website: http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/

START, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism. Hezbollah profi le: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profi le.asp?id=3101

The National Security Strategy papers of the United States of America, March 2006.

References:1 (or Shi’ite) A Sect or branch of Muslim religion centered in Iran with large

followings in southern Iraq and sub-sects (Alawi, Ismaili) in Syria and Lebanon (Bloom, 2005)

2 The mainstream Muslim religious sect3 (or Shi’ite) A Sect or branch of Muslim religion centered in Iran with large

followings in southern Iraq and sub-sects (Alawi, Ismaili) in Syria and Lebanon (Bloom, 2005)

4 The mainstream Muslim religious sect5 President Bush, National Security Strategy, March 20066 British Prime Minister Tony Blair on BBC 20057 Cousin and son-in law of Mohammed, ruled over the Islamic Caliphate from 656

to 661.8 Muslim religious jurisprudence and law. 9 Verse of the Qur’an, the holy book of Islam10 Takfi ri is a relatively small but important group of radicals ideologically driven

to label other muslims as heretics and apostates, thus justifying use of violence against them.

11 Holy war12 As quoted in Jamiat Ihyaa Minhaaj Al-Sunnah, A Brief Introduction to the

Salafi Dawah (Suffolk, U.K.: Jamiat Ihyaa Minhaaj Al-Sunnah, 1993), p. 5. (Taken from Wiktorowicz, 2001, p

36)13 Based on MIPT-TKB and START-GTD 1 databases.14 Hezbollah website



15 Source Hezbollah website16 Source START data, terrorist organizations profi le (TOPS) 17 Source Hezbollah website18 Al Qaeda’s second in command19 Quoted by Murawiec 2008:p 5520 Islamic religious jurisprudential opinions

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ECONOMIC COST OF PAKISTAN’S PARTICIPATION IN WOT

Sultan M Hali*

Abstract(Pakistan has no option but to win this war, even at the expense of development expenditure to bring back peace and stability as these are indispensible for sustained economic growth. The cumulative cost of the war on terror and militancy has been staggering and Pakistan needs a Marshall Plan-like ‘Lifeline’ to overcome its economic problems. The conclusive defeat of terrorism will not only benefi t Pakistan but also the region and the world. Whereas these are compelling reasons for the international community to participate in the process, Pakistan needs to put its own house in order. It has ample resources of its own which, if properly exploited, could be used to combat and defeat terrorism. The need of the hour is pragmatic leadership, which is selfl ess and dedicated to the cause of Pakistan, is willing to sacrifi ce its own comforts for the better future of the country; only then the people would be willing to tighten their belts and unite to defeat the scourge of terrorism. That is when every dollar spent would be justifi ed because terrorism is the main hurdle in Pakistan’s socio-economic prosperity, political stability, geo-strategic sustainability and energy security. No cost is enough to attain it. Author).

IntroductionPakistan’s tryst with terror is not new. It was faced with the wrath

of fanatic Hindu and Sikh marauders, who attacked, raped looted and killed the Muslim refugees, heading towards the “Promised Land” of * Group Capt. Sultan M. Hali (retd), Sitara-e-Imtiaz (M), is a former Naval and Air

Attache at the Pakistan Embassy in Riyadh. He is also a columnist and the host of a television talk show.

83

Economic Cost of Pakistan’s Participation in Wot


Pakistan after the declaration of Independence. After the 1947 partition, 7.2 million Muslim refugees from India crossed to Pakistan. It was the largest recorded refugee movement in history. There was little international assistance in this massive humanitarian crisis1 and it was left to the fl edgling nation to fend for itself and rehabilitate the hapless refugees, the survivors of the ordeal who carried the mental and, in some cases, physical scars from the trauma for the rest of their lives.

The next phase of subversion, sabotage and terror attacks, which Pakistan faced, was during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, when the secret services of USSR and Afghanistan: KGB and Khad/Wad singled out Pakistan for conducting punitive bombing attacks in various Pakistani cities, providing Pakistanis their fi rst taste of acts of subversion, sabotage and terror.

Before we embark upon discussing the economic costs of Pakistan’s participation in the global war on terror (GWOT) let us defi ne terror.

“Terror” comes from a Latin word terrere meaning “to frighten.”2 The terror cimbricus was a panic and state of emergency in Rome in response to the approach of warriors of the Cimbri tribe in 105 BC. The Jacobins cited this precedent when imposing a Reign of Terror during the French Revolution.3 After the Jacobins lost power, the word “terrorist” became a term of abuse4 although the Reign of Terror was imposed by a government whereas in modern times “terrorism” usually refers to the killing of innocent people5 by a private group in such a way as to create a media spectacle.6 This meaning can be traced back to Sergey Nechayev, who described himself as a “terrorist.”7 Nechayev founded the Russian terrorist group “People’s Retribution” (Народная расправа) in 1869. In November 2004, a United Nations Secretary General report described terrorism as any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”8

Pakistan is currently undergoing one of its worst crises since its independence. The post-1971 trauma resulting from the severance of its

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Eastern Wing pales in comparison to what the country is facing today. The economy is in tatters, soaring infl ation, acute energy crisis, the rising tempo of crime and the near absence of security for the common man are problems enough by themselves, but this is further compounded by recurrent terrorist attacks against a backdrop of political instability. Pakistan has consistently opposed all forms of terrorism and this paper will examine the economic impact of its participation in GWOT.

Pakistan’s entry into GWOT

Pakistan’s decision to join the post-9/11 international coalition for the global war on terror proved consequential. Earlier, former President George W. Bush had enunciated a stark “either” “or” option for the international community with the words, “You are either with us or against us?”9 The message to Pakistan is said to have been even more brazen. In his book, In the Line of Fire, former President Pervez Musharraf writes that US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, warned Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad, then Director General Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), who was on a visit to Washington at the time, that unless Pakistan cooperated it should “Be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age.”10This was repeated by Musharraf in his interview with CBS News’ 60 Minutes but has since been denied by Armitage.11 Whatever the truth, President Musharraf consented to become a US ally. The rest of the narrative is well-documented and continues to mould contemporary events.

The term “War on Terror” (also known as the Global War on Terror or the War on Terrorism) is the campaign launched by the United States of America, under the Presidency of George W. Bush, with the support of the United Kingdom, the rest of the NATO members and other countries with the stated objective of eliminating international terrorism in the backdrop of 9/11.12 The phrase was used frequently by President Bush and other high-ranking US offi cials to denote a global military, political, legal and ideological struggle against organizations designated as terrorist and regimes that were accused of having a connection to them or providing them with support or were perceived or presented as posing a threat to the US and its allies in general. It was used with a

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particular focus on militant Islamists and al-Qaeda. The administration of President Barack Obama has discontinued use of the term “War on Terror” and instead has adopted the formulation “Overseas Contingency Operation.” However, President Obama has stated that the US is at war with al-Qaeda.13

When the US-led forces attacked Afghanistan in October 2001, Pakistan severed its ties with the Taliban and threw in its lot with the coalition troops. Since then, Pakistan’s international standing and prestige have risen but it suffered tremendous losses, both directly in the shape of valuable lives, property and the cost of waging the war and indirectly through loss of revenue, investment and business. Since the start of the anti-terror campaign, an overall sense of uncertainty has prevailed in the country and it is at its peak in the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It has contributed to the fl ight of capital, slowed economic activities and made foreign investors jittery. Foreign direct investment has been adversely affected by the ongoing anti-terrorism campaign in FATA and other areas of the NWFP. Pakistan’s participation in the international campaign has led to an excessive increase in the country’s credit risk due to which the World Bank has lowered Pakistan’s credit rating further.14 In 2008 and 2009, Pakistan’s industrial base saw one-third of its factories close down. With the loss of jobs and the lack of foreign investment, domestic revenue collection fell, pushing the country into a debt trap. Pakistan was thus driven to resort to the IMF to bail it out, to which the latter consented but with stringent conditions, which have aggravated the situation further, but that is another topic.

The war against terrorism has cost Pakistan not just in precious lives but also in economic terms, freezing international investment and diverting priorities from social and other sectors. The aim of this paper is to briefl y examine the economic costs of Pakistan’s participation in the Global War against terror and verify the extent of loss.

Cost of Terror

The menace of terrorism is eroding Pakistan’s social structure, economic development and political system. The immediate fallout

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includes the loss of human lives, destruction of property and infrastructure and economic depression. The cost of terror for Pakistan can be quantifi ed both in the loss of human lives and the economic cost, which will be examined under various heads.

Loss of precious lives

The following fi gures are based on a research conducted by the Pakistani daily, The News,15 using statistics and chronology recorded by the US Department of State, archives of Pakistani newspapers and websites carrying information about global terrorism and are valid up to 17 May 2010. The extent to which Pakistan has borne the brunt of the US-led War against Terror can be gauged from the fact that during the last 102 months since the 9/11 episode, the country has, on average, faced terrorist attacks every 10th day and there has been 332 terrorism-related incidents resulting in 5704 deaths. While 58 terrorism-related incidents have jolted Peshawar (Charsadda and Darra Adamkhel included) since 11 September 2001, the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad have been hit 46 times in the last eight and a half years.

The report reveals that while the port city of Karachi has been struck 37 times by terrorists during this period, Lahore has faced such attacks on 21 occasions, the same number as the Swat valley. While Quetta has so far seen blood staining its streets 18 times, Dera Ismail Khan has been attacked 16 times. The Pakistan army personnel and installations of the country’s armed forces, outside the war zones of Swat, South and North Waziristan etc., have been targeted at least 22 times.

Meanwhile, no fewer than 105 terrorism incidents have occurred in the war-ridden Bajaur, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, South and North Waziristan agencies as well as Lower and Upper Dir. The NWFP cities frequently targeted include Hangu, Kohat, Shangla, Buner, Bannu, Mansehra, Buner, Haripur, Nowshehra, Lakki Marwat and Parachanar. Terror has also wreaked havoc in Dera Bugti four times. The residents of Bahawalpur, Sialkot, Hub, Sargodha and Faisalabad found themselves in the grip of fear on two occasions each. Horror also visited Multan, Mian Channu, Taxila, Pishin, Panjgur, Gujranwala, Wah, Dera Ghazi

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Khan, Kalat, Kamra, Bhakkar, Chakwal, Mianwali, Hassan Abdal and Muzaffarabad etc., at least once each.

Pakistan witnessed only two terror-related incidents in 2001, 14 in 2002, just 8 in 2003, 18 in 2004, 11 in 2005, 16 in 2006, 56 in 2007, 72 in 2008, 130 in 2009 and 37 in the fi rst four-and-a-half months of 2010 till the fi ling of this report. The year 2009, of course, remained the bloodiest of all with 130 incidents claiming around 1,800 lives, followed by 2008 which saw 1,565 people falling prey to 72 such attacks. Terror in Pakistan claimed not only the lives of eminent personalities like two-time premier Benazir Bhutto (27 December 2007), but also prominent politicians, military personnel, educationists and opinion builders but more importantly ordinary civilians. The latter are the forgotten victims of terrorism who constitute the cold-blooded and ever increasing casualty statistics. Updated statistics are at Tables 1 a & b.16

Economic Cost of Terrorism

Sluggish Economic Activity. Pakistan’s economy, which was already tottering due to numerous constraints like the international economic meltdown, political instability and fi nancial mismanagement, has suffered incalculable damage and is struggling to recover from a deep crisis. According to a recent survey, terrorism has cost the economy a hefty Rs. 380 billion in 2008 alone.17 Terrorism creates uncertainty, reduces confi dence and increases risk perceptions leading to lower rates of investment and lower economic growth. Pakistan has not only lost precious lives and infrastructure, but also has borne a loss of around $ 35-40 billion since 2001-02.18 These fi gures are an estimate, but in the absence of any other statistics, will have to suffi ce for this study. Both the war on terror as well as rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) consumed a sizeable portion of the government’s fi nancial resources, thus widening the fi scal defi cit and halting economic growth. With the ever looming threat of terrorist violence, normal businesses require more time and extra security for their transactions. Thus, terrorism typically leads to a general slowdown in economic activity. The absence of primary data makes estimating the cost of terrorism to Pakistan even more complex.

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Pakistan’s soft image shattered. The government had undertaken a number of initiatives in the late 1990s and early 2000s to project a soft image of Pakistan as a country that is not only investor friendly but also one that facilitates its nationals to conduct business with the rapidly growing economies of the world. Unfortunately, due to the terrorist incidents, the image of the country has been badly affected. As a result, there has been reluctance on the part of several countries to issue visas to Pakistanis. This has affected a broad spectrum of society including businessman, students and professionals who want to study or work abroad and bring productive wealth back to the country in the form of remittances. There have also been negative consequences for Pakistan’s trade links with other countries. Simultaneously, investors are reluctant to visit Pakistan while foreign governments discourage their citizens from traveling to Pakistan, either for business or for pleasure.

Fall in Domestic Consumption. A major negative impact of terrorism is the fear factor, which directly affects the consumption trends of society. For reasons of safety and security, people are afraid to visit the market places as these have been frequently targeted by terrorists. Consequently there has been a substantial decline in consumption/spending with negative implications for the country’s economic growth. This is borne out by the sharp fall in the GDP growth rate from 8.40 percent in 2004-05 to 5.80 percent in 2007-08 while in 2008-09 it plummeted to a paltry 2.1 percent (Table 2).19 The prognosis for the future is bleak as a GDP growth of a mere 2.10 percent means it will take around 33 years to double the size of Pakistan’s economy.

According to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 2010, Pakistan’s economic growth is likely to be the slowest in South Asia for the next three years although the region was the least impacted by the global recession. The World Bank study also estimates that the real GDP growth rate of Pakistan will be 3.7 percent in 2009-10, 3 percent in 2010-11 and 4 percent in 2011-12. Furthermore, the current account balance is expected to be a negative 5.9 percent of the gross domestic product in this fi scal year and a negative 4.5 and 4.1 percent for 2010-11 and 2011-12.20

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Reduced Foreign Direct Investment. A Harvard study (December 2008) states that the higher the risk of terrorism the lower the levels of net FDI and this has been Pakistan’s experience. In an integrated world economy, where investors are able to diversify their investments, terrorism has induced large transfers of capital across countries.21 Pakistan’s exports have reduced from $ 19.22 billion in 2007-08 to just $ 1.58 billion in 2008-09 (Table-2), while imports have also fallen. The trade balance is - $ 4.5 billion. This decline in the country’s exports was primarily due to the global recession and also because of the negative image of the country. The tragically frequent incidents of terrorist violence have also caused a fall in the FDI as foreign entrepreneurs have lost business confi dence in Pakistan and this applies as much to local investors who are wary of bringing their money into their own country. FDI has reduced from $484.7 billion in 2001-02 to $3.21 billion in 2008-09 (Table2). As a consequence the country’s reserves have also been depleted.

Friends of Pakistan commitments. The Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) was established as a forum for the purpose of extending support to the elected dispensation of the country in its efforts to consolidate democracy and support nation-wide social and economic development. The group was launched in New York on 26 September 2008 at the side lines of the United Nations General Assembly session. The initial meeting was co-chaired by the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan.

The founding member states of the FoDP included Britain, France, Germany, the United States, China, the United Arab Emirates, Canada, Turkey, Australia and Italy plus the United Nations and the European Union. Other countries also joined and at the meeting held in Abu Dhabi in April 2009 a total of 24 member states and international organizations attended.

The fi rst meeting of Friends of Pakistan was chaired by President Asif Ali Zardari, and attended by the foreign ministers of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Turkey, UAE, UK and US as well as representatives of China, the European Union and the United Nations. The next Friends of Pakistan meeting was held in Abu Dhabi in

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which Pakistan was represented by Javed Malik, Ambassador at Large, and Aizaz Chaudhary Additional Foreign Secretary.22

The FoDP members appointed since the inaugural meeting include: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Iran, European Commission, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank.23

On 24 September 2009 following the 64th session of the General Assembly in which UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon appealed to the international community to help Pakistan tackle terrorist threats as well as the problem of internally displaced people, a summit of the FoDP was co-hosted by President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and President Asif Ali Zardari. Ban Ki Moon reiterated that Pakistan was in the forefront of the war against terrorism and its democratic government needed the world community’s help to cope with the situation. Twenty heads of state and government and fi ve multilateral fi nancial institutions attended the summit. It was stressed on this occasion that: ‘While Pakistan remains committed to eliminating the menace of terrorism and is determined to become an anchor of peace and stability, it needs the moral, material and political support of its friends and allies.’… Only an economically, politically and militarily strong and stable Pakistan can combat the menace of terrorism and extremism in an effective manner.’

The summit acknowledged that Pakistan had already paid a huge price in terms of the lives of civilians and security personnel in addition to the economic costs of around $35 billion since 2001. At its third ministerial meeting held in Istanbul on 25 August 2009 FoDP undertook to expand cooperation with Pakistan to enable it to build upon its inherent strengths. It emphasized the importance of translating political support and solidarity into tangible projects on the ground.24 Earlier at Tokyo, on 17 August 2009 FoDP donors pledged $ 5.28 billion to stabilize the strife-torn country. However, to date not even a fraction of this amount has been received.

Currency Depreciation. The adoption of the structural adjustment program of the IMF, which has inducted reserves into the country, was

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aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability but this has also impacted politically because of the stringent economic conditionalities. The value of the Pakistani rupee fell sharply from Rs 61 to the US dollar in 2001-02 to Rs 84.5025 and this has had a negative multiplier effect on the country’s economy. The depreciation of the currency has increased the cost of imports and is a major contributory factor to the infl ationary spiral.

Trade Defi cit. The trade defi cit stands at a staggering $20 billion as against a projected oil import bill of $11billion which can only be paid by completely depleting the country’s foreign exchange reserves. The trend is unlikely to be reversed. The price of oil fi ve years ago was a mere $25 per barrel, subsequently it soared to $120 but again dropped substantially afterwards though it is slated to rise steeply again. Currently, the government is said to be providing subsidies of up to Rs17-18 per liter. It can no longer afford this and had to withdraw the subsidy on the advice of the IMF, raising fuel prices from Rs 53.70 to Rs 72.58.26 This trend is likely to continue. Infl ation, as a result, is reaching pandemic proportions. Food infl ation in the country already hovers around 20 percent and is set to rise further. This is a global phenomenon; however, its impact is particularly grave in developing countries where it is estimated that 70 percent of the meager income earned by an individual is consumed on the purchase of food. The number of ‘food insecure’ people in Pakistan is said to have risen to 77 million.27

Cut on Development Expenditure. The military operations against the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other terrorist outfi ts in FATA and Swat for the last several months has entailed heavy spending on security and this has whittled down budgetary outlays for development and other key sectors of the economy. The precarious security environment prevailing in Pakistan has triggered a diversion of FDI on a massive scale to India and contributed substantially to its impressive economic growth for the last several years. Thus, according to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 2010, the Indian economy is projected to be the fastest growing in the region with a real GDP growth of 6 percent in 2009-10, 7.5 percent in 2010-11 and 8 percent in 2010. This means that the Indian GDP growth is forecast to be 2.5 times higher than Pakistan’s

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in 2010-11 and two times higher in 2011-12.28

Price Hike and Infl ation. The poor condition of the economy can be gauged from the fact that the infl ation rate has soared. This is due primarily to the spending on security arrangements and the rising cost of production. According to the Pakistan Economic Update for the First Quarter Fiscal Year 2009-10 (July-September 2009) published by the government’s Finance Division, Principal Economic Adviser’s Wing:

Prices29

• The trend of disinfl ation (a positive, but declining, rate of infl ation) in the economy has continued for the eleventh consecutive month.

Infl ation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has − declined to 10.1 percent year-on-year in September (versus 23.9 percent in September 2008). The rate of infl ation (year-on-year) has nearly halved in the past six months.The decline in the rate of infl ation has occurred due to both the − Food as well as Nonfood categories. Core infl ation, measured as the rate of change in Non-Food, Non-Energy CPI, has decelerated to 11.9 percent in September.In addition to the adoption of prudent macroeconomic policies, − a strong base effect has also played a signifi cant role in inducing disinfl ationary trends in the economy, with the unwinding of the effects of the sharp rise in energy and food prices that occurred during 2008. While month-on-month CPI infl ation has decelerated in September after several months of elevated levels, the environment for price pressures in the economy appears less benign going forward, based on the following factors:

The base effect will wash out by December this year;• International oil prices have reversed near term course and • crossed US$80 as of third week of October, a rise of 15 percent since July 1;The possibility of still higher electricity tariffs under the • World Bank/Asian Development Bank-sponsored power sector reform;The possibility of higher gas tariffs for end-users after the • review of wellhead prices in December/January 2010.

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Tourism badly Affected. Tourism in Pakistan was once thriving and was a major source of revenue. The varied geography encompassing the towering peaks of the Hindu Kush, the Himalayas and the Karakoram ranges; the lush green plains of the Punjab, the deserts of Thar and Cholistan, the picturesque coastline of the Arabian Sea and the environmental diversity make Pakistan a tourist destination for all seasons. This is reinforced by the country’s rich culture and its history which spans ancient civilizations such as those that once fl ourished at Harappa, Taxila, and Mohenjo Daro as well as the historical but still bustling cities like Peshawar, Lahore, Multan and Thatta. The historical and geographical diversity has the potential of attracting both the casual tourist as well as the visitor with special interests.30

In 2007, Pakistan attempted a bold initiative. Despite an ‘image problem,’ it hoped that visitors could help fi ght poverty and extremism. It declared 2007 as the year of tourism. Pakistan’s missions abroad and the Ministry of Tourism chalked out ambitious plans to attract tourists. The Op-Ed page of The Christian Science Monitor of 5 April 2007 carried a piece by David Montero titled: ‘Pakistan Looks to Tourism to Fight Terrorism’ in which he commented, “While promoting tourism isn’t likely to take precedence over fi nding Al Qaeda leaders, President Pervez Musharraf’s regime is making hard-selling Pakistan’s softer side a priority. Still, how do you lure tourists when you are presumed to have become terrorists? But many, including the United Nations, see this as a novel approach to stability: Get more tourists, generate income, and the number of terrorists could decrease.”31

Unfortunately, 2007 proved to be a year of disaster for Pakistan. The sacking of the Chief Justice triggered massive street demonstrations and civic unrest, there were also increased bomb attacks and the invasion of Swat by the Taliban upset all plans of promoting tourism.

Whereas the scourge of terrorism has hit the tourist industry worldwide, the terrorist activities, suicide attacks, political instability, the kidnapping of foreigners and fortnight-long curfews have badly affected tourism in Pakistan. In some parts of the country particularly in the Northern Areas it has been the only means of sustenance for the

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local inhabitants. But at present many of the major tourist attractions, are almost on the verge of closure. The picturesque Swat valley, where not only international but local tourists swarmed in the summers to escape the heat of the plains, came under the control of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. After the Swat valley was invaded and captured by these terrorists, they took over the hotel resorts, burnt or destroyed the furniture and in some cases, garrisoned themselves in the hotel premises, conducting raids on security agencies and ultimately the hotels were reduced to rubble. There is no economic estimate to the losses suffered and revenue lost due to the trekking, mountaineering and vacationing expeditions coming to a virtual standstill. Even if the war against terror ends, it will take years and huge expenses to rebuild the resorts and attract the tourists again.

The Burden of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The military operations in Swat resulted in a massive displacement of residents who sought refuge in relatively safer locations. The Swat operations had displaced more than two million residents, increased unemployment manifold, discontinued education of youth, badly damaged infrastructure, ended tourism - the main source of income generation of the area - sparked violence in other parts of the country, and stopped the supply of essential raw materials from Swat such as marble, gems, jewelry and furniture, besides fresh fruits, vegetables and other hilly food items to other parts of the country. More than 2.8 million IDPs (400’000 families) were registered and distributed in various cities of NWFP. Out of those, about 10 percent were registered in 12 major camps and the rest sought shelter outside the camps with family, friends or on their own. The IDPs were provided food, non-food, health & education support. The situation was not permitted to get out of hand as a special support group (SSG) was created by the government of Pakistan to provide the basic amenities including disbursement of compensation. International agencies like the International Red Cross and others also provided valuable support. It goes to the credit of the SSG that after the successful military operations against the terrorists in Swat, the IDPs were moved out of the camps and enabled to return to their homes within a short span of two months. However, tremendous cost was incurred on the movement, housing, lodging, feeding, schooling and return of the IDPs. On return they found

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their houses damaged or destroyed, their crops ruined and their orchards torched. Additional compensation had to be provided for reconstructing the infrastructure and rehabilitating the IDPs.

Revenue from Sports activities suspended. Terror attacks have dealt a crippling body blow to sporting events in Pakistan. International teams, who were reluctant to visit the country for sports fi xtures, put a complete stop to it after the unfortunate attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team at Lahore. Sports tournaments not only provided the people of Pakistan a healthy entertainment, but were also a source of revenue for the government and for the various sports boards, who organized these events. The law and order situation has deteriorated to the extent that Pakistan, which was a co-host for the 2011 Cricket World Cup, along with India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has been dropped from the list. Thus a tremendous opportunity to generate revenues has been sacrifi ced at the altar of terrorism. Pakistan was to have hosted 14 matches, including one semi-fi nal. Eight of these matches have been shifted to India, four to Sri Lanka and two to Bangladesh. It is estimated that the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) will lose $10.5 million due to the tournament being taken away from them.32 This fi gure only includes the match-fee of $750,000 per match guaranteed by the ICC. The overall loss to the PCB and the Pakistani economy is expected to be much greater. Venues for sporting events of the stature of the World Cricket Cup encourage numerous sources of revenue generation, which include broadcasting rights, other entertainment and hospitality industries including food and beverages, event souvenirs, sightseeing and support to local economy through traditional handicraft purchase by visitors. The fi gure for these is unquantifi able.

Opportunity-lost for participating in Afghan reconstruction. Pursuing its own war against terror has deprived Pakistan the opportunity of participating in the reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. The Afghan refugees, who have spent decades in camps in Pakistan and otherwise assimilated in the country’s economic activity, could have been provided employment opportunities and given Pakistan the chance to earn both goodwill as well as revenue. Instead, India, China and Iran made full use of the situation along with a host of other countries. India

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currently has a “soft power” presence in Afghanistan, in the form of development aid, cultural ties, and construction projects. With more than $1 billion invested, Afghanistan constitutes its biggest overseas investment. China’s role in Afghanistan is primarily economic. It spent $3.5 billion to secure extraction rights at a copper mine in Aynak, south of Kabul, the largest single-investment project in the country.33

Occupation of Afghanistan affecting Pakistan’s exports/imports. The ongoing war in Afghanistan is blocking Pakistan’s exports to the Central Asian Republics, Russia and Europe. On the other side of the coin, popular opinion in Pakistan does not approve granting India a trade corridor to Afghanistan as a result of which Pakistan is losing out on transit fees. More importantly, major projects like the proposed trans-Afghanistan natural gas pipeline being developed by the Asian Development Bank, which will transport Caspian Sea natural gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan into Pakistan and then to India is being held up owing to the war. Other lucrative projects like the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline have also been a victim of the war against terror. After fourteen years of negotiations, Pakistan and Iran have inked an agreement34 though India is still to come on board.

Delays in reconstruction of FATA. The militancy and the consequent military operations against the Taliban/Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have delayed the much needed reconstruction projects envisaged for the approximately 10,500 square miles Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It has been rightly pointed out by numerous sociologists that poverty, deprivation and illiteracy are the root causes of terrorism. To remedy the situation, several projects were planned, however, they are yet to be implemented because of the fi ghting and the absence of an administrative structure that can provide governance and restore the rule of law. Thus economic opportunities have declined and, consequently, less than one-third of FATA’s nearly 5 million inhabitants barely manage to live above the poverty-line. Literacy has fallen to17.4 percent because access to education, especially for women, is extremely limited. Consequently, “fundamentalist Madrassas lure hopeful people with promises of knowledge and wealth, and then turn them into lawless hate-fi lled thugs” lamented one local

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FATA leader. Recently, a survey conducted in FATA by the Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme in collaboration with the British High Commission35 revealed that the people believed that amongst the major causes of religious extremism in Pakistan, illiteracy was the foremost, followed by the Afghan confl ict, poverty, bad governance and unemployment.

Conclusion

Various aspects of the economic costs incurred by Pakistan because of its fi ght against terror have been presented in this study and some of these have been quantifi ed by scholars. According to the report ‘Costs of Confl ict in FATA’ 36 the total cost of the insurgency in FATA has so far been Rs 171,671 million. This includes losses in infrastructure, human resource, economic, social, environment, security and IDP sectors. The fi gures are disconcerting:

Infrastructure and human loses stand at PKR 12,675 million. Human • resource (deaths, injuries and disabilities), public and private infrastructure damages are calculated to be PKR 4405 million, PKR 4270 million and PKR 4000 million respectively.Economic costs incurred stands at PKR 9505 million. The reasons • for the rise in economic dispossession are infl ation, unemployment, increase in transportation costs, and decrease in agriculture, industry and trade.Social costs, equated as seven times the total infrastructure and • human loss (point 2 above) stands at PKR 88725 million. The losses are due to closure of schools (500 schools have been destroyed), hospitals, non-attendance, poor service delivery etc.Environmental costs ‘roughly run over’ PKR 15,000 million. • Damages are incurred due to deforestation by security forces for tactical reasons, halt in plantation activities, depletion of pastures, soil erosion and loss of crop due to the resulting fl ash fl oods. Security and IDPs (Internally Displaced Person) costs stands at • PKR 45766 million. This includes capacity building of local law enforcement units (Levies and Khassadars, community police) - PKR 2656 million. It does not include costs incurred by regular Army and Frontier Corps units. Fixed costs to rehabilitate the 791,000 IDPs

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(reported and unreported, excluding refugees from Swat, which lies outside FATA) and recurring costs to provide services to the IDPs is calculated to be PKR 15,425 million and PKR 27,685 million.

A Pakistan Ministry of Finance document37 discloses: “Due to (the) war on terror, Pakistan suffered a loss of Rs. 2,080 billion from 2004-05 to 2008-09.” It added, “The average loss to Pakistan’s economy due to the war on terror is about US $7 billion per annum.” The document continues: “The impact of the war on terror on Pakistan’s economy only in 2008-09, was Rs. 678 billion.”

On the GDP front, the State Bank of Pakistan reported that “Pakistan’s GDP growth declined from 9 percent in 2004-05 to 2.4 percent in 2008-09.”

Recommendations

Despite the concessional infl ows of foreign aid, Pakistan faces different economic, social and political problems. There is massive income disparities, thirty one percent of Pakistanis live below the poverty line. Pakistan’s public spending on the social sector like health, education, housing are among the lowest in the region. For the resuscitation of the economy and jump-starting development the following policy options are recommended:-

Trade not aid is necessary. • The• US should give market access to Pakistan for its textiles sector.Transfer of technology is required as• that will provide Pakistan a base for competition in the region. Joint economic ventures should be initiated with the• EU and the US. These will help improve bilateral relationship in the long term. Visa restrictions should be eased for Pakistani businessmen and • exporters. Two-thirds of US aid should be reserved for the development of • economic programmes and one-third to security assistance. Consistency in economic policies should be ensured through stable •

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political institutions as that will strengthen economic stability in the long run.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized that Pakistan has no option but to win this war, even at the expense of development expenditure to bring back peace and stability as these are indispensible for sustained economic growth. The cumulative cost of the war on terror and militancy has been staggering and Pakistan needs a Marshall Plan-like ‘Lifeline’ to overcome its economic problems. The conclusive defeat of terrorism will not only benefi t Pakistan but also the entire region and the world. Whereas these are compelling reasons for the international community to participate in the process, Pakistan also needs to put its own house in order. It has considerable resources which, if properly exploited, could be used to combat and defeat terrorism. It should be amply clear by now that The Friends of Democratic Pakistan, have not fulfi lled their pledges as yet and may not do so for whatever reasons they may have. Despite being in an economic morass, if Pakistan evolves and formulates sound policies, takes its people into confi dence and adopts austerity measures, cutting unnecessary expenditures, there is no reason, why it will not emerge victorious. Instead of begging before others and smarting at the stringent checks and balances over the IMF bailout, Pakistan needs to demand the immediate reimbursement of the expenditure it has already incurred. Furthermore, whatever assistance Pakistan receives must be transparent and under no circumstances should there be under the table arrangements or illegal transactions. The need of the hour is pragmatic leadership, which is selfl ess, dedicated to the cause of Pakistan and is willing to sacrifi ce its own comforts for the better future of the country; only then would the people be willing to tighten their belts, face any hardship and unite to defeat the scourge of terrorism. That is when every dollar spent would be justifi ed because terrorism is the foremost hurdle in the way of Pakistan’s socio-economic prosperity, political stability, geo-strategic sustainability and energy security. No cost is enough to attain it.

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Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-20

Table 1 aAnnual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan, 2003-2010

Civilians Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

2003 140 24 25 189

2004 435 184 244 863

2005 430 81 137 648

2006 608 325 538 1471

2007 1523 597 1479 3599

2008 2155 654 3906 6715

2009 2307 1011 8267 11585

2010* 653 206 2146 3005Total 8251 3082 16562 28075

* Data till May 17, 2010

Table 1 bYear 2010

Civilians Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

January 182 33 387 602

February 92 68 340 500

March 168 36 502 706

April 182 50 558 790

May* 29 19 359 407Total 653 206 2146 3005

* Data till May 17, 2010Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional.

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Table 2 - Economic Indicators (2008-2009)

Indicators2001-

022002-

032003-

042004-

052005-

062006-

072007-08

2008-09Jul-Dec

Exports (Bil-lion $) 9.13 11.16 12.31 14.39 16.47 17.01 19.22 1.58

Imports (Bil-lion $) 10.34 12.22 15.59 20.6 28.58 30.54 39.96 2.91Trade Balance (Billion $) -1.2 -1.06 -3.28 -6.21 -12.11 -13.53 -20.74 -1.33FDI (Billion $) 484.7 798 949.4 1524 3,521 5,125 5,152.80 1012.30Foreign Investment (Million $)

475 820 922 1667.7 3,872 8,417 5,193 3,339

Workers’ Remittances (Billion$)

2.39 4.24 3.872 4.17 4.6 5.49 6.5 4.53

Forex Re-serves (Bil-lion $)

6.43 10.72 12.33 12.61 13.14 15.18 10.83 15.203

Exchange Rate (Rs./ US$)

61 57.7 57.92 59.66 60.16 60.5 71 84.5

GDP Growth 3.60 % 5.10 % 6.40 % 8.40 % 6.60 % 7.00 % 5.80 % 2.1 %Infl ation 3.40 % 3.30 % 3.90 % 9.30 % 8 % 7.90 % 10.3 % 17.9 %

References:1 Saumitra Mohan, Refugee Problem in South Asia, 18 September, 2009, PTI,

http://www.jansamachar.net2 Kim Campbell (September 27, 2001). ‘When is ‘terrorist’ a subjective

term?’. Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 2010-01-11. “New York Times columnist William Safi re wrote that the word “terrorist” has its roots in the Latin terrere, which means “to frighten.””

3 Kim Campbell (September 27, 2001), Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 2010-01-11. “The French were the fi rst to coin the term, he says.” Geoffrey Nunberg (October 28, 2001)’, San Francisco Chronicle, Retrieved 2010-01-11. “In 1792 the Jacobins came to power in France and initiated what we call the Reign of Terror and what the French call simply La Terreur.”

4 Geoffrey Nunberg (October 28, 2001)’, San Francisco Chronicle, Retrieved 2010-01-11. “For the next 150 years the word “terrorism” led a double life – a

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justifi able political strategy to some an abomination to others”5 Robert Mackey (November 20, 2009). ‘Can Soldiers Be Victims of

Terrorism?’, The New York Times, Retrieved 2010-01-11. “Terrorism is the deliberate killing of innocent people, at random, in order to spread fear through a whole population and force the hand of its political leaders.”

6 Jeremy Lott (December 5, 2001). ‘Suicide Blunderers: Terrorists kill selves, blame Jews’, Reason Magazine. Retrieved 2010-01-11. “The World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings were an unthinkable masterstroke, producing a media spectacle that rocked the world.”

7 Crenshaw, Martha, Terrorism in Context, p. 77.8 “UN Reform”, United Nations. 2005-03-21. Archived from the original on

2007-04-27. Retrieved 2008-07-11. “The second part of the report, entitled “Freedom from Fear backs the defi nition of terrorism – an issue so divisive agreement on it has long eluded the world community – as any action “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.””

9 George W. Bush (from a November 2001 press conference with Jacques Chirac)10 President Musharraf, in an interview with CBS News’ magazine show “60

Minutes,” aired on September 24, 200611 Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State in an interview with

NBC, msnbc.com and news services, aired on September. 22, 200612 The White House (October 7, 2001), “Presidential Address to the Nation”, Press

release, quoted at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_Terror13 Spillius, Alex (January 8, 2010). “Barack Obama: US is at war with al-Qaeda”, The

Daily Telegraph (London)14 Khan, Mehmood-Ul- Hassan, ‘Socio-Economic Costs of Terrorism with

Special Reference to Pakistan’ Overseas Pakistani Friends, March 3, 2009

15 Shah, Sabir, ‘332 terror hits claimed 5,704 lives since 9/11’, The News, Islamabad, March 18, 2010

16 http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm17 Jamal, Nasir, “Economic cost of terrorism”, Dawn, 26 October 2009. 18 Report, Socio-economic cost of Terrorism: A case study of Pakistan, Pakistan

Security Research Unit, Published April 11, 2010 19 Board of Investments Government of Pakistan, “Pakistan Economy: Economic

Indicators (2008-2009)”, available at http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/eco-ind.htm20 Mansoor Ahmad, ‘Pak economy may grow at slowest pace in South Asia’, The

News, January 22,201021 Khan, Mehmood-Ul- Hassan, ‘Socio-Economic Costs of Terrorism with Special

Reference to Pakistan’ Overseas Pakistani Friends, March 3, 2009

103



22 “Friends of Pakistan meeting in Abu Dhabi today”, Geo Pakistan. November 17, 2008.

23 http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pakistan/pakistan_brief.html24 ‘Friends of Democratic Pakistan First Summit Meeting Concluding Statement by

the Co-Chairs’, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/sept/129651.htm25 http://www.corporateinformation.com/Currency-Exchange-Rates.aspx?c=58626 Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority, Notifi cation E-10, Gasoline prices effective

May 01, 2010 27 Murshed, Mushfi q, ‘Cost of combating terrorism’, Dawn, May 6, 200828 Ibid29 Pakistan Economic Update, First Quarter Fiscal Year 2009-10, (July-

September 2009), issued by Government of Pakistan Finance Division, Principal Economic Adviser’s Wing, available at http://www.fi nance.gov.pk/admin/images/ecoSituation/PakistanEconomicreport.pdf

30 ‘Terrorist activities hamper tourism industry in Pakistan’ at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Terrorist+activities+hamper+tourism+industry+in+Pakistan.-a0197573111

31 Montero, David, ‘Pakistan Looks to Tourism to Fight Terrorism’ The Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 2007

Chakrabarti, Kaustav Dhar, ‘Costs of Confl ict in FATA’, Observer Research Foundation report, 09 July 2009

32 “Cricket-Pakistan counts fi nancial losses of World Cup shift”. Reuters.33 Ridge, Mian, ‘Q&A: Who Else Could Help in Afghanistan?’, The Christian

Science Monitor, February 2, 201034 ‘Pakistan, Iran fi nally sign gas pipeline accord’, Dawn, May 24, 200935 Malik, Sadia, M., ‘Threats to human security’, Dawn, May 3, 200836 http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/index.htm37 Arsalan, M., ‘Terror takes economic toll on Pakistan’, Central Asia online.com,

May 10, 2010

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Essays

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A COUNTER-RADICALIZATION STRATEGY

Mushfi q Murshed*

The counter-terrorism strategy currently being pursued by Pakistan is, at best, a half measure because it is not reinforced by a parallel counter-radicalization strategy. At issue here is the identifi cation of the root cause of terrorism and extremist violence only then will the country be able to deal with the radicalization of its nationals. More to the point, why are men and women alike, willing to sacrifi ce even their lives for an extremist ideology propounded by a lunatic fringe, numbering no more than a few thousand?

The obscurantist doctrines espoused by the so-called religious parties, target free markets, democracy, women’s rights and modernity in its diverse aspects. Unfortunately the mischief does not end here because these parties have made considerable inroads at the grass roots level. Their effi cient welfare network whereby food, clothing, shelter and education are provided to the needy, as at the time of the 2006 earthquake, further bolsters such outfi ts and ensures them a continuous fl ow of radicalized recruits.

This dissent into chaos can only be arrested if the government snaps out of its lethargy. It has to merge its disjointed efforts and evolve a strategy to win back the hearts and minds of the people. The solution lies in a mix of economic and ideological initiatives.

Socio-Economic IssuesThe ideological battle cannot be won until the malaise of grueling

poverty is addressed. Social and economic inequalities, the widening

* Mushfi q Murshed is the Editor-in-Chief of Criterion

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gap between the rich and the poor and the erosion of the middle class are playing a more pivotal role in increasing the fl anks of the militants than negative indoctrination by the clerics.

The Government must come forward with a well-thought-through programme to empower the masses by broadening the country’s economic base. To date, economic prosperity has been restricted to a few who have amassed huge fortunes. The country no longer has the time for the much touted trickle down benefi ts of growth. Political and social stability will continue to elude the country unless measures are immediately taken to reduce the level of poverty. Distribution of wealth through projects in vocational training, development of small and medium sized enterprises backed by micro-credit schemes need to be encouraged. Simultaneously, low income housing, healthcare and education have to be developed.

These projects are, however, a part of a medium to long term strategy with relatively long gestation periods. The immediate objective is to tackle infl ation which is further compounded by economic stagnation and has reached pandemic levels. Reports of suicides and the sale of children indicate the severity of the problem.

Desperate times require bold and imaginative measures. The Government must lead the way. Public awareness media campaigns are required to sensitize and mobilize the more fortunate. Funds for poverty alleviation are urgently needed and can be raised from both the private and public sectors. The proper utilization of these funds in the form of food banks, subsidies, temporary shelters and clothing must be effi ciently coordinated and monitored. The luxury of procrastination is no longer available to the government which has to move with speed and determination to redress the inequities.

The injustices and inequality prevalent in the society, infl ation without economic growth, massive disinvestment, unemployment and a large yet ineffective state administration is gradually eroding the confi dence of the people in democratic values and the secular parties that they brought into power just over two years ago.

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In societies where economic depression and injustice become unbearable an educated middle class usually provides the impetus for civil movements to rectify and address grievances. In extreme instances, these result in revolutions. In Pakistan, however, the middle class itself is being gradually eroded and sinking into the quicksand of poverty. This socio-economic morass is being skillfully exploited by the well-organized and fi nanced extremist elements, in the face of the callous neglect by the state, to gain support of the masses.

The Ideological IssueThe militant extremists profess to be fi ghting an ideological battle

to rescue true Islam and Muslims from the “infi dels.”

What is “true Islam”? Is it what was practiced under Taliban rule in Afghanistan? That administration was rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Islamic countries and only three of them i.e., Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia extended formal recognition to the Taliban Government. Saudi Arabia subsequently withdrew its recognition after the Taliban, despite an earlier undertaking, refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden during a stormy meeting in Kandahar between Mullah Omar and the then Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud.

In addition, how can the extremists claim that they are rescuing Muslims when a majority of the victims of terrorist violence have been Muslim civilians? The former base their actions on Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 1328) fatwa which was infl uenced by the Mongol invasions of the time and was, therefore, radical in nature. In a signifi cant article carried by the Secular Perspective of 16-30 April 2010, the noted scholar, Asghar Ali Engineer, referred to the Mardin fatwa issued by fi fteen leading scholars from the Islamic world against Ibn Taymiyya’s edict urging violence against unjust rulers. The following extract from the article is relevant:

“All analysts and scholars agree that Osama and his followers used Ibn Taymiyya’s famous fatwa on use of violence against unjust rulers. Ibn Taymiyyah was born a few years after the Mongol sack of Baghdad and unimaginable savagery committed by them killing hundreds of thousands of people in most barbarous ways.

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Taymiyyah, himself a great jurist, was follower of Imam Hanbal. Imam Hanbal prohibits rebellion against unjust authority as it would result in anarchy and more bloodshed.

However, Ibn Taymiyyah, against the teachings of his own school, issued a fatwa justifying violence against unjust and authoritarian rulers so as to re-establish the Islamic rule and rule of Shari’ah. This fatwa is being used by the terrorists to justify their attacks as ‘Islamic’ and many young Muslims who do not even know who Ibn Taymiyyah was and in what circumstances he issued this fatwa, get misled and fi nd ‘Islamic legitimation’ in his fatwa.

Initially the Ulema, though did not necessarily approve of use of this fatwa, kept mum or just whispered their opposition not loud enough to be heard. But when violence intensifi ed and became uncontrollable, their conscience revolted and many of them decided to call al-Qaeda’s bluff by opposing the fatwa. Now many of them are coming forward condemning use and misuse of Ibn Taymiyya.

Ibn Taymiyya, undoubtedly a great scholar and eminent jurist, had issued a set of four fatwas known as Mardin fatwas. Mardin was a Turkish fortress in South East Turkey with mixed population. And Osama had quoted this Mardin fatwa repeatedly in his calls for Muslims to overthrow the Saudi monarchy and wage jihad against the United States. Some prominent Ulema from the Islamic world decided to meet in Mardin to discuss Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa towards the end of March 2010.

This historic document was referred to by these Islamic scholars and took decisive stand against it. They said, ‘Anyone who seeks support from this fatwa for killing Muslims or non-Muslims has erred in his interpretation.’ They further said, ‘It is not for a Muslim individual or a group to announce and declare war or engage in combative jihad on their own.’

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Those who use Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa totally ignore the circumstances in which the fatwa was issued. Nothing can be valid unless seen in historically concrete circumstances. Ibn Taymiyyah himself, as pointed out above, had gone against his own Hanbali School in issuing the fatwa. Even then all Islamic scholars had not unanimously endorsed it. Moreover, as pointed out by an Islamic scholar from Belgium Prof. Yahya Michot, Mardin fatwa has some ambiguity which has been ignored both by terrorists as well as many western scholars and commentators.

It is important to note that the Mardin conference gathered 15 leading scholars from countries including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, India, Senegal, Kuwait, Iran, Morocco and Indonesia. Among them were Bosnian Grand Mufti Mustafa Ceric, Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah of Mauritania and Yemeni Sheikh Habib Ali al-Jifri.

It would be seen that while Ibn Taymiyyah was alone in issuing the fatwa here a galaxy of prominent Ulema and Muftis from across the Islamic world from Indonesia in South East to Algeria in the West Africa gathered and rejected the fatwa. It is representative statement of the Islamic world rejecting terrorism. Not that those terrorists are going to stop violence and come on table for negotiations for peace.

There are too powerful interests to care for any such rejection from across the Islamic world but it certainly sets norms and indicates what the Islamic world stands for. For sure even then anti-Islamic tirade is not going to stop and many western commentators and anti-Islamic forces will continue to hold Osama bin Laden as real representative rather than this galaxy of Ulema from across the Islamic world…..”

It is unfortunate that in Pakistan, which is the world’s primary victim of terrorism, the Mardin Fatwa of March 2010 is not even mentioned in the print and electronic media. One only has to scratch the surface to realize how fragile the attempts of extremists to legitimize their heinous crimes against humanity really are. The Ummah must wake up from

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its slumber and undertake genuine reform by reverting to the actual teachings of the Qur’an which is Islam in its purest form. It is time that the self-proclaimed militant spokesmen of the Islamic world are neutralized and their bogus call to jihad is exposed for what it really is. Their propaganda and distortion of the religion has to be countered, otherwise, a time may come when the masses may actually believe that eradication of a race or nation is justifi able and in accordance with Islamic tenets.

Sporadic attempts have been made by religious scholars to counter obscurantist doctrines. Maulana Hassan Jan, for instance spoke out against Taliban atrocities. His decree condemning Taliban suicide attacks as un-Islamic, however, led to his assassination in September 2007. His violent death generated fear among likeminded religious scholars and clerics who preferred to remain silent rather than denounce the Taliban and consequently face their wrath. However, Maulana Hassan Jan’s decree did not go unheeded.

In Mach 2008, an edict was circulated in Darra Adamkhel on behalf of Mufti Zainul Aabideen. Through this one page document, 73 different Muslim sects denounced the extremist acts perpetrated by the Taliban as being “out of Islam.” The edict exposed the contradiction between the Taliban atrocities, “in particular the slaughtering and beheading of innocent people,” under the pretence of defending Islam and the actual tenets of the religion based on peace and tolerance.

This bold initiative should have been used as a driving force to encourage similar edicts nationwide from religious personalities that are trusted and respected by the masses. It could have provided the impetus needed to launch an effective counter-extremist campaign alongside a similar movement in India around that time, whereby, 20,000 Deobandis collectively declared terrorism as un-Islamic. Such parallel efforts on the part of the enlightened ulema in Pakistan and India would have generated grass roots support against extremist violence and reinforced the war against terror being pursued by the government.

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The Deobandi movement in India against militancy in the guise of religion was inspired by Sheykh Waheeduddin Khan, a prominent scholar, who stated that Dajjal, a concept that some theologians equate with the Islamic antichrist, is not a person, but is a manifestation of violence and terrorism. As the Taliban in Pakistan are mostly Deobandi, the impact of such a movement, if effi ciently exploited, would have far-reaching consequences in broadening the rifts that already exist in their ranks.

Fighting an ideological battle involves changing people’s mindset which is a monumental task that requires commitment of time, effort and resources. This is certainly achievable and efforts have to focus on exposing the distortion of religious tenets by a miniscule minority. A concerted civil/government initiative is the ingredient which is lacking.

Proposal For A Counter Radicalization Association1. Majid Nawaz, co-founder and co-director of the Quillium Foundation,

rightly pointed out in his article, “Tackling Extremism” that: “while it is true that the madrassah system has supplied a steady stream of jihadists over the years, a little highlighted fact is that the leading ideologues of Islamist movements have invariably been educated, are elite and socially mobile. After all, Bin Laden is an engineer and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, a doctor.”The illiterate and madrassah educated may be the foot soldiers in this war, however, the top ranks of these organizations include nuclear scientists, computer engineers, lawyers, doctors, etc.

Some prominent examples from Pakistan are: Faisal Shahzad who was charged with attempting to detonate a car bomb in New York’s Times Square is an MBA from the University of Bridgeport. Dr. Aafi a Siddique is accused of being associated with the Al Qaeda. She is a neuroscientist who is a Massachusetts Institute of Technology alumna and a Brandeis University Ph.D.

The extremists have deftly used their network of mosques and madrassahs to spread their skewed interpretation of religion. As is evident from the examples cited, their success in the radicalization of some segments of society has nothing to do with whether the target

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audience is educated or not in the conventional sense. It is the lack of religious knowledge that is played upon and exploited. Even amongst the majority of the educated elite there is a proclivity to obtain answers on questions pertaining to religious matters from semi-literate clerics even though there is no priesthood in Islam rather than acquiring knowledge directly from the source, i.e., the study of the Quran and the life of the prophet. Furthermore, soliciting opinions from such clerics only provides them the opportunity to propound their distortions of religious doctrine.

This process has to be neutralized. The logical fi rst step in this direction would be to energize Islamic scholars to develop an Association to defend Islam against the miscreants and confront the danger posed by the deteriorating security situation in the country. Such an organization would elevate issues pertaining to religion from a local or regional level to a national level. The Association of Islamic Scholars would, if it is established, be able to:

Have a uniform nationwide approach on matters of faith, keeping 1. national interest as the driving force rather than local level agendas. It will be able to issue more credible, authoritative, far-reaching opinions than those at the local level. Ensure that the guidance in fatwas is uniform within the 2. country and, in accordance with the tenets of Islam and not infl uenced, once again, by extremist agendas. This would also entail scrutiny of fatwas being passed by violent and extremist organizations and thereby expose the lack of credibility of the scholars issuing them.Discredit and limit the infl uence of undesirable clerics as well 3. as allow the body to preemptively squelch opposition from violent/highly radicalized elements.

Delegitimize the idea that violent Islamic extremism is an 4. acceptable tactic to effect political change and draw attention to Islamic jurisprudence which strictly proscribes the violent extremist methods adopted by terrorist groups in the name of the religion.

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Push non-violent interpretations down to the local levels to 5. provide them with uniform guidance;Empower and embolden local level leaders; and6. Monitor education being imparted through the madrassahs. 7. Advise the fi ve boards on upgrading and updating courses, material, etc.

The establishment of such an Association is easier said than done because of the obvious diffi culties and obstacles in the way. These have to be taken into account and, where possible, remedial measures adopted. The problems that are likely to emerge include:

Overcoming the fear factor. This alone will be a daunting task. 1. Moderate Islamic scholars may refrain from joining such an Association for fear of becoming targets for reprisal by militants. No security arrangement can be absolutely foolproof, but the government would have to provide protection to the best of its ability. Given the contentious nature of the issues that will be discussed 2. in this forum, initial unanimity of opinion among the members is highly unlikely. It is, therefore, essential that an effi cient set of internal rules is developed to govern the Association so that issues can be debated and brainstormed for reaching consensus. For such an Association to be effective it needs to speak with one voice and cannot afford to have dissenting individuals publicly expressing views that are not in accord with the consensus.If such an Association eventually becomes effective and 3. infl uential then it is bound to attract the attention of groups with vested interests which will be counter-productive to its goals. Extremist groups, political parties and even other countries such as India may attempt to steer the members of this Association towards their own agendas. The internal rules or the charter of such an organization should include provisions for the expulsion of such members. It is also essential that, while keeping the national interest in 4. focus, the members of the association do not lose sight of local concerns and issues of the people. Particular attention has to be focused at the grassroots level where people are relatively more

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vulnerable to extremist ideology and obscurantist religious dogma.

The broad-based ambitious agenda of such an Association would require Government patronage. Support and coordination between the ministries of Religious Affairs, Education and the Interior and the Association would be essential for the latter’s success in having a nationwide impact. At a later stage, depending on such success, the Association could be made a constitutional body for which the required two-thirds majority in the National Assembly and the Senate might not be immediately available.

The organizational structure of the Association should be such as to make it effective at the local, regional and national levels. This would entail the creation of:

A four member board of founders (who should be the most 1. venerable, credible and moderate scholars). A board of governors (10-14 individuals selected by the board 2. of founders);A board of advisers ( who would be the Association’s local 3. representatives); andAn analytical unit (to examine fatwas which are being issued 4. illegally)

The Association would need to have monthly meetings to address routine/regular issues; there must be a provision for emergency meetings. The body would pull together and publish fatwas. There would be quarterly meetings to handle administrative business. Finally there would need to be yearly conferences to discuss/highlight topics of interest to the different schools of Islamic thought and to the Deobandi movement in particular since it is from this school that most of the extremist groups emerge. The idea is to moderate the Deobandis and this is not a farfetched objective as is evident from the fatwas issued by this School in India which have been cited earlier. The Association would be responsible for issuing Fatwas, surveying and refuting rogue fatwas, and over-seeing/advising on education (cleric re-education/licensing).

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Education2. Once again, one of the key factors that has accelerated the

radicalization process in Pakistan has been the reliance of the general public on what they hear in mosques. A large portion of preaching in mosques has been extremely politicized. The sermons tend to mesh matters of faith with local and world politics. The primary objective of many of these sermons is the demonization of modernism and progressive ideas as un-Islamic. The clerics/preachers of these sermons are the product of a vast network of Madrassahs within the country.

There does not seem to be a formal process or effective Pakistani Government institution responsible for guiding and monitoring the activity of these madrassahs. When the government came into power in 2008 there was talk of establishing a Madrassah Welfare Authority. We have yet to hear of what work has been done towards the establishment and operations of such an authority.

There is hardly any information on unregistered Madrassahs. However, the registered Madrassahs are controlled by their own boards. The name of these boards are: Wafaq ull Madaris, Tanzim ul Madaris, Wafaq ul Madaris (Shia), Rabta-tul-Madariss-al-Islamia and Wafq ul Madaris-al-Safi a.

All madrassahs teach their own modifi ed version of a curriculum called Dars-i-Nizami. This system was evolved by Mulla Nizam Uddin Sihalvi in the 18th century. The content taught from this system is medieval and does not address contemporary concerns. Even the commentaries on the Qur’an are from that period and therefore address issues of that era.

The Government must be proactive and work towards establishing collaboration with these boards to develop their curricula to meet contemporary requirements. This will also provide an opportunity for the administration to monitor what is being taught in these institutions.

Once the registered madrassahs have reached a certain standard then the certifi cation process of maulvies should only be through this system.

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Graduate from any unregistered madrassah should not be allowed to conduct sermons, issue fatwas, etc., unless he is fi rst certifi ed by the established boards.

Simultaneously, the secular education system in Pakistan has to make one essential addition to its curriculum and that is the introduction of Arabic as a compulsory subject. Understanding the language will allow future generations to circumvent intermediaries and go directly to the source, i.e., the Qur’an, to resolve any queries or issues that they may have regarding their religion. This will reduce, to a great extent, the infl uence that clerics presently have in propagating their extremist ideology.

ConclusionIt has been repeated on countless occasions since the War on Terror

began that the hearts and minds of the people have to be won over. This has remained mere rhetoric. Nothing of signifi cance has been done and therefore a vacuum has been created which is adroitly being taken advantage of by the multiple extremist groups within Pakistani society. The radicalization process has unnecessarily been given space to expand and has gathered momentum. The remedy lies in a mix of socio-economic and ideological initiatives.

The government has to take into account that this war cannot be won if a substantial segment of society lives below the poverty line. Social and economic inequalities may weigh more in a jihadi mindset than the desire to establish an “Islamic emirate.” The idea of living on the street, not being able to educate ones children or, even worse, not being able to put food on the table may be more threatening than any amount of negative indoctrination by clerics.

The time has come for the government to reclaim the public services provided by religious seminaries such as education, board, lodging and even stipends to the families of potential jihadists. Massive projects on a national level pertaining to low income housing, educational and vocational training, health care and employment opportunities have to

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be implemented. Once these basic necessities are met only then can the ideological battle against extremist violence yield results.

On the ideological front there have been several opportunities which were not availed. Individual efforts to counter extremism such as those of the late Maulana Hassan Jan, though undoubtedly commendable, are futile unless a proper mechanism is in place to galvanize these efforts and unify people behind them. This can only be achieved if the people and government of Pakistan collaborate to achieve the same objective.

A counter radicalization Association of Islamic Scholars that has been proposed would be a step in the right direction to establish a mechanism to take on the violent ideology propagated by extremist elements in the country. Local interpretations on matters of religion and faith that are skewed by local level agendas would be neutralized as the same issues would be handled through this Association.

The Government must also revamp the curriculum of registered madrassahs and have a say in the process of certifying clerics through these madrassahs who will then be allowed to conduct their public religious duties. Any graduate from unregistered madrasssahs should not be allowed the same privileges. Arabic should also be introduced as a compulsory subject in all schools to neutralize the possibility of people’s minds being manipulated by extremist perceptions and obscurantist doctrines.

The task at hand may be daunting but is nonetheless achievable. This will only be possible if there is a sincere commitment on the part of the country’s leadership to take on the challenge. It is fundamentally important to get civil society on board. Such a partnership, accompanied by a determined effort by the government to eradicate poverty, is essential for defeating the forces of extremism.

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FRAMING NATIONAL INTEREST OF PAKISTAN: FOREIGN POLICY AND

ASSURANCES OF PEACE

Ashraf Jehangir Qazi*

Given the state of our country it is only appropriate for people of my generation who contributed to it to speak with complete frankness and honesty in the hope that awareness, however painful, will be a fi rst step to doing something. This is the least that we delinquents owe the country.

In addressing such a subject a number questions arise. What is the national interest? Who frames it? How is it framed? Does it take suffi cient account of the interests of the people? What are the answers to these questions in the case of Pakistan?

Let us go back to the Pakistan Movement. When did it begin? What was it for? The answers are not always so clear or simple. What we do know is that the Muslim League was established in Dhaka in 1906 to safeguard the political rights and interests of the Muslims of British India. In 1930 Allama Iqbal addressed the Allahabad session of the Muslim League. He made the case for the Panjab, NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan to be amalgamated into a single state. He felt that “the life of Islam, as a cultural force in India very largely depends on its centralization in a specifi ed territory.” Did this mean a separate country? Iqbal said he wanted the ”free development” of Islamic culture which was practically impossible under a unitary government dominated by nationalist Hindu politicians. Did that mean a more decentralized federal structure would

* Ashraf Jehangir Qazi is a former Ambassador of Pakistan to the US and India. [email protected]

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be suitable? But then he adds “the problem of India is international, not national.” Is this a multinational problem within India or does it necessitate separate nations? In a letter addressed to the Quaid-e-Azam dated 21 June 1937, Iqbal suggested a separate federation of Muslim provinces was the only way to secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. He posed the question: why should the Muslims of the North West and Bengal not be considered nations with the same right of self-determination, just as other nations in India, and outside India? This, if anything, was a forerunner of the Cabinet Mission plan of 1946 which was ultimately and conditionally accepted by the Muslim League, but rejected by the Indian National Congress.

We all know that the word Pakistan was coined by Ch. Rahmat Ali in his pamphlet Now or Never in 1933. He thought in terms of a Pakistan in the North West, a Bang-e-Islam in Bengal and Assam, and an Usmanistan for Hyderabad State in the South. The Quaid did not believe his proposal to be practical. However, Ch. Rahmat Ali felt the creation of Pakistan within its 1947 borders had sabotaged the future of the then 100 million Muslims living in India and he called it the blackest day for all the Muslims of the subcontinent.

Just before Independence, the Quaid met a delegation of Indian Muslims and told them frankly “the Muslims of India would go through a number of ordeals, sufferings and sacrifi ces. Their future will remain dark for some years to come and thick clouds will be hanging over them.” He asked them to display courage fi nd the required leadership and preserve their identity. He advised them to avoid confl ict with the majority community and demonstrate through their merit that they could not be ignored. Regarding loyalty, the Quaid did not mince his words. They had to be loyal to their country which was India. He said “just as I want every Hindu in Pakistan to be loyal to Pakistan, so do I want every Muslim in India to be loyal to India. There is no other alternative.” Subsequently, the historic speech of the Quaid on 11 August 1947 at the inauguration of Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly reiterated the same sentiment. He said “you may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We are starting with

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this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.”

This was the ideology of the Founding Father of Pakistan. Without saying so, the Quaid had made abundantly clear that the two nation theory which was central to the Pakistan Movement had no role within an independent Pakistan. This was the basis on which all national policy – including foreign policy – was supposed to be formulated. However, Pakistan was born into a sea of challenges. It was confronted with hostility. It was overwhelmed by the slaughter and displacement of millions that accompanied the Partition, and which created an enduring legacy of bitterness on both sides of the border. Moreover, no one anticipated that the Kashmir dispute would become a permanent sore and the cause of an unending cycle of confl ict between the two countries adding to the bitterness, and poisoning the context in which so many other bilateral issues had to be addressed. Being the smaller and more vulnerable state, Pakistan became a security oriented state instead of becoming what the Quaid wanted, a development oriented state. The retention of the two nation theory under the slogan of Muslim nationalism, and with it separate electorates, was absurdly seen as some kind of psychological reassurance against re-absorption into India. It simultaneously demonstrated a lack of confi dence in Pakistan’s nationalism and set up an impediment against the development of a healthy nationalism based on a respect for diversity and respect for equal minority rights.

Worst of all, the Quaid departed the scene barely a year after the birth of Pakistan. There was no one of the required caliber to lead the country and develop the Muslim League into a people’s party. The Quaid, as mentioned, had asked the Muslims of India to develop the required leadership to meet their challenges in post-partition India. But, ironically, it was Pakistan after the Quaid that could not develop the leadership he hoped for. India, on the other hand, had the benefi t of Nehru’s leadership for 17 years after independence and he was able to lay the foundations of a development state. It must also be admitted that while the Congress party was infected by the virus of anti-Muslim communalism it was politically a more progressive party than the Muslim League whose mass base was largely left behind in India.

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Our foreign policy was accordingly impacted. The feudal class of West Pakistan much of which had until the very last moment refused to have anything to do with the Pakistan Movement or the Quaid, the refugee bureaucrats who came from India with better education and qualifi cations, the military which rose in signifi cance because of the challenges to national security, and the religious classes which had also opposed Pakistan and had no respect for the Quaid’s ideology which they saw as western and un-Islamic, came together to form a political elite based on a mutual accommodation of interests at the expense of the people as a whole. This, of course, happens everywhere. But given Pakistan’s traumatic birth, its infancy and fragility, and the loss of its beloved and irreplaceable leader, the anti-people ruling elite proved very costly indeed. India’s short-sighted and duplicitous approach towards Pakistan played straight into the hands of Pakistan’s cynical elite. This of course suited India just fi ne.

National security, not development, became the national priority. Development came to rely on external assistance as much as on mobilizing internal resources. Foreign policy had to facilitate these national political and economic strategies by facilitating the agendas of external benefactors and mobilizing external resources on the basis of convincing these benefactors that Pakistan was a more reliable and valuable ally than India – a mission that at best could achieve contingent and temporary success. Our foreign policy while managed by exceptionally gifted and committed individual diplomats was limited by these narrow elite determined and ineffi cient national priorities.

A new post-partition Pakistan ideology was invented largely by those who had little or nothing to do with the Pakistan Movement. The national priorities were those set by a soft praetorian elitist state that dressed itself up as a revived Salahaddin Ayubi state. Ayubi state it was, but not Salahaddin Ayubi! These priorities were, of course, set without any reference to available national resources or the priority needs of the people. Moreover the economic elite wanted a free ride in terms of exemptions from paying taxes, subsidies and protection from any kind of competition. The defence elite garnered the lion’s share of domestic resources and also wanted “external equalizers” to counter the greater

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size and resources of our major adversary, with whom perpetual enmity became a badge of honour and identity. When the results proved less than satisfactory, our foreign policy and diplomats were conveniently blamed.

Our foreign and defence policies were required to be romantic, heroic and successful on the basis of historic delusions and myths rather than rational analyses and any substantial investment in physical and human resources. The obvious fact that in the modern era standing peasant armies do not win conventional military victories was deliberately ignored despite all the war gaming that was supposedly going on. In fact, the case for rational evaluation was often denounced as cowardly, lacking in faith and western infl uenced. These arguments were not just silly. They were dishonest and dissembling. Meanwhile the people and the smaller provinces were progressively alienated by the demands of an ideology – couched in patriotic and religious terms - in the formulation of which they were not consulted and on behalf of which they saw their resources and opportunities for development being plundered. This led ultimately to the humiliating tragedy of military defeat and the loss of more than half our population - and the shameless betrayal of the vision and lifework of Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Iqbal.

As a result, the basis of our foreign policy changed from the idle boast of a thousand year war with India to a desperate struggle to pick up the shattered pieces of what was left of Pakistan. This transition was brilliantly managed by Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto. We upgraded our relations with the Islamic world, negotiated from an empty hand to get the Simla Agreement and secure the maximum breathing space for building a new Pakistan, and began searching for a new equalizer vis a vis India. The electoral victory of the PPP under Bhutto in 1970 empowered the lower classes under the slogan of “roti, kapra, makaan which indicated what the true ideology and agenda of the people was. They were already Muslims. They did not need to be repeatedly converted. Economic and administrative reforms were undertaken. In foreign policy an eastward and leftward orientation was imparted to bring us into line with the Non-Aligned Movement although this did not sit entirely well with our courting the Sheikhs of Arabia.

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Our shattered national image which sprang not just from defeat but also from our treatment of our own compatriots in East Pakistan began to acquire a positive and progressive image. Our relations with China were further strengthened because it feared the rise of a triumphant India becoming more assertive and seeking revenge for its 1962 defeat with western support. But this could not entirely replace the effective loss of the US as a supposed equalizer vis a vis India, especially after India’s “Smiling Buddha” peaceful nuclear implosion of 1974. We decided there was no alternative to seeking a nuclear equalizer even if our industrial base was not suffi cient to support the effort. Bhutto was quoted as having said “we will eat grass” if necessary to obtain nuclear weapons capability, although there was little danger of our comfortable classes being reduced to such a plight. The land reforms turned out to be bogus. The nationalization of banks and medium sized enterprises was an exercise in the assertion of power rather than genuine socio-economic reform. The tax base remained as exiguous as ever. Pakistan remained an elitist and soft praetorian state, and never made the transition to a people’s development state capable of taking and implementing tough decisions on behalf of the people’s interests. Our foreign policy refl ected these realities.

The fall of Bhutto inaugurated the Islamization of Pakistan – a misnomer because it was Islam in the service of military dictatorship and its cohorts, and not the state and people in the service of Islam. Islam the world’s most enlightened, humane and rational of religious traditions had to be distorted and degraded in order to disguise this betrayal of our ultimate set of values – the values that underlay the Pakistan Movement and the Quaid’s last messages to his people. Military dictatorship and intelligence agencies began to formulate the essential thrust of national policies including foreign policy. After the judicial murder of Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto in 1979, Zia was internationally despised and isolated. He might not have lasted long. But the Iranian Revolution and far more importantly the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saved his regime. In fact he became the center of gravity for the effort to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. A wonderful opportunity for the so-called Islamization and militarization of the state and society was provided, and availed of. The international community led by the US and the rest of the west

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rushed to Zia’s support as they later did to that of another military dictator without giving a damn about how this would impact on the balance between rational and irrational political agendas and the welfare of the people of Pakistan. They used Pakistan and threw it away when no longer needed allowing all the rot to fester and poison the future of the country. Democratic forces have never recovered since. As a result, we now fl uctuate between military dictatorship and kleptocracy, and call it a learning process in democratic governance. In this milieu, the conduct of foreign policy which is a technical/non-ideological art or skill was marginalized in terms of contributing to decision making within its own sphere of competence and responsibility, and was used as an instrument and as window dressing.

From the above we can see that the national interest has been defi ned by those in control of articulating the ideology of Pakistan who also exercise power over the use and allocation of its resources. This is seldom done in the national interest. In fact it has involved the deliberate and disastrous abandonment of the project to build the Quaid’s Pakistan for which the Pakistan Movement struggled. The great English writer Samuel Johnson said patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel. Patriotism and religion have both been misused in a similar way in Pakistan. The people, however, have developed greater awareness and consciousness over the decades. But they are not yet suffi ciently organized to signifi cantly impact the substance of national and foreign policies. The leadership of Pakistan is largely agreed on trying to keep the people out of the loop as much as possible through distractions of every kind. Democracy as political theater in the shape of bitter fi ghting among the major parties is a favourite stratagem. The people, of course, are not fooled. But they are not yet suffi ciently aware of their potential organized strength. The souls of the Allama and the Quaid must remain restless for some time to come. It is for the people to ensure that the day will come when they fi nally rest in peace.

Within this context what should be the role of our foreign policy? Since foreign policy has to serve the national interest it is not supposed to have an independent agenda of its own, independent, that is, of the national interest. It will of course have a very detailed agenda of its

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own. But it must fl ow from the agreed priorities of the national agenda. The national interests are many and varied. The standard list of what constitutes the national list is available from the Objectives Resolution and the Principles of Policy of the Constitution of Pakistan as well as any text book on politics and international relations. However, the essence of our national interest lies in the transformation of a pre-modern underdeveloped country in which the vast majority of the population is kept poor, uneducated, exploited and without hope by a narrowly based coalition of elite groups into a modern, economically developed and politically participatory democracy comprising educated, free and empowered citizens. If it is not this, it is nothing.

Our foreign policy’s major task is to contribute to this transformation. Any country with such a transformation national agenda needs an enabling neighborhood and external environment for its implementation. In addition it needs to maximize the quantity and quality of its economic growth in order to garner the resources required for the transformation agenda. Accordingly, our foreign policy must not only be conducted within these parameters but it must also contribute to the strengthening of them. It must contribute to meeting our development and security challenges, handling our bilateral, regional and international relations, the development of international understanding for our stand on a whole range of issues, developing a positive image of the country abroad on the basis of concrete achievements, etc. It must also contribute to mobilizing resources through economic cooperation, FDI, regional arrangements, market access and preferential arrangements, etc., that facilitate the maximum possible rate of growth. Narrow agendas that undermine the prospect of implementing a national transformation agenda and a foreign policy designed to facilitate it, neither serve the national interest nor the specifi c cause they claim to serve.

The real world is more complicated of course. Let us take the cases of Kashmir and nuclear weapons. In light of the transformation agenda and the need for a peaceful neighbourhood and maximizing economic growth, how much priority should we give to the Kashmir dispute? We must, of course, always support the Kashmiri right of self determination because that is their right. It is not ours to confer or to withdraw as

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General Musharraf blithely assumed. It is an internationally recognized right. It is a legal obligation of the international community, including Pakistan, to press India to meet its obligation in this respect. But it is not an enforceable right because it was adopted by the UN Security Council under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter and not Chapter 7 under which Security Council resolutions are enforceable. However, an occupied and oppressed people who have been forcibly denied the right to self determination, freedom and independence do have an inherent and recognized right to resist that situation, through armed struggle if necessary, and to seek international assistance for that purpose. Pakistan is a designated party to the Kashmir dispute and it has a moral and legal obligation to support the UN resolutions on Kashmir and to support the Kashmiri struggle for its inalienable rights.

The question is how do we do this? Through diplomatically seeking a compromise settlement? Through going to war with India? Through assisting armed Kashmiri resistance fi ghters against the Indian occupation forces? Or through some combination of all three options? And how do we square our choice with the need for a peaceful neighbourhood and maximizing the rate of our economic growth? Whatever choice is made, it should be legal, it should respect human rights particularly those of the Kashmiri people, it should be effective in facilitating the aspirations of the Kashmiri people, and it should not altogether undermine our bilateral relationship with India, because without a modus vivendi with it the neighbourhood and growth conditions for implementing our national transformation agenda cannot be fulfi lled. That obviously should eliminate certain options mentioned above if we have the interests of our own people in mind. But we don’t throw principle to the wind. We fi nd policies, strategies and tactics that allow us, as best as possible, to effectively support the Kashmiri people while maintaining and developing ties with India.

What if India does not cooperate? What if it says either abandon your support for Kashmiri rights or be ready for tense and confl ictual relations with us at the expense of your national agenda? That would complicate the situation, as it has. But we still do not give up on principle. We will need to defend ourselves against any Indian aggressive designs

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or intimidation. But we do not go looking for trouble. We do not allow ourselves to be accused of abetting terrorist acts as we have consistently done. We take all the tough decisions to ensure this. On this basis, we strive to persuade India that it is in the interests of both countries to fi nd mutually acceptable solutions that are, above all, acceptable to the Kashmiris. We look for win-win processes and not zero-sum solutions. Zero-sum solutions are not stable and zero sum strategies are always more costly for smaller countries. To the extent we are able to do this, we increase our standing and weight in the councils of the world, and we make it diffi cult for any interlocutor to adopt an uncooperative attitude towards our rational positions. A belligerent or irrational Pakistan would be much easier for an adversary to handle. We need to be wise.

Let us take the case of nuclear weapons. A conventionally superior India defeated and humiliated us in 1971 tearing away our eastern half. The US proved to be an insuffi cient ally. Even China could not take our chestnuts out of the fi re. In 1974 India conducted an atomic test. We had no option but to develop a nuclear weapons capacity as an equalizer to the superior conventional military power of India. Otherwise, India would never take us seriously. It was Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto who negotiated the Simla Agreement for a modus vivendi with India. But he also insisted on acquiring a nuclear weapons capacity to preserve the credibility of our policy. In 1998 India called our bluff and went nuclear. Much to India’s consternation we answered in full measure. Vajpayee came to Lahore in 1998. We went to Kargil in 1999. India responded short of an all out attack on us. They were deterred from crossing the Line of Control or the international border by our nuclear capability. This enabled the US to bring about an end to the confrontation on mutually acceptable terms. Three years later, in 2002, as a result of a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in Delhi, India blamed Pakistan and raised the ante by deploying its military along our borders to browbeat us into submitting to its demands. We stood our ground. Once again the Indians blinked, and the US was able to negotiate an end to the confrontation? So nuclear weapons are absolutely essential to preserving our security and independence. Right?

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Unfortunately, for all those who see the possession of nuclear weapons as an emotional imperative, an objective analysis does not so clearly support the case for nuclear weapons. If we assume that none of our domestic and foreign policies will alter, the dysfunctional elite will continue to determine our priorities and strategies, relations with India will remain as they are forever, and the international community will continue to ignore our just demands and fail to reward us suffi ciently, both militarily and economically, then a case for a nuclear deterrent can be made – even though it would still not be a convincing case, since it would certainly be at the expense of our transformation agenda. But if we were to re-orient our domestic and foreign policies to bring them in conformity with our transformation agenda as, for example, suggested in the case of the Kashmir dispute, then although diffi culties and differences with India may still take a very long time to overcome, the probability of a confrontation scenario in which a nuclear deterrent becomes essential will dramatically decline.

But what if India goes mad? Maybe some rotten leadership gets elected to offi ce, performs so abominably that it faces political extinction at the next polls, and the Kashmiri people rise in armed revolt against intolerable corruption and savage repression, could not such a government seek political redemption through a war of annihilation against Pakistan? It must be admitted that to the extent that such a scenario is possible, Pakistan would need a defence capacity including possibly a nuclear deterrent capacity. But even in this case, questions arise. Would a nuclear deterrent be the only available option against an India that becomes stupidly belligerent? How likely is such a scenario, and should we concentrate our resources on it to the exclusion of other more likely scenarios? Of course, one has to prepare for worst case scenarios, but if in doing so, we undermine our transformation agenda then what kind of options will we be able to develop vis a vis India in order to temper its behaviour towards us, including bringing about the settlement of long standing disputes on mutually acceptable terms? Moreover, if we insist that our security situation leaves us no option but to develop a nuclear deterrent capability, then how can we argue that Iran which faces an existential threat from Israel and its main supporter should refrain from doing so? And what about scenarios in which the

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umbrella of a nuclear stalemate is used to prosecute splendid little wars without fear of excessive escalation? How do we probe the extent of each others nuclear deterrent without running the risk of the nuclear deterrent failing? After all nuclear weapons are not meant to be used. Of course, the answer to this extremely complicated issue lies in the settlement of long standing disputes and in the nuclear weapons states being more sincere with respect to their nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT. This is not meant to oppose our nuclear policy. It is meant to suggest that the case for it is not that straightforward, and it has to be placed within a context, and that is our transformation agenda. Outside of this context, as one Pakistani commentator recently observed, we will be protecting our nuclear assets rather than our nuclear assets protecting us. Once again, we need to be wise.

Demagogues and mountebanks of one kind or another can always pretend to offer simpler solutions which, as we have seen time and again over the past 60 years, harm the people’s interest in a better future for their children. They need to be progressively sidelined. There are ways in which this can be done. The exposure of disgusting personal greed and low cunning at the highest levels speaking the language of high principle, lofty idealism and devotion to the people, is one way. The exposure of goons and thugs posing as defenders of democracy, both at home and abroad, is another. Principled, imaginative, realistic, and committed popular leadership will be required. Consultations and communication leading to an informed public opinion will be required. Diplomatic and other technical capacities will need to be developed. All the tracks of diplomacy will need to be coordinated into an integrated approach. A culture of peace and compromise will need to evolve. All this will take time, patience, persistence and faith. It will never be easy or free of personal cost. But any other approach will sooner or later mean a betrayal of the national transformation agenda – and that will be an anti-people and anti-Pakistan approach. And silence in the face of such an approach will eventually become complicity.

This is the approach we will need to adopt with respect to all items on our national and foreign policy agenda to ensure that it remains consistent with our national transformation imperative. We need to remember just

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one rule to have a very good idea of what our policy on any domestic or foreign policy issue needs to be. Any policy, or policy response, on any issue that in practice undermines the priority and the implementation of the transformation agenda is against the national interest. Apart from Kashmir and the nuclear issue which has an immediate impact on the level of conventional spending, if, for example, we cite the war on terror, the defence of the country, the ideology of Pakistan, the need to preserve the unity of the country, the need to improve relations with the US or any other country, the need to maintain law and order, the need to improve the investment climate, the need to keep the defi cit under control, etc., etc., as justifi cations for the consistent and deliberate denial of suffi cient resources for the nation-wide implementation of programs of education, health, protection of human rights, social welfare, generation of high employment and high value job creation, human and physical resource development, etc., etc., for the people of Pakistan, then, whatever we say, and whatever patriotic pose we strike, we are in fact abetting the decline and demise of our country. Once we know and act upon this truth, we can all begin to contribute to the saving of our country through participating in the discussion, formulation and conduct of policy on a hundred tracks, including the foreign policy track. The rest is detail.

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THE EMERGING NEW NUCLEAR ORDER AND PAKISTAN

Ali Sarwar Naqvi*

A wind of change seems to be blowing in the esoteric world of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. New terms like “Nuclear Renaissance” and, more recently, “Nuclear Spring” are in circulation. Observers and analysts have started talking of a new nuclear order that may be taking shape. This has been spurred in a large measure by growing concerns in regard to carbon emission resulting from the use of fossil fuels for producing energy. Not long ago, in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the international community, particularly the Western countries, had begun shunning nuclear power generation, but the new scare of global warming that set in with the turn of the new century, restored nuclear power as a “kosher” source. Nuclear energy was adjudged as environmentally “safe,” despite the vexing problem of waste disposal, for which it is being argued that improving technology will eventually solve the problem or at least make it manageable. From about the middle of this decade, many countries began contemplating setting up nuclear power plants. At present a total of 30 countries are involved in setting up as many as 40 nuclear plants for generating electric power.

The fl ip side of nuclear power is, of course, the danger of nuclear proliferation. For a long time, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was considered an effective regime for guarding against nuclear proliferation (which essentially involves the diversion of nuclear fuel for power to weapons grade fi ssile material). The Treaty provides for IAEA inspection of nuclear power facilities in adherent states and thus stops them from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. The fi rst half of * Ali Sarwar Naqvi is a former Ambassador of Pakistan.

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the 1990s saw the voluntary renunciation of nuclear programs geared to weapons capability by Argentina and Brazil and later South Africa, and the termination of nuclear programs in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the Republic of Belarus. The NPT Review Conference in 1995 was an upbeat, self-congratulatory meeting, in which the NPT was given a permanent lease of life.

However, the nuclear tests conducted by India and later Pakistan in 1998 cast a pall of gloom on the NPT Review Conference in 2000. Then, in the very fi rst few years of the new century, some NPT signatory states were found to be in violation of their obligation of abstaining from any steps leading to weapons development: North Korea, Libya, which confessed and came out clean, and Iran, where traces of enriched uranium were found on imported centrifuges, which were unexplained. The NPT regime seemed to be collapsing, as its own members were found to be in violation of its provisions. The NPT Review Conference in 2005, held in New York, in which I was the Pakistan Observer, met for a month, took more than two weeks to even agree on an agenda, and ended without an agreed statement, which had never happened before. The nuclear order, carefully crafted in 1968, much like the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 in the inter-war years, was fraying at the seams and spiralling downward towards possible collapse. As the North Korean and Iranian programs continued eluding international monitoring and inspection, the descent towards collapse seemed to continue unchecked, and many feared, had become unstoppable. To boot, with the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) decisively blocked by the US Senate, and the FMCT negotiations stalemated, the outlook of global non-proliferation looked bleak. It is this situation that the Obama administration found itself confronted with when it assumed offi ce.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the emerging realities, some elder statesmen in the US had been giving serious thought as to how the imbroglio that had developed could be cleared up. Quite naturally they realized that the root of the problem lay in the original discrimination or unfairness embodied in the NPT, whereby only fi ve countries were allowed to have nuclear weapons and the rest of the world prohibited from doing so. This stipulation was arrived at in a grand bargain, under

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which Article IV gave all non-weapon signatory states the right to have access to nuclear technology and receive international assistance in this regard, as a compensation for giving up the right to develop nuclear weapons capability, while Article VI contained a fi rm commitment by nuclear weapon states to disarm. The famous bargain struck between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) in the negotiations leading to the fi nalization of the NPT required implementation of both the articles, but as it transpired, Article IV has been rigorously implemented and Article VI has been ignored.

Realizing that this selective execution of the Treaty was gradually bringing the NPT regime to a collapse, the elder statesmen, Senator Sam Nunn, former US Secretaries George Shultz, William Perry and Henry Kissinger, wrote a joint article in the Wall Street Journal in January 2007 urging the Administration to go for eventual nuclear disarmament or what they termed as the Nuclear Zero option, in implementation of Article VI of the NPT. They argued that nuclear weapons had outlived, with the end of the Cold War, whatever utility they might have had, “that the various risks associated with their retention by existing powers, and acquisition by new ones, not to mention terrorist actors, meant that the world would be better off without them.” An active debate ensued over the following years, in which the proponents of the Nuclear Zero argument gained general support. This eventually led to President Obama’s Prague speech, just over a year ago, which offi cially committed the United States to total disarmament in the years to come, through a step-by-step process leading to complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Obviously, a lot has changed since 1968 when the NPT was drafted. As we look back more than forty years ago, and glance at the nuclear order that has prevailed over these years, we notice certain glaring shortcomings that characterize the old order:

It lacks equity, as the NPT allows only fi ve countries to have • nuclear weapons, and disallows the rest of the world from having them. Some important states that remained outside the NPT developed • nuclear weapons, thus undermining the entire international non-

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proliferation regime.In course of time, there have occurred violations of NPT • regulations by signatory states, thus almost depriving the NPT of its legal and moral authority.In the wake of 9/11 and the global terrorist threat, the total • inadequacy of the old order or the non-proliferation regime to deal with threats of nuclear terrorism, emanating from sources outside state systems, usually called non-state actors, further diminished its effi cacy.The old order has not brought about the entry into force of • the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or meaningful negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which are both vital adjuncts to the NPT.

In the wake of the nuclear renaissance on the one hand, and the angst of the international community, particularly the Western countries, at the collapsing international regime on nuclear non-proliferation on the other, new initiatives and approaches seem to suggest that an emerging nuclear order is in the offi ng. These are:

The issuance of the US Nuclear Posture Review on 4 April in • which the US declared that it would not launch nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapon states, unless faced with a WMD attack, and announced cuts/reductions in its nuclear and missile development programs. The signing of a US-Russia new Strategic Arms Reduction • Treaty (START) on 8 April reducing their respective arsenals by 30 percent, to be effected in seven years time.A 47-nation Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington • on 12-13 April, at US initiative, which approved a voluntary plan for nations to secure thousands of tons of fi ssile material now existing in many countries. By focussing on the safety and security of nuclear technology and material, the Summit per force relegated the goal of non-proliferation to a lower priority.The fi ve-yearly NPT Review Conference that ran through a four • week session in New York in May and aimed at the strengthening

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of the NPT, laid greater emphasis on safety and security, and disarmament, rather than on non-proliferation.On the other hand, the International Commission on Nuclear • Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, headed by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Japanese diplomat Yoriko Kawaguchi, is lobbying internationally for support of a graduated program of global disarmament.

All these events and actions seem to indicate new or revised thinking in regard to the major issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which is likely to result in substantial changes in the nuclear order that now prevails. As this new outlook represents a hopeful future, enthusiastic supporters have dubbed this period as a nuclear spring. While the contours of the new order have yet to take shape and form, it is possible to make an educated guess of some likely features that would characterize it. These may be:

A degree of fl exibility in the rigid non-proliferation regime of • old, as has already manifested itself in the Indo-US nuclear deal. The US decision to extend to India extensive nuclear cooperation, under the deal, despite the fact that India did not sign the NPT and developed a nuclear weapons program in open defi ance of the non-proliferation principles, was a body blow to the NPT, and demonstrated its virtual obsolescence.Greater focus on safety and security of nuclear materials and • nuclear technology, to avoid the danger of nuclear terrorism, resulting from nuclear material falling into the hands of non-state actors and terrorist groups. In regard to non-proliferation, efforts towards an early entry • into force of the CTBT, and negotiations towards an early conclusion of an FMCT, would continue, but for various reasons the realisation of these objectives, at least in the short term is unlikely.Continued serious efforts towards forward movement on global • disarmament, both at the level of states and in multi-lateral forums. In this regard, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament has published a report titled

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“Eliminating Nuclear Threats---A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers” which has charted out a full program of action for national governments, and has begun strong advocacy of the issue in multi-lateral events.

Interestingly, for Pakistan these trends carry positive implications. It is well-known that Pakistan has been against the status-quo in regard to the existing nuclear order. Whatever fl exibility or change takes place in the present unfair and rigid international nuclear regime, Pakistan is bound to benefi t.

The Nuclear Security Summit held in April seems to have exonerated Pakistan from the earlier stigma of a suspected proliferating state pinned upon it following the exposure of an illicit network trading in nuclear technology and material headed by Dr. A.Q.Khan. The argument that Pakistani diplomats have been making that: (a) the government did not know about the clandestine network nor support its activities, and (b) it took strong action against Dr.A.Q.Khan and his accomplices and has dismantled the network when it was discovered, fi nally seems to have been conceded. As this was perhaps the principal reason why the US withheld a civilian nuclear deal a la India to Pakistan, it should now look forward to developing a framework for nuclear cooperation with Western countries, particularly the United States. If this were to happen, Pakistan would be able to break out of the present isolation and virtual ostracism that it faces from the international nuclear community.

The great benefi t of such a deal would be to open up the possibility of civilian nuclear cooperation with other advanced countries as well, besides of course the United States. According to reports, Pakistan has already made a request for civilian nuclear cooperation with the US, and signifi cantly has not been rebuffed. In any case, again according to press reports, Pakistan is likely to fi nalize a civilian nuclear deal with China, which would provide for the setting up of two additional nuclear power plants in Pakistan. As China is also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which does not allow nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, as a non-signatory of the NPT, the Chinese decision is akin to the US decision to undertake nuclear cooperation with India. The effect of the

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China-Pakistan deal may well be to impel the US to accede to Pakistan’s request for a civilian nuclear deal.

Pakistan has also made a bid to be considered as a supplier state for providing nuclear fuel to a future fuel bank in the envisaged plan for internationalisation of the nuclear fuel cycle. In this regard, Pakistan argues that it is one of the few countries in the developing world which have mastered the entire process of the nuclear fuel cycle. This enables it to produce low-enriched uranium, used as fuel in nuclear power plants. Besides its own needs, Pakistan could produce nuclear fuel for sale to other states, which do not have a nuclear fuel cycle program. Thus Pakistan could qualify as a supplier state. It should be possible for Pakistan’s offer to be accepted under the new nuclear order. Therefore, Pakistan should look forward, if all goes well, to both a civilian nuclear deal with the United States, and perhaps other Western countries, as well as its acceptance as a supplier state in arrangements for the internationalisation of the nuclear fuel cycle and the setting up of nuclear fuel banks.

Pakistan had placed on the table, some years ago, a proposal for the setting up of nuclear power parks, in which foreign private investors can build nuclear power reactors in the designated parks, and operate as foreign enterprises, much as investors in other sectors, of course, under IAEA supervision and Pakistan’s regulatory requirements. This was proposed by Pakistan in the IAEA General Conferences in 2003 and 2004. This scheme does not depend upon a nuclear deal with the US or any other country and can become effective if the IAEA Board and perhaps the NSG approve it. As the building and operation of the nuclear power plants will be in the hands of foreign companies, and the electricity can be sold locally or to other countries, it should not cause any proliferation concerns either. The time may soon come when it would be possible to receive a positive response from the IAEA in this regard. If that were to happen, Pakistan would have access to state-of-the-art nuclear technology, albeit under IAEA supervision and foreign ownership.

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Pakistan should also expect less pressure on it for signing the NPT, and a US offi cial has already been reported to have said that the US will not mark out India and Pakistan as countries that needed to sign the NPT. There has also been talk in the non-proliferation community of some creative ways to accommodate non-signatory Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in the NPT, either through associate membership or some kind of adherent status. With less rigidity in regard to the NPT, some movement in this regard could be expected.

Pakistan faces the demand of signing the CTBT and moving forward on negotiations for an FMCT, but here too, it can raise its own concerns, before it could oblige. For example, Pakistan can press for a nuclear restraint regime in South Asia, or even a resolution of issues like Kashmir and water sharing with India. At the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April, Pakistan Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani proposed (a) the setting up of a nuclear restraint regime in South Asia, (b) a balance in conventional forces, and(c) a meaningful confl ict resolution mechanism in South Asia. Pakistan maintains that its nuclear weapons program is security driven, an improvement in the security environment in the region was necessary before it can enter into negotiations regarding a fi ssile material cut-off treaty. This position has already been taken by Pakistan at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, and is likely to be maintained.

To conclude, as far as the overall outlook of the nuclear order is concerned, it is obvious that a new perspective is now appearing to develop. It will depend upon our negotiating strategy how we can extract benefi ts for ourselves from this new orientation of the United States and the larger international community towards a more fl exible and accommodating nuclear order in the process of taking shape. Secondly, it would be necessary for us to do our home-work before we can seek a civilian nuclear deal with the US or other Western countries. As things stand, our nuclear program is an integrated program, with no clear separation of the open civilian, power generation facilities, and the classifi ed military program. Like India, we will have to separate the two. It carries fi nancial implications, and we would be well-advised to start looking for the additional resources that a separation would

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entail. Perhaps, in the short term, the effort should be to push forward the nuclear power park idea and invite foreign entrepreneurs to set up power plants, which they can operate for profi t. In this manner, we will be able to bring into Pakistan advanced power generation technology and break loose of the restrictive bind of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, as is the case at present. At the same time, we should continue to press for a civilian nuclear deal, so that it materialises when we are ready for it. Similarly, we should closely watch the progression in regard to the internationalisation of the nuclear fuel cycle initiative and make a bid as a supplier state at the appropriate time.

What is amply clear is that various possibilities for Pakistan will open up once the old order loses its rigidity and sole focus on nuclear non-proliferation. The days of heavy sanctions and restrictions on a country like ours, whose “sin” was non-signature of the NPT and the CTBT, and that of developing an indigenous nuclear program, may well be soon over. Pakistan has long remained “out in the cold,” in the phrase of John le Carre, and deserves to come back inside. If that happens, Pakistan would indeed be a benefi ciary of the Nuclear Renaissance, and the new nuclear order that is likely to emerge.

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WMDs: THE TERM AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Riaz Muhammad Khan*

‘Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)’ has entered the UN Security Council lexicon and, following 9/11, been given a legal defi nition by the US criminal law codes. WMDs lump together formally in the UNSC resolutions as well as in popular perception biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons. Regardless of the reprehensible nature of these and for that matter any weapon systems, bringing the three (or four) distinct categories of weapons under one umbrella of WMDs raises questions about the justifi cation of such a treatment and the underlying political impulses that have lent currency to this nomenclature. I had fi rst raised these issues at a UN-sponsored conference on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control matters, held in Cheju Island, Republic of Korea in early December 2002 just a few months before the US-led military intervention against Iraq. The argument I had made was twofold: fi rst, nuclear weapons were the only category that could justifi ably be described as WMD and as strategic weapons; secondly, it would be extremely diffi cult for a moderately developed country accused of possessing chemical or biological weapons to disprove the charge through the UN or international inspections or verifi cation procedures. These arguments had relevance to the mandates of IAEA Director General, El Baradei and Executive Director of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix who were respectively asked by the Security Council to verify non-possession of nuclear weapons and chemical and biological weapons by Iraq. On 7 March 2003, El Baradei was able to confi rm that Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons while Hans Blix understandably asked for many more months. The intervention in Iraq is a clear example of how the notion of WMDs formally adopted by the UN Security Council was * Riaz Muhammad Khan is a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan.

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leveraged to push a questionable political agenda. By implication, the episode underscores the need to rethink the use of the term in future resolutions of the United Nations especially when they are adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Popular usage to a Formal Defi nitionThe phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’ gained currency during

the Cold War and referred specifi cally to nuclear weapons that were unprecedented in their destructive power and had spawned new strategic doctrines of deterrence and mutually assured destruction that underpinned the tense, but relatively stable, global environment in which a direct confl agration between the two superpowers of the day was unthinkable. Nuclear weapons were considered to be the only weapons of decisive strategic import. Several other categories of weapons, including biological and chemical weapons, were variously considered as particularly inhumane and ‘excessively injurious’ and efforts were made to develop conventions to proscribe their development, possession and use. Neither the Convention on Biological weapons nor the Convention on the Prevention of Chemical Weapons carried any description of these weapons as ‘weapons of mass destruction.’

The transformed global security environment with the end of the Cold War by the late 1980s imparted a new meaning to the term ‘WMDs’ with President George H.W. Bush for the fi rst time using the phrase in the context of chemical weapons. The US security concerns over the Soviet nuclear threat had attenuated giving rise to new anxieties over acquisition and possession of chemical and possibly biological weapons by countries like Iraq. With the fi rst Gulf war in early 1991, the concern became pronounced and the term WMDs became slowly acceptable to refer to alleged pursuit by Iraq of nuclear, chemical and possibly biological weapons. The term was promoted during the Clinton administration and generally by the Western media whenever referring to the dismantling of the Iraqi weapons’ programmes. The fi rst mention of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in an UNSC resolution appeared in resolution 687 adopted on 3 April 1991 soon after the defeat of Iraq and enlisting demands on Iraq under Chapter VII including the dismantling of its chemical and biological weapons programmes and

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not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. The resolution carried only one general reference in the preamble to “the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to the area.” The operative paragraphs did not make such a reference and delineated Iraq’s obligations under the respective protocols and conventions on chemical and biological weapons and those under the NPT relating to its nuclear programme. UNSC resolution 1284 of 17 November 1999 that established the UN Monitoring, Verifi cation and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) also did not refer to the term WMDs and instead defi ned the mandate in the areas of the alleged chemical and biological weapons programmes and referred separately to the issue of verifi cation that Iraq was not pursuing a nuclear weapons programme.

Reference to WMDs returned to UNSC resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002 that provided the ostensible legal basis for the US and the ‘coalition of the willing’ to launch military attack against Iraq. In its preamble, the resolution “deplored the absence in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verifi cation, as required by the relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction…” This was an explicit linkage of WMDs to Iraq which was only implied and general in the Middle East context in resolution 687 (1991). In establishing this linkage, the sponsors of the resolution were helped by the turn of events since 9/11 which gave rise to a new international concern over WMDs falling in the hands of non-state actors. Theoretically, it was easy to argue that non-state actors could lay their hands on chemical and biological weapons. Public fears on the other hand were easily aggravated by positing the possibility of WMDs in the hands of terrorists, who operated as non-state actors. Following 9/11, the US adopted legal defi nition for weapons of mass destruction to include “chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and chemical, biological, and nuclear materials used in the manufacture of such weapons.”

The Anomalies Implicit in the Concept of WMDs

Bringing together under the rubric of WMDs, chemical and biological weapons together with nuclear weapons, is mixing oranges with apples in the qualitative and strategic sense.

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As stated earlier, nuclear weapons are the only strategic weapon system, with destructive power ranging from tens of thousands to millions of tons of TNT packed in a single weapon, capable of destroying entire cities and wiping out large population centers. No nation-state adversaries can ever afford to infl ict on each other such destruction, hence the value of the weapons as deterrent. The decisive strategic value, notwithstanding the issue of morality, was established by the fi rst and last ever use that precipitously brought about Japan’s surrender towards the end of World War II. Mutually assured destruction was the principal factor that held the two superpowers at bay and prevented them from engaging in direct confrontation for more than four decades of the Cold War. In comparison, let us consider the strategic worth and lethal quality of the chemical and biological weapons.

Chemical weapons had been used during the two World Wars and most recently in the Iran-Iraq confl ict by the Saddam regime. These weapons did not make any signifi cant impact on the course of the confl ict and their tactical worth on a battle-front could also be debatable. During the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, Iraq used chemical in more than a dozen fronts. Though this resulted in large scale casualties, it did not break the fi ghting spirit of the Iranian forces and only earned Iraq international opprobrium. The most lethal use of these weapons was against the Kurdish population in Halabjah in March 1988 which resulted in the death of several thousand civilians. This was an attack by the government to terrorize its own unsuspecting civilian population; however, in terms of lethality, similar numbers and even more have perished through the use of conventional weapons in civil wars. The relevant issue is not condoning a reprehensible crime, but to bring out the qualitative distinction and difference between chemical weapons and nuclear weapons as weapons of mass annihilation.

The same can be stated about biological weapons that had been banned fi rst under the Geneva Protocol of 1927 and then the Convention of 1972. There is no recorded use of biological weapons in recent warfare and therefore it would be diffi cult to comment on their impact in a confl ict situation. However, an analysis is possible given the known agents for such weapons and the contemporary experience of countries

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in containing epidemics. Anthrax and smallpox are regarded as among the most deadly and dreaded agents that can be theoretically used to debilitate a population.

The November 2002 issue of the well-respected and popular National Geographic Magazine published an article by Lewis M. Simons on WMDs that began with an hypothetical apocalyptic ‘war game’ scenario of how an attack by three persons masquerading as workers with plant sprayers contaminated a mall in Oklahoma city with smallpox that could kill more than one million Americans and infect another three million within less than two months with no end of the crisis in sight. Notwithstanding the timing of the article coinciding with the accusation of Iraq continuing to possess WMDs and its non-cooperation with UNMOVIC, we need to look into this claim. Smallpox was a menace until the early 1950s but was effectively controlled. There have since been a few reported cases but certainly these did not explode into a crisis of any magnitude. As for anthrax, around the world, especially in parts of Asia and Africa, there have been incidents of its outbreak which are contained. The recent example of pandemics, such as SARS in 2003 and the recent Swine Flu, even though initially untreatable, did not result in large scale casualties. Apart from nature’s own defence mechanisms to regress the potency of a biological agent in the environment, today the quarantine methods and public awareness is highly developed to contain the evil of a potential pandemic and avert dooms day predictions.

Lastly, the radiological weapon deserve a brief comment as these are also sometime described part of the WMD rubric. This weapon by defi nition is dispersal of radioactive material with the help of a conventional explosive device. The immediate victims of such a weapon would be those affected by the explosive device, in the long term the radioactive particles would contaminate the site in a more localized sense and have an injurious impact on those exposed to them. These weapons are also known as ‘dirty bombs.’ An issue of considerable controversy has been the use of depleted uranium used in armour-piercing bombs.

Separate treaties or conventions have been negotiated over the years to proscribe or control these weapons specifi c to the nature and

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technical issues involved with each weapon system. Biological weapons were fi rst banned under a 1925 Geneva protocol that was shaped into a convention on prohibiting biological and toxins weapons signed in 1972 and effective in March 1975. The convention on prohibition of chemical weapons was adopted in 1993 and came into effect in April 1997. There are two treaties in force for control of nuclear weapons: the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (effective October 1963) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (effective 1970). The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is yet to come into force.

The question arises about the underlying impulse for lumping these categories of weapons together with the nuclear weapons under the single description of ‘weapons of mass destruction:’ whether there were genuine technical reasons for promoting the new nomenclature or the effort was linked to political motivation. As the evolution of the defi nition shows, none of these weapon-systems were unknown during the Cold War when the term was applied almost exclusively to nuclear weapons. The term began to take a broader meaning with the end of the Cold War, a change in global security paradigm and more specifi cally the post-9/11 concerns. Accordingly, the explanation does not appear to owe to any new technological revelation and cannot be divorced from political circumstances and agenda. The monolithic term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ can evoke far greater fear and trauma in public minds than chemical or biological weapons and thus create a more powerful justifi cation for the eradication of the source of threat. The Bush administration settled on the threat of WMDs as the reason for military action against Iraq because on this everyone could agree on. This brings us to the issue that was my main argument at the Cheju UN Conference in December 2002.

The Sting in the Defi nitionThe point at that time was that it was extremely diffi cult for Iraq

to come clean of the charge of possessing (hiding) WMDs through verifi cation inspections or procedures. Iraq may be sui generis both in terms of political circumstances and the adversarial leadership in Baghdad and Washington. Yet, the argument can apply to any moderately

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developed country accused of the same charge in the future. Again the example of Iraq would illustrate the point.

Apart from the mandate of UNSCOM, resolution 1284 (1999) demanded two separate verifi cations: the IAEA chief El Baradei was required to verify that Iraq had destroyed all infra-structure and equipment contributing to its capability to develop nuclear weapons, whereas the Executive Director of the newly created UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, was required to prove the same in respect of chemical and biological weapons. After three years of hundreds of inspections and interviews by international inspectors and UNMOVIC teams, on 7 March 2003, both El Baradei and Hans Blix presented their quarterly reports, the last before the launch of military attack against Iraq later in the same month.

El Baradei was able to state that there were no indications of resumption of nuclear activity, attempt to import uranium by Iraq since 1990 or equipment for enrichment, or of “the revival of a nuclear weapons programme.” Hans Blix was not in a position to make a categorical statement with regard to his mandate. Instead, his report largely spoke of the extent of Iraqi cooperation with inspections and access to personnel and papers and how to reinforce monitoring and verifi cation of “key remaining disarmament tasks” necessary to draw conclusions that in his view would have required many more months, not weeks. The problem lay in the nature of two mandates.

Pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme requires large infrastructure with telltale signature verifi able with aerial photography. A chemical weapons programme is much harder to detect and would require tracing the trail of precursors and intrusive inspection of every chemical plant to disprove the charge. On the other hand to disprove with complete authority the existence of storage of biological agents can at best be based on extrapolation, it is almost impossible to physically establish it. A graphic example of the diffi culty was evident from the presentation given to the Security Council by US Secretary of State Colin Powell on 3 February 2003.

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Colin Powell showed to the open session of the UN Security Council slides of certain aerial photographs of trucks and sheds on the ground as well as sketches of container trucks with concealed cylinders stating that this was how Iraq was using mobile units to maintain its stockpile of chemical weapons. Then he showed to the Council members a model vial of anthrax, just a couple of inches long glass test tube, to illustrate how lethal biological material was stored. Clearly, to the untrained eyes of most of the audience in the Security Council chamber, these illustrations were no proof for Iraq’s culpability and possession of the alleged stockpiles; but they pointed to the enormity of the task of proving that no such trucks or vials existed throughout the length and breadth of a country of Iraq’s size. It was more than the search for the proverbial needle in a haystack. It was after the US forces and hundreds of UN agents scoured an occupied Iraq for months with complete freedom to access every corner and track every possible lead that the US-led coalition gradually admitted its failure to fi nd any active WMD programme in Iraq. The inescapable conclusion is that Iraq would have found it impossible to prove the truth about the status of the alleged programme, even if it were more forthcoming in its cooperation with UNMOVIC. Any moderately developed country would fi nd itself in the same situation if faced with the charge of possessing WMDs, even though the chances of such a recurrence have now become considerably low.

Iraq had a history of using chemical weapons and was already in the trap of a mandatory UNSC resolution for verifi able destruction of its “WMD programmes.” Given the rigorous implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention that came into force in 1997 with stockpiles of declared chemical weapons states in the process of supervised destruction, the possibility of another state emerging and using these weapons is almost non-existent. There is one possible scenario that requires comment.

The world community remains concerned over the possibility of WMDs falling in the hands of non-state actors. In that hypothetical situation, given suffi ciently credible evidence, the question would be how the Security Council should act. Most likely, the Council would

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want to work in cooperation with the state(s) that becomes the locale for such non-state actors and that the required cooperation would be available on the part of the state(s) concerned. The important point is to avoid arbitrary action. The post-Iraq global environment has trudged towards multi-polarity and has also exposed the limitation of the use of force and would therefore induce greater caution on the part of the Council members. However, it is worth bearing in mind the Iraq experience and emphasizing that the Council must not place an inordinate demand propelled by a political agenda on a country under its mandatory resolutions.

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THE INGREDIENTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

Shahid Kardar*

Governance is the manner in, and the process by, which authority is exercised, especially with respect to the management of a country’s economic and social resources. This, in turn, entails the capacity of institutions (both formal and informal) to design, formulate, and implement policies. It includes the discharge of functions that enable the effi cient and effective delivery of public services fairly, while holding the service providers accountable to the service recipients.

Since the widely held perception in the country today is of persistent corruption and abuse of power at the highest levels, it is not surprising that Pakistan scores poorly on the indicators of governance. On corruption (Transparency International) and general governance (DIFID), Pakistan ranked 139 and 162 out of 180 and 199 countries respectively in 2009. In a ranking of fourteen Asian countries by the World Bank, according to six sets of governance indicators, Pakistan is next to last, higher only to Yemen, behind Bangladesh and well behind India, the Philippines and Indonesia.

There is, therefore, a sense of deep disenchantment, helplessness and despair verging on desperation and anger among the youth. This has resulted in their alienation from the state and society. The widespread belief is that that the polity cannot be saved from further degeneration; that the process cannot be reversed nor effectively tackled; that every effort to correct the situation would be thwarted - if not corrupted in the process. This disgruntlement with the elite is not without substance. For moral legitimacy it is not enough to win an election and claim a right * Shahid Kardar is a former Finance Minister of the Punjab.

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to continue to rule even without ensuring security of life and property of the people and providing them decent quality public services. The political leadership has managed to create a poltico-economic culture where misuse of public money is accepted as a national culture. Such is the extent of disillusionment that people no longer believe that sterilized, clean politics and a rule-governed system is possible any longer, thereby leaving them no option but to reconcile to a choice between one criminal and another. A case in point is that of Mr. Dasti who lied about his academic qualifi cations but was nevertheless again voted into parliament with all-out offi cial support.

According to a World Bank study of over 100 countries conducted some years ago, 65% of the wealth of nations could be explained by investment in human and social capital (in the case of Japan the study concluded that as much as 85% of this wealth could be explained by this factor), 20% by natural capital and a mere 16% of the wealth by investments in physical assets.

The results of the study emphasized that for improving the effi ciency of society there is no substitute for a clean and honest government. Furthermore, the moral resources of society include social norms and values and the quality of mutual trust. All these factors are covered under the rubric of governance, a major reason for the country’s poor economic and social outcomes today.

There are three distinct and important aspects of governance. These include the following:

a) The form of political regime (i.e., does the government have legitimacy?);

b) The process by which authority is exercised to manage the economic and social resources for development. This refers to the accountability of political and offi cial elements of government (freedom of media, transparent decision-making processes and accountability mechanisms), and;

c) The capacity and competence of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and thereafter discharge the

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functions mandated to it.

Almost Sixty-three years on and we have still not been able to fully establish good and transparent governance systems. The principal reasons have included:

a) Lack of direction and poor policy decisions which created an imbalance in the roles of the public and the private sectors for establishing systems of good governance.

b) Creation of private empires through systems that enabled rent extraction, starting with the distribution of evacuee trust properties and permits and licences to establish industries or export and import goods and the establishment of incentive regimes that either subsidized the annual operations of a variety of enterprises or enabled them to earn super profi ts by restricting competition. Such preferential treatment corrupted society by enabling a handful of entrepreneurs to gain at the expense of ordinary consumers and enabled the ineffi cient to prosper. The most recent examples of structures that facilitate rent collections and blunt competition (by not allowing market mechanisms to work) are the decision to levy a 15% regulatory duty on exports of yarn, the high import duties on cars, especially the restrictions on the import of second hand cars, the duties that will now be levied on imported sugar to protect the cartel of ineffi cient producers of sugar and large farmers growing sugarcane at a very high cost with low yields and, the procurement price of wheat set at rates well above the price of the commodity in international markets.

c) The experience of the vast majority of the people at the grass roots, through their interface with the administration, is that it is unresponsive, ineffi cient, unsympathetic and insensitive, if not callous, and sometimes even cruel to those whom they are meant to serve. The underlying problem is not so much a matter of simplifying procedures or establishing a grievance-redressal mechanism, but fundamentally of a systemic nature.

Defi ciencies in both the design of the legal framework and the way it works affects the performance of the economy. In Pakistan,

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laws and regulations tend to be complicated, cumbersome and, at times, defective. Some laws are administered in ways contrary to their intent and spirit. Defects in law are compounded by weak, if not ineffective, enforcement which, in part, refl ects the diffi culties of monitoring compliance.

Abuse of discretionary powers in promoting offi cials (the most recent case being the decision of the prime minister to promote 54 offi cers to BPS-22, which was overruled by the Supreme Court) and appointments to senior positions in government-owned corporations such as the the Steel Mills, etc. Other glaring examples include the political appointments of non-career ambassadors to the detriment of the country’s interests. It is indeed also an irony of fate that many of those appointed on political basis some years ago have now become advocates of a merit-based system, such are the depths of incompetence that we have reached. In particular, what is most disturbing is the manner in which the police has become politicized and corrupted.

Moreover, government functionaries have historically been allowed to wield excessive powers, largely because of the heavy concentration of administrative and fi nancial powers. Furthermore, political interference has abetted corruption and protected the corrupt from being held accountable thereby creating an unholy alliance between politicians, administrators and criminals.

d) Until recently, a weak and pliant judiciary, making it diffi cult for people to exercise their legal rights.

e) Poor implementation and faulty/designs of plans not driven by any vision but projects fi nanced by donors that did not fi t into the country’s own development priorities. Such ill-advised projects also facilitated leakages through bribes, unmerited jobs for those well connected and perks for senior bureaucrats that approved these projects - in the form of cars and cell phones. All of these were funded under the project, through a system of fi nancing that was, and continues to be devoid of transparency.

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The prevalence of weak governance pervading all aspects of politics, economics and society has resulted in a culture that violates the concept of the rule of law, creating a crisis of the legitimacy of the state and its institutions. This gets refl ected in the form of expenditures run wild, wastages and poor prioritization of spending obligations, pomp and grandeur in the life styles of elected representatives and offi cials fi nanced from the public purse, poor delivery of public services to the less affl uent segments of society, a predatory state apparatus, audacious pillage of state resources, open theft of electricity, a low tax to GDP ratio owing to widespread tax evasion and a host of tax exemptions to the rich, non-merit appointments to key positions in the public sector, etc.

In the light of the discussion above the critical ingredients of good governance can be identifi ed as follows; most of which are in short supply in Pakistan.

The establishment of a merit-based system, which ensures upward a) social mobility through the availability of formal education; educational achievement should be an important criterion for occupational and social mobility. An integrating principle of most societies is the recognition of the talent with which you are born rather than where, or the household in which, you are born. For competent individuals poverty should not serve as a deterrent to upward social mobility. In other words, instead of a closed elitist system of a rentier class, the objective should be to create a society which encourages competition and controls, at a minimum level, unproductive rent-seeking activities. Strong institutions – an independent judiciary, an active b) parliament and a constitutionally guaranteed decentralization of powers to those at the local level. Both the federal and provincial governments should be stripped of many of their powers which should devolve to local level governments that would be more accountable to the recipients of public services. Appointments to key public offi ces (like the Governor State c) Bank, the Attorney General, the Auditor General, the Chief Election Commissioner) and chief executives of corporations

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that may have to be retained in the public sector for some time to become effective only after ratifi cation by the Senate. A vigilant civil society and a free media. In the absence of an d) informed public opinion, backed by strong non-governmental organizations in civil society, it is not possible to mobilize the resources and effort needed to ensure corrective action. To our good fortune, this is beginning to happen - an unintended but welcome outcome of the policy to expand and open up the electronic media.Systems that not only enforce the rule of law but also facilitate e) transparency by checking the free exercise of discretionary powers and by ensuring availability of detailed information on government spending (particularly on defence) – sheltered deals and expenditures are a product of regulation and opaque systems rather than of competition. An early privatization of all government corporations - f) particularly the Steel Mills, PIA, the distribution companies for electricity and gas, Pakistan State Oil, etc. This would not only result in saving scarce public resources from being plundered and looted or lost through other leakages and ineffi ciencies, but would also dampen the temptation and incentive to seek public offi ce.

g) A capable civil service system that provides good management and supervises the allocation of resources. This will require civil service reform in which the remuneration package needs to be suffi ciently raised in order to attract talent. The package also has to be transparent in the sense that all existing perks are monetized. (Such reform would become fi nancially sustainable only after the size of government is pared drastically).

h) For the people to have trust in the government, the social contract between the state and the citizens should ensure security of life and property and a fair system for resource distribution. This necessitates an equitable sharing of the burden of taxation and the provision of safety nets to enable the poor to exercise their economic rights. To guarantee a fair and broad-based tax structure, not only should incomes from all sources be subjected to taxation but the tax returns and wealth statements of all top

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functionaries of the government and their dependents should also be made public documents. These documents should pertain to the year prior to their elevation, during their tenures in these positions and two years thereafter. This would apply without exception to of all holders of public offi ce including the President, the Prime Minister, members of parliament, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chairman JCSC and the heads of the navy and the air force, the Chief Justices, the Attorney General, the Auditor General, and all federal and provincial secretaries, etc. This should be a mandatory precondition for appointment to and continuing in these and other positions.

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Back Issues AvailablePrice per issue is Rs. 200/- (Inclusive of postage)

Payments can be made by cross cheque payable to Criterion and sent to House 16, Street 15, F-6/3, Islamabad

Volume 1 Number 1October-December 2006

The Contemporary Challenge to Global Peace and Security – S. Iftikhar Murshed Bilateral Negotiations on Kashmir: Unlearnt Lesson – A.G. Noorani Interview with Qazi Hussain Ahmad – Navid Zafar Islamic Polity and the Constitutional Process in Pakistan – Walid Iqbal Post-9/11 Foreign Policy of Pakistan – Shamshad Ahmad Pitfalls and Economic Prospects of Pakistan – Dr. A.R. Kemal Education in Pakistan: Some Reflections – Dr. Manzoor Ahmad

Volume 2 Number 1January-March 2007

My Vision for Pakistan – Shaukat Aziz Problems and Prospects of Peace and Development in the SAARC Region: A Per-

spective from Bangladesh – Mohammad Mohsin Baluchistan: Pakistan’s Existential Dilemma – Tanvir Ahmad Khan Search for a Viable Solution to the Jammu and Kashmir Problem – Anwar Kemal On Economics and Civil War & Terrorism – Syed Mansoob Murshed Emerging Monopolies in the Pakistani Media – Muzaffar Abbas Iran’s Nuclear Programme – Challenge and Response – Javid Hussain

Volume 2 Number 2April-June 2007

Causes of the Rebellion in Waziristan – Khalid Aziz Globalization: Its Lures and Discontents in the Muslim World – S.M. Naseem Madrassas: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan – Dr. Tariq Rahman The Death of Zia-ul-haq – Khalid Ahmed Pakistan and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination

Against Women – Sabrina Khan Current Afghan Ground Realities – Rustam Shah Mohmand Role of Media in National Development in the 21st Century – Javed Jabbar The Kashmir Dispute: A Kashmiri Viewpoint – Abdul Hameed Karimi

Volume 2 Number 3July-September 2007

Using Trade as a Driver of Political Stability: Prospects in Indo-Pak Context – Moeed Yusuf Pakistan: On or Off? Examining the Future of US-Pakistan Relations in the War on

Terror and Beyond – Farhana Ali The Parliamentary System in South Asia – A.G. Noorani Fundamentalism, Extremism and Islam – Dr. Anis Ahmad OIC – Retrospect a Prospects – Tayyab Sddiqui The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection – Khaled Ahmed Turning on the Faucets of Thought – Anjum Niaz


Political Uncertainty and Extremist Violence – Editorial The Politics of Economic Policy Reforms – Ishrat Hussain Kashmir Dispute: Is there a Viable Solution? – Zamir Akram The Roots of Sectarianism in Pakistan – Khaled Ahmed Need for a Pak-Afghan Treaty on Management of Joint Water – Khalid Aziz Defining Moments: The Political Implication of State Policy – Shahwar Junaid Iran, the United Stated and Regional Stability – Iqbal Ahmad Khan Some Reflections on Islam and Governance – Dr. Manzoor Ahmad


The Broken Pledge – Editorial Pakistan Peoples Party and the War on Terror – Iqbal Ahmad Khan Pakistan – US Relations and the War on Terror – Zamir Akram Balti Tandoori and Chicken Tikka Masala: Culture as National Power –

Toheed Ahmad Militancy in the Pashtun Belt; Perspective of a Peace Jirga – Khalid Aziz Meeting Pakistan’s Energy Needs – Mukhtar Ahmad Should Islam Modernize Itself? – Dr. Khalid Zaheer Stock Market Performance in Pakistan: A Scrutiny – Inayat A. Mangla Musharraf’s Kashmir Policy: An Appraisal – Tayyab Siddiqui Combating Terrorism through Film – Mushfiq Murshed

Volume 3 Number2April-June 2008

New Government, Old Problems – Editorial Governance Reforms in Pakistan – Ishrat Hussain A Liberal Islam in South Asia – A.G. Norani Muslim Radicalism, Western Concerns – Tanvir Ahmad Khan The Bomber Under the Burqa – Farhana Ali The Law of Aerial Bombardment and Civil Casualties: Kosovo and Afghanistan –

Prof. Hayatullah Khan Security Alliances and Security Concerns: Pakistan and NATO – Shahwar Junaid Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Legacy and the Rebuilding of Pakistan – Iqbal Ahmad Khan Of Tongues and Languages: The Tao of Translation – Toheed Ahmad Dimensions and Consequences of NATO Expansion to Eurasia: Reviewing Iran’s

Security Environment – Arif Kemal


Impeachment of President – Editorial Interview with Justice Khalil-ur-Rahman Ramday – Criterion Team Jinnah’s Worldview/Outlook on World Affairs – A.G. Noorani The MQM and Identity Politics in Pakistan – Niloufer Siddiqui Transformation of Al Qaeda – Khaled Ahmed Patterns of Regional Cooperation: Options for Pakistan – Shahwar Junaid Nations of Saints and Scholars: a Portrait of Ireland – Toheed Ahmad The Status of Women in Pakistan: A Ray of Hope – Talat Farooq FATA at the Crossroads – Ayaz Wazir


Suicide Terrorism at the Islamabad Marriott – Editorial How to Develop the Afghan-Pakistan Tribal Belts – Shahid Javed Burki Jinnah & Muslims of India – A.G. Noorani The Haroon Report - A.G. Noorani Notes on Pakistan’s Trade and Industry Policy – Faizullah Khilji Some Thoughts on Democracy – Kazi Anwarul Masud Pakistan Muslim League: a Reality Check – Talat Farooq Pakistan: Religion, Terrorism and Democracy – K.S. Dhillon


The Mumbai Attack – Editorial Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – Syed Rifaat Hussain Jinnah & the Nizam of Hyderabad-A Tragic Liaison – A.G. Noorani A Critical View of the Political Developments in Pakistan – Kazi Anwarul Masud War and State Expansion: A Theoretical Framework – Talat Farooq Drugs, Counter Narcotics & State Building in Afghanistan – Nazia Hussain Economic Governance in Pakistan – Ishrat Husain The Muslim World in a Bind-Whither the Ummah? – Khalid Saleem

Volume 4 Number 2April-June 2009

Terrorism and Political Turmoil– Editorial Jihad vs. Terrorism – A.G. Noorani The USSR’s Last Gamble – The Why and Wherefore – Khalid Saleem Islam and Western Modernism: Is There a Way Forward? – Talat Farooq Mumbai Attacks and the North Arabian Sea – Muhammad Azam Khan Education: the Perennial Questions – Mahvesh Khan Navid Zafar – S. Iftikhar Murshed India – Emerging Global Power – Tayyab Siddiqui Minorities and Human Rights – Raja Tridiv Roy


Pakistan and the Challenge of Extremism - Editorial Supreme Court of Pakistan: The Case of Missing Persons – Dr. Tariq Hassan. The Islamic State: A Mirage – A.G. Noorani Islam and Apostasy – S. Iftikhar Murshed Analysis and responses to the Global Food Crisis – Veena Jha Pakistan’s Economic Problems: Some Non-Conventional Therapies –

Anwar Kemal The Inequitable Tax Structure – Shamim Ahmad The Transition to Democracy – Cyril Almeida A Deconstruction of Some Myths about the Pakhtun - Farhat Taj A Blueprint for Victory - Lt. Gen. (r)Javed Alam Khan Afghanistan: The Case for a UN Peace Keeping Force – Saeed Khalid Defeating Terror: Lessons from Recent History – Iqbal Ahmad Khan

Volume 4 Number 4Octobre-December 2009

Terrorism and the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan – Editorial Notes on the Financial Crisis, Global – Faizullah Khilji Imbalances, Recovery and the East Asian Response: What We Know and What We

Do Not Know The SINO-PAK Boundary Agreement – A.G. Noorani The Afghan Turmoil From 1747 to 2001 – S. Iftikhar Murshed Internal Security Challenges for Pakistan – Shahwar Junaid Promoting Political Parties and an Independent Legislature in Afghanistan –

Niloufer Siddiqui Institutional Role Behind Civil-Military Equation – Muhammad Ismail Khan A Strategy to Fight Militancy? – Cyril Almeida Between Dreams and Realities – Iqbal Ahmad Khan Cooperative Mechanism to Save Kashmir Environment and Water Wars –

Iftikhar Gilani The Price of ‘Sea Blindness’ – Muhammad Azam Khan

Volume 5 Number 1Januanry/March 2010

Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Scourge of Terrorism – Editorial The Kashmir Question: Penultimate Phase – A.G. Noorani Crisis of State & Government in Pakistan – Shamshad Ahmad Bangladesh Economy and Global Crisis – Kazi Anwarul Masud Desert Carrots: Baghdad’s House of Wisdom – Toheed Ahmad The Hudood Ordinances of Pakistan and the Denial of Justice – S. Iftikhar Murshed Liaquat Ali Khan - An Unheralded Founding Father of Pakistan – Sultan M Hali 1971-Lessons Et Cetera – Iqbal Ahmad Khan Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women – Aisha Khan Globalization Challenges and the Changing Role of the State – Javed Masud Why is it Necessary to De-Hyphenate Pakistan from ´´Afpak´´? – Imtiaz Gul

Volume 5 Number 2April/June 2010

Pakistan and Nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance – Khaled Ahmed

Jinnah’s 11 August, 1947 Speech – A.G. Noorani Religion and State in Pakistan – Iqbal Ahmad Khan Nuclear Politics and South Asia – S. Iftikhar Murshed Asia Rising? Inequality and Patterns of Growth in Asia – Taimur Khilji Pakistan’s Economy on the Razor’s Edge: Reform Imperatives – Zubair Iqbal Mountain & Glacier Response to Climate Change – Aisha Khan Impact of Transnational Media on Broadcastng in Pakistan – Hamid Raza Khan The Future of Small Scale Enterprises – Shahid Kardar

‘Criterion’ is a quarterly magazine which aims at producing well researched articles for a discerning readership. The editorial board is neutral in its stance. The opinions expressed are those of the writers.

Contributions are edited for reasons of style or clarity. Great care is taken that such editing does not affect the theme of the article or cramp its style.

Quotations from the magazine can be made by any publisher as long as they are properly acknowledged. We would also appreciate if we are informed.

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PublisherS. Iftikhar Murshed

Editor-in-ChiefS. Mushfi q Murshed

Executive AdvisersS. Mashkoor Murshed

Riaz KhokharAziz Ahmad Khan

Faizullah KhiljiDr. Tariq Hassan

EditorsIffat Rashed

Director FinanceIsmet Murshed

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