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Chapter-III
Biocentrism
Speciesist anthropocentrism has been identified by the majority of environmental
philosophers and other environmentalists as the root-cause of the present day eco-
crisis. And it is often said that contemporary environmental philosophy has set out
its journey by questioning this moral anthropocentrism. It is regarded as a
systematic bias in traditional Western attitude to the non-human world or the
nature in general. There have, however, recently developed some important views
rejecting this attitude, and this development has strongly influenced the ways in
which humans interpret their relationship with other species and with the nature
and ecosystems. One such world-view we find in contemporary environmental
philosophy is Biocentrism that considers all living beings to have moral value and
humans to be one among innumerable species of organisms that live on the earth.
‘Biocentrism’ (from Greek: βίος, bio, ‘life’; and κέντρον, kentron, ‘center’) is a
term that has more than one meaning. In environmental philosophy, however, it
refers to the life-centric nature-view. It means that all living beings on the earth,
including humans, have moral value. It recommends well-being of all life in the
biosphere.
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But it may be noted here that biocentrism also refers to the scientific position
that life and consciousness forms the basis of observable reality, and thereby is the
basis of the universe itself. For example, American scientist Robert Lanza
proposed a theory in 2007, where he upholds this view that life and biology are
central to being, reality, and the cosmos— life creates the universe rather than the
other way around. This biocentrism of Robert Lanza asserts that current theories of
the physical world do not work, and can never be made to work, until they fully
account for life and consciousness. While physics is considered fundamental to the
study of the universe, and chemistry fundamental to the study of life, biocentrism
places biology before the other sciences to produce a ‘theory of everything’.1
Of course, the reception of Lanza's theory has been mixed. Critics have
questioned whether the theory is falsifiable. Lanza has argued that future
experiments, such as scaled-up quantum superposition, will either support or
contradict the theory.2 Anyhow, this is a theory of cosmology, while we are
interested in environmental philosophy and ethics. In environmental philosophy
biocentrism is well-defined as the belief that all forms of life are equally valuable
and humanity is not the center of existence.
Anyhow, biocentrism transcends anthropocentrism. While anthropocentrism
argues in favor of a world-view centering solely on humans and recognizes value
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only in human beings, biocentrism regards every living being in the nature as
having intrinsic value and thus goes beyond speciesist anthropocentricity. This
view asserts that we have an obligation to the whole biotic community. The central
claim of biocentrism is that our moral obligation extends beyond humans to
include all living beings. This obligation is direct, not merely indirect obligation to
the living beings via humans. We are morally obliged, e.g., to preserve endangered
species, not only because present and future humans would find life of diminished
value unless we do that, but also because they are living beings with
intrinsic/inherent value, the fact that demands our moral respect.
Australian philosopher Richard Routley (Sylvan) gives a good example in
favour of biocentrism in his paper ‘Is there a Need for a New, an Environmental
Ethic? (1973) It goes by the name ‘last man argument’, where Routley asks us to
imagine a hypothetical situation in which the ‘last man’, surviving a world
catastrophe, acts to ensure the elimination of all other living beings and the
destruction of all the landscapes after his demise. From the anthropocentric point
of view, the ‘last man’ would do nothing morally wrong, since his destructive act
in question would not cause any damage to the interest and well-being of humans,
who would by then have disappeared. Nevertheless, Routley points out, there is a
moral intuition that the imagined last act would be morally wrong. An explanation
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for this judgement, he gives, is that those non-human objects in the environment
whose destruction is ensured by the ‘last man’ have intrinsic value, a kind of value
independent of their usefulness for humans. From his critique, Routley concluded
that the main approach in traditional western moral thinking was unable to allow
the recognition that natural things have intrinsic value and that the tradition
required overhaul of a significant kind. Anyhow, our common intuition is that it
does matter to destroy the last form of life, and this is taken as evidence that non-
human life has value independent of the existence of conscious valuers—and that
this value is relevant to the assessment of the moral standing of living things.
Classical Biocentrism
Paul Taylor is the champion of this biocentric view of Nature, to whom we owe for
its classical version. But the first life-centered concern in Western ethics is found,
perhaps, in Albert Schweitzer’s Civilization and Ethics published in 1923.
Schweitzer’s biocentric point of view is illustrated in terms of ‘Reverence for
Life’. He sees this as stemming from a fundamental ‘will-to-live’, inherent in all
living beings. In self-conscious beings, like us, this will-to-live establishes a drive
towards both self-realization and empathy with other living beings. He formulates
his world-view in this way: ‘I am life which wills to live, and I exist in the midst of
life which wills to live.’3 (‘Ich bin Leben, das leben will, inmitten von Leben, das
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leben will.’) Just in my own will-to-live there is a yearning for more life, the same
obtains in each the will-to-live around me equally, whether it expresses itself or
remains unvoiced. According to Schweitzer, all life is sacred and we should live
accordingly, keeping in mind that each and every living being is inherently
valuable ‘will-to-live’. In nature one form of life falls prey upon another. But,
human consciousness holds an awareness of, and sympathy for, the will of other
beings to live. As a moral human being, he strives to rise above from this predator-
prey relation so far as it is possible. Actually, as living beings with moral
consciousness, we are not only concerned with our own life but also for the lives of
other living beings and the environment in which we live in. According to him, ‘It
is good to maintain and cherish life; it is evil to destroy and check life.’4
We have
to choose to live up to this moral conscience; and our world-view must derive from
this life-view, not vice versa. Respect for life, overcoming coarser impulses and
hollow doctrines, leads the individual to live in the service of other people and of
every living creature. In contemplation of the will-to-life, respect for the life of
others becomes the highest principle and the defining purpose of humanity.
The fundamental principles of morality which we seek as a necessity for
thought is not, according to Schweitzer, a matter of galvanizing the traditional
moral views and norms, but also of expanding and extending the moral horizon.
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Morality, accordingly, is, in its unqualified form, extended responsibility with
regard to anything living. He writes: “A man is really ethical only when he obeys
the constraint laid on him to help all life which he is able to succour, and when he
goes out of his way to avoid injuring anything living. He does not ask for how far
this or that life deserves sympathy as valuable in itself, nor does he ask how far it
is capable of feeling. To him life as such is sacred.”3
It may be mentioned here that Schweitzer received the 1952 Nobel Peace
Prize for his philosophy of ‘Reverence for Life’. Schweitzer’s ‘reverence for life’
philosophy upholds that all living beings have intrinsic or inherent value. The
intrinsic value of nature can and should be appealed to as the basis for human
ethics. And the attitude of reverence for life would establish the connections
between ethics and nature. According to Schweitzer, ethics begins when we
recognize these connections, we feel awe and respect in the fact of living beings
that commands our reverence and that compels us to strive to promote and preserve
life in all its forms.
Anyhow, Schweitzer’s assertion ‘I am will-to-live’ reminds us of
Schopenhauer as his forerunner in the philosophy of ‘willing’ and ‘will’ in general.
Of course, Schweitzer somehow individualizes this ‘will to live’, and this is
something like this: I am life which wants to live amidst of lives which want to
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live! According to Schweitzer, I first of all experience the will to live and living in
my own feeling and organism and I come to rationally respect this will also in
other living beings, if I respect this will to live in myself. I am therefore forced or
driven to acknowledge some such will to living also in other living beings around
me and have to appreciate and respect this in the same way as in my own case. The
transfer from the respect for my own will to living to the reverence for life of the
other beings is grounded by certain methodological or meta-ethical principle of
equality or equalitarianism, being a certain kind of inference by analogy, which
Schweitzer however emphasizes as being ‘denknotwendig’ (necessary in
thinking).6 This kind of necessity and equalitarianism would and should lead me to
respect and revere any other life and living being independently from any
constraints or perspectives of speciesism, egotism or other partisan view-points.
Ethics should not be constrained by speciesist, racial, nationalistic or whatever
restricted points of view. Thus, the reverence for the will of life in other beings
should be a universal requirement.
Anyhow, as already stated, Paul Taylor is the best proponent of contemporary
biocentric view of nature. Taylor’s is, perhaps, the most comprehensive attempt to
articulate and defend a biocentric position in environmental discourse. His
biocentric world-view first comes to the fore with the publication of the article,
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‘The Ethics of Respect for Nature’ in Environmental Ethics in 1981. It was then
followed by a full-fledged book titled Respect for Nature: A Theory of
Environmental Ethics, which he published in the year 1986. The core of Taylor’s
position is the claim that all living things and beings have inherent value and so
merit moral respect. According to him, to say that an entity has a good of its own is
simply to say that, without reference to any other entity, it can be benefited or
harmed. This good is ‘objective’, in the sense that it is independent of what any
conscious being happens to think about it. Anyhow, to say that each living being
has a good of their own or something has inherent worth is, according to Taylor, to
invoke two principles: the principle of moral consideration and the principle of
intrinsic value.7
The principle of moral consideration means that every living being that has a
good of its own merits moral consideration. And the principle of intrinsic value
states that the realization of the good of an individual is intrinsically valuable. This
means that its good is prima facie worthy of being preserved or promoted as an end
in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is. The combination of these
two principles constitutes the fundamental moral attitude which Taylor calls
‘respect for Nature’.
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The first principle of moral consideration states that all living things deserve
the concern and attention of all moral agents simply by virtue of their being
members of the earth’s community of life. From the moral point of view, their
good must be taken into account whenever it is affected for better or worse by the
behaviour of some agents. This provision stands for all, no matter what species the
creature belongs to. The good of each entity is accorded some value and so
acknowledged as having some weight in the deliberations of all rational agents.
However, it may be necessary for such an agent to act in ways contrary to the good
of this or that particular organism in order to further other’s good, including human
good. But the principle of moral consideration prescribes that, with respect to each
being an entity having its own good, every individual deserves moral
consideration.
On the other hand, the principle of intrinsic value asserts that, irrespective of
what kind of entity it is in other respects, if it is a member of the earth’s biotic
community, the realization of its good is something intrinsically valuable. This
signifies that the good of the entity concerned is worthy of being preserved or
attended to, and this intrinsic/inherent value is an end in itself and for the sake of
the entity concerned. While we consider an entity as having intrinsic or inherent
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value, we deny that it can be treated as a mere object, or as an entity whose value
completely depends on being instrumental in promoting another’s good.8
Though these two principles seem nearer to each other, they are not identical.
While the principle of moral consideration affirms that all living beings deserve the
concern and consideration of all moral agents simply by virtue of their being
members of the earth’s community of life, the principle of intrinsic value states
that if some entity is a member of the earth’s biotic community, the realization of
its good is something intrinsically valuable, its good is worthy of being respected,
and this intrinsic value is an end in itself, and as such, it is for the sake of the entity
concerned. According to Taylor, when rational, autonomous agents regard such
entities as possessing inherent worth, they place intrinsic value on the realization of
their good and so hold themselves responsible for performing actions that will have
this effect and for refraining from actions having the contrary effect. Not only that,
then they subscribe to the principles of moral consideration and of intrinsic value
and so conceive of wild living beings as having that kind of worth. On Taylor’s
judgment, “[S]uch agents are adopting a certain ultimate moral attitude toward the
natural world. This is the attitude I call “respect for Nature”. 9
Respect for nature thus signifies a life-centered world-view of environmental
philosophy. This ethics of respect for nature has three basic elements: a belief
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system, an ultimate moral outlook, and a set of rules of duty and standards of
character. These elements are connected with each other in the following manner.
The belief system underlying this attitude of respect for nature is called ‘the
biocentric outlook on Nature’. As Taylor explains, the belief system provides a
certain outlook on nature which supports and makes intelligible an autonomous
agent’s adopting, as an ultimate moral attitude, the attitude of respect for nature.
Living things and beings are viewed as the appropriate objects of the attitude of
respect, and are, accordingly, regarded as entities possessing inherent/intrinsic
worth. One then places intrinsic value on the promotion and protection of their
good. As a consequence of this, one makes a moral commitment to abide by a set
of rules of duty and to fulfill certain standards of good character.
This ethics of respect for nature is symmetrical with a system of human ethics
grounded on ‘respect for person’. This has three aspects: The first is a conception
of oneself and others as persons, as centers of autonomous choice. Second, there is
an attitude of respect for person as person. It is adopted as an ultimate moral
attitude in which every person is regarded as having inherent worth or human
dignity. Third, there is an ethical system of duties which are acknowledged to be
owed by everyone to everyone. These duties are forms of conduct in which public
recognition is given to each individual’s inherent worth as a person.
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Accordingly, the bio-centric outlook on nature implies all these four
things:10
(1) Humans are members of the earth’s community of life on the same terms
as all the non-human members are.
(2) The earth’s natural ecosystems are seen as a complex web of
interconnected and interdependent elements.
(3) Each individual organism is conceived of as a teleological centre of life,
pursuing its own good in its own way.
(4) Humans are not superior to any other living thing.
While thus formulating the biocentric outlook, Taylor takes cognizance of
the fact of our being an animal species to be a fundamental feature of our
existence. He and his supporters do not deny the significant differences between
ourselves and other species, but they wish to keep in the forefront of our
consciousness the fact that, in relation to our planet’s natural ecosystems, we are
but one species population among many others. Our origin lies in the same process
of evolution that gives rise to all other species and that we are confronted with
similar environmental conditions that confront the members of other species. The
so-called laws of natural selection, of adaptation and of genetics apply
simultaneously with all of us as members of the biological community.
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If we have a deep watch on the happenings in the nature, we would see that
each animal and plant is like us in having a good, a telos of its own. Although our
human good (e.g., of value and significance of human life, including the exercise
of individual autonomy in choosing our own particular value-system) is not exactly
similar to the good of a non-human animal or plant, it cannot be maintained that
their good can go without the biological necessities for survival and physical
health.
Again, the possibility of the extinction of the human species makes us aware
of another aspect in which we should not consider ourselves in better position than
other species. Our well-being and survival is dependent upon the ecological health
and wellbeing of various animals and plants communities, while their survival and
health does not depend on human wellbeing. Rather, many wild animals and plants
would be greatly benefited if all human beings disappear from the earth. The
depletion of their habitats by human beings in the name of ‘development’ would
then cease. The anthropogenic pollution of the land, air and water would come to
an end. Ecosystems could gradually return to their balance, suffering only some
natural disruptions. All these imply that our presence is not so much needed from
the community standpoint.
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Let us come to the second component of biocentric worldview, which sees the
natural world as an organic system. To accept the biocentric outlook and regard
ourselves and our place in the world from its perspective is to see the whole natural
order of the earth’s biosphere as a complex but unified web of interconnected
organisms, objects, and events. The ecological relationship between any
community of living things and their environment forms an organic whole of
functionally interdependent parts. Such dynamic, but at the same time, relatively
stable structures such as food-chains, predator-prey relations, plant succession in a
forest, are self-regulating energy-recycling mechanisms that preserve the
equilibrium of the whole.11
And for this, while we think of the well-being of the biotic communities—of
humans, animals and plants, we should be careful for the ecological equilibrium.
When one views the realm of nature from this biocentric perspective, one should
never forget that in the long run the integrity of the entire biosphere of our planet is
essential to the realization of the good of its constituent communities of life, both
human and non-human. This holistic view of the earth’s ecological systems,
according to Taylor, does not by itself constitute a moral norm. These are facts of
biological reality, rather a set of causal connections put forth in empirical terms. Its
ethical implications for our treatment of the natural environmental lie entirely in
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the fact that our knowledge of these casual connections is an essential means to
fulfilling the ends we set for ourselves in adopting the attitude of respect for
Nature.
In order to explain the third component of the biocentric outlook Taylor
reiterates that each individual organism is to be conceived of as a teleological
center of life. The organism comes to mean something to be one as a unique,
irreplaceable individual. The final culmination of this process is the achievement
of a genuine understanding of the biocentric point of view and with that
understanding, an ability would crop up to take that point of view. Conceiving of a
living being as a center of life, one is able to look at the world from its perspective.
Understanding living beings as teleological centers of life does not necessitate
associating them with human characteristics. We need not consider all of them as
having consciousness like us. Some of them may be aware of the world around
them and others may not. Nor need we deny that different kinds and levels of
awareness are exemplified when high level consciousness in some form or other is
present. But be they conscious or not, all are equal teleological centers of life in the
sense that each is a unified system of goal-oriented activities directed toward their
preservation and well-being.
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The denial of human superiority as the fourth component of the biocentric
outlook on nature is perhaps the most important idea in establishing the
justifiability of the attitude of respect for nature. The concept of human superiority
is strictly human point of view, that is, from a point of view in which the good of
humans is taken as the standard of judgment. Because of that, all we need to do is
to look as the capacities of non-human animals from the standpoint of their good to
find a contrary judgment of superiority. In each case, the claim to human
superiority would be rejected from a non-human standpoint.
As Taylor explains, it is true that we are different from non-human animals in
respect of some specific capabilities. But these facts do not by themselves establish
human superiority. If we think a little, we would find that it is only from human
standpoint that looks like this. On the other hand, many non-human animals have
some capacities that we humans lack. The cheetah can run faster than men; an
eagle can see things from a far distance; so on and so forth. Why would these not
be considered as signs of their superiority over humans? From a neutral
perspective, the claim to human superiority does not carry weight, rather it could
be regarded as ‘an irrational bias in our own favor’.12
According to Taylor, this becomes clear as and when we conceive our relation
to other species in terms of the three components of the biocentric outlook. These
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components together give us an overall view of the natural world and of the place
of humans in it. As we take this point of view, we come to realise ‘other living
things, their environmental conditions and their ecological relationships in such a
way as to awake in us a deep sense of our kinship with them as fellow members of
the Earth’s community of life’.13
We then understand that humans and non-humans
together constitute an unified whole in which all living beings are functionally
interrelated. Each is then seen to share with us the same characteristic of being a
teleological centre of life. When this entire outlook becomes a part of the
conceptual framework, we come to look onto ourselves as bearing a certain moral
relation to non-human forms of life.
Another key exponent of biocentrism is Robin Attfield. He takes trees as an
example of non-sentient life and seeks to establish whether and why they might
also be morally considerable. He likewise maintains trees have a good of their
own, but, for him, it is not sufficient to show that trees merit moral consideration.
There are further differences between his position and that of Taylor. Taylor
appeals to the rational and scientific merits of biocentricism in support of the moral
status of trees, while Attfield appeals to analogy with morally significant human
interests, such as the interests that derive from their capacities for nutrition,
growth, and respiration.14
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Again, as to how the good of a non-human can be the ground of an obligation
for moral agents, the answer turns on its good having intrinsic/inherent value. It is
worth distinguishing between approaches which are qualified and unqualified in
their commitment to the intrinsic/inherent value of the good of non-rational beings.
A representative of the qualified view is Robin Attfield. For Attfield, whatever has
a good of its own has moral standing, i.e., merits moral consideration. His position
is that if we grant consideration to humans then we cannot consistently deny it to
other living beings, and the onus is on a would-be opponent of this view to name
some morally relevant differences between humans and other living beings which
would justify considering humans as moral patients and non-humans not. He
believes that this will prove hard to do. Anyhow, Attfield’s qualified view does not
deny that there might well be a preponderant need most of the time to treat plants,
and, perhaps, some other creatures, as resources, valuable though their lives are in
themselves. For Attfield, the moral standing of a being is established separately
and prior to any judgements as to its moral significance. All beings which have
moral standing have intrinsic/inherent value, but some of them will have very little
of it—indeed, too little to be a determinant of any obligation of a moral agent. It,
therefore, appears that a qualified approach may not necessarily lay the ground for
claiming anything more than a frankly anthropocentric one.
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Robin Attfield does not think that we owe moral respect to all living beings,
as not all lives are worthwhile. He also is not egalitarian even with regard to those
lives that are owed moral respect. The most compelling reason for preserving trees
refers first to the interests of humans, and then to those of other sentient animals.
He concludes that while some degree of respect is due to almost all life, the interest
of other non-sentient life will always have a relatively low priority. Even then,
Attfield and Taylor agree on the point that things and beings without good of their
own cannot merit moral consideration in their own right, and that only living
beings have goods of their own.15
Christopher Stone, a professor of law at the University of Southern California,
supports Attfield’s contention, but in different way. Stone proposes in his article
‘Should Trees have Standing?’ that trees and other natural objects should have at
least the same standing in law as corporations. Stone argues that if trees, forests
and mountains could be given standing in law then they could be represented in
their own right in the courts. Moreover, like any other legal person, these natural
things could become beneficiaries of compensation if it could be shown that they
had suffered compensatable injury through human activity.
Biocentric view-point is also present in John Rodman’s environmental
thought. He places the position of biocentricity in ‘ecological sensibility’ category.
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In his famous paper ‘The Liberation of Nature?’ he comes out to organize
environmental thought into four categories: resource conservation (contending the
reckless exploitation of forest, wildlife, soil, etc), wilderness preservation (arguing
for certain natural areas as sacred places), moral extensionism (supporting the view
that we have duties directly to some non-human natural entities), and ecological
sensibility (a complex pattern of perceptions, attitudes, and judgment to the
nature).16
Rodman speaks of three components of this ecological sensibility, and these
are: (i) a theory of value that recognizes intrinsic/inherent value in nature without
engaging in mere extensionism; (ii) a metaphysics that takes account of the reality
and importance of relationships and systems as well as of individuals; (iii) an
ethics that ‘includes such duties as non-interference with natural processes,
resistance to human acts and policies that violate the non-interference
principle….and a style of co-inhabitation that involves the knowledgeable,
respectful, and restrained use of nature’,17
for one ought not to treat with disrespect
or use as a mere means anything that has a telos or end of its own.
Most biocentric positions are presented within the framework of conventional
ethical theories. Attfield, for example, takes a consequentialist position. Taylor’s
position draws extensively on both Kant and Aristotle. Anyhow, biocentrism is
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individualistic in that their various moral concerns are directed towards individuals
only, not ecological wholes, such as species, populations, biotic communities, and
ecosystems. None of these is sentient, a subject-of-a-life, or a teleological-center-
of-life, but the preservation of these collective entities is a major concern for many
environmentalists. Moreover, the goals of animal liberationists, such as the
reduction of animal suffering and death, may conflict with the goals of the
environmentalists. For example, the preservation of the integrity of an ecosystem
may require the culling of feral animals or of some indigenous populations that
threaten to destroy fragile habitats. So there are disputes about whether the ethics
of animal liberation is a proper branch of environmental ethics.18
As we have seen above, Rodman and other critics have suggested that it is not
possible to generate an adequate environmental ethics by extending the range of
contemporary theories to this biocentric way, because these theories have evolved
to articulate moral claims that arise on an analogy to human cases, and are
inherently anthropocentric and individualistic. They are thus less than well-suited
to articulate the moral claims of non-humans, particularly those who are extremely
unlike human individuals.
According to Rodman, all the first three categories of environmental thought
will be rendered obsolete with the realization of ecological sensibility. But even
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then, the position of ecological sensibility derives primarily from the category of
moral extensionism, in which he places Singer’s Animal Liberation: Towards an
End to Men’s Inhumanity to Animals to be an example. The basis of the extension
thought from the third to fourth category is the idea of equality that involved with
non-human beings.
Anyhow, it is now time to turn onto the issue of animal liberation, which is
related with biocentrism. This discussion may be made in the name of Sentientism.
Sentientism
The term ‘sentience’ comes from Latin word ‘sentire’, that means ‘to feel’ or to
‘perceive’. ‘Sentience’ thus means ‘the capacity of feeling pleasure and suffering
pain’. Sentientism is the moral theory that all sentient beings, be they human or
non-human, have intrinsic moral value. Therefore, we are obligated to treat all
sentient beings with kindness and compassion, regardless of their external form or
level of intelligence. It is also said that no ethical system can be valid if it fails to
acknowledge all sentient beings. As early as in 18th century, Jeremy Bentham
raised the issue of non-human suffering and sadism in his An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation:
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If we study a little we can see that the French have already discovered that
the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be
abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor... What else is it that
should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the
faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a
more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day,
or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what
would it avail? The question is not, "Can they reason?" nor "Can they talk?"
but, "Can they suffer?”19
Following Bentham, the advocates of ethical sentientism propose in the
second half of 20th century that the most appropriate criterion of moral
considerability is that of sentience, that is, the capacity for experiening pleasure
and pain. If an entity is sentient, they argue, it seeks pleasurable states of being and
seeks to avoid painful states of being, and this is its interests. And since interests
are interests, irrespective of the species to which they belong, it is arbitrary to
respect only human interests. Rather beings, that have interests, ought to have their
interests taken into account in the context of actions regarding them. If an entity,
on the other hand, is not sentient or is incapable of having any interests of its own,
it does not owe any consideration to us. After all, what does it matter how we treat
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an entity if that entity cannot matter to itself? Peter Singer, the most prominent
exponent of this approach in contemporary times, summarizes this line of
argument as follows: “A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer.
Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A
mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being kicked along the road,
because it will suffer if it is.”20
He goes on saying: “If a being suffers, there can be
no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No
matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its
suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough
comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being is not capable of
suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken
into account. That is why the limit of sentience… is the only defensible boundary
of concern for the interests of others.”21
The idea of equality towards non-human beings, to the sentient beings was
also widely discussed at the end of the 1970’s. Bentham was well aware of the fact
that the logic of the demand for racial equality should not stop at the equality of
humans. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take
that suffering into consideration, and, indeed, to count it equally with like suffering
of any other being. Rather than regarding them as inferior to human beings because
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of their inability to reason, Bentham applied the moral principle of utilitarianism to
sentient animals. He said that because animals suffer, their happiness is indeed
relevant. The ethical theory of utilitarianism states that an action is right if its
results are superior to those of any other action. The basic idea is to generate the
greatest possible amount of happiness among the greatest number.
Indeed, utilitarianism is a powerful force in support of many environmental
philosophies. Rather than believing in the absolute ‘rights’ of animals and nature,
many environmentalists contend instead that their programme maximizes utility.
They say that because animals can suffer, they should be taken into account when
judging the morality of an action.8
The classical utilitarians shaped much of
philosophical debates in the nineteenth century, but they did not take animals’
moral standing seriously. It is in the second half of 20th
century moral
philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Jöel Feinberg, and Tom Regan who took up the
issue.
John Rodman appears to have first used the term ‘sentientism’ to refer to that
mode of ethics which restricts moral standing only to the living beings who can
feel pain and pleasure. But it is Peter Singer who can be regarded as the champion
of sentientism. Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation based on utilitarianism has
become ‘the holy book’ of animal liberation movement, and for this reason, the
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term ‘animal liberation’ has become closely associated with Singer’s views. He
claims that all animals are equal as they all have interests. He wonders, how could
this go unnoticed that this applies also to non-human animals, who also have lives
that can go well or badly, can suffer and hence have interest that we can affect!22
Some moral philosophers applied the idea of rights to animals. They argue
that animals, like humans, have certain basic rights, like the right to live and
flourish freely. This means that there are human actions which are simply
unacceptable, and that humans must respect animal rights. The equality claim does
not, however, imply equality in all respects, e.g., in intelligence and abilities,
capacity for leadership, rationality, etc. that are applicable to humans.
As already hinted, Singer has two key ideas of justification for equality of
consideration: First, he adopted Bentham’s pleasure and pain principle, argued for
sentience and in particular, the capacity to suffer. Animals feel pain, and this fact
makes them moral subjects. Animals who can suffer have an interest in avoiding
pain. And pain in a non-human animal is no different in moral significance to pain
in a human. Secondly, he evokes the principle of equality: the principle of equal
consideration of like interests. All entities which have a capacity to suffer have an
interest in avoiding suffering—of equal moral standing in each case—each such
entity has a claim to equally. But this does not, of course, mean equal treatment in
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all respects. Interests are not identical across living beings. Still then we could
admit that animals are entitled to equal considerations. But equal consideration for
different beings may, however, lead to different treatment.23
The grounds for inferring that animals can feel pain are nearly as good as the
ground for inferring other humans’ pain. Only nearly, for there is at least
behavioural sign that humans have, and no non-human have, and that is
sophisticated language. This has long been regarded as an important distinction
between man and other animals. But this distinction is not relevant to the question
of how animals ought to be treated, unless it is linked to the issue of whether
animals suffer. The link, according to Singer, has been attempted in two ways.
First, stemming from philosophical thought associated with Wittgenstein, who
maintains that we cannot meaningfully attribute states of consciousness to beings
without language. This position seems to us implausible one. States, like pain, are
more primitive, and seem nothing to do with language. Singer refers to Michael
Peters’ Animal, Men and Morals, where it is argued that the basic signals we use to
convey pain, fear, sexual arousal, and so on, are not specific to our species.24
So
there is no reason to believe that a creature without language cannot suffer. The
second link is the best evidence that we can have that another creature is in pain is
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when he tells us that he is. But, according to Singer, ‘I am in pain’ is not really the
best possible evidence that the speaker is in pain because he or she might be lying.
Anyhow, let us now see how do we know that animals can feel pain? We can
never directly experience the pain of another being, whether that being is human or
non-human. Animals in pain behave in much the same way as humans do, and
their overt behavior is sufficient justification for the belief that they feel pain. We
also can point to the fact that the nervous systems of all vertebrates, and especially
of birds and mammals, are fundamentally similar. This anatomical parallel makes
it likely that the capacity of animals to feel pain and pleasure is similar to our
own.25
Thus Singer claims that the capacity for consciousness of pleasure and pain
would, all by itself, suffice to give an animal moral standing. In Animal Liberation
Singer writes: “The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for
having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of
interests in a meaningful way.”26
Anyhow, in his essay ‘All Animals are Equals’
Singer makes his form of sentientism even more explicit: If a being is not capable
of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing in it to be
taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience is the only defensible
boundary of concern for the interests of other. Given Singer’s understanding of
what it is to be sentient, we have the following criterion of morality:
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A thing has interests or well-being only if it is capable of suffering or
experiencing enjoyment.
A potentially more stringent sentientist position is proposed by moral and
political philosopher Jöel Feinberg. In his famous essay ‘The Rights of Animals
and Unborn Generations’ argues that while it make sense to attribute rights to some
non-human animals and to future generations of humans, neither plants, species,
nor ecosystems are plausible candidates for right. According to Feinberg, in order
to have right, an entity must be capable of consciously aiming at – thinking about –
things in its future. In his own words, “…an interest…presupposes at least
rudimentary cognitive equipment cognitive equipment. Interests are compounded
somehow out of desires and aims—both of which presuppose something like
beliefs, or cognitive awareness…Mere brute longings unmediated by beliefs—
longings for one knows not what—might be a primitive form of
consciousness…but they are altogether different from the sort of thing we mean by
‘desire’, especially when we speak of human beings.” 27
Beside Singer and Feinberg, a third proponent of animal liberation is Tom
Regan. He characterized a truly environmental ethics in an article entitled ‘The
Nature and Possibility of Environmental Ethics’ in the celebrated journal
Environmental Ethics (1981), as one in which ‘all conscious beings and some non-
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conscious beings held to have moral standing’. Although he, like Singer and
Feinberg, takes sentience to be of moral significance, he does not refer his case to
utilitarianism as source. He embraces a sentientist but deontological rights view,
labeling Aldo Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’ as ‘environmental fascism’.28
Regan argued
for the need for a more rights-based focus than could be found within Singer’s
Animal Liberation. According to Regan, it is not be possible to argue convincingly
the case for animal rights unless they are held to possess a right to life. Regan
accords moral standing to those animals who are ‘subjects of life’. Beings that
meet the criterion, however, are ends in themselves and possess inherent worth,
and on this ground, they can be said to possess rights.
In the book The Case for Animal Rights (1983) Regan says that ‘having moral
right’ is an all or nothing thing; to ‘have rights’ at all is to have a blanket right not
to be significantly harmed in any way. His argument for extending to animals a
blanket right not to be harmed has two parts. First, he argues that recognizing this
blanket right in human is the essence of respecting them as individuals. Second, he
argues that any non-speciesist explanation of why very nearly all human beings
deserve to be treated with this kind of individual respect will imply that many
animals deserve the same. In particular, Regan argues that what he calls the
‘subject of a life criterion’ best explains the scope of moral rights among humans,
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and implies that at least all normal adult mammals, and probably all normal adult
birds, deserve similar respect. To be a subject of a life, in Regan’s sense, is to have
a conscious well-being which is tied to having one’s conscious desire for one’s
future.
Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights (1983) is a rigorous exploration of the
implications of extending a common conception of moral rights from humans to
animals which have the kind of cognitive capacities that Feinberg took to be
necessary for having interests. Regan’s account of the tie between interests and
rights can be paraphrased in this way. If an entity A ‘has moral rights’, then it
would be wrong to set back significant way on purely utilitarian grounds—it would
be wrong to set back significant interests of A unless a certain kind of non-
utilitarian justification for doing so was available. Although appeals to rights in
day-to-day speech are significantly more nuanced than this simple account, it does
capture a core meaning of rights claims as used in daily arguments about ethics.
For instance, when opponents of abortion invoke a fetus’s right to life, they are in
effect saying that the costs of carrying it to term cannot suffice to justify aborting it
—that only be invoking a similar right to life on the mother’s side could abortion
be justified.
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It is important to note that, for Regan, ‘having moral rights’ is an all-or-
nothing: to ‘have rights’ at all is to have a blanket right not to be significantly
harmed in any way (at least not for the sake of purely utilitarian goals). In daily life
when we talk about rights we typically invoke various specific rights not to be
harmed in fairly specific ways. For instance, to have a right to free speech is to
have the right not to be harmed in the specific way we would be harmed by having
our speech limited, to have a right to a public education is to have to have the right
not to be harmed in the way we would be harmed by not being provided with an
education, etc.
Regan’s argument for extending to animals a blanket right not to be harmed
has two parts. First, he argues that recognizing this blanket right in humans is the
essence of respecting them as individuals. To think that aggregate benefits to
others can suffice to justify us in harming an individual is to think of that
individual as a mere ‘utility receptacle’. Regan claims that the classic objections to
utilitarianism—that it could justify punishing the innocent, slavery, etc., if only the
aggregate benefits are large enough to outweigh the costs to the harmed individuals
—arise because utilitarianism fails to respect individuals in this way. Second,
Regan argues that any non-speciesist explanation why very nearly all human
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beings deserve to be treated with this kind of individual respect will imply that
many animals deserve the same.
In particular, Regan argues that what he calls the ‘subject of a life’ criterion
best explains the scope of moral rights among humans and implies that at least all
normal adult mammals, probably all normal adult birds, deserve similar respect. To
be a ‘subject of a life’ in Regan’s sense is (roughly) to have a conscious well-being
which is tied to having one’s conscious desires for one’s future satisfaction. On
this criterion, a permanently comatose human no longer has moral rights, because
he no longer has any conscious desires for his future in terms of which we can
conceive of him as being harmed in the relevant sense; but even very profoundly
retarded humans would be harmed in this sense, and so, too, animals with at least
rudimentary conscious desires for their future would have that right.
So Regan’s view, like Feinberg’s, may be even more restrictive than
Singer’s. For Singer, the bare capacity to feel pleasure or pain gives an entity
moral standing. According to Regan and Feinberg, however, something more is
required: the capacity to consciously desire things in one’s future—it is in terms of
one’s desires for the future, rather than bare consciousness of pain. But evolution
may have produced consciousness of pain in some organisms without coupling it
with the ability to consciously plan for the future. Pain combines vital information
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about tissue damage in the present with strong negative effect, and these might aid
organisms in simple conditioned learning where thinking about how to achieve
things in the future is unnecessary.
Even then, when Regan distinguished between ‘an ethic for the use of the
environment’ and ‘an ethic of the environment’, it is argued, he seems to embrace
some form of holism. Gary Varner said that if ‘environmental philosophy’ were
defined as that discipline that attributes moral standing to non-conscious entities,
then it would be an analytic truth that no form of sentientism could be an
‘environmental ethic’. Varner concludes that any version of holism claims that no
version of sentientism would be ‘adequate’ as an environmental ethics. Three kinds
of reason for this conclusion may be given:29
First, the range of policy goals for
preserving the health or integrity of ecosystems, sentientist ethics cannot support
these goals as fully as holistic ethics could. Second, in certain hypothetical
situations (like the ‘last man’ case) a sentientist ethic conflicts with the intuitions
of a holistic environmental philosopher. Third, it is that because environmental
philosophers are directly concerned with preserving holistic entities, such as
species and ecosystems, the conceptual machinery of traditional ethical theory is
ill-suited in capturing the general value framework of environmental philosopher.
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The most widely discussed in this connection is J. Baird Callicott’s 1980-
paper ‘Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affairs’ contributing to the widespread
impression that sentient ethics must be an inadequate basis for an environmental
ethics. Callicott draws between the implications of sentientist ethics and the Land
Ethic of Aldo Leopold on practical issues in very stark terms. He says that the
Land Ethic would permit or even require hunting of animals to protect the local
environment, implying that animal liberationists should oppose hunting even in
such situations. The Land Ethic sees that predators as critically important members
of the biotic community, but sentientist condemn them as merciless, wanton, and
incorrigible murderers. Animal liberationists advocate vegetarianism, but Callicott
argues that universal vegetarianism probably would produce an environmentally
catastrophic population increase.30
Anyhow, in none of the sentientist views surveyed here can include entities
such as species or ecosystems (as opposed to some to their individual members)
plausible candidates for moral standing, and this basic feature of sentientist views
has played a major role in their rejection by many prominent environmental
ethicists. This leads us to search for a more comprehensive environmental theory,
like ecocentrism.
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Notes and References:
1. “Biocentrism (Cosmology).” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 01 June 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biocentrism_ (cosmology)>.
2. Ibid.
3. Albert Schweitzer. “Reverence for Life.” Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and
Application. Louis P. Pojman & Paul Pojman, eds. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008.
p. 132.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 133.
6. Hans Lenk. Global Technoscience and Responsibility: Schemes Applied to Human
Values, Technology, Creativity and Globalization. Auslieferung/Verlagskontakt,
Fresnostr: Lit Verlag, 2007. p. 296.
7. Paul Taylor. “Biocentric Egalitarianism.” (Originally published in Environmental Ethics.
vol. 3, 1981. in the name of ‘The Ethics of Respect for Nature’). Environmental Ethics:
Readings in Theory and Application. op. cit., p. 141.
8. Ibid., p. 142.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 145.
11. Ibid., p. 147.
12. Ibid., p. 152.
13. Ibid.
14. Kate Rawles. “Biocentrism.” Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. Ruth Chadwick et al. vol.
1, San Diago: Academic Press, 1993. p. 278.
15. Ibid.
16. John Rodman. “The Liberation of Nature.” Inquiry 20. 1977. pp. 94-101.
17. Peter Hay. “Ecophilosophy.” A Companion to Environmental Thought. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2002. p. 31.
18. “Environmental Ethics.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 02 June 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_Ethics >.
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19. Jeremy Bentham. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Ch. XVII.
London: Russell, 1962. Sec. 1. Footnote to paragraph 4.
20. Peter Singer. Practical Ethics. 2nd
ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933. p.
57.
21. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
22. Peter Hay. “Animal Liberations/Animal Rights.” A Companion to Environmental
Thought. op. cit., p. 37.
23. Ibid.
24. Peter Singer. “Animal Liberation.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to
Radical Ecology. op. cit., p. 25.
25. Peter Singer. Practical Ethics. 2nd
ed. op. cit., p. 70.
26. Peter Singer. Animal Liberation: Towards an End to Men’s Inhumanity to Animals.
Wellingborough: Thorsons Publishers, 1975. p. 9.
27. Gary Varner. “Sentientism.” A Companion to Environmental Philosophy. Dale Jamieson,
ed. USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2001. p. 194.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 196.
30. J. Baird Callicott. “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affairs.” Environmental Ethics.
Robert Elliot, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 55.
Special acknowledgement: In preparing this chapter I have also taken some help of I Gede
Suwantana’s unpublished thesis From Ecology to Ecosophy: A Study of Arne Naess’s
Environmental Philosophy. Burdwan: The University of Burdwan, 2010.