crime and insurgency
TRANSCRIPT
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Crime andInsurgencyin the Tribal Areas ofAfghanistan and Pakistan
HARMONY PROJECT
AuthorGretchen Peters
EditorDon Rassler
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Finally, I want to thank my husband and daughters, who have endured without
complaint the longhours Ihaveput into thisproject.Theyare the reason Iwant the
worldtobeasaferplace.TambienagradezcoaSocorroEspinosaJimnez.Respetomuchosu
manera
de
vivir
la
vida
con
amor
y
cario
para
todos.
GretchenPeters
Denver,CO
October2010
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LISTOFACRONYMS
FATA FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(Pakistan)
HIG HizbeIslamiGulbuddin
HQN HaqqaniNetwork
HuJI HarakatulJihadalIslami
IED ImprovisedExplosiveDevice
IJU IslamicJihadUnion
IMU IslamicMovementofUzbekistan
ISI InterServicesIntelligenceDirectorate(Pakistan)
JDQ JamaatudDawaalQuraniWalsunna
KPP KhyberPakhtunkhwaProvince(Pakistan,formerlytheNWFP)
LT LashkareTaiba
LI LashkareIslami
NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization
NDS NationalDirectorateofSecurity(Afghanistan)
PKR PakistaniRupees
QST QuettaShuraTaliban
QZG QariZiaGroup
SIM ShuraIttihadulMujahideen
TTP TehrikeTalibanPakistan
TTS TehrikeTalibanSwat
TNSM
Tehrik
e
Nifaz
e
Shariat
e
Muhammadi
UAE UnitedArabEmirates
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
EXECUTIVESUMMARY............................................ .............................................. ............................. iINTRODUCTION............................................ ............................................. ........................................... 1SECTIONI: AFGHANISTAN................................................. ........................................... ............ 11SOUTHERNAFGHANISTAN................................................ ............................................ ................... 15
Kandahar,Helmand,Zabul,UruzganandOtherAreas ............................................ .... 15SOUTHEASTERNAFGHANISTAN .............................................. ........................................... ............ 34
Paktika,Paktia,Khost,GhazniandLogar ........................................... ................................ 34NORTHEASTERN
AFGHANISTAN............................................. ........................................... ............ 39
KunarandNuristan ............................................. .............................................. ......................... 39NORTHERNAFGHANISTAN............................................... ............................................ ................... 43
KunduzandOtherProvinces............................................ ........................................... ............ 43SECTIONII: PAKISTAN ........................................... ............................................ ........................... 51KHYBERPAKTUNKHWAPROVINCE................................................ ........................................... .... 58
Swat,Dir,MalakandandBunerAgencies .................................................. ........................ 58FEDERALLYADMINISTEREDTRIBALAREAS ............................................... ................................ 69
KhyberAgency ................................................ ............................................. ................................. 70 BajaurAgency ................................................. ............................................. ................................. 73 NorthWaziristan........................................... .............................................. ................................. 79 SouthWaziristan........................................... .............................................. ................................. 82 OtherMilitantEntities ............................................... ............................................ ................... 88
CONCLUSION.................................................. ............................................. ......................................... 90APPENDIXA: SAMPLEHARMONYDOCUMENTS.............................................. ........ 94APPENDIXB: EXAMPLEOFTALIBANTAXRECEIPT ............................................ .... 98
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i
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
Insurgentand terrorgroupsoperating in the tribalareasofAfghanistanandPakistan
aredeepening their involvement inorganized crime, an aspectof the conflict that atoncepresentsenormouschallengesandalsopotentialopportunitiesforCoalitionforces
tryingtoimplementapopulationcentriccounterinsurgency(COIN)strategy.Withina
realmofpoorgovernanceandwidespreadstatecorruption,antistateactorsengage in
andprotect organized crimemainly smuggling, extortion andkidnappingboth to
raise funds and also to spread fear and insecurity, thus slowing the pace of
development and frustrating attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a
sustainable liciteconomy.Militantgroupsoneithersideof thefrontierfunction likea
broad
network
of
criminal
gangs,
not
just
in
terms
of
the
activities
in
which
they
engage,butalsointhewaytheyareorganized,howfundsflowthroughtheircommand
chainsandhowtheyinteractandsometimesfightwitheachother.Thereisnodoubt
thatmilitant groups have capitalized on certain public grievances, yet their ties to
criminalprofiteering,alongwith thegrowingnumberofciviliancasualtiestheycause
onbothsidesof the frontier,havesimultaneouslycontributed toawideningsenseof
angerandfrustrationamonglocalcommunities.Throughaseriesoffocusedandshort
anecdotalcasestudies,thispaperaimstomapouthowkeygroupsengageincriminal
activity in strategic areas, track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or
changingand illustratehow insurgentand terrorgroups impose themselveson local
communitiesas theyspread tonew territory. It ishoped thatacloserexaminationof
this phenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting the problem, as well as
illustrate how Coalition forces, the international community and moderateMuslim
leaders might capitalize on an untapped public relations opportunity by better
protectinglocalcommunitieswhoarethemainvictimsofit.
MainFindings
Organizedcrimefundsthemilitantsaswellasprofitingcorruptstateactorsandregional power brokersamplifying and sustaining the conflict by spreading
insecurityandgraft,slowingdevelopmentand reinforcingperceptions that local
governmentsareweakandineffectual.
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ii
The insurgencys involvement in organized crime presents an untappedopportunitywithin thewiderCOIN campaign.While there have been laudable
efforts by the Coalition to reduce civilian casualties and to disrupt militant
violence,military forces stand to further improvecommunity relationsbybetter
protectinglocalsfromwidespreadcrime.
Coupledwith increased levelsofviolence,militant ties to crimehavepromptedgrowingnumbersof localcivilians toquestion the stated religious,politicaland
ideological motives of the insurgents. To the extent that Coalition and local
security forces and officials are seen as improving governance, they could
capitalizeonwideningdisillusionmentwithastrategiccommunicationscampaign
thathighlightsthepredatorybehaviorofthemilitants.
Aswithcriminalgangsandmobfamiliesinotherpartsoftheglobe,rivalriesovercriminalprofits create structuralweaknesseswithin and between insurgent andterror groups in theAfghanistan/Pakistan frontier. These structuralweaknesses
could be exploited in order to disrupt funds reaching militant coffers and to
degradelevelsofmilitantcooperation.
Afghanistan
TheAfghanTaliban,orQuettaShuraTaliban(QST),hasreshuffled itscommandstructure and issued a newCode ofConduct to exert control over unruly sub
commanders,streamline
the
flow
of
drug
and
other
criminal
funds
and
attempt
to
improve relationswithAfghancivilians.These initiativeshavenotbeenentirely
successful,althoughtheQSTdoesreceivewidespreadpraiseforitsshadowjustice
system,andforitspracticeofpunishingitsowncommanders.
TheQST increasingly behaves like a traditional drug cartel.Apparentlyseekinghigherprofitmargins, theQSTnowfocuses lesson taxingpoppy
farmers,havingturneditsattentiontothemoreprofitableprocessingand
exportingendofthebusiness.
Taliban leaders now demand that money earned from extortion andnarcotics flows direct into central coffers instead of being controlled bydistrictlevelcommanders.
TheHaqqaniNetwork (HQN) appears to collaborate closelywith the PakistaniTalibanandalQaida,both in termsof launching terrorattacksand, specifically
with the Pakistani Taliban, engaging in illicit activity, particularly kidnapping.
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iii
Abductionmay be theHQNs largest revenueearner. The group also protects
smugglersandextortsbusinessesinitscontrolzones.
HezbeIslamiGulbuddin (HIG)protects the smuggling of lootable resources in
theeast,competingforbusinessagainstlocalgroupstiedtoalQaida.
All three insurgent factions launchedoperations inAfghanistansnorth in 2009.Themannerinwhichinsurgentssetaboutraisingfundsandfoughtoverrevenue
streamsillustratesthefinancialmotivesbehindtheirtactics.
Pakistan
Aweb of interlocking strategic and economic bargainsprompt factions of theTehrikeTaliban Pakistan (TTP) to collaborate for the purposes of launching
attacks and engaging in organized crime. However, internal squabbles haveprevented the TTP from presenting a unified front. Many intergroup
disagreementswerereportedlyaboutmoney.
While some factions appear to command powerful criminal empires,othersseemtobestrugglingforcash.
There appears to be sporadic cooperation on organized crime betweenmembersoftheTTPallianceandothergroups,andindicationsthatsome
criminal proceeds are sent up the command chain to the TTP emir.
Moneyand
technical
expertise
also
flow
between
groups.
The Afghan Taliban has tried to manage and shape the TTPs trajectory bysupporting alliances, such as the Shura IttihadulMujahidin, yet there are a
number of indications that the TTPthrough its violent acts and criminal
activityistarnishingandthreateningtheAfghanTalibanbrandname.
EvidencethatPakistaniTalibanandAfghanactors,suchastheHaqqaniNetwork,arecooperatingoncriminalandmilitaryactivitiescontradictsPakistanieffortsto
makeadistinctionbetweengoodandbadTaliban.
AlQaidaappears tohave coopted somePakistani extremistgroupspreviouslyunderthewingofPakistansspyagency,theInterServicesIntelligence(ISI).While
there is little evidence directly linking alQaida to criminal activities there are
widespread indications thegroup isgaining influenceover localmilitantoutfits,
includingtheTTP,whichoftenrelyuponcriminalenterprisesforfunding.
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1
INTRODUCTION
Amideffortstodevelopapopulationcentricstrategy intheAfghanistanandPakistan
war theaters,NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (NATO)commanders, localofficialsandmembersoftheinternationalcommunityworkingtostabilizetheregionroutinely
overlook the extent to which local civilians are victimized and frustrated by illicit
activitiescarriedoutbyinsurgents,extremistgroupsandthelocalgangsterswithwhich
some radical Islamistsassociate.The tribalareasofAfghanistanandPakistanarenot
thefirstconflictzonewhereorganizedcrimehasbecomeamajordestabilizing factor.
Wartime networks in Bosnia, for example,morphed into political criminal networks
thatwere tied to tax evasion, smuggling,andhuman trafficking,according toa2000
U.S.
government
study.1
Ties
between
the
Kosovo
Liberation
Army
and
Balkan
smuggling networks also slowed efforts to stabilizeKosovo.2 In amore recent case,
organizedcrimeinpostBaathistIraqbecametheunrecognizedjokerinthepack,as
PhilWilliamsputit,fundingalQaidaandJaishalMahdi,aswellasanumberofSunni
tribesthatinitiallyfoughtU.S.forces.3Whetheritisdrugtrafficking,kidnapforransom,
robbery, extortion, smuggling or protection rackets, organized crime not only helps
fund antistate actors across the region, it is also a key element of their asymmetric
warfarecampaign,spreading instabilityandfear.While the insurgencys ties tocrime
createmanychallenges,theysimultaneouslypresentopportunitiesfortheInternational
Coalitionand theAfghanandPakistanigovernments.4Abetterunderstandingof the
criminalinsurgentrelationshipisthereforecriticalinordertodefineandtargetenemy
networks,andtodisruptwhateverpoliticalcapitalinsurgentsgainfromthisactivity.5
1U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,CommitteeinInternationalRelations,Bosnia:CrimeandCorruption
ThreatenSuccessfulImplementationoftheDaytonPeaceAgreement,TestimonybyHaroldJ.Johnson,19July
2000,pg.3.2Formoredetail,seeUnitedNationsOfficeofDrugsandCrime,CrimeanditsImpactontheBalkans
andAffectedCountries(March2008),http://www.unodc.org/documents/dataand
analysis/Balkan_study.pdf.
3PhilWilliams,Criminals,MilitiasandInsurgents:OrganizedCrimeinIraq,StrategicStudiesInstitute
(June2009),www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub930.pdf.4Scholarshavecharacterizedinsurgentinvolvementinillicitactivityasbeingadoubleedgesword.See
JohnT.PicarelliandLouiseI.Shelley,OrganizedCrimeandTerrorism,inTerrorismFinancingandState
Responses:AComparativePerspective,ed.JeanneK.GiraldoandHaroldA.Trinkhunas(PaloAlto,CA:
StanfordUniversityPress,2007),3955.5QuotefromlettertotheNationalSecurityAdvisor,GeneralJamesJones,fromtheSenateSelect
CommitteeonIntelligence,seeCatherineCollinsandAshrafAli,FinancingtheTaliban:Tracingthe
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2
Perhaps the most significant challenge is that the complex relationship between
insurgentactorsandillicitactivityservestoamplifyandsustaintheinsurgencyinboth
Afghanistanand
Pakistan,
seriously
undermining
the
authority
of
both
governments.
Tounderstand the immense challenge that organized criminal activitypresents, it is
important toacknowledgearelevantandgrowingbodyofacademic literatureon the
roleoforganizedcrime inrecentcasesof insurgencyandcivilconflict.This literature
probes the effectof illicit economiesonmilitary conflictandhow thevarious factors
influencingcriminalitycanalterthetrajectoryofbelligerentgroups,suchastheFuerzas
ArmadasRevolucionarias deColombia, or FARC. There is good reason to give this
scholarship close attention and to examine themotives conflict actorsmay have for
sustaining conflict. A wellknown World Bank study by James Collier and Anke
Hoefflerprovidesreasons toquestion theassumption that insurgentactorsaredriven
solelybypoliticalgrievances,showingthateconomicmotivationsalsoplayakeyrolein
sustainingdisorder.6JamesFearons2004studyfoundthatconflictsinwhichtheactors
dependeduponvaluablecontraband lastedfivetimes longerthanotherconflictson
average.7AsthecurrentphaseofthewarinAfghanistanpushesintoitsninthyear,itis
nowmorepertinentthanevertostudytheeconomicdriversofthisconflict.
CollierandHoefflersanalysissuggeststhatgreedisacausalfactordrivingamajority
ofcontemporarynonstatearmedactors,andthereisreasontoapplythisassessmentto
theAfghanconflict.Historicalassessmentsof theTalibansrisenote thekey role that
Pashtun truckinggroupsandsmugglersplayed infirstbankrolling thegroup,andby
mostaccounts theTalibanweredeeply involved inprotecting theopium tradebefore
foreigntroopsarrivedin2001.Thisreportdocumentsthecontinuationofthosetiesand
explorestheintegratedrelationshipbetweenotherinsurgentandcriminalactorsinthe
tribal areas ofAfghanistan andPakistan.While it is not alwayspossible to separate
whethernonstatearmedactorsaremotivatedbygreedorgrievance, it isoftenclear
DollarsBehindtheInsurgenciesinAfghanistanandPakistan,CounterterrorismStrategyInitiativePolicy
Paper(April2010). 6PaulCollierandAnkeHoeffler,GreedandGrievanceinCivilWar,OxfordEconomicPapers56,no.4
(August2004),563595.7JamesFearon,WhydoSomeCivilWarsLastsoMuchLongerthanOthers?,JournalofPeaceResearch
41,no.3(May2004),275301.ThisfindingisconcerninggiventhattheAfghanwarisalreadyconsidered
thelongestwarinU.S.history.
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3
that thebalanceshiftsover time.Onecan findvarious indications in thisbattlespace
and otherswhere an insurgent group thatwas firstmotivated to action forpolitical
reasons laterfoundbenefits in illicitenterpriseand thereforeanadditionalreason to
continuefighting.
8The
prevalence
of
organized
crime,
and
the
extent
to
which
militant
groupsappeartobedeepeningtheirinvolvementinit,raisesthepossibilitythatcertain
factionsoftheinsurgencyinAfghanistanandPakistanaremotivatedmorebyprofit
or,inotherwords,greedthanthepoliticalgrievancesoverwhichtheyclaimtofight.
Scholarshavenotedhow themotivationof insurgentactorscanaffect thedurationof
conflictandcomplicateeffortstopromotestability.9Militantgroupsonbothsidesofthe
DurandLinehavecapitalizedon legitimatepolitical,ethnicandeconomiccomplaints
heldbymembersofthelocalcommunity,andthereisscantevidencethatthelowrank
membersof insurgentand terrorgroupsoperating in theAfghanistan/Pakistanregion
takeuparms inorder toenrich themselves,orearnmuchonce theydo.At thesame
time, however, there is clear evidence that the continued state of insecurity richly
benefits a smallnumberof elites onboth sidesof thebattlefield,giving both corrupt
stateactorsandmilitantleadersafinancialincentivetosustainthedisorder,regardless
ofwhether theirwiderpoliticalandothergoalshavebeenmet.Buildingastablecivil
societyandcapablegovernmentinstitutionsinsuchcontextswillnodoubtbedifficult.
Attempts to eliminate illicit behavior often serve only to stoke the flames of the
insurgency,especiallywhenthepopulacedependsoncriminalproceedstosurvive,and
efforts tocombat the insurgencymayboostdemand forcriminalactors tosupply the
insurgentsandbribecorruptlocalofficials.Thiscycleisdifficulttobreak.
The presence of lootable resourcestypically narcotics, timber and gemstonesnot
onlytendstogeneratesubstantialeconomicbenefitsforinsurgentgroups,butalsocan
become a critical source of income for civilians in lethally uncertain conflict
8
Similar
arguments
have
been
made
about
other
terrorist
groups,
for
example
Ryan
Clarke
and
Stuart
Lee,ThePIRA,DCompany,andtheCrimeTerrorNexus,TerrorismandPoliticalViolence20,no.3
(Summer2008),376395.9Forexamplesee,Caroline Hartzell,Matthew Hoddie andDonald Rothchild,StabilizingthePeace
AfterCivilWar:AnInvestigationofSomeKeyVariables,InternationalOrganization55,no.1(Winter
2001),183208;DavidE.Cunningham,VetoPlayersandCivilWarDuration,AmericanJournalofPolitical
Science50,no.4(October2006),875892;MatsBerdalandDavidM.Malone,eds.,GreedandGrievance:
EconomicAgendasinCivilWar(Boulder,CO:LynneRienner,2000);andChrisDishman,Terrorism,
Crime,andTransformation,StudiesinConflictandTerrorism24,no.1(2001),4358.
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4
environments.10 All of these lootable resources are abundant in different regions of
AfghanistanandPakistan,andthisreportconfirmstheirroleasanimportantsourceof
fundingforinsurgents,especiallyastheymoveintonewterritory.Somescholarshave
arguedthat
control
over
such
resources,
or
industries,
provides
insurgents
with
opportunitiestogainpoliticalcapital.11Forexample,byprotectingtheilliciteconomy,
belligerents can protect the local populations livelihood from government efforts to
suppress it.12 Such regulation can help an insurgent group to curry favor or gain
legitimacy andadditionalpopular support,particularly from thosewhobenefit from
the industries being protected. According to Vanda FelbabBrown, just how much
politicalcapitalinsurgentsacquireisdependentuponanumberofconditions,suchas
thenatureof the illiciteconomyand thegovernmentsresponse to it.Thisreportalso
finds that thequalitative characterof the insurgents involvement in these industries
canpositivelyornegativelyaffecthowthatactivityisperceivedbythecommunity.
Insurgents in theAfghanistanPakistan region rely heavily on kidnapping, extortion
androbberytosustaintheircoffersandalsotospreadfear.AsJohnPicarelliandLouise
Shellypointout,suchactivitiesareattractivetoinsurgentsandterroristsbecausethey
havelowbarrierstoentryandrequireforcebutlimitedskill.13Engaginginthistypeof
illicit activity serves to reduce their risk by diversifying their income streams and
increasing their financial liquidity.14At the same time,kidnapping,attackson supply
convoys andwidespreadprotection racketshavedramatically increased security and
other costs for the Coalition, local governments and international organizations
working in the region, slowing the pace of development and reconstruction and
spreadingtheperceptionthatlocalgovernmentsareweakandineffective. Thevicious
cycle ofdevelopmentprojects andbusinesses thatpayprotection to insurgents,who
thenusethefundstobuyexplosivesandattackCoalitiontroops,createsamoralhazard
fortheinternationalcommunityandcontributestoaselfsustainingwar.
10KarenBallentineandJakeSherman,eds.,ThePoliticalEconomyofArmedConflict:BeyondGreedand
Grievance(Boulder,CO:LynneRiennerPublishers,2003);BerdalandMalone. 11VandaFelbabBrowndefinespoliticalcapitalasbeingcomprisedoflegitimacyandpopularsupport.
SeeVandaFelbabBrown,ShootingUp:CounterinsurgencyandtheWaronDrugs(BrookingsInstitution
Press,2010). 12Ibid.,17. 13PicarelliandShelley,3955.14Ibid.
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6
thispathofstrifebetweenthetruthandtheeviltoobtainmaterialgoals.They
haveloftyIslamicandnationalistaims.20
Whatever
legitimacy
such
claims
may
provide,
there
are
growing
indications
that
militantinvolvementinorganizedcrime,coupledwithhighlevelsofterroristviolence,
haveunderminedpublicsupport,particularlysincelocalcommunitiesvirtuallyallof
them fellowMuslimsare themainvictims.Whilemilitantsmayprotect some illicit
economiesand,indoingso,gainpoliticalcapitalfromcommunitymemberswhoseek
toprotect their incomesourcemilitant interactionwithcivilians isalsopredatory in
nature,both in termsof the taxesandprotection fees themilitantscharge,and to the
extentthattheinstabilitytheycreatehampersthedevelopmentoflicitalternatives.Put
another way, members of the local community may at times cooperate with the
militantsforeconomicreasons,oroutoffear,butthatcooperationdoesnotnecessarily
indicate themilitants have been embraced as a popular force. Indeed, in a growing
numberofdistrictsonbothsidesof theborder,wheremembersof thepublicopenly
admit they initiallywelcomed the insurgents aspotential emancipators from corrupt
and ineffective governments, themilitants are now perceived bymany community
members as violent gangsters. Recent public surveys confirm these accounts and
indicate that approval ratings for the insurgents are dropping on both sides of the
DurandLine.Thirtypercent ofPakistanis had a favorable opinion of theTaliban in
2009,downfrom67percentin2008,accordingtoaPewsurvey.21Meanwhile,90percent
ofAfghanssurveyedinaJanuary2010ABC/BBCNewspollpreferredthegovernmentof
President Hamid Karzai to the Talibanan increase of eight points over a figure
providedayearearlierwhile69percent,anewhigh,describedtheinsurgentsasthe
nationsgreatestthreat.22Althoughsomeanalystshavequestionedthehighfavorability
ratesthattheKarzaigovernmentearnedintheABC/BBCpoll,lowanddeclininglevels
ofpublicsupportfortheinsurgentscouldbetrackedacrossseveralpollstakenin2009
20Forthefullstatement,seeTalibanDeputyAmirObamasNewStrategy,30October2009,
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaAkhund1109.pdf.21GrowingConcernsaboutExtremism,ContinuingDiscontentwithU.S.,PewResearchCenter,13
August 2009,http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/265.pdf.22ViewsImproveSharplyinAfghanistan,ThoughCriticismsoftheU.S.RemainHigh,ABCNews,11
January2010.ThispollwasconductedwiththeBBCandARDGermanTV.Pollresultscanbeseenat
http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/afghanistanabcnewsnationalsurveypollshow
support/story?id=9511961.
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7
in both countries, reaffirming the general accuracy of the ABC/BBC poll.23 Afghan
civilians justifiably blame the Karzai government for not protecting the populace
againsttheTaliban,andreproachKabulforfailingtoprovidejobsanddevelopment.At
thesame
time,
the
publics
hostility
towards
the
militants
was
palpable
in
dozens
of
interviewsconductedforthispaper.Risinglevelsofpublicantipathymayaccountfor
why theAfghanTalibanappear tobe trying to reduce theexploitationofcivilians in
their control zones, and could explain late 2009 denials by the Pakistani Taliban of
involvementinsuicideattacksthatclaimedhighnumbersofciviliancasualties.24
U.S. forcesand theNATOCoalitionwhichalsoremainunpopularandaresimilarly
blamed for widespread insecuritycould potentially improve levels of community
supportandcapitalizeonpublicdisgusttowardsthemilitantsbydevelopingstrategies
to protect civilians victimized by organized crime and violence.25 The Pakistan
governmentandmilitary, forexample,wasable to takeadvantageofamajorshift in
publicperceptiontowardtheTalibaninSwataspartofitssuccessfulefforttoretakethe
valley.Localgovernments,widelyperceivedascorrupt,couldalsoimprovetheirimage
bymakingeffortstostampoutcrimeandreducecorruption.Separately,rivalriesover
criminalprofitscreatestructuralweaknesseswithinandbetween insurgentand terror
groupsintheAfghanistan/Pakistanwartheater.Exploitingthoserivalriesandbreeding
distrust could serve to degrade levels of militant cooperation and disrupt funds
reachingmilitant coffers. This strategy is risky, however, to the extent that it could
23JeanMacKenzie AreAfghansReallyHappy?,GlobalPost,23January2010.Thisarticlenotesthat
thereislittleempiricalevidenceofoptimismamongmanyordinaryAfghans,suggestingthatthe
numberscouldreflectasenseofhopethingswillimprove,ratherthanexpectations.Formoredetail,see
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/100118/afghanistanopinionpoll.A2009surveybythe
AsiaFoundationalsofoundAfghanstobegrowingmoreoptimistic,butbyasmallermargin.That
surveycanbeseenathttp://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/2009AGpollKeyFindingsFINAL.pdf.A
2009surveybythesameABC/BBC/ARDconglomeratetrackeddroppingconfidencelevels.Thatdatais
foundathttp://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1083a1Afghanistan2009.pdf. 24
On
17
November
2009,
al
Qaidas
video
production
arm
as
Sahab
issued
a
video
statement
by
TTP
spokesmanAzamTariqdenyingresponsibilityforrecentbombexplosionsinPeshawarandIslamabad,
whichheblamedonPakistansInterServicesIntelligenceDirectorateandtheU.S.contractingfirmXe,
formerlyknownasBlackwater. 25SixintenAfghansviewtheworkoftheU.S.andtheNATOCoalitionpoorly,accordingtotheABC
Newspoll,althoughthatreflectsa10percentimprovementoverlastyearsrate.Meanwhile,64percentof
thePakistanipublicregardstheU.S.asanenemy,accordingtoanAugust2009Pewsurvey,whileonly9
percentdescribeitasapartner.SeeGrowingConcernsaboutExtremism,ContinuingDiscontentwith
U.S..
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8
sparkinternecineviolenceandcontributetomoreciviliancasualties.
Thereasonsforthelocalpopulationsupporting,toleratingoropposingillicitactivityin
theregion
are
complex
and
varied,
but
they
remain
central
to
disrupting
the
criminal
insurgent relationship.TheworkofFelbabBrown servesan important reminder that
sometimesprogramsdesigned tostop the flowof funds to insurgents,suchaspoppy
eradication campaigns, could endup strengthening them and the local support they
derive.26 Effective solutions to these multifaceted challenges require an improved
understanding of the criminalinsurgent nexus and the landscapes uponwhich this
activitytranspires.Tothatend,andasafundamentalstartingpoint,thisreportaimsto
mapouthowmilitantantistateactors located in the tribalareasofAfghanistanand
Pakistanengage inandearnfromcriminalactivity.27Thismonographdoesnot intend
to present an encyclopedic or empirical catalogue of how insurgents and extremist
groups engage in organized crime, but rather aims to provide brief anecdotal case
studies that are representative of key organizations operating in areas of strategic
concern.Leveraging firsthandaccounts, this reportexamineshow theseactivitiesare
perceived by local communitymembers who live in these areas. Lastly, using the
northernAfghanprovinceofKunduzandPakistansSwatValleyandBunerDistrictas
minicasestudies,thisreportexploreshowlocalTalibanandothermilitantsestablished
theircriminalenterprisesandbegan toearnoff localcommunities immediatelyupon
pushing into new territory. It is hoped that this studywill bring some clarity to an
extremely complex phenomenon and prove useful to those developing policies and
plansfortheAfghanistan/Pakistanregion.
26FelbabBrown.27Foradditionalperspectives,seeCatherineCollinsandAshrafAli,FinancingtheTaliban:Tracingthe
DollarsBehindtheInsurgenciesinAfghanistanandPakistan,CounterterrorismStrategyInitiativePolicy
Paper(April2010);ArabindaAcharya,SyedAdnanAliShahBukhari,andSadiaSulaiman,Making
MoneyintheMayhem: FundingTalibanInsurrectionintheTribalAreasofPakistan,StudiesinConflict
andTerrorism32,no.2(2009),95108;ThomasH.Johnson,FinancingAfghanTerrorism:Thugs,Drugs,
andCreativeMovementsofMoney,inTerrorismFinancingandStateResponses:AComparativePerspective,
ed.JeanneK.GiraldoandHaroldA.Trinkhunas(PaloAlto,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2007),93114.
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9
MethodologyandCaveats
Informationpresented in thisreporthasbeencompiledmainlyfrom localcommunity
members inareaswhere insurgentsandextremistsoperate.Thereareadvantagesand
drawbacksto
field
based
research
in
aconflict
zone,
and
there
are
particular
challenges
associated with the Afghanistan/Pakistan border areas, many parts of which are
inaccessibletoforeignandlocalresearchersalike.Membersofthecommunityareable
toprovidealevelofimmediacyandintimacythatfewoutsiderswouldbeabletoattain
on theirown,but relianceon their largelyanecdotal informationalsomakes thedata
presentedhereinharder tocorroborate.Given this limitedaccess, it isalsodifficult to
establish how representative the views expressed by those interviewed are of the
broader population. Complicating matters further, examining illicit activity is a
challenging prospect in any environment, since most crime goes unreported and
criminalactorstendtolie.
Thereisnowaytocompensatefortheseissuesentirely,buteachcasestudypresented
inthisreporthaseitherbeencorroboratedbyAfghan,PakistaniandWesternofficialsor
themediaandotheropensourcereporting,orwasrecountedbyenoughsourcestobe
consideredgenerallyaccurate.Despite thefactthat tendifferent localresearchers,few
ofwhomhadanycontactwitheachother,interviewedciviliansacrosstheconflictzone
intwocountries,theyfoundastrikingsimilarityinresponses,bothintermsofthetypes
of criminal exploitation civilians suffered, as well as their quiet state of rage and
frustrationabouttheproblem.
TheU.S.Militaryalsosharedwiththeauthoraraftofdeclassifieddocumentsseizedin
Afghanistan and stored in theHarmony database,which also served to corroborate
localreporting.Readersshouldbeawarethatanalyzingsuchdataisfraughtwithrisk.
Documents intheHarmonydatabasewerecollectedonthebattlefieldunscientifically.
ThereisnowaytoknowhowrepresentativedocumentscapturedbyU.S.forcesareof
the largerbodyof informationproducedbytheTalibanorother insurgents.Likewise,
the vast database inwhich they are stored is imperfect and virtually impossible to
search systematically.Readers and researchers should therefore bewary of drawing
conclusionssolelyfromthesedocuments.
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10
OrganizationoftheReport
This report isdivided into twomain sectionsAfghanistanandPakistanwith each
beingfurtherorganizedbysubgeographicareaandthemilitantgroupspredominately
activein
those
specific
regions.
Such
territorial
boundaries
are
in
no
way
confining
in
actuality,sincethesphereofoperationsofmilitantgroupscanneverbeconfinedtoone
specificagency,districtorprovince.Casesofoverlappingmembership,foreignadvisors
whooperatewithinlocalinsurgentfightingunitsandthecrossborder,intraprovincial
relationsbetween thevariousmilitant factions furthercontribute to thecomplexityof
the subjectmatter.This report isnotanexhaustiveexplorationofallmilitantgroups
operatinginAfghanistanandPakistan;forthesakeofbrevityandanalyticalfocus,the
report intentionallydisregardssmallerandlessactivemilitantentities.SectionIofthe
report explores the criminal activities of the three main factions of the Afghan
insurgency:theQuettaShuraTaliban(QST),theHaqqaniNetwork(HQN)andHizbe
slamiGulbuddin(HIG).Itpaysparticularattentiontothesignificantwaysinwhichthe
QSThasrevamped itscommandstructureandstreamlined thewaymoneyflows into
centralcoffers.SectionIIreviewstheactivitiesofanumberofmilitantgroupsalongthe
easternsideoftheDurandLine,includingthefivemainfactionsoftheTehrikeTaliban
Pakistan,knownbyitsUrduacronymtheTTP.Toalesserextent,italsoexaminesother
local,regionalandinternationalextremistgroups,includingTehrikeNifazeShariate
Muhammadi (TNSM),HarakatulJihadalIslami (HuJI), theQari Zia Group (QZG),
LashkareIslami (LI), the IslamicMovement ofUzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad
Union(IJU),alQaidaandLashkareJhangvi.
NoteonTransliteration
TransliterationoftheshortvowelefollowsEncyclopaediaIranicaguidelines.28
28Forreferenceseehttp://www.iranica.com/pages/guidelines.
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11
SECTIONI: AFGHANISTAN
In parallel to U.S.led efforts to reshape NATO strategy in Afghanistan,29 Mullah
MohammedOmar,
the
leader
of
the
Quetta
Shura
Taliban
(QST)
also
altered
his
tactics,
orderinghis commanders to avoidkilling localsordamaging theirproperty inwhat
could be seen as a populationcentric approach, Taliban style. Central to this new
approachwasthe2009releaseoftheTalibansthirteenchapterCodeofConduct,which
instructed its subcommanders to treat villagers fairly, broadened its shadow
government and its Sharia court system that settles local disputes, and appointed
provinciallevel commissions where civilians could bring complaints about local
commanders.30TheCodeofConductrepresentedatacitacknowledgementbytheQST
leadership that itsviolent tacticshadbecome a strategic risk for the insurgency.But
whilethepopulationcentricaspectsoftheQSTsshadowgovernmenthavereceived
attentionfromacademicandmilitarycircles,aswellasfromthemedia,therehasbeen
lessfocusonaseparatemotivationMullahOmarmayhavehadforrevampingstrategy
andtighteninghisgriponthesometimesfractiousinsurgencyhecommands.Asmuch
astheTalibanCodeofConductcouldbeinterpretedasaheartsandmindscampaign,
itcanalsobeseenasaneffortbyMullahOmartoincreasehiscontroloverfundsraised
through illicitactivity. Indeed, inaddition toattempting tobringunrulyvillagelevel
Talibancommanders into line, thenewstrategygives lowerranking insurgents fewer
opportunities toearnmoneyat theground level, thusmaking thecommandersmore
dependenton theTalibans tenmanrulingcouncil,orShuraMajlis (referred toas the
Quetta Shura), for funding.Various chapters of thedecree appear aimed at limiting
localcommandersfromtaking theirowndecisionsorearningfundsat the local level,
instead ceding all authority to the provincial commissions and the Taliban supreme
leadership.These initiatives appear to have been effectivedespite theFebruary 2010
arrests of key Taliban officials in Pakistan,which briefly led to conjecture that the
Talibansshadowgovernmentwouldbesignificantlydisrupted.Itisworthnotingthat
theTalibans influenceandreachhasspreaddramatically in thepast18months,with
30AnEnglishlanguagetranslationoftheCodecanbefoundat:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/etc/mullahomar.pdf.
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12
some80percentofAfghanistanwitnessingatleastsomeinsurgentactivityandasmuch
asonethirdofthecountryundertightTalibancontrolformuchof2009.31
Inaddition
to
evaluating
the
Talibans
streamlined
system,
this
section
also
examines
howvariouscomponentsof theQST,aswellasotherAfghan insurgentgroups,raise
funds through organized crime. The three separately commanded factions of the
Afghan insurgencythe QST, the Haqqani Network (HQN), and HizbeIslami
Gulbuddin (HIG)appear to bewellfunded, and the array of criminal activities in
which their fighters have participated in recent years have widened as fresh
opportunities to raise funding presented themselves.While the opium trade likely
provides the largest percentage of income for the QST in southern and western
Afghanistan,wherethebulkofthecountryspoppycropiscultivatedandlaterrefined
intonarcotics,insurgentsalsoappeartohavedeepenedtheirinvolvementinotherillicit
activities,mainlykidnapping, taxing the trafficof legal commodities and extorting
localbusinessesanddevelopmentprojects.InpartsofAfghanistanwherethereislittle
ornopoppygrown,insurgentsseemtorelymoreheavilyonkidnapping,shakedowns
andprotectingother smuggledgoods, ranging from timberandgemstones topeople
andlegalgoodsliketiresandcookingoil.
TheHaqqaniNetwork,basedinsoutheasternAfghanistanandnamedforthelegendary
mujahidin leader Jalaluddin Haqqani, appears to depend heavily for funding on
kidnapping schemes run incollaborationwith factionsof thePakistaniTaliban.32The
HizbeIslami Gulbuddin, which operates mainly from eastern and northeastern
Afghanistan, collaborates with traffickers and traders to protect licit and illicit
commodities smuggled from its control zones, but there are fewer reports of HIG
commandersengaginginabductionforransomschemes.33Insomeareas,theHQNand
31PersonalinterviewbyauthorwithDavidKilcullen,WashingtonD.C.,27October2009.32
Authors
interviews,
Arlington,
VA,
26
October
2009
and
by
telephone,
10
November,
2009;
Ashraf
Ali,
PakistaniCriminals,TalibanSeeEasyCashinKidnapping,SanFranciscoChronicle,13July2008.Fora
detailedaccountofanabductionontheAfghansideoftheborder,inwhichthevictimsweretakento
PakistanandshiftedamongcompoundsbelongingtothePakistaniTalibanandtheHaqqaninetwork,see
DavidRohde,HeldbytheTaliban,NewYorkTimes,17November2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html.33ForabreakdownofHQNandHiGspheresofinfluenceinsoutheasternAfghanistan,seeSebastien
Trives,RootsoftheInsurgencyintheSoutheast,inDecodingtheNewTaliban:InsightsfromtheAfghan
Field,ed.AntonioGuistozzi(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2009),89100.
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13
HIG factions seem to operate alongside theQSTestablished shadow regime, neither
opposing itnorworkingwithin it. Inotherareas, therearesignsof rivalryandcases
wherethefactionshaveopenlybattledeachother.
Partly in response to thearrivalof thousandsofU.S. troops insouthernAfghanistan,
local and foreignmilitants have become active in greater numbers in the countrys
northparticularly in provinces like Kunduz and Badghiswhere they have
immediately set to earning from the localpopulation and collaboratingwith existing
smuggling networks.34 The manner in which QST, HIG and HQN militants began
interacting with the local communitycollecting taxes and extorting traders and
businessesprovides awindow into how they operate, and also illustrates how the
threefactionsinteract,cooperateandattimescompetefordominance.
34Accountsofthenumbersofforeignfightersoperatinginthenorthvary.TheKunduzgovernor,for
example,estimatedtherewereaboutfifteentotwentyUzbekfightersoperatinginhisprovince,but
civiliansputthenumberatmorethanonehundred.Therewasnowaytoverifytheseparateclaims.
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14
Map1:GeneralBreakdownofTaliban/InsurgentAreasofActivityinAfghanistan
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15
SOUTHERNAFGHANISTAN
Kandahar,Helmand,Zabul,UruzganandOtherAreas
Overview: The strongest militant force in southern Afghanistan, the Quetta Shura
Taliban, increasinglybehaves likea sophisticated criminalcartel,controlling complex
extortionandprotectionracketsandexertinginfluenceoveranenormoussupplychain
ofillicitnarcotics.Apparentlyseekinghigherprofitmargins,theQSThasalsoturnedits
attention to themoreprofitableprocessingandexportingendof theopiumbusiness.
Recently,theQSThastakennumerousstepstomanageitsimageandimproverelations
with localcommunitymembers,mostnotably through the2009releaseof itsCodeof
Conductand theestablishmentofprovincialcommissionsacrossmostof thecountry.
Whiletheseinitiativesareviewedpositivelybysomelocals,theycanalsobeinterpreted
as an effort by the leadership to gain control overmoney flow and key aspects of
strategicdecisionmaking.
Inthefirsthalfof2009,theQuettaShuraTalibanappearedtobeshoringupitspolitical
position andmaking strategicpreparations for the surge ofU.S. troops. In the early
monthsof theyear,MullahMohammadOmar, the reclusiveoneeyed founderof the
movement,namednewregionalcommandersandshuffled the lineupof itsexecutive
council.Later,inJune,heissuedanewCodeofConductinanapparentattemptbothto
exert control over unruly Taliban subcommanders and to improve relations with
ordinary Afghans by establishing a civilian shadow government at the local level.
Underthenewstructure,theTalibanalsocreatedprovinciallevelcommissionswhere
Afghans could present their requests or complaints to a local council of religious
scholars,who thenansweredback to theexecutivecouncil.36Theoverhaulappears to
TheactivitiesandinfluenceoftheQuettaShuraTalibancannotbeconfinedtoseveralprovinces,one
geographicareaorregionalcommand,butinsteadarepervasivethroughoutAfghanistan. Atthesame
time,whiletheQSTisthemostprominentandimportantactorinsouthernAfghanistan,itisnottheonly
militantactoroperatinginthisarea.
36TheQuettaShuraissonamedbecausetheTalibanleadershipiswidelybelievedtotakeoperatefrom
thewesternPakistanicityofQuetta,inBaluchistanprovince.Inrecentmonths,therehavebeenopen
sourcereportssuggestingthattheTalibanleadershiphasshiftedtothesouthernportcityKarachioutof
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16
havebeenbothtacticalandfinancialinmotive.Thereasontheychangedtheirtacticsis
thattheywanttoprepareforalongtermfight,andforthattheyneedsupportfromthe
people; they need local sources of income, saidWahidMuzhdah, a formerTaliban
officialwho
now
tracks
the
insurgency
on
the
Internet.
37The
command
overhaul
also
appeared aimed at stamping out rivalries over local sources of funding, and
streamlining howmoneymade its way back to the Quetta Shura, thus giving the
leadership more control over subcommanders and other lowerranking fighters
(discussed further below). Money is not a problem for them, said an Afghan
provincialgovernor,buttheyarerealizingthattheyneedtocontrolitbetter.38
AKinder,GentlerTaliban?
Certainpassages in the 2009Code ofConduct, aswell as theupdated 2010version,
provideguidelines thataim tominimize thevictimizationofordinaryAfghans.The
Talibanmust treat civiliansaccording to Islamicnormsandmorality towinover the
heartsandmindsof thepeople,says thenewsixtyninepageTalibanbooklet,which
waspublished shortlybefore the topNATO commander in the country,Gen.David
Petraeus, issued guidelines that also urged soldiers to avoid civilian casualties. All
effortsmustbemade to avoidharming civilians in attacks.39While the hearts and
mindspassageof theCodeofConducthas receivedwidespreadattention, therehas
been less focusonaparallelmotivation for thenewTaliban rulebook:TheCodealso
lays out strict instructions for field commanders on money matters, literally
institutionalizinghowprofitsearnedfromorganizedcrimearetobedistributedwithin
thecommandchain.Forexample,theCodesaysthatTalibansoldiersarepermittedto
keepupto80percentofwhateverbootytheycapturefromaninfidelcombatantor
Coalition base. But it says that onefifth of the value or property seized must be
transferred to the shadowprovincialgovernor, inmuch the samewaymobstersand
gangmembersmustkickaportionof theirearnings to theirboss.TheCodesimilarly
fearthatanintensiveU.S.leddronecampaignintheFATAwouldbeextendedtoBaluchistantotarget
QSTleaders.Seeforexample:ImtiazAli,KarachiBecomingaTalibanSafeHaven?CTCSentinel,
January2010,p13.TheQSTnumbertwo,MullahBaradar,wascapturedinKarachiinFebruary2010,
followedshortlythereafterbyasmanyasfourotherTalibanofficialsinotherpartsofthecountry.37AlissaRubin,TalibanOverhaulTheirImageinaBidtoWinAllies,NewYorkTimes,21January2010. 38Afghanofficial,inpersonalinterviewwithresearchassistant,LashkarGah,July2009.39MatiullahAchakzai,TalibanCodeofConductSeekstoWinHeart,Minds,AssociatedPress,3August
2010.
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17
outlineshow tohandleshakedownsandextortionfees,banningprovincialordistrict
level Taliban commanders from directly making deals with local businesses and
companies.Disputesonissuesrelatedtobusinessesandcompaniesshouldbereferred
tothe
leadership,
the
Code
insists.
This
would
suggest
the
QST
is
evolving
into
an
organization that more openly functions like a traditional mafia, with strict rules
governing criminal earnings, and where the Shura has final say in all matters of
collectingprotectionmoney.
One of the architects behind these reformswasMullahAgha JanMutassim, a close
confidantofMullahOmarwhochaired theTalibanspowerfulFinancialCounciluntil
hewasarrestedbyPakistaniofficialsinthesouthernportcityofKarachiinMarch2010.
According to local sources, it wasMutassim, along with the Taliban number two,
MullahBarader(alsoarrestedbyPakistaniauthoritiesin2010),whoconvincedMullah
OmaroftheneedtoreducethefinancialexploitationofthelocalpopulationbyTaliban
fighters, arguing that the insurgents risked losing the cooperation of the civilian
population.40Afghanofficialsand tribalsourcesclose to theTalibansaybothBarader
andMutassim worried that internecine fighting between Taliban subcommanders,
particularlyovermoneyandresources,hadbecomedetrimentaltotheoverallstrength
and unity of themovement.41 ApparentlyMutassim feared a return of the kind of
violence that occurred in the early 1990s,when rivalmujahidin commanders turned
theirgunsoneachotherandterrorizedlocalcommunitiesacrosssouthernAfghanistan.
Before his capture, Mutassim also pressed Omar to purge unruly commanders
(discussedfurtherbelow)andtosplitfromthuggishcriminalgangswhocooperatewith
the Taliban at the village level.42 Perhaps even more significantly, Mutassim
implementedaseriesof reforms (discussed furtherbelow) thatstreamlinehow funds
collectedatthelocallevelreachtheTalibanscentralcoffers,meaninghestandstohave
significant intelligencevalue in termsof theTalibans finances.He is like theAshraf
Ghani of the Taliban, said an Afghan official who tracks the Taliban leadership,
referringtotheformerAfghanfinanceministerwhoranforpresidentonacampaignto
stamp out graft and who was instrumental, until he resigned from the Karzai
40Personalinterviewsbyresearchassistant,Kabul,JulyandAugust2009. 41Afghanofficials,inpersonalinterviewswithresearchassistants,KabulandKandahar,July2009. 42Ibid.
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19
The Taliban field commander also carried a document naming two insurgent
commanderswhohadbeengiventheresponsibility tocollectdonations fromall the
peoplethat
have
gardens
Stay
away
from
this
job,
otherwise
you
will
be
in
trouble.
46
Inanothercase, theTalibancommission inHelmandcastigateda judge inMusaQala
whomtheTalibanhadappointed.OnejudgewasfoundtakingabribeandtheTaliban
putblackalloverhis faceand tiedhim toa tree,businessmanEitadullahKhanwas
quotedassayingbytheAssociatedPress.47Whenhewasreleased,hewasfired.48
Such behavior stands in stark contrast to theKarzai government,which has largely
refused to investigate accusations ofwidespread corruptionwithin its ranks. Local
community members interviewed for this paper praised the insurgents for their
willingnesstodisciplinetheirownfighters.Butsomeciviliansalsosaidtheydecidedto
utilize the Taliban justice system partially out of fear, apparentlyworried about the
potential consequences of local Taliban finding they had turned to the local
government.
The provincial commissions are also a significant development from a financial
management standpoint, having the power to issue decrees using the stamp of the
IslamicEmirateofAfghanistan,theofficialtitleoftheTalibangovernment.49Theyhelp
theQuettaShuramaintaincontroloverfundsraisedatanddispatchedtotheprovinces.
Eachcommissionhasapoliticalandeconomiccommittee,accordingtolocalswhohave
dealtwiththem,andeachgetsasetbudget,decidedbyandnegotiablewiththeQuetta
Shura.Wardakprovince, for example, receivedabudgetofabout$36,000permonth
through2009,whilemoreactivecombatzoneslikeGhazniandZabulreceivedasmuch
as$107,000monthly,according toasenior InteriorMinistryofficial inKabulwhohas
seeninterceptedTalibandocumentsoutliningthequantities.50Thecommissioncontrols
46Ibid.47KathyGannon,TalibansShadowGovernmentPosesChallengetoElection,USTroops,Associated
Press,18August2009. 48Ibid. 49Afghanofficials,inpersonalinterviewswithresearchassistant,Kabul,July2009.50Interviewbyresearchassistant,Kabul,August2009.Thisinformationwascorroboratedinpartbyan
AfghanmilitaryintelligenceofficialinGhazniwhoconfirmedthatTalibancommandersinhiszonewere
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20
howmoney is earnedat thevillage level in eachprovince,yet theQuetta leadership
shuffles commissionmembers on a frequent basis, inwhat appears to be a bid to
preventanyoneindividualorgroupfrombecomingtoopowerful.Itremainstobeseen
howthe
February
and
March
2010
arrests
of
key
members
of
the
ruling
Shura
and
provincialTalibanofficialswillaffectthisprocess.
TalibanCommandPurge: BringingIndividualsinLine
MullahOmaralsopurgedanumberofcommanders,mostnotablyMansoorDadullah,
whowerenotfollowingorderssentdownbytheseniorleadership,andaccordingto
somesourcesforpocketing too largeashareof themoney rather thansending it to
Quetta.51 Several years ago, Omar also disciplinedMansoor Dadullahs notoriously
violentelderbrother,MullahDadullah forsimilar transgressions.TheelderDadullah
waskilledina2007firefightinHelmand,amidrumorsthatrivalriesovermoneyledto
hisdeath.52AspokesmanfortheTalibancalledthemediainlate2007toannouncethat
MansoorDadullah,whohadassumedmanyofMullahDadullahsresponsibilities,had
beenfiredbecausehedisobeyedordersoftheIslamicEmirate.53
The QST leadership also attempted to deal with was the fact that Taliban sub
commanders routinely bickered among themselves over operational issues and
competedforfundsraisedthroughorganizedcrimeatthevillagelevel.Researchersfor
this paper heard ofmultiple cases where QST commanders across the south were
disciplined, demoted, and shifted to new regions, or even pushed out of the group
entirelyiftheywerefoundtobecollectingfundsinareasoutsidetheirassignedcontrol
zones,oroverexploiting the localpopulace.Insomeareas, theTalibanalsodistanced
itself from localcriminalgangsduring2009,although localsandgovernmentofficials
alikesaythat insurgentscontinuetosubcontract localcriminalgangsonanasneeded
basisinregionswheretheinsurgentsarelessdominantorwheretheyareattemptingto
establishwidercontrol.
receivingbudgetsworthmillionsofPakistaniRupeesmonthlyandbyaprovincialofficialoftheNational
DirectorateofSecurity,whoconfirmedthe$36,000budgetforWardakprovince. 51Interviewbyresearchassistant,Kabul,August2009.52Formoreonthisepisode,seeGretchenPeters,SeedsofTerror(NewYork:StMartinsPress,2009),127.53TalibanSacksKeyRebelCommander,AgenceFrancePress,29December2007.
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21
There are tantalizing indications that efforts to reshuffle Taliban commanders and
impose more control over their ability to earn funds independently has partially
backfired for the QST leadership, possibly exposing a strategic weakness of the
organization.Sources
close
to
the
movement
told
researchers
that
some
QST
commanders had rebelled against efforts to rein them in, sometimes violently. In a
December 2009 Kabul press conference, Afghanistans National Security Council
appearedtocorroborateatleastonereport,sayingtheKabulgovernmenthadreceived
intelligenceindicatingthatMullahOmarhadsackedtwomoreTalibancommandersin
the poppyrich districts ofArghandab inKandahar andGereshk inHelmand. Jamil
Bahrami, director of strategy at the National Security Council said some of the
command changes have triggered differences and oppositions among local Taliban
commanders,accordingtoalocalnewsreport.54ThepossibilitythatQSTcommanders
areresistingorevenrevoltingagainsteffortstocutthemofffromlocalfundingsources
may indicate those specific commanders weremore driven by profitmotives than
political allegiance to the Taliban, and that the new streamlined system could be
threatening,ratherthanstrengthening,theShurasstrategiccontroloveritsnetworkin
someareas.That said it is alsoa sign that theQST leadership ispositioning itself to
governAfghanistan,andinsomepartsofthecountrymaybedoingamoreeffectivejob
thantheKabulgovernment.
AMixedRecord: LocalPerspectivesandEnforcementoftheCode
WhileordinaryAfghanscomplainaboutcriminalvictimization,manynotethatcorrupt
actors in the Afghan government engage in the same activities. In someways, the
Talibanwinpraise from local communities,particularly for itsvillage justice system
anditspracticeofpunishingitsownmembers.Yetitisimportanttorecognizethatthe
Talibanhasneitherbeenentirelysuccessful in implementing itsCodeofConduct,nor
entirely innocenton the chargeof attacking civilians. Indeed, theTalibans efforts to
reachouttocivilianswereunderminedbyanincreaseinsuicidebombings,Improvised
ExplosiveDevice(IED)attacksandtargetedkillingsbyinsurgentsthatwerecreditedby
theUnitedNationswithcausing67percentof theciviliandeaths inAfghanistan that
year.55Moreover,manyAfghanscontinuetofaceoratleastperceiveatangiblelevel
54DarzHaBaineSofoofeTalibanGushaadTarMigardand,ArmaneMelli(inDari),23December2009. 55AJanuary2010reportbytheUNAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan(UNAMA)saidtheTalibankilled
2.73timesmoreciviliansin2009thanprogovernmentforces.UNAMAblamedTalibaninsurgentsfor
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22
of threat if they do not abide by Taliban decrees. There seems to be no let up
whatsoever, for example, in the vicious punishments handed out by the insurgents,
withlocalsinthesouthsayingQSTcommanderscontinuetoholdpublicexecutionsof
anyonesuspected
of
spying
for
the
Coalition.
56People
cooperate
with
the
Taliban
outoffear,saidAbdulGhani,directoroftheAfghanNationalPolicesantiterrorism
departmentinGhazniprovince.IftheTalibansensetheslightestwhiffofespionageby
local individuals, they instantly kill those peoplewithout anymercy.57When U.S.
Marinespushed intoMianPosteh inHelmandprovince,villagers initially refused to
frequentthebazaartheAmericantroopscleared,sayingtheTalibanhadthreatenedto
chopofftheirheadsiftheydid.ThereareTalibaneverywhere,villageelderHajiFada
MohammedtoldtheMarines.IfItellyouwhotheyare,Iwillbeindanger.58
ManagingtheirImage: TheTalibanasImpoverishedHolyWarriors?
Tomanagepublicperceptionsandtominimizeassociationwithillicitactivity,Taliban
membersroutinelycastthemselvesaspoormujahidin,livingoffthealmsofthepeople,
withnoambitionotherthandrivingoutforeigninvadersandestablishingSharialaw.
Inonestatement,postedona jihadiwebsiteinJuly2009,anallegedTalibanfighter in
thesouthclaimed:Ifthepeoplefromthevillageswouldnothavefeduswewouldnt
have the money to feed ourselves.59 This deliberate strategy may be intended to
facilitatedonationsfromtheGulfandalsotodisguisemilitantinvolvementincrime.It
isalsolikelygearedtogivetheperceptionthatpoliticalandideologicalgrievances,and
notprofit,are themaingoalsof theresistance.Closer inspectionof theQSTactivities
would appear to indicate greed plays a strong role in determining Taliban activity,
however.
The Taliban ferociously rejects any suggestions it is receiving funding from foreign
1,630civiliandeaths(67percentofthetotalrecordeddeaths)in2009,a41percentincreaseon2008,when
1,160
deaths,
or
54
percent,
were
attributed
to
the
insurgents.
For
detail
see
Afghanistan:
Over
2,400
civiliandeathsin2009UNAMA,IRIN,13January2010,
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87716. 56Personalinterviewsbyresearchassistant,LashkarGahandKandahar,July2009.57Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Ghazni,July2009. 58AnnScottTyson,InHelmand,CaughtBetweenU.S.,Taliban,WashingtonPost,15August2009. 59Forthefullstatement,seeJihadiDiscussionForumPostingClaimsTalibaninDesperateNeedof
Money,NEFAFoundation,7July2009,
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_talibanmoney0709.pdf.
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23
governments,suchasPakistan,IranandGulfnations.Despitetheclearevidenceofthe
QSTs close ties to drug smugglers in southern Afghanistan andwestern Pakistan,
Talibanleadersalsopubliclydenytheirinvolvementinthecountrys$4billionpoppy
trade.When
asked
by
aWestern
interviewer
about
massive
opium
stockpiles
that
were
seized inMusaQala afterNATO forces retook the town from the Taliban in 2007,
spokesmanZabiullahMujahidresponded:
TheTalibanarenot trading inopium.TheTalibanwant to fight theirenemy
anddefeat them.Thosewhoaredealing inopiumareothers,smugglerswith
nothing todowith theTaliban.As tothosewhowerekeeping theopium,the
Talibandidnothaveanyauthorityover them.TheTalibanareagainstdrugs.
DuringtheTalibanregime,thewholeofAfghanistanwasdrugfree;atthetime,
nobodywoulddaretokeepevenamon[7kilograms]ofdrugsintheirhouses.60
Mujahidwaspartiallyaccurate.TheTalibanasanorganizationdidnotatfirsttradein
opiumper se, but commanders haveprotected, taxed, and collaborated closelywith
smuggling groups that do since the Taliban first emerged in the early 1990s. The
spokesmansstatementalsoobscuredthefactthattheTalibanpermittedandtaxedthe
cultivationand trade inopiumpoppy from1996 to1999,onlybanning farmers from
growingpoppy in theyear2000.61Thatyear,Talibanofficialscontinued to taxopium
marketssellingstockpilesofopiumgumandalsocollectedrevenueatdrugrefineries.
QSTIncreasinglyEngagedinProcessingandExportingNarcotics
Western estimates of theQSTs annual earnings fromnarcoticsvary byhundreds of
millionsofdollars.Althoughmost analystsagree that it isnotpossible todetermine
preciselyhowmuch theQSTearnsfromopium,norestimatewhatportionof its total
budgetcomesfromnarcotics,seniorU.S.militaryintelligenceofficialsandmembersof
theAfghanThreatFinanceCell,an interagencybody trackingTalibanfinance,believe
theAfghan insurgency is now selffinanced and that narcotics likely represents the
60Forthefullstatement,seeExclusiveInterviewwithTalibanSpokesman,NEFAFoundation,4January
2008,www1.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefatalibanintvu0108.pdf. 61Forfurtherdetail,seeUnitedNationsInternationalDrugControlProgram,AfghanistanOpium
Survey2001;Peters,Ch.3.
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24
largestportionofQSTfunding.62TheTalibanprofitsfromtheopiumtradeinfourmain
sectors:bytaxingpoppyfarmers10percent(ushr)oftheirfarmoutput;bychargingfees
toprotectopiumshipmentsandheroinrefineries;bytaxingand,increasingly,running
theirown
drug
labs;
and
by
collecting
large
cash
payments
made
to
the
Quetta
Majlis
bymajor traffickinggroups.Of thesesums, taxcollected from the farmersappears to
representthesmallestportionofthe insurgentstake,andtheseearningsbyand large
remainatthevillagelevel.Subcommandersoftencollectopiuminkind,laterreselling
whattheycollecttolocalagentsinordertocovertheirownoperationalcosts.
Following the arrestsof anumberof leadingAfghandrug traffickers, seniorTaliban
commandersinthesouthappeartobetakingabroaderroleinthedrugtrade,moving
intothemoreprofitableprocessingandexportingendofthebusiness,andshiftingtheir
focusoffoftaxingpoppyfarmersanddrugconvoys.Thisshiftinfocusfromfarmlevel
taxationtotheprocessingandexportingendofthedrugtradeindicatesthattheQSTis
behavingmore likeadrugcartel.U.S. lawenforcementandmilitaryofficialsarenow
trackingmorethanthreedozenseparatesmugglingoperations,manyofwhichappear
toanswerdirectlytotheQST.63Toseparatethedrugsmugglersfromtheinsurgencyin
thesouth isnowalmost impossible,saidaU.S.officerwhoclosely tracks theopium
trade.64
Large,Pakistanbased smuggling rings thathave long collaboratedwith theTaliban,
known collectively as theQuettaAlliance, appear to have lost adegree of influence
following the arrests of a number of key drug kingpins. The Quetta Alliance has
historicallyincludedfourclanrunsmugglingorganizations.HajiJumaKhan(HJK)ran
thelargest,knownastheKhanOrganization,untilhisOctober2008arrestinIndonesia.
HajiBashirNoorzai reportedly commanded another clanbased groupuntil his 2005
arrest.The 2009 capture ofHajiBaghChagul, a.k.a.HajiBajcho,who arrived in the
United States in June 2009, was another significant interdiction that illustrated the
financialscaleofthesmugglingoperations.WhenU.S.agentsraidedBajchoslairthey
found logbooks indicating that$169millionhadpassedthroughhishands inthepast
62Personalinterviewsbyauthor,Washington,DC;seealsoAfghanistansNarcoWar,14. 63PersonalinterviewsbyauthorwithU.S.lawenforcementandmilitaryintelligenceofficials,Washington
D.C.andbytelephoneAugustandSeptember2010.64Personaltelephoneinterviewbyauthor,September2009.
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25
ninemonths.65Meanwhile,Haji JumaKhansgangdominatedamajoropiummarket
out ofMarjah, a town in theHelmand River floodplainswhere Coalition forces in
February 2010 launched amajor operation to clear out the Taliban, andmaintained
multiton
storage
depots
and
drug
refineries
in
Baram
Chah,
adusty
outpost
that
straddles the AfghanPakistan border. His organization appears to have continued
functioningunderthecommandofKhansnephewandformerchiefofoperations,Haji
HafizAkhtar,althoughTaliban commanders in somedistrictsofHelmandappear to
havemuscledinonhisgroupsoperations.66
TheimmensescaleofTalibandrugoperationsbecameclearinMay2009,whenNATO
andAfghantroopslaunchedamajoroffensivetoclearmilitantsoutofanopiummarket
based inMarjah ahead of a suspected assassination plot being launched from there
againsttheHelmandgovernor.67Afterthreedaysof intensefighting,sixtyTaliban lay
deadand the troopshadseizedastaggeringninetytwometrictonsofheroin,opium,
hashish and poppy seeds, as well as hundreds of gallons of precursor chemicals,
makingitthesecondlargestdrughaulinglobalhistory.Indicatinghowcloselyopium
merchants and insurgents now work, themarket also housed a Taliban command
center, completewith elaborate communications systems, suicide vests and a large
weaponscache.68
Reliablelocalmediareportshavealsoindicatedthatwiththedecliningfarmgateprice
of raw opium, therehas been adramatic increase in thenumber of refineries inside
Talibanheld regions of southernAfghanistan capable of refining opium into crystal
heroin,thehighvalueandmostpotentversionofthedrug.AnOctober2009drugraid
onaTalibanbase inHelmandrecoveredfortyfivemetrictonsofopium,alongwitha
stunning 1.8metric tons of processed heroin, according to a press release from the
65MichaelBraun,formerDrugEnforcementAgencyofficial,inpersonalinterviewwiththeauthor,
August
2009.
66U.S.militaryintelligenceofficials,inpersonalinterviewwiththeauthor,October2009andSeptember
2010. 67Foradetailedaccountoftheoffensive,confirmedbymilitaryofficialswhotookpartinit,see
AfghanistansNarcoWar:AReporttotheCommitteeonForeignRelations,U.S.Senate(Washington,
DC:GovernmentPrintingOffice,10August2009),19,http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:51521.pdf.68Personalinterviewsbyauthor,byemail,July31,2009andSanDiego,August21,2009.HeidiVogt,
TroopsMakeLargeDrugSeizureinAfghanistan,AssociatedPress,23May2009.
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role in ensuring that drug and other illicit shipments get through, supported by an
elaboratewebofpayoffsmadeby thesmugglersdirectly toprovincialofficials,police
andborderguards tomakesure that the roadsareclearand thatvehiclesdonotget
intercepted.A
colorful
dispatch
published
in
the
December
2009
issue
of
Harpers
Magazine illuminates the linksbetween theAfghanborderpolicecommanderand the
drugtradeintheKandaharibordertownofSpinBoldak.74Studiesofotherpostconflict
zoneshavefoundthattryingtotransformrebelswhoengagedincrimetosupporttheir
wareffortintolawenforcementofficers,notsurprisingly,oftenresultsincorruptpolice
operations.75
OtherFeesCollectedbytheTaliban
VillagelevelTalibansubcommandersdonot justcollectafarmtitheonpoppycrops,
butdemandmonthlypaymentsfromvariousmembersof thecommunity,whichthey
define as taxes or donations, butwhich are rarely amatter of choice.TheTaliban
collect aportionofall farmoutput,whether licitor illicit,usually in the rangeof10
percent,butnegotiabledependingonthewealthofthefarmerandthelevelofinfluence
theTalibancommandsinagivenarea.Researchersforthisreportheardstoriesofpoor
farmershanding the localTalibansubcommanderas littleasabagoffruitfromtheir
annual harvest, but there were also reports that large landowners had to pay a
significantlyhigheragriculturaltithe,asmuchas20percentincertaindistrictsofFarah
province,forexample.Insomevillages, theTalibansubcommanderhas tosplitwhat
hecollectsfifty/fiftywiththelocalMullah,andinmostzones,hemustsend10percent
of his take to his provinciallevel commander.When villagelevel subcommanders
collectacommodityforwhichtheyandtheirtroopshavenouse,theywilloftensellit
toalocalbroker,knownasajalabinPashto.Althoughthispracticeisnotuniversal,in
someareastheTalibanhavebegunhandingouttaxreceiptstoensurethatvillagersand
shopkeepersarenotchargedmorethanonce(seeAppendixB).Thispracticehasbeen
implemented in northern Kunduz province, where the QST has made significant
inroads in thepastyear.76Localperceptionsof the taxation systemvary.While some
74SeeMatthieuAikins,TheMasterofSpinBoldak,HarpersMagazine(December2009),
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/12/0082754. 75JeremyMcMullin,OrganizedCriminalGroupsandConflict:TheNatureandConsequencesof
Interdependence,CivilWars11,no.1(March2009),93. 76InformationforthisparagraphwascompiledbysixresearchersacrossAfghanistaninJulyandAugust
2009.
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28
privatelycomplainthattheydonotwanttohandovermoneytotheinsurgents,many
alsogripeabouthavingtopayoffcorruptlocalofficials,sayingthatatleasttheTaliban
have standardized their rates. In some areas, the Taliban does provide some
rudimentarygovernment
services,
including
its
shadow
justice
system
and
other
conflictresolutionservices.Italsoprovidessecurityforpoppyfarmersinsomeareas.
Inruralareaswherethereislittleuseforhardcash,andwhereopiumisoftenusedasa
form of currency, Taliban fighters often collect tax in kind, literally carting off 10
percent of a farmers crop.This is one reasonwhyCoalition troops often find large
opiumstashesatTalibanbases.Inadditiontothereceipts,recentseizuresindicatethat
that Taliban and traffickers keep careful books to document their activities. It bears
mentioning that when NATO forces capture or raid a Taliban hideout, the most
valuablepieceofevidence in thatcompoundcouldverywellbe thegrubbynotebook
full of numbers, which ordinarily might seem quite unimportant. One logbook,
obtained byCoalition troops in 2009, appears to catalogue localmeasurements and
values of opium either collected frommembers of the community or traded.77 It is
unclearifthelogbookcamefromalocaltraffickerorrepresentsataxcollectionrecord,
but the accountbooknoteswhen individualshad arrears topay off, and appears to
havebeenupdatedincaseswhenanindividualpaidoffhisbalance.
Coalition forces in Kandahar in 2009 captured another set of documents fromHaji
Abdul Ghani Mohammad, a known Taliban financier and drug trafficker, which
includeordinaryreceiptsforagriculturalequipment,fuel,motorcycles,and,inonecase,
349bagsofopiumseed.78InadditiontoordinarycustomsreceiptspaidtotheAfghan
government,Mohammadwasfoundwithalogbooklistinghisopiumsales,alongwith
adetailed recordof thezakat,an Islamic tax, thathepaid to theTaliban.Whilesome
logbooksmeasure quantities in kilograms, many employ traditional rural forms of
measurementincludingchaharak(about1kilo),mons(about7kilos)andkharwars(about
560kilos).TheysometimescomputethevalueusingPakistaniRupees,whichareoften
referredtoasKaldars.OthertimesvalueiscalculatedinAfghani,theAfghancurrency,
77HarmonydocumentAFGP2009K0000640.ThisdocumentandanEnglishlanguagetranslationcanbe
viewedanddownloadedfromtheCTCswebsite,www.ctc.usma.edu. 78HarmonydocumentAFGP200939722613.ThisdocumentandanEnglishlanguagetranslationcanbe
viewedanddownloadedfromtheCTCswebsite,www.ctc.usma.edu.
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29
or inTomans,an informal termforanIraniancurrencyunit.Some logbooksappear to
incorporatecrudecodesorlocalslang,referringtoheroin,forexampleaspowderor
simplywhite,andinsomeinstancesreferringtodrugsasgroceries.
ExtortingLocalBusinessesforCommodities,notCash
Shopkeepers and other small businesses, including pharmacies, teashops and
automotive repair stations, are required to hand over a portion of their monthly
proceedstotheTalibanusuallyintherangeof10percent,althoughthisfigureisoften
dependent on total earnings. In many cases, Taliban will ask the shopkeepers for
suppliesusefultotheirwareffort,ratherthanmoney.OnegrocerinGhaznidescribed
having to supply local insurgents with cooking oil and rice in lieu of a monthly
payment,andsaidhereceivedareceipt.79ResearchersforthispaperfoundthatTaliban
fighters routinely requested tobepaid in the formof telephonehandsetsand topup
cardsforairtimecredit,apparentlywanting tochange theirphonesregularlytoavoid
surveillance.Shopkeepersalsoreported thatTalibanwillresellcommodities that they
havecollectedastaxorconfiscatedfromlootedconvoys.Theywillcallupandsay,
wehavesometelephonesorgeneratorsorwhatever,ifyouwanttobuythem,saida
localbusinessman.80Shopkeepers interviewed for this reportalsodescribedhaving to
onpassmessagesfortheTalibanastheymovedthroughtown.Someclaimedtheydid
notwant toserveasmessengers,norhandoveramonthlyshareoftheirrevenue,but
feared the consequencesofnothelping the insurgents.The apparent resentment that
villagersharbor towards the insurgentscould representanuntappedopportunity for
theCoalition,ifNATOforceswereabletoprotectlocalbusinessesfromthispractice.
SeekingtoControltheProtectionRacket
AlthoughQSTsubcommanderscontinuetotaxfarmersandsmalltimebusinessesat
the local level, there isalsoevidence that theShuraMajlishasmoved toregulatehow
protectionmoneyiscollectedfromlargerbusinesses,aidanddevelopmentprojects,as
wellasthetruckingfirmsthatoperateonthebusyKandaharQuettacorridorandother
southernhighways.Sourcesclose totheQST leadershipsaythisdecisionwasdirectly
tiedtoMullahMutassimsconcernofareplayoftheanarchythatexistedontheroads
insouthernAfghanistanintheearly1990s.Ahalfdozentruckdriversandtheowners
79Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Ghazni,August2009. 80Telephoneinterviewbyauthor,November2009.
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30
oftwolargetruckingfirmsinterviewedforthispapersaidthatQSTforcesinthesouth
no longer collect payments on theQuettaKandahar highway, for example. Instead,
under a system Mutassim developed, trucking firms now must deposit protection
paymentswith
specified
moneychangers
in
Quetta
and
Kandahar.
The
moneychangers
record the licenseplatenumbersof the trucksanddetailsaboutwhatcargo theywill
carry,andthemoneyishandedoverdirectlytoMutassimsFinancialCouncil.81Drivers
reported receiving a code that they couldgive to armedmenwho stop themon the
road.Thetigeriswoundedbutalive,wasacodeonedrivergaveasanexample.
Truckscarryinggoodsforthelocalmarket,ortransitingacrossAfghanistan,canexpect
topayabout10percentofthevalueoftheirshipment.Convoyscarryinggoodsforthe
Coalitiongetchargedahigherrate,whichcanrangefrom25to40percentofthetotal
valuebeingcarried,accordingtotruckersandofficialsattruckingfirms.82Amemberof
theAchakzai tribe,whichhas longdominated the transport business on theQuetta
Kandahar route, said he paid the Taliban between $95,000 and $130,000 every six
months toprotect convoyshe sends to supply theKandaharAirField.This isvery
organizedbetweenthe[Taliban]fightersandtheShura,hesaid.Yougivethenameof
thedriverandthelicenseplate,andyourtruckissafe.LowrankingTalibanwhoply
theroadsbetweenKandaharandthePakistanbordercontinuetohituppassengercars
forprotectionpayments,butthelargesumsnowgodirecttoQuetta.83
TheAfghan Taliban appear to rely on an elaborate network of informantsthe so
calledvillageundergroundtohelp themdeterminehowmuch theycanchargeeach
truckingfirmtheytarget,aswellasfamilies,businessesandaidgroups.Theinformants
getpaidofffortheinformationtheyprovide,andlocalsourcessaytheybelievebusand
taxidriversandmerchantswhohaveexcusesforleavingthevillageonaregularbasis
areroutinelypartoftheinformationnetwork.Truckingfirmswhotrytoavoidpaying
theTalibanusuallyenduppayingahigherprice.OnetruckerinKandaharrecalledthe
storyofatraderwhoimportedsparepartsfromPakistan,andwhomadethemistakeof
81Personalinterviewsbyresearchassistants,KabulandKandahar,August2009.82Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Kandahar,August2009.83Sofar,thissystemseemstooperateonlyinKandaharandHelmand.InotherpartsofAfghanistan
wherethereisamixofinsurgentfactionsandcriminalgangs,truckerscanexpecttobehitupforcashon
theroads.
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31
bragging ina teashopat theborder thathedidntplan topayoff the insurgents.His
four vehicles barelymade it outside the governmentcontrolled border town of Spin
BoldakbeforeTalibangunmenovertooktheconvoy,anditcosthimcloseto$200,000to
buyhis
equipment
back.
84It
is
not
always
clear
if
such
tales
are
actually
true.
The
importantthingisthattheyarewidelybelievedamongthetruckingcommunity,which
doesnottakechances.TherehasbeendocumentedevidencethattheTalibanhastried
toregularize itstaxcollectionsystem.In2009,theTaliban inHelmand issued its local
representativewithanoticetoallKajakishopkeepersandtruckdriversThebearer
ofthisletterisournewrepresentative.Pleasecooperatewithhimlikeeverbefore.85
TheQuetta Shura also collectsprotectionmoney from larger businesses, notably the
telecommunications sector and construction projects funded by international aid
organizations and theCoalition. SargonHeinrich, aKabulbased businessman in the
construction and service industrieswas quoted in a September 2009 Time Magazine
reportassayingthat16percentofhisgrossrevenuewenttopayingfacilitationfees,
mostly to protect shipments of valuable equipment coming from the border.86 The
reportaptlydescribesthecircularnatureoftheproblem:theU.S.governmentprovides
money to local contractors to build roads, schools and bridges as part of the
counterinsurgency campaign, but the contractorsmust pay off insurgents to avoid
having those projects attacked. The insurgents then spend themoney they raise to
purchaseweaponsandexplosives,whichinturngetusedtokillAmericansoldiers.It
becomesaselfsustainingwar,saysanadvisertotheAfghanMinistryofInterior.A
selflickingicecream.87Inpartsofthecountrywherethereislittleornopoppygrown,
especiallyindistrictswherethereismajorconstructionworkorcentralroadwayspass
through,extortionisbelievedtobethelargestsourceofincomefortheinsurgents.This
creates a moral hazard for the international community, which seeks to stabilize
Afghanistan but inadvertently ends up financing the insurgency and the explosives
rebels use to kill Coalition troops and Afghan civilians. The U.S. Agency for
InternationalDevelopmenthasopenedan investigation intoallegations that its funds
84Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Kandahar,August2009.85Harmonydocument,AFGP2009B0000598.ThisdocumentandanEnglishlanguagetranslationcanbe
foundinAppendixAandviewedanddownloadedfromtheCTCswebsite,www.ctc.usma.edu.86ArynBaker,HowCrimePaysfortheTaliban,TimeMagazine(7September2009).87Ibid.
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33
protectingthecommunityfromtheircriminalactivitiesandworkingwithlocalofficials
toimprovegovernance.
Cooperation
with
Other
Insurgent
Groups
The QST appears to have made deals with the other two factions of the Afghan
insurgency, theHQNand theHIG, tooperatealongsideeachotherand todivide the
proceeds they earn in some zoneswheremore than one faction operates.A senior
investigator with Afghanistans National Directorate of Security says that
representatives of theQST,HQN andHIGmet at the beginning of 2009 to resolve
differences that existed between them and [to settle on] the appointment of
governors and other Taliban authorities.90 BothHaqqani andHekmatyarwere told
theycouldoperateunder thebannerof the IslamicEmirateofAfghanistantheQST
flagbut could no longer maintain their own command, according to Afghan
intelligenceofficials.91Thisdealappearstohaveheldinsomeareas,buttherehavebeen
reportsofsquabblingoverearningrightsamongthevariousfactionsoftheinsurgency
in thenorthernprovinceofKunduz,andMarch2010 reportsof fightingbetween the
HIG and QST forces in Baghlan province. In one particular instance, the Pashto
languageAfghannewspaperHewadWrazpanareportedthatHIGandQSTfightershad
battledover thecollectionoftaxfrom thepopulace.ThereportquotedMohammad
AmeenMangal,aseniorpoliceofficer,assayingthatfortyfivemilitants,thirtyofthem
fromHIG,werekilledinthefighting.92
90Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Ghazni,August2009.91Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Kabul,July2009. 92WeekendFightingBetweenHizbiIslamiandTaliban,UrduPashtuMediaProject,SpecialDispatch
2850,9March2010,http://memri.convio.net/site/R?i=2N5cMLtXbM5P8QPlWdupeA.
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34
SOUTHEASTERNAFGHANISTAN
Paktika,Paktia,Khost,GhazniandLogar
Overview:Therearesigns theHQN isbecomingcloser toalQaidaand thePakistani
Taliban under the command of Sirajuddin Haqqani, in terms of launching tactical
operations and attacks and, specificallywith the TehrikeTaliban Pakistan (TTP), in
smuggling, extorting protection money from local and regional businesses and
kidnappingwealthyor influential individualsaround theKhostregionandnorthwest
Pakistan.TheHQNcommandsasprawlingministateextendingfromPaktika,Paktia
and Khost in southeast Afghanistan to its rear base in NorthWaziristan,where it
appearstodependongoodrelationswithPakistansInterServicesIntelligence(ISI),or
atleastanoninterferencepact.Althoughthegroupdoesnotappeartohavedeepties
to the narcotics trade, the HQN behaves inmany ways like amafia organization,
engaginginwidespreadsmuggling,abductionandshakedownstoraisefunds.
TheHaqqaniNetwork,whichmainlyoperatesinthesoutheasternprovincesofPaktika,
PaktiaandKhost(P2K),hasamuchcloserrelationshiptoforeignjihadistelementsthat
theQST.Led by the ageingmujahidin commander JalaluddinHaqqani, a legendary
fighter during the Soviet resistance, the HQN also maintains a close working
relationshipwith the Pakistani Taliban and appears to collaboratewith the TTP in
holdingkidnapvictimssnatchedonbothsidesoftheDurrandLine.
With the elderHaqqani in poor health, his son Sirajuddin has assumed daytoday
commandoftheHQNandisbelievedbyU.S.militaryintelligencetohaveeclipsedhis
fatherintermsofbrutalityandreach.TheHQNhasbeencreditedwithmasterminding
a series of sophisticated attacks inAfghanistan in the past two years, including the
April2008assassinationattemptonPresidentHamidKarzai,theJanuary2009attackonthe SerenaHotel inKabul, the July 2009 car bomb attack on the IndianEmbassy in
KabulandamultistagesuicideattackataU.S.militarybaseinKhostinAugust 2008.
Although there has been no concerted effort to improve relations with the local
community,aswiththeQST,theHQNisknowntopayitsoperatives,aswellaslocal
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35
peoplewhotakeuparmsorlaunchattacksonitsbehalf,forsuccessfulmissionsagainst
theAfghangovernmentandNATO.SecurityforcesinKhostsaylocalscanexpecttobe
paid several hundred U.S. dollars to destroy a bridge or school or kill an Afghan
policemanor
soldier.
Killing
asenior
provincial
official,
aU.S.
soldier
or
destroying
a
Coalitionvehiclecanbring in$5,000ormore.Thefeesarenormallypaid inPakistani
Rupees,andcangohigher if theattackersmanage tovideo theevent.93Thenetwork
also issuesNightLetters instructing localsnot to collaboratewith theCoalition, and
warningofdireconsequences if theydisobey. Inone2009NightLetterdistributed in
Paktika,which carried the name of the Islamic Emirate but the logo of the former
Haqqanimadrassa, thegroupprohibitedmembersofthe localcommunityfromusing
roadsbeingbuiltbytheCoalition,barredcommunitymembersfromsendingtheirkids
toschoolandsaidtribalmeetings thathavebeenestablishedby thegovernmentare
alsoprohibited.94
FamilialandTribalCommandStructure
TheHQNcommandstructureremains looserandmore familial than thatof theQST,
withmostmemberscoming fromHaqqanisownZadran tribe.Unlike theQST, there
hasbeennodocumentedevidenceofaneffortbytheHQNleadershiptoassertcontrol
over upward money flows over the past year. Afghan officials and locals in the
southeastandinNorthWaziristansaytheorganizationdoesnotappeartosufferalack
offunding.95NewYorkTimesreporterDavidRohde,whowaskidnappedandheldby
theHQN formore than sevenmonthsalongwith twoAfghan colleagues,described,
both in a newspaper series and in a conversationwith the author,Haqqaniswell
suppliedoperation inNorthWaziristan,therearoperationsbaseforthenetwork,asa
Talibanministate.96NarcoticsdonotappeartoplayamajorroleinHQNfinances
since little if any poppy is cultivated in southeast Afghanistanand the network
appearstodependfarmoreheavilyonkidnapping,protectionracketsandextortionto
raisefundslocally,accordingtoWesternan