county service delivery: does government structure matter?

County Service Delivery: Does Government Structure Matter?Author(s): J. Edwin BentonSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 471-479Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3110361 .

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J. Edwin Benton University of South Florida

County Service Delivery: Does Government Structure Mater?

Very little systematic research has been conducted to determine the policy effects of changing the form of county government. The findings of this study suggest that efforts to modernize county government structure may enable county officials to respond successfully to increasing citizen demands for a higher level of current services as well as expand the menu of services. Specifically, there is a strong association between the type of county government (non-charter commission, non-charter commission/appointed administrator or elected executive, or charter commission! appointed administrator or elected executive) and county spending for all types of services. In addition, there is a strong linkage between type of county government and three categories of county services representative of the service roles of the modern American county-that is, traditional, local, and regional services.

Introduction One of the most enduring debates among political re-

formers, scholars, and practitioners has focused on the hy- pothesized impact that government structure has on local government policy decisions. Specifically, the debate boils down to the following question: Are the policy consequences different for reformed versus unreformed government structures? On one side of the issue are those who predict so-called "reformed" government structures produce better public services, lower tax rates and expenditures, and more professional administration, while "unreformed" government structures result in a lower quality of public services, higher tax rates and spending, and less administrative professionalism. On the other side of the issue are those who contend that government structure does not matter. In short, they argue that taxing and spending decisions, quality of services, and administrative professionalism are not determined by the structure of local government, but rather by other factors. I

The findings of empirical studies of the impact of local government structure appear to be divided. On the one hand, some studies (Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Hansen 1975; Karnig 1975; Lyons 1978; Schneider and Park 1989; Benton 2000a, b, 2002) support the argument that structure matters. On the other hand, other studies (Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Benton and Gamble 1984; Deno and Mahey 1987; Farnham 1987; Hayes and Chang 1990; Morgan and

Kickham 1999) report that structure has little or no impact. However, many of these studies have focused on municipalities. This choice of study subjects is undoubt- edly due to the fact that there are many more reformed municipalities than reformed counties. Indeed, the political reform movement that swept the country during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been slow in coming to county governments.

A study conducted by Schneider and Park (1989), however, suggests the policy effects of structural reform may be different for counties than for municipalities. In fact, Schneider and Park find that reformed county governments spent more-not less-than did unreformed counties. In addition, their research shows that reformed county governments performed more functions than did unreformed counties.

The present research expands this line of inquiry-particularly as it applies to county expenditures-in two important ways. First, it examines in greater depth the notion

J. Edwin Benton holds a joint appointment in the Public Administration and Political Science Programs in the Department of Government and Interna- tionalAffairs at the University of South Florida. In addition to being coeditor (with David R. Morgan) of Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy, coauthor (with Wayne Clark and Robert Kerstein) of State-Local Relations in Florida, and author of Counties as Service Delivery Agents: Changing Roles and Expectations, he has published widely in political science andpublic administration journals. Email: jbenton @chuma.cas.usf.edu.

County Service Delivery: Does Government Structure Matter? 471



of "reform." In particular, it looks at the impact of adopting a charter form of county government, in addition to having either an elected executive or appointed administrator, on county spending policies. Second, it examines the influence of this expanded notion of reform on spending for three different types of county services (traditional, local, and regional).

Previous Research Proponents of municipal government reform typically

argue that the adoption of reform structures tends to pro- mote the employment of businesslike or professional practices and principles in the day-to-day operation of city government. This, in turn, should lead to greater efficiencies and assist in constraining municipal taxing and spending. Social science research that has tested this proposition, however, has produced mixed results. On the one hand, a number of studies (Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Lowery and Berry 1983; Lyons 1978; Hansen 1975; Karnig 1975) have reported significant varia- tions in policy outputs that are attributable to reformed versus unreformed types of city government. In particular, these studies find that reformed municipalities tended to tax and spend less than unreformed municipalities. On the other hand, a number of other studies (see Hayes and Chang 1990; Deno and Mehay 1987; Farnham 1987; Morgan and Pelissero 1980) find that city government structure has little or no effect on municipal revenue and expenditure behavior. Specifically, these studies indicate that reformed cities do not necessarily raise more revenue or spend more than unreformed city governments.

A different scenario, however, has been depicted for county governments. Reformers have frequently argued that county governments, with their geographic scope and potential access to broader fiscal resources, should play a more active role. Nevertheless, the ability of county governments to enlarge their service role has been hampered by their governmental structure. In particular, traditional or unreformed forms of county government-that is, ones governed by a board of county commissioners with no executive leadership-often are viewed as less capable of responding to the challenges of metropolitan growth and service delivery than reformed county governments-that is, ones led by an elected chief executive or an appointed professional administrator (Duncombe 1977; DeGrove and Lawrence 1977). According to Schneider and Park, this has led to "a new structure of government [being] advocated as a means to increase the level of professionalism and as a means by which counties can expand their service role" (1989, 349). Consequently, the effects of a reformed or modernized county government may be the opposite of that predicted for municipalities. In short, structural reform

472 Public Administration Review * July/August 2002, Vol. 62, No. 4

may lead to higher county expenditures, not to the lower levels of spending expected in municipalities.

Schneider and Park (1989) confirmed this prediction in their study of 162 counties located in 50 of the largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in 1977. Spending in three categories (total, developmental, and redistributive) was higher for the two types of "reformed" county governments (that is, commission-elected executive and commission-administrator) than for the "unreformed" or traditional form of county government (board of commissioners with no executive head). Across each of the three spending categories, counties with elected executives spent more, followed by counties with an appointed administrator. Counties governed by a board of county commissioners with no executive lagged far behind in their spending.

A more recent study (Park 1996) documents the impact of government structure on expenditure growth among counties. Data for 244 counties in 56 of the largest MSAs for 1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987 were pooled to estimate the influence of government structure over time. The findings of this study suggest that expenditure growth in four service areas (developmental, redistributive, allocational, and public safety) was greatest for counties that had reformed structures (that is, commission-administrator or commission-elected executive types). The rate of expenditure growth for counties governed solely by a commission (that is, unreformed types) was much smaller.

If we entertain the possibility that government structure may matter, then other important research questions need to be addressed. Are there different degrees of reformed or modernized county government? If so, is there a connec- tion between the adoption of a charter form of county government that includes an elected executive or appointed administrator and greater spending for county services? In addition, does the structure of county government have a differential effect on county spending for different classes of county services? Before seeking answers to these last- named questions, it is imperative to understand what a reformed or modernized county government is.

Local Government Reform: Rationale and Purposes

The term "reform" historically has meant different things to different people. In the early part of the twentieth cen- tury, those in the good government movement endorsed a number of ways to free the nation's large cities from the control of corrupt political machines. In addition to elimi- nating graft and corruption, the reformers sought municipal governments that were efficient, businesslike, and more responsive to the popular will. To that end, reform groups advocated such institutional devices as nonpartisan and shorter ballots, at-large elections, civil service, and the city



manager form of government. The implementation of the civil service and the creation of new electoral arrangements (including the direct primary, initiative, recall, and refer- endum) were directed at the abuses of power and dishon- est practices of political machines. To encourage greater economy, efficiency, and rational decision making in city government, however, reformers advocated the council- manager plan of government structure.

Simply put, Progressive Era reformers equated reform with ridding cities of political corruption and their adoption of businesslike practices. Likewise, groups that tar- geted counties for reform also waged campaigns against the corruption found in county machines and strongly advocated the adoption of businesslike practices. However, reform of county government took on an additional meaning. Specifically, reformers urged state governments to grant county governments greater home rule authority to enable them to respond to the rapidly growing service needs of their citizens. As a result of this additional meaning now given to county reform, the expression "modem county government" increasingly was being used as synonymous with or in place of "county government reform."

Efforts to reform or modernize county government usually have been associated with seeking greater home rule in three principal areas: structural, functional, and fiscal. The first area relates to what is considered the most seri- ous weakness in county government-the lack of a county executive. Structural reform-in the form of permitting counties to choose between a commission-administrator and a commission-elected executive form of government- would bring the flexibility, centralization, and profession- alization necessary for counties to function successfully in a rapidly changing society. Other structural reforms include appointment rather than election of row officers and the authority to determine the commission size. Functional reforms-permitting counties to provide optional services (that is, services not mandated by the state) and to consider alternative service-provision arrangements would give counties the flexibility to adapt and respond to new service demands and complex issues, something they cannot do as administrative arms of the states. Finally, fiscal reform would ensure budget stability through financial flexibility. For instance, granting counties greater authority in setting tax and fee rates, issuing bonds, raising debt limits, and establishing benefit service districts would enable counties to adjust revenues and expenditures to changing cir- cumstances.

Reformers argue the traditional form of county government (that is, a board of commissioners with no executive) is probably adequate for counties that function essentially as administrative arms of the state and are not growing in population. However, reformers reason that this structure of government does not enable counties to

satisfy the service needs of a more diverse, urban, and rapidly growing population. As a result, counties (where permitted to do so by state law) have been abandoning the traditional commission form of government and as- suming responsibility for a broad range of customarily urban or municipal services (Benton and Menzel 1991, 1993; Marando and Reeves 1991; Strieb and Waugh 1991). No longer just record-keeping units or legal ex- tensions of state government, counties provide fire protection, utilities, water and sewer services, solid waste disposal, and manage intricate health care and social service programs. In fact, Schneider and Park (1989) report that metropolitan counties now provide more services than do suburban communities. In addition, Benton and Menzel (1993) document that aggregate and per capita county expenditures for services are increasing at a faster pace than such expenditures for cities.

Nevertheless, counties, unlike cities, remain under much tighter state control and are much more dependent on ex- ternal financial aid. In spite of the need and desire of counties to exercise broader powers of self-rule, they are much less likely to do so than cities. For instance, 36 states now provide for county home rule (DeSantis and Renner 1993), yet only about 10 percent of eligible counties have taken advantage of it (Salant 1989).

However, modern or reformed county governments are not necessarily created equal. There are varying degrees of modernization or reform. The elected executive typically has the greatest power and usually has the ability to operate more independently from the commission. Hence, he or she is in the best position to shape county policy. The powers given to the appointed chief executive may vary considerably. Under the county manager plan, the appointed administrator possesses powers equal to those of a city manager-setting the legislative agenda, controlling the budget, appointing department heads, and overseeing general county operations. Other appointed administrators may have much more limited authority: They may have re- stricted appointment and budgetary powers and operate under the close supervision of the governing board. Thus, they should have less opportunity to influence county policy. In the weakest version, the administrator "prima- rily performs tasks and gives advice at the request of the council" (DeSantis and Renner 1993, 23). (Although this study does not make any distinctions between the duties and responsibilities of the appointed administrator, any persuasive test of the policy consequences of county reform or modernization should take into account the authority residing in the office of the county administrator.)

The modern or reformed form of county government that is probably best able to satisfy the expanding service needs of a rapidly growing population is one that has either an appointed administrator or elected executive as well




as a charter. According to Jeffrey, Salant, and Boroshok (1989, 127), a charter is a document that is framed and approved locally and serves as the county's "little consti- tution," thereby formalizing the spirit of home rule. More important, reforms under a charter include not only an appointed administrator or an elected executive, but also an array of functional and fiscal reforms. The fundamental premise of a charter is to free county governments from excessive legal restrictions imposed by the state (Duncombe 1977, 107). Therefore, counties with such an arrangement have the greatest potential to exercise self-rule and self- determination, and hence they have the ability to respond to the ever-growing service needs of their residents.2

County Government Structure and Spen ing: A Test of Basic Assumptions

Based on the differentiation made above between "unreformed" and "reformed" county governments, as well as the differences between different types of "reformed" or "modernized" counties, two hypotheses are in order:

H1: Non-charter county governments with either an elected executive or an appointed administrator will spend more than county governments with only a traditional commission-type government and no executive head.

H2: Charter county governments that have either an elected executive or an appointed administrator will spend more than non-charter county governments with either an elected executive or an appointed administrator.

Although the logic of these hypotheses may seem self- evident given the earlier theorizing, it is important to of- fer some reasons why reformed governments may spend more. First, the expenditures of reformed county governments are likely to be greater because a charter grants them the legal authority to do more than they could under a traditional structural arrangement. Advocates of reform frequently argue that counties operating under a traditional structure have the legal authority to provide only those services specifically mentioned in their state constitutions or statutes (usually mandated services). Moreover, the ability of counties to fund any new or existing programs or services is severely hampered by bor- rowing and taxing restrictions. In short, the granting of home rule charters makes it possible for counties to become full-service governments in much the same way municipalities have become full-service governments.

Second, the existence of an appointed administrator or an elected executive provides the leadership and expertise necessary for county government to respond expeditiously and effectively to the citizenry's appetite for existing ser-


vices or the provision of new services, as well as to better manage current programs. Simply put, the county legislative branch (county council or commission) frequently defers to the county executive on matters of policy implementation and expects him or her to recommend how their policy decisions can be translated into specific programs and services. As a consequence, the elected executive or appointed administrator typically is given the power to prepare the county budget. In sum, the recognition that the county needs an executive head usually is indicative of a growing county, and hence one whose budget is growing at such a pace that necessitates greater attention.

On comparison, the two hypotheses differ in an important respect from the propositions tested by Schneider and Park (1989). Although they make a distinction between types of chief executives (appointed administrator versus elected executive), Schneider and Park do not consider the impact of adopting a county charter. In the present study, however, a distinction is made between two types of reform or modernized county government-those with a charter and those without one. A charter is expected to grant a county a greater degree of self-rule, and hence make it easier for it to respond to increasing resident demands for an expanded menu of services as well as a higher level of current services. This, in turn, should result in a notice- ably higher level of county spending.

To test the two hypotheses, the most recent expenditure data available for counties (1992)3 with populations of 100,000 or greater are used. This makes for a sample of 146 counties with a commission form of government, 193 non-charter counties with an elected executive or an appointed administrator, and 74 charter counties with an elected executive or an appointed administrator.4 Per capita expenditures and spending proportions for each type county government are presented in table 1.

Clear support for both hypotheses can be found from these data. Non-charter county governments that have an appointed administrator or an elected executive spend more money per capita ($511 compared to $285) and account for a larger proportion of all local government spending

Table 1 Spending for All Counly Services Commission- Commission-

administrator/ administrator/ elected executive elected executive

Commission Without charter With charter (N= 146) (N=193) (N=74)

Per capita $285 $511 $770 expenditures

County expenditures 12 37 45 as a percentage of local government expenditures Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Government Finances in 1991-92 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing O~ffice, 1995, table 5).



(37 percent versus 12 percent) than do counties with the traditional commission form of government. In fact, the differences are substantial. Specifically, non-charter counties with either type of chief executive spend almost twice as much per capita and account for over three times as much of all local government spending when compared to commission counties.

The data also indicate that adopting a charter can make a substantial difference in the spending behavior of counties. For example, charter counties spend $770 per capita for county services compared to $51 1 per capita for non- charter counties. This means that charter counties spend 51 percent more money to provide services than do non- charter counties. Furthermore, charter counties account for an additional 8 percent of all local government expenditures than do non-charter counties (that is, 45 percent compared to 37 percent).

If various types of structural reform or modernization affect total county spending, does a change in government structure differentially influence spending patterns when county services are grouped according to the roles county governments play? Let's consider three categories of services provided by counties (traditional, local, and regional)5 that are derived from three roles the modern county government plays.

Traditional services are the result of counties originally being created to serve as administrative arms or political subdivisions of their state governments. From the outset, the powers of county governments were interpreted narrowly (for example, Dillon's Rule), and counties could provide only those services permitted by their states. Given this legal status and purpose, they were expected to provide essentially state services (welfare, health, transportation, and judicial) to all county residents. Many of these services were mandated, and counties were granted very little authority to provide optional services. In short, counties were not designed to serve as full-service local governments like municipalities.

Nevertheless, county residents progressively began to demand a higher level of mandated services, as well as a number of services that were derived from or intended to augment mandated services. For example, hospitals, mental health and retardation services, alcohol and drug abuse programs, homes for the aged, emergency medical services, and animal control may be considered an extension of health care services. Food stamp programs, day care services, human resource planning, job training and work experience programs, child welfare services, and emergency financial assistance are a few services that have evolved out of counties' public welfare function. Similarly, forensic investigations, central emergency number services, and work release programs originate in the requirement that counties provide police protection and corrections.

Moreover, a number of other specific services (such as juvenile courts, limited jurisdiction courts, and indigent defense) find their genesis in the mandated responsibility of counties to furnish a system of judicial administration. (For a more detailed listing of traditional services, see table lA in the appendix).

It is predicted that the ability of counties to provide a higher level of mandated services-particularly, services that are derived from or augment mandated services-is enhanced when a county is granted home rule. Specifi- cally, counties that have an appointed administrator or an elected executive form of government (but having no charter) will spend more for county services than traditional commission governments. Additionally, it is predicted that counties that have adopted a charter as well as having an appointed administrator or an elected elective will spend more than non-charter counties with some form of a county chief executive.

Support for these expectations can be seen from the data displayed in table 2. Counties that have adopted a charter with an appointed administrator or an elected executive spend the most for traditional services ($616), followed by non-charter counties that have an administrator or an elected executive ($416). Counties governed by the traditional board of county commissioners with no county chief executive lagged far behind in their spending for traditional county services ($226). The same pattern is evident from a comparison of expenditure proportions. Both types of reformed or modernized counties account for a much greater proportion of all local government expenditures for traditional services than do counties with the traditional commission form of government (67 and 59 percent, respec- tively, versus 22 percent). However, as predicted, charter counties account for a larger percentage of all local government spending for traditional services than do non-charter counties (67 percent compared to 59 percent).

In addition to providing traditional services, counties increasingly have been under considerable pressure to provide an expanded menu of optional services (that is, those not usually permitted by state constitutions). Referred to

Table 2 Spending for Traditional Counly Services Commission- Commission- administrator/ administrator/

elected executive elected executive Commission Without charter With charter (N=146) (N=193) (N=74)

Per capita $226 $416 $616 expenditures County expenditures 22 59 67 as a percentage of local government expenditures Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Government Finances in 1991-92 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing O~ffice, 1995, table 5).




as local and regional services in this article, these type services are the result of the increasingly urban character of most counties.

Local services are ones that municipalities historically have provided to their residents and are now providing to unincorporated area residents of many counties. The like- lihood that these services will be provided increases as the county becomes more urbanized. Among the most com- mon local services are the provision of water, electric power, gas, local parks, libraries, fire protection, garbage and sewer collection, street lighting, sidewalks, drainage, traffic control, street construction, protective inspections, and consumer protection. (For a more detailed listing, see table 1B in the appendix).

Citizen pressure to provide local services was precipi- tated by the massive migration of city dwellers to the sub- urbs in the early 1900s. Because they disliked the city and feared annexation would result in higher taxes, suburban residents and businesses initially resorted to creating single- purpose special districts and small, incorporated communities to satisfy their desire for "municipal-type" services. These efforts, however, usually proved to be unacceptable because of their high costs of operation and inability to realize economies of scale. Subsequently, these newly trans- planted residents and businesses frequently requested their county governments provide many of these functions. In- deed, Schneider and Park observe that county governments increasingly are "the front-line government for the larger proportion of suburban residents who live in the unincorporated areas of metropolitan regions" (1989, 350).

Regional services (sometimes referred to as "urban- type" services) are provided to all residents of the county (both incorporated and unincorporated) and address problems and situations that require an area-wide solution. Because county governments have area-wide jurisdiction (that is, legal authority over the entire county that super- sedes state grants of power to other units of government) as well as linking and coordinating capabilities, they are the logical choice to deliver many of these urban-type services. Most of these services address problems that know no political boundaries. Some of the more notable regional services are airports, public housing, economic development, mass transit and parking, conservation of natural resources, museums, water transportation, stadi- ums, convention centers, parks, planning and zoning, sewage disposal, and solid waste and hazardous material management (table IC in the appendix provides a more complete listing).

A number of complex, interrelated factors (principally, urbanization, suburbanization, and metropolitan fragmen- tation) have contributed to the initiation of and growth in regional services of county governments. Three simple explanations, however, seem most plausible. First, county


governments assumed responsibility for these services (such as airports, parks, and recreational facilities) when cities that historically had provided them to residents of both the central city and the rapidly growing unincorporated area of the county were either no longer willing or financially capable of providing them.6 In other instances, counties reluctantly agreed to provide services to remedy some "new" urban or regional problems (solid waste management, environmental protection, sewage and hazardous waste disposal) after being mandated to do so. Finally, counties voluntarily agreed to provide some of these services at the request of county residents. In the last two scenarios, central cities typically had never provided these kinds of services, and if they were being provided at all, they were being done so on a piecemeal or ad hoc basis. Most importantly, the complexity, scope, and impact of the issues underlying these services defied narrowly framed solutions, and hence required a coordinated, area-wide solution that counties were best suited to provide.7

Because counties originally were designed to be administrative arms of state government and not intended to be full-service governments (like municipalities), most state constitutions and statutes did not permit counties to provide local and regional services. Thus, the pursuit of home rule for counties, either through state constitutional amend- ment or the passage of enabling legislation, was critical for counties if they were to expand their repertoire of services to satisfy increasing resident demand. In other words, home rule permitted counties to adopt a modernized structure of government that could be more responsive to service issues prompted by rapid urbanization. Therefore, it is anticipated that reformed or modernized counties will spend more for local and regional services than will counties operating under the traditional structure.'

Expenditure data presented in tables 3 and 4 confirm these expectations about the association between county government structure and spending for local and regional services. Specifically, non-charter counties with an appointed administrator or an elected executive spend more money per capita and account for a larger proportion of all local government spending for both local and regional services than counties with the traditional commission form of government. Furthermore, charter county governments with some form of county chief executive spend more and account for a larger proportion of local government spending for both types of services than do non-charter counties with an executive head.

Several other important findings emerge from these data. With respect to local services, there are larger per capita spending and expenditure proportion differences between commission counties and non-charter counties than between non-charter counties with an executive head and charter counties. The opposite is the case for regional ser-



Table 3 Spending for Local County Services Commission- Commission- administrator/ administrator/

elected executive elected executive Commission Without charter With charter (N=146) (N= 193) (N=74)

Per capita $12 $35 $56 expenditures County expenditures 1 9 13 as a percentage of local government expenditures Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Government Finances in 1991-92 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, table 5).

Table 4 Spending for Regional County Services Commission- Commission- administrator/ administrator/

elected executive elected executive Commission Without charter With charter (N= 146) (N=193) (N=74)

Per capita $46 $60 $106 expenditures County expenditures 9 19 28 as a percentage of local government expenditures Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Government Finances in 1991-92 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, table 5).

vices. The greatest differences for these services are between charter counties and non-charter counties with an executive head. In short, this seems to suggest that, although adopting a charter seems to matter, it may matter more for the provision of regional services.

Implications and Conclusions This study has improved our knowledge base in several

ways. First, it demonstrates the importance of considering different conceptualizations of "reformed" or "modernized" county governments. It appears that adopting a charter may permit county governments more latitude in the provision of services. Secondly, this study illustrates the significance of considering different classes of county services that more clearly reflect the roles counties play and the service expectations of their citizens. Perhaps most importantly this study has re-affirmed the strong association between counties' type of government structure and their ability to provide sundry services.

However, a note of caution is in order as to the interpre- tation of the data in this study. On the one hand, they could indicate that counties have opted for either type of reformed or modernized government structure because they were persuaded it would permit them to expand their menu of services to satisfy increasing citizen demands. On the other hand, the adoption of a reformed or modernized form of

government may have occurred out of a belief this type structure would be better suited to the execution of the responsibilities they had already assumed. In short, it remains unclear as to whether reformed or modernized structures encourage or facilitate greater levels of policy activism. As Park and Schneider (1989) and Morgan and Kickham (1999) note, this issue of caution cannot be determined with data collected at a single point in time.

The next important step for future research in this area is to sort out this issue of causation. One recent effort (Mor- gan and Kickham 1999) did not produce any definitive answer. Although the authors employed an interrupted time- series research design, the 10 "modern" counties chosen for the study were not representative of the 74 counties that have adopted a charter and have an appointed administrator or elected executive. (The sample was heavily skewed toward low-spending counties and included no counties from two rapid growth states, California and Florida.) Moreover, this study does not consider the impact of structure on different classes of county services, reflective of the three roles that the modem county must play. Hopefully, a follow-up study that takes these factors into consideration will move us closer to closure on this important issue.

Notes 1. Although no differentiation is made here between cities and

counties, some contend that unreformed governments (particularly cities) have strengths that their reformed counter- parts lack. That is, unreformed structures facilitate represen- tation, responsiveness, and the resolution of political conflicts. In point of fact, most U.S. cities have not adopted most municipal reforms.

2. A likely scenario would be a county, confronted with inevi- table, sudden, and rapid growth, scrambling to modernize its structure in order to provide effective and efficient services. The alternative would be to provide services that might be mediocre at best or cost much more under the present anti- quated structure of government.

3. According to officials at the U.S. Bureau of the Census, there are no plans to publish annual county expenditure data after 1992. The Census Bureau continues to publish (on the Internet) finances for the nation's 25 counties with populations above one million. The Census Bureau still plans to publish county expenditure data every five years for counties with populations of 100,000 or more in the Compendium of County Finances. The most recent such publication (published in 2001) contains data for 1997.

4. As of 1992, 118 counties had adopted a charter form of government and also had opted for an appointed administrator or an elected executive. However, 16 of these counties were classified as city-county consolidations, thus reducing the number of pure counties with a reformed structure to 102.




Because the Bureau of the Census reports detailed expenditure information only for counties with populations over 100,000, the number of counties available for analysis is reduced to 74.

5. Salant (1989, 1991) originally suggested that county services could be divided according to the roles these governments play. Her classification scheme contains four groupings: "traditional," "administrative arm of the state," "local," and "regional" services. For purposes of this study, her first two categories are collapsed into one category, "traditional."

6. For a thorough discussion of this explanation, see Duncombe's (1977, 74-76) "urban cycle" theory. One should not, however, make the assumption that a greater county role in the provision of regional services should necessarily lead to a reduction in the spending behavior of other governments that have relinquished these kinds of services. Although these governments may use the fiscal resources "saved" from shed- ding these services to reduce overall expenditures, they may opt to utilize this "extra" cash to pay for new services or expand existing services.

7. Several observers of local government service delivery (Salant 1991; Berman 1993; Marando and Baker 1993; Cigler 1995) have noted the critical need to improve regional problem solv- ing and the role that county government could play.

8. Support for this prediction also can be traced back to the findings of previous research (Park 1996; Benton and Menzel 1991; Schneider and Park 1989; Benton and Rigos 1986).

References Benton, J. Edwin. 2000a. County Government Structure and

Service Delivery. Paper presented at the American Society for Public Administration Annual Conference, April 1-4, San Diego, California.

. 2000b. The Impact of Structural Reform on County Government Service Provision. Paper presented at the 2000 Southern Political Science Association Meeting, November 8-11, Atlanta, Georgia.

. 2002. Counties as Service Delivery Agents: Changing Expectations and Roles. New York: Praeger.

Benton, J. Edwin, and Darwin B. Gamble. 1984. City/County Consolidation and Economies of Scale: Evidence from a Time-Series Analysis in Jacksonville, Florida. Social Science Quarterly 65(1): 190-98.

Benton, J. Edwin, and Donald C. Menzel. 1991. County Service Trends and Practices. State and Local Government Review 23(2): 69-75.

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Appendix

Table 1 A Traditional Services of County Governments Finance Social Services

Property tax assessment Income maintenance Property tax collection Emergency financial assistance

Police Protection/Corrections Food stamps Patrol Family social services Detective investigations Individual social services Forensic investi ations Services to the aging Criminal records Child welfare services Detention facilities Day care services Work release program Human resources planning Adult probation program Transportation

Judicial Road maintenance General jurisdiction courts Road construction Limited jurisdiction courts Miscellaneous Juvenile/family court Land records

Legal Services and Prosecution Vital statistics Criminal prosecution Elections Legal/civil services Indigent defense

Public Health Home health Maternal and child health Communicable disease control Dental health Mental health facilities Mental health outpatients Mental retardation facilities Training for mentally retarded Alcohol/drug programs Animal control Hospital care Outpatient medical services Homes for the aged

Source: Services were extracted from the survey questionnaire designed and imple- mented in 1 976 by the Joint Data Center of the National Association of Counties and the International City Management Association.

Table 1 B Local Services of Counly Governments Other Public Safely Parks

Fire protection Neighborhood parks Public Health Miscellaneous

Sanitation inspection Libraries Public Utility Public information services

Water supply Consumer protection services Power supply Cable television

National Resources Solid waste collection

Source: Services were extracted from the survey questionnaire designed and imple- mented in 1976 by the Joint Data Center of the National Association of Counties and the International City Management Association.

Table 1 C Regional Services of County Governments Police Protection/Corrections Community Development/Housing

Central emergency number Building code enforcement Other Public Safety Housing code enforcement

Emergency medical services Conventional public housing Disaster preparedness Leased public housing

Rural housing programs Man power Industrial development Joo trainingPak Work experience programs Parks Public service employment Park acquisition

Transportation Park maintenance Public parking facilities County parks Mass transit Culture and Recreation Airports Recreational services Highway safety Fair rounds Bikeways Faiuns

Natural Resources Convention centers Flood/drainage control Marinas Irrigation Swimming pools Soil conservation Museums Coastal zoning Performing arts Energy conservation Erfon Energy management Pre-school Solid waste disposal Elementary and secondary Water pollution control Communta college Air pollution control Community college Noise control Vocational/technical

Land Use Comprehensive land use planning Growth management Open space control Subdivision control

Source: Services were extracted from the survey questionnaire designed and imple- mented in 1976 by the Joint Data Center of the National Association of Counties and the International City Management Association.




county service delivery: does government structure matter?

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