Projectsubmittedby:

CincinnatiPoliceDepartment

PoliceChiefEliotIsaac

LieutenantMatthewHammer,M.S.SeniorCrimeAnalyst,BlakeChristenson,M.A.

CincinnatiPoliceDepartment

Dr.TamaraD.Madensen(Ph.D)UniversityofNevada,LasVegas

June2017

HermanGoldsteinAwardSubmission

P.I.V.O.T.Place-basedInvestigationsofViolentOffenderTerritories

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PROJECTSUMMARY

ProjectTitle:Place-basedInvestigationsofViolentOffenderTerritories(P.I.V.O.T)

Scanning

In2015,theCityofCincinnatiandtheCincinnatiPoliceDepartment(CPD)madereducing

violence, specificallygun-relatedviolence, aprimaryobjective.Analyses revealed that23

micro-locationsexperiencedahighlydisproportionateamountofgunviolence–although

theselocationsmakeuponly1.4%ofthecity’slandmass,theyaccountforover42%ofall

shooting incidents. Further, these locations have remained chronically violent over time.

Crimedataanalyses, coupledwithresidentsurveys,confirmedthat these incidentscould

be addressed using a problem-oriented policing approach (as defined by the CHEERS

criteria).

Analysis

A new place-based investigations policing strategy was developed to address the

systemicallyviolentlocationsandcomplementCPD’sexistingfocused-deterrencestrategy.

Thisnewstrategy–Place-basedInvestigationsofViolentOffenderTerritoriesorP.I.V.O.T.–

focusesonidentifyinganddisruptingcrimeplacenetworks.Thesenetworksincludecrime

sites,butalsoplacesusedbyoffendersthatdonottypicallycometotheattentionofpolice.

Aninitialprojectsitewasselected(Baltimore&McHenry)andaP.I.V.O.T.team(alongwith

community partners) conducted investigations to uncover the location’s crime place

network.Theirlocationanalysesuncovered6majorgunviolencefacilitatorsatnetworked

places, including: unregulated parking space, lack of place management, unsecured

structures, illegal vending activities, inadequate lighting, and blighted/abandoned

properties.

Response

TheP.I.V.O.T.investigationsteamworkedwithover20public/privatepartnerstodisrupt

thecrimeplacenetwork.Thesepartners,withcommunityinputandsupport,modifiedor

eliminatedtheidentifiedviolencefacilitators.Responsesincluded,butwerenotlimitedto,

permanent on-street parking restrictions, obtaining compliance from rental property

owners, code enforcement and commercial/retail property owner partnerships, directed

patrols,lighting,propertydemolition,anddevelopingacommunityparkandwalkingtrail.

Assessment

Since the initiation of the P.I.V.O.T. project (June 2016), numbers of shooting victims at

Baltimore & McHenry have fallen dramatically (over 80%), the time between shooting

incidents increased from an average of 32 to 130 days, and gun-related violence, as

measuredbyaviolencescoremetric,decreasedfromahighpre-interventionscoreof172.4

to a low (and most recent) post-intervention score of 26.8. Observable blight at this

location has also decreased by over 29%. There is little to no evidence of crime

displacement, but analyses indicate a possible diffusion of crime control benefits. The

P.I.V.O.T.investigationsteamisnowworkingin3othersites,withpreliminaryresultsthat

supporttheeffectivenessofthisplace-basedinvestigationsapproach.

(393Words)

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SCANNING

CincinnatiPoliceDepartmentandJurisdiction

TheCincinnatiPoliceDepartment(CPD)istheprimarylawenforcementagencyfortheCity

ofCincinnatiandprovidesafullrangeofpoliceservicesto52diverseneighborhoods(see

AppendixA).Cincinnatispansapproximately77squaremiles,islocatedinsouthwestOhio,

and is third largestcity in thestate.The2010U.S.Censusreports296,943residents live

within CPD’s jurisdiction, with racial demographics of mostly white (52.7%) and

black/African-American(47.8%)residents.

TheCPDcurrentlyemploysapproximately1009swornofficersand153civilianemployees.

Led by Police Chief Eliot Isaac, law enforcement operations are divided among four

Bureaus:Patrol,Investigations,Administration,andSupport.In2015,theFBIreported3.7

violent crimes per 1,000 U.S. residents – CPD recorded 9.3 violent crimes per 1,000

residents,farabovethenationalaverage.1

Cincinnati’sResponsetoViolence

In 2015, the City of Cincinnati and CPD made reducing violence, and specifically gun-

relatedviolence, aprimaryobjective.TheDepartment committed resources todevelopa

newpolicingstrategyaimedatuncoveringandaddressingcrimeopportunitystructuresin

historically violent locations. CPD conducted a series of analyses aimed at identifying

systemically(chronicorpersistent)violenthotspotsthroughoutthecity.Themethodology

used to identify these locations, developed by Senior Crime Analyst Blake Christenson,

identifiedgunviolencelocationsbasedonthedataandmethodologyoutlinedinTable1.

The methodology goes

beyond simple hotspot

analysis by (1) analyzing

four different data

sources, (2) weighting

events by time (recent

events areweightedmore heavily than distal events), (3) using a kernel density search

radiustofocusattentiononclustersofviolentevents,and(4)givingmoreweighttothose

places that fell within the top 1% of violent locations across all three time periods

examined.Toconductthiskerneldensityanalysis,thecitywasdividedinto100’x100’cells

(n=225,618),whichrepresentsapproximately¼oftheaveragelengthofaCincinnaticity

block.Clustersof these cells (micro-locations) thatproducedgunviolence scoresof8or

higher(gunviolencescoresrangedfrom0to12)wereselectedforfurtheranalysis.Figure

1depictsthe23locationsthatmetthesecriteria.

AdoptingaProblem-OrientedModeltoReduceGunViolence

Additionalanalysesinthesystemicallyviolentlocationsrevealedthatgunviolenceinthese

placesmeteachofthesixrequiredelementsnecessarytodefineaproblem.2Ananalysisof

theCHEERScriteria,asdefinedbyEck&Clarke(2003),revealed:

GunViolenceIndicators(n=4)

TimePeriodsExamined(n=3)

Locations

Shootingincidents PriortoDecember2015: 100’x100’cells

Robberyincidents 1yearprior 23gunviolence

Gunoffenseincidents 3yearsprior clustersidentified

Shots/shootingCFS 5yearsprior

Table 1: Selection of Systemically Violent Locations

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Figure1:SystemicallyViolentMicro-Locations(n=23)

• Community–Incidentsofgunviolencenegativelyimpactcommunities.Asexpectedand consistentwith the literature, the systemically violent locations identified fell

withindisadvantagedneighborhoods.Assuch,thetargetsofthesecrimes(residents

and some local businesses) have fewer resources available to themand aremore

vulnerablethanthosewhocanaffordprivatesecurityontheirproperties.Aspartof

the scanning phase, a resident survey was conducted by volunteers and the

Community Police Partnering Center in these locations (n = 412). Survey results

revealed that over25%of residentsplanned tomoveout their communitiesover

thenextyear(Table2summarizesthisandothersurveyresults).

• Harm–Theharmstemmingfromtheseincidentsincludeactsofviolence(describedbelow)andanincreaseincitizenfearofcrime.Accordingtoresidentsurveys,46.7%

feltthattheirneighborhoodswereunsafe,70%worriedaboutbecomingarobbery

victim,and67%worriedthattheywouldbecomevictimsofassault.Almost81%of

residents reported that they worried about the safety of children in their

neighborhoods.

• Expectation–Thepublicexpectsthepoliceto interveneandfindsolutionstothisproblem.Thissentimentisevidencedbyresidentsurveydatainwhichover73%of

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theresidentsgavespecificexamplesofwhattheythoughtthepolicecoulddoordo

better to prevent crime (e.g., community partnerships, foot patrols, talk with

residents).

• Events – Gun violence involves at least three types of dangerous behaviors:predatory (e.g., an offenderwho intentionally preys on a specific victim), conflict

(e.g., gang-on-gang violence), and

endangerment(e.g.,innocentbystandersin

a drive-by shooting).3Places with these

typesofactivitiesarealsooftenassociated

withviolenceagainstpoliceofficers.Inthe

23micro-locationsidentified(whichmake

up only 1.4% of the city’s landmass),

14.6% of officer injuries (67 of 460) and

24.0% of non-compliant behaviors (1,516

of 6,315 obstruction of official business,

resisting arrest and assault on a police

officercharges–behaviorsthatcreaterisk

of officer injury) occurred between 2012

and2015.

• Recurring–Although theviolentmicro-locationsmakeuponly1.4%of the city’slandmass,adisproportionamountofviolencerecursintheseplaces.Figure2shows

that 14.4% of all Part I crimes, 25.7% of Part I violent crimes, and 42.6% ofshootingsinvolvingavictimoccurredinthesesmallgeographicareas.

Figure2:PercentofTotalConcentrationsinSystemicallyViolentLocations

Percentofresidentsthat… PercentPlannedtomoveoutoftheir

communityinthenextyear25.1

Felttheirneighborhoodswas

unsafe46.7

Wasworriedaboutbecominga

robberyvictim70.0

Wasworriedaboutbecomingan

assaultvictim67.0

Wasworriedaboutthesafetyof

neighborhoodchildren80.7

Gavespecificexamplesofwhat

theythoughtpoliceshoulddo73.3

Table2:Early2016ResidentSurveyResults

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• Similar– All of the incidents included in the data analysis involved violent gun-relatedcrimes(seeTable1fortypesofevents).

The CHEERS analysis suggested that the problem of gun violence in Cincinnati could be

addressedusing aproblem-orientedpolicing approach.This led to thedevelopmentof a

newplace-basedpolicingstrategyandtheselectionofaninitialprojectsite.

ANALYSIS

Threeobjectiveswere identifiedduring thesecondphaseof theproblem-solvingproject:

(1)developapolicingstrategytoaddresssystemicallyviolentmicro-locations,(2)selectan

initialprojectsite,and(3)analyzedata/gatherintelligencetocreateatailoredresponse.

P.I.V.O.T.:ANewPlace-BasedPolicingStrategy

In 2007, the CPD adopted CIRV, the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence, to address

gangviolencethroughafocuseddeterrenceapproach.4Apartnershipamongmultiplelaw

enforcement agencies (local, state and federal), social service providers, and the

communitywasestablishedtodeliveraclearmessagetoviolentstreetgroupsthatviolence

would not be tolerated and future offenders would face enhanced prosecution. CIRV

significantlyreducedgangmemberinvolvedhomicidesbyfocusing

onnetworksofoffendersandvictims,5butthedeclineinviolencewasnotsustained.Placeswhereviolenceconcentratedpriortothe

implementation of CIRV began to experience increases in violent

activity over time. In the fall of 2015, former CPD CaptainMaris

Heroldwastaskedwithdevelopingaplace-basedpolicingstrategy

to reduce gun violence. The Department hoped to increase

sustainability of their violence reduction efforts by couplingCIRV

with a place-based strategy to address all three sides of the

problemanalysis(crime)triangle:offenders,victims,andplaces.

Like crime among offenders and victims, crime is not randomly

distributed across places, as confirmed by the analysis conducted during the scanning

phase.Recentadvancesinresearchandtheorysuggestthat,alsolikeoffendersandvictims,

crimeplacesarenetworked.6Crimeplacenetworksprovide the“infrastructure”necessaryforoffenderstooperateillicitmarketsandengageinviolentbehavior.Ifleftunaddressed,

new (or returning) offenderswill use these networks to continue to engage in criminal

activity.

Crimeplacenetworksextendbeyondlocationswherecrimeoccurstoincludeothertypes

of places used by offenders. These places often remain hidden without targeted police

investigation.Crimeplacenetworkscanincludefourtypesofplaces(CS4):

1. CrimeSites—specificplaceswherecrimeoccurs

2. ConvergentSettings—publicplaceswhereoffendersroutinelymeet

3. ComfortSpaces—privatemeeting,staging,andsupplyinglocations

4. CorruptingSpots—placesthatencouragecriminalactivityinotherlocations7

Problem Analysis Triangle Source: popcenter.org

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Basedonthisresearch,anewCPDpolicingstrategy,Place-basedInvestigationsofViolent

Offender Territories (P.I.V.O.T.), was developed to disrupt the crime place networks in

Cincinnati’s systemically violent locations by supplementing previous and on-goingCIRV

violence reduction activities. This strategy relies on investigative techniques to uncover

crime place networks (e.g.,gatheringintelligence, conductingsurveillance, anddevelopinginformation sources and confidential informants) and a citywide response to engage inproblem-solving and identify resources to change crime-facilitating dynamics in the

targetedlocations.Figure3depictsageneraloutlineoftheP.I.V.O.T.policingstrategy.

Figure3:P.I.V.O.T.Strategy

A P.I.V.O.T. investigations team, led by LieutenantMatthewHammer,was established in

spring of 2016. This team consisted of the Lieutenant, a supervising sergeant and six

investigators with diverse

backgrounds(fourofficersandtwo

crimeanalysts–seeAppendixB).

A citywideP.I.V.O.T.ReviewBoard,

made up of representatives from

various city departments and

community agencies was

established.ThisReviewBoardwas

designed tomeet every twoweeks

to review CPD investigation

findings, physically observe the

identified location, provide

additional intelligence on the Figure4:P.I.V.O.T.ReviewBoardPartnerships

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history of the location (using historical data from their respective

departments/organizations), and offer recommendations and resources to dismantle the

identifiedcrimeplacenetwork.Figure4providesexamplesofagenciesandorganizations

whocontributetotheP.I.V.O.T.ReviewBoardandstrategy.

InitialProjectSite

The first site selected for investigation and interventionwas Baltimore&McHenry (see

Figure 5). This location experienced year-over-year increases in shooting victimization

between2013-2015.With18shootingvictimsin2015alone(with1fataland3non-fatal

shootings occurring in December, 2015 – just prior to the selection of the project site),

preliminary analysis revealed intense clustering of shootings on two intersecting street

segments. Several indicators of open-air drug market activity were present (based on

P.I.V.O.T. investigators’ observations of social and physical disorder and open-air drug

transactions). It appeared that volatile drug market activity, associated disorder, and

interpersonaldisputeswerecontributingtosustainedviolenceinthearea.Thecrimeplace

network facilitatingviolence in theareawas identifiedusingthe investigativetechniques

outlinedinTable3.Intelligenceaboutthenetworkandassociatedoffenderswasgathered

throughout2016asaresultofongoinganalysis.

Figure5:InitialProjectSite:Baltimore&McHenry

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Table3:InvestigativeTechniquesUsedtoUncoverCrimePlaceNetworksIntelligence

• Briefingswithbeatofficers,detectives,specializedunits(e.g.,violentcrimesquad),crimeanalysts,

allcitydepartments,andcommunitymembers-intelligencegatheredfrommunicipal,state,and

federaldatabasesonhistoricalplaceviolationsandownershipconnectionsamongplaces.

Surveillance• Directsurveillanceofplaceandoffenderactivities(e.g.,surveillancecameras,plainclothes

officers).

InformationSources• Informantstoreportplaceactivities(e.g.,security/managementpersonnel).

TheCrimePlaceNetworkAnalysis/investigations revealed that drug market offenders capitalized on physical

featuresofthenearbyspaceandmanagementpracticesofplaceowners.Figure5provides

aroughdiagramofthecrimeplacenetworkusedtooperatetheillicitmarket.Thenetwork

includedbothlow-densityrentalresidentialhousing(A,B,C,H),commercial/retailcorner

stores (E, F), andpublic property (i.e. public street –D,G).Othernearby locationswere

monitored during the initiative to measure displacement after intervention

implementation.Twopotentialdisplacementlocationswereidentifiedbasedonproximity

and similar place features, but neither of which have materialized as an extension the

originalcrimeplacenetwork.

Investigations revealed that, of

the offenders’ private comfort

spaces, two were used as

meetinglocations(A,H),onewas

usedasasupplylocation(B),and

two were used primarily as

staginglocations(C,G).

Figure6:Baltimore&McHenryCrimePlaceNetwork

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MajorFindings

The analysis of place dynamics (conducted through investigations, data analysis,

observations, community surveys and interviews, officer intelligence briefings, and

informationreceivedfromP.I.V.O.T.ReviewBoardmembers)revealedsixmajorfindings:

1. Community and officer observation confirmed that offenders used street parking to

supportdrugmarketactivity.Hand-to-cartransactionsoccurredalongthestreet,and

dealers parked cars along the thoroughfare in an effort to protect themselves from

potentialdrive-byshooters.

2. Threeparcelswithlow-density(one/two-family)rentalresidencesplayedaroleinthe

facilitatingtheopen-airdrugmarketandassociatedviolence.Allthreepropertieswere

instatesofdisrepair,primarilywithregardto landmaintenance.Thepropertieshad

histories of code, litter, and/or health complaints. P.I.V.O.T. investigators recovered

drug paraphernalia and firearms concealed in tall grass on one of these properties,

demonstratingaclearpublicsafetyrisk.

3. Drugmarket activity anddisorderwas also noted at locationE, a commercial/retail

propertyadjoininglocationsA,B,andC.CityBuildingsandInspectionsnotedseveral

violations,someofwhichwerefacilitatingdrugmarketoperations(examplesincludea

dumpsternotenclosedandsetnearthestreettoprovidecoverandconcealment,and

anillegalstreetvendoronthepropertycontributingtohighvolumepedestriantraffic

anddisorder).

4. Officersobservedevidenceofregulardrugmarketactivityat locationF,despitevery

fewcallstopolice.

5. P.I.V.O.T. investigators received community intelligence that car-to-car drug

transactionswereoccurringonaquietandunlit

portionofapublicside-street.

6. A blighted, vacant, and abandoned location (H)

had been the site of repeated code violations

(trash and debris on property, open and/or

brokenwindows,andpartialstructuralcollapse).

The P.I.V.O.T. team focused on this property

because of general blight and investigation

intelligence that suggested the space was

operatingasacomfortspacewithinthenetwork.

Table4liststhemajorplace-basedviolencefacilitatorsidentifiedduringtheanalysisphase.

Researchon“BestPractice”ModelsforPreventingGunViolence

ThePOPguidesavailablethroughtheCenterforProblem-OrientedPolicingwebsitewere

identifiedaspotentialresourcesfordevelopingsolutions.Theguides,“Drive-ByShootings,”

“Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders,” “Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets,”

Table 4: Place-Based Violence Facilitators

• Unregulatedparkingspace

• Absenteeowners/lackofplacemanagement

• Unsecuredstructures

• Illegalvendingactivities

• Inadequatelighting

• Blighted/abandonproperty

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“StreetRobbery”,“DisorderlyYouthinPublicPlaces,”“ShiftingandSharingResponsibility

forPublicSafetyProblems,”and“ImprovingStreetLightingtoReduceCrimeinResidential

Areas,”offeredinsightintopotentiallyeffectiveresponses.

Additionally, partnershipswith crime andplace experts at theUniversity ofNevada, Las

Vegas(Dr.TamaraD.Madensen)andtheUniversityofCincinnati(Dr.JohnE.Eck),aswell

as theeducational/practicalbackgroundof theP.I.V.O.T.Lieutenant (MatthewHammer–

who developed the concept of comfort spaces through earlier place-based policing

initiativesandpublished this inhis thesis)broughtadditionalexpertiseandresources to

theproject.

RESPONSE

BeginninginJune2016andfollowingtheP.I.V.O.T.team’sinitialinvestigationandanalysis,

CPD worked with P.I.V.O.T. Review Board members and other partners to address the

conditions facilitating violent crime at the Baltimore &McHenry location. The following

providesabriefsummaryofthemajorresponsesandpartnershipsleveragedtoeliminate

or change identified crime facilitators. Table 5 summarizes the timeline of P.I.V.O.T.

interventions.

Response#1:PermanentOn-StreetParkingRestrictions

Given that street parkingwas being used to facilitate drugmarket and violent activities

(location D), the P.I.V.O.T. team assessed the potential impact of removing legal parking

spaces. During the analysis phase, investigators noted that the vast majority of nearby

residentshadaccesstopersonaldrivewaysandallbusinesseshadprivatelotsdesignated

for customer parking. In speaking with neighborhood leaders and residents, the

community strongly supported proposed parking restrictions. P.I.V.O.T. team officers

informed affected residents prior to the

implementation of parking restrictions

andengagedinatwo-weekwarning-only

period prior to enforcement. The

removal of parking made drug dealing

moredifficultandriskysincebuyersand

dealers had to walk to the location or

park illegally, drawing attention to their

illicit activities. It also removed the

physical barrier offenders used for

protectionfromdrive-by-shooters.

Response#2:Rentalpropertyownercompliance

The P.I.V.O.T. team made direct contact with the owners of the three rental properties

(locations A, B, and C) identified as part of the crime place network. In each instance,

P.I.V.O.T.investigatorsestablishedcommunicationwithownersandcoordinatedwithCity

departments(e.g.,Buildings&Inspections,Law)inanefforttoincreaselevelsofeffective

Table5:InterventionTimeline

Response#1:Parkingrestrictions 06/24/2016-presentResponse#2:Ownercompliance 07/19,8/26,11/16/2016Response#3:Codeenforcement 07/16/2016-presentResponse#4:Directedpatrols 08/22/2016-01/23/2017Response#5:Lighttower 12/21/2016-presentResponse#6:Propertydemolition 03/2017Response#7:Spaceactivation 05/20/2017

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place management. This communication and contact led to the removal of key

environmental facilitators(e.g., tallgrassusedtohide firearms,unsecured locationsused

asdrugpackaging/distributionlocations)andtheevictionoftenantsassociatedwithillicit

activities.

Response#3:CodeEnforcement/OwneronNotice

TheP.I.V.O.T. teammetwith theownerof thecommercial/retailproperty (locationE)at

which several code violationswere identified during investigations. Themost important

changes made as a result of owner contact were (1) securing the loose and mobile

dumpster (with direct assistance from city partners) and (2) removal of illegal vendors

from the storeparking lot.Additionally, a fencewaserectedaroundanearby residential

lot, also owned by the store’s owner, to prevent dealers from using this space as a

stashing/stagingarea.

Response#4:DirectedPatrols

Adirectedpatrol strategywas initiated inAugust to furtherdisruptdrugmarketactivity

anddeter associatedviolence. Coordinatingwith theEmergencyCommunicationsCenter

(ECC), dispatch prompts were sent to patrol cars on a scheduled basis. This helped to

achieve a higher percent of directed patrol completion. While limited in duration, the

directed patrol strategy served to compliment and reinforce earlier interventions (e.g.,

parkingrestrictions)andincreasetheireffectiveness.

Response#5:LightTower

To deter car-to-car drug transactions, P.I.V.O.T. investigators stationed a portable light

tower/generator along the unlit public street (location G). This elevated light levels,

increasing the risks associatedwith conducting drug activity in this area, and created a

high-profile symbol of City/police presence while the Department of Traffic and

Engineeringcoordinatedwiththelocalelectricprovidertoinstallapermanentlightsource.

Regulardialoguewithcommunitymemberswas initiated toensure thatunintendedside

effects(e.g.,noiseproducedbythegenerator)didnotnegativelyimpactnearbyresidents.

OnFebruary16,2017,apermanentstreetlightwasinstalledatthissiteattherequestof

thecommunity,police,andDepartmentofTrafficandEngineering.

Response#6:BlightedPropertyDemolition

Theblightedproperty(locationH)usedaspartofthecrimeplacenetworkwasexamined

bymembersoftheP.I.V.O.T.ReviewBoard.ThepropertywasevaluatedbyCityBuildings

and Inspections. The property was subsequently declared a public nuisance and

demolished.

Response#7:ActivationofUnusedPublicSpace

AnunusedsoccerfieldownedbytheCincinnatiRecreationCommission(CRC)wasnotan

identifiedcomponentofthecrimeplacenetwork,butitborderslocationGandisdirectly

across the street from locationH (this soccer field is labeled as location I in subsequent

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tables). A P.I.V.O.T. partner, the Neighborhood Enhancement

Program(NEP),reviewedthesiteandhelddiscussionsto identify

ways to “reactivate” this unused public space. Community

leadership helped to solicit resident input regarding communityneeds/wants to facilitate CRC and Economic Development’s

mission to re-purpose the space. This intervention became a

public-private development project to build a community

playground (with the help of “KaBOOM”8) and a surrounding

walkingtrailforresidents.

Table6 linksactivitiesofP.I.V.O.T.ReviewBoardmembersandotherpartnersatspecific

locationswithin the crime place network. As noted previously, location I represents the

unusedsoccerfield(notadirectpartofthecrimeplacenetwork).Keyprivatepartnersfor

thisP.I.V.O.T.projectincluded“KaBOOM,”RumpkeWaste&RecyclingCompany,andWelsh

ExcavationCompany.

Table6:PartnershipstoChangeLocationDynamics Locations

Partners Site-wide A B C D E F G H I

Police X X X X X X X X X X

CommunityLeaders/Council X X X X X X X

BuildingsandInspections(B&I) X X X X X X

Community&EconomicDevelopment X X X X

Traffic/Engineering(DOTE) X X

PublicWorks X X

Law X X X

CommunityLeaders/Council X X X X X X X

CommunityPolicePartneringCenter(CPPC) X

KeepCincinnatiBeautiful(KCB) X

CIRVLeadership/Partners X X X

Community&EconomicDevelopment X X X X

Health X

RecreationCommission(CRC) X

HamiltonCountyProbation X

PrivatePartners X X

UnanticipatedOutcomes

P.I.V.O.T.teammembersinitiallyanticipatedpotentialresidentresistancetothepermanent

on-street parking restrictions and the light tower. However, during the no-parking sign

installation,somenearbyresidentsrequestedalargerrestrictionfootprintthanoriginally

planned.Further,despite thenoiseof the light generator (prior to the installationof the

permanentstreetlight),residentswerehighlyreceptivetotheinterventionandrequested

theplacementofadditionalgeneratorsclosertotheirhomes.TheP.I.V.O.T. teambelieves

that thisoutcomeresulted fromopendialoguewithresidentsandcommunitysupportof

policeinterventiontopreventviolence.

News coverage of the playground and walking trail construction can be found at: http://local12.com/news/local/sustaining-peace-partnerships-change-a-neighborhood

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ChallengestoStrategyImplementation

Threemajor challenges to the implementation of the P.I.V.O.T. during this initial project

wereidentified:

1. Staffing.P.I.V.O.T. teammembersareoftendetailed tootherunits/assignments toaddress other departmental needs. Only one investigation team is dedicated to

workingonP.I.V.O.T.identifiedsitesatthistime.

2. Buy-in fromP.I.V.O.T.ReviewBoardmembers.Some agencies/organizations areableorwillingtodevotemoreresourcesthanotherstoaddressing issues inthese

locations.

3. Speed. P.I.V.O.T. investigations (including the training of officers) and citywideresponses takemore time to implement than traditional policing responses (e.g.,

hotspotanalysistofocuspoliceresources).

ASSESSMENT

P.I.V.O.T.’sgoalistoreducegunviolence.Assuch,successcanbemeasuredinvarious

ways.However,thisassessmentwillfocusononespecificmeasure(numberofshooting

victims),onegeneralmeasure(aviolencescoremetric),andanindirectmeasureof

communityqualityoflife(ablightindex).

ShootingVictims

AsteadyincreaseinshootingvictimsoccurredattheBaltimore&McHenrymicro-location

between2013and2015,with18shootingvictimsreportedin2015.Table7showsthe

numberofyearlyshootingvictims.TheP.I.V.O.T.projectbeganinJune2016and3shootingvictimswerereportedduringthiscalendar

year–adecreaseofmorethan83percent.In2017,

shootingnumberscontinuetofall.Todate,therehas

beenonlyoneshootingvictimreported.

Thenumberofdaysbetweenshootingincidentswas

alsocalculatedfortheprojectsite.Table8showsthat,

priortotheintervention,thetimebetweenshooting

events(time-to-failure)wasapproximately32days.

Duringthe1-yearpost-interventionperiod,thedays

betweenshootingeventshasincreasedto130days.9

ViolenceScoreMetric

Inadditiontoshootingvictims,P.I.V.O.T.investigatorstrackoverallchangesinviolence.

Theprimarymeasureusedtoassesschangeinviolenceovertimeinthesemicro-locations

isaviolencescoremetric,developedbySeniorCrimeAnalystBlakeChristenson.This

metricwasdevelopedtoaddresstheproblemoftrackingchangesinrelativelyrareevents

(e.g.,gunviolence),overshortperiodsoftime,insmallgeographicareas.Themetric

incorporates4datasets/gunviolenceindicators,givesgreaterweighttomoreserious

Table7:YearlyShootingVictims–Baltimore/McHenry

Year #Victims %+-

2013 5 --

2014 8 +60.0%

2015 18 +125.0%

2016 3 -83.3%

2017* 1 -66.6%*year-to-date

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Figure7:ChangesinViolenceMetricScoreatBaltimore&McHenry

crimesandcrimesthathaveoccurredmorerecently,and

usesthesame100’x100’cellsthatwerecreatedtoidentify

violentlocationsatthestartoftheproject.Additional

informationabouthowtheviolencescoremetricis

calculatedcanbefoundonCPD’sP.I.V.O.T.website.10

Figure7plotstheviolencescoremetricasitchangedover

time.Thefigureshowsthatthescoredecreasedfroma

highpre-interventionscoreof172.4toalow(andmost

recent)post-interventionscoreof26.8.

Changesintheviolencemetricscorearealsodepictedin

Figures8,9,and10.Figure8showsthescoresassociated

withthe“places”(i.e.,100’x100’cells)inthemicro-

locationbeforetheinitiationoftheproject(November1,

2015).Darkercellsareassociatedwithhigher

concentrationsofviolence.

Figure9showstheviolencescoreswithinthesite

boundariesonMay22,2017(justpriortotheauthoring

thisdocument).Theemptyorunshadedcellsindicatevery

littletonoviolentactivity.

Figure10depictsthechangeintheviolencescoremetric

betweenthesetwotimeperiods.Allcellsshowdeclinesin

violence–darkercellsindicategreaterdeclinesinviolent

activity.

Table8:Time-To-FailureforShootingIncidents

EventDate DaysBetween03/13/15 --

04/07/15 25

04/18/15 11

05/07/15 19

05/09/15 2

05/27/15 18

08/02/15 67

09/26/15 55

10/15/15 19

10/23/15 8

10/31/15 8

12/08/15 38

03/26/16 109

05/07/16 42

Pre-intervention(avg=32days)

09/05/16 121

01/23/17 140

Todate

(5/31/2017)128

Post-intervention(avg=130days)

15

Figure8:ViolenceScoresatBaltimore&McHenry–November1,2015

Figure9:ViolenceScoresatBaltimore&McHenry–May22,2017

Figure10:ViolenceScoresChangesatBaltimore&McHenry–11/01/2015-05/22/17

16

QualityofLife:BlightIndex

P.I.V.O.T.partner,KeepCincinnatiBeautiful,conductedaseriesofblightindexmeasures

duringthemostactivephasesoftheproject.Table9presentstheresultsoftheseblight

measuresduringSeptember,October,November,andDecemberof2016.Generally,

changesmadetotheprojectsiteduringthistimeappeartohavereducedlevelsofblightin

thecommunity.Theoverallblightindexfortheprojectsitedecreasedfrom2.4to1.7(a

29.2%decrease).AlthoughrecentorganizationalchangesandotherprojectsatKeep

CincinnatiBeautifulhavepreventedanothersitesurvey,itisexpectedthatthisscorewill

decreaseevenfurtherwhenasecondarysurveyisconducted.

Table9:BlightIndexofStreetswithinBaltimore&McHenryP.I.V.O.T.ProjectSite

Baltimore/McHenry

BlightIndex(1=leastblighted;4=mostblighted)

Sep2016 Oct2016 Nov2016 Dec2016

2200blockofBaltimoreAv 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.5

2300blockofBaltimoreAv 3.0 2.8 1.5 2.0

2400blockofBaltimoreAv 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.5

2300blockofIrollAv 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0

3500blockofMcHenryAv 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.0

3600blockofMcHenryAv 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.0

AverageBlightedness 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.7

Displacement

WhenBaltimore&McHenrywasselectedasaprojectsite,thepotentialfordisplacementto

nearbyareaswithsimilarfeaturesandcriminogenicopportunitystructureswasassessed.

Anadjoiningneighborhoodwhichappearedmostatriskforgeographicdisplacement

experiencednogunshotvictimsin2016andonly2in2017,aftersuffering4,4,and6

during2013,2014,and2015,respectively.Violencescoresinsurroundingareasalsooffer

littletonoevidenceofsubstantialdisplacement.11Instead,nearbylocationsappeartobe

experiencingadiffusionofcrimecontrolbenefits.

FutureProjectDirections

Althoughbeyondthescopeofthisdocument,theP.I.V.O.T.teamhasbeenactivelyengaged

in3ofthe23additionalviolentmicro-locationsidentifiedduringtheinitialscanningphase.

Preliminary evaluations show the same promising results found at the Baltimore &

McHenry site. Place-based investigations appear to hold promise as a problem-solving

techniquethatproduceslong-termsustainabilityinviolencereduction.

(3,863words,excludingtables/figures/endnotes)

17

ENDNOTES 1https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-20152SeeStep14,“UsetheCHEERStestwhendefiningproblems,”inClarke&Eck(2005)3Eck&Clarke(2003)4http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/community-involvement/cincinnati-initiative-to-

reduce-violence/5http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/linkservid/81E5280A-F1F2-7294-

453E0E47BC735A5E/showMeta/0/6http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/research-brief-place-based-

investigations/?ref=89888a6170e5fbaeb39a74881cb0f597#sthash.qDiV2shq.dpuf7TamaraD.MadensenandJohnE.Eck,“CrimePlacesandPlaceManagement,”inTheOxfordHandbookofCriminologicalTheory,eds.FrancisT.CullenandPamelaWilcox(NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress,2013),554–578.8https://kaboom.org/9Thisisaconservativeestimategiventhat5/31/2017representsyear-to-date,notthe

dateofaseparateincident.10http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/assets/File/Data/ViolenceScoring.pdf11http://www.popcenter.org/tools/pdfs/displacement.pdf

18

PROJECTCONTACTSLieutenantMatthewHammerCincinnatiPoliceDepartment

Attn:P.I.V.O.T.Unit

310EzzardCharlesDrive

Cincinnati,Ohio45214

Matthew.Hammer@cincinnati-oh.gov

(513)352-2548

SeniorCrimeAnalystBlakeChristensonCincinnatiPoliceDepartment

Attn:P.I.V.O.T.Unit

310EzzardCharlesDrive

Cincinnati,Ohio45214

blake.christenson@cincinnati-oh.gov

(513)978-3485

Dr.TamaraD.Madensen,AssociateProfessorUniversityofNevada,LasVegas

DepartmentofCriminalJustice

4505S.MarylandPkwy,#5009

LasVegas,Nevada89154-5009

Tamara.Madensen@unlv.edu

(702)895-5903

19

APPENDIXACincinnatiNeighborhoodBoundaries

20

APPENDIXB

PIVOTUnitPersonnel5/30/2017

Background:

PIVOTUnitCommander:LieutenantMatthewHammerisinhis17thyearofservicewiththeCincinnati,OhioPoliceDepartment(CPD)andiscurrentlyassignedasthePIVOTUnitCommander,overseeingimplementationandoperationofthePIVOTInvestigativeSquadandtheCrimeAnalysisandProblemSolving(CAPS)Squad.Hehaspreviouslyservedinavarietyofpatrolandinvestigativeassignments,withaheavyemphasisonviolentcriminalactivity.Hespentsevenyearsworkinginandsupervisingviolentcrimessquads(DistrictsOneandTwo).HehasalsoservedasCrimeAnalysisandProblemSolvingSquadSupervisor,AssistantInvestigationsCommander(DistrictFour),NightInspector,andShiftCommander(DistrictsFourandFive).LieutenantHammerreceivedhisB.A.inCriminalJusticefromtheUniversityofDayton(Ohio),andhisM.S.inCriminalJusticefromtheUniversityofCincinnati.HeiscurrentlyworkingtowardcompletionofaPh.D.inCriminalJusticeattheUniversityofCincinnati.

PIVOT Squad Supervisor: Sergeant Shannon Heine

Crime Analysis & Problem Solving Squad (CAPS) Supervisor: Senior Crime Analyst Blake Christenson

PIVOT Squad Investigators: • PoliceOfficerDonKonicki• PoliceOfficerChrisClarkson• PoliceOfficerGregVollner• PoliceOfficerOscarCyranek

CAPS Analyst: Crime Analyst Brandon Kyle

PIVOT Unit Commander: Lieutenant Matthew Hammer

21

PIVOTSquadSupervisor:SergeantShannonHeinehasbeenapoliceofficerfor19years.Inadditiontopatrolwork,shehasextensiveinvestigativeexperience.SergeantHeinehasatotalof12yearsinvestigativeassignment,includingasadistrictinvestigator,ProfessionalStandardsSectionInvestigator(InternalInvestigations),andasaHomicideInvestigator.ThedepthandbreadthofSergeantHeine’sexperienceisatremendousassettothePIVOTSquad.SergeantHeinehasanAssociate’sDegreeinBusinessManagementfromXavierUniversity(Ohio).Shehasreceivedtraininginavarietyoftopicsassociatedwithinvestigativeworkincluding:interviewandinterrogation,humantrafficking,gangandstreetcrimes,andevidencecollection.PIVOTSquadInvestigators:PoliceOfficerChrisClarksonhasbeenapoliceofficerfor10years.HehasservedinDistrictFourandCPD’sViceUnit.Hehasspecializedinlong-terminvestigativeworkfocusedparticularlyonliquorpermitpremiseswithpersistentviolentcrimeissues.OfficerClarksonhasreceivedtraininginawidearrayofinvestigativetoolsandtechniques,includinginterviewandinterrogationandadvancedviceandnarcoticsinvestigations.OfficerClarksonalsoservesintheCPD’sMarinePatrolandBikepatrol.OfficerClarksonisamemberoftheUnitedStatesAirForcereserves.PoliceOfficerOscarCyranekhasservedCPDforthepast10years,inDistricts1,3,4,5,District4ViolentCrimesSquad,andViceUnit.OfficerCyranekbringsavarietyoftrainingandexperiencetothePIVOTunit.HereceivedaChief’sCommendationforhisearlyPIVOTwork,whichincludedtherecoveryof6firearmsinthefocusareaswithinashortperiodoftime.OfficerCyranekisaUnitedStatesArmyveteran.PoliceOfficerDonKonickihas17yearsofexperienceasapoliceofficerwiththeCincinnatiPoliceDepartment.HehaspreviouslyservedinDistrictFour’sViolentCrimesSquad,ViceUnit,PersonalCrimesUnit,MajorOffendersUnit,andtheCentralBusinessSection.OfficerKonickiearnedBachelorandMaster’sDegreesinCriminalJusticefromtheUniversityofCincinnati.OfficerKonickicurrentlyservesinCPD’sHonorGuard,theCivilDisturbanceResponseTeam,CPDbikepatrol,andhaspreviouslyservedintheUnitedStatesArmy.PoliceOfficerGregoryVollnerhasservedCPDforthepast10years,inDistrict2and5,andassistedDistrict2’sViolentCrimesSquad.OfficerVollnerreceivedFieldTrainingOfficertraining,andparticipatesinCPDbikepatrol.HehasaMaster’sDegreeinCriminalJusticefromtheUniversityofCincinnati.HereceivedaChief’sCommendationforhisearlyPIVOTwork,whichincludedtherecoveryof6firearmsinthefocusareaswithinashortperiodoftime.CrimeAnalysisandProblemSolvingSquad:

22

SeniorCrimeAnalystBlakeChristensonisinhis3rdyearofservicewithCPD.HereceivedhisB.A.inGeographyfromtheUniversityofWisconsin-EauClaireandhisM.A.inCriminologyandCriminalJusticefromSouthernIllinoisUniversityCarbondale.SeniorCrimeAnalystChristenson’sworkhasbeenrecognizedwiththeSpecialAchievementsinGIS(SAG)AwardfromESRI.Hisareasofexpertiseinclude:crimeandplace,spatialanalysis,evidencebasedpolicing,andenvironmentalcriminology.CrimeAnalystBrandonKyleiscompletinghisfirstyearofservicewiththeCincinnatiPoliceDepartment.HereceivedAssociates,Bachelor’sandMaster’sDegreesinCriminalJusticefromtheUniversityofCincinnati.CrimeAnalystKylehaspriorexperienceasaCrimeMappingAnalyst,andhaspreviouslyservedintheUnitedStatesMarineCorps.Mr.KyleisaPurpleHeartrecipient.