Court Patronage, County Governors and the Early Stuart Parliaments

Stephen Hollings

Parergon, Number 6, 1988, pp. 121-135 (Article)

Published by Australian and New Zealand Association of Medieval and Early ModernStudies (Inc.)DOI: 10.1353/pgn.1988.0013

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Court Patronage, County Governors and the Early Stuart Parliaments

There is no lack of historical scholarship on court patronage, county power structures or the Early Stuart Parliaments. There is, however, a rather critical lack of understanding of the way these three central areas of Stuart politics impinged on each other and the way in which they interacted. The patron/client struggles at court had far-reaching ramifications for the power balances of the county hierarchies and both worked to dictate which men would sit in Parliament and w h o m and what they would represent there. The ways in which this worked and the evolutionary process of these relationships during the reign of James I, particularly, are largely misunderstood and yet it is only through an examination

of the roles of allegiance and patronage in these three areas that any true understanding can be gained of the quite fundamental changes in the make-up of political relations during the early years of the Stuarts.

In order to try to explain the events of the 1620s, more recent historical scholarship has placed a renewed emphasis on the roles of the patron in the House of Lords and the client in the House of Commons. Such scholarship has not gone unchallenged and it has become obvious that there wiU not be a widely acceptable thesis explaining the politics of that decade until w e have a fuller understanding of the period which preceded it. The historians of the 1620s are working with far too few reliable reference points from the earlier period and in absolutely vital matters such as patron/client relationships in the context of Parliaments, our knowledge of the early part of James I's reign is still woefully incomplete. A s a result, historians have been unable to make the sort of meaningful comparisons which need to be made before a more complete understanding of the reign can be found.

N o satisfactory picture of those troublesome Parliaments of the 1620s can be gained until w e have a greater understanding of what really occurred in the preceding Parliaments, particularly that of 1604-10. O n this point, at least, there is validity in the arguments of J.H. Hexter and his fellow 'Revisers of Revisionism', as they seem to term themselves.1 Unfortunately it is in this area

'See J.H. Hexter, Power Struggle, Parliament and Liberty in Early Stuart England, Journal of Modern History 50, no. 1, 1978, 42, 47; D. Hirst, Parliament, Law and War in the 1620s, review article, Historical Journal 23, no. 2, 1980, 457; and T.K. Rabb, The Role of the Commons, in Revisionism Revised: Two Perspectives on Early Stuart Parliamentary History, Past and Present 92, August 1981, 67. Rabb gives a concise bibliography of the principal revisionist publications, the most important of which are C. Russell, Parliamentary History in Perspective 1604-1629, History 61, 1976; K. Sharpe, ed., Faction and Parliament, Essays on

122 S. Hollings

of gaining a better understanding of what preceded the 1620s that both the revisionists and their revisers have failed to make headway, to the detriment of

aU their arguments. The first quite central point that can be made from an examination of

patronage relations in the first half of James' reign is that they were in very great

contrast to those operating in the latter years of the reign.2 This was particularly so when the way patronage relations interacted with Parliament is

examined and the early years of James' reign provides a rather surprising picture,

but one which makes the events of the 1620s far more explicable. Obviously not all patronage relations can be uncovered, but what evidence

survives is most compelling. The essential relations for government, both in

Parliament and outside of it, were the relations between the leading courtiers and

the county governors. This latter group sat in Parliament as a virtual right because of their position in the counties and acted as the JPs and deputy lieutenants carrying out royal policy in the counties. It was the views of these county governors which dictated whether government could be workable or well

nigh impossible. Throughout James' reign the attitude these men held when in their counties was coloured by what they found at the centre, particularly when they were sitting in Parliament The reasons for the prevalence in the 1620s of widespread opposition in both Parliament and the counties can be found, at least in part, in the very substantial changes in the nature of patronage relations between the court and the county governors during the reign of James I, especiaUy with relation to Parliamentary activities.

Until his death the role of the Earl of Salisbury was central. His network of patronage links with the county governors was more extensive than any other in the period of James I's reign. William Cecil, Lord Burghley, left his son both a legacy of contacts and the knowledge of how to utilise such a patronage network. Robert was one of very few men w h o understood quite how court/county relations functioned in England. Unfortunately his new monarch, James I, lacked such an understanding and any will to learn.

Given that many 'Cecil men' sat in Parliament, the first Parliament of James' reign should have been an outstanding success for Salisbury. To understand why this was not the case it is necessary to delve into the way in which the Cecil patronage network operated. Being a client of the Earl of

Early Stuart History, Oxford, 1978, and C. Russell, Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629, Oxford, 1979. 2For a detailed examination of patronage relations in the reign of James I see S.L. Hollings, W e b of Power - The Function and Connections of Courtiers and Great Ministers in the Patronage Network during the reign of James I, Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney, 1983.

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Salisbury did not commit you to support the Earl or government in Partiament, and while this was understood by both the Earl and his clients it was not fully realised by the King or the rising courtiers, who were to be his ministers in later years. W h e n looked at from this perspective, the problem in the 1620s appears to be not so much one of clients in the C o m m o n s following rebel patrons in the Lords, but one of men in the C o m m o n s wanting the freedom which they and their fathers had enjoyed under the Earl of Salisbury.

Even a cursory examination of Salisbury's clients shows that there were very few like Sir Walter Cope who habitually voted for the government line. Cope, w h o sat for Westminster, was really the Earl's 'lieutenant' and was not significant in county administration. It is those who were close to the Earl and major figures in their counties who display the most interesting characteristics.

Old Sir Rowland Lytton was one of the Earl's principal agents in what can almost be described as Salisbury's native county of Hertfordshire. The Lytton family was according to Chamberlain hereditarily dependent upon the Cecils and Sir Rowland had helped to make il so. Sir Rowland's son, WiUiam, became a close companion of Salisbury's son and was to undertake the sort of tasks for the second Earl that Sir Rowland undertook for Robert, the first Earl of Salisbury. Sir Rowland was both a JP and a deputy lieutenant and it was to him that Salisbury gave the task of producing a list of Hertfordshire gentlemen who would make a loan in the first privy seal loans of the reign in 1604. Sir Rowland handled this delicate matter quickly and efficiently. Yet Notestein quite accurately described Sir Rowland as taking his 'own independent line'.3 Clearly Lytton saw Parliament as the place to speak his mind.

So, if one so close was 'independent' when in Parliament, what of some of those m en w h o have been classed traditionally by historians as opposition leaders? Notestein considered Sir Robert Wingfield to have been an opposition leader and his Parliamentary record appears to justify such a description. H e had opposed monopolies in the later Elizabethan Parliaments, played a part in formulating the 1604 Apology, and strongly supported Sir Francis Goodwin in that infamous disputed Buckinghamshire election.4 Sir Robert Wingfield was actuaUy very close to the Earl of Salisbury. H e was a relative, habitually sat in Partiament for the Cecil-controlled borough of Stamford, and just prior to his death entrusted the care of his son to Salisbury and the Earl of Exeter. Wingfield was Salisbury's deputy steward of the Queen's manors in Lincolnshire and, as a

3W. Notestein, The House of Commons 1604-1610, New Haven, 1971, 526, note 17 and N.E. McLure, ed.. The Letters of John Chamberlain,Phi\adelphia, 1939, vol. 1, 200, letter 68. 4D.H. Willson, The Privy Councillors in the House of Commons 1604-1629,1940, New York (repr. 1971), 120-121; W . Notestein, op.cit., 61; and G.R. Elton, A High Road to Civil War?, in C H . Carter, ed.. From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation, London, 1966, 337.

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deputy lieutenant and justice of the peace, was undoubtedly the Earl's principal agent in Northamptonshire.5 H e corresponded frequently with Salisbury over county matters, keeping the chief minister very accurately informed about the state of Northamptonshire and surrounding areas. H e often sent Salisbury small

gifts, as clients were wont to do, and, during the winter when his county duties

were less onerous, was to be found in the Earl's chambers at court6

The historian is faced with the seeming paradox of Wingfield as the perfect client when in the county, and the perfect opposition leader when in the C o m m o n s , although later in the 1604 Parliament Wingfield supported the

concept of the Union of Scotland and England and kept Salisbury informed on the state of the debate in the C o m m o n s and the way in which the matter was

moving - again seemingly the perfect client Even on this matter Wingfield was prepared to stand up for what he thought was right, and vigorously defended Sir Edward Hoby to Salisbury, after the House of Lords had taken exception to what Hoby had said upon the matter in the Commons. 7 In this he was supporting another of Salisbury's clients for Hoby, a gentleman of the privy chamber, utilised the Earl's support for his suits and was to be one of the principal mourners at Salisbury's funeral.8

Wingfield's activities suggest a fairly radical reassessment of what was expected in terms of allegiance from a patron-client relationship. Clearly, for Wingfield at least, dUigence and allegiance in the counties did not necessarily translate into unthinking allegiance in the Parliament. Notestein tried to get over the discontinuities in Wingfield's Parliamentary stance by arguing that

Wingfield's stand on the Union was motivated by a desire to regain the King's favour, which he had lost because of his earlier speeches in the Parliament9

The key point, however, is that at no lime did Wingfield lose the Earl of Salisbury's favour, because Salisbury's expectations of what he could and should receive from his clients when they were in Partiament was realistic.

Wingfield and other examples make the term opposition largely meaningless in the 1604 Parliament. Like Wingfield, Sir Francis Hastings, the Somerset deputy-lieutenant, had opposed monopolies and favoured the Apology. H e had also incurred the King's extreme displeasure for his support of the 1605 petition

5Historic Manuscript Commission (hereafter H..M.C), Salisbury (Cecil) MSS, vol. 17, 51, vol. 17, 219-20, 332, and vol. 21. 70, 121-2; P.R.O., SP14/44/67; and History of Parliament, H. of C. 1558-1603, ed. P.W. Hasler, London, 1981, vol. 3, 638-640. 6Wingfield also tried to gain a position at court through Salisbury, but in this was unsuccessful. See H.M.C., Salisbury (Cecil) MSS, voL 17, 51. nlbid., vol. 18, 456-7. iIbid„ vol. 15, 15, vol. 16. 233. vol. 17, 54, 60, 127-8, vol. 19, 105, vol. 21, 374; and P.R.O., SP14/48/146. 9 W . Notestein, op.cit., 225.

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against the deprivation of Puritan ministers, yet despite all this continued to enjoy Salisbury's friendshjp and assistance. When, at ihe instigation of King James, Hastings was deprived of all his county offices for his support of the petition, Salisbury actively sought to have Hastings restored. Salisbury was not just acting out of friendship but rather through a care for the efficiency of government. His principal agent in Somerset, Lord Chief Justice Sir John Popham, had made clear to Salisbury the need for experienced men, weU versed in government, to be appointed to the ranks of the county governors.10 A man with Hastings' experience was not easily replaced.

Sir Henry Neville, another prominently involved with the 1604 Apology, had been imprisoned in the Tower for his part in the Essex rebellion in 1601, but by 1604 was closely connected with Salisbury, and was privy to some of Salisbury's plans for improved governmental efficiency. In 1608, for example, he proposed a scheme for parishes to make a composition in Ueu of jury service, a measure which Salisbury certainly supported.11 Sir John Holies while another supporter of the 1604 Apology nonetheless in the same session supported a bill being promoted by Sir John Stanhope, the vice-Chamberlain of the Household,

who was foUowing Salisbury's instructions on the matter. What Salisbury wanted was the support of these men where they thought

the measures involved could be successfully implemented and here Holies, like the others was a dutiful client. In 1610, for example, he was found writing to the Earl about the reaction within his home county of Nottinghamshire to the proposed Great Contract12 It was precisely this sort of honest assessment of county opinions which Salisbury expected and needed even though, of course, it was honesty tinged with setf-interest

Other supposedly 'opposition' M.P.S had links with Salisbury, including Sir William Strode, John Hare, a Clerk of the Wards, who led many of the attacks on purveyance and Richard Martin who, like Wingfield strongly supported Sir Francis Goodwin in the disputed election. Indeed it is a mistake to see the Goodwin/Fortescue struggle in the context of one group opposing Salisbury because Goodwin worked hard to achieve a good relationship with the Earl.13

D.H. Willson described John Hare as a man w h o had left the proper

10C. Cross ed.. The Letters of Sir Francis Hastings 1574-1609, Somerset Record Society, vol. 69, 1969, 87, 92-4, 108-9, 111-2; and H.M.C.. Salisbury (Cecil) MSS, vol. 16, 172, 365, vol. 17, 120, and vol. 21, 26. nG.R. Elton, op.cit., 338 and O.L. Duncan Jr., The Political Career of Sir Henry Neville: A n Elizabethan Gentleman al the Court of James I, Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1974, 212-3. 12D.H. Willson, op.cit., 116 and P.R.O., SP14/57/62. 1 3W. Notestein, op.cit., 28, 97 and H.M.C., Salisbury (Cecil) MSS, vol. 16, 40.

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responsibilities of royal service to join the 'popular party',14 but this

misunderstands the complexities of patronage relations and their responsibilities. Nicholas Tyacke has demonstrated that Sir Robert Wroth, the agitator

against wardship and purveyance, was certainly not opposed to the Earl of Salisbury, and may even have been fulminating along lines endorsed by

Salisbury.15 Wroth had strong links with the court, had accompanied Salisbury to France in 1598 and entertained King James at his house while the monarch was on a hunting trip. Tyacke has argued that Salisbury was thinking even in 1604 about some sort of Great Contract and was laying the foundations by having men tike Wroth oppose the evils of wardship and purveyance.16

This is probably to be unduly cynical about Salisbury's 'modus operandi' and to suggest a certain dishonesty about Wroth's agitations, neither of which are necessarily warranted. It can certainly be said that Salisbury look no offence at Wroth outlining in strong terms the very legitimate arguments that he and his

fellows in the counties had against these measures. Perhaps the Earl was afready thinking in terms of a Great Contract; perhaps after hearing men like Wroth and Wingfield he realised the need for some major measures and then conceived the idea of a Great Contract. For there to be any certainty of this a substantial

amount of additional evidence would need to be uncovered. In very basic terms the Parliament was a meeting place between the royal

government and the governing classes. Royal officials looked to achieve the level of Parliamentary taxation they desired and the passage of some royal measures, although these were not usually very great in number. County governors came to Westminster believing very strongly that their role was to represent accurately the wishes and feelings of their fellows, and that if they did not do this they would be being dishonest to those w h o had elected them. This is why the question of grievances almost always surfaced early in the lives of these Parliaments. In arguing for alleviation of county grievances, the county governors also saw themselves as serving patrons such as Salisbury for

successful government could hardly be carried out in a climate of county opposition because the centre had not acted upon the problems in the periphery.

Salisbury's attitude to what was necessary in order to achieve successful government in the counties provides the key to his attitude to men like Wingfield and Lytton. It was not useful to him to have his clients unquestioningly support government measures in the Commons, purely out of

an allegiance to him as his clients, if the passing of those measures created

14D.H. Willson, op.cit., 116. 15N.R.N. Tyacke, Wroth, Cecil, and the Parliamentary Session of 1604, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 50, no. 121, May 1977, 120-125. l6Ibid. 121 and H.M.C., Salisbury (Cecil) MSS, vol. 16 385 and vol. 17, 364.

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considerable opposition back in the counties, where they would have to be implemented.

In the context of overall government rather than just in the success or failure of a Parliamentary session, there seems to be a far more understandable attitude to patronage duties by both Salisbury and the county governors. The latter's independent attitudes can even be seen as an advantage to the Earl. While at times it could make life very difficult for him in Partiament, it did tend to ensure that there would be little opposition within the counties to the sort of measures that he introduced. The period of Cecil primacy, particularly when compared with the 1620s, demonstrates this fairly clearly. What is more, Satisbury's attitude allowed these country gentlemen and county governors to combine quite happily an honest representation of the views and principles of their feUows in the counties with an honest allegiance to their patron - Salisbury. Combining the two was of critical importance for the smooth running of government in the counties, and Salisbury, the consumate politician, recognised this. Had he forced his clients to 'toe die line' then either they would have remained loyal to him but had their county standing drastically reduced, thereby making it more difficult for them to carry out their responsibilities and in at least some cases more difficult to be subsequently re-elected to Parliament, or they would have broken with the Earl and the centre in order to maintain their pinciples in the county in which they lived and operated. These sorts of dilemmas, never faced by Salisbury's ctients, obviously beset the county governors in the 1620s.

That is not to say that Salisbury did not use his very powerful patronage as a lever. The Salisbury papers show that the Earl's displeasure was rarely taken tightly. Wherever he could he would use his patronage as a manipulative tool but with the county governors he was always careful. Few were fools, most needed no reminder from the Earl about how loss of favour would affect them, but so too were they men of very substantial standing in their own right and many were the Earl's genuine friends. M u c h of what they said from the point of view of their counties would have found sympathy with Salisbury the county magnate even if it sometimes jarred with Salisbury the chief minister!

W h e n it suited him Salisbury could quite easily use his patronage as a bargaining tool. O n the evening of July 10, 1610, at a critical time in the discussion of the Great Contract, Salisbury summoned a meeting with a number of the leaders of the C o m m o n s - Sir Maurice Berkeley, Sir Henry Neville, Sir John Scott, Sir Herbert Croft, Sir Edwin Sandys, and Edward Alford.17

Salisbury had demonstrated a proven willingness to establish stable relations with virtually all these men irrespective of their stance in the C o m m o n s and all

17T. Birch, The Court and Times of James the First, ed. R.F. Williams, London, 1849, (AMS reprint 1973), vol. 1, 123; O.L. Duncan Jr., op.cit., 219; W . Notestein, op.cit., 28-29, and H.M.C., Salisbury (Cecil) MSS, vol. 19, 12.

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would have been quite aware of the consequences for themselves had they not dealt honestly with the Earl. Salisbury needed to gauge accurately the mood of the C o m m o n s and the likelihood of the success of the Contract, and impress upon these men the need for some sort of Parliamentary taxation. The subsequent day the C o m m o n s agreed to grant one subsidy and one fifteenth. Perhaps this was helped by the meeting, perhaps not, but it was indicative of Salisbury's style. What he wanted from his clients and contacts was a fair hearing and their honest assessment of how their counties would react, combined with an appreciation of the demands of government

The striking similarities between these examples allow us to argue that a man's allegiances in terms of patronage are not to be found easily, if at all, by

examining his Parliamentary performances. Salisbury recognised that Parliament was unlike any other forum and needed a very different touch. His politics were, however, fundamentally Elizabethan, unlike those of his new Stuart monarch who had come from a different political background and had less understanding of the nuances of English politics. James' view of Kingship was influenced by Scottish lairds, not English county gentlemen. With Salisbury

dead, inexperienced courtiers and ministers, like the Duke of Buckingham, were too quickly prepared to take criticism in Parliament as a sign of complete and irrevocable opposition. Their response of withdrawing patronage to the Parliamentarians was markedly different to Salisbury's policies and had the effect of driving the luckless Parliamentarians into some kind of opposition outside

Parliament, something Salisbury always sought to smother. What is striking about the court of James I is the way in which there was

such discontinuity in court personnel between the early years and the later ones. Salisbury's death left a large vacuum, principally because he had not prepared a successor. This failure to consider the future was symptomatic of the jealousy with which he had hung onto power, and so it was hardly surprising that his fellow Councillors lacked his experience and insights, both in the art of

governing generally and more particularly in Parliamentary management. Indeed the Addled Parliament of 1614 can be seen, at least in part, to be a story of misunderstanding by those at the court who thought they knew how Salisbury managed Parliaments, but at best knew only part of the story.18 In fact they never had the royal confidence to implement such a management policy in the first place. A number of Salisbury's colleagues continued in government and

exhibited various degrees of competence, but Buckingham soon eased most of these out of office. Some like the Earl of Northampton had atieady followed Salisbury to the grave. The result was that by the 1620s there was an almost

18For the Addled Parliament see T.L. Moir, The Addled Parliament of 1614, London, 1958.

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totally new court handling the Parliaments. There were some exceptions to this - the Earl of Pembroke had some experience of the earlier period and he was probably the most successful in his relations with members of the Commons, but for much of the period he was not playing a fundamental role in policy­making.

The court was new but many of the leading Parliamentarians were not new, or at least came from experienced Parliamentary families. M e n like Sir Robert Phelips had been in James' first Parliament and would have been schooled in the ways of Parliaments by their fathers, just as Burghley had instructed young Robert Cecil. The Cecil ways that these Parliamentarians were familiar with, however, had now been lost at court

There can be little doubt that the leading county governors and the Parliamentarians of the 1620s approached their Parliaments with fundamentally different expectations from those being entertained by the courtiers, who were supposedly going to manage the Parliaments. These facts alone would have led to enormous problems and many of the discontinuities that are now apparent When aU this came at the same time as the pressures of foreign policy, religious strife, war, and poor harvests, to name just a few, die remarkable thing really was that the Parliaments held together for any time at all.

This is not the place for a study of the 1620s Parliaments but it is the place to suggest how interpretations in the light of events eartier in the reign make the actions of some of the Parliamentarians far more explicable. Just as the examples of the 'opposition' leaders from James' first Parliament threw considerable doubt on whether they were actually opposing the court at all, a similar study of their counterparts in the 1620s can help to clarify the primary motivations of these county governors. There are a number of examples of actions by Parliamentarians which show a striking similarity to the behaviour of Salisbury's men in James' first Parliament but which had very different results. A re-examination of just a few key incidents in those 1620s Parliaments is sufficient to demonstrate that actions which have tended to bewilder the historians of these Parliaments were not so peculiar at all.

So perplexed is Conrad Russell over the behaviour of Sir Robert Phelips in the 1625 Partiament that he even goes as far as to suggest that Phelips was suffering from hysteria brought on by thought of the plague.19 Such an explanation stretches the bounds of incredulity a little far but with a sound knowledge of the sort of patronage relations common under the Earl of Salisbury

it is more than possible to suggest that Phelips was only showing signs of Wingfield schizophrenia' - nothing more. In the 1620s though, such a disease

1 9C. Russell, Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629, 244, note 1 continued from p.243.

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was virtually terminal to one's prospects both at court and in county

government Sir Robert had been groomed by his father, Sir Edward Phelips, and when

Sir Edward was away at court fulfilling his many duties as sergeant-at-law and then Master of the Rolls, it was Robert w h o handled the family affairs in

Somerset. H e was aware of the way his father had transmitted the perceived grievances of the county to the court and, like his father, saw this as part of the

role of the diligent county magnate. In 1604, for example, Sir Edward Phelips' name headed a list of seventeen prominent Somerset county gentlemen, who were protesting at the attempts to make the county responsible for paying a muster master. While assuring Salisbury of their willingness to further the

King's service, the gentlemen asked him lo assist them in this matter when it

came before the Council.20

Salisbury seems to have accepted Phelips' stand as representative of feeling in the county, and did not see it as any reason lo stop assisting Sir Edward at court. Years later Sir Robert Phelips voiced very similar objections to the county having to pay a muster master, yet this was not weU received at court and Professor Barnes, the Somerset county historian, ascribed these sentiments to a 'country' grouping which was ranged against the court.21 N o such description was ever applied to Sir Edward who, if anything, tended to be seen as a pro-Court figure in county politics. Barnes was accurately describing how the court viewed the matter, but there can be liitle doubt that the difference of perception and actions came from the court, and not the county. This sort of dichotomy

provides the key to Phelips's otherwise perplexing actions in 1625 and to the motivations of many of the other county governors who were to be classed as 'opposition' Parliamentarians. Compared with Salisbury's clients many were trying to assist Buckingham far more diligently but, confronted by the favourite's quite inflexible attitudes, were faced with either losing faith with their counties or with the court. In such circumstances many opted for what they knew and that was their counties rather than the new attitudes of the court

There is quite sufficient evidence for the first part of the 1625 Parliament at least, to indicate that Phelips felt he was supporting die court and government The fact that his moves were of little help to Buckingham and the court can hardly be blamed on Sir Robert but should, instead, be blamed on the pitifully inadequate actions of those Councillors who sat in the 1625 Commons. Early

in the Westminster session of 1625, the question of supply was raised and Sir Francis Seymour suggested a subsidy. There was litde comment from the Councillors present and Phelips suggested twice as much and the House carried

2 0H.M.C, Salisbury (Cecil) MSS, vol. 16, 325. 21T.G. Barnes, Somerset 1625-1640, A County's Government During the 'Personal Rule', Cambridge, Mass., 1961, 263-5.

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this motion. Phelips probably considered this a fair grant - no war had actually bceen declared, and no doubt he felt that he was diligently supporting the government Of course, from the Duke of Buckingham's point of view, with full knowledge of the commitments and plans he and King Charles had made, the sum seemed manifesdy inadequate and he took it as a sign of Phelips' opposition designed to frustrate him. It is most unlikely that Phelips believed that his actions could be interpreted in that manner. Similarly Sir Robert's support of the moves for an early adjournment may not have been motivated by anti-government thoughts but by a genuine concern about the dangers of the plague and the realisation that a Parliament obsessed with concern for its own health and safety would not be terribly amenable to the favourite.22

Sir Robert claimed in an undated letter to Buckingham that his speeches had been misrepresented and that he wished to retain Buckingham's favour.23 Much depends on its dating. If it was written after the later Oxford session in which Phelips unquestionably took a much harder line against government policy, overtly criticising the favourite, Russell's incomprehension may be understandable. The letter, however, may have been written after the first session, and with regard lo that Phelips could reasonably argue that all he had done was try to present his honest opinions about what the country would stand. It should be remembered that the country was even more in the dark than Phelips about what Charles and Buckingham were actually planning. Buckingham however was no politician, and certainly no Salisbury - he was a young favourite in a hurry to impress his monarch and it may well be that Phetips was prompted to be more overtly critical of the Duke in the second session because of Buckingham's complete lack of appreciation of Phelips' earlier efforts. For his more critical stand at Oxford, Phelips lost his county offices and the favour of Buckingham. Translation of the feelings of the county to the centre received no thanks from Buckingham and Charles if the feelings were not those they wanted to hear.

The men who were appointed as the special sheriffs of 1626 are in general not good examples of those indulging in Parliamentary opposition just for the sake of it. In many cases the reception that their comments and speeches received would have been quite different had they been made two decades earlier. Richard Knyghtley Esquire, of Northamptonshire, was flabbergasted when he heard that he had been made a sheriff, because he believed that he had supported

22For differing interpretations of Phelips' actions in the Parliament see C. Russell, Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629, 218-221, 226-229, 243-259 and R. Lockyer, Buckingham, The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham 1592-1628, London, 1981, 245-6, 269. "Somerset R.O., DD/PH/221/12. The dating of 1625 given to this document is an uncertain one.

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the favourite in the Parliament. In this Knyghtly was not alone. Even Sir Edward Conway, a Secretary of State, agreed with Knyghtley's interpretation of

his actions but somehow the unfortunate magnate had offended the Duke of Buckingham. 2 4 Again it is likely that his failing was that he accurately

represented the feeling of his countrymen in one of his speeches in ParUament

Knyghtley would have seen it as serving the Duke by allowing him to gauge the feelings of the country. At best Buckingham saw it as unhelpful criticism - in

most cases he interpreted it as outright opposition. Knyghtley's family had a long history of good relations with the court and

had enjoyed a particularly good relationship with Salisbury. Salisbury's support allowed them to survive many of their Puritan actions, including involvement with that 1605 petition against the deprivation of Puritan ministers. They suffered only temporary loss of office and the government did not move at all quickly to collect their Star Chamber fine.25 The Knyghtley influence in the county and surrounding districts was very substantial and Salisbury would never have been as foolish as to risk turning it inio a force for opposition to the centre. Buckingham managed to do so at a lime when the family was actively

looking for continued court patronage. Sir Thomas Wentworth's history is quite well known but again his actions

fall into this same category and are far more explicable once w e have a solid understanding of the earlier period. Prior to the Oxford session of 1625 Wentworth and Buckingham came to some sort of rapprochement, but the favourite reaffirmed his opposition to Wentworth after Sir Thomas opposed the call for more subsidies. Wentworth, with a solid knowledge of the local scene, realised how unpopular fresh subsidies would be in the counties, where previously voted subsidies were still being collected. Of course Wentworth's assessment of county feeling proved to be accurate and would have been welcomed by Salisbury, who realised the necessity of the centre appreciating the sentiments of those in the counties, and framing policies accordingly. To

^See B.M., Harleian M S , 1580 fo. 341-344, Conway to Buckingham. Hampton Court, 30 November, 1625; H.M.C., Buccleuch and Queensbury MSS, vol. 1, 261-2 and J.S. Wilson, Sheriffs' Rolls of the Sixteenth and Sevententh Centuries, English Historical Review 47, no. 185, 1932. Gruenfelder reiterates the view found in Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 11, 269 that Knyghdey was pricked as sheriff because he was one of those in opposition to the government in J.K. Gruenfelder, The Parliamentary Election in Northamptonshire, 1626, Northamptonshire Past and Present, 1968/69, 161. " H . M . C , Salisbury (Cecil) MSS, vol. 21, 55; P.R.O.. SP/14/69/17; and J. Wake. ed., A Copy of Papers Relating to Musters, Beacons, Subsidies etc., in the county of Northampton A.D. 1602-1623, Peterborough, 1935, 244-248.

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Buckingham such advice was unwelcome and Wentworth, too, was named as a sheriff for the following year.26

Sir Dudley Digges lost his position on the Kent commission of the peace in 1626 because of what he said in Parliament and he found this link between county offices and Parliamentary speeches quite astonishing. In 1624 he had worked very hard to support Buckingham in Parliament but had not received any preferment or thanks for doing so. He, too, had no idea what Charles and his favourite were planning in 1625 and 1626 and so expressed his disquiet at what was happening. H e did not anticipate expressing such opinions might lead to disgrace in the county.27 From 1622 Buckingham was Lord Lieutenant of Middlesex and one of his deputy-lieutenants, Sir Gilbert Gerrard represented the county in the 1621, 1624, 1625 and 1626 Parliaments. Gerrard was very close to county opinion and his Parliamentary stance tended to be critical of the government H e was the one deputy-lieuienant with w h o m Buckingham did not have close ties.28 To Buckingham it was seemingly unimportant that an influential county figure felt removed from the court and his patronage.

Sir Nathaniel Rich in Essex was another with a strong county base that saw

him constantly re-elected to Parliament For a while Rich was close to the favourite but when Rich started to question the favourite's religious and foreign policy, Buckingham turned against him, despite the fact that he was influential in Parliament and clearly not out of line with the way many in Essex were thinking.29

The county governors did not necessarily see criticism in Parliament as opposition to government They saw it in a more constructive fashion. There can be little doubt that Buckingham's approach stemmed from a quite different perception of the role of Parliament to that of the great mass of county governors. Buckingham certainly shared Charles' view of Partiaments, one that came perhaps from King James who, throughout the life of the first Parliament, demonstrated that he did not understand the sort of policies Salisbury was pursuing; nor was he concerned to find out the ways of English politics under the Cecils. Derek Hirst rightly says that the county governors felt that the Parliament was the legitimate place to air grievances and expected to be able to do so, accepting that in return they would not disrupt local government30 but in claiming that they saw the two areas as quite separate he is less accurate. The county governors did connect the two areas. They expected to be able to give

26Russell quite rightly finds the logic of Buckingham's moves difficult to follow, see C. Russell, Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629, 258-9. 2 7S. Hollings, op.cit., 352-4. 2%lbid„ 346-8. 29Ibid., 350. 3 0D. Hirst Court, Country and Politics before 1629, in K. Sharpe, ed.. Faction and Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History, 131.

134 S. Hollings

their opinions in Parliament so that their grievances could be dealt with, and so that what was passed in Parliament would not be disruptive to county government They believed their role in county administration entitled them or their fellows to a voice in the Parliament with that voice having the responsibility of carrying die concerns of the county to the centre for the good of

government throughout England. Buckingham, who had not gained experience in government under Salisbury,

and who had not been involved with county government until he was made a Lord Lieutenant, did not see why the Parliamentarians should be given these freedoms of expression. Buckingham, like most of the other later Jacobean ministers, was not looking for honest opinions but compliance, and when he received them anyway, interpreted the expression of grievances as signs of opposition. If Charles and Buckingham did not receive unqualified support they were quite prepared to link the retention of county offices to Parliamentary performance. By so doing they created a dangerous and very volatile political system.

A far better picture of the first Jacobean Parliament and later Elizabethan

Parliaments ought to throw further light on the problems of the Parliaments of the 1620s. That Salisbury did not move to dissolve the 1604 Parliament and then, at a later time, summon a fresh Parliament which might have been more co-operative may be explained by the theory that Salisbury, whose range of contacts was the most extensive in the kingdom, was satisfied that he was getting from the Parliament an honest reflection of how the country was

thinking. At times he must have been bitterly disappointed by it, but he was a realist and probably believed that any fresh Partiament would act in a similar vein.

Salisbury's style of handling relations with Parliament and with his clients during a Parliamentary session was markedly different to that which was to be employed by Buckingham. These differences go a long way towards helping to explain why there were such remarkable problems with the Parliaments of the 1620s, and why a gulf seemed to develop between the centre and the counties. Salisbury's failure to groom a number of protegds or prepare a successor, however, was responsible for a great deal of the inexperience which characterised so many of the courtiers in the later period of James' reign.

Burghley instructed his son that if one did not make friends of the great men

at court one was likely to be left 'like a hop without a pole'.31 It was, however, a two-way process and both Burghley and his son realised that great men needed support poles in the counties to enable them to govern and this coloured gready the way in which they viewed the actions of the county governors in the

31B.M., Harleian M S 787, fol. 86-87. The spelling has been modernized.

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Commons. Buckingham was a great man at court but by his actions during Parliamentary sessions left himself and the Stuart government rather 'like a hop without a pole' in the counties. The end result of this was the breaking of the EUzabethan nexus between court, county governors and the Parliament. During James' reign this was replaced by a political volatility which was to become the

hallmark of the Stuart years.

Stephen HoUings Sydney