Counterpoint

Abortion as a Mixed Good

Marvin Kohl There are good reasons for supporting a

liberal abortion policy. Many anti-abortion

arguments we hear today are inadequate. If

born human progeny have greater moral

standing, if fundamental respect for women

demands the recognition of their right to

choose responsibly, and if an anti-abortion

public policy is deeply harmful, then we have

a plausible case for abortion as a mixed

good. It is a mixed good because it typically

harms by killing another closely akin being

—even when an abortion is performed to

prevent injury to the life or health of the

mother. Moreover, to take away a life leaves

many of us with a sense of moral uneasiness,

often anguish—even if it be less sentient or

only a potential human being, even if it be

the best we can morally do in a particular

situation. This sentiment is not the result of a

Ghandi-like sense of purity. Rather it is due

to the understanding that, in many cases, sex

education or birth-control might have been

workable and, if so, clearly seems to be

preferable. A large part of this anguish is

that, as with many human problems, we

have allowed the situation to develop to the

point where the best moral alternative

(though not the only one) is to kill another

being.

In light of this, I wish to suggest that

Richard Taylor and Jeanne Caputo's

"Abortion and Morality" (FI, Fall 1982, p. 32) is an unfair portrayal of the problem.

First of all, suppose it is true (which I think it

is not) that "the question of when a fertilized

ovum becomes a `human being' is clearly

unanswerable." Surely it is then at least

plausible to maintain that, since a line

cannot be successfully drawn, we should

assume that we indeed do have a human

being from the moment of conception.

Taylor and Caputo attempt to parry this

criticism by suggesting that, since most

fertilized ova are never implanted in the

womb, God is the supreme abortionist. Now

this slapdash move may be amusing to some,

Marvin Kohl is professor of philosophy at

the State University of New York College at

Fredonia and author of The Morality of

Killing.

but it is clearly fallacious: for the issue in

abortion is not the death of the fetus (as in an

honest miscarriage or its like), but deliberate

killing.

Taylor and Caputo rightfully marshal

evidence about the human suffering and the

capacity for evil that lies in the proposals to

curtail the legal right to abortion. Again,

am sympathetic with their conclusion. But

to arrive at it by suggesting that all, or even

most, anti-abortionists are blind to morality

because they are indifferent to suffering is, at

best, simplistic.

First of all, it is one thing to disagree

with a moral position and another to deny

that it is a moral position. Second, not all

harm is suffering; killing someone whose life

has, or could have, genuine meaning is

plausibly conceived of as an act of harm.

Third, dogmatic fundamentalists are not the

only ones who oppose abortion. Many

reflective people oppose abortion, as

utilitarians, because they believe killing is

contagious. They believe that a slide is

inevitable and therefore that a liberal or

moderate abortion policy has net negative

utility. Many other opponents of abortion

seem to be act intuitionists. They maintain

that one can "see" the rightness or wrong-

ness of an act. They maintain that all

abortion is wrong because, if one would

witness an abortion, one would "see" or

intuit the wrongness of that act.

Now both of these positions may be

mistaken. Nonetheless they are moral points

of view. And the humanist can dismiss them

our of hand only if he is willing to embrace

the same kind of simple-minded dogmatism

he hopes to conquer. Perhaps in the great

battle with the Moral Majority it is under-

standable that some should become almost

like their enemies. But an open society, a

political democracy, if it is to work well,

requires that we have full relevant informa-

tion as to choices. To the extent either side

falsifies or oversimplifies the issues, the

process of democracy is made more difficult.

To the extent that we humanists lose our

reverence for certain ideals or choose

immediate political gain at the price of

sacrificing truth and fairness, we violate our

birthright. •

Letters (continuecl from page 3)

as we utilize our common framework in the

"shared quest for the expression of ethical

values in human life."

Individual humanists should certainly

participate in political parties and organiza-

tions that further their own values. In fact, it

is difficult for me to imagine a humanist not

recognizing the enormous significance of the

political process. I suggest, however, that in

our relatively small organizations and

institutions, the humanist community

consider the recent advice of Paul Beattie,

President of the Fellowship of Religious

Humanists: "We can do more to change the

world by encouraging sound thinking and

healthy living than we can ever achieve as an

organized political force. It is time for liberal

groups to abandon the practice of passing

resolutions on every topic under the sun and

concentrate instead upon developing, per-

fecting, and sharing the humanist way of life.

Make the practice of humanism so appeal-

ing, our dialogue so informed, that others

will want to join us."

Mark Kaufman

St. Louis, Missouri

Skinner Responds to Dora Russell

1 am sorry that Dora Russell identifies me

with a long-outmoded brand of behaviorism

(FI, Letters, Spring 1982). 1 view human

behavior as a product of three kinds of

selection: (I) natural selection, responsible

for the genetic endowment of the species, (2)

operant conditioning, which shapes and

maintains the behavior of the individual,

and (3) the evolution of the social environ-

ments through which individuals gain from

the transmitted experience of others.

Selection by consequences as a causal

mode has been recognized for only little

more than a century and is still not fully

understood at any of the three levels, but one

feature is clear: It is found only in living

things! Nothing could be less mechanical

than a modern behavioristic view of human

behavior.

Circus animals are "trained" with

operant conditioning, as Dora Russell says,

and much to their advantage as positive

reinforcement replaces punishment, but the

contingencies of reinforcement analyzed in

modern laboratories and applied to an in-

creasing range of problems are much too

complex to be described with the horticul-

tural metaphor of training.

B. F. Skinner

Harvard University

Cambridge, Massachusetts

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