Petitioner: Elvira Yu OhRespondent(s): Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

FACTS:

Petitioner purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc. Due to her failure to pay the purchase price, the company filed civil cases against her for specific performance before the RTC of Pasig. On September 17, 1990, petitioner and Solid Gold through it general manager, Joaquin Novales III entered into a compromise agreement to settle said civil cases. It was approved by the trial court provided that petitioner shall issue a total of ninety-nine post-dated checks in the amount of PHP 50,000.00 each, dated every 15 th and 30th of the month starting October 1, 1990 and the balance of over PHP 1million to be paid in lump sum on November 16, 1994 (the due date of the 99 th post dated check). Petitioner then issued ten checks at Php 50,000.00 each for a total of Php 500,000.00 drawn against her account at the Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC). Novales then deposited each of the ten checks on their respective due dates to the company bank account. However, said checks were dishonored by the EBC for the reason “Account Closed”. Dishonor slips were issued for each check that was returned to Novales. On October 5, 1992, Novales filed 10 separate informations before the RTC of Quezon City charging the petitioner with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

Nonetheless, RTC convicted her of ten counts of violation of BP 22. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:(1)   Whether or not appellate court was mistaken in not granting retroactive effect to RA 7691 in

view of Art 22 of the RPC.(2)   Whether or not “notice of dishonor” is indispensable in this case.

HELD:(1)   No. RA 7691 is not a penal law and therefore, Art 22 of the RPC does not apply in the present

case. A penal law is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties for its violations. It also defines crime, treats of their nature and provides for its punishment. RA 7691 is a law that vests additional jurisdiction on courts, thus, it is substantive. The court further held that it cannot be given retroactive effect.

(2)   Yes. It is necessary that a “notice of dishonor” be received by the issuer and the prosecution has the burden of proving the fact of service. It thus stated in section 2 of BP 22. It is essential for the drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her checks so she could make arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law (5 days).

Hence, SC reversed the decision of the CA and acquits the petioner.

People of the Philippines vs Cayat

“Equal Protection” – Requisites of a Valid Classification – Bar from Drinking Gin

FACTS:

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any

other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was

caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay

P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the

constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal

protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination

or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant

challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification.

The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics

that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be

arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not

merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.”

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less capable

race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy

towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those

privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before

the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by

appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of

their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the

basis of true equality.

 City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio

Police Power

FACTS:On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE

PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING

CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN

THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND

FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars,

motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red

light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the

ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering

amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use

women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only

regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a

valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized

that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an

ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government

unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it  must also

conform to the following substantive requirements:(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the

constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be

reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an

invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

 

CASE DIGEST ON In Re: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI [35 SCRA 429 (1970)]

Facts: Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a recognized non-stock, non-profit corporation contests validity of RA # 6132 Sec. 8 saying it violates due process rights of association, freedom of expression and is an ex post facto law

Issues:1.         WON it violates three rights?No. It’s set up to prevent prostitution of electoral process and equal protection of laws.

2.         WON it is an ex post facto law?No. Ex post facto law defined:a.         makes criminal an act done before law was passed and punishes act innocent when done.b.         aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it wasc.         inflicts greater punishment than the law prescribed when committedd.         alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different testse.         assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of right which when done was lawfulf.          deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.

Held: Petition denied. Constitutional act.Constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws. Penalty in law imposed to acts committed after approval of law

TITLE OF THE CASE: SALVADOR V. MAPADATE OF PROMULGATION: November 28, 2007SUBJECT AREA: Civil Procedure; Criminal LawKEY DOCTRINES/CONCEPTS: Special Civil

Action for Certiorari (Rule 65) vs. Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45); Prescription; Ex Post Facto Laws

FACTS:On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issuedAdministrative  Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad HocFact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.  Behest loans areloans granted by government banks or GOCC at the behest,command, or urging by previous government officials to thedisadvantage of the Philippine government. The Committeewas tasked to inventory all behest loans and determine thecourses of action that the government should take to recover  these loans.By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, thefunctions of the Committee were expanded to include all non-performing loans which shall embrace behest and non-behestloans. Said Memorandum also named criteria to be utilized asa frame of reference in determining a behest loan S e v e r a l   l o a n   a c c o u n t s   w e r e   r e f e r r e d   t o   t h e   C o m m i t t e e   f o r   investigation, including the loan transactions between MetalsExploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc.(PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were knownc r o n i e s   o f   t h e n   P r e s i d e n t   F e r d i n a n d   M a r c o s ;   t h e   l o a n   w a s under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at thetime the loan was granted.Consequently,  Atty. Orlando L. Salvador,  Consultant of theFact-Finding Committee, and representing the PCGG, fi ledw i t h   t h e   O m b u d s m a n   a   s w o rn   c o m p l a i n t   f o r   v i o l a t i o n   o f   Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-G r a f t   a n d   C o r r u p t   P r a c t i c e s   A c t ,against the respondentsMapa, Jr. et. al.The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of  prescription.  It stressed that Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 asoriginally enacted, provides that  the prescriptive period for v i o l a t i o n s   o f   t h e   s a i d   A c t   ( R . A .   3 0 1 9 )   i s   t e n   ( 1 0 )   y e a r s . Moreover, the computation of the prescriptive period of a crimeviolating a special law l ike R.A. 3019 is governed by Act No.3326 which provides that prescription shall begin to run fromthe day of the commission of the violation of law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof andthe institution of the judicial proceedings for its investigationand punishment. Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in thecase of People vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12thSupp., 50, ruledthat when there is nothing which was concealed or needed tobe discovered because the entire series of transactions were by public instruments, the period of prescription commenced torun from the date the said instrument were executed.I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e l o a n s w e r e e n t e r e d i n t o b y v i r t u e o f   public documents (e.g., notarized contracts, board resolutions,approved letter-request) during the period of 1978 to 1981.Records show that the complaint was referred and f i led with the Ombudsman on October 4, 1996 or after the lapse of morethan fifteen years from the violation of the law. Therefore, theoffenses charged had already prescribed.Also pointed out was that the Presidential Ad Hoc Committeeo n   B e h e s t L o a n s w a s   c r e a t e d   o n   O c t o b e r   8 ,   1 9 9 2   u n d e r   Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, MemorandumOrder No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued definingthe criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determiningb e h e s t   l o a n s .   A c c o r d i n g l y ,   i f t h e s e   O r d e r s a r e   t o b e c o n s i d e r e d   t h e   b a s e s   o f   c h a r g i n g   r e s p o n d e n t s   f o r   a l l e g e d offenses

committed, they become ex-post facto laws which areproscribed by the Constitution.The Committee fi led a Motion for Reconsideration,  but theOmbudsman denied it on July 27, 1998.ISSUE 1: WON THE PRESENT PETITION FOR REVIEW ONCERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR BEING THEWRONG REMEDY IN ELEVATING THE CASE TO THE SC.DECISION: No.RATIO:A petit ion for review oncertiorari u n d e r R u l e 4 5 i s n o t t h e p r o p e r   m o d e   b y   w h i c h   r e s o l u t i o n s   o f   t h e O m b u d s m a n   i n preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reviewed by theS C .   T h e   r e m e d y   f r o m   t h e   a d v e r s e   r e s o l u t i o n   o f   t h e Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.H o w e v e r ,   t h o u g h   c a p t i o n e d   a s   aP e t i t i o n   f o r   R e v i e w   o n Certiorari , the SC treated the petition as one f i led under Rule65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petioner imputesgrave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissingt h e c o m p l a i n t .   T h e a v e r m e n t s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t , n o t t h e nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of theaction.ISSUE 2: WON THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. (e)A N D   ( g )   O F   R . A .   3 0 1 9   H A S   A L R E A D Y PRESCRIBEDDECISION: No RATIO:It is well-nigh impossible for the State to have knownt h e   v i o l a t i o n s   o f   R . A .   N o .   3 0 1 9   a t   t h e   t i m e   t h e q u e s t i o n e d   t ra n s a c t i o n s   w e r e   m a d e   b e c a u s e   t h e public officials concerned connived or conspired withthe beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, the prescriptiveperiod should be computed from the discovery of thec o m m i s s i o n   t h e r e o f   a n d n o t   f r o m   t h e d a y   o f   s u c h commission.ISSUE 3: WON ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13A N D   M E M O R A N D U M   O R D E R   N O . 6 1   A R E EX- POST  FACTO  LAWS

DECISION: No.RATIO:T h e   S C   d i d   n o t   s u s t a i n   t h e   O m b u d s m a n ’ s   d e c l a r a t i o n   t h a t Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61violate the prohibition againstex post factolaws for ostensiblyinfl icting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which was innocent when done.The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullificationof a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of theC o n s t i t u t i o n ,   n o t   a   d o u b t f u l   o r   a r g u a b l e   i m p l i c a t i o n . Furthermore, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertainquestions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman,t h e r e f o r e ,   a c t e d   i n   e x c e s s   o f   i t s   j u r i s d i c t i o n   i n   d e c l a r i n g unconstitutional the subject administrative and memorandumorders.In any event, the SC held that Administrative Order No. 13 andMemorandum Order No. 61 are notex post factolaws.Anex post factolaw has been defined as one — (a) whichmakes an action done before the passing of the law and whichwas innocent when done criminal,  and punishes such action;or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it waswhen committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the

crimewhen it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of  evidence and receives less or different testimony than the lawrequired at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. This Court added two (2) more to thelist, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights andremedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprivesa person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to whichhe has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.The constitutional doctrine that outlaws anex post factolawgenerally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal lawsare those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts andestablish penalties for their violations; or those that definecrimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly donot come within the shadow of this definit ion. AdministrativeOrder No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-FindingCommittee on Behest Loans, and provides for its compositiona n d f u n c t i o n s .   I t d o e s n o t m e t e o u t p e n a l t y f o r t h e a c t o f   granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merelyprovides a frame of reference for determining behestloans.N o t   b e i n g   p e n a l   l a w s ,   A d m i n i s t r a t i v e   O r d e r   N o .   1 3   a n d Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized asex  post facto laws.

Case Digest: U.S. vs. Ah ChongG.R. No. L-7929 March 19, 1910

Facts: Because of the many bad elements happening at Fort McKinley, Ah Chong, a cook, locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door of his room. He called out twice, Who is there, but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at the precise moment, he was struck by the chair and believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.

Issue: Whether or not Ah Chong was guilty of murder.

Ruling:Under Article 11 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that to justify the act, there should be:

First.Unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed;

Second.Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third.Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Ah Chong was not held liable for the death of his roommate. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts conviction of homicide, saying that Ah Chong committed a mistake of fact. He would not have stabbed his roommate had he known the identity of the person who entered the room. If the person who opened the door had really been a robber instead of his roommate, he would not be criminally liable if he had stabbed that person in self-defense. 

People vs. Oanis

July 27, 1943 (74 Phil 257)

 

PARTIES:

Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines

Defendants and appellant: Antonio Oanis, Alberto Galanta

FACTS:

Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped

convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the

suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping

with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired at him

which resulted to the victim’s death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson,

an innocent man.

ISSUE:

1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest

performance of their official duties.

2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty.

HELD:

1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti excusat”

applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the

supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real

Balagtas.

2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts

in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to

justify this: (1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right

or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due

performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first

requisite is present.

CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v. BINDOY [56 Phil. 15 (1931)]

Facts: On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas’ wife. She refused and Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife and attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The disturbance attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter’s hand, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam’s chest, who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that the death of Omamdam was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.Issue: WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the ground of accident.Held: Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised Penal CodeRatio:1.         There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam.?          No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas.?          No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam’s presence.?          No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam. On the contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good terms with each other.2.         The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Bindoy’s seeing him, because Omamdam had passed behind him. The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.3.         If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would be liable for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done is different from that which he intended.This is not the case here. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. He was only trying to defend his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. His conduct was perfectly lawful.

Case Digest: Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 171951                28 August 2009

FACTS:

The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down to which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him.  Two days later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister, Esquibel.   Chy was about to come out of his house and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him.  Chy continued to parry the blows and when he found an opportunity to escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the mauling.  He also complained of difficulty in breathing.  He was found later unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. 

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy.  Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide.  The autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the victim’s heart is healthy.  What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning the violence inflicted upon him. 

ISSUE:  Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should be appreciated

RULING:

The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability.  Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code.  Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner.  The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically caused the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart is in good condition.  

Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period.  Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Complex crimePEOPLE vs TOLING

FACTS: Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila. Jose's three children had stayed in Manila also since 1964. Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants. It was then noontime After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach had one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman

G.R. No. 162540

July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO,

Petitionervs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent PERALTA, J 

A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Facts:

Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.Later, Rowena Rica blanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored. Rica blanca then called and relayed the message through accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Rica blanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Rica blanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino further testified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the dishonored check.Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that shewas going along with Valencia's plan.Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was theP10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time. A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle. RTC rendered its Decision finding them

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced each imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS,as minimum , to SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS,as maximum .The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial court was MODIFIED , in that:(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months

arresto mayor medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. Hence,the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone,

Issue:

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

Held:

As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,

the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to  gain from the thing stolen . This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court must resolve the issue in the negative. Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod (see doctrines laid out in Intod) , the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty. Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod.In this case,petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft  ─ the taking of personal property of another.” As of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft,had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case . Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the

drawee bank.Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain. Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED . The Decision of the Court of Appeals, are MODIFIED .Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4,paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six(6) months of arrresto mayor , and to pay the costs.

BALEROS, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case DigestRENATO BALEROS, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 

G.R. NO. 138033 January 30, 2007 

FACTS: At about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila, the accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, tried to rape the victim by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice. 

Renato Baleros, Jr. moved for a partial reconsideration of a SC decision acquitting him of the crime of attempted rape but adjudging him guilty of light coercion. It is Baleros' submission that his conviction for light coercion under an Information for attempted rape, runs counter to the en banc ruling in People v. Contreras where the Court held: The SOLGEN contends that Contreras should be held liable for unjust vexation under Art. 287(2) of the RPC. However, the elements of unjust vexation do not form part of the crime of rape as defined in Art. 335. Moreover, the circumstances stated in the information do not constitute the elements of the said crime. Contreras, therefore, cannot be convicted of unjust vexation. 

ISSUE: Whether Renato Baleros, Jr. is guilty of unjust vexation. 

HELD: Yes. He argues that the Information against him does not allege that the act of covering the face of the victim with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation, torment, distress and disturbance. The SC wish to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in an Information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that the term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. 

The paramount question in a prosecution for unjust vexation is whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That the victim, after the incident cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed, by the acts of the Baleros.

ARTICLE IV: IMPOSSIBLE CRIMESPEOPLE VS. DOMASIAN  FACTS:Ponente: Justice Cruz, 1993Petitioner: Pablito Domasian-the kidnapper 

Dr. Samson Tan – he was a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico’s father. Respondent: People of the Philippines, Solicitor-General Victim: Enrico Paulo AgraWitnesses: Enrico Agra Tirso Ferreras –Enrico’s Classmate Alexander Grate –Tricycle Driver where Agra and Domasian rode, he speculated that the latterwas a kidnapper and reported the incident to the tanods.

Events: Enrico was walking with a classmate when a man, Domasian, approached him and asked for his assistance in getting his father’s signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed and rode with him in a tricycle. Enrico became apprehensive when instead of going to the hospital; he was forced by petitioner inside a mini-bus, holding him firmly all the while.They rode another tricycle and alighted from where they walked in a market. Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and handed a letter address to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy’s father. They then boarded the tricycle of Grate,which aroused his the latter’s suspicion and reported the incident to the barangay tanods, together with Grate, they went after Domasian and Enrico.They were able to recover Enrico, Domasian escaped. Afternoon of that day, a ransom note arrived to Dr. Agra, asking for 1 million pesos in exchange of his son, Enrico, who was able to return home earlier that day, after having been recovered from Domasian. Dr. Agra identified the handwriting in the letter as Dr. Tan’s, and this was confirmed by an investigation made by the NBI.

Filling of the Case: Regional Trial Court convicted Domasian and Tan of Kidnapping

ISSUES: Convictions of Reclusion Perpetua are subject to review by the Supreme Court.?Domasian petitions that he was forced to confess the crime in violation of his constitutional rights? Tan petitions that his act of crime, if indeed proven, only constituted an impossible crime? WON the act committed by Dr. Tan constitutes an Impossible Crime?

RULING: The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed. Article 4 Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code States: Criminal Liability shall be incurred By a person committing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment, or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. On the matter of Conspiracy : the acts done by Domasian and Tan were complementary to each other. Kidnapping of Enrico by Domasian, and Ransom note of Tan, with one end goal in mind,which is, the ransom of 1 million pesos from Dr. Agra. Court held that even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense,which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.

Edgar Esqueda vs People of the Philippines G.R. No. 170222

Facts:A petition for review on certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court regarding the affirmation of the Court of Appeals to the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Dumaguete City on Criminal Case Nos. 14612 and 14609 of herein respondents common-law spouses Gaudencio Quiquinto and Venancia Aliser respectively against

petitioner Edgar Esqueda and one John Doe of 2counts of Frustrated Homicide.The private respondents were awaked on of before 11 o’ clock in the evening on March 3, 1999 by the accused petitioner who concealed their identities as members of roving patrol in their place and asking for a drink from the household. One of the respondents, Gaudencio Quiquinto opened the door and went outside while his lived-in partner Venancia Aliser followed him and stayed by the door. They found two men outside, one is positively identified as the accused petitioner while the other is not identified. The accused petitioner allegedly stabbed Gaudencio immediately. Aliser tried to ran away but was allegedly stabbed and fell on the ground and was continually inflicted mortal wounds against the victims.The defense anchored on alibi and denial. Presented three witnesses, Claudio, Viviana and Domingo testified before the court that the accused was out sea fishing during the time of the crime.Issue:Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the latter guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and totally disregarding the latter’s defense. Held:The Honorable Court did not disregard the defense of the accused petitioner in rendering its decision. The presented alibis and denial by the defense are essentially weak against the positive identifications made by the respondents. For an alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he is somewhere else and it is physically impossible for him to be in the scene for the crime. Physically impossible refers to the distance betweenthe place where the crime has transpired and the place where it was committed, also the facility of access between the two places. Using the testimonies of the witnesses as evidence, the accused petitioner failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to went to the scene of the crime atthe time of the incident. In this case, the defense of alibi failed. The positive identification destroys the defense of alibi giving to such effect to be weak, given as the identification was made with resound and credible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONESG.R. No. 152589 & 152758. January 31, 2005

Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant of our Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said decision, we modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding accused-appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We, however, upheld the ruling of the court a quo with regard to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. 

Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code states: “(a)ny person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.” As explained by an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the two. In rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman whereas this element is absent in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling events which took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of private complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter intended to ravish his very own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant before the trial court, accused-appellant, taking advantage of the cover of darkness and of the absence of his wife, removed her (private complainant’s) clothing and thereafter placed himself on top of her. Accused-appellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant, then proceeded to kiss the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until finally, he rendered private complainant unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These dastardly acts of accused-appellant constitute “the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” Far from being mere obscenity or lewdness, they are indisputably overt acts

executed in order to consummate the crime of rape against the person of private complainant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSAG.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death.The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense is applicable in this case.Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable—not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

 PEOPLE  v. CASTANITO GANOG.R. No. 134373   February 28, 2001FACTS:Accused was convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced to the penalty of death. The core issue now before us is whether the three (3) killings should be appreciated as separate aggravating circumstances to warrant the imposition of the penalty of death.

ISSUE: WON the 3 killings should be appreciated as separate aggravating circumstances to warrant the imposition of death penalty?

HELD:The SC found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide, but imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same Code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an “anomalous situation” where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.