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Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2073 October 19, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PEDRO T.

VILLANUEVA,Defendant-Appellant.

Pedro T. Villanueva in his own behalf. Special Prosecutor Filemon R. Consolacionfor appellee.

R E S O L U T I O NMONTEMAYOR, J.:By a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth Division of the defunct People'sCourt after trial of appellant Pedro T. Villanueva on a charge of treason on severalcounts, found him guilty of treason and murder and sentenced him thus -In view of the foregoing consideration, the court, finding the accused Pedro T.Villanueva guilty of the complex crime of treason and murders as defined in Article114 of the Revised Penal Code, in connection with Article 48 of the same code,sentences him to suffer death penalty, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify

the heirs of Cosme Calacasan in the amount of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of JuliaCabilitasan in the amount of P2,000, and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos(P20,000) and the costs of the proceedings.

Villanueva duly appealed to this court. The records were sent up to us not only byvirtue of the appeal but also under the provisions of Rule 118, Section 9, of the Rulesof Court which provides for review and judgment by this Tribunal of all cases in whichthe death penalty shall have been imposed by a court of first instance, whether thedefendant shall have appealed or not.

It appearing that the stenographic notes taken of the testimony of the witnesses whotestified on October 8, 1947, could not be located, and following the recommendationof the solicitor general, a resolution was promulgated on August 1, 1952, remanding

the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the testimony of saidwitnesses.

Thereafter before the said court defendant-appellant Villanueva filed a petition datedAugust 24, 1953, stating that about July 4, 1953, the Chief Executive grantedexecutive clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason, including those whose caseswere pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first withdrawn, supposedlyto give finality to the judgment of the lower court, and asking that he be allowed towithdraw his appeal. Acting upon said petition the Court of First Instance of Iloiloissued an order dated September 10, 1953, directing the return of the case to thisCourt for whatever action it may take in the premises, in view of the petition forwithdrawal of the appeal filed by appellant and because the case had to be reviewedby the Supreme Court anyway regardless of the appeal by the defendant.

The case was considered by us on September 21, 1953. The agenda of this Court onthat date as regards this was prepared by the Clerk of Court's Office only on the basis

of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by the defendant. Our attention was not calledto the fact that defendant had previously appealed from a decision sentencing him todeath, which decision called for an automatic review and judgment by us. So,following the practice of this Tribunal of acting favorably on petitions for withdrawal ofappeals where the briefs have not yet been filed, as in the present case, said petitionfor withdrawal of appeal was granted by resolution of September 21, 1953. On thesame date, however, and presumably after the passing of the resolution, appellantVillanueva filed directly with this court a petition reiterating the request for withdrawalof his appeal previously made with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, attaching to his

petition Exhibits A and B, said to be copies of the conditional pardon and of the letterof the legal assistant in the Office of the President addressed to the director ofprisons. It was only on considering said petition that we realized the nature of thecase and the decision appealed to this Court, the withdrawal of which appeal hadbeen granted by the resolution of September 21, 1953.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed towithdraw his appeal like any other appellant in an ordinary criminal case before thebriefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the case from thejurisdiction of this court which under the law is authorized and called upon to reviewthe decision though unappealed. Consequently, the withdrawal of the appeal in thiscase could not serve to render the decision of the People's Court final. In fact, as wassaid by this court through Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil.,532, speaking on the matter of review by this court of a decision imposing the death

penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is not final, and cannot beexecuted and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon bythe Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered bythe trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment andsentence; that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passesupon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and that this automatic review by theSupreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is something which neitherthe court nor the accused could waive or evade.

Furthermore, when the case was remanded to the lower court for the purpose ofretaking the testimony of those witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the casewas virtually remanded for new trial. Of course, the evidence and the testimonyreceived during the trial before the People's Court which is still intact and available

shall stand and the new trial will be confined to the testimony of the same witnesseswho testified on October 8, 1947, the stenographic notes or transcript of which cannotnow be found. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for the trial court to rendera new decision because the new trial is being held before a new Judge and there isno assurance that the witnesses testifying, altho the very same ones who were on thewitness stand on October 8, 1947, would testify to the same facts and in the samemanner that they did at the former trial, altho they are supposed to do so. (SeeDemetria Obien de Almario vs. Fidel Ibaez, et al., 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 390,81 Phil., 592). Going over the record of the case, we find that it would not be toodifficult for the trial judge to see to it that the said witnesses as far as possible confinethemselves to the same points on which they testified on October 8, 1947, becausethe testimonies of said witnesses including the defendant are referred to anddescribed in the decision of the People's Court on pages 87, 123, and 124 to 129,and that there are only four witnesses including the accused himself.

Examining Exhibits A and B submitted by appellant in relation to this petition for the


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withdrawal of his appeal, we find that although his name appears in the list ofprisoners convicted by the People's Court and supposed to be pardonedconditionally, the pardon itself refers to the remission of the "unexpired portions of theprison sentence terms and the fines of the prisoners listed below who were convictedby the defunct People's Court of treason and committed to the new Bilibid Prison toserve their sentence."1 It is highly doubtful that the pardon could have contemplatedand included appellant herein because his sentence of death does not merely involvea prison term which expires in time. Besides, a death sentence is not exactly servedbut rather executed. 2 Moreover, Exhibit B says that "those prisoners whose cases

are still pending on appeal shall be released only after their appeal has beenwithdrawn." The implication is that the withdrawal of the appeal rendered the decisionof the People's Court final, resulting in conviction, this is to bring it into harmony witharticle VII, section 10 (6) of the Constitution which requires conviction as a conditionprecedent to the exercise of Executive clemency. As we have already stated, despitedefendant's withdrawal of his appeal from the decision imposing the death sentence,there is no definite conviction or sentence until and after this tribunal has reviewed thecase and rendered its own decision affirming, modifying or reversing that of the lowercourt, unless of course in the new decision of the trial court based on the new trial asentence other than death is imposed, in which case there would be no automaticreview by us.

Let the record of this case be again remanded to the Court of First Instance of Iloilofor new trial and thereafter, for a new decision.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, andLabrador, JJ.,concur.


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Manila

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-1446. March 4, 1949.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaint if f-Appellee, v. FILEMON DELGADO,Defendant-Appellant

.

Vicente Delgado for Appellant.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Lucas Lacson forAppellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; EVIDENCE; IDENTITY OF ACCUSED ANDSUFFICIENT OF EVIDENCE TO CONVICT; ALIBI AS A DEFENSE. The factssubstantiated by the evidence for the prosecution constituting the overt acts remainunimpeachable, notwithstanding the denial of the defendant. The alibi defense isentirely flimsy as flimsy as the assertion made by the witnesses for the defense that

the person named F. D. who participated in the mass arrest and looted the inhabitantsof Mambaling and Basak, was different from the herein defendant. Appellant hasbeen thoroughly identified on the record to be the very one who committed the overtacts testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution. The testimony of the witnessesfor the prosecution positively pointed to and identified the appellant not only by namebut also by having actually seen him and maltreated by him, and there is no reasonfor the belief that said prosecution witnesses had falsely accused the appellant of thisgrave crime through ulterior motives.

2. ID.; ID.; ACTS CONSTITUTING ADHERENCE TO THE ENEMY AND GIVINGTHEM AID AND COMFORT. Adherence to the Japanese forces of occupation andgiving them aid and comfort by acting as their spy, undercover man, investigator, andeven killer when necessary to cow and compel the inhabitants to surrender their

firearms and disclose information about the guerrillas has been fully established. Hismanner of investigation and maltreatment of some of his victims like T. S. and P. S.,was so cruel, brutal and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable, that a Filipino cancommit and practise such atrocities especially on his own countrymen. But, evidently,war, confusion and opportunism can and do produce characters and monsterunknown during peace and normal times.

3. ID.; ID.; BRUTALITY WITH WHICH KILLING OR PHYSICAL INJURIES WERECARRIED OUT AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. The appellant may beconvicted only for treason, and the killing and infliction of physical injuries committedby him may not be separated from the crime of treason but should be regarded asacts performed in the commission of the treason, altho, "the brutality with which thekilling or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an aggravatingcircumstance."

D E C I S I O N

MONTEMAYOR, J .:

Before the Peoples Court the appellant Filemon Delgado was charged with treasonunder five counts, was found guilty under four counts of "the crime of treasoncomplexed with the crime of murder," and sentenced "to death penalty by

electrocution," with all the accessories of the law. He is appealing from that decision.

Because of the nature of the offense, especially the extreme penalty imposed, wehave carefully and painstakingly examined the evidence in this case. From saidexamination we are convinced of the guilt of the appellant. The pertinent facts of thiscase may be briefly stated as follows: During the month of July, 1944 in the town ofTalisay, province of Cebu, a Japanese Navy truck and a train coach operated by theJapanese troops were ambushed by the resistance and guerrilla forces. As ameasure of reprisal, on July 29, 1944, a mass arrest or concentration of the maleinhabitants of Dolho, Talisay, Mambaling and Basak was effected. Many Japanesesoldiers accompanied by Filipino spies and undercover men, among them theappellant Filemon Delgado, rounded up a great number of men, some througharrests, others by invitation and order to go to the Basak schoolhouse for a supposedmeeting. In the morning of that day Tereso Sanchez, a guerrilla soldier and Antonio

de la Cerna were arrested in Mambaling and were lodged at the Mambaling chapel.They were later transferred to the Basak schoolhouse where they found hundreds ofmen, among them Jose de la Cerna and Fidencio Delgado and it was there wherethey saw the appellant armed with a revolver, and other Filipino undercover menworking with and helping the Japanese soldiers tying up the hands of those arrested,investigating and torturing them in order to obtain information about the guerrillas andabout firearms they were suspected of possessing. Tereso Sanchez, Antonio de laCerna and Fidencio Delgado saw Jose de la Cerna being suspended in the air andpunched and beaten with an iron bar by appellant Filemon Delgado during hisinvestigation. After extreme torture Jose de la Cerna finally admitted that he had afirearm in his house, after which, the appellant accompanied by other undercover menaccompanied him to his house and took said firearm. Thereafter Jose de la Cernawas taken to the Japanese Military Police headquarters and after a months

confinement he was released. Antonio de la Cerna was also maltreated together withother prisoners by the defendant. Fidencio Delgado was himself tied up, but beforehis time came to be investigated and possibly maltreated by the appellant, hehappened to mention that his surname was Delgado and upon its verification with hisresidence certificate, said appellant released him from confinement, saying that hadhe known it, F idencio should have been released earlier.

The following morning or rather on July 30, 1944, a number of the persons confined inor around the Basak schoolhouse were taken toward the mountains of Toong. Amongthem, were Tereso Sanchez and Antonio de la Cerna. Upon arrival there, theJapanese and Filipino undercover men among them the appellant, proceeded withtheir decision to summarily execute those prisoners who insisted that they did nothave any firearm to surrender. After seeing that several of his companions hadalready been shot to death, Antonio de la Cerna told his captors that he really had a

revolver in his house and he was separated from the group and his life was sparedpresumably to give him a chance to get the said firearm and surrender it to the


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Japanese. Tereso Sanchez was less fortunate. He had no firearm to surrender.Neither did he make any pretense that he had one which he would surrender were itonly to stall for time, suspend his execution and live even only on borrowed time. Sothe appellant simply told him to turn around which he did and Filemon Delgadoimmediately fired at him, hitting him on the back of the head on the occipital region,the bullet coming out thru his left eye. As he fell to the ground the appellant pushedhim down into a ravine. Because he was still moving down below some undercovermen fired parting shots at him, wounding him in the back. Miraculously, however,Sanchez did not die. After the Japanese and Filipino undercover men had left him,

friends and guerrillas finding Sanchez to be still alive helped him up and carried himto a hut where he upon regaining consciousness found himself. There, he stayed forabout a month, his wounds being treated with coconut oil and he lived to tell thisgruesome tale. His testimony of being shot at by appellant was duly confirmed by thetestimony of Antonio de la Cerna.

About August 24, 1944, while plowing his rice field in Banilad, Mandaue, Cebu,Leonardo Ouano was arrested and taken to his house where he found the defendantFilemon Delgado together with about nine undercover men and two Japanesesoldiers surrounding his house. His house was ransacked by them. He wasquestioned about his brother Sulpicio Ouano, a guerrilla soldier. Later in the afternoonEduardo Ouano and Patricio Suico under custody were taken to said house. Patriciowas suspected of being a lieutenant in the volunteer guards. In the evening, the threearrested men were taken to the Japanese Military Police headquarters at the city of

Cebu. There, Leonardo and Patricio were hanged and suspended in the air andbeaten with a wooden stick by the appellant and other undercover men in their effortto make them admit connection with the guerrilla forces, and to reveal thewhereabouts of Sulpicio Ouano, brother of Leonardo. Eduardo Ouano was notmaltreated, but his hands were tied behind his back. Late that night the three men(Leonardo, Eduardo and Patricio) were taken back to the house of Leonardo inBanilad, Mandaue, where they were closely guarded with their hands tied behind theirbacks. The following morning Leonardo and Patricio were hanged and suspended inthe air and severely punished and maltreated by the appellant and his fellowundercover men. All this and what follows was testified to not only by Leonardo butalso by Eduardo who that morning was made to pound rice for the food of theJapanese and Filipino undercover men and by Arcadio Ceniza who had also beentaken to the house of Leonardo and ordered to slaughter and dress a pig for the mess

of the appellant and his companions. While performing their appointed tasks, Arcadioand Eduardo saw all that was happening and was being done to Leonardo andPatricio. After continued beating, Patricio pleaded with the appellant, telling him thathe could not bear the torture any longer. Filemon Delgado told him that he should bemade to suffer longer and more, but evidently seeing that Patricio was collapsing, heordered him lowered to the floor and then he directed three undercover men to takePatricio to the neighboring house of Nicanor Ouano in order to look for hiddenfirearms. On the way and at a distance of about 300 yards Patricio collapsed and fellto the ground and no amount of threat on the part of the undercover men could makehim get up. By order of the appellant Patricio was dragged back to the house ofLeonardo where he was placed on a native sled. Taking hold of a wooden pestle theappellant began to beat up and belabor Patricio who was lying motionless on the sled,and noticing no reaction to the beating and suspecting that Patricio might beunconscious or dead, the appellant ordered a fire to be built under the sled, just below

the head and buttocks of Patricio. His face was burned and his clothing set on fire andstill Patricio did not move. He was dead. By order of the appellant the sled with the

body of Patricio on it was dragged to a spot about 300 yards from the house, wherethe body was taken from the sled and dumped under a buri palm. Pulling out hisbayonet, the appellant slashed the throat of Patricio with it and then thrust thebayonet into the right and left breast of Patricio. The following day, under the buripalm, Patricios widow named Rosario Remedio found her husbands body with theface burned and the neck slashed, and with the help of friends and relatives gave it adecent burial.

The theory of the defense is that the appellant could not have been possibly present

in the arrest, investigation, torture and shooting committed by Japanese soldiers andFilipino undercover men on the inhabitants of the province of Cebu, particularly onJuly 29 and August 24-25, 1944, for the reason that at the time, he was underdetention in the Constabulary barracks after he had been arrested by the Japaneseforces and was made to work in the Japanese air field in Cebu and later delivered tothe Constabulary for custody. It was also claimed that Filemon Delgado mentionedand referred to by prosecution witnesses as one of the spies or undercover men whoparticipated in the arrest, investigation, and torture made and committed on thosedays of July and August, 1944, was a person different from the appellant, thoughbearing the same name. This defense was rejected by the Peoples Court not onlybecause it was sought to be established by witnesses whose veracity andresponsibility were not believed in by it, witnesses like Mariano T. Jaucian, AntonioRacaza, and Eduardo Prieto, all treason indictees who at the time they testified hadalready been convicted and sentenced to death for treason, but also because of the

inherent weakness of the evidence for the defense. We are reproducing a pertinentparagraph of the decision of the trial court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The facts substantiated by the evidence for the prosecution constituting the overtacts alleged in the amended information under counts 4 and 5, remainunimpeachable, notwithstanding the denial of the defendant. The alibi defense isentirely flimsy as flimsy as the assertion made by the witnesses for the defense thatthe person named Filemon Delgado who participated in the mass arrest and lootedthe inhabitants of Mambaling and Basak, was different from the herein defendant.That he has been thoroughly identified on the record to be the very one whocommitted the overt acts testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution, is obvious.There is no scintilla of doubt about it. The witnesses for the defense, after all, deserveno credence on the part of this Court, not only because of their being notorious

characters, but also because the evidence for the defense itself merits no seriousconsideration." (Page 13, decision of trial court.)

On the point of sufficiency of the evidence to convict, we may add that the testimonyof the witnesses for the prosecution positively pointed to and identified the appellantnot only by name but also by having actually seen him and maltreated by him. As amatter of fact, before the trial, some of the government witnesses had been taken tothe stockade where detention prisoners had been kept and Filemon Delgado waspositively and unhesitatingly identified by them. Moreover, there is no reason for thebelief that said prosecution witnesses had falsely accused the appellant of this gravecrime through ulterior motives. On the contrary, at least one of the witnesses,Fidencio Delgado who was a recipient of a favor from the appellant resulting in hisrelease from confinement and perhaps the saving of his life, had more reason totestify in favor rather than against the defendant.

The appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to the Japanese


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forces of occupation and giving them aid and comfort by acting as their spy,undercover man, investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow and compel theinhabitants to surrender their firearms and disclose information about the guerrillashas been fully established. His manner of investigation and maltreatment of some ofhis victims like Tereso Sanchez and Patricio Suico, was so cruel, brutal and inhumanthat it is almost unbelievable, that a Filipino can commit and practise such atrocitiesespecially on his own countrymen. But, evidently, war, confusion and opportunismcan and do produce characters and monsters unknown during peace and normaltimes.

The Peoples Court found the appellant guilty of treason complexed with murder. TheSolicitor General, however, maintains that the offense committed is simple treason,citing the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of People v. Prieto (80 Phil.,138) but accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under article 14, paragraph21, of the Revised Penal Code, and not compensated by any mitigating circumstance,and he recommends the imposition of the penalty of death. We agree with theSolicitor General that on the basis of the ruling of this Court in the case of People v.Prieto, supra, the appellant may be convicted only of treason, and that the killing andinfliction of physical injuries committed by him may not be separated from the crime oftreason but should be regarded as acts performed in the commission of treason,altho, as stated in said case, "the brutality with which the killing or physical injurieswere carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance." We refer, in thepresent case, to the manner Tereso Sanchez was shot, and Patricio Suico was

tortured and finally killed. But while a good number of the justices participating inthese proceedings believe that the appellant is deserving of the death penaltyimposed by the trial court, because of lack of the required number of votes, saidpenalty is hereby reduced to life imprisonment. In addition, the appellant will pay afine of P20,000. With these modification, the decision appealed from, is herebyaffirmed with costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6277 February 26, 1954JUAN D. CRISOLOGO,Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON.

PABLO VILLALOBOS,Respondents.

Antonio V. Raquiza, Floro Crisologo and Carlos Horrilleno for petitioner.

FirstAssistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for

respondents. Pablo Villalobos in his own behalf.

REYES, J. :

The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world warand at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant colonel in the ArmedForces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under article114 of the Revised Penal Code in an information filed in the People's Court. Butbefore the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was onJanuary 13, 1947, indicted for violation of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwiseknown as the Articles of War, before a military court created by the authority of the

Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the firstand third, were those of treason consisting in giving information and aid to the enemyleading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender andcooperate with the enemy, while the second war was that of having certain civilianskilled in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges but guilty of thesecond, he was on May 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment.

With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the People'sCourt, the criminal case in that court against the petitioner was, pursuant to theprovisions of said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga andthere the charges of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon theamended information, petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the

jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his previoussentence in the military court. But the court denied the motion and, after petitioner hadpleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for certiorariand prohibition was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from proceedingwith the trial and dismiss the case.

The petition is opposed by the Solicitor General who, in upholding the jurisdiction ofthe trial judge, denies that petitioner is being subjected to double jeopardy.

As we see it, the case hinges on whether the decision of the military court constitutesa bar to further prosecution for the same offense in the civil courts.

The question is not of first impression in this jurisdiction. In case of U.S. vs. Tubig, 3Phil., 244, a soldier of the United States Army in the Philippines was charged in the

Court of First Instance of Pampanga with having assassinated one Antonio Alivia.Upon arraignment, he pleaded double jeopardy in that he had already been

previously convicted and sentenced by s court-martial for the same offense and hadalready served his sentence. The trial court overruled the plea on the grounds that athe province where the offense was committed was under civil jurisdiction, the militarycourt had no jurisdiction to try the offense. But on appeal, this court held that "onewho has been tried and convicted by a court martial under circumstances giving thattribunal jurisdiction of the defendant and of the offense, has been once in jeopardyand cannot for the same offense be again prosecuted in another court of the samesovereignty." In a later case, Grafton vs. U.S. 11 Phil., 776, a private in the UnitedStates Army in the Philippines was tried by a general court martial for homicide underthe Articles of War. Having been acquitted in that court, he was prosecuted in theCourt of First Instance of Iloilo for murder under the general laws of the Philippines.Invoking his previous acquittal in the military court, he pleaded it in bar of proceedingsagainst him in the civil court, but the latter court overruled the plea and after trialfound him guilty of homicide and sentenced him to prison. The sentence was affirmedby this Supreme Court, but on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, thesentence was reversed and defendant acquitted, that court holding that "defendant,having been acquitted of the crime of homicide alleged to have been committed byhim by a court martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under the authority of theUnited States, cannot be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil courtexercising authority in the Philippines."

There is, for sure, a rule that where an act transgresses both civil and military lawssubjects the offender to punishment by both civil and mil itary authority, a conviction or

an acquittal in a civil court cannot be pleaded as a bar to a prosecution in the militarycourt, and vice versa. But the rule "is strictly limited to the case of a single act whichinfringes both the civil and the military law in such a manner as to constitute twodistinct offenses, one of which is within the cognizance of the military courts and theother a subject of civil jurisdiction" (15 Am. Jur., 72), and it does not apply where bothcourts derive their powers from the same sovereignty. (22 C.J.S., 449.) It therefore,has no application to the present case the military court has convicted the petitionerand the civil court which proposes to try him again derive their powers from onesovereignty and it is not disputed that the charges of treason tried in the court martialwere punishable under the Articles of War, it being as a matter of fact impliedlyadmitted by the Solicitor General that the two courts have concurrent jurisdiction overthe offense charged.

It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court is different fromthat charged in the civil court and that even granting that the offense was identical themilitary court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People'sCourt had previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that theconviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point, it is urged that theamended information filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga contains overtacts distinct from those charged in the military court. But we note that while certainovert acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga court were notspecified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are embraced in the generalcharge of treason, which is a continuous offense and one who commits it is notcriminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt acts "hehas done or might have done for that purpose constitute but a single offense." (Guintovs. Veluz, 144 Off. Gaz., 909; People vs. Pacheco, 2L-4570, promulgated July 31,1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the amended information in the

Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said informationcontains an enumeration of additional overt acts not specifically mentioned in the


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indictment before the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts donot in themselves constitute a new and distinct offense from that of treason, and thisCourt has repeatedly held that a person cannot be found guilty of treason and at thesame time also guilty of overt acts specified in the information for treason even ifthose overt acts, considered separately, are punishable by law, for the simple reasonthat those overt acts are not separate offense distinct from that of treason butconstitutes ingredients thereof. Respondents cite the cases of Melo vs. People, 347off. Gaz., 4631, and People vs. Manolong,447 Off. Gaz., 5104, where this court held:Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant isresponsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the factsexisting at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot besaid to be second jeopardy if indicted for a new offense.

But respondents overlook that in the present case no new facts have supervened thatwould change the nature of the offense for which petitioner was tried in the militarycourt, the alleged additional overt acts specified in the amended information in thecivil court having already taken place when petitioner was indicted in the former court.Of more pertinent application is the following from 15 American Jurisprudence, 56-57:Subject to statutory prohibitions and the interpretation thereof for the purpose ofarriving at the intent of the legislature enacting them, it may be said that as a rule onlyone prosecution may be had for a continuing crime, and that when a n offensecharged consists of a series of acts extending over a period of time, a conviction oracquittal for a crime based on a portion of that period will bar a prosecution covering

the whole period. In such case the offense is single and indivisible; and whether thetime alleged is longer or shorter, the commission of the acts which constitute it withinany portion of the time alleged, is a bar to the conviction for other acts committedwithin the same time. . . .

As to the claim that the military court had no jurisdiction over the case, well known isthe rule that when several courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense, thecourt first acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of theothers. This rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the person of the defendantshall have first been obtained by the court in which the first charge was filed. (22C.J.S., pp. 186-187.) The record in the present case shows that the information fortreason in the People's Court was filed on March 12, 1946, but petitioner had not yetbeen arrested or brought into the custody of the court - the warrant of arrest had not

even been issued - when the indictment for the same offense was filed in the militarycourt on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited, mere priority in the filing of thecomplaint in one court does not give that court priority to take cognizance of theoffense, it being necessary in addition that the court where the information is filed hascustody or jurisdiction of the person of defendant.

It appearing that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil court is thesame, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts derivetheir powers from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out by the military court to thepetitioner should, in accordance with the precedents above cited, be a bar topetitioner's further prosecution for the same offense in the Court of First Instance ofZambales.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorariand prohibition is granted and the criminal case

for treason against the petitioner pending in that court ordered dismissed. Withoutcosts.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labradorand Concepcion, JJ.,concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2189 November 3, 1906

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ETAL.,Defendants-Appellants.

Aguedo Velarde and Pineda and Escueta, for appellants. Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

CARSON, J. :

The appellants in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila ofthe crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Governmentof the United States in the Philippine Islands and the Government of the PhilippineIslands, as defined and penalized in section 4 of Act No. 292 of the PhilippineCommission.

The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, with

hard labor, and $3,000 fine, and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon, and each ofthem, to three years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and a fine of $2,000, and all andeach of the said appellants to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the trialand to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to paytheir respective fines.\

The evidence of record conclusively establishes that during the latter part of the year1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos,resident in the city of Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government ofthe United States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and establishing in itsstead a government to be known as the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina;that one Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy and oneArtemio Ricarte as chief of the military forces to the organized in the Philippines in the

furtherance of the plans of the conspirators; that toward the end of December, 1903the said Ricarte came to Manila from Hongkong in hidding on board the steamshipYuensang; that after his arrival in the Philippines he held a number of meetings in thecity of Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was perfected the above-mentioned conspiracy hatched in Hongkong that at these meetings new memberswere taken into the conspiracy and plans made for the enlistment of an army ofrevolution and the raising of money by national and private loans to carry on thecampaign; that to this end bonds were issued and commissions as officers in therevolutionary army were granted to a number of conspirators, empowering the officersthus appointed to raise troops and take command thereof; and that the conspiratorsdid in fact take the field and offered armed resistance to the constituted authorities inthe Philippines, only failing in their design of overthrowing the Government because oftheir failure to combat successfully with the officers of the law who were sent againstthem and of the failure of the people to rise en masse in response to their

propaganda.

It further appears from the evidence that the appellant Francisco Bautista, a residentof the city of Manila, was an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote andnotified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to aid him in his journey, Bautistaforwarded to him secretly 200 pesos; that after the arrival of Ricarte, Bautista waspresent, taking part in several of the above-mentioned meetings whereat the plans ofthe conspirators were discussed and perfected, and that at one of these meetingsBautista, in answer to a question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessarypreparations had been made and that he "held the people in readiness."

It further appears that the appellant, Tomas Puzon, united with the conspiratorsthrough the agency of one Jose R. Muoz, who was proven to have been a primeleader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorizedto distribute bonds and nominate and appoint certain officials, including a brigadier-general of the signal corps of the proposed revolutionary forces; that at the time whenthe conspiracy was being brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held severalconferences with the said Muoz whereat plans were made for the cominginsurrection; that at one of these conferences Muoz offered Puzon a commission asbrigadier-general of the signal corps and undertook to do his part in organizing thetroops; and that at a later conference he assured the said Muoz that he had things inreadiness, meaning thereby that he had duly organized in accordance with the termsof his commission.

Puzon at the trial declared that he had never united himself with the conspirators; that

he had accepted the appointment as brigadier-general of the signal corps of therevolutionary forces with no intention of ever taking any further action in the matter,and merely because he did not wish to vex his friend Muoz by refusing to do so, andthat when Muoz offered him the appointment as brigadier-general he did so in "ajoking tone," and that he, Puzon, did not know that Ricarte was in Manila organizingthe conspiracy at that time.

These statements, however (except in so far as they corroborate the testimony ofMuoz as to the fact that he had several interviews with Puzon at which plans wereentered into for the advancement of the cause of the conspirators), can not beaccepted as true in the light of a written statement signed by Puzon himself at thetime when he was first arrested, part of which is as follows:

Q. What is your name and what is your age, residence, and occupation? - A. Myname is Tomas Puzon; born in Binondo in the Province of Manila; 37 years of age;married; by profession a teacher of primary and secondary schools, and residing inCalle Concepcion, No. 195, district of Quiapo.

Q. Do you know Artemio Ricarte? - A. Personally I do not know him, but by name,yes.\

Q. Did you have any information that Ricarte was in these Islands and with whatobject he came here? And if you know it to be true, through whom did you get suchinformation? - A. In the first place I had notice of his coming to the Islands as well ashis object by reading the newspapers of Manila, and secondly because J. R. Muoztold me the same on one occasion when I was in his house to visit him.

Q. Did you acquire this information through any other person? - A. No, sir; I have nomore information than that which I have mentioned.


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Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by Ricarte? - A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is the employment ( empleo) which you have in this organization, and who isit who invited you to join it? - A. J. R. Muoz, who is general of division of this neworganization, spoke to me with much instance, asking me to accept employment asbrigadier-general, chief of signal corps, to which I, on account of his request and inview of the fact that the said Muoz is a friend of mine from my youth, acceded;nevertheless I have organized absolutely nothing in respect to this matter.

Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you any commission for it? - A.Yes, sir; I accepted said employment and although they gave me an order to organizein my brigade I did not do it, because I had neither the confidence nor the will.

Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor the will to carry out what wasintrusted to you, why did you accept employment as general of the brigade? - A. Iaccepted it on account of friendship and not to vex a friend, but I never have theintention of fulfilling the obligations.

Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that he made thisstatement, but he attempted to explain it away by saying that when he made i t he wasso exited that he did not know just what he was saying. He does not allege thatimproper means were taken to procure the confession, and it was proven at the trialthat it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation,

threat, menace, or promise of reward or leniency. The accused appears to be anintelligent man and was for eighteen years a school-teacher and later a telegraphoperator under the Spanish Government, and during the insurrection he held acommission as an officer in the signal corps of the revolutionary army. His confessionis clear and intelligible and in no way supports his pretense that he was so excited asnot to know what he was saying when he made it, and its truth and accuracy in so farit inculpates him is sustained by other evidence of record in this case.

It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer ofthe military forces of the conspiracy should not be considered as evidence againsthim in the light of the decisions of this court in the cases of the United States vs.Antonio de los Reyes1(2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs.Silverio Nuez et al.2 (3Off. Gaz., 408), the United States vs.Eusebio de la Serna et al.3(3 Off. Gaz., 528),

and United States vs.Bernardo Manalo et al.4

(4 Off. Gaz., 570). But the case at baris to be distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that the record clearlydisclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the apppointment inquestion and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance, andthat the charge in this case is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accusedaccepted the appointment is taken into consideration merely as evidence of hiscriminal relations with the conspirators. In the first of these cases - the United Statesvs.De los Reyes - the accused was charged with treason, and the court found thatthe mere acceptance of a commission by the defendant, nothing else being doneeither by himself or by his companions, was not an "overt act" of treason within themeaning of the law, but the court further expressly held that

That state of affairs disclosed body of evidence, . . . the playing of the game ofgovernment like children, the secretaries, colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags

and seals and commission, all on proper, for the purpose of duping and misleadingthe ignorant and the visionary . . . should not be dignified by the name of treason.

In the second case - the United States vs.Nuez et al. -- wherein the accused werecharged with brigandage, the court held that, aside from the possession ofcommissions in an insurgent band, there was no evidence to show that it they hadcommitted the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared that they had never united withany party of brigands and never had been in any way connected with such partiesunless the physical possession of these appointments proved such relation," and thatit appeared that each one of the defendants "were separately approached at differenttimes by armed men while working in the field and were virtually compelled to acceptthe commissions."

In the case of the United States vs.de la Serna et al. it was contended that de laSerna had confessed that "he was one of the members of the pulajanes, with acommission as colonel," but the court was of opinion that the evidence did not sustaina finding that such confession had in fact been made, hence the doctrine laid down inthat decision, "that the mere possession of such an appointment, when it is not shownthat the possessor executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does notconstitute sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant," applies only the case ofEnrique Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record was "the fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant was found at his house."

In the case of the United States vs.Bernardo Manalo et al. there was testimony thatfour appointments of officials in a revolutionary army were found in a trunk in thehouse of one Valentin Colorado, and the court in said case reaffirmed the doctrine

that "the mere possession of the documents of this kind is not sufficient to convict,"and held, furthermore, that there was "evidence in the case that at the time thesepapers were received by the appellant, Valentin Colorado, he went to one of theassistant councilmen of the barrio in which lived, a witness for the Government,showed him the envelope, and stated to him he had received these papers; that hedidn't know what they were and requested this councilman to open them. Thecoucilman did not wish to do that but took the envelope and sent it to the councilmanJose Millora. We are satisfied that this envelope contained the appointments inquestion and that the appellant did not act under the appointment but immediatelyreported the receipt of them to the authorities."

It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in no wiseconnected with them to some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that such

person would afterwards accept the commission and thus unite himself with them,and it is even possible that such an appointment might be forwarded in the mail orotherwise, and thus come into the possession of the person thus nominated, and thatsuch appointment might be found in his possession, and, notwithstanding all this, theperson in whose possession the appointment was found might be entirely innocent ofall intention to join the conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators to use hisname in this manner nor to send such a commission to him. Indeed, cases are notunknown in the annals of criminal prosecutions wherein it has been proven that suchappointments have been concealed in the baggage or among the papers of theaccused persons, so that when later discovered by the officers of the law they mightbe used as evidence against the accused. But where a genuine conspiracy is shownto have existed as in this case, and it is proven that the accused voluntarily acceptedan appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly betaken into consideration as evidence of his relations with the conspirators.

Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the


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testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court,to support a conviction for the crime of treason should be applied in this case, but thiscourt has always held, in conformance with the decisions of the Federal courts of theUnited States, that the crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate anddistinct offense from the crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is notapplicable in such cases. ( In re Bollman, 4 Cranch, 74; U. S. vs.Mitchell, 2 Dall.,348.)

The evidence of record does not sustain the conviction of Aniceto de Guzman. Thefinding of his guilt rest substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds fromone of the conspirators, such bonds having been prepared by the conspirators for thepurpose of raising funds for carrying out the plans of the conspiracy, but it does notaffirmatively appear that he knew anything of the existence of the conspiracy or that,when he received the bonds wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of thebundle was, nor that ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect tothese bonds. He, himself, states that when he opened the bundle and discovered thenature of the contents he destroyed them with fire, and that he never had anydealings with the conspirators in relation to the conspiracy or the object for which itwas organized.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment and sentence before us, in so far as itaffects the said Aniceto de Guzman, should be reversed, with his proportionate shareof the costs of both instances de oficio, and that the said Anecito de Guzman should

be acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and set a liberty forthwith, and thatthe judgment and sentence of the trial court, in so far as it applies to FranciscoBautista and Tomas Puzon, should be, and is hereby, affirmed, except so far as itimposes subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay theirrespective fines, and, there being no authority in law of such provision, so much of thesentence as undertakes to impose subsidiary imprisonment is hereby reversed.

After ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, when the record willbe returned to the trial court for execution. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur. Mapa, and Willard, JJ.,concur as to the penalty imposed upon Bautista and dissent as to that imposed uponPuzon.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4663October 9, 1909

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PEDRO CABOLA, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellants.

Wade H. Kitchens and J. Ostrand, for appellants. Office of the Solicitor-GeneralHarvey, for appellee.

MORELAND, J. :The defendants, Pedro Cabola, Urbano Ramos, Claro Ramos, Rafael Apostol, PerdoRamos, Gregorio Ramos, Agustin Castro, Martin Soriano, Blas Ramos, GenaroSison, Domingo Macaraeg, Carlos Caguioa, Domingo Caguioa, Antonio Romero,Fabian Rosario. Inocencio Torio, Nicolas Abalos, Roman Prado, Diego Cansino,Ricardo Fernandez, Francisco Fernandez, Eugenio Lomibao, Ciriaco Verzosa,Domingo Archangel, and Celedonio Ramos, were charged with the crime of violatingsection 4 of Act no. 292 of the Philippine Commission, enacted for the purpose ofpunishing those who should enter into a conspiracy to destroy the Government of the

United States in the Philippine Islands.

The defendants were tried in the Court of First Instance of the Province ofPangasinan and were, with the exception of Nicolas Abalos, Martin Soriano, BlasRamos, and Domingo Caguioa, on the 15th day of January, 1908, declared guilty ofthe crime charged and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

From the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed thereunder thedefendants Celedonio Ramos and Inocencio Torio appealed to this court. None of theother defendants appealed to this court. None of the other defendants appealed andthe judgment of the court below is being executed against them.

It appears from the proofs that in or about the month of August, 1907, in the pueblo of

Lingayen, in the Province of Pangasinan, Pedro Cabola, in conjunction with otherindividuals, by means of the pacto de sangre, organized a Katipunan Society, whichhad for its object the destruction by force of the Government of the United States inthe Philippine Islands and the establishment by said defendants of anothergovernment in the form of a military organization in which Pedro Cabola should figureas supreme head, Urbano Ramos as a lieutenant-colonel, Claro Ramos and RafaelApostol as comandantes, Pedro Ramos as secretary, Gregorio Ramos, AgustinCastro, Martin Soriano, Genaro Sison, Domingo Macaraeg, Carlos Caguioa, DomingoCaguioa, Antonio Romero, Fabian Rosario, Inocencio Torio, Nicolas Abalos, RomanPrado, Pedro Miranda, Diego Casino, and Ricardo Fernandez as captains, FranciscoFernandez, Eugenio Lomibao, and Ciriaco Verzosa as lieutenants, DomingoArchangel as military governor of the pueblo of San Carlos and Celedonio Ramos asmilitary governor of the pueblo of Lingayen. Under this government the Province ofPangasinan was divided into six zones or military districts.

The evidence clearly and indubitably shows the existence of such society and the

seditious character of its purposes. It shows that most of the defendants attendedvarious meetings of said society, at which Pedro Cabola made revolutionary andseditious speeches; and that many of the defendants signed a document ordocuments seditious in character, their clearly indicated purpose being the destructionof the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands. Many of thedefendants were found in possession of commission from Pedro Cabola appointingthem officers in his military organization. Several of the defendants confessed theirguilt to the public officials and related facts connecting many of the other defendantswith the society in question.

As to the appellant Celedonio Ramos, he was present at a meeting of the KatipunanSociety held on the 23d day of August, 1907, in the barrio of Taloctoc, at which PedroCabola made an inflammatory and seditious speech and at which it was resolved toconstruct in an isolated place a shelter for 25,000 soldiers who should be furnishedwith guns and ammunition, which, according to the orator, had already been landed atBinangonan by the Japanese. It also appears that Ramos was elected to the office ofmilitary president of the pueblo of Lingayen at a meeting of the society held in themonth of August, 1907, near the home of said Ramos.

As to the appellant Inocencio Torio, it appears from the evidence that he was amember of the Katipunan Society above referred to and that he knew of its seditiousand revolutionary character; that he was present at said meeting in the barrio ofTaloctoc on the 23d of August, 1907, when Pedro Cabola pronounced the seditious

discourse already referred to; that he was a captain in organization; and that hesigned Exhibit A-4, a document admittedly of a revolutionary and seditious character.

A careful reading of the proofs adduced at the trial, briefly outlined above, induces theconclusion is irresistibly that the appellants are guilty of the crime charged.

The judgment of the lower court is, therefore, affirmed with costs against theappellants.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.


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Manila

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaint if f-Appellee, v. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIOI. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN

HIONG, and JOHN DOES, Accused-Appel lants.

D E C I S I O N

MELO, J .:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Courtfor sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersignedponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.chanrob1esvirtua1 1aw 1ibraryIn the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the

PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene,2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value ofP40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on,Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded,with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by EmilioChangco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, includingaccused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took completecontrol of the vessel. Thereafter, Accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crewmembers to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front andrear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel.The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo,Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleadingradio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of thevessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine AirForce and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yieldednegative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore andcruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed toarrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991,arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18nautical miles from Singapores shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride"

anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transferthe vessels cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride." Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong

supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after aninterruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30,1991.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed thetransfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vesselremained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in threebatches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities fora period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The firstbatch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven byaccused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them toImus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew inproceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different placesin Metro Manila.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew,called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. Thecrew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incidentwas also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers andmembers of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates werepresent at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days ofsurveillance, Accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBIheadquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at AguinaldoHi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed toevade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, Accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at thelobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation ofPresidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, andnine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committedas follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both datesinclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with

high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping oneanother, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and


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seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleumproducts, together with the complement and crew members, employing violenceagainst or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel toproceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned tothe Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.chanrob1es virtua11aw 1ibraryCONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the RegionalTrial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Uponarraignment, Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereuponensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding someinconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer ofany cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having theirown respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2,1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with CaptainEdilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached theseashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel.

They were told that the work was l ight and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreedeven though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned thevessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone toSingapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in themorning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteendays of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses.There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was athome sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of EmilioChangco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidencethat he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, andlater completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two yearson board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as PortCaptain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, includingshipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. Itowned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changcoand his cohorts, Hiongs name was listed in the companys letter to the MercantileSection of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radiotelephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker,

who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singaporedollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan,

the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceededto the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, uponhis return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-shiptransfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated byPaul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and wasgiven the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, togetherwith Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward avessel called "M/T Galilee." Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making thetransfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authoritiesbefore departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a portclearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan,and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through theimmigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee." The brokersthen told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer ofthe oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/TGalilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiongclaimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latterspersonal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "NaviPride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which"Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed thepayment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning ofMarch 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased bythe firm" from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the firsttransfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks,including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfertook ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full forthe transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vesselsand wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a brokeror ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines todiscuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer,this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel wasscheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at AlphaHotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." Aperson by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changcohimself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco,Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested byNBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the

crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:


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WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is herebyrendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, AndresInfante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of thecrime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No.532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death.However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose thedeath penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., andCecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is herebymeted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the RevisedPenal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, VirgilioLoyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to thePNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused canno longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly andseverally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00,Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong SanHiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the"M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to saidcorporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, tothe Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87,Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused

Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported toSingapore.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the NationalBureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this caseprovided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules andregulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. Withcosts against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellantsmay be summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that thetrial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time theywere being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby deprivingthem of their constitutional right to procedural due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered hisappearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, oron February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a memberof the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven

witnesses for the accused.

Further, Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformlycontend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physicalviolence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to readthe contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informedof their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that theprosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime ofqualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew whototaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated thecrime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodgedon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge thatEmilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or thatthe cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) thetrial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracyunder Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice whenthe acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine

waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial,to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual conclusions withoutevidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the evidenceadduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice underSection 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal bydirect participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to beinformed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do notprove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy.He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/TTabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not awarethat the vessel and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the informationwith qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convictedfor acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminaljurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the Accused-Appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legaleffects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellantsduring the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence ofcounsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that theprosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants

committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate thecrime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant


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Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when theacts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters andterritory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) wasexecuted by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they wererepresented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representationduring the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made withthe full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, Accused-Appellants, asrepresented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that saidaccused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of thesubject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same.They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn,February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himselfin person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment topromulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalitiesof trial. However, it is also provided by law that" [r]ights may be waived, unless thewaiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs orprejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the

Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that" [u]pon motion, theaccused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears tothe court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." Byanalogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practiceof law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently andproperly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of therecord will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule thatthere was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with thefull assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of dueprocess cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made(People v. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson v. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigationmay not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offenseshall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competentand independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford theservices of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waivedexcept in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiatethe free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall

be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section aswell as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birthto the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioningduring custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right toremain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, andthat he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Thedefendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is madevoluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringentrequirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions ofthe accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of theMiranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of theaforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "f ruit from the poisonous tree doctrine,"a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v.United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source(the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivativeevidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the

principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain otherevidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidencesubsequently obtained (People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in thiscase, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without avalid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information isderived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence againstthem.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there issufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree withthe sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and"UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire andconfederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now JusticeRomeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals

. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers andmembers of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to thesaid Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" onMarch 2, 1991, at about 6:30 oclock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro,with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew ofthe vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles offthe shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong uponwhich the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for theprice of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .

x x x

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were onboard the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April


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10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in themind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see andidentify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused weretaken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, BenjaminSuyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "JointAffidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of thepirates.

x x x

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accusedadmitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening ofMarch 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination, whichturned out to be off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial courts finding that accused-appellants defense of denialis not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight isgiven to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnessesthan to the accuseds plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime(People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead,Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by threecomplete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian

Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing withone another along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to workon board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, saidaccused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period oftime without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing theirdestination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for along voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with humanexperience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon,Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 oclockin the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5)cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changcos defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house inBacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently aweak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v.Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, anddifficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidencethat, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to havebeen in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewiseunable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of a testimony isaccorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity toobserve directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certainwitness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial courts finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists whentwo or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony

and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, oneneed not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in everyact or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in theexecution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times whenconspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated toone another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a commoncriminal design.

We affirm the trial courts finding that Emilio Changco,Accused-appellants Tulin,Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the"M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco wasto fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan,Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crewand the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions o

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