Court Case Notes

Religious Freedoms

1st Amendment Rights

U.S. Supreme CourtENGEL v. VITALE, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)

370 U.S. 421

ENGEL ET AL. v. VITALE ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

No. 468.

Argued April 3, 1962.

Decided June 25, 1962.

ENGEL v. VITALE, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)

Facts of the Case The respondent Board of Education of Union Free

School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, acting in its official capacity under state law, directed the School District's principal to cause the following prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day:

"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."

“This daily procedure was adopted on the recommendation of the State Board of Regents, a governmental agency created by the State Constitution to which the New York Legislature has granted broad supervisory, executive, and legislative powers over the State's public school system. These state officials composed the prayer which they recommended and published as a part of their "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools," saying: "We believe that this Statement will be subscribed to by all men and women of good will, and we call upon all of them to aid in giving life to our program.“’

ENGEL v. VITALE, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)

Outcome Vote 6-1 “Neither the prayer's nondenominational character nor its voluntary

application saves it from unconstitutionality. By providing the prayer, New York officially approved or establishes religion.”

Majority Opinion (Justice Black) “There can be no doubt that New York's state prayer program officially

establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer.

Dissent (Justice Stewart) “With all due respect, I feel the court has misapplied a great constitutional

principle. I cannot see how an ‘official religion’ is established by wanting those who want to say a prayer say it.”

U.S. Supreme CourtWISCONSIN v. YODER, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

WISCONSIN v. YODER ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

No. 70-110.

Argued December 8, 1971Decided May 15, 1972

WISCONSIN v. YODER, (1972)

Facts of the Case

Three Amish families sued the state of Wisconsin over its requirement that children be enrolled in school until the age of sixteen. The parents refused to comply by removing their children from school after they completed the eighth grade and were convicted of violating the law. The families claimed that their rights to freely exercising their religion were not being respected. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found in favor of the Amish parents.

DecisionVote 6 and a half to one-half The Supreme Court agreed by a vote of

with the lower court that Wisconsin's law violated the families' rights to free exercise of religion. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the vote.

U.S. Supreme CourtMARSH v. CHAMBERS, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)

MARSH, NEBRASKA STATE TREASURER, ET AL. v. CHAMBERS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 82-23.

Argued April 20, 1983Decided July 5, 1983

MARSH v. CHAMBERS, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)

Facts of the Case

Chambers was a member of the Nebraska state legislature who objected to its chaplaincy policy. The clergyman who opened each session with a prayer was paid by public funds. The District Court objected to the use of public money to pay the preacher’s salary while the Appellate Court objected to the prayer being offered.

OutcomeVote 6-3 Supreme Court permitted the practice

of beginning the legislative session with a prayer given by the publicly funded chaplain.

MARSH v. CHAMBERS, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)

Majority Opinion: (Chief Justice Burger)

“The use of prayer is embedded in the nation’s history and tradition. That the practice of the Nebraska legislature is consistent with the framers’ intent is proven by their use of chaplains. Additionally, the Supreme Court and Congress have traditionally begun their sessions with prayers. Individual states do not have to abide by more stringent First Amendment limits than the federal government. The “Establishment Clause does not always bar a state from regulating conduct simply because it harmonizes with religious concerns.” Because of the principles upon which the nation has developed, religion has become part of the fabric of society. The offering of the prayer is a “tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.” The public payment of the chaplain is historically allowable because it was done by the Continental Congress years earlier. The pervasiveness of involving prayer with governmental activity without adverse effect has shown that there is no real threat from continuing the practice.”

Significance

The Court placed a heavy reliance on looking to history and the intent of the framers in reaching this decision. Because the practice had been done for many years, it had become a communication of shared values rather than a decidedly religious practice.

Student Freedoms

1st Amendment Rights

Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. School Dist.

393 U.S. 503 (1969)

Argued: November 12, 1968

Decided: February 24, 1969

Tinker v. Des Moines

Facts of the Case

John Tinker, 15 years old, his sister Mary Beth Tinker, 13 years old, and Christopher Echardt, 16 years old, decided along with their parents to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to their Des Moines schools during the Christmas holiday season. Upon learning of their intentions, and fearing that the armbands would provoke disturbances, the principals of Des Moines school districts resolved that all students wearing armbands would be asked to remove them or face suspension. When the Tinker siblings and Christopher wore their armbands to school, they were asked to remove them. When they refused, they were suspended until after New Year's Day.

Constitutional Question

Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Tinker v. Des Moines

Conclusion The Court ruled that wearing armbands is protected speech as a form of political expression.

This right is extended to students as a form of non-disruptive speech.Vote 7-2Majority Opinion: Justice Fortas, joined by White, Stewart, Brennan, Douglas, Warren,

Marshall “The wearing of armbands was "closely akin to 'pure speech'" and protected by the First

Amendment. School environments imply limitations on free expression, but here the principals lacked justification for imposing any such limits.The principals had failed to show that the forbidden conduct would substantially interfere with appropriate school discipline.”

“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”

Goss v. Lopez419 U.S. 565 (1975)

Oral Argument: Wednesday, October 16, 1974

Decision: Wednesday, January 22, 1975

Goss v. LopezFacts of the Case Nine students at two high schools and one junior high

school in Columbus, Ohio, were given 10-day suspensions from school. The suspensions arose out of a period of widespread student unrest during February and March 1971.

One of these, Tyrone Washington, was among a group of students demonstrating in the school auditorium while a class was being conducted there. He was ordered by the school principal to leave, refused to do so, and was suspended.

Rudolph Sutton, in the presence of the principal, physically attacked a police officer who was attempting to remove Tyrone Washington from the auditorium. He was immediately suspended. The other four Marion-Franklin students were suspended for similar conduct.

Dwight Lopez was a student at the Central High School. He was suspended in connection with a disturbance in the lunchroom which involved some physical damage to school property. Lopez testified that at least 75 other students were suspended from his school on the same day. He also testified below that he was not a party to the destructive conduct but was instead an innocent bystander. Because no one from the school testified with regard to this incident, there is no evidence in the record indicating the official basis for concluding otherwise. Lopez never had a hearing.

None was given a hearing to determine the operative facts underlying the suspension, but each, together with his or her parents, was offered the opportunity to attend a conference, subsequent to the effective date of the suspension, to discuss the student's future., and Ohio law did not require them to do so.

Goss v. Lopez

Constitutional Question:

Could the Ohio public schools suspend students without preliminary hearings or is this a violation of students' Due

Process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the state of Ohio could not withdraw the right to a public education once it had extended that right to its citizens "on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct ha[d] occurred." The Court held that Ohio must recognize that students' entitlements to education are protected by the Due Process Clause and that right could not be taken away without minimum procedures required by the Clause. The Court found that students facing suspension should at a minimum be given notice and some form of hearing.

Hazelwood School District et al.v. Kuhlmeier et al.

484 U.S. 260

Argued October 13, 1987

Decided January 13, 1988

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

Facts of the Case: Former high school students who were staff

members of the school's newspaper, filed suit in Federal District Court against the school district and school officials, alleging that their First Amendment rights were violated. The schools principal deleted two pages of the school paper that included an article (1) describing school students' experiences with pregnancy and another article (2) discussing the impact of divorce on students at the school.

The newspaper was written and edited by a journalism class, as part of the school's curriculum. Pursuant to the school's practice, the teacher in charge of the paper submitted page proofs to the school's principal, who objected to the pregnancy story because the pregnant students, although not named, might be identified from the text, and because he believed that the article's references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students.

The principal objected to the divorce article because the page proofs he was furnished identified by name (deleted by the teacher from the final version) a student who complained of her father's conduct, and the principal believed that the student's parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to the remarks or to consent to their publication.

The District Court held that no First Amendment violation had occurred. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

Conclusion: In a 6-3 vote, the principals right to edit the paper was upheld by the Court. The majority opinion noted that the

school newspaper was not a public forum and thus the 1 Amendment challenge was not valid. Moreover, the court affirmed prior rulings (see T.L.O., Bethel, etc) that student right are not “coextensive” with the rights of adults outside of the school setting. The school may still meet its educational mission while censoring the student newspaper and so the principals editorial control is upheld.

Lee v Weisman

Decision:Wednesday, June 24, 1992Issues:First Amendment, Establishment

of Religion

Lee v Weisman Facts of the Case In keeping with the practice of several other

public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.

Question Does the inclusion of clergy who offer

prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Lee v Weisman

Conclusion Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government

involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.

Brown v. Board

Decision:Monday, May 17, 1954

Issues:Civil Rights, Desegregation, Schools

Brown v. Board

Facts of the Case Black children were denied admission to public schools

attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to the races. The white and black schools approached equality in terms of buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. This case was decided together with Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County.

Question Does the segregation of children in public schools solely

on the basis of race deprive the minority children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?

Brown v. Board

Conclusion Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by

"objective" factors, intangible issues foster and maintain inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but equal is inherently unequal in the context of public education. The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial separation.

CA v. Greenwood

Decision:Monday, May 16, 1988Issues:Criminal Procedure, Search and

Seizure

CA v. Greenwood Facts of the Case Local police suspected Billy

Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges.

Question Did the warrantless search and

seizure of Greenwood's garbage violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantee?

CA v. Greenwood

Conclusion Voting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed

at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of the public."

Employment Division v. Smith

Decision:Tuesday, April 17, 1990Issues:First Amendment, Free Exercise of

Religion

Employment Division v. Smith Facts of the Case Two Native Americans who worked as

counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization, ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related "misconduct." The counselors lost their battle in state court. But the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the free exercise clause. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture.

Question Does the state law violate the Free Exercise

Clause of the First Amendment?

Employment Division v. Smith

Conclusion No. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that

the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.

Furman v. Georgia

Decision:Thursday, June 29, 1972Issues:Criminal Procedure, Cruel and

Unusual Punishment, Death Penalty

Furman v. Georgia

Facts of the Case Furman was burglarizing a private home

when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively).

Question Does the imposition and carrying out of

the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Furman v. Georgia

Conclusion Yes. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the

imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.

Westside v. Mergens

Decision:Monday, June 4, 1990Issues:First Amendment, Parochiaid

Westside v. Mergens Facts of the Case The school administration at Westside High

School denied permission to a group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other Westside after-school student clubs. In addition to citing the Establishment Clause, Westside refused the club's formation because it lacked a faculty sponsor. When the school board upheld the administration's denial, Mergens and several other students sued. The students alleged that Westside's refusal violated the Equal Access Act, which requires that schools in receipt of federal funds provide "equal access" to student groups seeking to express "religious, political, philosophical, or other content" messages. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the students. The Supreme Court granted Westside certiorari.

Question Was Westside's prohibition against the

formation of a Christian club consistent with the Establishment Clause, thereby rendering the Equal Access Act unconstitutional?

Westside v. Mergens

Conclusion No. In distinguishing between "curriculum" and "noncurriculum

student groups," the Court held that since Westside permitted other noncurricular clubs, it was prohibited under the Equal Access Act from denying equal access to any after-school club based on the content of its speech. The proposed Christian club would be a noncurriculum group since no other course required students to become its members, its subject matter would not actually be taught in classes, it did not concern the school's cumulative body of courses, and its members would not receive academic credit for their participation. The Court added that the Equal Access Act was constitutional because it served an overriding secular purpose by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of philosophical, political, or other types of speech. As such, the Act protected the Christian club's formation even if its members engaged in religious discussions.

Marbury v. Madison

Decision:Wednesday, February 23, 1803

Marbury v. Madison Facts of the Case The case began on March 2, 1801,

when an obscure Federalist, William Marbury, was designated as a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. Marbury and several others were appointed to government posts created by Congress in the last days of John Adams's presidency, but these last-minute appointments were never fully finalized. The disgruntled appointees invoked an act of Congress and sued for their jobs in the Supreme Court.

Question Is Marbury entitled to his appointment?

Is his lawsuit the correct way to get it? And, is the Supreme Court the place for Marbury to get the relief he requests?

Marbury v. Madison

Conclusion Yes; yes; and it depends. The justices held,

through Marshall's forceful argument, that on the last issue the Constitution was "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and that "an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void." In other words, when the Constitution--the nation's highest law--conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid. This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicial review.

Chicago v. Morales

Decision:Thursday, June 10, 1999Issues:Due Process, Miscellaneous

Chicago v. Morales Facts of the Case Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits

"criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.

Question Does Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which

prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

Chicago v. Morales

Conclusion Yes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an

opinion for a marjority on several key points. The Court held that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."