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PEOPLE v LAGON185 SCRA 442

FELICIANO.: May 18, 1990

FACTS-On July 7 1976 a criminal action was filed with the City Court of Roxas chargingLagon with estafa for allegedly issuing a P4,232 check as payment for goodsknowing she had insufficient funds. However on Dec. 2, as the trial commenced,the City Court dismissed the information on the ground that the penalty prescribedby law for estafa was beyond the courts authority to impose. Hence this petition forreview.

ISSUEWON the City Court had jurisdiction over the case

HELDNO

- It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters isdetermined by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of the criminalaction and not the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offensecharged.-Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal judges in the capitals ofprovinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction asthe CFI to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions,in which penalties provided do not exceed prision correccional or fines no exceedingP6,000 or both.-At the time of the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty under Art 315of the RPC was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional it is

minimum period, falling well within the jurisdiction of the City Court. But when theinformation was filed, PD 818 had increased the imposable penalty to prision mayorin its medium period.-The real question raised by petitioner is whether the said doctrine disregards therule against retroactivity of penal laws. It has been repeatedly held that in criminalprosecutions, jurisdiction is not determined by what may be meted out to theoffender in after trial but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes. Once

jurisdiction is acquired by the Court in which the information is filed, it is retainedregardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense which carries a penaltythat would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court.-In the instant case, should the information be refiled with the RTC, the court maynot impose a more onerous penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTC retains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the refiled case under PD 818, given the dateof the commission of the crime (before effectivity of PD 818), the lower penaltyprovided in Art 315 (otherwise within the jurisdiction of the City Court) should beimposed.Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the petition

LEGADOS V. DE GUZMAN

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US v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265 (1911) repealed by Legados case; Inferior courts

have no jurisdiction to over crimes that may require sentencing the accused to

support the offspring from the crime, even if the period of imprisonment is within

the jurisdiction of the inferior court.

Legados v. de Guzman, 170 SCRA 357 (1989) MTC has exclusive original

jurisdiction over all offenses where the penalty imposable does not exceed 4 years

and 2 months (now 6 years) regardless of other imposable penalties and civil

liability arising from such offense. Hence, the inferior courts have jurisdiction for

simple seduction, even if the accused might be required to support the offspring

from the crime.

FULL CASE:

Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Bilang129, effective August 14, 1981, grants toMetropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit TrialCourts 1"(e)xclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable withimprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not morethan four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of otherimposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from suchoffenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amountthereof. 2

The proviso altered and superseded the long standing doctrine first laid down in a1911 case 3that an inferior court had no jurisdiction over the crime of simpleseduction although the penalty imposed is arresto mayor because convictionthereof carried with it the liability imposed by Article 345 of the Revised Penal Codeto acknowledge and give Support to the offspring. The doctrine was madeapplicable whatever the peculiar circumstances of the offender and offended partymight be, it not being permitted, upon considerations of consistency andorderliness, "to speculate on whether or not an offspring may still arise from thecrime, whether or not the complainant or the accused may be sterile or incapable ofprocreation, whether or not the complaint was already pregnant by another manwhen the crime was committed and various other factual considerations before the

jurisdiction may be fixed. 4

In the case at bar, long before the passage of B.P. Big. 129, 5a complaint for

simple seduction 6was filed with the then City Court of Dipolog (Branch11) 7against Vilmor Icao. The complaint was presented by the offended girl, CoraLegados, represented by her mother, Rosa, and was subsequently made the basisof an information filed by the First Assistant City Fiscal. 8After entering a plea ofnot guilty on arraignment, Icao moved to quash the information on the ground thatthe City Court had no jurisdiction to try the offense, and the fiscal who filed theinformation bad no authority to do so. The Court denied the motion and scheduledthe case for trial on the merits. Icao thereupon instituted an action of

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prohibition 9with the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City 10which, indue course, granted the petition and permanently enjoined the proceedings in theCity Court. It is this Order which is now assailed in this Court as having beenrendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The writ of prohibition was, of course, correctly issued by the respondent Judge,being consistent with the doctrine obtaining at the time, i.e., that an inferior courthad no jurisdiction over the crime of simple seduction. But, as already pointed out,the doctrine has since been changed. Now, the offense is explicitly declared by lawto be within the exclusive original jurisdiction, no longer of Courts of First Instance(since abolished and replaced by Regional Trial Courts), but of Metropolitan TrialCourts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

WHEREFORE, the disputed Order of respondent Judge of October 9, 1972 is SETASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City(which replaced the City Court) for further proceedings. This decision isimmediately executory. No costs.

PP. VS. MTC-QC

Whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the Metropolitan Trial Court or otherfirst level court which has exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal actions oflibel, is the issue raised by the People of the Philippines, as petitioner in the specialcivil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamusat bar. The fairly simple factsfrom which the issue has arisen are hereunder briefly narrated.

On January 30, 1995 an information for libel was filed against Isah V. Red inthe Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case thereby initiated was docketed as

Criminal Case No. 95-60134 and raffled to Branch 82.

Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the RTC had nojurisdiction of the offense. The Judge found merit in the motion and by an Orderdated March 29, 1995, remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of QuezonCity for proper action/disposition in the premises. His Honor declared that

(u)nder Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceedingsix (6) years, irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposableaccessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offensesor predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof isvested in the Municipal Trial Court. ** . The case was accordingly transferred to

the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court where it was docketed as Case No. 43-00548 and raffled to Branch 43.

Thereafter, the private prosecutor, under the control and supervision of theFiscal, filed a Manifestation and Motion to Remand datedAugust 1, 1995 prayingthat the case be returned to the RTC. The movant invoked Article 360 of theRevised Penal Code, as amended, which pertinently provides that:[1]
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*** *** ***

The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of writtendefamation, as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously orseparately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the

libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offendedparties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense *** ,

and argued that

** . Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court (such asthe Court of Tax Appeals) are special in character, and should prevail overthe Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Courtof First Instance) which is a general law. (De Joya vs. Lantin, 19 SCRA893). Moreover, a general law cannot repeal or amend by implication aspecific provision or a special law. Otherwise stated: a subsequent statute,general in character as to its terms and operation, is not to be construed asrepealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to

do so is manifested. This is so, even if the provisions of the latter aresufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the specialact. (Philippine Railway Co. vs. CIR, 91 Phil. 35; Villegas vs. Subido, 41SCRA 190; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 207 SCRA 487).

The MetroTC denied the motion by Order dated August 14, 1995. It opined thatRep. Act. No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, would partake of thenature of a modern law which impliedly repeals an ancient law (the RevisedPenal Code) which is of 1932 vintage, which is inconsistent with the later law ** ;(and that) if the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law shallbe applied.[2]Later, the MetroTC also denied the private prosecutors motion forreconsideration, by Order dated September 7, 1995. Still later, in an Order datedOctober 18, 1995, it denied another motion by the same counsel reiterating theplea to remand the case back to the RTC, and further directed the prosecution topresent ** (its) next witness, trial having in the meantime commenced.

Now, in this proceeding, the Stated prays for judgment: (1) declaring thequestioned Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18,1995 as null and void for having been issued by the respondent court actingwithout jurisdiction; (2) enjoining the respondent court from further conductingtrials in Criminal Case No. 43-00548; and (3) commanding the respondent court toremand Criminal Case No. 43-00548 to the Executive Judge of the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City for proper disposition. It citesJalandoni v. Endaya(55 SCRA

261 [1974]), where this Court (a) drew attention to the categorical language ofArticle 360 of the Revised Penal Code to the effect that it is a court of first instancethat is specifically designated to try a libel case, and (b) indicated thirteen (13)cases, from People v. Topacio, 59 Phil. 356 (1934) to Time, Inc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA303 (1971), wherein this ** Court ruled that municipal courts do not have

jurisdiction over libel cases.[3]It further argues that in light ofJalandoni,and Berces v. Guingona(241 SCRA 539 [1995]) -- to the effect that a subsequentstatute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construedas repealing special or specific enactment unless the legislative purpose to do so is
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manifest or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between them --Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code may not be deemed to have been supersededby Republic Act No. 7691.

This Court has already had occasion to resolve the issue, substantially in linewith the position taken by the People, account having been taken of substantially

the same arguments adduced by the opposing parties in this case. In G.R. No.122126 entitled Lydia Caro vs. Court of Appeals and Violeta Sarigumba, involvingthe same jurisdictional issue as that specifically presented in the case at bar, thisCourt promulgated a Resolution on June 19, 1996 pertinently reading as follows:

Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible errorcommitted by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitionersmotion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. No.7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel casescannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of sixmonths and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised PenalCode) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Courts

jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law, however, excludestherefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of theRegional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520andJalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court ofAppeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial Courts have theexclusive jurisdiction over the libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdictionconferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases.

Moreover, Administrative Order No. 104-96 -- treating of the subject: **DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING,DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUALPROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES -- issued onOctober 21, 1996 by the Chief Justice upon the advice and consent of the Court EnBanc, inter aliaprovides, in categorical acknowledgment of the validity of thedoctrine just adverted to, that LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONALTRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THEMETROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPALTRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.

The proposition is hereby reaffirmed, the Court perceiving no argumentadvanced by respondents justifying its abrogation or modification.

Concerning respondents contention that the challenged orders are nowimmutable, having become final and executory for failure of the prosecution to take

an appeal therefrom, it suffices to advert to the familiar and uniformly appliedaxiom that only final orders -- i.e., those that finally dispose of a case, leavingnothing more to be done by the court respecting the merits of a case -- can becomefinal and executory -- in the sense of becoming unalterable through an appeal orreview proceeding.[4]Interlocutory orders, on the other hand -- i.e., those whichresolve incidental motions or collateral matters but do not put an end to the case --never become final in the sense of becoming unchangeable and impervious to
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impugnation after expiration of the period prescribed for taking an appeal from afinal judgment.[5]

Respecting respondents claim that venue is merely procedural, suffice it topoint out that unlike in civil cases, in criminal cases venue is jurisdictional.[6]

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent Courts Orders datedAugust 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null andvoid for having been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined fromfurther taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548,which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Courtof Quezon City for proper disposition.

SARIGUMBA V. SANDIGANBAYAN(full case)

FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, SHERLITA R. GALLEGO, and EMMA C.DAGONDON,petitioners, vs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FirstDivision, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR.,J.:

This is a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for thenullification of the March 20, 2002 Resolution[1]of the Sandiganbayan denying themotion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 24505-07 as well as the June 13, 2002Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Antecedents

Sometime in 1994, in a meeting held at the residence of Atty. Bernadette P.Encinareal, then Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. promised to give P10,000.00to each of the 33 barangay captains of the Municipality of Tudela, MisamisOccidental. The Congressman assured the barangay captains that the amount washis personal gift to each of them.

It turned out that the amount provided by Congressman Ramiro came from hisCountrywide Development Fund (CDF) which was remitted to the MunicipalTreasurer of Tudela per Allotment Advice No. F2-6781-94-315 in the amountof P220,000.00 under Check No. 497664; and Allotment Advice No. F2-7784-94-415 in the amount of P110,000.00 under Check No. 497679. Forthwith, petitioner

Mayor Felix Sarigumba secured a cash advance chargeable against the CDF ofCongressman Ramiro and submitted to the Municipal Treasurer Voucher Nos. 9411-422 and 9412-445 in the total amount of P330,000.00. The particulars contained inthe said vouchers read: to cash advance the CDF for payment of snacks duringassembly meeting for peace and order meeting of 33 barangays of Tudela, MisamisOccidental.

Petitioner Sarigumba, thereafter, gave P9,500.00 to each of the barangaycaptains through two members of his staff, Loreta Salinasal and Crosita Singidas.
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As per his agreement with the barangay captains, each of the latter was togive P500.00 to the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) which would serve ascontributions for projects. The barangay captains thought that the amount given toeach of them was a cash gift or pahalipay from Congressman Ramiro.[2]

Petitioner Sarigumba later liquidated his cash advance

of P220,000.00 viaLiquidation Voucher No. 9412-478, stating therein that the saidamount was used as follows:

(1) For the liquidation of cash advance amounting TWO HUNDRED TWENTYTHOUSAND PESOS, to furnish to various barangays of Tudela under check#497664 for meals and snacks during peace and order meeting as persupporting papers hereto attached in the total amount of P220,000.[3]

The petitioner-mayor also liquidated his cash advanceof P110,000.00 via Voucher No. 9412-488, in which he stated that he used theamount

(2) For the liquidation of cash advance under check #497679 on V #9412-445 to cover up expenses on peace and order meeting to variousbarangays of Tudela, Misamis Occidental from CDF Fund under AA #F2-6781-94-315 in the total amount P110,000. [4]

He then supported his liquidation vouchers with attendance sheets bearing thesignatures of those who purportedly attended the assembly meetings. PetitionerEmma C. Dagondon approved Voucher No. 9412-478, while petitioner Sherlita R.Gallego approved Voucher No. 9412-488.

Subsequently, Flaviano Zaide, William Gumisad, Edilberto Quinalagan, Maria

Pacaro and Virginia Tampoog, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against thepetitioners Sarigumba, Gallego and Dagondon, alleging, inter alia

That we strongly deny that there had been an assembly or meeting where freemeals and snacks during a peace and order meeting were given to the barangaypeople in the year 1994 and 1995 except during the SOT at Barangays Napurog,Duangican and Maribojoc but we knew for a fact that the said snacks were notgiven from the above vouchers but the money out of the above disbursements weregiven as cash gifts to the Barangay Captains of Tudela, Misamis Occidental. Insupport to the liquidation of the withdrawal of the aforesaid amount were thesignatures of the barangay people not for the purpose as alleged in those vouchers

but obtained in different manners like attendance during the monthly barangayassembly, or signatures for the retention of the Tudela, Public High School at theTudela Central School while other signatures were obtained to reimburse paymentof a hand-set radio (two-way) procured for the different barangays by the Mayor;

That signatures of the undersigned and numerous signatures of barangay folksincluding children were forged or obtained under other pretense by the aforesaidmayor in support of the vouchers thereby cheating the people of their money.[5]
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The Ombudsman requested the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct aninvestigation of the Peace and Order Campaign Funds for 1994. The Auditordirected each of the barangay captains who received the P9,500.00 from petitionerSarigumba to remit the said amounts to their respective barangay treasurers and tosubmit the receipts the latter would issue thereon.

When the barangay captains received the letter of the COA, they weresurprised. They then secured receipts from their respective barangay treasurerswhich indicated that they had returned the amount they received from petitionerSarigumba although no such amounts had yet been received by the former. Thebarangay captains were thereafter accorded a chance to re-liquidate the amountsthey received from the petitioner-mayor and they did so.

In their Memorandum Report to the Provincial Auditor dated December 3, 1995,the auditors declared that, with the barangay captains submission of officialreceipts, there had been, in effect, no loss of government funds.

When the Sandiganbayanreceived a copy of the COA Report, its Committee on

Legal Matters and Committee on Finance, Budget and Appropriations, conducted aninvestigation, which yielded the following findings as per Committee Report No. 96-13:

4. That the amount released to each Barangay Captain wasonly P9,500.00 and others P9,400.00 per affidavit submitted by LoretaSalinasal, the Private Secretary to the Mayor.

5. That sometime in 1994 Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, [Jr.] assuredthe Barangay Captains of a personal cash gift of P10,000.00 for eachBarangay from his own pocket, but it was never meant that the amountwould come from Congressman Ramiros CDF for peace and ordercampaign in the Municipality of Tudela. All Barangay Captains receivedthe amount as promised by Congressman Ramiro and disbursed it fortheir personal benefit. But later on re-submitted liquidation papers forPeace and Order Campaigns in their respective barangays.

6. That the barangay captains changed their positions and denied, asshown in their uniform testimonies, that the amount was indeed forPeace and Order Campaign and not a personal cash gift fromCongressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. The illegal act was alreadyconsummated.

7. That COA initiated the investigation of the release of said amountsonly after the directive of the Ombudsman arrived. Directing all

Barangay Captains to return the amount of P10,000.00 and to produceofficial receipts acknowledging that said amount had been received bythe Barangay Treasurers even if no actual cash was turned over. Itappears also that the Municipal Treasurer issued official receipts withoutactual cash involved to make it appear that said amounts were returnedby the barangay captains. The barangay then re-submitted liquidationsto justify the earlier liquidations where the forged signatures of barangayconstituents were first presented to COA as liquidation of said vouchers.

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The amounts released were already disbursed. The liquidation papersfor P220,000.00 and P110,000.00 were already submitted to COA asfinal liquidation. For all intent and purposes the act was alreadyconsummated. The second liquidation would appear to have beenfabricated and had been compromised to legalize the unlawful act.

After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued aresolution finding probable cause for malversation against petitioner Sarigumba;two counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4 of theRevised Penal Code also against the petitioner-mayor; and one count of falsificationof public documents against petitioners Dagondon and Gallego.

Accordingly, the Ombudsman filed an Information for malversation under Article217 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Sarigumba with theSandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information docketed as CriminalCase No. 24505 reads:

That sometime in November and December 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto in the Municipality of Tudela, Province of Misamis Occidental, and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, ahigh-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, while in theperformance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office,taking advantage of his official positions, did then and there, willfully, unlawfullyand feloniously take, embezzle and appropriate unto himself and/or thruabandonment, or gross negligence allowed other parties to misappropriate,embezzle and/or use to some other purpose the total sum of P330,000.00 he hadearlier obtained as cash advance from the Municipality intended for the Peace andOrder Campaign of the different Barangays of the same municipality, therebyconstituting him a special disbursing officer and for which he is accountable, to the

damaged (sic) and prejudice of the government and of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Another Information for falsification of public document under Article 171 of theRevised Penal Code against petitioners Sarigumba and Gallego was filed with theSandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information, docketed as CriminalCase No. 24506 reads:

That sometime in December 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in theMunicipality of Tudela, Province of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, a high-rankingpublic officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, and SHERLITA R.GALLEGO, a low-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Accountant, bothaccused, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offensein relation to their office, taking advantage of their official positions, in order tocover up the misuse of public funds advanced by respondent FELIX L. SARIGUMBAintended for the Peace and Order Campaign of the 33 Barangays of the sameMunicipality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsifyLiquidation Voucher No. 9412-488 amounting to P110,000.00 by making it appear
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it was for expenses during the peace and order meeting when, in truth and in fact,both accused knew well that there were no such peace and order meetings beingheld; furthermore, fabricated attendance sheets and list of signatures were used assupporting documents causing it to appear that persons attended such peace andorder meetings when, [in] truth and in fact, they did not for there was no suchmeetings being held, to the damaged (sic)and prejudice of the government and ofpublic interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

A third Information was filed with the graft court against petitioners Sarigumbaand Dagondon for falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the RevisedPenal Code. The inculpatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal CaseNo. 24507, reads:

That sometime in December 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in theMunicipality of Tudela, Province of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, a high-rankingpublic officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, and EMMA C. DAGONDON,a low-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Accountant-Designate, bothaccused, while in the performance of their official functions committing the offensein relation to their office, were taking advantage of their official positions, in orderto cover up the misuse of public funds advanced by respondent FELIX L.SARIGUMBA intended for the Peace and Order Campaign of the 33 Barangays of thesame Municipality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsifyLiquidation Voucher No. 9412-478 amounting to P220,000.00 by making it appearit was for meal and snacks during the peace and order meeting when, in truth andin fact, both accused knew well there were no such peace and order meetings

being held and much more on the serving of meals and snacks; furthermore,fabricated attendance sheets and list of signatures were used as support documentscausing it to appear that persons attended such peace and order meetings when,[in] truth and in fact, they did not for there was no such meetings being held, tothe damaged (sic)and prejudice of the government and of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

During the hearing of March 30, 1998, the Sandiganbayan expressed anxietyover the number of crimes committed, and issued a Resolution worded as follows:

This morning, this court expressed its anxieties over the correctness of theaccusation herein against the Mayor and separately against the municipalaccountant for the alleged malversation of sum of money and acts of falsificationinvolving the conversion of portions of the total amount by the accused. It wouldappear that, considering that there are two amounts, two (2) offenses may havebeen committed; furthermore, the prosecution can clarify whether or not thealleged falsification took place after the completion of the malversation or was partof the total plan in order to effect the malversation without the same coming to theattention of the examining authorities. Answers to these questions might result in
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the re-arrangement of the statement of accusation against the accused charged forseparate offenses.[9]

This prompted the Special Prosecutor to ask for a period of fifteen (15) dayswithin which to respond to the misgivings of the graft court. In the meantime, the

trial court deferred the issuance of any warrants of arrest against the petitioners.During the hearing of April 29, 1998, the trial court issued an Order,

quoted infra:

This morning, the Court expressed its uncertainty over the propriety of proceedingwith these cases as they stand at this time considering that, on the basis of thevery records of the prosecution at preliminary investigation, it would appear thatthere is a need to determine whether or not the barangay captains did, in fact,receive the amounts allegedly distributed by the accused mayor to them or whetheror not any deficiency in the liquidation of these cash advances were deficiencies inthe submissions by the barangay captains alone or the barangay captains in

conspiracy with any other official.

Considering the concurrence of Prosecutor Victorio U. Tabanguil with the doubtsexpressed by this Court on this matter, as prayed for by him, he is given sixty (60)days from today within which to determine whether or not there exists probablecause against Mayor Felix L. Sarigumba as well as the subordinate officials of theMunicipality of Tudela, Misamis Occidental, or against any other persons not yetcharged. Should he wish, he may summon other witnesses herefor, including theinitiation of another preliminary investigation to summon the barangay captains orsuch other persons who may have been involved in the receipt and distribution ofthese funds. The prosecution shall furnish this Court with all of its issuances andorders both in Manila and in Mindanao, should the Deputy Ombudsman for thatarea deem it wise to take over the case one more time.[10]

In the meantime, during the period of July 22 to 31, 1998, Graft InvestigationOfficer I Elmer Ben V. Pasion of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanaoconducted clarificatory hearings. In the course of the proceedings, petitionerSarigumba admitted that he and the barangay captains had agreed that each of thelatter would contribute P500.00 for the ABC projects, and that the amount actuallyreceived by each was only P9,500.00. The said accused submitted deposit slipsshowing that the barangay captains had deposited the amounts they received tothe barangay treasurers. It appears that the barangay captains executed separateaffidavits explaining the circumstances under which they received the amounts

from the petitioner Sarigumba through his employees, and how the said amountswere spent.

In a Memorandum to the Ombudsman dated December 21, 1998, GraftInvestigator Pasion summarized his findings:

1. That the barangay captains did, in fact, receive the amount distributed byMayor Sarigumba through his representatives Loreta Salinasal and CrositaSingidas. That the amount actually received by the barangay captains was
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only P9,500.00 as the barangay captains agree to contribute P500.00 each to theproject of the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC).

2. That some of the Barangay Captains in good faith had spent the money fortheir personal use having thought all along that the amount distributed was a cash

gift or pahalipay promised by Congressman Ramiro. It was, however, refundedback to the barangay government by the barangay captains concerned as barangayfunds upon learning that the amount distributed was from the CDF of CongressmanRamiro and intended for the Peace and Order Campaign.

3. The requirement of COA for the 33 barangay units to issue OfficialReceipts (Record, pp. 340-372)for the receipts of the money corrected therecording in the Municipal Government of Tudela and properly recorded the transferof funds and accountability to the 33 different barangay governments.

4. That the 33 different barangay governments subsequently submitted theirliquidations with the municipal government of Tudela.

5. That based on the corresponding liquidation reports submitted by differentbarangay units, only some of the barangays conducted the barangay assemblieswhere meals and snacks were served particularly during the Service OrientationTraining (SOT) with the 32nd Infantry battalion. That generally, the amountdistributed was not spent by the different barangay units for meals and snacks inthe peace and order assembly but on some other immediate needs for their peaceand order programs as determined by the barangay captains.[11]

Graft Investigator Pasion thus recommended the withdrawal of the Informationfor malversation and the retention of the Informations for falsification, as follows:

1. Considering that during the clarificatory hearing, it was duly established byevidence and by admissions that the barangay captains did, in fact, receive theamount distributed by respondent Mayor Sarigumba, the Information forMalversation against the respondents is hereby recommended to be withdrawn inthe absence of evidence of shortage, taking, appropriation, conversion or loss ofpublic funds.

For lack of criminal intent, probable cause could not be established against thebarangay captains who, in an honest mistake of fact, spent the money for theirpersonal use, believing in good faith that the money distributed was a cash gift or

pahalipay promised by Congressman Ramiro.

2. Respondents, however, were unable to satisfactorily explain and justify thepreparation of falsified Liquidation Vouchers No. 9412-478 and 9412-488 bymaking it appear therein that the amount distributed [was] expended for meals andsnacks during the peace and order meetings when, in truth and in fact, peace andorder meetings were conducted only in some of the barangays. Moreover,fabricated attendance sheets and list of signatures were used as supportingdocuments for the questioned Liquidation Vouchers causing it to appear that

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persons named therein attended such peace and order meetings when, in truth andin fact, they did not so attended (sic).

Premised, therefore, on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Domagas vs.Malana, 223 SCRA 359, that In the crime of falsification of a public document, the

principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of truthas therein solemnly proclaimed, it is hereby maintained that the Informations forFalsification of Public Documents against the accused Municipal Mayor Felix L.Sarigumba and Municipal Accountants Emma C. Dagondon and Sherlita R. Gallegobe prosecuted before the Sandiganbayan.[12]

The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., approved thesaid Memorandum, a copy of which was filed with the Sandiganbayan by SpecialProsecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil on February 4, 1999.[13]On February 22,1999, Special Prosecutor Tabanguil submitted a Review Memorandum to theOmbudsman recommending that the three Informations be withdrawn. However,the Ombudsman denied the recommendation with the following notation: Present

the Documents containing the false entries for the scrutiny of the Court.

In their comment on the Memorandum of the Graft Investigator Pasion, thepetitioners reiterated that, as found by the investigator, they had acted in goodfaith and that there was an absence of damage and prejudice to the government.They, thus, prayed that the cases against them be dismissed. Appended theretowas the joint affidavit of the barangay captains.

Despite the Ombudsmans denial of his Review Memorandum, the SpecialProsecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion for the withdrawal of the threeInformations for falsification of public documents on March 29, 1999.[14]

During the proceedings on October 17, 2000, the graft court addressedclarificatory questions to the Special Prosecutor regarding the Memorandum ofGraft Investigator Pasion which the Ombudsman concurred with.

Despite the responses of the Special Prosecutor, the Sandiganbayan foundprobable cause against the petitioners and ordered the cases to remain in the courtdocket.[15]Warrants were issued for the arrest of the petitioners. They forthwithposted cash bail bonds for their provisional release[16]which were later approved bythe graft court.

On December 26, 2000, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation[17]with theSandiganbayan reiterating his March 29, 1999 Manifestation and Motion.

The petitioners then filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Arraignment and toMotion to Quash the Informations. However, on February 15, 2001, theSandiganbayan issued an Order denying the motion.[18]The graft court, likewise,denied the oral motion for reconsideration thereof made by the petitioners.

All of the petitioners were arraigned on February 19, 2001 and pleaded notguilty.[19]

On May 28, 2001, the petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Cancel Pre-Trialand Trial, Motion to Dismiss the cases, claiming that:
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4. In the early part of May 2001, undersigned counsel, however, received fromthe accused a copy of the Settlement and Balances dated April 16, 2001, from theCommission on Audit, Province of Misamis Occidental, Oroquieta City, clearlyshowing that the amount of P330,000.00 subject of the controversy in the instantcase and which was disallowed in 1995 for lack of proper documentation, had beenfully settled and allowed as of April 16, 2001.[20]

The complaining witnesses, through counsel, opposed the motion; the SpecialProsecutor, however, concurred with the said motion. After due hearing, theSandiganbayan issued a Resolution[21]denying the motion of the petitioners onMarch 20, 2002. The graft court reiterated its finding of probable cause againstthem. The petitioners then filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof, whichwas denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated June 13, 2002.

The Present Petition

In the present petition, the petitioners assert that the court committed graveabuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it foundprobable cause against them, denied their motion to dismiss the cases, as well astheir motion for reconsideration thereof. The petitioners proffer the followingarguments:

First. Petitioner Sarigumba did not make use of the P330,000.00 subject of theInformations in Criminal Cases No. 24506, considering that the said amount camefrom Congressman Ramiros CDF, and was distributed to and received by the 33barangay captains of Tudela, Misamis Occidental, who submitted the appropriatedocuments liquidating said amounts. Moreover, as per the COA Report, thegovernment did not suffer any loss of funds and until clearance of the barangay

captains.Second. The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao and Special Prosecutor

Tabanguil recommended the withdrawal of the three Informations in said case.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for certiorari, it must firstbe demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in anarbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and itmust be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusalto perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse ofdiscretion is not enough. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board oroffice, has jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted withoutauthority.[22]

In a case where a lower court or quasi-judicial body commits an error in theexercise of its jurisdiction and which is only one of judgment, such error isreviewable only by appeal. On the other hand, if the act complained of was issued
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by such court or body with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack orin excess of jurisdiction, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petitionfor certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[23]

In the present cases, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of itsdiscretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a

criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender awell-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent isprobably guilty thereof. The determination of its existence lies within the discretionof the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation uponcomplaint of an offended party.[24]Probable cause is meant such set of facts andcircumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believethat the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein hasbeen committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probablecause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to thecalibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. Herelies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on

evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and thatit was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than baresuspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justifyconviction.[25]Specifically, probable cause to warrant arrest requires such facts andcircumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believethat an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.[26]

Once the Informations are filed with the trial court, the determination of thepresence or absence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrestagainst the accused, or for the withdrawal of the Informations, or for the dismissalof the cases, is addressed to its sound discretion. As such, the trial court is notbound by the recommendation of the Prosecutor. The trial courts exercise of its

judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be interfered with in the absence ofgrave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorariwill not lie to cure errors in the trialcourts appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reachedbased on the said findings, as well as the conclusions of law. The general rule isthat as long as the trial court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errorscommitted in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than mereerrors of judgment, correctible by appeal.[27]

Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for thearrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in theInformations, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including otherdocuments and/or evidence appended to the Information.

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause for the issuanceof warrants for the arrest of the petitioners for one count of malversation and twocounts of falsification of public documents against petitioner Sarigumba. The graftcourts finding was based on the allegation in the Information, the Resolution of theOmbudsman finding probable cause for the filing of the said Informations, thedocumentary evidence appended thereto, as well as the facts and circumstancesunearthed during the clarificatory hearing of October 17, 2000. After theclarificatory hearings on the petitioners motion to dismiss the cases, the
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Sandiganbayan found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for their arrestand for the court to proceed to trial, on the following ratiocination:

It was not denied by the accused that the P330,000.00 came from the CountrywideDevelopment Fund of Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. The documentation for

the cash advances taken out by the accused mayor shows that the money was tobe used for peace and order campaign.

Mayor Sarigumba is charged in the instant cases for malversation of the totalamount of P330,000.00, as well as for falsification of the attendance sheetsattached to the first set of vouchers he had submitted to liquidate the cashadvances for P220,000.00 and for P110,000.00. It is claimed by the accused,however, that since the liquidation was finally approved, no injury resulted from thecash advances he had made.

It will be noted that the cash advances were taken out by the accused mayor withthe following particulars: To cash advance the CDF for the payment of various

expenses during the assembly meeting for peace and order of 33 barangays ofTudela, Misamis Occidental as shown by the Prosecutions findings.

From the clarificatory hearings conducted during the review hereof, it appeared thatthe barangay captains were also under the impression that the amounts given tothem were the cash gifts or pahalipay earlier promised by then CongressmanRamiro. That was the reason why, as one of them explained, they spent theamounts on personal matters although, later, they were required to refund thesame.

The complainant made a list of her own findings after going over the receipts made

by the barangay captains. According to her, these documents were inappropriatefor the liquidation of the cash advances. Her findings ranged from inadequacy inthe amounts accounted for to impropriety of the expenditures made vis--visthepurpose for which the funds were intended per the terms of the voucher.Furthermore, there is also the finding by the prosecutor at review that these wereunderstood by the barangay captains to be cash gifts and not for the purpose forwhich they were purportedly drawn by the mayor.[28]

What militates against the petition at bench is the failure of the petitioners toappend thereto certified copies of the transcripts taken during the clarificatoryhearings. Without such transcripts, the Court cannot review the factual findings of

the Sandiganbayan and determine whether or not it committed grave abuse of itsdiscretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against thepetitioners, and in denying their motion to dismiss the cases.

Indeed, petitioner Sarigumba failed to establish that the Sandiganbayancommitted grave abuse of its discretion in finding probable cause against him formalversation. Malversation is defined in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code,thus:

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ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property - Presumption of malversation.Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for publicfunds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate orshall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any otherperson to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwisebe guilty of the misappropriation of malversation of such funds or property, shallsuffer:

1. The penalty ofprision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if theamount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed twohundred pesos.

2. The penalty ofprision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the amountinvolved is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

3. The penalty ofprision mayorin its maximum period to reclusion temporalin itsminimum period, if the amount involved is more than 6,000 pesos but is less than

12,000 pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporalin its medium and maximum periods, if theamount involved is more than 12,000 pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If theamount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall bereclusion temporalin its maximumperiod to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetualspecial disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed orequal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or propertywith which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly- authorized officer, shallbeprimafacieevidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personaluses. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1060, approved June 12, 1954.)

The elements of the crime are the following:

(a) The offender is a public officer;

(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the dutiesof his office;

(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he isaccountable; and

(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, orthrough abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by anotherperson of, such funds or property.[29]

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The felony consists not only in misappropriation or converting public funds orproperty to ones personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use ofor misappropriate the same.[30]The felony may thus be committed by dolo or byculpa. The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is imposedregardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due tonegligence.[31]An accountable officer may thus be convicted of malversation even ifthere is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that thereis a shortage in the officers account which he has not been able to explainsatisfactorily. All that is essential is proof that the accountable officer has receivedpublic funds but that when demand therefor is made, he is unable to satisfactorilyaccount for the same.[32]

The law declares that the failure of the public officer to account for such publicfunds or property upon demand by any duly-authorized officer shall beprimafacieevidence that he has appropriated the same for his personal use.

Based on the record, it is true that petitioner Sarigumba did not make use ofthe P330,000.00 which he received from the Municipal Treasurer which was

chargeable to the CDF of Congressman Ramiro; hence, there is no probable causefor the charge of malversation by doloagainst him. It must be stressed, however,that the petitioner-mayor is also charged with malversation by culpa under theInformation, allegedly committed by distributing P9,500.00 to each of the barangaycaptains without bothering to inform them that the amount was from the CDF ofCongressman Ramiro and that the money should be used for the peace and ordercampaign in their respective jurisdictions. All along, the barangay captains were ofthe belief that the amounts they received were from the personal funds of theCongressman and that they had unfettered use of the money, for whatever purposethey chose.

Indeed, Barangay Captain Cosme D. Sarabia admitted that he usedthe P9,500.00 he received from the petitioner to pay his personal debts. Thepetitioner and the barangay captains agreed to remit P500.00 each from theamounts they received from petitioner Sarigumba to the ABC for its projects.Indeed, the barangay captains were astounded when they received the directivesfrom the Auditor to remit the amounts they received from the petitioner to thebarangay treasurers, and to submit receipts as proof that they had followed thedirective. However, the barangay captains merely secured receipts from thebarangay treasurers without actually refunding the amounts, and were only latergiven a chance to liquidate the same.

The bare fact that the barangay captains were able to return the amounts theyreceived from the petitioner or liquidate the same after demand therefor does notpreclude the finding of probable cause for malversation. As this Court heldin Kimpo v. Sandiganbayan:

In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement offunds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish thecriminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect the accuseds civilliability thereunder and be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous tovoluntary surrender.[33]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/154239_41.htm#_ftn30

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Indeed, the matter of whether the barangay captains were able to liquidate thesaid amounts and whether the bases thereof are justified are matters of defenseduring trial, and not before trial, in a motion to dismiss the case.

Whether or not the barangay captains acted in good faith is a matter of defenseon the part of the petitioner Sarigumba. Even if the barangay captains had indeed

acted in good faith, still, if petitioner Sarigumba had failed to make it clear beforeor when he distributed the money to them that the money was for the peace andorder campaign in their respective barangays, he may be criminally liable formalversation by culpa.

Likewise barren of merit is the petitioners claim that there is colorable truth inthe allegations of petitioner Sarigumba in his liquidation vouchers, that the amountsgiven to the barangay captains were used mostly or substantially for snacks orrelated expenses and that there was no probable cause against him formalversation, and against all the petitioners for falsification. It must be stressedthat the barangay captains themselves disavowed such claim in their respectiveaffidavits.

Demosthenes Singidas of Barangay Cahayag declared that there was a peaceand order assembly which coincided with their Barangay Assembly in 1994, wherehe gave P50.00 for meals to those who attended and that he spent a total ofonly P4,000.00. Adelaida Paigan of Camating admitted that she spent the moneyfor seminar registration (no specific amount), a hand- held radio antennae (noamount also), P85.00 for the peace and order campaign, food and snacks for thesoldiers who guarded the election at around P1,000.00; Service OrientationTraining (SOT) meals and snacks in the amount of P1,184.00, and leveling andimproving barangay roads in the amount of P2,000.00. She also declared thatpapers were passed for signatures of the population of Camating, but there hadbeen no peace and order assembly held for the release of said amount. For hispart, Francisco Jerusalem of Barangay Casilak San Agustin alleged that he wasgiven P10,000.00 by the mayor for no stated purpose; that he did not want toreceive it; and that it was given to him ascash gift. He did not even know thatthe money was for the peace and order campaign. He stated further, however, thathe spent the money for meals and snacks during the peace and order assembly andfor the SOT but did not state a specific amount. Gaudencio Olarte of BarangayUpper Centro averred, among others, that he used the P10,000.00 for the jacketsand flashlights of three (3) barangay tanods; and for the construction of an outpostand a playhouse for the day-care center. There was also a peace and orderassembly in his Barangay in 1994 where the attendance was taken, and he servedmeals and snacks with no statement as to where he got the funds. Edilberto Castro

of Barangay Centro Hulpa declared that he received the P10,000.00 which hethought came from Congressman Ramiro for the election of the ABC President,Emeterio Valmoria and that he divided the P10,000.00 among his councilmen andthe members of the peace and order council. Edilberto Cobrado of BarangayColambutan Bajo asserted that he did not have his constituents sign for peace andorder assembly. He maintained that he served snacks during the peace and orderassembly but out of his personal money. The P10,000.00 which he believed to be acash gift from Congressman Ramiro was spent for a barangay tanodoutpost, posts

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for everypurokand meals for visitors of the barangay. Delio Cagas of BarangayColambutan Settlement admitted that he received the P10,000.00 and thought thatthe money was for his own use and that it was up for him to spend it or share itwith his councilmen. Perlito Yamaro of Barangay Duanguican alleged that in 1995a Barkadahan which was a sort of peace and order assembly was held, duringwhich the attendees signed their attendance in the record book. He also admittedthat he received the P10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayor through Mrs. Salinasal,and it was up for him to spend it.

Equally damaging to the petitioners is the admission of Juan Gumilos ofBarangay Gala that he received the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal with nomention as to its purpose. Eduardo Rara of Barangay Gumbil was as candid whenhe stated that he received the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal and learned that itwas a cash gift coming from Congressman Ramiro. Nido Madrazo of BarangayMaikay likewise stated that he received the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal with nomention as to its purpose. It was somehow conveyed to him that the money wasfor his own use, and that it was up to him how to spend it. Feliciano Sumader of

Barangay Mitugas also admitted that he received P10,000.00 which he shared withhis councilmen. He also bought a battery charger for a hand-held radio, aerialantennae, battery pack, and also spent some for the Lupong Tagapayapa. He hadno receipts to prove his claim.

Cosme Sarabia of Barangay Nailon alleged that he received the P10,000.00from Mrs. Salinasal which he believed was a cash gift promised to him byCongressman Ramiro. Luther Limbaga of Barangay Silongon declared that hereceived the P10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayors secretary, and that hebelieved it was a cash gift to encourage him to vote for Emeterio Valmoria whowas then running as ABC president. He added that he gave P150.00 each to seven(7) CVOs from December 1994 to July 1995, meals and snacks for the assembly

and the SOT. Sabino Dagondon of Barangay Taguima averred that he receivedthe P10,000.00 in cash from Mrs. Salinasal and it was said to be for his own use.Vicente Lagas of Barangay Tigdok even admitted that he did not hold a peace andorder assembly in 1994, only the monthly regular meeting, and that no meals andsnacks were served. He also stated that he used the P10,000.00 for wire andantennae in the amount of P500.00 (no receipt); gave P200.00 each for councilmenincluding his secretary and treasurer; P3,800.00 for food items when barangayofficials conducted patrols around the barangay; and spent P100.00 during theseminar of hand held radio users. Cipriano Sumondong of Barangay Yahong allegedthat he received the P10,000.00 as cash gift from Congressman Ramiro and that hepresumed the money as the promised cash gift. Caridad Lagunay of BarangayBongabong alleged that she received the P10,000.00 as cash gift and was toldthat it was up to her how to spend it. She alleged that there was no peace andorder assembly but only the monthly barangay assembly where the names of thosepresent were checked against the logbook. When asked what she did withthe P10,000.00, she answered: I bought some things for the barangay office likecurtains, plates, chairs and dividers and others. Bebiana Saligan of BarangayBarra declared that she received the P10,000.00 as cash gift from CongressmanRamiro for voting for Emeterio Valmoria as ABC president but after three weeks,she was required to submit an attendance sheet. This confused her, and it was only

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then that she decided to return theP10,000.00 to the municipality. Rodolfo Ontulanof Barangay Basirang averred that he received the P10,000.00 from LoretaSalinasal at the mayors office for the incoming election of the ABC president. He,however, stated further that he used the P10,000.00 to buy a hand-held radioantennae in the amount of P500.00 and that he gave P100.00 to each member ofthe barangay council.[34]

In fine, no less than the barangay captains belied petitioner Sarigumbas claimsin his liquidation vouchers that the cash advances the latter received from the CDFof Congressman Ramiro were used for meals and snacks during the peace andorder meetings.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ZALDIVIA V. REYESZALDIVIA V REYES, JR.

211 SCRA 277CRUZ; July 3, 1992

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari

FACTS- The petitioner Lus Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes

without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of theMunicipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal, allegedly committed on May 11,1990. The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Rizal on May 30, 1990 and the information was filedwith the MTC of Rodriguez, presided by Judge Andres Reyes, Jr., on October 2,1990.- The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime hadprescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal, the RTC of Rizal affirmed thedenial of the motion.Petitioners claims In this petition, the petitioner argues that the charge againsther is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure

(RSP):Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the procedure in the MetTC, theMTC, and the MCTC in the following cases:B. Criminal Cases:

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; .- Petitioner also invokes Act No. 3326, "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescriptionfor Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to ProvideWhen Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:

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Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided insuch acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations

penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of theviolation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discoverythereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and

punishment.The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against theguilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed forreasons not constituting jeopardy.

- Petitioner concludes that as the information was filed way beyond the two-monthstatutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the chargeagainst her should have been dismissed on the ground prescription.Prosecutions position The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period wassuspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the OPP. The SolGeninvokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (RCP),providing as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summaryprocedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:b) Foroffenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC, by filing thecomplaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office.However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may befiled only with the office of the fiscal.In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offensecharged.

- Respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the OPP comes underthe phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases,without distinction, including those falling under the RSP.

ISSUEWON the offense has prescribed

HELDYES- The filing of the complaint in the MTC, even if it be merely for purposes ofpreliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period ofprescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint orinformation is filed can not try the case on its merits. Even if the court where thecomplaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, itsactuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender.- It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, twomonths before the promulgation of the RSP on August 1, 1983. On the other hand,Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision ofthe RCP on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added onOctober 1, 1988.

- Sec. 1 of the RCP begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule onsummary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does

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not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in allcases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by theSection, that is, those offenses not governed by the RSP.- The charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinanceof Rodriguez, is governed by the RSP and not the RCP.- Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the

jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC," the obvious reference is to Section 32 (2) ofB.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment ofnot exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand

pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessoryor other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or

predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof;Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminalnegligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable finedoes not exceed twenty thousand pesos.- These offenses are not covered by the RSP. Under Section 9 of the RSP, "the

complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a priorpreliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that thisprovision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminaryinvestigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced onlywhen it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct apreliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive periodshall be halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not on any datebefore that.- This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 whichsays that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings areinstituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof

are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the SolGen that theyinclude administrative proceedings.- At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the RSP and theRCP, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict betweenAct No. 3326 and the RCP, the latter must again yield because this Court, in theexercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modifysubstantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescriptionin criminal cases is a substantive right.- The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced fromits alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted bythe filing of the complaint with the OPP on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicialproceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was thefiling of the information with the MTC of Rodriguez, but this was done only onOctober 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. Case is DISMISSED on the ground ofprescription.

ESCOBAL V. GARCHITORENA

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ARNEL ESCOBAL,petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, PresidingJustice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, ExecutiveClerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, PresidingJudge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca,respondents.

Facts: P is a graduate of PMA, a member of the AFP and the PhilippineConstabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. OnMarch 16, 1990, the P was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking atthe Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. Hesomehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one RodneyNueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the RTC ofNaga City, Branch 21 charging Pand a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias JunBombita with murder.

RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the P from the service underPresidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. The GeneralHeadquarters of the PNP issued Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending the

P from the service until the case was terminated. P was arrested by virtue of awarrant of arrest. When arraigned on April 9, 1991, the P pleaded not guilty to theoffense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, he filed a Motion to Quashthe Information alleging that as mandated by C.A. No. 408, in relation to Section 1,PD No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had

jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.Pending the resolution of the motion, P on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief

of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, hissuspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he shouldnow be reinstated. On September 23, 1993, the PNP Region V Headquarters wroteJudge David C. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order lifting

the Ps suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994, the P fileda motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged that hehad served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate

justice. The RTC denied the motion. Trial thereafter proceeded, and theprosecution rested its case. The P commenced the presentation of his evidence.On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of thePhilippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he committed the crime in theperformance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over thecase.

RTC issued an Order declaring that the P committed the crime charged whilenot in the performance of his official function. It added that upon the enactment ofR.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory lawtransferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to theRTC since the P did not have a salary grade of 27. The trial court neverthelessordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling inRepublic v. Asuncionand R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusiontherein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the P in theperformance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office. P filed a motion forthe reconsideration of the said order. He asserted that the trial court failed to

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consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, whichwas enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.

RTC issued an Order reversing and setting aside its Order. It declared thatbased on the Ps evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred.It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto.The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and toallege that the offense charged was committed by the P in the performance of hisduties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, tothereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographicnotes, to the Sandiganbayan.

On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered theExecutive Clerk of Court IVto return the records of Criminal Case to the court oforigin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, asamended by R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, consideringthat the P had a salary grade of 23. Furthermore, the prosecution had alreadyrested its case and the P had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC;following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with

the case and render judgment therein after trial.

Issue(s):whether the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a graveabuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering theremand of the case to the RTC.

Ruling: The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and therulings of this Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the courtof origin.

The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by theallegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time

of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactiveapplication thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in theInformation. Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the casecontinues until the case is terminated.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, theSandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known asthe Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and ChapterII, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employeesin relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned orcontrolled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes,where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional orimprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said

law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essentialthat the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of theoffender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in theInformation. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that thecrime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office

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because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed withthe RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimaterelation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had

jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered there-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitionercommitted the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered theelevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No.7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positionscorresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the saidRepublic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendentor higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested inthe proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal TrialCourt, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant totheir respective jurisdiction as provided in