Counter-insurgency

Police question a civilian during the Malayan Emergency.Counter-insurgency involves action from both military and po-lice authorities.

U.S. Marines and ANA soldiers on patrol during counter-insurgency operations in Marjah, Afghanistan, February 2010

See also: Foreign internal defense, Insurgency, Lowintensity conflict, Divide and rule and Fourth generationwarfare

According to the U.S. Government CounterinsurgencyGuide (2009) counter-insurgency or counterinsur-gency[1] (COIN) “may be defined as ‘comprehensivecivilian and military efforts taken to simultaneouslydefeat and contain insurgency and address its rootcauses’".[2] “Insurgency is the organized use of subver-sion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge politicalcontrol of a region. As such, it is primarily a political

struggle, in which both sides use armed force to createspace for their political, economic and influence activi-ties to be effective.”[3]

Counter-insurgency campaigns of duly-elected or polit-ically recognized governments take place during war,occupation by a foreign military or police force, andwhen internal conflicts that involve subversion and armedrebellion occur. The best counterinsurgency campaigns“integrate and synchronize political, security, economic,and informational components that reinforce governmen-tal legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing insur-gent influence over the population. COIN strategiesshould be designed to simultaneously protect the pop-ulation from insurgent violence; strengthen the legiti-macy and capacity of government institutions to gov-ern responsibly and marginalize insurgents politically, so-cially, and economically.” (U.S. Government Counterin-surgency Guide, 2009)

1 Models

The guerrilla must swim in the people as the fishswims in the sea.“”–Aphorism based on the writing of Mao Zedong [4]

Counter-insurgency is normally conducted as a com-bination of conventional military operations and othermeans, such as propaganda, psy-ops, and assassinations.Counter-insurgency operations include many differentfacets: military, paramilitary, political, economic,psychological, and civic actions taken to defeatinsurgency.To understand counter-insurgency, one must understandinsurgency to comprehend the dynamics of revolutionarywarfare. Insurgents capitalize on societal problems, of-ten called gaps; counter-insurgency addresses closing thegaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of dis-content, creating the environment in which the insurgentcan operate.[5]

In The Insurgent Archipelago John Mackinlay puts for-ward the concept of an evolution of insurgency fromthe Maoist paradigm of the golden age of insurgency tothe global insurgency of the start of the 21st-century.He defines this distinction as 'Maoist' and 'post-Maoist'insurgency.[6]

1

2 3 COUNTER-INSURGENCY THEORISTS

2 Legal and ethical challenges

William B. Caldwell wrote:

The law of armed conflict requires that,to use force, "combatants" must distinguishindividuals presenting a threat from innocentcivilians. This basic principle is accepted byall disciplined militaries. In the counterinsur-gency, disciplined application of force is evenmore critical because our enemies camouflagethemselves in the civilian population. Our suc-cess in Iraq depends on our ability to treat thecivilian population with humanity and dignity,even as we remain ready to immediately de-fend ourselves or Iraqi civilians when a threatis detected.[7]

3 Counter-insurgency theorists

3.1 Santa Cruz de Marcenado

The third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732) is probably the earliest author who dealt system-atically in his writings with counter-insurgency. In hisReflexiones Militares, published between 1726 and 1730,he discussed how to spot early signs of an incipient in-surgency, prevent insurgencies, and counter them, if theycould not be warded off. Strikingly, Santa Cruz recog-nized that insurgencies are usually due to real grievances:“A state rarely rises up without the fault of its governors.”Consequently, he advocated clemency towards the popu-lation and good governance, to seek the people’s “heartand love”.[8]

3.2 B. H. Liddell Hart

The majority of counter-insurgency efforts by majorpowers in the last century have been spectacularly unsuc-cessful. This may be attributed to a number of causes.First, as B. H. Liddell Hart pointed out in the Insurgencyaddendum to the second version of his book Strategy: TheIndirect Approach, a popular insurgency has an inherentadvantage over any occupying force. He showed as aprime example the French occupation of Spain during theNapoleonic wars. Whenever Spanish forces managed toconstitute themselves into a regular fighting force, the su-perior French forces beat them every time.However, once dispersed and decentralized, the irregularnature of the rebel campaigns proved a decisive counterto French superiority on the battlefield. Napoleon's armyhad no means of effectively combatting the rebels, andin the end their strength and morale were so sapped thatwhen Wellington was finally able to challenge French

forces in the field, the French had almost no choice butto abandon the situation.Counter-insurgency efforts may be successful, especiallywhen the insurgents are unpopular. The Philippine–AmericanWar, the Shining Path in Peru, and theMalayanEmergency in Malaya have been the sites of failed insur-gencies.Hart also points to the experiences of T. E. Lawrence andthe Arab Revolt during World War I as another exampleof the power of the rebel/insurgent. Though theOttomansoften had advantages in manpower of more than 100 to 1,the Arabs' ability to materialize out of the desert, strike,and disappear again often left the Turks reeling and par-alyzed, creating an opportunity for regular British forcesto sweep in and finish the Turkish forces off.In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel fight-ers were working in conjunction with or in a mannercomplementary to regular forces. Such was also the casewith the French Resistance during World War II and theNational Liberation Front during the Vietnam War. Thestrategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant toweaken and destabilize the enemy to such a degree thatvictory is easy or assured for the regular forces. However,in manymodern rebellions, one does not see rebel fightersworking in conjunction with regular forces. Rather, theyare home-grown militias or imported fighters who haveno unified goals or objectives save to expel the occupier.According to Liddell Hart, there are few effectivecounter-measures to this strategy. So long as the insur-gency maintains popular support, it will retain all of itsstrategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legiti-macy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So longas this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot bedefeated by regular forces.Another option in combating an insurgency would be tomake the presence of troops so pervasive that there issimply no place left for insurgents to hide, as demon-strated in Franco's conquest of Republican Spain dur-ing the Spanish Civil War or the Union occupation ofConfederate States with Federal troops following theAmerican Civil War. In each of these cases, enormousamounts of manpower were needed for an extended pe-riod to quell resistance over almost every square kilome-tre of territory. In an age of ever shrinking and increas-ingly computerized armed forces, this option too is pre-cluded from a modern commander’s options.Essentially, then, only one viable option remains. Thekey to a successful counter-insurgency is the winning-over of the occupied territory’s population. If that canbe achieved, then the rebellion will be deprived of its sup-plies, shelter, and, more importantly, its moral legitimacy.Unless the hearts and minds of the public can be sepa-rated from the insurgency, the occupation is doomed tofail. In a modern representative democracy, in the face ofperceived incessant losses, no conflict will be tolerated byan electorate without significant show of tangible gains.

3.3 David Galula 3

• Vietnam War

Although the United States and its ARVN allies won sev-eral major battles with North Vietnamese forces and theirallies suffering staggering losses, the cost of victory wasso high in the opinion of the US public (58,193 U.S.deaths) that it came to see any further possible gains asnot worth the troop losses.As long as popular support is on their side, an insurgencycan hold out indefinitely, consolidating its control and re-plenishing its ranks, until their opponents simply leave.

• Current situations

In these cases, such as the Israeli occupation of Lebanon,which ended in 2000, and the recent Iraqi insurgency, thegoal of the insurgent is not to defeat the occupying mili-tary force; that is almost always an impossible task giventhe disparity in resources. Rather, they seek through aconstant campaign of sneak attacks to inflict continuouscasualties upon their superior enemy forces and therebyover time demoralize the occupying forces and erode po-litical support for the occupation in the homeland of theoccupying forces. It is a simple strategy of repeated pin-pricks and bleedings that, though small in proportion tothe total force strength, sap the will of the occupier tocontinue the fight.

3.3 David Galula

David Galula gained his practical experience in counter-insurgency as a French officer in the Algerian War. Histheory of counterinsurgency is not primarily military, buta combination of military, political and social actions un-der the strong control of a single authority.Galula proposes four “laws” for counterinsurgency:[9]

1. The aim of the war is to gain the support of the pop-ulation rather than control of territory.

2. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict;support of the masses can be obtained with the helpof an active friendly minority.

3. Support of the population may be lost. The popula-tion must be efficiently protected to allow it to co-operate without fear of retribution by the oppositeparty.

4. Order enforcement should be done progressively byremoving or driving away armed opponents, thengaining support of the population, and eventuallystrengthening positions by building infrastructureand setting long-term relationships with the popu-lation. This must be done area by area, using a paci-fied territory as a basis of operation to conquer aneighbouring area.

Galula contends that:

A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is notthe destruction in a given area of the insurgent’sforces and his political organization. ... A vic-tory is that plus the permanent isolation of theinsurgent from the population, isolation not en-forced upon the population, but maintained byand with the population. ... In conventionalwarfare, strength is assessed according to mili-tary or other tangible criteria, such as the num-ber of divisions, the position they hold, the in-dustrial resources, etc. In revolutionary war-fare, strength must be assessed by the extentof support from the population as measuredin terms of political organization at the grassroots. The counterinsurgent reaches a positionof strength when his power is embedded in apolitical organization issuing from, and firmlysupported by, the population.[10]

With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to de-scribe a general military and political strategy to put theminto operation in an area that is under full insurgent con-trol:

In a Selected Area

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to de-stroy or to expel the main body of armed insur-gents.2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to op-pose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, in-stall these troops in the hamlets, villages, andtowns where the population lives.3. Establish contact with the population, con-trol its movements in order to cut off its linkswith the guerrillas.4. Destroy the local insurgent political organi-zation.5. Set up, by means of elections, new provi-sional local authorities.6. Test those authorities by assigning them var-ious concrete tasks. Replace the softs and theincompetents, give full support to the activeleaders. Organize self-defense units.7. Group and educate the leaders in a nationalpolitical movement.8. Win over or suppress the last insurgentremnants.[10]

According to Galula, some of these steps can be skippedin areas that are only partially under insurgent control,and most of them are unnecessary in areas already con-trolled by the government.[10] Thus the essence of coun-terinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as “Build(or rebuild) a political machine from the populationupward.”[11]

4 3 COUNTER-INSURGENCY THEORISTS

3.4 Robert Thompson

Robert Grainger Ker Thompson wrote Defeating Com-munist Insurgency[12] in 1966, arguing that a successfulcounter-insurgency effort must be proactive in seizing theinitiative from insurgents. Thompson outlines five basicprinciples for a successful counter-insurgency:

1. The government must have a clear political aim:to establish and maintain a free, independent andunited country which is politically and economicallystable and viable;

2. The government must function in accordance withthe law;

3. The government must have an overall plan;4. The government must give priority to defeating po-

litical subversion, not the guerrillas;5. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government

must secure its base areas first.[13]

3.5 David Kilcullen

Establish, Consolidate, Transfer

Effectiveness x Legitimacy

Global, Regional, Local

CONTROL

INFORMATION

SECURITY POLITICAL ECONOMIC

Tempo Violence Stability

Military

Police

HumanSecurity

Public Safety

PopulationSecurity

Mobilization

GovernanceExtension

InstitutionalCapacity

SocialReintegration

HumanitarianAssistance

DevelopmentAssistance

Ressource &InfrastructureManagement

Growth Capacity

IntelligenceInformation OpsMedia Ops

Counter-ideologyCounter-sanctuaryCounter-motivation

Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency

In “The Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency”, Dr. DavidKilcullen, the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Co-ordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Depart-ment in 2006, described a framework for interagency co-operation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars –Security, Political and Economic – support the overarch-ing goal of Control, but are based on Information:

This is because perception is crucial in de-veloping control and influence over populationgroups. Substantive security, political and eco-nomic measures are critical but to be effec-tive they must rest upon, and integrate with abroader information strategy. Every action incounterinsurgency sends a message; the pur-pose of the information campaign is to con-solidate and unify this message. ... Impor-tantly, the information campaign has to be con-ducted at a global, regional and local level —

because modern insurgents draw upon globalnetworks of sympathy, support, funding andrecruitment.[14]

Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal impor-tance, because

unless they are developed in parallel, thecampaign becomes unbalanced: too much eco-nomic assistance with inadequate security, forexample, simply creates an array of soft tar-gets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much se-curity assistance without political consensus orgovernance simply creates more capable armedgroups. In developing each pillar, we mea-sure progress by gauging effectiveness (capa-bility and capacity) and legitimacy (the degreeto which the population accepts that govern-ment actions are in its interest).[14]

The overall goal, according to this model, “is not to re-duce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but ratherto return the overall system to normality — noting that'normality' in one society may look different from nor-mality in another. In each case, we seek not only to es-tablish control, but also to consolidate that control andthen transfer it to permanent, effective and legitimateinstitutions.”[14]

3.6 Martin van Creveld

Military historian Martin van Creveld, noting that almostall attempts to deal with insurgency have ended in failure,advises:

The first, and absolutely indispensable,thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent ofthe literature on counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Sincemost of it was written by the losing side, it is oflittle value.[15]

In examining why so many counterinsurgencies by pow-erful militaries fail against weaker enemies, Van Crev-eld identifies a key dynamic that he illustrates by themetaphor of killing a child. Regardless of whether thechild started the fight or how well armed the child is, anadult in a fight with a child will feel that he is acting un-justly if he harms the child and foolish if the child harmshim; he will therefore wonder if the fight is necessary.Van Creveld argues that “by definition, a strong coun-terinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members ofa small, weak organization of insurgents - let alone thecivilian population by which it is surrounded, and whichmay lend it support - will commit crimes in an unjustcause,” while “a child who is in a serious fight with an

3.6 Martin van Creveld 5

adult is justified in using every and any means available -not because he or she is right, but because he or she hasno choice.”[16] Every act of insurgency becomes, from theperspective of the counterinsurgent, a reason to end theconflict, while also being a reason for the insurgents tocontinue until victory. Trường Chinh, second in com-mand to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, wrote in his Primerfor Revolt:

The guiding principle of the strategy forour whole resistance must be to prolong thewar. To protract the war is the key to vic-tory. Why must the war be protracted? ... Ifwe throw the whole of our forces into a fewbattles to try to decide the outcome, we shallcertainly be defeated and the enemy will win.On the other hand, if while fighting we main-tain our forces, expand them, train our armyand people, learn military tactics ... and at thesame time wear down the enemy forces, weshall weary and discourage them in such a waythat, strong as they are, they will become weakand will meet defeat instead of victory.[17]

Van Creveld thus identifies “time” as the key factor incounterinsurgency. In an attempt to find lessons fromthe few cases of successful counterinsurgency, of whichhe lists two clear cases: the British efforts during TheTroubles of Northern Ireland and the 1982 Hama mas-sacre carried out by the Syrian government to suppressthe Muslim Brotherhood, he asserts that the “core of thedifficulty is neither military nor political, but moral” andoutlines two distinct methods.[18]

The first method relies on superb intelligence, providedby those who know the natural and artificial environmentof the conflict as well as the insurgents. Once such supe-rior intelligence is gained, the counterinsurgents must betrained to a point of high professionalism and disciplinesuch that they will exercise discrimination and restraint.Through such discrimination and restraint, the counterin-surgents do not alienate members of the populace besidesthose already fighting them, while delaying the time whenthe counterinsurgents become disgusted by their own ac-tions and demoralized.General Patrick Walters, British commander of troops innorthern Ireland, explicitly stated that his objective wasnot to kill as many terrorists as possible, but to ensurethat as few people on both sides were killed. In the vastmajority of counterinsurgencies, the “forces of order” killfar more people than they lose. In contrast and using veryrough figures, of the approximately 3000 British killedduring The Troubles, 1700 were civilians and 1000 wereBritish soldiers and members of security forces, translat-ing into a three-to-one kill ratio in favor of the terror-ists.[19]

If the prerequisites for the first method - excellent intel-ligence, superbly trained and disciplined soldiers and po-

lice, and an iron will to avoid being provoked into lashingout - are lacking, van Creveld posits that counterinsur-gents who still want to win must use the second methodexemplified by the Hama massacre. In 1982 the regimeof Syrian president Hafez al-Assad was on the point ofbeing overwhelmed by the countrywide insurgency of theMuslim Brotherhood. al-Assad sent a division under hisbrother Rifaat to the city of Hama, known to be the centerof the resistance.Following a counterattack by the Brotherhood, Rifaatused his heavy artillery to demolish the city, killingbetween ten and 25 thousand people, including manywomen and children. Asked by reporters what hadhappened, Hafez al-Assad exaggerated the damage anddeaths, promoted the commanders who carried out theattacks, and razed Hama’s well-known great mosque, re-placing it with a parking lot. With the Muslim Brother-hood scattered, the population was so cowed that it wouldbe years before opposition groups dared to disobey theregime again and, van Creveld argues, the massacre mostlikely saved the regime and prevented a bloody civil war.Van Creveld condenses al-Assad’s strategy into five rules,while noting that they could easily have been written byNiccolò Machiavelli:[19]

1. There are situations in which cruelty is necessary,and refusing to apply necessary cruelty is a betrayalof the people who put you into power. When pressedto cruelty, never threaten your opponent but disguiseyour intention and feign weakness until you strike.

2. Once you decide to strike, it is better to kill toomany than not enough. If another strike is needed,it reduces the impact of the first strike. Repeatedstrikes will also endanger the morale of the coun-terinsurgent troops; soldiers forced to commit re-peated atrocities will likely begin to resort to alco-hol or drugs to force themselves to carry out ordersand will inevitably lose their military edge, eventu-ally turning into a danger to their commanders.

3. Act as soon as possible. More lives will be savedby decisive action early, than by prolonging the in-surgency. The longer you wait, the more inured thepopulation will be to bloodshed, and the more bar-baric your action will have to be to make an impres-sion.

4. Strike openly. Do not apologize, make ex-cuses about "collateral damage", express regret, orpromise investigations. Afterwards, make sure thatas many people as possible know of your strike; me-dia is useful for this purpose, but be careful not tolet them interview survivors and arouse sympathy.

5. Do not command the strike yourself, in case itdoesn't work for some reason and you need to dis-own your commander and try another strategy. Ifit does work, present your commander to the world,

6 4 TACTICS

explain what you have done and make certain thateveryone understands that you are ready to strikeagain.[20]

3.7 Lorenzo Zambernardi

In “Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma”, Dr.Lorenzo Zambernardi, an Italian academic now work-ing in the United States, clarifies the tradeoffs involvedin counterinsurgency operations.[21] He argues that coun-terinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real prac-tice a counterinsurgent needs to choose two goals out ofthree. Relying on economic theory, this is what Zam-bernardi labels the “impossible trilemma” of counterin-surgency. Specifically, the impossible trilemma suggeststhat it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) forceprotection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants andnoncombatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insur-gents.According to Zambernardi, in pursuing any two of thesethree goals, a state must forgo some portion of the thirdobjective. In particular, a state can protect its armedforces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscrim-inately killing civilians as the Ottomans, Italians, andNazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe. Itcan choose to protect civilians along with its own armedforces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, butonly by abandoning the objective of destroying the insur-gents. Finally, a state can discriminate between combat-ants and noncombatants while killing insurgents, but onlyby increasing the risks for its own troops, as the UnitedStates and ISAF did in Afghanistan under the leadershipof Gen. Stanley McChrystal. So a country must choosetwo out of three goals and develop a strategy that can suc-cessfully accomplish them, while sacrificing the third ob-jective.Zambernardi’s theory posits that to protect populations,which is necessary to defeat insurgencies, and to physi-cally destroy an insurgency, the counterinsurgent’s mili-tary forces must be sacrificed, risking the loss of domesticpolitical support.

4 Tactics

4.1 Population control

With regard to tactics, the terms “drain the water” or“drain the swamp” involves the forced relocation of thepopulation (“water”) to expose the rebels or insurgents(“fish”). In other words, relocation deprives the afore-mentioned of the support, cover, and resources of the lo-cal population.A somewhat similar strategy was used extensively by USforces in South Vietnam until 1969, initially by forcing

A strategic hamlet in South Vietnam c.1964

the rural population into fenced camps, referred to asStrategic Hamlets, and later by declaring the previous ar-eas as free-fire zones to remove the rest from their vil-lages and farms. Widespread use was made of Agent Or-ange (which was first used on a large scale by the Britishduring the Malayan Emergency), sprayed from airplanes,to destroy crops that might have provided resources forViet Cong and North Vietnamese troops and their humansupport base. These measures proved ineffective, sincePhạm Ngọc Thảo, who oversaw the program, was a com-munist agent and sabotaged the implementation of thehamlets. This allowed Viet Cong activists and sympathiz-ers to infiltrate the new communities.[22] In any event, theVietnam War was only partly a counter-insurgency cam-paign, as it also involved conventional combat betweenUS/ARVN forces, Vietcong Main Force Battalions, andthe North Vietnamese Army (NVA).According to a report of the Naval Postgraduate School:

Among the most effective means are suchpopulation-control measures as vehicle andpersonnel checkpoints and national identitycards. In Malaya, the requirement to carry anID card with a photo and thumbprint forced thecommunists to abandon their original three-phase political-military strategy and caused di-visive infighting among their leaders over howto respond to this effective population-controlmeasure.[23]

4.2 Oil spot

The oil spot approach is a descriptive term for the con-centration of counter-insurgent forces into an expanding,secured zone. The origins of the expression is to befound in its initial use by Marshal Hubert Lyautey, themain theoretician of French colonial warfare and counter-insurgency strategy.[24][25] The oil spot approach was later

4.5 Public diplomacy 7

one of the justifications given in the Pentagon Papers[26]for the Strategic Hamlet Program.

4.3 Cordon and search

Cordon and search is a military tactic, one of the ba-sic counter-insurgency operations[27] in which an area iscordoned off and premises are searched for weapons orinsurgents.[28][29] Other related operations are “Cordonand knock”[30][31][32] and “Cordon and kick”. “Cordonand search” is part of new doctrine called Stability andSupport Operations or SASO. It is a technique usedwherethere is no hard intelligence of weapons in the house andtherefore is less intense than a normal house search. It isused in urban neighborhoods. The purpose of the mis-sion is to search a house with as little inconvenience tothe resident family as possible.

4.4 Air operations

See also: Counter-insurgency aircraft

Air power can play an important role in counter-insurgency, capable of carrying out a wide range of oper-ations:

• Transportation in support of combatants and civil-ians alike, including casualty evacuations;

• Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnais-sance;

• Psychological operations, through leaflet drops,loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts;

• Air-to-ground attack against 'soft' targets.[33]

A 7th SFG Special Forces medic gives a young boy a coloringbook during a meeting with village religious leaders to gain theirsupport and obtain information, Afghanistan 2008

4.5 Public diplomacy

In General David Petraeus’ Counterinsurgency Field Man-ual, one of themany tactics described to help win in coun-terinsurgency warfare involves the use of public diplo-macy through military means.[34] Counterinsurgency iseffective when it is integrated “into a comprehensivestrategy employing all instruments of national power,”including public diplomacy. The goal of COIN opera-tions is to render the insurgents as ineffective and non-influential, by having strong and secure relations with thepopulation of the host nation.An understanding of the host nation and the environmentthat the COIN operations will take place in is essential.Public diplomacy in COIN warfare is only effective whenthere is a clear understanding of the culture and popula-tion at hand. One of the largest factors needed for defeat-ing an insurgency involves understanding the populace,how they interact with the insurgents, how they interactwith non-government organizations in the area, and howthey view the counterinsurgency operations themselves.Ethics is a common public diplomacy aspect that is em-phasized in COIN warfare. Insurgents win their war byattacking internal will and the international opposition.In order to combat these tactics the counterinsurgencyoperations need to treat their prisoners and detainees hu-manely and according to American values and principles.By doing this, COIN operations show the host nation’spopulation that they can be trusted and that they are con-cerned about the well being of the population in order tobe successful in warfare.

Operation Moshtarak; A U.S. Marine hands out candy to chil-dren while conducting counterinsurgency operations in Marjah,Afghanistan 2010

“Political, social, and economic programs are usuallymore valuable than conventional military operations inaddress the root causes of the conflict and underminingthe insurgency.”[35] These programs are essential in or-der to gain the support of the population. These pro-grams are designed to make the local population feel se-cure, safe, and more aligned with the counterinsurgencyefforts; this enables the citizens of the host nation to trust

8 5 SPECIFIC DOCTRINES

the goals and purposes of the counterinsurgency efforts,as opposed to the insurgents’. A counterinsurgency is abattle of ideas and the implementation and integration ofthese programs is important for success. Social, politicaland economic programs should be coordinated and ad-ministered by the host nation’s leaders, as well. Success-ful COIN warfare allows the population to see that thecounterinsurgency efforts are including the host nation intheir re-building programs. The war is fought among thepeople and for the people between the insurgents and thecounterinsurgents.A counterinsurgency is won by utilizing strategic com-munications and information operations successfully. Acounterinsurgency is a competition of ideas, ideologies,and socio-political movements. In order to combat in-surgent ideologies one must understand the values andcharacteristics of the ideology or religion. Additionally,counterinsurgency efforts need to understand the cul-ture of which the insurgency resides, in order to strategi-cally launch information and communication operationsagainst the insurgent ideology or religion. Counterinsur-gency information operatives need to also identify key au-diences, communicators, and public leaders to know whoto influence and reach out to with their information.[36]

4.5.1 Information operations

Public diplomacy in information operations can only beachieved by a complete understanding of the culture itis operating in. Counterinsurgency operations must beable to perceive the world from the locals’ perspective.To develop a comprehensive cultural picture counterin-surgency efforts should invest in employing “media con-sultants, finance and business experts, psychologists, or-ganizational network analysts, and scholars from a widerange of disciplines.”[36] Most importantly, counterinsur-gency efforts need to be able to understand why the localpopulation is drawn into the insurgent ideology; like whataspects are appealing and how insurgents use informationto draw their followers into the ideology. Counterinsur-gency communication efforts need a baseline understand-ing of values, attitudes, and perceptions of the people inthe area of operations to conduct successful public diplo-macy to defeat the enemy.Developing information and communication strategiesinvolve providing a legitimate alternate ideology, improv-ing security and economic opportunity, and strengtheningfamily ties outside of the insurgency. In order to con-duct public diplomacy through these means, counterin-surgency communication needs to match its deeds with itswords. Information provided through public diplomacyduring a counterinsurgency cannot lie, the informationand communication to the people always has to be truth-ful and trustworthy in order to be effective at counteringthe insurgents. Public diplomacy in counterinsurgency toinfluence the public thoughts and ideas is a long time en-gagement and should not be done through negative cam-

paigning about the enemy.Conducting public diplomacy through relaying informa-tion and communicating with the public in a counterinsur-gency is most successful when a conversation can happenbetween the counterinsurgency team and the local pop-ulation of the area of operation. Building rapport withthe public involves “listening, paying attention, and be-ing responsive and proactive” which is sufficient for thelocal population to understand and trust the counterinsur-gency efforts and vice versa.[36] This relationship is strin-gent upon the counterinsurgents keeping their promises,providing security to the locals, and communicating theirmessage directly and quickly in times of need.Understanding and influencing the cognitive dimensionof the local population is essential to winning counterin-surgency warfare. The people’s perception of legitimacyabout the host nation and the foreign country’s counterin-surgency efforts is where success is determined. “Thefree flow of information present in all theaters via televi-sion, telephone, and Internet, can present conflicting mes-sages and quickly defeat the intended effects.”[37] Coor-dination between the counterinsurgency operations, thehost nation, and the local media in information presentedto the public is essential to showing and influencing howthe local population perceives the counterinsurgency ef-forts and the host nation.Public opinion, the media, and rumors influence how thepeople view counterinsurgency, the government hostingtheir efforts, and the host nation legitimacy. The use ofpublic diplomacy to strategically relay the correct mes-sages and information to the public is essential to successin a counterinsurgency operation. For example, close re-lationships with media members in the area is essential toensure that the locals understand the counterinsurgencyobjectives and feel secure with the host nation govern-ment and the counterinsurgency efforts. If the local me-dia is not in sync with the counterinsurgency operativesthen they could spread incomplete or false informationabout the counterinsurgency campaign to the public.“Given Al Qaeda’s global reach, the United States mustdevelop a more integrated strategic communication strat-egy for counter-insurgency with its allies to diminish vio-lent rhetoric, improve its image abroad, and detect, deter,and defeat this social movement at its many levels.”[36] In-formation operations and communicative abilities are oneof the largest and most influence aspects of public diplo-macy within a counterinsurgency.

5 Specific doctrines

5.1 British Empire

5.3 France 9

5.1.1 Malaya

British forces were able to employ the relocation methodwith considerable success during the "Malayan Emer-gency". The Briggs Plan, implemented fully in 1950, re-located Chinese Malayans into protected “New Villages”,designated by British forces. By the end of 1951, some400,000 ethnic Chinese had moved into the fortifica-tions. Of this population, the British forces were ableto form a “Home Guard”, armed for resistance againstthe Malayan Communist Party, an implementation mir-rored by the Strategic Hamlet Program later used by USforces in South Vietnam.[38][39] Despite British claims ofa victory in the Malayan Emergency, military historianMartin van Creveld has pointedly noted that the end re-sult of the counterinsurgency, namely the withdrawal ofBritish forces and establishment of an independent state,are identical to that of Aden, Kenya and Cyprus, whichare not considered victories.[40]

5.2 Dutch Empire

The Dutch formulated a new strategy of counter-insurgency warfare, during the Aceh War by deployinglight-armedMarechaussee units and using scorched earthtactics.In 1898 Van Heutsz was proclaimed governor of Aceh,and with his lieutenant, later Dutch Prime MinisterHendrikus Colijn, would finally conquer most of Aceh.They followed Hurgronje’s suggestions, finding coopera-tive uleebelang or secular chiefs that would support themin the countryside and isolating the resistance from theirrural support base.

5.3 France

France had major counterinsurgency wars in its coloniesin Indochina and Algeria. McClintock cited the basicpoints of French doctrine as:[41]

• Quadrillage (an administrative grid of populationand territory)

• Ratissage (cordoning and “raking”)

• Regroupement (relocating and closely controlling asuspect population)

• ‘Tache d'huile' – The 'oil spot' strategy

• Recruitment of local leaders and forces

• Paramilitary organization and militias

Much of the thinking was informed by the work ofearlier leading French theoreticians of colonial warfareand counter-insurgency, Marshals Bugeaud, Gallieni andLyautey.[25]

While McClintock cites the 1894 Algerian governor,Jules Cambon, as saying “By destroying the administra-tion and local government we were also suppressing ourmeans of action. ...The result is that we are today con-fronted by a sort of human dust on which we have noinfluence and in which movements take place which areunknown to us.” Cambon’s philosophy, however, did notseem to survive into the Algerian War of Independence,(1954–1962).

The sophisticated NLF/PAVN insurgent structure was embeddedin the population and difficult to root out and combat. French andUS Special Forces (Green Berets) saw some success in organizingtribal peoples to fight.[42]

5.3.1 Indochina

Post-WWII doctrine, as in Indochina, took a more dras-tic view of “Guerre Révolutionnaire”, which presented anideological and global war, with a commitment to totalwar. Countermeasures, in principle, needed to be bothpolitical and military; “No measure was too drastic tomeet the new threat of revolution.” French forces takingcontrol from the Japanese did not seem to negotiate se-riously with nationalist elements in what was to becomeVietnam,[43] and reaped the consequences of overconfi-dence at Dien Bien Phu.[44]

It occurred to various commanders that soldiers trainedto operate as guerrillas would have a strong sense ofhow to fight guerrillas. Before the partition of FrenchIndochina, French Groupement de Commandos MixtesAéroportés (GCMA), led by Roger Trinquier,[45] tookon this role, drawing on French experience with the Jed-burgh teams.[46] GCMA, operating in Tonkin and Laosunder French intelligence, was complemented by Com-mandos Nord Viêt-Nam in the North. In these missions,the SOF teams lived and fought with the locals. One Lao-tian, who became an officer, was Vang Pao, who was tobecome a general in Hmong and Laotian operations inSoutheast Asia while the US forces increased their role.

5.3.2 Algeria

Further information: Algerian War

The French counterinsurgency in colonial Algeria was asavage one. The 1957 Battle of Algiers resulted in 24,000

10 5 SPECIFIC DOCTRINES

detentions, with most tortured and an estimated 3,000killed. It may have broken the National Liberation Frontinfrastructure in Algiers, but it also killed off French le-gitimacy as far as “hearts and minds” went.[41][47]

Counter-insurgency requires an extremely capable intel-ligence infrastructure endowed with human sources anddeep cultural knowledge. This contributes to the dif-ficulty that foreign, as opposed to indigenous, powershave in counter-insurgent operations. One of France’smost influential theorists was Roger Trinquier. TheModern Warfare counterinsurgency strategy describedby Trinquier, who had led anti-communist guerrillas inIndochina, was a strong influence on French efforts in Al-geria.Trinquier suggested three principles:

1. separate the guerrilla from the population that sup-ports him;

2. occupy the zones that the guerrillas previously op-erated from, making the area dangerous for the in-surgents and turning the people against the guerrillamovement; and

3. coordinate actions over a wide area and for a longenough time that the guerrilla is denied access to thepopulation centres that could support him.

Trinquier’s view was that torture had to be extremelyfocused and limited, but many French officers consid-ered its use corrosive to its own side. There were strongprotests among French leaders: the Army’s most dec-orated officer, General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière,confronted General Jacques Massu, the commander ofFrench forces in the Battle of Algiers, over orders insti-tutionalizing torture, as “an unleashing of deplorable in-stincts which no longer knew any limits.” He issued anopen letter condemning the danger to the army of the lossof its moral values “under the fallacious pretext of imme-diate expediency”, and was imprisoned for sixty days.[41]

As some of the French Army protested, other parts in-creased the intensity of their approach, which led to an at-tempted military coup against the French Fourth Repub-lic itself. Massu and General Raoul Salan led a 1958 coupin Algiers, demanding a new Republic under Charles deGaulle. When de Gaulle’s policies toward Algeria, suchas a 1961 referendum on Algerian self-determination, didnot meet the expectations of the colonial officers, Salanformed the underground Organisation de l'armée secrète(OAS), a right-wing terrorist group, whose actions in-cluded a 1962 assassination attempt against de Gaullehimself.

5.3.3 Subsaharan Africa

France has had taken Barnett’s Leviathan role[48] in Chadand Ivory Coast, the latter on two occasions, most signif-icantly in 2002-2003.[49] The situation with France and

Ivory Coast is not a classic FID situation, as France at-tacked Ivorian forces that had attacked UN peacekeepers.

5.4 India

There have been many insurgencies in India from its cre-ation in 1947. The Kashmir insurgency, which startedby 1989, was brought under control by Indian govern-ment and violence has been reduced. The Army’s eliteRashtriya Rifles (RR) played a major role in putting downthe insurgency. The RR was well supported by CentralReserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force(BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and state gov-ernment police.The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CI-JWS) is located in the northeastern town of Vairengtein the Indian state of Mizoram. Personnel from coun-tries such as the United States, the United Kingdom,France, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan andVietnam haveattended this school.[50] High quality graduate level train-ing by a joint staff of highly trained special operators atCamp Taji Phoenix Academy and the CounterinsurgencyCenter For Excellence is provided in Iraq[51] as well asmany Iraqi Officers.

5.5 Portugal

Main article: Portuguese Colonial War

Portugal's experience in counterinsurgency resulted fromthe “pacification” campaigns conducted in the PortugueseAfrican and Asian colonies in the end of the 19th centuryand the beginning of the 20th century.In the 1960s and early 1970s, Portugal conductedlarge scale counterinsurgency operations in Angola,Portuguese Guinea andMozambique against independen-tist guerrillas supported by the Eastern Bloc and China,as well by some Western countries. Although these cam-paigns are collectively known as the "Portuguese ColonialWar", there were in fact three different ones: the AngolanIndependence War, the Guinea-Bissau War of Indepen-dence and the Mozambican War of Independence. Thesituation was unique in that small armed forces – those ofPortugal – were able to conduct three counterinsurgencywars at the same time, in three different theatres of op-erations separated by thousands of kilometers. For theseoperations, Portugal developed its own counterinsurgencydoctrine.[52]

5.6 United States

Main article: Foreign internal defense

The United States has conducted counterinsurgency

11

campaigns during the Philippine–American War, theVietnam War, the post-2001 War in Afghanistan, andthe Iraq War. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have re-sulted in increased interest in counterinsurgency withinthe American military, exemplified by the 2006 publi-cation of a new joint Army Field Manual 3-24/MarineCorps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, Counterin-surgency, which replaced the documents separately pub-lished by the Army and Marine Corps 20–25 yearsprior.[53] Views of the doctrine contained in the man-ual has been mixed.[54] The 2014 version of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 acquired a new title, Insurgencies andCountering Insurgencies, it consists of three main parts,

Part one provides strategic and operationalcontext, part two provides the doctrine for un-derstanding insurgencies, and part three pro-vides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. Inshort, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is organized toprovide the context of a problem, the problem,and possible solutions.[55]

6 See also

7 References

Notes

[1] See American and British English spelling differ-ences#Compounds and hyphens

[2] An insurgency is a rebellion against a constituted author-ity (for example an authority recognized as such by theUnited Nations) when those taking part in the rebellionare not recognized as belligerents (Oxford English Dictio-nary second edition 1989 “insurgent B. n. One who risesin revolt against constituted authority; a rebel who is notrecognized as a belligerent.”)

[3] U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Bureau ofPolitical-Military Affairs, Department of State. 2009.Retrieved September 1, 2014.

[4] Mao Zedong. On Guerrilla Warfare (1937), Chapter 6 -“The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare":

Many people think it impossible for guer-rillas to exist for long in the enemy’s rear.Such a belief reveals lack of comprehensionof the relationship that should exist betweenthe people and the troops. The former maybe likened to water the latter to the fish whoinhabit it. How may it be said that these twocannot exist together? It is only undisciplinedtroops who make the people their enemiesand who, like the fish out of its native elementcannot live.

[5] Eizenstat, Stuart E.; John Edward Porter and Jeremy M.Weinstein (January–February 2005). “Rebuilding WeakStates” (PDF). Foreign Affairs 84 (1).

[6] John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, (London:Hurst, 2009).

[7] Caldwell, William B. (8 February 2007). “Not at allvague”. Washington Times. Retrieved 16 October 2011.

[8] Excerpts from Santa Cruz’s writings, translated into En-glish, in Beatrice Heuser: The Strategy Makers: Thoughtson War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz (SantaMonica, CA: Greenwood/Praeger, 2010), ISBN 978-0-275-99826-4, pp. 124-146.

[9] Reeder, Brett. “Book Summary of Counterinsur-gency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula”.Crinfo.org (The Conflict Resolution Information Source).Retrieved 2008-09-22.

[10] Galula, David Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory andPractice Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security Inter-national, 1964. ISBN 0-275-99303-5 p.54-56

[11] Galula p.95

[12] Thompson, Robert (1966). Defeating Communist insur-gency: the lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. New York:F.A. Praeger.

[13] Hamilton, Donald W. (1998). The art of insurgency:American military policy and the failure of strategy inSoutheast Asia. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN978-0-275-95734-6.

[14] Kilcullen, David (28 September 2006). “Three Pillars ofCounterinsurgency” (PDF). U.S. Government Counterin-surgency Conference, Washington D.C.

[15] van Creveld, p. 268

[16] van Creveld, p. 226

[17] van Creveld, pp. 229-230

[18] van Creveld, p. 269

[19] van Creveld, p. 235

[20] van Creveld, pp. 241–245

[21] Zambernardi, Lorenzo, “Counterinsurgency’s ImpossibleTrilemma”, The Washington Quarterly, 33:3, July 2010,pp. 21-34

[22] Karnow, p. 274

[23] Sepp, Kalev I. (May–June 2005). “Best Practices inCounterinsurgency,” (PDF). Military Review: 8–12.

[24] Lyautey, Hubert. Du rôle colonial de l'armée (Paris: Ar-mand Colin, 1900)

[25] Porch, Douglas. “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The De-velopment of French colonial warfare”, in Paret, Peter;Craig, Gordon Alexande; Gilbert, Felix (eds). Makersof Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 376-407.

[26] “Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, Chapter 1,“US Programs in South Vietnam, Nov. 1963-Apr. 1965,:section 1”. Mtholyoke.edu. Retrieved 2009-10-03.

12 7 REFERENCES

[27] “Basic Counter-Insurgency”. Military History Online.Retrieved 2009-10-03.

[28] “Vignette 7: Search (Cordon and Search)". Globalsecu-rity.org. Retrieved 2013-09-04.

[29] “Tactics 101: 026. Cordon and Search Operations”.Armchair General. Retrieved 2009-10-03.

[30] Chronology: How the Mosul raid unfolded. Retrieved28.07.2005.

[31] U.S. Detains 6 Iranians in Irbil Raid Accessed January 11,2007 -- included use of “stun bombs” in the operation.

[32] Used in “Operation Quick Strike” in Iraq on August 6,2005. Retrieved 11 January 2007. Archived December30, 2006 at the Wayback Machine

[33] Sagraves, Robert D (April 2005). “The Indirect Ap-proach: the role of Aviation Foreign Internal Defense inCombating Terrorism in Weak and Failing States” (PDF).Air Command and Staff College.

[34] Petraeus, David H.; Amos, James F. (2006). FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. pp. li–liv.

[35] Petraeus, General David H. (2006). CounterinsurgencyField Manual. pp. 2–1.

[36] Krawchuk, Fred T. (Winter 2006). “Strategic Commu-nication: An Integral Component of CounterinsurgencyOperations”. The Quarterly Journal. 5 3: 35–50. Re-trieved April 2, 2011.

[37] Joint Publication 3-24 (October 2009). CounterinsurgencyOperations.

[38] Nagl, John (2002). Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife:Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-275-97695-5.

[39] Thompson, Robert (1966). Defeating Communist Insur-gency: Lessons fromMalaya and Vietnam. Chatto&Win-dus. ISBN 0-7011-1133-X.

[40] van Creveld, p. 221

[41] McClintock, Michael (November 2005). “Great PowerCounterinsurgency”. Human Rights First.

[42] Pike, Douglas. PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam. (Pre-sidio: 1996) pp. 37-169

[43] Patti, Archimedes L.A. (1980). Why Vietnam? Prelude toAmerica’s Albatross. University of California Press. ISBN0-520-04156-9.

[44] Fall, Bernard B (2002). Hell in a Very Small Place: TheSiege of Dien Bien Phu. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81157-X.

[45] Trinquier, Roger (1961). Modern Warfare: A FrenchView of Counterinsurgency. ISBN 0-275-99267-5.

[46] Porte, Rémy. “Intelligence in Indochina: Discretion andProfessionalism were rewarded when put into Practice.”(PDF). Archived from the original on November 25,2006. Retrieved 2007-11-26.

[47] Tomes, Robert R. (2004). “Relearning Counterinsur-gency Warfare” (PDF). Parameters (United States ArmyWar College).

[48] Barnett, Thomas P.M. (2005). The Pentagon’s New Map:The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century. Berkley Trade. ISBN 0-425-20239-9.Barnett-2005.

[49] Corporal Z.B. “Ivory Coast – Heart of Darkness”.

[50] “Army’s jungle school a global hit”. Dawn Online. 10April 2004.

[51] IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency. “US army offi-cers will receive training in guerrilla warfare inMizoram”.Globalsecurity.org.

[52] Cann, Jonh P., Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Por-tuguese Way of War, 1961-1974, Hailer Publishing, 2005

[53] “FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. (Approvedfor public release; distribution is unlimited.)". Ev-eryspec.com. 2006-12-15. Retrieved 2013-09-04.

[54] Hodge, Nathan (14 January 2009). “New Administra-tion’s Counterinsurgency Guide?". Wired. Retrieved 24June 2013.Melton, Stephen L. (9 April 2013). “Aligning FM 3-24Counterinsurgency with Reality”. Small Wars Journal.Retrieved 20 June 2013.Paul, Christopher; Clarke, Colin P. “Evidentiary Valida-tion of FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Worldwide, 1978-2008”. NDU Press. National Defense University. Re-trieved 24 June 2013.

[55] FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering In-surgencies, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14May 2014. (Approved for public release; distribution isunlimited.)

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• Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars: ATheory of Asymmetric Conflict. (New York: Cam-bridge University Press, 2005), ISBN 0-521-54869-1.

• Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. “Tunnel at the End of theLight: A Critique of U.S. Counter-terrorist GrandStrategy,” Cambridge Review of International Af-fairs, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2002), pp. 549–563.

• Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. “How to Lose a War on Ter-ror: A Comparative Analysis of a Counterinsur-gency Success and Failure”, in Jan Ångström and Is-abelle Duyvesteyn, Eds., Understanding Victory andDefeat in ContemporaryWar. (London: Frank Cass,2007).

• Burgoyne, Michael L. and Albert J. Marckwardt(2009). The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa With E. D.Swinton’s “The Defence of Duffer’s Drift”. Univer-sity of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-08093-2.

13

• Callwell, C. E. Small Wars: Their Principles &Practice. (Lincoln, Nebraska: Bison Books, 1996),ISBN 0-8032-6366-X.

• Cassidy, Robert M. Counterinsurgency and theGlobal War on Terror: Military Culture and Irreg-ular War. (Stanford: Stanford University Press,2008).

• Catignani, Sergio. Israeli Counter-Insurgency andthe two Intifadas: Dilemmas of a ConventionalArmy. (London: Routledge, 2008), ISBN 978-0-415-43388-4.

• Corum, James. Bad Strategies: How Major Pow-ers Fail in Counterinsurgency. (Minneapolis, MN:Zenith, 2008), ISBN 0-7603-3080-8.

• Corum, James. Fighting theWar on Terror: A Coun-terinsurgency Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith,2007), ISBN 0-7603-2868-4.

• Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: The-ory and Practice. (Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger,1964), ISBN 0-275-99269-1.

• Joes, James Anthony. Resisting Rebellion: The His-tory and Politics of Counterinsurgency. (Lexington,KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), ISBN 0-8131-9170-X.

• Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. NewYork: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-670-84218-6.

• Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fight-ing Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. (London:Hurst, 2009).

• Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. (London:Hurst, 2010).

• Kitson, Frank, Low Intensity Operations: Subver-sion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. (1971)

• Larson, Luke. Senator’s Son: An Iraq War Novel.(Phoenix: Key Edition, 2010), ISBN 0-615-35379-7.

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• Mao Zedong. Aspects of China’s Anti-JapaneseStruggle (1948).

• Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars:State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria,Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam.(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003),ISBN 0-521-00877-8.

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• Van Creveld, Martin, The Changing Face of War:Combat from the Marne to Iraq, 2008, New York:Ballantine, ISBN 978-0-89141-902-0

• Zambernardi, Lorenzo. “Counterinsurgency’s Im-possible Trilemma”, The Washington Quarterly,Vol. 33, No. 3 (2010), pp. 21–34.

8 External links• “Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebel-lion” by Raj Desai and Harry Eckstein

• Small Wars Journal: Insurgency/CounterinsurgencyResearch page

• CNAS, Abu Muquwama 'The CounterinsurgencyReading List'

• The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual

• Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year afterBeslan

• “Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict” U.S.Depts. of the Army and Air Force

• “Inside Counterinsurgency” by Stan Goff, ex - U.S.Special Forces

• “Instruments of Statecraft – U.S. Guerrilla Warfare,Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990” by Michael McClintock

• “Counter-Revolutionary Violence – Bloodbaths inFact & Propaganda” by Noam Chomsky and Ed-ward Herman

• “The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More” by SS BrigadeCommander Jürgen Stroop

• “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Cen-tury” by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen

• Wired News article on game theory in war on terror

• Military forces in counterterrorism and counterin-surgency operations at JihadMonitor.org

• “Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School India”

• “Bibliography: Theories of Limited War and Coun-terinsurgency” by Edwin Moise (Vietnam-era)

• “Bibliography: Doctrine on Insurgency and Coun-terinsurgency” Edwin Moise (recent)

• “Military Briefing Book” news regarding counter-insurgency

14 9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

9.1 Text• Counter-insurgency Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-insurgency?oldid=636253392 Contributors: Wesley, Ed Poor, Lean-

drod, Stevertigo, Kwertii, Jtdirl, MaggieL, Dbabbitt, Sander123, PBS, Demerzel, Xanzzibar, Centrx, Lupin, Juancarlos2004, Antandrus,Piotrus, Pascalvenier, Neutrality, Klemen Kocjancic, Kingal86, Steven Andrew Miller, Rich Farmbrough, Rama, Pavel Vozenilek, Cmdr-jameson, Iain Cheyne, Ajdlinux, Ashley Pomeroy, Milesli, Wtmitchell, Max rspct, BanyanTree, Alai, Drbreznjev, Dziban303, FrancisTy-ers, Woohookitty, Before My Ken, Lapsed Pacifist, Kglavin, Stefanomione, Descendall, BD2412, Jemiller226, Rjwilmsi, NatusRoma,Carl Logan, New Thought, YurikBot, RussBot, RedLyons, Pjones, Kirill Lokshin, Azucar, Muruga86, SigPig, Renata3, Black Falcon,2over0, Chase me ladies, I'm the Cavalry, Wallie, SmackBot, Looper5920, Dblobaum, Hmains, Chris the speller, Bluebot, WikiFlier,Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg, Open-box, PlasticFork, Bolivian Unicyclist, Psywar, Gamgee, Aaronlance, EdGl, Lapaz, Taz-maniacs, Gobonobo, Ddilegge, Joffeloff, Mgiganteus1, Nobunaga24, Neddyseagoon, Ft93110, Tawkerbot2, CmdrObot, That Asian Guy,J-boogie, Pit-yacker, Mirrormundo, Thijs!bot, Crockspot, Hcberkowitz, Signaleer, Isilanes, North Shoreman, RebelRobot, Ryan4314, Par-secboy, JamesBWatson, Ejcunc, Tberla, Raoulduke47, Bumblethorn, R'n'B, KTo288, BrokenSphere, Dskluz, Zarlino, Stymphal, Kimdime,Funandtrvl, Kubaan, Dchall1, Jschager, Prof77, Nikosgreencookie, Octavo-Dia, Solicitr, Smsarmad, Jefferybott, Derickdmiller, Perspi-cacite, Goolcap, Celebau, Will Hartley, JL-Bot, LarRan, Kos93, Niceguyedc, Cirt, Eeekster, Doug davison, Vendeka, Bonewah, Ed Moise,Vanished User 1004, DumZiBoT, Semitransgenic, AlanM1, Jsg2020, MystBot, Milstuffxyz, Heaven’s Army, Addbot, Fyrael, Douglasthe Comeback Kid, Rejectwater, MrOllie, Captain Obvious and his crime-fighting dog, Lightbot, Pietrow, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Reenem,AnomieBOT, Bsimmons666, Edutiao, Zawer, Citation bot, LilHelpa, Xqbot, CaliSEAL, Tomwsulcer, Srich32977, J04n, Doorvery far,GorgeCustersSabre, Mark Schierbecker, Jalapenos do exist, Prezbo, RightCowLeftCoast, Dragonivich65, Augen Zu, Sidna, Ladwiki, Ci-tation bot 1, RCPayne, Calmer Waters, SaadMuhammad, Petie J, Ionisiso, Trappist the monk, MFIreland, Himanil Raina, NFSreloaded,Dasha14, Morizbliz, Thevstyle, Mohound, RjwilmsiBot, Beyond My Ken, Krbi2009, S8isfi, EmausBot, John of Reading, Acather96,Dewritech, Mwgf79, Stephens101, ZéroBot, H3llBot, DBG Heuser, Lookatmego123, Thewolfchild, Grampion76, Teapeat, CharlieE-choTango, TheTimesAreAChanging, Helpful Pixie Bot, Haleyparks, Razorbliss, Puckett88, Dainomite, Tkenney2, BattyBot, Embrittled,YFdyh-bot, Hmainsbot1, Standardschecker, XXzoonamiXX, Jsrgroup, Nabak, Redshang053, Ptc113, Monkbot, ColAdon and Anonymous:134

9.2 Images• File:6th_Marine_Rgt._on_patrol_in_Marja_2010-02-22_crop.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/18/

6th_Marine_Rgt._on_patrol_in_Marja_2010-02-22_crop.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imagery.html#guid=c5f78eccd9dfcf0e2fb19badc05fbff224f850f6 Original artist: LCpl. Tommy Bellegarde; cropped by Beyond My Ken(<a href='//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Beyond_My_Ken' title='User talk:Beyond My Ken'>talk</a>) 14:22, 14 April 2010(UTC)

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