cost application annex 6: evaluation
DESCRIPTION
ÂTRANSCRIPT
March 2013
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It
was prepared by Social Impact, Inc. under Task Order No. AID-OAA-TO-12-00028 under the Evaluation
Services IQC.
E VA LUATION
Evaluation of USAID Support to the Eurasia Foundation
under Core Grant III (2001-2013)
March 2013
This publication was produced for the United States Agency for International Development. It was
prepared by James Fremming, Lyubov Palyvoda, and Mathias Kjaer of Social Impact, and David Cowles,
Sharon Valentine, and Taryn Lovelace of USAID.
The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United
States Agency for International Development nor the United States Government.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
OF THE EURASIA FOUNDATION
Photo Credit: Photos courtesy of Eurasia Foundation. All rights reserved.
This document (Report No. AID-OAA-TO-12-00028) is available through the Development
Experience Clearing House (http://dec.usaid.gov). Additional information can be obtained from:
Social Impact, Inc.
2300 Clarendon Boulevard, Suite 1000
Arlington, VA, 22201
Tel: (703) 465-1884
Fax: (703) 465-1888
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The evaluation team would like to thank all the Eurasia Foundation staff in both Washington,
D.C. and the eight Eurasian countries visited that provided such valuable support throughout our
effort. EF staff consistently took time out of their busy schedules to help find project
documentation, arrange and participate in interviews, answer follow up questions, and review
our draft report. Without exception, EF staff showed themselves to be helpful, honest, and
gracious hosts. The team is especially grateful to Lisa Coll, Rob O’Donovan, and Horton Beebe-
Center for the assistance and insight they have provided over the past several months.
The team would also like to thank our Advisory Group (AG) members, Vivian Derryck, Bill
Fuller, and Larry Garber, for their interest and participation in our evaluation. The insight and
understanding that came out of our AG meetings provided the basis for our understanding of a
more general “foundation model” to providing development assistance and helped elucidate how
well EF has and has not followed that model. The AG’s comments on the draft report were also
helpful for strengthening our final recommendations.
We also wish to acknowledge and thank our USAID Europe and Eurasia Bureau (USAID/E&E)
colleagues for their guidance throughout the evaluation. Specifically, the team wishes to
recognize Jerome Gallagher for his detailed review and methodological suggestions for
strengthening our report and our COR, Erin McCarthy, for her patience, responsiveness, and
overall willingness to aid our effort from the very beginning of our contract. Erin’s collegial and
supportive approach to overseeing this contract was a significant factor in our ability to revise
and strengthen the report to what it is today.
Lastly, we wish to express our gratitude to all the EF beneficiaries that spoke with us or
answered our online survey as part of this effort. This report would not have been possible
without their detailed and honest answers.
ACRONOYMS
AG Advisory Group
AOR Agreement Officer’s Technical Representative
BSEU Belarus State Economic University
BSI Business Support Institutions
BSTU Belarus State Technological University
BSU Belarus State University
BTEUCC Belarusian Trade and Economics University of Consumer Cooperation
BUEE Business Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers
CANS Central Asia News Service
CAR Central Asian Republics
CMI Capacity Mapping Initiative
CRRC Caucasus Regional Resource Centers
CS Civil Society
CSD Civil Society Development
CSO Civil Society Organization
DOS US Department of State
DRL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DOS)
EC European Commission
EEF East Europe Foundation (Ukraine, Moldova)
EERC Economics Education and Research Consortium
EF Eurasia Foundation
EFCA Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)
EF-DC Eurasia Foundation, Washington DC
EPF Eurasia Partnership Foundation (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia)
EUR-ACE Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia
FAPS Foundation Administered Projects
FCO UK Foreign Commonwealth Office
FGD Focus Group Discussion
FNE New Eurasia Foundation (Russia)
FY Fiscal Year
GMS Grant Management System
GoB Government of Belarus
IDF Institutional Development Framework
IMP Institute for Privatization and Management
KII Key Informant Interview
KSE Kiev School of Economics
LOE Level of Effort
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MBA Master of Business Administration
MoE Ministry of Economy
MVF Media Viability Fund
NEE New Eurasia Establishment (Belarus)
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NICRA Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement
OCA Organizational Capacity Assessment [Tool] (USAID)
OCAT Organizational Capacity Assessment Tool (McKinsey)
PE Private Enterprise
PA Public Administration
PF Partner Foundation
PSDE Private Sector Development and Entrepreneurship
RIPMP Russia Independent Print Media Program
SATR Support for Armenia-Turkey rapprochement
SBLP Small Business Lending Program
SI Social Impact
SKII Structured Key Informant Interview
SO Strategic Objective
SOW Scope of Work
UNDP United Nations Development Program
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
TABLE OF CONTENTS
COMPONENT I: EVALUATION OF EF AND THE EF NETWORK
Exeuctive Summary ....................................................................................................................... i
Background on Eurasia Foundation ............................................................................................. i
Evaluation Purpose and Methods ................................................................................................ i
Key Findings and Conclusions ................................................................................................... ii
Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... x
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1
Purpose of the Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 1
Background, Context, and Evolution of the Eurasia Foundation ............................................... 1
Evaluation Design and Methodology ......................................................................................... 4
Findings and Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 6
Issue I: Has EF Contributed to the Achievement of the Three SOs Identified in the Original
Grant Agreement? ....................................................................................................................... 6
Issue II: Has EF-DC succeeded its efforts to establish and build sustainable foundations
through its Network prior to the end of core grant funding? .................................................... 21
Issue III: What are the strengths and weaknesses of EF as a model for advancing US
development objectives? ........................................................................................................... 35
Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 44
Annexes ........................................................................................................................................... I
Annex A – Scope of Work .......................................................................................................... I
Annex B – Detailed Methodology, Limitations, and Threats to Validity ............................. VIII
Annex C – List of People Contacted ..................................................................................... XIV
Annex D – List of EF’s Gender Indicators .......................................................................... XVIII
Annex E – Grant Agreement SOW ....................................................................................... XIX
Annex F – Spending Across SOs by Country ...................................................................... XXV
Annex G – Interview Guides ............................................................................................. XXVII
Annex H – Electronic Survey.......................................................................................... XXXVI
Annex I – Individual PF Case Studies .............................................................................. XLVII
List of Figures
Figure 1: EF and PF Organizational Chart .................................................................................... 3
Figure 2: Grant Analysis of Grant Amounts over Time ................................................................ 6
Figure 3: Grantee Survey Response ............................................................................................... 7
Figure 4: Senior Management Self-assessment of Impact and Effectiveness ............................. 14
Figure 5: Performance Against Financial Sustainability Targets ................................................ 28
Figure 6: History of implementation for each PF ........................................................................ 32
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EXEUCTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND ON EURASIA FOUNDATION
The Eurasia Foundation (EF) is a publicly funded, privately managed foundation working to
foster open, just, and progressive societies in the former Soviet Union. A joint United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State’s (DOS) Office of the
Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE) initiative, EF began operating
in May 1993 with an initial $75 million grant. It received a second $104 million grant in 1997
and a third $148 grant, its current, in 2001, which is due to end in December 2013.
EF’s grant agreement states that EF “was created explicitly to deliver a bottom-up, grassroots
grants program in Eurasia.”1 It began as a traditional grantmaker providing both open-door and
targeted grants to the most promising and sustainable Eurasian institutions carrying out activities
consistent with three broad United States Government (USG) strategic objectives (SOs): Private
Enterprise (PE) Development; Civil Society (CS) Strengthening; and Public Administration (PA)
and Policy Reform. However, in the early 2000s, EUR/ACE requested EF shift away from its
reliance on core funding to a model of financial sustainability. EF responded in 2004 by
beginning to establish the EF Network, “a constellation of affiliated, locally-registered
foundations in Russia, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Ukraine, and Moldova,”2 as well as a
locally registered representative office in Belarus. In 2010, EF produced a Sustainability Plan,
which established the conditional release of additional core funding upon EF-Washington, D.C.
(EF-DC) and its five partner foundations (PFs) meeting specific fundraising targets.
Following nearly 20 years of operation, $320 million in USG core funding, and activities
spanning 12 countries, EF finds itself at a crossroads. The prospect of additional USG core
funding looks unlikely, and EF-DC and its PFs face significant challenges to their future
sustainability and are increasingly shifting from a foundation to a service provider model in
search of new donor funding. EF’s experience presents a unique evaluation opportunity to not
only take stock of past performance and organizational capacity internally but also for the USG
to assess the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the “foundation model” in achieving
high-level foreign policy objectives externally.
EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODS
USAID/E&E contracted Social Impact (SI) to conduct a summative performance evaluation of
its assistance to EF under its current grant. A similar evaluation was conducted in 2001 toward
the end of the previous grant.3 The evaluation is divided into two parts. Component I focuses on
evaluating EF’s success in meeting the grant’s three SOs, assessing EF’s organizational capacity,
and commenting on the comparative advantages of the foundation model. Component II, which
follows in a separate evaluation report, focuses on EF’s representative office in Belarus, the New
Eurasia Establishment, assessing its organizational capacity, overall performance, and alignment
1 “The Eurasia Foundation Grant Agreement,” Grant No. EMT-G-00-02-00008-00. Pg. 10.
2 Eurasia Foundation website. “About Us.” http://www.eurasia.org/about-us. Accessed on January 15, 2013.
3 See Blue, Richard, et al. “Final Report: Eurasia Foundation Evaluation.” Nathan Associates. January, 2001.
ii
to USAID/Belarus’s SOs.
A team of SI and USAID/E&E evaluation specialists, five from SI and three from USAID/E&E,
conducted the evaluation between September 2012 and March 2013. They utilized a qualitatively
focused but mixed-methods approach involving a desk review of primary and secondary
documents; key informant and focus group interviews; an electronic survey of EF grantees
across all 12 countries; and a Delphi Advisory Group of former foundation executives. Field data
collection involved over 130 interviews with EF staff, donors, partners, and beneficiaries in eight
Eurasia countries (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Belarus) between September and October 2012.
KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings and conclusions presented below represent the evaluation team’s selection of those
believed to be of most importance and relevance to the reader. A complete listing of findings and
conclusions can be found in the main body of the report.
EF’S CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVEMENT OF THREE OVERARCHING SOS
LEVEL OF INVESTMENT WITHIN EACH SO
Overall, the evaluators found that there is a distinct emphasis on CS programs over the life of the
grant. Data provided by EF shows that 46% of total grant amounts fall under CS, followed by PE
with 33%, and PA with 21%. A trend analysis illustrates that while EF placed an early emphasis
in PE, CS overtook PE in 2004 and continued to be the top-funded SO until 2011 (see page 6).
Investment across the SOs in EF’s flagship programs was more equally distributed; however, this
investment more accurately reflects areas where EF could play a role in promoting economic and
democratic reform rather than an overt attempt to invest in specific SOs. Regarding the PFs’
individual portfolios, the team found that current PF programs are strongly oriented toward CS.
Interviews with PF staff indicated that this was due in large part to their core competencies,
country contexts, and respective donor interests.
LEVEL OF SUCCESS WITHIN EACH SO
The current grant agreement explicitly states that EF was created to deliver a bottom-up
approach to support small grassroots initiatives in strengthening local civil society, which was
expected to result in increased demand for national level political reform. Although the 2001
evaluation of EF’s core grant (the latest external evaluation available) recommended that EF
shift its focus to working at the national level, the drafters of the current grant agreement chose
to continue the grassroots-level focus.
Consistent with the grassroots focus, the EF Network has awarded close to 3,000 grants to date
and implemented numerous direct programs in three broad SOs in 12 countries. As EF did not
collect data on national level impact and the evaluation did not allot the resources needed for the
evaluators to collect the data themselves, the evaluators were unable to test the grant agreement’s
development hypothesis that grassroots activity would spur national-level reform.
However, the evaluators relied on qualitative interviews with EF donors, staff, and beneficiaries
to get a sense of where interviewees thought EF had the greatest level of impact. They found that
donors and PF staff consistently replied that the PFs’ core competencies, and thereby implicitly
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their largest level of perceived impact, fell in the CS area. The evaluators also noted that even
when PFs were engaged in PE and PA activities, their focus was often on working with CS
partners to bring about changes within these SOs.
FACTORS THAT FACILITATED OR HINDERED SUCCESS
In terms of general competencies, interview responses consistently indicated that the PFs’ key
strengths were in building both the organizational and technical capacity of its local partners;
their emphasis on treating local entities as partners rather than solely as beneficiaries; and their
extensive local knowledge and networks. In some cases, PF leadership also described
community-based projects as a niche, noting that there are fewer competitors doing this work
compared to national-level projects.
As for country context, regional democratic backsliding presented both a challenge and
opportunity for the PFs, influencing the nature and success of their programs. PFs in all regions
noted that corruption and the degree of democracy had implications for both CS and PA efforts.
The variation in local partner capacity was also another key factor influencing PF success.
Organizational factors such as the PFs’ reputation as international organizations or the PFs’
staff continuity and skill areas were also significant determinants of success. While the PFs’ US-
affiliation has in some cases hindered their ability to work with national governments, this
affiliation has led to PFs being widely recognized as having strong financial and program
management and grantmaking capabilities due to their international background, making them
appealing to donors and local partners. However, as the PFs broadened their donor base to focus
on sustainability, staff at times lacked the required technical skills in new program areas.
STEPS TAKEN TO ENSURE GENDER BALANCE
EF-DC continues to track gender-related metrics for all programs and some PFs have programs
that specifically address gender issues, which is particularly relevant in Central Asia. One PF has
a written gender mainstreaming policy. However, as the PFs have evolved into independent
organizations, there does not appear to be a consolidated approach to gender.
CONCLUSIONS: EF’S LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT IN EACH OF THE THREE SOS
• There is a clear upward trend in investment in CS programming over the life of the
current grant. In addition, EF programs appear to have been more successful in CS,
relative to the other SOs, followed by PE and PA respectively, according to donor and
beneficiary interviews that consistently described EF as having had an impact in
developing civil society and numerous local CSOs.
• The grant agreement emphasized working at the grassroots level. While some programs
did in fact focus on national-level reform issues, it was not possible to demonstrate that
the grassroots interventions led to improvement at the national level in any of the SO
areas.4 Furthermore, the grassroots approach makes it almost impossible to measure
4 It should be noted that the evaluators did not rigorously test for national level impact; they did not explicitly ask
about national level impact in their interview protocol, trace causal logic chains, or run an impact evaluation.
However, in nearly all interviews, if the KI spoke to national level issues while being interviewed about a particular
project, the team would follow up by asking whether the project had any national level impact. This was particularly
iv
impact at the national level given that the EF network awarded close to 3,000 grants and
implemented numerous direct programs in the broad SO areas in 12 countries with a
combined population of 255.5 million. While the total size of the third core grant seems
large, $148 million over 10 years, it actually represents about five cents per person per
year. Several sources noted that successes occurred at the local level but that given the
size and scale of several of the countries, particularly Russia and Ukraine, it was
unreasonable to expect national level impact.
• Country context, particularly democratic conditions and civil society landscape, had
implications for success as well as the overall ability to work in CS and PA areas. In
some countries, undemocratic conditions precluded PFs from being able to work at the
national level in the PA space effectively. Issues such as conflict, corruption, and political
instability also created challenges for working in PA at the national level. Furthermore,
suspicion of the PFs as US organizations hindered work in both CS and PA areas.
Logically, the availability of strong NGOs or other partners in the CS area was cited as a
determinant of success. In countries with a richer NGO environment, the PFs felt they
had more success than in countries where NGOs were weaker.
• The EF Network’s reputation as independent and transparent organizations contributes to
their ability to build trust with local partners and donors. Staff longevity can affect the
performance of the PF overall, and high turnover clearly has negative consequences on
the success of specific programs regardless of the SO alignment. There are also cases in
which staff did not possess the appropriate technical skills for implementing donor
programs regardless of their longevity with the organization.
LESSONS LEARNED
• If you mandate that a foundation operate with a bottom-up, grassroots-level approach, it
will be exceedingly difficult to produce convincing evidence to link project level
activities to observable changes in national-level indicators, particularly within fixed
budget and LOE constraints of a typical evaluation.
EF’S SUCCESS IN ESTABLISHING AND SUPPORTING SUSTAINABLE PARTNER
FOUNDATIONS
EF has faced the sizeable task of overseeing its PF’s transformations while at the same time
managing its own in the face of declining resources. This section analyzes the extent of EF-DC’s
success in building its PFs’ managerial, operational, and financial sustainability.
ESTABLISHMENT AND EARLY SUPPORT
Before commenting on EF-DC’s steps to strengthen the managerial and operational capacity of
its PFs, the evaluators thought it important to underscore the significant amount of work, and
relative success, that EF-DC had in merely establishing these PFs in the first place. EF-DC
true with issues surrounding public administration. Furthermore, and more importantly, the evaluators did
consistently ask whether the project was successful and in what areas the PF was most effective, which oftentimes
led to provision of information on impact. The evaluators also reviewed PF documentation on impact. Following
these methods, the team did not identify impacts at the national level.
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worked with PF staff and local lawyers to navigate the various host country laws associated with
establishing independent foundations. This had the complicating effect of requiring different
operational structures to respond to the various host country regulations. Each structure has its
own comparative advantages and disadvantages along with unique challenges to organizational
sustainability.
LEADERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CAPACITY
Within the PFs and even EF-DC, different functions such as strategy identification, control, and
execution are distributed respectively among the Boards of Directors, Advisory Boards, and the
PF Executive Directors/Presidents. The team found that EF has placed high emphasis on the
development of the Board of Directors as an oversight institution of the PFs but that these boards
vary in how actively engaged they are programmatically and operationally with their respective
PFs. However, in general the boards do carry out oversight, governance, advisory, and
fundraising functions in close collaboration with the respective PF Presidents.
The team found that PF leadership was a significant determinant of future sustainability. Russia
provided a particularly apt example of how strong and resourceful PF Presidents can help their
foundations navigate significant threats to their operation through thoughtful adjustments to their
funding sources and operational model.
In terms of strategic planning, the team found that all PFs indicated that they had developed at
least a three-year strategic plan with regional and local partners utilizing different strategic
planning approaches. The strategies were found to be adequately done and provided rationales
for strategic objectives and periodic updates with board input; however, the team noted that
foundation staff were more familiar with their annual operational plans than their strategic plans.
OPERATIONAL CAPACITY
Interviews with PF staff indicated that a significant step for ensuring their sustainability is the
building of in-house technical expertise, as staff acknowledged their limited technical knowledge
and expertise in specific areas of their work. However, the evaluators found that PFs generally
do not have a formal plan for staff development and limited and diminishing core funding will
force the PFs to reconsider the staff policies, trainings, and structure.
Interview responses overwhelmingly emphasized that the strong program management
procedures inherited by the PFs are a key operational strength for future sustainability. However,
over 70% of interviewees also indicated that these procedures needed to be further refined to
respond to their specific host-country needs.
EF’s establishment and support of the EF Network as a means of leveraging economies of scale
and knowledge sharing within the Network is another key step taken to encourage sustainability.
However, the evaluators found that opinions on the utility of the Network varied significantly
among the PFs, particularly according to their various stages of development. They also found
minimal evidence to suggest that there were significant benefits or economies of scale for
individual PFs. While some respondents commented that the Network was useful for identifying
new donors and funding opportunities, few of these respondents were able to provide specific
examples. There was similarly little evidence of efficiencies in the provision of specialized
services such as technology, communications, and evaluation. As for EF-DC’s role in supporting
the PFs’ long-term institutional sustainability and program success, much remains to be seen.
The evaluators did not find substantial evidence that EF-DC improved the identification,
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implementation, or monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of PF projects.
FINANCIAL OPERATION AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PFS
The grant agreement stipulated that EF would be sustained through an endowment. However,
such an endowment was never established during the life of the grant.5 Instead, the decision was
made to shift EF’s operational model toward building sustainable legacy foundations given
specific fundraising targets that it needed to achieve. Incremental funding was tied to achieving
those objectives – at least informally – through the Sustainability Plan. While the EF Network
has broadly met these targets to date, there is significant variation among the PFs based on
country context and available sources of funds, and some might not successfully transition to
long-term sustainability. EF-DC is also struggling to adjust to new realities without core funds. It
has attracted some corporate money and has won competitive bids for other USAID and State
Department funded programs, but without core funds EF-DC increasingly finds itself moving
from a foundation to a service provider model.
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CMI TOOL
One of the most significant steps EF took to support the sustainability of its PFs was the
development and implementation of its Capacity Mapping Initiative (CMI) tool. However, the
evaluation team found that CMI was unevenly applied and that the capacities mapped and people
interviewed to gauge those capacities appeared to be determined by a few select employees,
usually senior EF and PF staff, thereby introducing a significant risk of selection bias. The
evaluation design does not include an assessment of the accuracy of the CMI tool itself.
However, it does allow the evaluators to present a summary of the opinions of PF staff on CMI’s
effectiveness in building organizational capacity. The majority of interviewed PF staff answered
that CMI was generally a good tool to paint an overall picture of an organization; to detect
problem areas, bottlenecks, or areas for improvement; and to organize their PF’s approach to
capacity building.
CONCLUSIONS: EF’S SUCCESS IN ESTABLISHING AND SUPPORTING SUSTAINABLE
PARTNER FOUNDATIONS
The adoption of a new business model of sustainability following the end of core funding
requires significant transitions in a range of organizational capacity areas beyond a sole
focus on fundraising. The process can entail significant downsizing and staffing changes
and requires significant lead-time. The evaluators found that FNE has undertaken the
most significant transition and adopted a business model distinct from the other PFs, but
most other PFs have not really undertaken a major organizational transformation to date.
EF-DC does not appear to have fully recognized the need for a transformational change
from a grantmaking to operational foundation and has had limited capacity to effectively
manage its PFs’ transformations, which is in large part due to reduced core funding.
5 N.B.: The grant agreement stated that EF should rely on USG funding until the endowment was established;
however, it did not specify whether the endowment would be to maintain EF indefinitely or for a fixed period of
time (say 10 or 15 years) with the expectation that EF would disappear at that time as the mission would be broadly
accomplished. The implicit assumption was that EF would have a stream of funds from the USG until the
endowment was established and that they would then continue their work, indefinitely or for a fixed period of time,
using the revenue from the endowment.
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Many respondents, however, mentioned that PFs inherited strong operational procedures
will need to be further adapted to individual country contexts. PFs also face a dual
challenge of needing to build technical expertise while at the same time responding to the
additional burdens of declining human resources and support from EF-DC caused by
decreases in core funding. Finally, the EF Network does not appear to be providing the
economies of scale and expected benefits envisioned in EF’s Sustainability Plan. It is of
greatest benefit to the least developed PFs within the Network; however, the importance
of EF-DC decreases as PFs mature and smaller, more regionally focused networks
provide greater benefit.
With the end of core funding, from a financial perspective, some PFs are at risk. In some
cases, PFs have to undertake a significant program realignment to meet the needs of new
donors. This is already happening in Russia and to a lesser extent Central Asia.
Organizations may find themselves in very different lines of business than those
undertaken when funding and program direction came from the USG. The provision of
key EF-DC functions to the PFs, such as fundraising and M&E, have been lost due to a
reduction in core funding. It is critical that the PFs have sufficient resources to cover
fundraising/proposal development, which traditionally had been covered by core funds.
Financial sustainability is compromised in some cases in which the USG has decided to
decrease funding to these countries or determined that the locally registered PFs are not
eligible to compete for funding reserved for local organizations either because of their
board structure, which includes internationals, or their perceived alignment to EF-DC.6
The CMI tool was not applied consistently and was not used to its full advantage.7
However, the majority of interviewed PF staff believe that CMI produces scores that
accurately reflect their individual capacity areas, but most also commented that there has
been little follow-up by EF-DC and that some, but not all, of the recommendations
produced by the exercise have been implemented by the PFs.
LESSONS LEARNED
Once core funding ends and a foundation needs to compete for funds in order to survive,
its willingness and ability to continue to support specific US foreign policy objectives
will be diminished. The EF experience conveys the lesson that when and if core funding
ends, the mission of the foundation will likely start to move away from supporting the
original donor objectives. US policymakers need to be aware of the implications of the
decision to end core funding and the potential reduced focus on US priority objectives.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE FOUNDATION MODEL FOR
ADVANCING USG SOS
Aiming to increase the utility of their findings, the evaluation team modified the original
6 The evaluators encountered several examples, the most striking of which occurred in Armenia where the PF was
excluded from a competition because its board structure (which does not include any native Azeris or Armenians)
does not meet USAID Forward principles. The issue is that Azeris and Armenians will not sit on the same board, so
a predominantly local board is not possible. 7 It should be noted that the CMI process was phased out due to limited core funding.
viii
evaluation question to focus on an analysis of the strengths and weakness of foundations in
general (i.e., the “foundation model”) for advancing US development objectives and also to
provide a commentary on how well EF was able to conform to this model. Given EF’s
experience, in which a dedicated funding stream was discussed but never implemented, the team
felt that there was limited value in commenting on the usefulness of replicating this model,
which they would not recommend. However, the team felt that a more macro-level discussion on
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of foundations in general, and the extent to which
EF was able to capture these, would prove more useful to future programming.
DEFINING THE TERM “FOUNDATION”
The team found surprisingly few commonly accepted definitions of foundations, perhaps due to
the varied structures, activities, revenue sources, and country laws of foundations. However, one
defining characteristic appeared in most definitions – namely, the availability of a steady funding
stream usually in the form of an endowment or trust. It is on this criterion that EF appears to
have deviated most significantly from the traditional foundation model as the transition to
sustainability was undertaken.
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE FOUNDATION MODEL IN TERMS OF
SPEED, FLEXIBILITY, AND INNOVATIONS COMPARED TO USAID CONTRACTING
Based on secondary data, interview responses, and their Advisory Group discussions, the team
found that foundations offer comparative advantages in terms of flexibility in programming,
speed of start-up of projects, and an ability to pursue long-term objectives compared to
traditional direct contracting models. Foundations benefit from their longer-term institutional
presence (compared to contractors), which leads to deeper knowledge and relationships with
local partners fostering greater acceptance, access, and trust. However, it should be noted that
one of the defining characteristics of foundations, and the basis of the foundation model’s most
significant and tangible comparative advantages, is the availability of a reliable source of long-
term funding which was not present in the EF example.
On the other hand, the team found that contractors operating under USAID projects often have a
defined period of performance and defined scope of work. These attributes mean that contractors
may be better suited to work on issues that can be addressed within a defined life of project and
which require specific technical expertise. Contracts by their nature are not quick or flexible and
may be more suitable for addressing a specific set of well-defined issues.
A complete listing of the individual comparative advantages and disadvantages of the
“foundation model” can be found on pages 35-38.
EF’S CONFORMITY WITH THE FOUNDATION MODEL
The team found that EF’s performance in terms of speed, flexibility, and innovation in
comparison to USAID contracting was largely dependent on the availability of core funding.
When core funding was available, EF was able to capitalize on many of the advantages of the
“foundation model” and generally outperformed other contractors in terms of supporting local
ownership of programs, fostering sustainability, and supporting the social capital needed to
enhance democratic processes. However, as core funding declined, EF was no longer able to
capitalize on these advantages and did not perform as well as contractors, particularly in terms of
programmatic focus and depth of technical expertise.
In terms of sector-specific comparative advantages, the evaluation team concluded that EF’s
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work has generally been most successful in the civil society arena. This result is in accord with
the trends in PF portfolio investments observed earlier in this report. Given the predominance of
civil society activity in the overall program of EF, it is not possible to determine the
effectiveness of EF’s model in other areas from its work in civil society. While the evidence here
is clear that the model “performs well” in supporting civil society assistance, this does not mean
that the model would not work for other sectors as well. Even though the evidence available in
this evaluation was limited, several foundations, such as The Asia Foundation, have
demonstrated success in these sectors.
BENEFICIARIES’ EXPERIENCE WORKING WITH EF
Beneficiaries often found PF’s operational expectations, such as quality of proposals, reporting,
and financial transparency, to be more rigorous than other grantmakers, and in the end, PFs were
usually seen to be supportive, competent partners. The more experienced grantees were able to
compare PF expectations with those of other donors. In some instances, the level of difficulty
was about the same as with other grantmakers, but more often PF processes were considered
more challenging. However, some interviewees stated that high expectations by the PF helped
their organizations to build capability and find subsequent sources of new funding. Most
interviewees stated that they would work with the PF again.
EF COORDINATION WITH USAID MISSIONS AND OTHER USAID PROGRAMS
The EF regional grant is overseen by a USAID Agreement Officer’s Technical Representative
(AOR) based with the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia in Washington, D.C. At the country level
there are no formalized coordination points or mechanisms except on occasions (such as in
Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Russia) when the USAID Mission has awarded one of its
own programs to a PF. In Russia, FNE is widely known and FNE leadership and staff talk
regularly with donors – although of course with the closing of the USAID program in Russia
such frequent communications are not expected in the near future. The working relationship in
Moldova is not close and USAID personnel noted a lack of coordination with EEF-M, although
we note that the Country Director was invited to visit the most recent meeting of the EEF board
and other events. Further, donor coordination meetings convened by USAID/Embassy, which
had been effective in earlier years for understanding and directing the work of EEF-M, are no
longer held regularly.
On the Washington side, EF-DC historically has looked to State and EUR/ACE for oversight and
coordination rather than to USAID. For its part, USAID’s historical pattern has therefore been to
exert little oversight through the AOR.
CONCLUSIONS: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE FOUNDATION MODEL
Foundations offer comparative advantages in terms of flexibility, speed, and ability to
pursing long-term objectives compared to traditional direct contracting models. Contracts
by their nature are not quick or flexible and may be more suitable for addressing a
specific set of well-defined issues. These models can thus complement each other by
capturing advantages and benefits not captured by the other.
There was a marked difference in EF-DC and the PFs’ ability to conform to the
comparative advantages of the foundation model as it became clear that core funding
would end. As articulated above, having a reliable funding stream is a defining
x
characteristic of foundations and basis for key comparative advantages.
While the application, monitoring, financial management, and reporting requirements of
EF grantmaking can be challenging at times for grantees, these operational expectations
appear not to be overly burdensome to beneficiaries and indeed prove to be opportunities
for valuable capacity strengthening for many.
Despite a strong recommendation from the first evaluation, the level of coordination
between PFs and USAID Missions is inconsistent. When the PF has received money from
the bilateral mission, they become an implementing partner with strong communications
linkages, whereas in other countries the USAID mission was not even aware the PF
existed.
RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION FOR USG AUDIENCE
USAID/PPL SHOULD CREATE AN AGENCY-WIDE POLICY ON FOUNDATIONS
USAID has and will continue to support foundations in addition to EF in the Europe and Eurasia
region and elsewhere. As a result, USAID has continued to gain experience working with
foundations in support of critical foreign policy objectives and developed a deeper understanding
of the strengths and weakness of the model. USAID’s Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning
(USAID/PPL) should consider developing a policy for establishing, supporting, and working
with foundations. The policy should define what constitutes a foundation; describe the different
kinds of foundation models (e.g., endowed vs. non-endowed) and outline their comparative
strengths and weaknesses; differentiate when USAID should consider creating its own
foundations versus collaborating with existing foundations; and clearly articulate how to support
and sustain foundations advancing desired USG foreign policy interests.
This policy could be informed by this evaluation but should draw from a variety of sources in
order to properly capture the richness and diversity of the foundation world.
DESIGNERS AND POLICYMAKERS SHOULD ESTABLISH THE FUNDING AND
EXPECTATIONS OF A FOUNDATION UPFRONT
It is vital that the conditions for funding foundations are explicitly stated and followed upfront. A
foundation can be designed to exist indefinitely based on an endowment, exist for an unspecified
period of time based on a “sinking fund,” or operate for a fixed period with a dedicated source of
funding. As witnessed in the EF example, the implication of switching towards a sustainability
model, compared to the traditional model of having a sustained source of funding, limited EF’s
ability to capitalize on the comparative advantages of the foundation model. It also demonstrates
the consequences of designers and policymakers failing to have a clear idea up front on the type
of foundation they are establishing.
Policymakers need to understand that changes in operating assumptions made midstream, such
as switching its operational model to one focusing on the sustainability of local partner
foundations, can be very disruptive to the effectiveness of the foundation and can significantly
impact a foundation’s ability to capitalize on the advantages of the foundation model. To best
capture these comparative advantages, particularly in terms of speed, flexibility, and long-term
view, a foundation must have access to a reliable source of long-term funding.
xi
POLICYMAKERS NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT A TRANSFORMATION IN A FOUNDATION’S
OPERATIONAL MODEL REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENTS OF TIME, RESOURCES,
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE EXPERTISE.
Should policymakers find themselves in the suboptimal position of needing to mandate a change
in a foundation’s operational model, policymakers need to allocate sufficient time, resources, and
expertise to allow for a full transformation to take place. Policymakers need to realize that if
requiring a transition to an operational program, a foundation will need significant organizational
restructuring and that additional resources and support may be required in the short term to make
this transition possible. Policymakers should realize that the foundation’s leadership may not
have the right skills or capabilities to lead this transition. Organizational change expertise is
required, which the foundation headquarters is not likely to have. Also, if the headquarters entity
is undergoing a similar transition, they may have fewer resources to devote to the transition of
local “affiliates.” In the EF example, both EF and the USG did not appear to fully recognize the
difficulty of this transformation and the level of time and investment needed to do so.
From the foundation perspective, the organization’s leadership: (1) must recognize the need for
an organizational restructuring; (2) develop a plan to significantly realign staff and identify the
needed resources; and (3) implement concrete steps to overhaul its staffing composition. This
should include investing heavily in training current staff in and/or hiring new staff that possess
the required competencies.
POLICYMAKERS SHOULD EXPECT THAT THE END OF CORE FUNDING WILL LEAD TO
PROGRAMMING LESS DIRECTLY ALIGNED WITH USG FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS
Once core funding ends and a foundation needs to compete for funds in order to survive, its
willingness and ability to continue to support specific USG foreign policy objectives will be
diminished. Foundations will have the incentive to pursue other donor funding which may or
may not align with USG interests.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EF AUDIENCE
USAID MISSIONS SHOULD SEEK MORE ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH PFS REGARDLESS
OF WHETHER THEY ARE IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS OR NOT
There are benefits to having a local foundation on the ground and USAID should leverage that as
a means to build understanding and networks as well as consider areas of collaboration. There
are specific actions that could be taken, such as including EF PFs in regular meetings of
implementing partners regardless of whether the PF is a direct recipient of USAID funding at
that time.
USAID AORs could do more to foster the relationship between the field Missions and the PFs by
increasing communication to the Missions regarding EF activities. The AORs should continue to
visit PF offices while in country and share reports and other relevant information.
EF-DC AND PF SHOULD UNDERTAKE SIMILAR EFFORTS TO ENGAGE WITH USAID
EF should increase its outreach to USAID with information on its ongoing activities. EF should
seek to invite USAID to public events, share annual reports, and convene their own donor
coordination meetings in areas where the PF has clear expertise.
1
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation report provides the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) with a high-level assessment of its support to the Eurasia Foundation (EF) under its
current grant agreement, the third awarded since 1993. The $148m grant (2001-present) provides
core funding to EF and its EF Network – a constellation of affiliated but locally registered
foundations in Russia, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova – to promote
“open, just, and progressive societies” in the former Soviet Union.8 9 With the grant due to end
on December 31, 2013, USAID procured this evaluation to:
1. Assess how well EF has met the grant’s three broad Strategic Objectives (SOs):
promoting private enterprise (PE), civil society (CS), and public administration and
policy reform (PA);
2. Analyze the success of EF’s strategy for building sustainable partner foundations; and
3. Identify the advantages and disadvantages of the “foundation model” in delivering
USAID assistance as opposed to contracts and/or “project-based” assistance.
The report aims to build a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the foundation
model to inform various audiences within USAID and the broader United States Government
(USG) on future program design. It provides findings that may be useful to the EF home office
(EF-DC) on how to improve their operating model, sustainability efforts, and support to PFs.
These recommendations will also be useful for other foundations and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) providing similar development assistance.
BACKGROUND, CONTEXT, AND EVOLUTION OF THE EURASIA
FOUNDATION
The “Stremlau Memo” of January 1992, named after the then Deputy Director for Policy
Planning at the US Department of State (DOS), called for the establishment of EF as a “cost
effective and political way to accelerate and broaden US
engagement in the development of civil societies in the
region.” It explained that EF’s goal was to provide “many
small grants to assist grass-roots organizations” across the
region, where non-existence of civil society created
particular challenges. The foundation model was cited as
8 “Eurasia Foundation.” EF website, http://www.eurasia.org/about-us. Accessed on November 12, 2012.
9 N.B.: Part of the core grant funding also goes to supporting EF’s programs in China but these programs are outside
of the scope of this evaluation.
USAID Grants to EF:
1. Core Grant I - 1993-1997 ($75m)
2. Core Grant II - 1997-2001 ($105m)
3. Core Grant III – 2001-2012 ($148m)
2
having a comparative advantage in reaching civil society,10
and the work of EF was to be
complementary to the activities of larger bilateral and multilateral agencies. Subsequent grant
agreements further clarified that EF should fund the most promising and sustainable Eurasian
institutions and carry out programs consistent with USG regional policy objectives.
The focus and activities of EF have consequently evolved over time. EF initially awarded small
grants for projects proposed through unsolicited applications known as the “open door”
mechanism. This grantmaking approach allowed EF to respond to needs and solutions identified
by local institutions. In 1999, “EF began to get rid of open door grant making as it is expensive
to administer and difficult to fundraise,” switching instead to a “grants plus” approach which
provided larger but more targeted grants that were often accompanied by technical assistance,
training, and networking opportunities.11
Grant competitions also concentrated EF’s resources in
particular fields of interest, such as supporting local government councils, watchdog NGOs, or
regional media outlets. In 1995, in consultation with USG and other partners, EF began
implementing “Foundation-Administered Projects” (FAPS) to extend the reach and impact of its
core grant programs. EF’s three FAPS were:
• The Economics Education and Research Consortium (EERC), which supported
economics education in Ukraine and economic research and policy analysis in Russia. In
2003, the EERC emerged as an independent institution – the Kiev School of Economics
(KSE) – that has awarded more than 500 master’s degrees since its inception.
• The Small Business Lending Program (SBLP), which disbursed about $6.8 million to
132 borrowers over ten years of operations in Ukraine, resulting in 828 new jobs and
loan losses equal to just 1.04% of total disbursals. In Armenia, SBLP disbursed about
$10.5 million to borrowers over ten years resulting in 2,219 new jobs. Both programs
were terminated by EF when local banks met the market demand.
• The Media Viability Fund (MVF), which provided technical consultations and access
to loans to independent media outlets in Russia and Ukraine. In 2004, the MVF evolved
into the Russia Independent Print Media Program (RIPMP), which still operates today
serving more than 50 clients and directly assisted with the establishment of the Alliance
of Independent Regional Publishers in Russia.
An evaluation of the second EF grant found that EF’s grantmaking program had largely met its
objectives and “had significant impact, especially at the micro-level of NGO development.”12
However, the evaluation also noted that EF needed to focus on steps to translate grassroots action
into lasting change at the regional and national level. The evaluation also noted that EF has the
infrastructure and leadership to become a USG “legacy” organization in the region and made a
recommendation that EF seek to diversify its funding base and that USAID consider offering
matching funds for a public-private EF endowment.
10
“The Eurasia Foundation would emulate the success of the Asia and other foundations in filling vital grass-roots
needs not covered or easily accessible to larger official bi-lateral and multilateral donor agencies…experience in
other regions has also shown that congressionally funded foundations are able to work more effectively in local
communities because they are perceived to be independent and, in any event, less interventionist than official
donors. Moreover, they can support private initiatives in ways that are difficult if not impossible for bi-lateral and
multilateral donors.” 11
Quote from email communication with EF-DC staff. 12
Blue, Richard et al. “Final Report: Evaluation of the Eurasia Foundation.” Nathan Associates. January 2001.
3
and
futures….Unle
ss the situation
changes, the
Network is not
useful or
necessary.”
~FNE
New Eurasia
Eurasia Foundation (EF-DC)
Washington, DC
East Europe
Foundation
(EEF)
Ukraine
Moldova
Eurasia
Partnership
Foundation
(EPF)
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Eurasia
Foundation of
Central Asia
(EFCA)
Kazakhstan
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
New Eurasia
Foundation
(FNE)
Russia
However, the stipulation of the current grant agreement did not follow the recommendations of
the previous 2001 evaluation but instead continued to emphasize bottom-up, grassroots activity
as a means to advance USG objectives. It focused on similar areas as previous grants and
referenced a plan to leverage USG resources through the establishment of an endowment or trust
with the understanding that EF would remain primarily a grantmaking institution.
During its early phases of implementation (April 2003), the focus of the grant shifted at the
direction of the USG from grants management and program implementation to establishing and
building PFs in the region that would extend beyond the life of core USG funding.13
Consequently, since 2004, the Eurasia Foundation has evolved from a US-based foundation with
multiple field offices into the Eurasia Foundation Network that works in partnership with Eurasia
Foundation DC (EF-DC). To date five partner foundations have been established as follows:
The New Eurasia Foundation (FNE) launched in Moscow in 2004.
The Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia (EFCA) launched in 2005.
Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EFP), launched in 2007, serving Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia.
East Europe Foundation of Ukraine (EEF-Ukraine), launched in 2007 and previously
included Moldova.
East Europe Foundation of Moldova (EEF-Moldova), launched in 2010 as an
independent entity.
Figure 1: EF and PF Organizational Chart
13
This change was made in “Amendment 3,” which added a section on grants to indigenous organizations to enable
EF-DC to use core resources to establish these entities.
4
In addition, EF-DC has established the New Eurasia Establishment (NEE), which is a Belarusian
legal entity, non-profit organization that acts in the capacity of a representative office of the EF-
DC in Belarus. It was founded in 2005 after the closure of the EF’s representative office by the
Government of Belarus. The NEE is not structured as a partner foundation and is discussed
separately in Component II.
As a result, since 2004, funding for direct grants and operating programs declined as core
funding was redirected to support the establishment of indigenous PFs. As part of this transition
process, in June of 2010, a Sustainability Plan was agreed upon by DOS, USAID, and EF-DC
that outlined a path to end the reliance on ongoing USG core funding. Thus, the vision of
establishing a traditional endowment, defined as a dedicated pool of money transferred to EF,
was unfulfilled and EF-DC and PFs were told to raise their own funds from US and non-US
donor and private sources. The plan envisioned full financial sustainability for EF-DC without
the need for further core USG resources by the end of 2012 with specific benchmarks to measure
progress in meeting this goal. While the EF Network met many of these fundraising goals in the
last two years, future funding streams remain uncertain and will remain a constant challenge.
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Evaluation Questions
The evaluation Scope of Work (SOW) focused on three major evaluation questions, each with a
set of specific sub-questions. It also specified how much to focus on each question.
1. Has EF contributed to the achievement of the three SOs identified in the original
grant agreement (20% of LOE)?
a) Was EF successful in advancing the three SOs identified in the original grant
agreement and were EF and its partners better able to carry out programs in some SOs
than others?
b) Were there any contextual factors that facilitated or hindered the achievement of each
SO? What steps did EF take to ensure a gender balance in each of the SOs?
2. Has EF-DC succeeded in its efforts to establish sustainable foundations through its
partnership network prior to the end of core grant funding (40% of LOE)?
a) What steps has EF-DC taken to ensure the financial sustainability of its partner
network beyond the end of core grant funding?
b) Does each of the partner foundations have the financial, managerial, and operational
capacity to ensure ongoing program growth and sophistication?
c) Is EF-DC’s Capacity Mapping Initiative (CMI) successful in accurately measuring
the organizational capacity of partner foundations and addressing the key areas that
allow for this determination?
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of EF as a model for advancing US
development objectives (40% of LOE)?
a) Were there sector or country areas where the EF model speed, flexibility, and
innovation had a comparative advantage in delivering development assistance
compared to other forms of USAID assistance?
5
b) How do grantees and other beneficiaries report on their experience working with EF
and its partners and how did this compare to working with other donor programs, i.e.,
were procedures open and transparent, how difficult was it to meet reporting,
financial and other requirements of USAID compared to others, etc.?
d) How did EF coordinate with USAID Missions and other USAID programs?
Design and Methodology
Social Impact (SI) employed a mixed-method evaluation design involving desk review, key
informant and focus group interviews, a grant beneficiary survey, and a Delphi Advisory Group
comprised of former foundation executives. The evaluation took place between September and
December 2012 and involved six weeks of fieldwork conducting more than 100 interviews with
USAID staff and other donors, EF-DC leadership and Board members, EF Partner Foundation
staff, implementing partners, and beneficiaries. The beneficiary survey was distributed to 677
organizations that had received a grant(s) from EF (across partner countries) and 148 individuals
responded. The evaluation team travelled to seven countries to conduct in-depth interviews
including Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
Qualitative and quantitative field data was subsequently synthesized and discussed in numerous
sessions by the evaluation team to reduce bias and subjective judgments. Preliminary findings
were then presented to the Advisory Group (AG) to provide a different perspective and layer of
analysis before finalizing conclusions; however, the focus of the AG was on the question of the
comparative advantage and disadvantage of the foundation model and the sustainability of EF’s
PFs. A more detailed discussion on the methodology employed can be found in Annex B.
Threats to Validity
The selection of PFs, programs, and beneficiaries was the most significant limitation of the
study. Given resource and time constraints, the evaluation team could not travel to all countries
where EF PFs operate and thus selected a sample of which PFs they would visit and which of
their respective programs they would review. This purposeful convenience sampling of countries
was based on a matrix comparison of both the overall percentage of core grant funding received
as well as the percentage of funding received in each of the three strategic objectives. The
purposeful sample was intended not to be completely representative of all PFs but instead to
sample PFs receiving the largest amount of funding. The evaluation team also intentionally
sampled larger and more recent programs in the PFs’ portfolios to more accurately reflect and
comment on how the majority of the USAID core grant was being spent. Programs that were
reviewed included initiatives that are funded by other donors – both USG and non-USG,
including competitive bids for USAID Mission-funded programs and DRL.
Another significant threat to validity was the selection of grant beneficiaries interviewed
following program selection. Given the limited time and logistical challenges of arranging focus
group interviews during the evaluation team’s visit, the evaluation team sought the support of the
PFs in arranging focus group interviews with project beneficiaries. PFs arranged interviews
based on availability and possibly selected beneficiaries more inclined to give a favorable
account of their interaction with the partner foundation. The evaluation team attempted to
mitigate this bias through the use of probing questions during their interviews as well as
distributing an electronic survey to a larger group of beneficiaries (1,800) in order to triangulate
6
and validate statements made during the focus group interviews. The evaluators also attempted to
mitigate this risk by meeting with donors and implementing partners for these initiatives and not
just beneficiaries. Please see Annex B for further details.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
ISSUE I: HAS EF CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE
THREE SOS IDENTIFIED IN THE ORIGINAL GRANT AGREEMENT?
Before determining the level of EF’s success in achieving the three SOs identified in the grant
agreement, the evaluation team thought that it important to explore the level of investment made
in each of the SOs. The findings below summarize the team’s research on the allocation of
financial resources among the SOs and the specific trends of investment in EF grants, flagship
programs, and the current portfolio.14
Overall, the evaluators found that there is a distinct
emphasis on CS programs in both the grants and current program portfolio over the grant life.
Grant Portfolio
Data provided by EF shows that most of the grant activities over the life of the grant fall under
the CS SO, accounting for 46% of total grant amounts.15
PE followed with 33% of total funding
and PA with 21%. A trend analysis illustrates that while early emphasis was in PE, CS overtook
PE in 2004 and continued to be the top-funded SO until 2011 (see Figure 1 below).
Figure 2: Grant Analysis of Grant Amounts over Time
When the data is disaggregated by PF, this pattern is consistent across countries.16
For New
Eurasia Foundation (FNE), Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia (EFCA), and Eurasia Partnership
14
See Annex E for how the SOs are defined in the Grant Agreement. The Methodology section notes data
limitations on how programs are aligned to specific SOs. 15
Includes grant funding from USAID core funding to any country within EF’s purview during the 2001-2011
period regardless of whether that country is currently supported by an EF partner foundation. 16
See Annex F for additional charts.
$0
$1,000,000
$2,000,000
$3,000,000
$4,000,000
$5,000,000
$6,000,000
$7,000,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Grant Amounts by EF Over Time All Countries, 2001-2011
Civil Society Private Enterprise Development Public Administration and Policy
7
Foundation (EPF), PE received the greatest funding early on but was overtaken by CS in 2003
and 2004. East Europe Foundation-Ukraine (EEF-Ukraine) and East Europe Foundation-
Moldova (EEF-Moldova) grants have been heavily focused on CS and neither country has made
much investment in PE. This shift to CS was further evidenced by the evaluators’ grantee survey
in which nearly 60% of respondents considered themselves to be engaged in CS activities (see
Figure 3 below).17
The EF Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 Report to USAID helps to explain this shift, noting that, “[F]ield
offices continued to identify a number of fields of interest within the Foundation’s mandate that
resulted in guided grant-making for more focused results…field staff applied knowledge of
country trends, needs and experience to both the development of the Foundation's grant portfolio
and to programs funded by other donors.”18
As one EF-DC key informant clarified, “As core
funding went down, EF and the partner foundations began to get rid of open door grant making
as it is expensive to administer and difficult to fundraise for…The field offices, and later the
partner foundations, were responding to needs they see in their communities and investing
resources in those areas where they thought they had value or expertise to add. Later, when the
partner foundations were largely using core funds to leverage other donor funds, the priorities of
those donors also played a role in where the resources were directed.”19
Thus, the increased CS
focus represents a series of conscious decisions based on EF’s understanding of country needs
and opportunities.
Figure 3: Grantee Survey Response
Flagship Programs
In the third and current grant agreement,
EF invested $3.75 million into the EERC,
which was established in 1996 together
with other donors. This program is best
categorized as PA since its objective was
to “create sustainable local capacity in
economic research and analysis to
support improved decision-making and
policy in both private and public sectors
at both the federal and regional levels” in
Ukraine, Russia, and other countries.20
In the current grant agreement, EF invested approximately $850,000 in SBLP, which was
launched in Armenia and Ukraine in 1995 and is best categorized as a PE program. Its goal was
to provide small business loans unavailable through commercial banks.
In the current grant, EF invested $568,922 in MVF, which was designed to help cultivate a free
and independent press in Russia21
and fits best within the CS SO. MVF provided technical
consultations and access to loans to independent media outlets. In 2004, it evolved into the
17
However, it should be noted that the survey’s low response rate makes any definitive conclusions tenuous. 18
EF FY 2003 Report to USAID. 19
Key informant interview with EF-DC staff. August 2012. 20
EERC Program Evaluation 2003. 21
FY 1996 USAID Annual Report.
Given the following choices, which area of activity best
captures your activities?
Answer Options Response
Percent
Response
Count
Private Enterprise
Development 17.3% 9
Civil Society 59.6% 31
Public Administration 13.5% 7
Other (please specify) 9.6% 5
answered question 52
8
Russia IPM Program. It still operates today and serves more than 50 clients. It also directly
assisted with the establishment of the Alliance of Independent Regional Publishers in Russia, the
leading professional group for independent media companies in Russia today.
USAID continued the investment in the three FAPs in the grant agreement.22
However, the
design of those programs during the previous grant was driven by EF’s understanding of where
they could play a role in economic and democratic reform by implementing grants directly, as
opposed to simply providing grants, and not as an attempt to invest in specific SOs.
PF Portfolios
Similar to the trend in grant funding discussed above, the team found that current PF programs
are strongly oriented toward CS.23
Based on interviews with PF staff, donors, and in some cases
beneficiaries, the evaluation team found several reasons why the current portfolios, which are
funded by several donors and private sector sources, are more oriented toward CS. Staff at three
of five PFs indicated staff and organizational core competencies drive programmatic focus. As a
result, the PFs have focused on areas where they have a comparative advantage, which is more
often noted in CS and, to a lesser extent, PA.24
Conversely, PFs also recognized areas where they
did not have the technical expertise to engage, even if it was a priority issue in the country. For
example, FNE noted that they never made a foray into human rights or rule of law because there
were others better equipped to tackle these issues. Similarly, three PFs noted the lack of expertise
in PE compared to other organizations.25
Country context also influenced programmatic decisions.26
For example, given political context,
some PFs cited plenty of room for growth and demand in CS programs, thus shaping their
priorities.27
In other instances, where the national government is not reform-oriented or is
plagued by instability, PFs decided it was not possible to focus on PA.28
Programmatic focus was
also driven by donor interests, but this was perhaps not always due to country context. Staff at
22
See Annex E for Current Grant Agreement, pg. 17. 23
EPF and EFCA both described their portfolios as heavily focused in CS, including programmatic priorities in
youth, media, support to vulnerable populations, community development, and cross-border engagement. They
noted that they are least active in PE, and although PA is an area of focus for some priority programs in Moldova,
Ukraine, and Central Asia, it tends to be at the local level.
PF portfolios in Russia and Ukraine vary considerably, but both include a large CS component. FNE identifies four
broad areas of focus: education, territorial development, social projects, and independent media. Territorial
development, which is defined as PE by FNE, originally focused on small businesses but has expanded to include
housing, urban planning, and vocational training, which may not be as specific to PE and rather be more related to
CS. FNE also manages social projects for people with special needs as well as public health and energy. In Ukraine,
the four areas of focus are local economic development, local social development, governance and civil society, and
energy efficiency and environment. Thus, though in both Ukraine and Russia there are areas that do not clearly align
to the SOs of the grant agreement, CS is still a clear focus area.
EEF-Moldova is an outlier, as it has a greater focus on PA than the other PFs in areas such as civic and voter
education. EEF-Moldova is also unique in that its work in PA includes several national level initiatives, while other
PFs are focused more on the local level. 24
EFCA, EPF both said CS, EEF-Moldova in PA 25
EEF-Moldova, EPF, and EFCA 26
Please see Annex I, which provide individual PF case studies and richer country context. 27
EPF, EFCA, FNE 28
EPF and EFCA
9
three of the PFs felt that programmatic focus was at least some extent driven by donor
priorities.29
PFs noted that they are “flexible” in responding to donor priorities and sometimes
take on projects even if they would not consider it a country priority.30
Furthermore, in some
countries it was noted that the donor interests are shifting, which will reduce their focus in some
areas.31
Finally, in the case of EEF-Moldova, where the exception has been noted regarding the
focus on PA, this was also donor driven in the sense that the US Embassy directed the PF’s focus
in PA.
CONCLUSIONS: WHERE EF INVESTED AND WHY
• There is a clear upward trend in investment in CS programming compared to the other
two SO areas in EF’s grants, flagship programs, and PFs portfolios over the life of the
current grant.32
o While the grants program was initially “open door” and thus applicant driven, it
evolved into a more targeted grantmaking approach favoring CS programs based
on specific country needs and PF’s comparative advantages.
o EF’s flagship programs demonstrated a more equitable level of investment among
the three SOs; however, this appears to be more because of EF’s understanding of
where they could play a role in economic and democratic reform than a conscious
attempt to invest equally in each SO.
o PFs’ current portfolios demonstrate a clear focus in CS programming. PF staff
indicated that this focus was a result of the in-house technical expertise,
comparative advantage in CS arena versus other organizations that were more
experienced in PE and PA, and donor interest most often favoring CS programs.
WAS EF SUCCESSFUL IN ADVANCING THE THREE SOS AND WAS IT EASIER TO
CARRY OUT PROGRAMS IN SOME SOS OVER OTHERS?
EF’s current grant agreement emphasizes working at the grassroots level and did not adopt a
recommendation of the previous grant agreement that the organization work more at the national
level. Although the agreement also called for working in three broad SO areas, the development
hypothesis was that small grassroots programs with intimate knowledge of local context would
be instrumental to accomplishing USG foreign policy objectives in the region. The current grant
agreement explicitly states that EF was created to deliver this bottom-up approach, which would
complement the work of other bilateral and multilateral organizations.33,34
29
EPF, EEF-Ukraine, EFCA 30
FNE, EEF-Ukraine, EFCA 31
FNE and Azerbaijan for CS and “democracy” programs 32
Although it should be noted that all three SOs show a general downward trend in grant investment overall. 33
“Experience of the past ten years strongly suggests that the West should increase its engagement in the region—
although not necessarily the size of its financial commitment. And, most importantly, it should re-orient its support
to focus on bottom-up, grassroots activity (emphasis original).” 34
Blue, Richard, et al. “Final Report: Eurasia Foundation Evaluation.” Nathan Associates. January 2001.
10
However, the grassroots approach creates challenges in measuring success and impact,
particularly at the national level. Given that the EF network awarded close to 3,000 grants and
implemented numerous direct programs in three broad SO areas in 12 countries, demonstrating a
linkage between the activities of EF and the SO areas on a national scale is particularly
problematic. There are examples of individual programs that sought to achieve a national level
goal, particularly in the PA reform area, but the evaluation did not have the resources to collect
data that would link numerous grants and programs to a specific national level indicator.
Thus, in the context of such an expansive project focusing on broad SOs and emphasizing a
grassroots-level approach, the evaluation team sought to more manageably determine criteria for
measuring the advancement of the SOs by grants, flagship programs, and current programs
separately:
With respect to the grant portfolio, the team decided to make a judgment about SO
advancement by first assessing whether EF did what was mandated by the grant
agreement: investing at a grassroots level. Second, the team considered whether,
according to key informants’ own understanding of the success of activities funded by
these grants, a preponderance of evidence suggested that grant-funded activities had been
successful. At the individual grant level, evidence suggests that grants have largely been
useful in advancing the goals of grantee organizations.
With respect to the flagship programs, the team-based judgments on whether the
programs achieved the purpose or goals prescribed for each one in relevant
documentation. The purpose of each program and to which SO it aligns are listed and
described in more depth in the findings below. A secondary consideration in judging
success is whether the program has achieved or is expected to achieve sustainability.
For current programs of each PF, similar to the measurement used for grants, the team
again considered whether, according to key informants’ own understanding of the success
of activities funded by these PFs, a preponderance of evidence suggested that program-
funded activities had been successful in terms of the relevance of programs to at least one
USAID SO and with regard to identifiable program outcomes. In this case, the team also
asked PF leadership to quantitatively rate the impact and effectiveness (taken together) of
programs on a scale of 1-5 so that the team could compare the ratings across SOs and
PFs.
To collect evidence of success, the team interviewed PF staff, donors and beneficiaries; read
evaluations of flagship programs and programs; reviewed progress in meeting indicators
established by projects; studied PF presentations and documentation on how they assess success;
and conducted an electronic survey of grant beneficiaries.
There are also important data limitations to this effort. The team only reviewed a fraction of
programs, including primarily current or recent activities, and EFs and PFs suggested many of
the programs that were assessed and key informants that were interviewed. As noted, the team
also allowed interviewees to use their own understanding of the terms “success,” “impact,” and
“effective” when responding to all questions regarding advancement of the SOs.
Grant Portfolio
11
The grants program disbursed a large number of small grants to hundreds of organizations in the
region, as envisioned by the grant agreement, with the goal of building the most promising
institutions.35
Between 2001 and 2011, 2,456 grants were made, totaling a little over $61 million
(or 41% of the total amount of the $147 million agreement) with an average grant size of about
$25,000. Based on EF self-reporting, since 2002, the grants program has cumulatively reached
more than 1.5 million individual beneficiaries and 113,000 organizational beneficiaries. It has
trained over 322,000 people, leveraged more than $26 million in contributions (much of this in-
kind) from counterparts, and created more than 11,000 new jobs.36
The grant agreement
instructed EF to make many small grants; they did so and have an extensive reach based on the
number of people and organizations that were beneficiaries, as noted above.
The evaluators’ beneficiary survey revealed that 80% of grantees that responded (40 of 50
respondents) felt that they had been either “successful” or “very successful” in working toward
their mission; 69.8% (37 of 53 respondents) felt that EF had helped them build their
organizational capacity; and 79% (42 of 53 respondents) would reapply for additional grants
from EF. Grantee responses here may of course be biased toward positive comments regarding a
funding source, but since (a) most grantees have derived funding from other sources in addition
to the EF and (b) grants have been quite consistently awarded and monitored with high levels of
attention and professionalism, this pattern of positive responses is indicative of authentic,
substantive contributions to the effectiveness of grantee programs.
Again, we cannot fully test the development hypothesis that this would translate into national
level impact on reform. However, as noted in the previous section, the focus of the grants
program evolved over time to focus on CS areas, and PFs noted that they felt they had greater
success in CS than in the other SO areas. In triangulated interviews with PFs, donors, and
beneficiaries, a consistent finding is that the PFs contributed to CS development in their
countries; PFs in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as the primary donor in Moldova, said
that their organizations have been instrumental in establishing or building the capacity of the
strongest NGOs in the country.37
For example, in Armenia, the PF stated that of 150 active
NGOs in the country, they have supported the establishment of 25-30 strong and sustainable
NGOs, and Azerbaijan said there is hardly an active NGO in the country they have not
supported.
Flagship Programs
As noted above, there are three flagship programs aligned to the three SO areas: the EERC to
PA, the SBLP to PE, and the MVF to CS.
EERC: After a $1.2 million investment by EF-DC, in 2003 the program spun off into three
components: KSE, Kiev Research Center, and Moscow-based Research Network. Bannock
Consulting conducted an assessment of the program’s performance in 2003. The overarching
35
As described on page 10 of the grant agreement, “[EF’s] purpose is to support programs at the grassroots level
designed to help the citizens of Eurasia build local institutions that will serve their own best political, social, and
economic interests….the majority of the foundation’s grants are awarded in response to needs identified and
solutions presented by local institutions.” 36
Information taken from Eurasia Foundation Annual Reports. 37
Interviews with PF management in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Central Asia and SIDA in Moldova.
12
conclusion of the assessment was that EERC Ukraine had been very successful as a “delivery
mechanism” for masters-level economists trained in Western techniques. EERC succeeded to
some degree in influencing policy in as much as many of the participants engaged in policy-
relevant work. Initial expectations that many of its graduates would find employment in
government have not been met but largely for reasons outside of the control of EERC.38
With
respect to sustainability, it was noted that EERC faced challenges.
These admittedly dated findings were echoed in interviews with current staff. In Ukraine, staff
hoped the program would influence the way economics was taught in other universities and
provide a stream of highly qualified economists. The aim of the program was in effect to support
public policy. Today the school has turned out over 500 graduates and 20% have gone on to
complete their Ph.D in a Western university. However, staff stated that the school has had no
discernible impact on policy and no graduates are currently in key positions in government.39
With respect to sustainability, KSE is donor-dependent and donors are leaving. Staff interviewed
at the school are fairly confident about funding for the next two years but expressed doubts after
that. They also lamented the fact that they missed earlier opportunities to work on sustainability
(e.g., buying a building in the early years when money was plentiful). All interviewed staff
characterized the school as somewhat successful.
In Russia, the Bannock Consultants concluded, “[F]ew, if any, research grant competitions
anywhere in the world approach EERC’s level of efficiency and transparency. The online
presence at www.eerc.ru is world class, and is as imaginative and well executed as that of any
other research network or policy research institute in the world.” However, EERC could not be
viewed as a success unless it was able to demonstrate that it could contribute to the policy
process. They concluded that it is too soon to judge whether these policy initiatives will be
successful.
SBLP: In Armenia, the program received co-funding from the Izmirlian Foundation in 1999 and
ceased to be an EF program in 2004; the Izmirlian-Eurasia Universal Credit Company continued
to operate the program until Araratbank purchased it in 2009. The program in Ukraine also ended
in 2004. According to the EF fact sheet, the SBLP accomplished the following:
In Armenia
Loan amounts reached up to $125,000 at a rate of 15% and the loan period could be
up to four years.
296 loans were made totaling $10,475,749 with an average loan size of $35,400.
Recipient businesses created 2,219 new jobs and loan losses equaled less than 2% of
total disbursals.
In Ukraine
132 loans were made totaling $6,803,137 with an average loan size of $51,500.
38
Government employment was found to be unattractive to EERC graduates for reasons such as, for example:
minimal salaries, outdated management styles, and lack for innovation in decision making, and the absence of a
policy for hiring graduates with Western education. 39
Although it should be noted that there have been KSE graduates that have served in government and policy
positions in the past.
13
Recipient businesses created 828 new jobs and loan losses equaled 1% of total
disbursals.
The EF-DC manager characterizes both programs as “highly successful,” emphasizing that they
worked through local banks and provided training in small business loan management. The loans
also had a longer maturity than those available from other sources because EF provided long-
term capital to the banks. The programs were successful in disbursing funds and had very low
loss rates. Both proved to be sustainable: In Ukraine the three banks continued to make similar
loans after the end of the program and, in Armenia, the Izmirlian-Eurasia Universal Credit
Company continued lending.
A weakness of the SBLP is that the loans were made at below-market rates and denominated in
hard currency. Subsidized interest lending is discouraged by USAID policy as is hard currency
lending where borrowers assume the foreign exchange risk. While the programs were successful
in helping clients get access to much-needed capital, the aggregate amounts were miniscule
given the size of the economies concerned. In Ukraine, for example, total loans made under the
program were less than $1 million a year. Total domestic credit to the private sector was $7.8
billion in 2002 and increased to $47.5 billion by 2006.
MVF: An FNE key informant notes that the program is scheduled to run until 2015 but has
already accomplished a great deal. USAID/Russia DG office views the current programs as more
effective than the predecessor program, stating that the program’s major accomplishments have
been supporting the Alliance of Regional Independent Publishers (ARIP) and establishing
professional standards of journalism/newspapers. The national government has tried to suppress
their work through claims of libel, defamation, etc., which USAID believes may be considered a
sign of its success and impact. USAID is pessimistic that the individuals currently benefitting
from the project will be able to continue their collaboration with EF as an implementing partner.
AIRP staff believes that their members are the most developed in Russia, with high quality
content and solid design, but they feel uncertainty about their operations over the next three to
five years. No Russian funders want to support this type of controversial program in independent
media. In summary, EF, USAID, and beneficiaries regard this CS program as highly successful
but believe its continuation is uncertain due to the current hostile political environment.
PF Portfolios
In almost all cases the PFs felt they had the greatest impact and were most effective in
addressing CS issues. PF management was asked to evaluate their impact and effectiveness in
each of the three SO areas on a 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest. While there was some
variation among the countries that responded to the question, CS was most consistently rated
highest.
14
Figure 4: Senior management self-assessment of impact and effectiveness of program activities in USAID SO
areas (1-5 scale with 5 highest)40
Country Private
Enterprise
Civil Society
Development
Public
Administration
Armenia 4 5 5
Azerbaijan41
N/A N/A N/A
Georgia 2 4 2
Kyrgyzstan 4 5 3
Moldova N/A 5 N/A
Russia*
Tajikistan 3 3.5 4
Ukraine 4 5 4
* Question not covered during this interview as discussion of unexpected events took precedence
and the interviewers ran out of time.
Furthermore, during interviews the PFs indicated more limited success in the two SO areas other
than CS; while there are success stories in the PE and PA areas, the PFs felt they were having
greater impact in the CS area.
The PFs also consistently described their missions in CS terms and feel they have core
competencies in this area. The evaluators noted during their interviews that even when PFs were
engaged in PE and PA activities, their focus was often on working with CS partners to bring
about changes in these SOs. In other words, their “tool of choice” was to work with CS to
achieve results in PE or PA. The fact that many PFs see themselves as CS oriented further
reinforces that this is where they feel they have greater impact. Again, there are some exceptions,
such as PA work in Moldova and a clear evolution away from CS work in Russia, but most PFs
believe they are strongest in CS.
Another common theme from many of those interviewed was that programs were successful in
the locations where they were active but that resources were not available to scale up and
replicate at a national level. In the larger countries, such as Ukraine and Russia, this was
particularly true.42
Moldova is an exception in this area and has a significant working
relationship with the national government, including work on elections and establishing the
National Participatory Council, which engages civil society in the review of laws. EEF-Moldova
may be the leading example of a PF’s ability to work in PA at the national level, as many other
PFs noted specific difficulties in accomplishing this.43
CONCLUSIONS: EF’S LEVEL OF SUCCESS WITHIN EACH SO
40
For Central Asia, the team covered Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as part of the evaluation. Thus, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan were not part of the evaluation. 41
Baku staff did not provide numerical ratings but indicated that CS was strongest followed by PA and PE. 42
Ukraine: Senior staff noted the need to consider the size of the country; energy efficiency program highly
successful but no funds to go to scale. In Russia both vocational education and a small business program are
regarded as successful but lack resources to have impact at country level. 43
Russia, EFCA, EPF
15
• EF programs were more successful in CS, followed by PE, with PA as the least
successful across the three SO areas.44
o Although difficult to quantify, the majority of interviewees, including PFs,
beneficiaries, and donors, felt that the grant program managed by EF had an
impact, meaning an implicit indicator of success, in developing CS and supported
numerous organizations and institutions. There was a clear shift to focus on CS
over time, as noted above, and PFs noted they felt this was an area where they
could have a definitive impact, particularly in relation to PE and PA, for which
some PFs indicated that they were less effective due to a range of reasons
discussed in the next section.
o Of the flagship programs, the EERC was aligned to PA, the SBLP to PE, and the
MVF to CS. All were seen as successful in achieving specific objectives, but only
the SBLP achieved its main goal and can be considered sustainable. The EERC
has continued to contribute to improved research and education standards and
training graduate level economists in Western techniques, its main goal, but did
not affect national level policy, and sustainability is unlikely as donors disappear.
The SBLP was successful in achieving its main purpose and in subsidiary
objectives. The SBLP can be considered sustainable since loans continued to be
made after program funding ceased. The MVF program accomplished significant
results and continues to support its main goal of bolstering independent media in
the country and cultivating free press. However, given that the situation in Russia
is problematic for the program’s future, its sustainability is not ensured.
o With regard to current portfolios of programs, the PFs, donors, and beneficiaries
consistently cited a greater level of success in the CS area. This included areas of
local organizational capacity building, in particular, and some PFs could
specifically note that they were instrumental in building capacity of local
organizations and developing civil society as a concept, which was new in many
of these countries. They most often describe current missions and programmatic
priorities in CS terms. This is not to say that there are not examples of strong
work in PA and PE, but these are more the exception than the rule. The PFs felt
they were less successful in PA and PE.
WERE THERE ANY CONTEXTUAL FACTORS THAT FACILITATED OR HINDERED THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF EACH SO?
44
As previously noted, the evaluators did not rigorously test for national level impact; they did not explicitly ask
about national level impact in their interview protocol, trace causal logic chains, or run an impact evaluation.
However, in nearly all interviews, if the KI spoke to national level issues while being interviewed about a particular
project, the team would follow up by asking whether the project had any national level impact. This was particularly
true with issues surrounding PA. Furthermore, and more importantly, the evaluators did consistently ask whether the
project was successful and in what areas the PF was most effective, which oftentimes led to provision of information
on impact. The evaluators also reviewed PF documentation on impact. Following these methods, the team did not
identify impacts at the national level.
16
The factors that appeared to encourage or inhibit success of EF grants, EF FAPs, and PF
programs can be divided into three main categories: (1) General Competencies; (2) Country
Context; and (3) Organizational Capacity. In some cases, these are aligned to specific SOs but
for others the findings are more general.
General Competencies
Capacity Building (CS): PF staff consistently identified their strength in focusing on capacity
building of local organizations as a key success factor in CS programs. Many PFs felt they had
contributed significantly to developing civil society in their countries, and staff frequently stated
that their expertise in capacity building gives the PF a comparative advantage over competitors
in the CS space. Donors that selected PFs in competitive awards reiterated this theme, noting that
PFs were selected due to their strength in capacity building and working with local partners.45
The strengths in capacity building were evident in several programs reviewed by the evaluation
team, in which beneficiaries and donors frequently emphasized that PFs integrated capacity-
building efforts into implementation (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine).46
Beneficiaries also
mentioned receiving technical assistance in a range of areas, including technical writing (e.g.,
journalism standards), organizational procedures (e.g., accounting) and fundraising (e.g.,
working with a PF to prepare a proposal). Conversely, in programs that were described as less
successful by donors and partners, interviewees noted that EF did not sufficiently incorporate
capacity-building elements, even if other program output indicators were reached.47
Partnership Approach (CS): Another success factor frequently cited by PF staff, donors, and
beneficiaries in CAR, Ukraine, and Moldova is the emphasis on treating local entities as partners
rather than solely as beneficiaries. In CAR and Ukraine, many of the successful programs
reviewed by the team involved collaboration and coalitions with numerous stakeholders. This
partnership approach included conducting local needs assessments and facilitating sessions to
jointly design projects. In Youth Bank and vulnerable population and conflict resolution
programs, small-scale efforts were often designed to address a specific need identified by the
local community. In three projects in Moldova (anti-corruption, elections, and National
Participation Council), this was institutionalized through a Secretary for Coalitions that was
created to build and leverage partnerships.
Local Knowledge and Networks (CS and PA): Another factor that has contributed to the success
of PF programs is their extensive knowledge and networks at the local level, including the local
NGO landscape and community needs. PF leadership consistently identified this as a reason for
success and as a competitive advantage in winning other donor projects in both the CS and PA
areas.48
In some cases, PF leadership also described community-based projects as a niche, noting
that there are fewer competitors doing this work compared to national-level projects.
This community-focused approach allowed PFs to build strong relationships with local NGOs
and organizations in CS as well as with local government officials in PA programs. EFCA PFs
45
USAID Kyrgyzstan for Cross Border and Educational Loans, USAID Ukraine, USAID Moldova 46
EFCA – Professional Youth Journalism Development Program, CANS (although late), AmCham Tajik, UNITER 47
EFCA – Education Loan Program and Cross Border Youth; FNE donor for N Caucasus Conflict Mitigation,
Donor in Moldova said EEF does too much themselves rather than teaching NGOs how to do it . 48
PF leadership interviews in CAR, Caucasus, Ukraine and Russia.
17
noted, for example, that support from local officials was important to success in several
programs, including a capacity-building effort with local service providers and a youth outreach
program facilitated by local schools. In Ukraine, donors cited the EEF’s relationships with local
officials as critical to the success of an energy efficiency and e-Governance project. Both
Armenia and Moldova staff noted the importance of support from municipal officials in their
Youth Bank project.
Country Context
The composite picture for the region shows that PE, CS, and PA indicators in EF countries are
well below those of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have graduated from the
USG assistance program. In all three areas, there has been significant backsliding during the
grant period. While there are important differences in these indicators among the countries in
which EF operated, overall EF was fighting an uphill battle in the three SO areas.49
Democratic and Political Conditions (PA and CS): Conditions for democracy and civil society
presented both challenges and opportunities for PF activities and influenced the nature and
success of PF programs. PFs in all regions noted that corruption and the degree of democracy
had implications for both CS and PA efforts.
Several PFs cited challenges to working in PA due to suspicion of international organizations as
well as local NGOs. In Tajikistan, for example, EFCA meets quarterly, on average, with the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs’ Department of International Organizations to explain their
activities. They noted that the government is suspicious of all NGOs, particularly those with US
funding, and that following the Arab Spring conditions seemed to worsen. Azerbaijan noted
similar issues although they believe their transition to a local organization has facilitated their
ability to work with the government since they are no longer perceived as a US organization.
While Kyrgyzstan is a far more democratic environment, the PF emphasized that political
instability hinders them from working with the national government on a sustained basis. In
Ukraine beneficiaries of the e-Governance project said that turnover at the local government
level has also created challenges.
Media programs are also affected by country conditions. EFCA staff stated that the Central Asia
News Service (CANS), which sought to increase the quality and quantity of news on the region,
was successful in Kyrgyzstan (and to a lesser extent Tajikistan) but encountered significant
challenges in covering Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan due to the more restrictive media
environments in those countries.50
In Russia, the independent media program faces pressure from
the government, including claims of libel. FNE staff, USAID, and beneficiaries regard the
program as very successful but are concerned with its sustainability given the need to have
private sector funding, which is increasingly unlikely due to political factors.
Furthermore, in the CS space, PFs have taken on extremely difficult issues and programs such as
cross border and conflict resolution efforts that are clearly driven by the political environment.
While donors praised PFs for not shying away from tough issues, they also said that these
programs – specifically CAR Cross Border Youth and the Caucasus Media Program – did not
49
Annex F contains specific data regarding country performance with respect to private enterprise development,
civil society, and public administration based on the E&E Bureau’s MCP reporting. 50
EFCA staff in both countries and beneficiaries.
18
meet expectations. EFP staff noted that external factors could very quickly destroy the work
undertaken by their cross border projects.
NGO Landscape (CS): One issue that clearly influenced the success of programs was the
collective capacity of local NGOs at the onset and partners and the operating environment for
NGOs. In this regard, the evaluation found significant diversity across the region. In CAR, for
example, the PF staff in Kyrgyzstan noted benefits from a rich NGO environment, while in
neighboring Tajikistan, NGO capacity is very low and this creates numerous challenges for
finding local partners. Despite the more open society, EEF-Moldova also cited challenges with
partners lacking good governance and management practices. Staff in Armenia and Tajikistan
also noted that local NGOs engage in non-transparent behavior and nepotism, further frustrating
success in reaching objectives.
Organizational Factors
Reputation as an International Organization: While the PFs’ US-affiliation has in some cases
hindered their ability to work with national governments, the PFs are widely recognized as
having strong financial, program management, and grantmaking capabilities that make them
appealing to donors and local partners. PF leadership also noted that competitor organizations do
not have the procedures and policies in place that PFs have from EF-DC.51
In addition, PF staff
and donors noted that they are perceived as an independent, non-political organization. Thus,
there is a general reputational element that benefits them not only in winning work but also in
being seen as a trusted partner by local entities.52
This is not directly aligned to an SO area but
would clearly benefit work in the CS area as well as PA at the local level.
Donors and PF leadership also emphasized that having a governance structure with independent
boards is a differentiator and enhances their programmatic capabilities.53
During the transition to
sustainability, PF Boards continue to provide guidance to ensure that the organizations focus on
core competencies and remain mission driven.54
However, a main concern during some PF
interviews was the ability of PFs to do this as they compete for donor funds.55
Staff Continuity and Skill Areas: One area that clearly influences program success relates to
staff continuity and skills. In Central Asia, turnover is a major issue where the donor-rich
environment creates higher-paying opportunities. In Kyrgyzstan, there has been significant staff
turnover, including the recent change in Executive Director. In Bishkek, one program had two
different program managers and three different IT staff tasked to create a website. In the Osh
office, the three primary staff members have been there less than one year and one program had
three project managers in a two-year period. Country programs suffered from delays in delivery,
lack of responsiveness to USAID and partners, and some issues complying with USAID
regulations.56
Tajikistan also suffered from a fraud situation that led to the dismissal of five staff
51
Other donors in Azerbaijan cited their trust of financial procedures as a reason to select them – although this is not
about programmatic success. 52
CAR, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova staff. 53
Ehrlich and Tim in CAR, Ukraine. 54
Jeff and Tim in CAR. 55
EFCA, EEF-Moldova. 56
According to an interviewed Agreement Officer’s Representative.
19
members and resulted in delays in implementation and a loss of technical capability (although
EFCA was praised for the transparent way in which this matter was handled).57
However, in Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, and the Caucasus there is greater longevity in staff and
various staff members commented that they have stayed because they are committed to the
mission of their PF.58
Furthermore, with regard to the longer running flagship programs, EF staff
for both SBLP and MVF cited staff skill and longevity as factors for success in those programs.59
Beyond the issue of turnover, the technical skills of staff are cited as both strengths and
weaknesses in specific programs. There are clear areas where the PFs have developed technical
skills and have demonstrated core competencies throughout the region. In Central Asia and the
Caucasus, partners and donors stated that the PF staff had developed strong skills in youth,
media, cross border dialogue, and conflict resolution. In Russia, PF staff, donors, and
beneficiaries commented that the success of education and media programs, in particular, are due
to having very strong technical expertise in these areas.60
Donors also commented on the
strengths of the staff in implementing a range of projects in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and
Tajikistan.61
However, in programs that were seen as less successful, the lack of technical knowledge by PF
staff was sometimes noted. Interviewees said that PF staff have appropriate technical skills in
grant management and a good understanding of important issues in SOs areas but lack deep
knowledge in some technical areas. This included the Education Loan Program and some Youth
Banks in Central Asia in which donors noted that the PF staff did not possess the right technical
skills. In Armenia, one grantee working in media noted that EPF lacked the ability to understand
and assist with challenges unique to that field.
CONCLUSIONS: CONTEXTUAL FACTORS THAT FACILITATED OR HINDERED SUCCESS
• The organizations’ focus on capacity building of local NGOs/organizations, emphasis on
working in partnership with beneficiaries, and extensive local networks and knowledge
contributed to success in CS and, to a lesser extent, PA. This was recognized by the PFs
as well as donors and in some cases beneficiaries. PFs have developed a niche for
working at the local level in some countries.
• Country context, particularly democratic conditions and civil society landscape, had
implications for success as well as the overall ability to work in CS and PA areas. In
some countries, undemocratic conditions precluded PFs from being able to work
effectively in PA at the national level. Issues such as conflict, corruption, and political
instability also created challenges for working in PA at the national level. Furthermore,
suspicion of the PFs as US organizations hindered work in both CS and PA areas.
Logically, the availability of strong NGOs or other partners in the CS area was cited as a
57
Meeting with Nigina and Ravshan and PM (Tajikistan); Meeting with Erkin, Osh Office, Bishkek office. 58
Interviews with staff in Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 59
Interviews with EF-DC staff managing flagship programs. 60
Interviews with FNE staff, USAID, Mott (on education), and beneficiaries (on media). 61
Interviews with former USAID staff in Tajikistan; OSCE, USAID and UK Embassy in Ukraine; BP and UK
Embassy in Azerbaijan; and USAID, Mott and British Embassy in Russia.
20
determinant of success. In countries with a richer NGO environment, the PFs felt they
had more success than in countries where NGOs were weaker.
• From an organizational perspective, the EF network’s reputation as an independent and
transparent organization contributes to its ability to build trust with local partners and
donors. Their positive reputation allows them to be seen as a trusted partner by local
entities, which benefits work in CS area and, to a lesser extent, the PA area.
• Staff longevity versus turnover can affect both the performance of the PF overall and
high turnover clearly has negative consequences on the success of specific programs
regardless of the SO alignment. There are cases in which staff turnover created skill
deficits that negatively impacted program delivery. There are also cases in which staff did
not possess the appropriate technical skills for implementing donor programs regardless
of their longevity with the organization.
WHAT STEPS DID EF TAKE TO ENSURE A GENDER BALANCE IN EACH OF THE SOS?
The original grant agreement identified seven primary indicators to be tracked by EF, with two
gender specific indicators: the number of identifiable participant trainees by gender and number
of identifiable beneficiaries by gender. This shows gender balance was largely achieved with
females representing 47% of total beneficiaries and 48% of training participants. This data only
relates to grants, so as the grantmaking activities declined, this becomes a less relevant indicator
for gender balance. However, the indicators are included in Annex E.
In addition, specific programs address gender-based issues, and EF continues to track gender-
related metrics beyond grants. An EF-DC document on Women’s Empowerment notes that since
1992, EF has had 115 programs that promote the roles of women, including training and support
to women and women-led NGOs. Some particularly successful examples highlighted
entrepreneurship training for women in rural Georgia, economic literacy for women in
Uzbekistan, and efforts in Azerbaijan and Armenia to increase the role of women in politics.
During fieldwork, the evaluation team did not ask questions specific to gender but addressed this
when a PF staff member identified this area as a priority. There were clear examples in which
gender issues influenced program design and implementation. This is particularly the case in
Central Asia where women face several cultural and social challenges. For example, programs
with vulnerable populations and involving income generation addressed the needs of women
who are able to work only in culturally-accepted areas such as hairdressing and sewing. Training
programs and grants have been used to develop vocational capacity for women and girls. The
Access to Justice Program in Central Asia provides legal support to women who are dealing with
such issues as divorce and domestic violence. This is especially an issue in Tajikistan, where the
migration of men to Russia has resulted in severe hardships on women who are left with no
sources of income when divorced or abandoned. In addition, the Osh office manages a Women's
Peace Bank project that seeks to integrate women's groups into conflict resolution issues.
Also in Central Asia, several EFCA staff noted the challenges of securing and retaining female
participation in specific programs due to strong societal pressures not to participate.62
For
example, in the Youth Journalism and Youth Bank programs, recruiting and retaining ethnic
62
Ravshan Interview on Youth Radicalization program.
21
Uzbek girls has been an issue.63
In Tajikistan, of the five communities targeted for a youth
radicalization program, four of the five are completely male and even if girls begin to participate,
they are often encouraged to exit the program. Other PFs also have existing programs that focus
on gender-based issues. For example, in the joint EPF-Armenia and EPF-Azerbaijan “Unbiased
Media” project, journalists interviewed women to produce series of “Women’s Narratives” in an
effort to have women’s voices heard. The Support for Armenia–Turkey Rapprochement (SATR)
also engaged women in activities. EPF has developed gender-mainstreaming strategies to
incorporate gender equality into all activities, rather than as a separate programmatic area, and
conducted gender-mainstreaming training for its staff.
CONCLUSION: STEPS TAKEN TO ENSURE GENDER BALANCE
• The EF Grant Agreement includes indicators that track participants/beneficiaries by
gender, but this is less relevant now as a reflection of gender balance since the overall
grants program has declined. The evaluators found that EF-DC continues to track gender-
related metrics for all programs. Furthermore, some PFs have programs specific to
addressing gender-based issues, particularly relevant in Central Asia, and one PF has a
gender mainstreaming policy. As the PFs have evolved into independent organizations,
there does not appear to be a consolidated approach to gender.
ISSUE II: HAS EF-DC SUCCEEDED IN ITS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AND
BUILD SUSTAINABLE FOUNDATIONS THROUGH ITS NETWORK PRIOR
TO THE END OF CORE GRANT FUNDING?
In early 2003, Amendment 3 to the Core Grant Agreement required EF to establish a network of
indigenous entities (i.e., PFs) to carry out programs following the end of USG core funding. EF
complied and launched FNE the following year, followed by EFCA in 2005, EPF and EEF-
Ukraine in 2007, and EEF-Moldova in 2010. EF’s 2010 Sustainability Plan added a further layer
of complexity to EF’s new operational model, requiring EF-DC to lead the transition of its PFs
from grantmaking to operational foundations while at the same time undergoing a similar
process requiring internal restructuring, expansion into new program areas, and identifying new
sources of funding. This has created a challenging situation in which EF-DC has declining
resources to support the PFs’ transitions while also managing its own.
This section will analyze the steps taken by EF-DC to build the managerial, operational, and
financial sustainability of its PFs under the current grant and provide an assessment of EF-DC’s
success in this effort. The evaluators thus defined success as EF-DC fully recognizing the level
of resources needed to ensure that the PFs had the human, organizational, and financial resources
needed to fully transform their business models to a sustainable approach of achieving their
mission and continuing operations beyond the end of USAID direct support.
DOES EACH OF THE PFS HAVE THE MANAGERIAL AND OPERATIONAL CAPACITY
63
Professional Youth Journalism Development Program – Uzbek girls leave the program in Osh but in Tajikistan
and Bishkek 90% of participants are girls. In the Youth Banks (Cross Border?) program, the ability to retain girls is
difficult due to societal pressures.
22
TO ENSURE ONGOING PROGRAM GROWTH AND SOPHISTICATION?
Establishment and Early Support
Before commenting on EF-DC’s steps to strengthen the managerial and operational capacity of
its PFs, the evaluators thought it important to underscore the significant amount of work, and
relative success, that EF-DC had in merely establishing these PFs in the first place. EF-DC
worked with PF staff and local lawyers to navigate the various host country laws associated with
establishing independent foundations. This had the complicating effect of requiring different
operational structures to respond to the various host country regulations. For example, in Russia,
Ukraine, and Moldova, the PFs are each single registered entities, while the Central Asian and
Caucasus PFs are both regional in scope with one overarching name, President, and Board but
separate legal registrations in each country. Each structure has its own comparative advantages
and disadvantages along with unique challenges to organizational sustainability. For example,
while the regional model entails additional bureaucratic and political challenges (such as having
to sign official documentation three times or considering the political sensitivities of, for
example, having Azeri or Armenians working together), it also offers unique advantages such as
strengthening regional knowledge sharing and collaboration, management and operational
unification, and programming flexibility. EFCA and EPF noted in interviews that the regional
model gives them a competitive advantage in bidding on regional projects (i.e., EFCA’s Equal
Before the Law or EPF’s CRRC programs).
Managerial Capacity
EF has placed high emphasis on the development of the Board of Directors as an oversight
institution in the PFs, a US-based approach to foundation governance and management. The
host-countries’ NGO and foundation legislation seeks to balance powers among different
structures of organization such as the Board of Directors, Advisory Board, and Executive
Director. Different functions, such as strategy identification, control, and execution, are
distributed respectively among the Board of Directors, Advisory Board, and Executive Director.
Governance. While the PFs are under the executive leadership of their respective Presidents, PF
governance also features Boards of Trustees made up of high-profile individuals that are often of
international stature. These boards vary in how actively engaged they are programmatically and
operationally with their respective PFs, but in general the boards do carry out oversight,
governance, advisory and fundraising functions in close collaboration with the respective PF
Presidents. The EEF board, for example, holds quarterly committee meetings and semi-annual
full board meetings. Board committees include Executive (which evaluates the President’s
performance), Finance, Nominating and Governance, and Communications committees.
Representation on the boards tends to be derived from the local private sector as well as
international donor organizations. This can be advantageous for gaining new financial support
for programs, but the relative lack of representation from technical specialists or representatives
of grantee groups on some boards (such as EEF’s) arguably stands as a limitation to board
effectiveness.
Strategic Planning. All interviewed PFs indicated that they had developed at least a three-year
strategic plan with regional and local partners utilizing different strategic planning approaches.
As a rule, a unified strategic plan is developed for a regional office that encompasses three
countries (as in Central Asia and Caucasus) and individual strategic plans are developed for
23
organizations that work only in one country (as in Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia). For the most
part, the strategic plans cover functional areas such as Program/Financial Management, Board
Governance, HR, and Fund Development and Communication. They do not include institutional
capacity building as a separate area of the strategy.
The strategies are adequately done with rationales provided for strategic objectives and periodic
updates with board input. The strategies tend to have been developed in-house, however, with
limited contribution or participation by grantees or other local-level partners.
Annual operational and financial plans are prepared according to the strategic plans. The
evaluation team noted that foundation staff were often more familiar with the annual operational
activity plan than with the strategic plan.
Operational Capacity
Staff Capacity. A majority of the PF staff identified the need to build sufficient in-house
technical expertise as a priority for strengthening future operations. EF fashioned its PFs based
on its experience as a grantmaker, providing a strong Grants Management System and training a
small but dedicated internal staff to oversee the grantmaking process. However, as acknowledged
by PF staff, the skillset of a grantmaker and implementer differ: the former needs broader
operational knowledge and the latter deeper technical expertise.
All together PFs have around 250 staff members, the majority of whom are administrative (office
managers, accountants, administrative assistants, logisticians, drivers, etc.). The staff of PFs have
a clear assignment of responsibility and tasks, which were developed specifically for
grantmaking foundations. Interviewed staff members generally recognized their limited technical
knowledge and expertise in specific areas of their work. However, the evaluators found that PFs
generally do not have a formal plan for staff development and limited and diminishing core
funding will force the PFs to reconsider the staff policy and structure. This will most likely result
in overall staff reduction particularly among administrative/support personnel. For instance, in
Azerbaijan, most of the 13-14 staff members will have to leave by the end of December 2012
due to project closeouts. Reduced core funding will also lead to the need for local staff training
in skills specialization and professional standards and the review of the remuneration policy and
types of employment. Some functions
(e.g., M&E) may not be affordable
after core funding ends, and the
reduction of core funding has already
resulted in less investment in
communications, M&E, and the loss
of the DC-based grants manager.
Thus while the PFs are strong in their
core competencies – grantmaking,
relationship-building with local civil
society partners, and ability to engage
with local governments and
businesses – there is a need to build
their in-house technical expertise in
order for them to grow as
implementing organizations. The PFs appear to be cognizant of this need as evidenced in many
“Even though we’re registered locally we’re seen as American-
based...we’re perceived to have systems and procedures,
handbooks, policies, charters, GMS, etc.” ~ EPF staff
“Major benefit of EF was that we inherited solid business
processes and procedures. Seen as having international standards
– DC is very open and transparent.” ~ FNE staff
“EF provided EFCA with internal regulations, rules, procedures,
and processes…Procedures remain in place and we now have
strong monitoring and evaluation systems. Our GMS is also
strong. We can stay competitive because of this.” ~ EFCA staff
“[EEF-M are] extremely qualified and extremely professional.
We undertook system based audit of them and our auditor said
that it was one of the best system based audits that they have
ever carried out. I would give them a very, very good grade.”
~ Sida (donor) representative on EEF-M.
24
of the slides addressing sustainability in the PF presentations during the latest EF Network
meeting in Chisinau, in which PFs suggest a need to “reposition” or “restructure.”64
Program Management Procedures. Interview responses with PF donors and staff consistently
emphasized the strong internal systems and procedures inherited from EF as a key operational
strength (see textbox right).
However, while EF has clearly been successful in transferring sound grants-based procedures
and quality standards, feedback from staff convey that further action is needed to support the
PFs’ transitions to becoming operational foundations. Twenty-one of 29 PF staff respondents
(72%) indicated that current internal systems and procedures will need to be further modified to
respond to their specific host-country needs and that their success in doing so will be a major
determinant of their future sustainability. Some PFs have already succeeded in adapting their
inherited procedures – i.e., “all [procedures] have been adapted to local circumstances. Russian
rules and procedures are complex” (FNE) – while other PFs are still in earlier stages – i.e., “our
procedures need to be localized because we have things like labor regulations” (EPF).
Leveraging the EF Network
Another significant step in EF’s efforts to support the sustainability of its PFs was the
establishment of the EF Network, described by EF as a “constellation of locally chartered
institutions organically linked to the international foundation community.”65
EF-DC is the self-
described “hub of the Network, leveraging interaction and cooperation among member
foundations, overseeing successful institutional development as well as joint ventures and
economies of scale in administrative, training, fundraising, communications, and other
specialized services.”66
The evaluators noted that similar programs among the PFs indicate some of the influence of the
EF Network but found that opinions on the utility varied significantly among the PFs,
particularly according to their various stages of development (see textbox below).
64
EF Network Meeting in Chisinau, Moldova. September 28-29, 2012. 65
“Eurasia Foundation Sustainability Plan: 2010-2014.” Pg. 2. 66
Ibid. Pg. 5.
Opinions on the Utility of the EF Network
Strong Utility:
“Network has very important benefits…for example, we leveraged past program experience—as an example,
we modeled our Ferghana Valley program after a similar program in the Caucasus.” ~ EFCA-Tajikistan
“EF is very helpful. It will be difficult if EF decides to close its offices in DC.” ~ EPF-Georgia
Mixed Utility:
“We have infrequent interaction with DC—mostly help with the narrative part of proposals—but frequent
with regional office.” ~ EPF-Armenia
“Finance network has finance network and programs has programs. These mini-networks work better than
overall Network.” ~ EEF-Ukraine
Little Utility:
“We have not been successful in transferring skills and knowledge in Network.” ~ EPF-Azerbaijan
“[PFs] have a network, a common past, but very different structures, funding sources, governance principles
25
This is perhaps not surprising given the diversity of backgrounds, personalities, and positions of
respondents within the PFs. While the opinions on the utility of the overall Network were too
varied to draw aggregate conclusions, the evaluators noted that there seemed to be common
agreement that the PFs’ relationships with EF-DC were most useful during their earlier stages of
development and that their regional networks were more important for identifying present
funding opportunities. In describing the advantages of their relationship with EF-DC, most PF
staff would point to the establishment of sound policies, procedures, and a functional GMS, and
they also mentioned that their current interaction related mostly to reviewing funding proposals.
EF’s 2010 Sustainability Plan stated that “the network structure offers economies of scale and
supports institutional development and specialized services, such as fundraising, new
technology, communications, and evaluation.”67
EF’s 2010-2012 Strategic Plan further detailed
that “in the new architecture of the Network, EF-DC’s central purpose is to support the long-term
institutional growth and program success” of the PFs.68
Based on the evidence available to the
evaluators, it is not clear that EF has met the goals of either document.
The evaluators found minimal evidence to suggest that the EF Network produces significant
benefits or economies of scale for individual PFs. While some respondents commented that the
Network was useful for identifying new donors and funding opportunities, few of these
respondents were able to provide specific examples – the exception being EEF-Ukraine, which
stated that NEE (Belarus) had built its energy efficiency project based on the Ukrainian model
and the Youth Bank model being implemented by most PFs. Others replied more critically: “We
would like EF-DC to be more pro-active, help approach different US-based donors,” according
to one interviewed staff member of EFP-Armenia. One senior FNE staffer responded most
bluntly: “The big question for EF is whether it can continue to approach this region as region?
PFs have a network, a common past, but very different structures, funding sources, governance
principles and futures….Unless the situation changes [an opportunity for large regional project],
the network is not useful or necessary.”
There was similarly little evidence to support economies of scale in the provision of specialized
services such as technology, communications, and evaluation. Of the three, efficiencies in
communication are the most significant benefit with EF-DC producing good quality semi-annual
reports and collecting individual “success stories” to share with potential donors. A few
respondents (less than five) cited examples of EF-DC staff providing trainings in design,
monitoring, and evaluation techniques or helping to conduct final program evaluations. The only
technological benefit cited by the respondents was the provision of the GMS, which, although
highly praised, was primarily useful for managing PF grants – not their projects and programs.69
Regarding EF-DC’s role in supporting the PFs’ long-term institutional sustainability and
program success, much remains to be seen. The following section describes the financial
situations and challenges of each PF – for most, their future is far from secure. The evaluators
also did not find substantial evidence of EF-DC improving the implementation of PF projects.
The evaluators were told that there were instances in which EF-DC would visit to evaluate the
67
Ibid. Pg. 5. 68
“Eurasia Foundation Business Plan: 2010-2012.” Pg. 1. 69
EEF-Moldova is the exception and claims that the GMSME system is a useful tool for managing both grants and
operational programs.
26
“As the Eurasia Foundation seeks to diversify its
funding sources and further leverage USG funds by
attracting non-USG financial support, an effort has
been launched to obtain an endowment or trust
consisting of matching public and private funds. An
endowed Eurasia Foundation will ensure that the USG
remains engaged with the former Soviet Union in a
way that reduces political exposure and is in line with
calls by the US Congress to modify its operating
practices around the world. Until the endowment/trust
has been assembled, the Eurasia Foundation would
continue to depend primarily on annual allocations
from USAID under this Grant, as well as expected
significant funding from other sources” ~ Core Grant Agreement, Section G: Endowment/Trust
achievements but a couple of respondents (both from EFCA) commented that they were never
informed of the results of these evaluations.
CONCLUSIONS: STEPS TAKEN TO BUILD PF’S MANAGERIAL AND OPERATIONAL
CAPACITY
Managerial Capacity. EF took considerable steps to improve the managerial capacity of
its PFs. EF has placed high emphasis on the development of the Board of Directors as an
oversight institution in the PFs, and the team found that these boards generally do carry
out their oversight, governance, advisory, and fund-raising functions as expected.
However, the team also found that the sustainability of the PFs is largely determined by
the immediate leadership of their Executive Director/President. Here EF-DC’s success
was mixed with some PFs demonstrating strong leadership while other PFs demonstrated
less inspired leadership.
Operational Capacity. PFs staff have demonstrated core capacities as strong grantmakers
but need to build their depth of expertise in the technical areas in which they manage
projects. PFs face a considerable dual challenge of needing to building technical expertise
while at the same time responding to the additional administrative burdens caused by the
anticipated loss of administrative staff due to decreases in core funding. The PFs have
also inherited strong grants management systems and procedures from EF but still need
to adapt their operational procedures to better respond to individual country contexts.
Leveraging the EF Network. The EF Network is of greatest benefit to the least developed
PFs within the Network. It has provided PFs with core program management systems and
procedures and also helped identify early opportunities for outside funding. However, as
PFs mature, the importance of EF-DC decreases and smaller, more regionally focused
networks provide greater benefit.
WHAT STEPS HAS EF-DC TAKEN TO ENSURE THE FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF
ITS NETWORK BEYOND THE END OF
CORE GRANT FUNDING?
The Grant Agreement stipulated that EF
would be sustained through an endowment
and could continue to rely on an allocation of
funds from USAID (see textbox). Based on
interviews with relevant EF staff, board
members, and EUR-ACE representatives,70
discussions began in 2004 with respect to EF
transitioning to financial sustainability,
defined as the ability to continue operations
without additional core funding from
70
EUR-ACE is the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia
oversees the bilateral economic, security, democracy, and humanitarian assistance of all USG agencies providing
assistance to 18 states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
27
USAID.
At that time, EUR-ACE felt that with declining assistance to the region, EF needed to transition
away from reliance on USG core funding. Initially this was not seen as a total phase-out, but
rather a reduction. This led to the sustainability question: EUR-ACE agreed to commit a certain
amount of funding over three years and in return EF would generate its own resources. The first
example was the FNE in Russia, which was registered as a Russian organization with the same
basic charter as EF.
In 2006, the decision was made to go forward with establishing other legacy organizations. EUR-
ACE provided letters to EF committing to funding levels and allowed core funding to be used for
the purpose of building organizational capacity necessary to achieve this objective. In 2009, the
last commitment letter was issued covering Ukraine and Moldova.
EF-DC, however, wanted an endowment, as envisioned in the grant agreement, or an annual line
item budget similar to that of other regional foundations. They were optimistic they could get an
authorization bill in Congress but wanted EUR-ACE to provide bridge funding. EF met with the
Undersecretary and Congress and started an advocacy effort, arguing they did not want to
become “just another NGO hustling on the street.”71
EF’s relationship with EUR-ACE was
somewhat contentious at times.72
Ultimately, EF did not succeed in getting a line item and the
core budget ends December 2013.
In June 2010, after six months of vigorous negotiation, EUR-ACE, USAID, and EF agreed to a
Sustainability Plan that established specific fundraising targets for EF-DC and the five PFs. The
release of further core funding was conditional on making satisfactory progress in meeting these
benchmarks, which included:
EF-DC will raise no less than $8m in non-directed funds during the first year (June 2010-
June 2011). Thereafter, EF-DC will increase the annual funds raised by at least an
additional $1.5m a year for a total of $28.5m through June 2013 ($8m+$9.5m+$11m).
Of the non-directed funding expended each year in the four-year period, EF-DC will pass
through at least 75% to the local foundations.
Each partner foundation will increase the percentage of its own budget from non-directed
sources (not through sub-awards from EF-DC) by an average of 5% annually over the
four-year period from the 2010 baseline.
For the first reporting period of June 2010-June 2011, almost all targets were met or exceeded.
However, performance fell off somewhat in year two (see table below).
71
Interview with EUR-ACE. 72
Ibid.
28
Figure 5: Performance Against Financial Sustainability Targets
June 2010 - May 2011
June 2011 - May 2012
June 2012 - May 2013
Target Actual % Target Actual % Target Actual %
Entity
EF-DC $ 8,000,000
$ 9,469,465 118%
$ 9,500,000
$ 7,522,580 79%
$ 11,000,000
$ 4,424,533 40%
Central Asia (EFCA)
$ 3,292,515
$ 3,042,835 92%
$ 3,457,141
$ 3,234,984 94%
$ 3,629,998
Ukraine/Moldova (EEF)
$ 1,368,343
$ 3,483,853 255%
$ 1,436,760
$ 2,212,068 154%
$ 1,508,598
South Caucasus (EPF)
$ 3,753,357
$ 5,547,426 148%
$ 3,941,025
$ 5,535,752 0%
$ 4,138,076
Russia (FNE) $ 3,447,352
$ 7,474,087 217%
$ 3,619,719
$ 6,892,902 190%
$ 3,800,705
Variations in Financial Sustainability of PFs
While the EF network has broadly met their financial sustainability targets to date, there is
significant variation among the PFs in their expectations about the future. Furthermore, each PF
has taken a different path to sustainability based on country context and available sources of
funds. It is also worth noting that some PFs have both a regional headquarters and specific
country offices, and there are variations in sustainability among the country offices as well.
FNE: was the first PF to be established and is the most advanced in terms of achieving financial
sustainability. They currently receive approximately 80% of their funding from Russian sources.
Nevertheless, senior staff are “somewhat doubtful” about their continued ability to attract donor
funding. This is a reflection of the very difficult and hostile political environment in Russia
demonstrated by the new NGO law that requires any organization accepting funds from sources
outside Russia to register as a foreign agent.
• FNE made the difficult transition from a grantmaking organization to what they term a
“social development agency.” The transition was gradual and painful. No one wanted to
give money to FNE because they thought of them as a donor. The old staff was used to
spending money rather than earning it and had no background in writing proposals.
“There were not too many survivors,” according to the FNE President. Core funds were
essential during the transition period.
• FNE’s strategy is to rely on the ability to sell services to Russian institutions,
government, and foundations. They do not have a written business strategy; rather, each
of the four operating units has its own fundraising/outreach strategy: “business
development is everyone’s business.” It is very difficult to get donors to fund overhead
costs in Russia. The current operating budget is $4.5 million, down from $7 million in
earlier years. FNE had planned to purchase a building with core funds, which was
approved by USAID, but EF decided not to proceed due to the increased risk of operating
in Russia. Thus, FNE currently rents office space, which is a significant overhead cost.
The FNE finance manager notes that local (Russian) donors are not likely to donate to
either the media program or the civil society programs as these programs are seen as US
linked and can provoke conflicts with the Russian government. Only big businesses have
29
the ability to give money and they do not want to antagonize the government. Therefore,
the end of core funding may result in a significant shift away from US objectives in
program areas.
EEF-Moldova: is the newest of the PFs. Senior leadership is “very confident” about continued
donor funding. With a staff of 14 and an annual budget of $1.5 million, they have already
secured core funding from SIDA to cover the next four years, which includes overhead costs.
Unlike FNE, the end of US core funding has not precipitated a wrenching transformation. They
have been able to substitute one donor for another. They have a written business strategy that
runs through 2012 and are in the process of writing a new one for 2013-2016.
EEF-Ukraine: Senior staff report that they are “very confident” about future donor funding
while the President notes that it is a very competitive environment and that he expects they will
experience a budget decrease. The budget for FY 2013 is $1.4 million, a 13% reduction from
2012. EEF-Ukraine is in the process of purchasing office space with USAID core funding, which
will contribute significantly to future sustainability by reducing operational costs. Their strategy
is to focus on larger donors like USAID and the EU. They do have a written fundraising
strategy/business plan and regard business development as everyone’s responsibility. The
President notes that generating money for overhead costs is extremely difficult, while the finance
manager says it can be done, but with difficulty. They note the end of core funding is also
difficult because many donors want to know that there is a co-funder and the absence of core
funds will make this difficult. A knowledgeable board member notes that EEF-U has tried to
approach local private businesses, but this has been very difficult because they are owned by
oligarchs who are also involved in politics with their own foundations and own programs – and
this makes working with them too political. He notes that with core funding ending, EEF-U will
have to downscale significantly and/ or change their program strategy.
EPF: The three country programs, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, are grouped together as
part of a regional foundation, based in Georgia, which creates advantages in terms of
opportunities to bid on regional activities and programs that advance dialogue between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. However, the financial circumstances of each country are quite different. The
EPF President and Finance Manager are “very confident” with respect to future funding as is the
Georgia Country Director. The Azerbaijan Country Director is “fairly confident” while the
Armenia Country Director is “somewhat doubtful.” There are about 100 total staff members in
all three programs, with a 2012 total budget of $8.4 million ($2.5 Armenia, $1.7 Azerbaijan, and
$4.2 Georgia). The total budget for 2013 is $4.5 million, approximately 45% less than 2012. This
is due to major fundraising issues in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Georgia and Armenia
programs are looking to purchase offices with USAID core funding, which again will contribute
greatly to sustainability by lowering overhead costs.
The biggest challenges cited by EPF staff are difficulty procuring funding (donor fatigue and no
respectable local oligarchs/donors); corporate funders refusing to pay for overhead costs; and the
need to restructure offices by July 2013 when core funding ends.
Armenia faces perhaps the most significant challenges. Transitioning from a grantmaking
foundation into a program implementation organization has meant triple the work for program
managers: implementing programs, managing grants, and fundraising. This has created a
substantial amount of stress in the office. In addition, they are downsizing to a smaller building
and salaries will drop. They currently have funding for two people for another six months and
30
then for two people part-time after June 2013. Without core funding they will survive, but they
will be a completely different type of organization.73
They also note that they have been
prevented from competing for USAID grants reserved for local organizations because their board
structure, with international representation, does not conform to USAID Forward guidelines.
The situation in Azerbaijan is similar. They are currently undergoing a shift from grantmaking to
running programs. The EPF-Azerbaijan Executive Director notes that the current staffing
situation is “a catastrophe.” Leadership must let people go because contracts are ending and they
do not have project work and finances to sustain them.
Georgia on the other hand is very confident and is looking to USAID and other foreign
government assistance programs for funding. They have a written business strategy in place and
are able to cover overhead costs, although this does not include funds for the regional office.
The regional office itself, comprised of the EPF President and Finance Manager, looks
vulnerable with the end of core funding. One of the country managers was clear that they could
not get donors to pay for local office overhead or the overhead associated with the regional
office.
EFCA: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan comprise EFCA. The foundation has 72 staff
and a combined budget of $4.6 million. The regional office in Almaty is important to allow them
to bid on regional projects, and there several currently under implementation. The evaluation
team interviewed the EFCA President and five staff members, all of whom are “very confident”
or “somewhat confidant” about EFCA’s ability to secure future funding. However, while
Kazakhstan is distinct in that it raises substantial funds from the private sector, and thus may
have at one time had greater advantages in fundraising due to the oil and gas sector, the costs in
Almaty are extremely high. A Former EFCA President noted that while initially concerns were
that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may have to close, now they appear stronger in terms of
fundraising and Kazakhstan is the weakest of the three. Other major challenges include
controlling high staff turnover and keeping quality high and costs low. The Executive Director
for Kyrgyzstan notes they have a three-year EFCA strategy that targets multiple funding sources.
They are usually able to cover overhead costs in their proposals and EFCA created an overhead
rate of 7% that has been accepted by most donors but not USAID, which is noted as extremely
beneficial by current EFCA staff. In Tajikistan, the PF did not win US-funded grant competitions
reserved for local institutions because of the interpretation that they are an international
organization. This is a different issue than in the South Caucus where the board structure does
preclude them from consideration as a local organization under USAID Forward guidelines.
However, in Tajikistan this appears to be a perception issue and was noted by other donors as an
issue that needs to be addressed. EFCA is planning to hire a PR person and reposition/rebrand
and possibly rename the organization to promote their perception as a local entity.
EF-DC: It is clear from interviews with DC staff and board members that EF-DC is also fighting
to adjust to new realities without core funds. The majority of the board wants to keep DC open,
but without core funds, this is a challenge. EF-DC has attracted some small corporate money
from oil, law, and accounting firms; however, without core funds, they need to go out and
compete (and this could create situations where EF-DC competes with PFs in the future). This is
73
According to a Senior EPF-Armenia staffer.
31
an entirely different business model and they increasingly find themselves moving from a
foundation to a service provider model. After a painful reorganization process last year, EF-DC
is now “lean and mean” and is actively expanding into Asia and the Middle East (China and
Iran).
EF-DC’s fundraising efforts are run by one person, and the DC office is primarily focused on
implementation and management issues. This raises the question of whether they have sufficient
capacity to pursue a targeted fundraising strategy. The need for greater dedicated resources to
fundraising was identified by the evaluation but there is no clear solution since private donations
are unlikely to support additional staffing.
One board member noted that EF-DC is now a “Beltway bandit” bidder; they have become
exactly what they were created not to be and may not be sustainable. While the PFs may survive
without EF-DC, it was the flow of core funding though EF-DC to the PFs that gave the USG a
voice in programming resources. This will now be diminished.
CONCLUSIONS: STEPS TAKEN TO BUILD PF’S FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY
With the end of core funding, some members of the EF Network are financially at risk.
EPF and EF-DC are struggling to make the transition from a foundation model to a
service provider. EPF-Azerbaijan and Armenia are facing very difficult periods. Ukraine
also faces funding challenges, and while EFCA overall is successfully raising funds, the
cost of the Almaty office is problematic.
On the other hand, Russia and Moldova are both financially strong. In Russia where
donor funds have dried up, FNE has successfully found local sources of funding
including the government and local private firms. For FNE, the risk is more due to the the
political challenges of operating in Russia than the end of core funding. Even if core
funding were to continue, it is likely that FNE would not accept it following the adoption
of the foreign agent law. It is also not clear whether FNE will register, accept, and further
foreign funds. While they can raise substantial resources from the Russian private sector,
the programming will be quite different than was the case with core funds. In Moldova, a
much smaller and poorer country, EEF-Moldova has been able to transition from one
donor, USAID, to another, SIDA, with minimal disruption.
In some cases, with the end of core funding, PFs have to undertake a significant program
realignment to meet the needs of new donors. This is already happening in Russia and, to
a lesser extent, Central Asia. Organizations may find themselves in very different lines of
business than those undertaken when funding and program direction came from the USG.
Key EF-DC functions, such as fundraising and M&E, have been lost due to the reduction
in core funding. It is critical that the PFs have sufficient resources to cover
fundraising/proposal development, which traditionally was covered by core funds.
Financial sustainability is compromised in some cases where the USG has determined
that the locally registered EFs are not eligible to compete for funding reserved for local
organizations, either because of their board structure, which includes internationals, or
their perceived alignment to EF-DC.
32
The transition to a new business model after core funding can be wrenching, entailing
significant downsizing and staffing changes. This is a difficult process best begun early.
The evaluators found that FNE has made the most significant strides in this effort, but
most other PFs have not really undertaken a transformation to date and this has created
gaps in technical capabilities since the
nature of grantmaking vs. operational
foundation has yet to be absorbed or
understood.
IS EF-DC’S CMI SUCCESSFUL IN
ACCURATELY MEASURING THE
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY OF PFS?
A critical step in EF’s effort to support the
sustainability of its PFs was the development and
implementation of the CMI tool. CMI was
designed in 2008 to help PFs “identify specific
areas of organizational growth to invest in, target
resources more effectively, and evaluate the impact
of [their] collective capacity building efforts.”74
It
utilizes a diagnostic approach designed to assist EF
and PF staff to evaluate their current capacities and
work in partnership to determine a path for growth
and measuring achievement along the way.
History of Implementation
Figure 6 below depicts the history of the CMI’s implementation and highlights that only the two
longer-standing PFs have conducted the evaluation three times. It also highlights that EF-DC has
never used the CMI tool to evaluate its own capacity. Only six of seven capacities were applied
in the CMI applications and there is no evidence that the Leadership and Management review
was conducted in any of the PFs or in EF-DC. The most frequently used capacities include Board
Governance, Financial Management, and Program Management, which correspond to EF’s
Sustainable Plan prepared for 2010-2014.
Figure 6: History of implementation for each PF
CAPACITY/YEAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Board Governance FNE, EFCA FNE, EPF,
EFCA
FNE, EFCA,
EEF-U - EEF-M
Financial Management FNE, EFCA FNE, EPF EEF-U - EEF-M
Program Management FNE, EFCA FNE, EPF,
EFCA
FNE, EFCA,
EEF-U -
Fund Development - FNE, EPF,
EFCA EEF-U - EEF-M
HR and Staff Development - FNE, EPF,
EFCA EEF-U - EEF-M
74
Eurasia Foundation Network’s Capacity Mapping Initiative: A Resource for Building Legacy Foundations
Implementation Guide.” Eurasia Foundation. 2008. Pg. 4 and 6.
Understanding the CMI Tool:
CMI Application Process:
1. Schedule mapping exercise
2. Select capacities to be mapped
3. Collect and analyze background documents
4. Conduct site visit and interviews
5. Draft mapping report
6. Debrief and discuss report with PF
management before finalizing
7. Present to Board
8. Create an organizational development plan
and monitor achievement of capacity
building targets
CMI’s Seven Key Areas of Capacity:
1. Board Governance
2. Executive Leadership and Management
3. Financial Management
4. Program Management
5. Fund Development
6. Human Resources and Staff Development
7. Communications
33
Communication - FNE, EPF,
EFCA
FNE, EFCA,
EEF-U - EEF-M
Leadership and Management - - - - -
EF has typically provided funds to support each PF’s first CMI application with the PFs then
expected to fund follow-on applications themselves. This may explain the uneven frequency of
application witnessed among the PFs. Several respondents commented that although they
thought the CMI tool was overall helpful, their PFs did not have enough money (or perhaps did
not prioritize the process enough) to fund follow-on applications: “We never had enough money
to really use it,” according for one EPF Director.
The evaluators were struck that the capacities to be mapped and the people interviewed to gauge
those capacities appeared to be determined by a few select employees, usually senior EF and PF
staff. This process introduces a significant risk of selection bias with PF staff possibly being
inclined to select those staff members likely to provide the highest scores. The evaluators noted
that unlike other capacity assessment tools – such as USAID’s “Organizational Capacity
Assessment” (OCA) tool, McKinsey’s “Organizational Capacity Assessment Tool” (OCAT), or
the MSI’s Institutional Development Framework (IDF) tool – the PFs’ implementation of CMI
seemed to interview a small group of people to gauge specific capacities. For example, financial
capacity would be scored based on interviews with financial staff solely or communications
would be scored based on interviews with the PF director and communications person. The other
aforementioned tools take a different approach and ask each respondent to comment individually
on a variety of capacities and then bring respondents together for a group discussion.
CONCLUSIONS: IMPLEMENTATION OF CMI
The frequency of EF’s CMI application and the number of capacities mapped within PFs
has varied significantly with lack of funding being the most common explanation.
CMI was to be a process that should be applied regularly in order to verify capacity
growth; however, it was not applied consistently and was not used to its full advantage.
The limited application of the CMI did not result in the intended training/learning effect
for the PFs. It failed to improve the overall understanding of all staff members in the PFs
on the importance of building
an organization as one
complete structure and solicit
the input of every staff member
on the needed areas of
development within their
foundations.
Accuracy of Measurement
This evaluation design does not enable
the evaluators to comment on the
accuracy of the CMI tools itself. To do
so, the evaluators would have to be
able to independently conduct an
assessment of each PF during their
Diversity of PF Staff Opinions on Usefulness of CMI
Highly Useful:
“[CMI] is conducted on an annual basis. It was accommodated
for internal use and staff are evaluated based on certain
abilities. When CMI results are ready, an annual organizational
development plan is developed and submitted to the Board for
approval. Progress is the checked on a weekly basis during
directors’ meeting.” ~ EPF-Georgia staffer.
Somewhat Useful:
“Scores were more or less accurate. Not completely but useful
for seeing where to improve…we discussed what we could
do—like having trainings on logic frameworks and outcomes.”
~ EEF-Ukraine staffer.
Not Useful:
“The CMI process appears to be ad hoc, not really used to train
staff.” ~ former EFCA Senior Manager
34
time of CMI application and compare the results of their assessment versus the resulting CMI
scores. However, the evaluation design does allow the evaluators to present a summary of the
opinions of PF staff regarding the accuracy of CMI, as presented below.
Overall, the evaluators saw a significant diversity of opinion among PF staff on the utility of the
CMI process (see examples in textbox above); however, most PF staff seemed to think that the
CMI tool itself generally produced an accurate reflection of their present capabilities. The
majority of interviewed PF staff answered that CMI was generally a good tool to paint an overall
picture of an organization; to detect problem areas, bottlenecks, or areas for improvement; and to
organize their PF’s approach to capacity building. Interestingly, the majority of EPF and EFCA
staff mentioned that they intended to use CMI to gauge the capacities of their partners.
While the consensus of PF staff responses, and the evaluators’ own review of the CMI tool,
indicate that CMI is a useful tool for scoring individual organizational capacities, the evaluators
were surprised by the lack of documentation and respondent recall on how the CMI
recommendations were actually implemented. EPF-Georgia seems to be an exception, though
most respondents could only recall the implementation of one or two recommendations
following the CMI process.
Lastly, the evaluators noted that the CMI tool appears to consider human resource and staff
development as a separate capacity, rather than a more holistic and important part of the
development of each capacity. Based on the evaluators’ own experience, staff capacity
development is an integral part of all stages of an organization’s development, particularly
during periods of transition (such as moving from a grantmaking to operational foundation)
when the quality of staff can make a big difference.
CONCLUSIONS: ACCURACY OF CMI
The majority of interviewed PF staff believes that the CMI tool produces scores that
accurately reflect their individual capacity areas. However, most also commented that
there has been little follow-up on the recommendations produced by these scores.
CMI’s separate treatment of Human Resource and Staff Development fails to capture the
importance of staff capacity building in each of CMI’s seven Key Capacity Areas.
Instead, CMI’s emphasis seems to be focused on assessing the context of a personnel
handbook rather than on understanding staff skills, strategy to staff development, needed
training/mentoring, or staff motivation.
OVERARCHING CONCLUSIONS: HAS EF-DC SUCCEEDED IN ITS EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH AND BUILD SUSTAINABLE FOUNDATIONS?
Ensuring the sustainability in challenging political environments is no easy feat. The
adoption of a new business model of sustainability following the end of core funding
requires significant transitions in a range of organizational capacity areas beyond solely
the focus on fundraising. The process can entail significant downsizing and staffing
changes and requires significant lead-time. The evaluators found that FNE has made the
most significant strides in this effort and adopted a business model distinct from the other
PFs, but most other PFs have not really undertaken a genuine transformation to date.
While EF-DC undertook a considerable effort to improve the managerial and operational
35
capacity of its PFs, it does not appear to have fully recognized the need for a
transformational change in its PFs (from grantmaking to operational models) and has had
limited capacity, in large part due to reduced core funding, to effectively manage its PFs’
transformations.
ISSUE III: WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EF AS A
MODEL FOR ADVANCING US DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES?
With the aim of increasing the utility of its findings, the evaluation team modified the evaluation
question to focus on an analysis of the strengths and weakness of foundations in general (i.e., the
“foundation model”) for advancing US development objectives and then to provide a
commentary on how well EF was able to conform to this model. Given EF’s experience, in
which a dedicated funding stream was discussed but never implemented, the team felt that there
was limited value in commenting on the usefulness of replicating this model, which the team
would not recommend. However, the team felt that a more macro-level discussion on the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of foundations like EF, and the extent to which EF
was able to capture these, would prove more useful to future programming.
The section below begins by defining how the team understands and uses the term “foundation.”
It then highlights traditional comparative advantages and disadvantages of foundations, in
comparison only to USAID contracting, drawing from interviewee responses, publically
available secondary data, and discussions with the team’s Advisory Group comprised of former
foundation executives. It then analyzes how well EF capitalized, or failed to capitalize, on these
advantages/disadvantages, noting a marked difference when core funding was certain and
uncertain. The section concludes with an examination of how EF beneficiaries and partners
perceived the quality of their operational relationships with EF and EF’s program coordination
with USAID operating units.
DEFINING THE TERM “FOUNDATION”
The team found surprisingly few commonly accepted definitions of foundations, which was
likely caused by the varied structures, activities, revenue sources, and country legal frameworks
regulating foundations. For the purposes of this evaluation, the team utilized definitions from the
US-based Foundation Center and European-based European Foundation Centre.
The Foundation Center (TFC) defines a foundation as a “a nongovernmental, non-profit
organization with its own funds (usually from a single source, either an individual, a family, or a
corporation) and program managed by its own trustees and directors, established to maintain or
aid educational, social, charitable, religious, or other activities serving the common welfare,
primarily by making grants to other non-profit organizations.”75
It also notes that a foundation
has a “principal purpose of making grants to unrelated organizations, institutions, or individuals
for scientific, educational, cultural, religious, or other charitable purposes.”76
TFC distinguishes
between two types of foundations: (1) Private Foundations (independent/family foundations,
company/corporate foundations, or operating foundations) and (2) Public Foundations
75
“About Us.” Foundation Center. http://foundationcenter.org/about/. 76
Ibid.
36
(community foundations, Women’s Funds, or other public foundations).”77
The European Foundation Centre (EFC) has a similar but slightly different definition:
“Foundations are autonomous, non-profit organisations with their own resources that work
locally, regionally and internationally to improve the lives of citizens, by running and funding
activities in a myriad of areas…They each have an established and reliable income source, which
allows them to plan and carry out work over a longer term than many other institutions such as
governments and companies.”78
EFC groups foundations into four broad categories: (1)
Independent Foundations; (2) Corporate Foundations; (3) Governmentally-Supported
Foundations; (4) Community Foundations.
While the above definitions differ on the issue of governance, they both emphasize the
importance of independence in program and the availability of a steady funding stream (usually
in the form of an endowment or trust). It is regarding this latter criterion, the availability of a
steady funding stream, where EF appears to have deviated from the traditional foundation model.
This has had significant consequences for the development of EF and its overarching success,
and this is an issue that is explored in detail below.
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF FOUNDATIONS VERSUS
CONTRACTING INCLUDING SPEED, FLEXIBILITY, AND INNOVATION
Traditional Advantages
The list below outlines some general comparative advantages of foundations, compared to
contracting traditional implementing partners, as informed by the evaluator’s secondary
research,79
interview responses, and the evaluation’s Advisory Committee. These comparisons
are broad and typological in nature; cases may be identified as exceptions to the contrasts drawn.
Nevertheless, the evaluation team has found these comparisons useful in exploring the
significance of the foundation model.
1) Dedicated Funding Source. As compared to contractors, foundations generally benefit from
a dedicated funding source or pool of core funding. This provides more flexibility in
planning and programming design, allowing foundations to focus on areas of core interest
and adapt longer-term timelines than contractors despite fluctuations in outside political
environments or donor support. Foundations are thus better able to “stay the course” despite
changes in political or donor support. Some significant related advantages include:
a) Flexibility in Programming. Less beholden to short-term donor interests than
contractors, foundations have the luxury of being less risk-averse and have the ability to
fund less popular and potentially controversial projects, such as activities focused on
stateless populations or other vulnerable groups, municipal-level administrative reforms,
etc. Foundations also generally operate through grants and cooperative agreements,
which usually provide more operational flexibility compared to contracts despite having
77
“Foundation Tutorials.” Foundation Center. http://foundationcenter.org/getstarted/tutorials/ft_tutorial/what.html. 78
“Foundations FAQ.” European Foundation Centre.
http://www.efc.be/programmes_services/resources/Pages/Foundations-FAQ.aspx 79
Especially Kevin F.F. Quigley [1997], For Democracy’s Sake: Foundations and Democracy in Central Europe,
Washington: Wilson Center Press.
37
similar competitive requirements.
b) Increased Speed of Response. Operating under an endowment, trust, or reservoir of core
funding, foundations can be divorced from procurement hurdles that often plague
contractors and can quickly fund and start up emerging opportunities and new project
ideas as they become available.80
It typically takes a year or more for USAID to design
and award a new contract and more time still for a contractor to mobilize and begin
operations in country.81
While contractors can manage small grants through a “grants
under contract” mechanism, it can at times take up to a year or more to get a grants
manual approved by USAID. Foundations generally have more streamlined internal
procurement procedures, particularly for small grants distribution, which allow them to
act in a more decentralized way to fund and start up emerging and innovative ideas.
c) Longer Time Horizons. Foundations generally operate outside of the traditional three to
five year contract durations under which contractors operate. They are established to
provide a long-term local presence with a long-serving full-time local staff. Contractors,
on the other hand, face difficulty retaining high performing staff as a project approaches
its end. Follow-on projects frequently do not overlap with their predecessors and the
competitive process means that the same project may have a different implementing
partner making it difficult to maintain continuity in pursuing a long-term goal.
2) Deeper knowledge of and stronger relationships with local partners and development
contexts. Foundations, as compared to contractors, are established long-term in the country
context and can readily prioritize becoming familiar with the socioeconomic, political, and
cultural contexts of assistance, including “who is doing what” at any given time. These
attributes leave foundations better suited than contractors to deal with long-term institutional
capacity building issues with local partners and changing attitudes and behaviors of
populations over extended periods of time. They can thus create and strengthen local
organizations, build coalitions, and mobilizing local support around specific issues better
than contractors.
3) Flexibility in responding to changes in operating environment. With a long-term presence
on the ground, foundations can be relatively quick and flexible in responding to emerging
issues and challenges. They are able to more rapidly gauge (“take the pulse”) political
climates and public sentiment and adjust their programs accordingly, or advise the USG to
adjust theirs, with respect to issues “too politically sensitive to touch” compared to
contractors.82
4) Better able to support development or strengthening of new institutions, such as think
tanks or other types of research organizations. Such accomplishments are outcomes of
80
Comment from Advisory Group meeting on December 7, 2012. 81
There are of course ways to expedite the normal contracting process. OFDA, for example, operates a single award
IQC that allows for the rapid issuance of Task Orders to respond to unforeseen circumstances without the time
consuming requirement to engage in a further round of competition. OTI has developed a specific set of tools and
procedures that allow them to respond quickly and flexibly to unanticipated needs. The primary contracting vehicle
is the SWIFT 3 multiple award IQC, which is a $1.5 billion vehicle built around transition activities. Expedited
procedures allow for awards within 5-6 weeks of issuance of a solicitation. They have issued awards in as little as 48
hours with a justification for other than full and open competition. 82
Quoted phrases stem from Advisory Group discussion.
38
strong local partnerships, emphasis on the long term, and a capacity to take programmatic
risks. Numerous interviewees stressed that because of their long-term presence, foundation
staff generally develop a “sense of responsibility” for the legacy of their projects and
partnerships beyond the usual three to five year contract lives that contractors operate under.
5) Ability to serve as “knowledge hub.” Through small grant programs, either targeted or
“open-door,” foundations can more easily encourage the sharing of ideas and best practices
than contractors. They can provide a, sometimes limited, opportunity for citizens to gain a
voice in their own community development and propose projects that emanate from local,
everyday needs, as opposed to “their needs” as articulated by an outside donor. While
contracts can involve detailed contextual analyses and needs assessments, they are rarely
designed by beneficiaries themselves.
6) Degree of autonomy. Foundations are generally “one step removed” from government or
business interests. While foundations are undoubtedly associated with, and often beholden to,
the interests of their founders, they operate with a degree of autonomy and possess greater
flexibility, perhaps deniability, in their actions. Foundations can thus support initiatives that
may be less welcomed by their host or home country audiences.
7) Internal accountability. Foundations are generally established with internal oversight or
governing authorities to monitor operations and (ideally) minimize instances of corruption
and mismanagement. Foundations, particularly Western-style foundations, generally face
strict transparency and fiduciary requirements to register and operate.
Traditional Disadvantages
However, the foundation model also entails comparative disadvantages or, perhaps better
phrased, situations in which direct contracting would be more appropriate.
1. Susceptibility to weakened programmatic focus. Given the demand-driven nature of
small grant management, foundations can end up supporting numerous disparate
programs and projects. Foundations can also suffer from being too closely associated or
familiar with local contexts, enticing them to become myopic and pursue micro-level
solutions to macro-level problems.83
The complexities of local problems can in other
words, cause foundations to lose “sight of the forest from the trees.”
2. Rigidity of ideas. Given their long-term focus and establishment around specific
missions and visions, foundations can be less receptive to new programming ideas,
scholarly thinking, or funding opportunities as compared to contractors whose projects
are bound by shorter timeframes. There is irony here, of course, since this threat of
inflexibility can be present in foundations that enjoy relative autonomy and independence
from funding sources.
3. Accountability to whom? While often “one step removed,” foundations can be
susceptible or beholden to the interests of their founders or board members. Generally
operating outside of popular support or short-term funding, foundations run the risk of
being captured by an elite or privileged few.
4. Lack of deep technical knowledge. As a knowledge center and a catalyst for innovative
83
As articulated during the Advisory Group discussions.
39
development ideas, a foundation relies heavily on the technical knowledge it is able to
readily access through its staff, its board, or other individuals close to the organization.
They generally operate with low overheard, employing a small but capable staff able to
program across sectors. However, breadth of coverage can come at the expense of depth
of coverage. The majority of interviewed PF staff admitted not having the same level of
technical understanding of their programming areas. In contrast, contractors generally
have access to a deep pool of technical experts, either on staff or by ongoing recruitment
efforts for intermittent consultants, in specific functional areas.
5. Too forgiving, too early. While the establishment of relationships with beneficiaries can
bring contextual understanding and situational awareness, it can also result in the loss of
objectivity. Direct and long-term relationships can cause foundations to “lose
perspective” and fund or support ideas that may be unrealistic or unsustainable.84
6. “Kiss of death.” Just as foundations can benefit from the association with their founders,
they can also suffer from them. This was particularly evident to the evaluation team in
Russia as FNE had to disassociate itself completely from its US roots in the face of strict
and xenophobic host-country regulations.
7. Difficulty recovering overhead and administrative costs. While contractors have the
ability to charge their overhead and administrative costs through Negotiation Indirect
Cost Recovery Agreements (NICRAs) and General and Administrative (G&A) line
items, numerous PF interviewees commented on their difficulty to get donors to fund
administrative and overhead costs.
CONCLUSIONS: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE FOUNDATION MODEL
COMPARED TO CONTRACTING
Foundations offer comparative advantages in terms of flexibility, speed, and ability to
pursing long-term objectives compared to traditional direct contracting models.
One of the defining characteristics of foundations, and origin of the foundation model’s
most significant and tangible comparative advantages, is the availability of a reliable
source of long-term funding.
Contractors operating under USAID projects have a defined period of performance and
defined scope of work. These attributes mean that contractors may be better suited to
work on issues that can be addressed within a defined life of project and which require
specific technical expertise.
Contracts by their nature are not quick or flexible and may be more suitable for
addressing a specific set of well-defined issues.
The foundation and direct contracting models can complement each other by capturing
individual advantages and benefits not captured by the other.
EF’S CONFORMITY TO THE FOUNDATION MODEL
84
As discussed during Advisory Group meeting.
40
Areas where EF captured the advantages of the Foundation Model and likely performed better
than USAID contracting.
Accumulation of Local Knowledge. EF provides an impressive illustration of how a
foundation can accumulate knowledge of local conditions and institutions, translate this
knowledge to locally adaptive programs, and invest in longer-term results. Since the PFs
are generally not highly specialized in technical sectors, as compared to contractors, their
strength is relatively greater in grantmaking processes and promoting institutional
capacity among partners. In the cases of some foundations, such as EEF-U, they are
considered by partners and donors to be among the best grantmakers in the country.
Flexibility in Changing Environments. EF has been highly successful in quickly getting
many small grants “out the door” in many countries. EF could rapidly respond, for
example, to the new political environment afforded by the Rose Revolution in Georgia,
and EEF was readily able to rally resources and partners for political liberalization in
Moldova. Some observers noted to the evaluation team that USG agencies and their
contractors are also fully capable of running grantmaking programs and that there is
therefore nothing particularly unique about EF’s record in this area. Our interviews,,
however, included complaints from local observers that at least in some countries (such
as Moldova) the grantmaking carried out by other organizations, such as DOS and their
contractors, have been accompanied by poorly defined rules, lack of transparency in
communication, lengthy delays in making awards, and lack of support in explaining
reporting requirements. While EF’s record with grantees is not unblemished, overall the
evaluation team has identified few instances of weak grantmaking procedures by EF.
Supporting local institutions. EF’s record includes cases of essential startup and/or
continuing support of institutions of national and regional significance, including the
Caucasus Regional Resource Centers (CRRC).
Areas where EF was not able to capture advantages of the Foundation Model and likely
performed worse than USAID contracting.
Did not benefit from dedicated funding stream. EF’s core funding is derived from its
USAID grant. While EF organizations have varying levels of alternative funding, with
the exception of FNE and EEF-Moldova, all the field-based organizations are to varying
degrees dependent on the USAID-originated core grant scheduled to be terminated in
December 2013. EF is not supported by an endowment. Other major international
foundations are supported by recurring line items in the US federal budget and while EF
has sought such funding, Congress has not delivered this support.85
While their design and startup may be difficult and labor-intensive, endowments have
been considered part of USAID’s “toolbox” for advancing development goals for some
years, and Agency guidance since 1994 has recognized endowments funded via
85
The 1992 Stremlau memo made reference to funding of this kind: “The foundation’s broad goals and structure
would be similar to the Asian, Inter-American and African Development Foundations, that are congressionally
funded, independent and provide many small grants to assist grass-roots organizations across those regions.”
41
appropriated dollars rather than local currency.86
Among other objectives, USAID may
support the establishment of an endowment to, for example, broaden or enhance the
funding base of an NGO engaged in activities with long-term horizons; insulate the
endowed organization from unpredictable government and donor agency budget
fluctuations; allow the recipient organization to attract other funds by increasing donor
confidence; or allow an activity to be institutionalized and continue beyond USAID’s
funding when it otherwise may not have been.
Not having a reliable stream of revenue can undermine the other tenets of a foundation
model (longer-term thinking, deep knowledge base, etc.). While no EF organization (EF-
DC or any of the PFs) has established an endowment, to varying degrees they all have
stepped beyond the unilateral USAID “spigot” to include other bilateral and multilateral
donors, international foundations, foundations based in-country, and private sector
organizations to diversify funding.
Strained Programming Focus. With the exception of FNE, which, although reliant on
multiple local sources of funding, has managed to keep its program largely directed
toward social assistance and media programs, EF’s other PFs are applying local
knowledge and relationships in many increasingly diverse areas. The PFs in Armenia and
Azerbaijan identify areas of program focus but at the same time face funding issues that
strain commitment to the narrower path. Contractors, on the other hand, usually have
specific and focused scopes of work and thereby implicitly a strong program focus.
Lack of Deep Technical Expertise. Generally, EF-DC and the PFs appear to have been
able to avail themselves of the technical knowledge needed for designing high-quality
programs, monitoring them adequately, and working on a peer basis with grantees and
other partners. The evaluation team did encounter a small number of instances in which
grantees noted that the program manager was insufficiently prepared to provide support
in a relatively new area of intervention, such as film production. As we have noted,
however, these cases appear to be rare, and the “process professionalism” of Foundation
staff in dealing with grantees and partners has prevented serious undermining of
credibility for the organization involved.
Mixed benefit from degree of autonomy. A foundation can carry the advantage of
being locally perceived as less interventionist than international donors. At the same time,
in EF’s case, this status offers both the challenges and opportunities associated with
leveraging a foundation’s “third sector” status to support public-private partnerships,
corporate social responsibility initiatives, and similar efforts that engage business and
governmental entities as stakeholders in programs of mutual interest. The PFs clearly do
operate from an institutional venue in the civil society sphere; however, PFs vary greatly
in the extent to which they have chosen to, or have been able to, stake out a set of
working relationships with state and private sector entities. In addition, the “brand’
afforded by PFs’ affiliation with a US-based development institution is met with mixed
reactions among partner foundation staff and stakeholders: While in some instances this
affiliation is viewed as a kind of stamp of approval for a PF’s professionalism, in other
86
See USAID Policy Determination 21 (Guidelines: Endowments Financed with Appropriated Funds, July 18,
1994): http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/pd21.pdf.
42
cases it is seen as something of a burden on the organization’s image.
CONCLUSIONS: EF’S CONFORMITY TO THE FOUNDATION MODEL
EF’s performance in terms of speed, flexibility, and innovation in comparison to USAID
contracting was largely dependent on the availability of core funding. When core funding
was available, EF was able to capitalize on many of the advantages of the “foundation
model” and outperformed other contractors in supporting local ownership of programs,
fostering sustainability, and supporting the social capital needed to enhance democratic
processes. However, as core funding declined, EF was no longer able to capitalize on
these advantages and did not perform as well as contractors in terms of programmatic
focus and depth of technical expertise.
In terms of sector-specific comparative advantages, the evaluation team concluded that
EF’s work has generally been most successful in the civil society arena. This result is in
accord with the trends in PF portfolio investments observed earlier in this report. Given
the predominance of civil society activity in the overall program of EF, it is not possible
to determine the effectiveness of EF’s model in other areas from its work in civil society.
So while the evidence is clear that the model “performs well” in supporting civil society
assistance, on the other hand, there is no compelling evidence that the model could not
succeed as well in other sectors if a foundation were to choose to invest in such
directions. Foundations can complement other forms of assistance.
HOW DO GRANTEES AND OTHER BENEFICIARIES REPORT ON THEIR EXPERIENCE
WORKING WITH EF AND ITS PARTNERS COMPARED TO WORKING WITH OTHER
DONOR PROGRAMS?
Beneficiaries often found PF’s operational expectations (such as quality of proposals, reporting,
and financial transparency) more rigorous than other grantmakers, but in the end PFs were
almost always seen to be supportive, competent partners. The more experienced grantee
organizations were able to compare PF expectations with those of other donors. In some
instances, the level of difficulty was about the same as with other grantmakers, but more often
PF processes were considered more challenging. However, some interviewees told us that high
expectations by the PF helped their organizations to build capability and find subsequent sources
of new funding. With few exceptions, beneficiaries told us they would work with the PF again.
Data from the evaluation team’s administration of an electronic survey of Foundation
beneficiaries illuminated various levels of satisfaction with the PFs as partners. With a total of 81
responses, the survey captures only a small portion of all PF grantees (700 contacted), and there
may be a tendency for those with more positive attitudes toward the Foundation to respond to the
survey. Nevertheless, some noteworthy patterns emerge from these responses:
When asked to compare their experience with other donors with their EF relationship,
60% said that the experiences are about the same;
85% of respondents indicated that during the grant period they interacted “frequently” or
“constantly” with EF staff;
55% of grantees found the EF grant application process “not very difficult,” but 18%
43
found it “very difficult” or “difficult”;
76% reported that the local EF staff were “very
helpful” or “helpful” in guiding them through the
application process;
60% reported that once they received the grant EF
staff were “very helpful” or “helpful” in providing
assistance toward achievement of grant objectives;
66% said that the professional competence of EF
in explaining grant requirements was a positive aspect of their EF experience;
27% percent noted that “too much emphasis on monitoring and measuring results” (the
most commonly chosen factor among several choices) was the least positive aspect of
their experience; and
79% said that support from the EF had contributed to their organization’s success in
meeting its goals.
In summary, while the application, monitoring, financial management, and reporting
requirements of EF grantmaking can be challenging at times for grantees, these operational
expectations appear not to be overly burdensome to beneficiaries and indeed prove to be
opportunities for valuable capacity strengthening for many.
HOW DID EF COORDINATE WITH USAID MISSIONS AND OTHER USAID
PROGRAMS?
The EF regional grant is overseen by a USAID Agreement Officer’s Technical Representative
(AOR) based with the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia in Washington, D.C. At the country level,
there are no formalized coordination points or mechanisms except on occasions (such as in
Armenia) when the USAID Mission has awarded one of its own programs to a PF. In Russia,
FNE is widely known and FNE leadership and staff talk regularly with donors – although of
course, with the closing of the USAID program in Russia, such frequent communications are not
expected in the near future. The working relationship in Moldova is not close and mission
personnel complained about a lack of coordination, although we note that the USAID Mission
Director was invited to visit the most recent meeting of the EEF board.
In Ukraine, leadership and staff are on a familiar basis with technical specialists at the Mission.
Without an ongoing program relationship one key USAID source described the Mission’s
attitude as one of curiosity about how EEF sees its strategic vision and role in the civil society
sector.
On the Washington side, EF-DC historically has looked to State and EUR/ACE for oversight and
coordination rather than to USAID. For its part, USAID’s historical pattern has therefore been to
exert little oversight through the AOR.
Beneficiary Comment on Working
with EF
“In our case, EPF was the real presence
next to us (for example, with technical
problem solving with interpreters, etc.).
They were constantly checking in to be
available to help.”
--A grantee for a cross-border program
supported by EPF-Armenia
44
RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION FOR USG AUDIENCE
USAID/PPL SHOULD CREATE AN AGENCY-WIDE POLICY ON FOUNDATIONS
USAID has and will continue to support foundations in addition to EF in the Europe and Eurasia
region and elsewhere. As a result, USAID has continued to gain experience working with
foundations in support of critical foreign policy objectives and developed a deeper understanding
of the strengths and weakness of the model. USAID’s Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning
(USAID/PPL) should consider developing a policy for establishing, supporting, and working
with foundations. The policy should define what constitutes a foundation; describe the different
kinds of foundation models (e.g., endowed vs. non-endowed) and outline their comparative
strengths and weaknesses; differentiate when USAID should consider creating its own
foundations versus collaborating with existing foundations; and clearly articulate how to support
and sustain foundations advancing desired USG foreign policy interests.
This policy could be informed by this evaluation but should draw from a variety of sources in
order to properly capture the richness and diversity of the foundation world.
DESIGNERS AND POLICYMAKERS SHOULD ESTABLISH THE FUNDING AND
EXPECTATIONS OF A FOUNDATION UPFRONT
It is vital that the conditions for funding foundations are explicitly stated and followed upfront. A
foundation can be designed to exist indefinitely based on an endowment, exist for an unspecified
period of time based on a “sinking fund,” or operate for a fixed period with a dedicated source of
funding. As witnessed in the EF example, the implication of switching towards a sustainability
model, compared to the traditional model of having a sustained source of funding, limited EF’s
ability to capitalize on the comparative advantages of the foundation model. It also demonstrates
the consequences of designers and policymakers failing to have a clear idea up front on the type
of foundation they are establishing.
Policymakers need to understand that changes in operating assumptions made midstream, such
as switching its operational model to one focusing on the sustainability of local partner
foundations, can be very disruptive to the effectiveness of the foundation and can significantly
impact a foundation’s ability to capitalize on the advantages of the foundation model. To best
capture these comparative advantages, particularly in terms of speed, flexibility, and long-term
view, a foundation must have access to a reliable source of long-term funding.
POLICYMAKERS NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT A TRANSFORMATION IN A FOUNDATION’S
OPERATIONAL MODEL REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENTS OF TIME, RESOURCES,
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE EXPERTISE.
Should policymakers find themselves in the suboptimal position of needing to mandate a change
in a foundation’s operational model, policymakers need to allocate sufficient time, resources, and
expertise to allow for a full transformation to take place. Policymakers need to realize that if they
require a transition to an operational program, a foundation will need significant organizational
45
restructuring and that additional resources and support may be required in the short term to make
this transition possible. Policymakers should realize that the foundation’s leadership may not
have the right skills or capabilities to lead this transition. Organizational change expertise is
required, which the foundation headquarters is not likely to have. Also, if the headquarters entity
is undergoing a similar transition, they may have fewer resources to devote to the transition of
local “affiliates.” In the EF example, both EF and the USG did not appear to fully recognize the
difficulty of this transformation and the level of time and investment needed to do so.
From the foundation perspective, the organization’s leadership: (1) must recognize the need for
an organizational restructuring; (2) a develop plan to significantly realign staff and identify the
needed resources; and (3) implement concrete steps to overhaul its staffing composition. This
should include investing heavily in training current staff in and/or hiring new staff that possess
the required competencies.
POLICYMAKERS SHOULD EXPECT THAT THE END OF CORE FUNDING WILL LEAD TO
PROGRAMMING LESS DIRECTLY ALIGNED WITH USG FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS
Once core funding ends and a foundation needs to compete for funds in order to survive, its
willingness and ability to continue to support specific USG foreign policy objectives will be
diminished. Foundations will have the incentive to pursue other donor funding which may or
may not align with USG interests.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EF AUDIENCE
USAID MISSIONS SHOULD SEEK MORE ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH PFS REGARDLESS
OF WHETHER THEY ARE IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS OR NOT
There are benefits to having a local foundation on the ground and USAID should leverage that as
a means to build understanding and networks and consider areas of collaboration. There are
specific actions that could be taken, such as including EF PFs in regular meetings of
implementing partners regardless of whether the PF is a direct recipient of USAID funding at
that time.
USAID AORs could do more to foster the relationship between the field Missions and the PFs by
increasing communication to the Missions regarding EF activities. The AORs should continue to
visit PF offices while in country and share reports and other relevant information.
EF-DC AND PF SHOULD UNDERTAKE SIMILAR EFFORTS TO ENGAGE WITH USAID
EF should increase its outreach to USAID with information on its ongoing activities. EF should
seek to invite USAID to public events, share annual reports, and convene their own donor
coordination meetings in areas where the PF has clear expertise.
I
ANNEXES
ANNEX A – SCOPE OF WORK
C.3.1 STATEMENT OF WORK FOR COMPONENT I: THE EURASIA FOUNDATION AND
PARTNER NETWORK EVALUATION
The Eurasia Foundation has now been in operation for nearly 20 years, received approximately $320
million in core U.S. Government funding, and has operated in a total of 12 countries (with current
operations in 10 through the foundation network). The extent of the Eurasia Foundation’s reach and
experience presents a unique evaluation opportunity to assess the success of this approach in meeting
USAID objectives, the overall strengths and weaknesses of the foundation model, and the efforts to build
sustainable legacy foundations. This evaluation is intended to identify valuable lessons learned for multiple
audiences and purposes.
As noted above, there are three main evaluation issues: (I) assess how successful EF programs were in
meeting the three broad strategic objectives identified in the grant agreement; (II) assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the Eurasia Foundation as a model in advancing U.S. policy objectives; and, (III) assess the
efforts of EF-DC to establish and build sustainable foundations through its partnership Network and to plan
for the end of core funding.
The primary objective of the overall evaluation is to build understanding of the strengths/ weaknesses and
advantages/disadvantages of the foundation model to inform USAID, the State Department and other
stakeholders on future program design in the region, including those involving foundations. This will also
be of interest to Members of Congress who have supported the Eurasia Foundation model. Furthermore, the
report should provide learning opportunities for EF-DC to improve upon their model, sustainability efforts,
and support services provided to the foundation network. The findings will also be of interest to other
foundations and NGOs involved in the core program area of the EF grant agreement.
A. Evaluation Questions
The evaluation is aligned to three primary Evaluation Issues identified above that broadly relate to
advancing USAID strategic objectives, foundation models, and sustainability. As noted above, Evaluation
Issue I related to advancing strategic objectives is expected to require 20% of the Level of Effort and be
based primarily on program documentation and information gathered in stakeholder meetings related to the
other two evaluation issues. Thus, the priority areas are Evaluation Issues II and III related to the
foundation model and sustainability, which are expected to each require 40% of the total Level of Effort.
1. Evaluation Issue I: Meeting Strategic Objectives - 20% of Level Effort
Given the breadth of issues addressed by EF over the 10 years of the current grant agreement, and the
evolving conditions and uneven pace of reform in the region, it would be difficult to produce a
comprehensive and quantitative analysis of the overall effectiveness of the program, or develop
standardized evaluation criteria. However, given the sizable investment of U.S. Government resources to
advance the three strategic objectives (SOs) in the region, the evaluation should seek to draw high level
conclusions regarding how successful EF programs were in meeting these objectives in specific cases.
The evaluators should focus on the countries and SOs where the greatest investments were made (See
Annex A). The evaluators should also distinguish between high level political developments and the civil
society/grassroots level, which is where Eurasia Foundation programs were targeted. Eurasia Foundation
and its partner foundations have made hundreds of small grants and it is not envisioned that the evaluators
seek to interview numerous beneficiaries in program areas. Rather, the evaluators should select 5-7 focus
areas defined as SO-country/region combinations and then seek to gather much of the information on the
effectiveness of programs in these specific areas through interviews required for other evaluation issues,
II
including EF partner foundations, major grantees, and USAID representatives. A few additional
supplemental meetings with other donors, leading NGOs, associations and/or civil society groups that are
familiar with EF programs and grantees may be held to further explore views on what made programs more
or less successful. This section should also incorporate some information based on gender, including the
examination of available data on participant trainees and beneficiaries disaggregated by sex.
The purpose of Evaluation Issue I is to draw high level conclusions on the factors contributing to or
detracting from success in 5-7 specific SO-country/region combinations as a means to inform future
program design. Such conclusions would be based primarily on qualitative information from stakeholder
interviews and program documentation. Illustrative examples are provided here to demonstrate the level at
which conclusions should be reached – they are not intended to be examples of areas where the evaluators
should focus.
Example: After 10 years in Country X, there is a clear record of progress in civil society development.
Progress was achieved in specific areas where EF programs were active. Key stakeholder interviews
show that beneficiaries felt that EF programs were effective and contributed to a growing and
strengthening NGO community.
Example: The efforts of the EF through its Small Business Loan Program to advance entrepreneurship
were not a significant part of EF’s program in any country. Even in the countries where EF was most
active, there were numerous other larger donor programs supporting small business lending. While
individual businesses may have benefitted there is no evidence that the programs had a significant
impact in any country or a region.
Example: Media programs developed in several countries made a significant contribution to improved
journalism standards and drew public attention to issues of corruption, placing pressure on government
officials to change behavior in some countries. In several countries where EF was active, there has
been significant backsliding in terms of free and independent media. While key stakeholder interviews
ranked EF programs as effective or very effective, government efforts to control or intimidate the
media created a hostile environment. Some beneficiaries of EF programs felt that they were better able
to cope with the situation as a result of EF training and support.
In addressing the ability to meet strategic objectives, the evaluators should address the following issues:
Did EF programs contribute to advancing the three primary SOs outlined in the original Grant
Agreement related to: Private Enterprise Development, Civil Society, and Public Administration and
Policy?
Did the Foundation prove more effective in advancing some SOs than others? Were EF and its partners
better suited to carry out programs in some strategic objectives than others?
EF and its partner foundations currently operate in 10 countries. Were there countries or regions where
the activities of EF and its partners were considered more successful, less successful? Were there local
factors that contributed to the prospects for success in some program areas vs. others?
Based on available gender disaggregated data, what high level conclusions can be reached regarding
the gender balance in EF programs? Were there some SOs where gender balance in participation was
achieved and others where it was not? Was it more challenging in some countries to attain gender
participation than others?
2. Evaluation Issue II: Foundation Model - 40% of Level of Effort
The evaluation should also assess the overall strengths and weaknesses of the foundation model as an
assistance delivery mechanism. This process should also identify lessons learned for establishing
foundation programs and for interactions with local stakeholders. This should draw upon the direct
experience of the EF and its network foundations in the advantages of operating as a foundation in the E&E
environment. The evaluation should address the following issues:
What were the primary operating models or instruments of delivering assistance employed by the
Eurasia Foundation? Were some instruments more effective than others?
III
Were there areas where the EF model or foundation approach had a comparative advantage in
delivering assistance, in terms of speed, flexibility, and innovation?
Are there clear advantages and shortcomings of the foundation model in meeting certain strategic
objectives? Conversely, are there areas where the EF model is not appropriate to meet USAID
objectives? If so, what USAID tools might be a more appropriate option (project, local APS
mechanism, bilateral agreement, DOAG)?
During the current grant agreement, did the EF change its operating models or instruments based on
lessons learned in implementation or to address limitations to existing instruments?
How do grantees and other beneficiaries report on their experience in working with the EF and its
partners? Were procedures open and transparent, were there frequent rules changes, how difficult was
it to meet reporting, financial and other requirements? Do beneficiaries note that other USAID or
donor programs were easier to apply, implement and report (i.e., EU, IFC, Soros, etc.)?
How did EF coordinate with USAID Missions, other donors, other programs? Were efforts made to
ensure USAID was aware of the programs supported by EF? Were programs harmonized?
How did EF and its partner foundations monitor and evaluate their programs? What are the strengths
and weaknesses of their M&E approach?
3. Evaluation Issue III: Sustainability – 40% of Level of Effort
As noted above, the EF grant agreement was modified in 2003 to allow EF-DC to focus on establishing
partner foundations in the region. The evaluation should assess the effectiveness of EF-DC in building
these institutions, prospects for sustainability of EF-DC and the foundation network, and whether this
approach can serve as a model for future programs. The evaluation should also assess if the drive to
sustainability has required the partner foundations to alter their focus areas, or if they continue to
implement or fund programs that align to the purpose of the original grant. If the program purpose has
evolved considerably, the evaluators should note this and provide explanations. In addition, through
desktop research, the evaluators should try to determine if other U.S. Government supported foundations
have evolved to a sustainability model similar to EF-DC. This includes the Asia Foundation, Inter-
American Foundation, and African Development Foundation.
The evaluation should address the following issues:
Is EF-DC on track to meet its long-term goal of financial sustainability without need of further directed
core funding from the USG? In which countries and SOs does EF-DC expect to continue operations in
the next 5 years?
How has the drive to financial sustainability altered EF-DC’s operations and capabilities? Are the
number of programs or focus areas being reduced or expanded to operate in accordance with
sustainability requirements?
EF-DC has also been focused on establishing and building partner foundations in the region since
2003. EF-DC created the Capacity Mapping Initiative (CMI) model to develop and measure the
organizational capability of partner foundations. Does the EF CMI model sufficiently address the
organizational needs of the partner foundations? Did EF leverage the CMI model with training and
other resources to prepare staff for the transition to sustainability? Are there gaps in this process?
Are the partner foundations capable of continuing to carry out their programs? Is their fundraising
capability sufficient? Are management and operational capabilities (HR, finance, training, etc.) in
place to allow for ongoing growth and program sophistication?
Although EF-DC and the partner foundations receive funding from other sources, does the Foundation
Network continue to focus predominantly on areas aligned to the three SOs in the grant agreement? If
their focus areas have changed significantly, a brief explanation should be provided (i.e., changing
conditions in the country, changing donor landscape, new priorities, etc.).
What key services are provided by the Washington office to the Network foundations? How do the
Network Foundations regard the quality and timeliness of these services? Are Network Foundations
willing to pay the Washington office for these services?
Leveraging desktop research, the evaluators should determine if other U.S. Government supported
foundations have evolved to a sustainability model similar to EF-DC, such as the Asia Foundation,
IV
Inter-American Foundation, and African Development Foundation. If so, which ones have done so and
have any established sustainable partners in the field?
B. Team Composition and Qualifications
This evaluation will be carried out by a four- to five- person team. Two members will be provided by the
Contractor under this task order. Two-three USAID staff will participate as a team member on each team
but under the direction of the Team Leader. The contractor team will include a Senior Technical Advisor
/Team Leader, and an Institutions and Organizations Analyst. Individual contractor evaluation team
member responsibilities and qualifications are listed below.
1. Senior Technical Advisor/Team Leader - The Senior Technical Advisor/Team Leader should have 15
years of experience in the implementation of foreign assistance programs and an advanced degree
(Masters or above). He/she should have extensive overseas program evaluation experience (including
USAID related) and be thoroughly familiar with techniques of program performance appraisals. Strong
writing and word processing skills are a requirement. Previous overseas experience in the NIS and
Russian language capability is highly desirable.
The incumbent is responsible for coordinating and directing the overall evaluation effort, including
planning for logistical aspects of the evaluation and preparation and submission of the draft and final
evaluation reports to USAID/E&E. The incumbent should be either a regular staff member of the
contractor or a consultant used by the contractor for evaluations. As evaluation team leader, the
incumbent should possess good organization and teambuilding skills.
2. Institutions and Organizations Analyst - The Institutions and Organizations Analyst should have a
minimum of 10 years of experience in the design, implementation and/or evaluation of foreign
assistance programs and an advanced degree. The incumbent should have broad familiarity with the
organization structure, problems and needs of foundations, NGOs, or civil society groups, including
fundraising and outreach programs. He/she should also have expertise in appropriateness, structure and
benefits of successful grants programs. Strong writing and word processing skills are a requirement.
Previous overseas experience in the NIS and Russian language capability is highly desirable.
The incumbent is responsible for supporting and coordinating logistical aspects of the evaluation and
preparation and submission of the draft and final evaluation reports to USAID/E&E. The incumbent will
draft sections of the evaluation specific to the countries he/she visits, leading interviews, and developing
questionnaires as needed. The incumbent should be either a regular staff member of the contractor or a
consultant used by the contractor for evaluations.
3. USAID Officers - The two to three incumbent(s) should have broad USAID experience, with particular
emphasis on project implementation and evaluation. They should also have broad experience in the
E&E region as well as a detailed understanding of the Eurasia Foundation programs and operations
from both a Washington as well as field perspective. The USAID team members should each have
direct experience in one or more of the SO aligned areas – private enterprise development, civil
society, and/or public administration. USAID staff will operate under the general direction and
guidance of the Team Leader and will participate in data collection through interviews, meetings, etc.,
both in Washington and in the field. After the award is made, they will be engaged with the contractor
in the evaluation design process and support drafting relevant sections of the report as appropriate.
They will also review text and make comments and edits during the drafting and review process.
The Evaluation team shall demonstrate familiarity with USAID’s Evaluation Policy
(http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation/USAIDEvaluationPolicy.pdf). All Team members will be required to
provide a signed statement attesting to a lack of conflict of interest, or describing an existing conflict of
interest.
C. Suggested Methodology
V
There are extensive background information and reports available to the evaluators. The document review
should include but not be limited to the following:
The original grant agreement and all amendments and modifications
All annual and bi-annual reports from EF-DC to USAID
The 2001 Evaluation under the previous grant
Country specific 3-year strategic plans that identify priority areas of focus for that country/region
The CMI tool and past CMI reports
Sustainability Plan and EF-DC reports under the Sustainability Plan
The 2008 Development Plan prepared by EF-DC that includes EF network fundraising plans and
targets
Network foundation reports to EF-DC
Relevant evaluations of programs carried out by EF-DC and partner foundations (for programs to be
specifically reviewed by the evaluators)
A review of secondary literature as determined relevant by the evaluation team.
This evaluation presents challenges due to the long term nature, extensive geographic reach, and significant
funding levels of the EF grant. This is particularly relevant in carrying out Evaluation Issue I – Meeting
Strategic Objectives. As noted above, this is expected to require approximately 20% of the evaluator’s
Level of Effort. Given that the Eurasia Foundation operated in 12 countries, with 3 strategic objectives
each, this creates 36 possible areas to explore. Furthermore, given the number and diverse nature of the
grants awarded by EF and its partners, as well as their own programs, it is not feasible to establish
quantitative criteria to measure program impact across all activities.
As noted above, the purpose of this Evaluation Issue is to inform future program design in the region. As
such, the evaluation is expected to draw high level conclusions on how successful EF programs were in 5-7
SO- country/region combinations and the factors that contributed to or detracted from success. As included
in the questions section above, these factors can include country conditions or issues specific to EF, its
network foundations, or partners. Demonstrating causation or direct linkages between specific programs
and outcomes is not expected. Rather, the evaluators should seek to draw high level conclusions about what
worked well, what did not, and why (please refer to the Illustrative Examples on page 14).
A suggested approach for considering success in meeting the strategic objectives would be to first review
commonly used resources of economic and democratic development for countries in the region. Examples
include Freedom House “Nations in Transit”, USAID’s “NGO Sustainability Index”, the World Bank
“Doing Business Report”, the World Economic Forum “Global Competitiveness Index”, Transparency
International’s Global Corruption Reports, and other resources. In addition, USAID’s Monitoring Country
Progress report analyzes country performance by drawing from these reports and other data points and
creates additional indicators for country comparisons and trends over time. Based on desktop research of
these resources, broad conclusions can be reached in terms of the performance of specific countries over
the designated timeframe. A matrix could be produced that reaches broad conclusions as to whether a
country improved or declined in looking at indicators reflective of each of the SOs.
The evaluators should then review the investments made by EF and partner foundations in order to
determine the countries and SOs where the largest investments were made. Then, using the analysis of
available resources, determinations can be made as to whether EF made significant investments in the areas
where the country performance improved or conversely, where it declined. With this information, the
evaluators could then identify the 5-7 SO-country/ region combinations that would be explored further.
The evaluators will then seek to identify key stakeholders to interview regarding those specific SO-
country/region combinations. As noted above, much of the information to assess Evaluation Issue I will be
gathered from the same stakeholders as with Evaluation Issues II and III. However, some supplemental
meetings will also be needed to complete Evaluation Issue I. This could include large grantees or
organizations that worked extensively with a grantee in a particular area. In addition, external stakeholders
VI
could include other foundations in the region (including US supported Enterprise Funds and their legacy
foundations); other donors such as the World Bank and EBRD; leading NGOs or civil society groups;
private sector associations and professional groups; and host government officials when appropriate. The
evaluators should seek the input of the EF Network offices in each country, USAID staff, and other donors
to identify key stakeholders, but should also conduct independent research as needed. However, only a few
key additional stakeholder meetings are envisioned to assess a particular SO-country/region combination.
The draft Work Plan (see Deliverables section below) should identify the 5-7 SO-country/region
combinations that will be explored, the justifications for proposing those areas for further analysis, and the
supplemental interviews that will take place as part of assessing this evaluation issue. The final
determination will be made in consultation with the COR.
With respect to Evaluation Issue II, evaluators should review project documentation and conduct interviews
with USAID, EF staff and program participants to understand EF’s operating model and areas where the EF
model had a comparative advantage to other types of programs. Furthermore, given the long timeframe of
the grant, to assess coordination with USAID Missions it might be required to interview staff no longer at
that post. EF-DC and USAID will facilitate identifying and contacting those informants.
For Evaluation Issue III, the information should be gathered directly from EF-DC and the Foundation
Network. Review of the sustainability plan, CMI tool, and current targets and fundraising results of EF-DC
and the partner foundations will be critical. Evaluators may request management documentation from EF-
DC and the Foundation Network to assess sustainability. In assessing sustainability, evaluators should
compare observed and reported practices, operations, and capabilities of the foundation and its partners to
explicit sustainability criteria, such as best practices, benchmarks, or NGO sector standards.
The evaluation team should then develop interview guides to be reviewed and accepted by the COR. The
interview guides should identify the target audience for sets of questions by each Evaluation Issue. Mini-
surveys and/or group interviews of relevant informants, such as USAID staff, should also be considered, as
well as web-surveys or group interviews of key stakeholders in some countries. Program documentation
should be used, as appropriate, to support evaluation findings.
Also note that this approach is also suggested methodology and offerors can propose any approach that
they feel will enable them to draw sufficient conclusions to achieve the objectives of this evaluation. Any
methodology proposed by the Contractor should allow them to stay within the LOE percentage allocations
for each issue area.
D. Country Visits
EF activities are widely dispersed throughout the E&E region, extending over thousands of miles. For this
reason, along with security considerations and travel difficulties, it is not considered feasible to have the
evaluation team visit all 10 countries in which EF operates. A minimum of 5 country visits should be made,
and visits are mandatory for Russia and Ukraine given the level of investment in these countries. At least
one country each from the Caucasus and one from Central Asia must also be included, and the additional
country should be proposed and justified by the contractor.
The country visits for Component I will be conducted over a 4-week timeframe, and a 6-day work week is
authorized while in the field. Ideally, travel will occur during the month of June in an effort to avoid to the
extent possible seeking interviews during this region’s popular holiday months of July and August. It is
also envisioned that the team split up and visit countries in sub-teams of 2, based on a logical schedule
proposed by the contractor that minimizes expense and travel times. Each group of 2 will include one
representative of the contractor and one representative of USAID, each visiting a group of countries
together.
The contractor is expected to propose a specific schedule and arrangement of country visits in the Work
Plan. This should include the number of days in each country, as well as identify travel within a country or
cross border trips.
VII
The final decision on country visits will be determined in consultation with team members and the USAID
COR. Countries selected should provide a cross-section of EF activities, and allow the team to assess the 5-
7proposed SO-country/region combinations proposed in the Work Plan.
In each country visited, the evaluation team should visit USAID Missions and meet with Mission staff
familiar with EF programs as well as relevant US Embassy personnel. EF partner foundation offices should
also be visited and meetings with relevant partner foundation staff to assess each of the Evaluation Issues.
Also, for assessing Evaluation Issues I and II in particular, interviews should be scheduled with local
organizations that received extensive EF support, project sites, and other donors involved in relevant
program areas. While a minimum of 5 country visits is required to consider all the Partner Foundations,
opportunities to visit additional programs and stakeholders by making short regional trips should also be
explored.
While on the ground, the evaluation team should identify other stakeholders to interview and allow
flexibility in schedule in order to respond to new information and opportunities in country.
C.5 DELIVERABLES87
1. Work Plan: include evaluation activities, schedule, country visits and days in each country for
Components I and II, along with defined roles and responsibilities for team members
2. Evaluation Design: outline of methodology for the evaluation for Components I and II, including
detailed evaluation design matrix with evaluation questions, and for each question the methods used to
address it, sources of information, and data analysis plan.
3. Data Collection Tools: Draft and Final questionnaires, surveys, focus groups, and other data collection
instruments in both draft and final for Components I and II.
4. Updated SOW if applicable
5. Briefings: Out-briefs provided to each Mission that requests one in countries visited, structured as no
more than a 10-slide PowerPoint or 3-page Word document
6. Draft Report: 1Electronic version due within two weeks of conclusion of field visits that is structured
as outlined above and includes appendices
7. Final Report: 10 copies and an electronic version due within 6 days of receipt of final comments from
USAID that incorporates USAID comments and includes appendices
8. Final Presentations: Following acceptance of the Final Report, a presentation will be made to USAID
Washington, State Department and other relevant stakeholders on final report findings that will be in
Power Point format and follow the structure of the Final Report. A presentation will also be scheduled
with Eurasia Foundation in Washington.
9. Evaluation Record: including interview transcripts or summaries, all quantitative data collected by the
evaluation team must be provided in an electronic file in easily readable format agreed upon with the
COR.
All deliverables should be submitted to USAID/W, including the hard copies of the final report. The
Contractor will make the final evaluation reports publicly available through the Development Experience
Clearinghouse within 30 calendar days of final approval of the formatted report. A more detailed
description of the deliverables can be found in Section F.
87
All deliverables are to be produced in English
VIII
ANNEX B – DETAILED METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS, AND THREATS
TO VALIDITY
SI employed a mixed-method evaluation design with a heavy reliance on qualitative data and analysis,
reinforced where possible by quantitative analysis. This consisted of a detailed desk review, semi-
structured key informant and group interviews, focus group interviews, an electronic grantee survey, and
a quasi-Delphi “Advisory Committee” discussion.
The team’s desk review consisted of analyzing relevant documents provided by USAID/E&E and EF and
program and management documentation received from EF and its PFs. The team also reviewed materials
associated with the earlier 2001 EF evaluation.
During fieldwork, the team conducted semi-structured key informant (SSKI) and group interviews and
also conducted a few focus group discussions where feasible (Tajikistan and Belarus). Interviewees were
selected by the individual PFs themselves and interviews almost always took place at the PFs’ offices.
The team used SSKI guides that combined both open and close-ended questions (See Annex G). The
guides were not pretested and were slightly refined as the fieldwork went on. Key stakeholders were
interviewed in Washington, D.C. and in each of the 8 countries to be visited (Russia, Moldova, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Belarus). These included USAID and other USG
officials, EF leaders and grant managers, grantee representatives, and a selected number of program
beneficiaries, such as media professionals, graduates of training programs, and government officials at the
policy and administrative levels. At the conclusion of fieldwork, the team had a robust data set from over
100 SKIs. Interviews were in almost all cases conducted by two evaluators, one asking questions and the
other taking notes and asking follow up questions.
SI also assembled an Advisory Group comprised of esteemed foundation executives to review draft
evaluation findings and conclusions regarding questions on the “foundation model” and the sustainability
of EF and its network. The idea was to utilize a modified Delphi technique to attempt to validate the
team’s early impressions. The AG’s discussions were incorporated into the draft report. The AG was also
asked to read the draft report and provide written comments for incorporation into the final draft.
Lastly, the team designed, refined, and implemented an electronic survey to EF beneficiaries across all
PFs (not just those visited by the team). The survey data was then analyzed by SI HQ staff and
incorporated into the draft report.
EVALUATION QUESTIONS
The original Request for Task Order Proposals (RFTOP) provided a useful set of primary evaluation
questions (shown in bold) and secondary evaluation questions which SI focused and modified. While the
additional evaluation questions posed in the RFTOP were relevant and interesting, SI stressed the
importance of focusing on those questions of most importance and utility to USAID in designing similar
or follow-on activities.
COMPONENT ONE: EVALUATION OF EF AND ITS PARTNER NETWORK
Has EF contributed to the achievement of the three SOs identified in the original grant agreement
(20% of LOE)?
Was EF successful in advancing the three SOs identified in the original grant agreement and were
EF and its partners better able to carry out programs in some strategic objectives than others?
Were there any contextual factors that facilitated or hindered the achievement of each SO? What
steps did EF take to ensure the achievement of gender balance in each of the SOs?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the EF as a model for advancing US development
IX
objectives (40% of LOE)?
Were there sector or country areas where the EF model had a comparative advantage in
delivering development assistance compared to other forms of USAID assistance in terms of
speed, flexibility, and innovation?
How do grantees and other beneficiaries report on their experience in working with the EF and its
partners, and how did this compare to working with other donor programs, i.e., were procedures
open and transparent, how difficult was it to meet reporting, financial and other requirements of
USAID compared to others, etc.
How did EF coordinate with USAID Missions and other USAID programs in implementation?
Has EF-DC succeeded its efforts to establish and build sustainable foundations through its
partnership network prior to the end of core grant funding (40% of LOE)?
What steps has EF-DC taken to ensure the financial sustainability of its partner network beyond
the end of core grant funding?
Does each of the partner foundations have the financial, managerial, and operational capacity to
ensure ongoing program growth and sophistication?
Is EF-DC’s Capacity Mapping Initiative (CMI) successful in accurately measuring the
organizational capacity of partner foundations and addressing the key areas that allow for this
determination?
COMPONENT TWO: EVALUATION OF NEE IN BELARUS
How effective are NEE programs (40% of LOE)?
To what degree are NEE programs effective?
What are the internal and external factors influencing the level of success of NEE programs?
Would a smaller and more targeted portfolio influence the success and visibility of NEE
programs?
Does NEE’s current program portfolio contribute to achieving USAID/Belarus’s SOs (20% of
LOE)?
In what way does the NEE portfolio contribute to achieving USAID/Belarus's SOs?
How can NEE modify and adjust its portfolio to better achieve USAID/Belarus SOs?
What are the strengths and gaps in NEE’s organizational capacity (40% of LOE)?
What are the key constraints and capacity gaps that effect the NEE’s sustainability?
Does the CMI tool of the Eurasia Foundation offer opportunities to address the identified capacity
gaps, as compared to the OCA and other tools used by the evaluators?
How effective is the current mode of operation/division of labor, with EF/Washington providing
management oversight and EF/Kiev providing technical and financial oversight of the NEE?
Could the delivery of services through the EF Network to the NEE be improved?
EVALUATION DESIGN MATRIX
Evaluation Question Evaluation Method Source of Information Data Analysis Plan
Component One: Evaluation of EF and its Partner Network
Has EF contributed to the
achievement of the three
SOs identified in the
original grant agreement?
1. Desk review
2. Structured key
informant
interviews
3. Group
1. Administrative and
management data
from EF (desk
review)
2. Grant portfolios (desk
1. Prepare a chart showing
range, value, and array
of input investments to
identify patterns of
association and variance
X
- Was EF successful in
advancing the three SOs
identified in the original
grant agreement and
were EF and its partners
better able to carry out
programs in some SOs
than others?
- Where there any
contextual factors that
facilitated or hindered
the achievement of each
SO? What steps did EF
take to ensure the
achievement of gender
balance in each of the
SOs?
interviews
4. Electronic
surveys
review)
3. Secondary data
sources, as listed in
text (desk review)
4. EF staff (SKIs)
5. Cohort grantees
including civil
society, gender
identified
groupings, local EF
Network staff, and
government
officials (Group
interviews)
6. EF beneficiary
stakeholders
(Survey)
7. Non-stakeholders
familiar with EF
program outcomes
(SKIs)
between inputs
2. Disaggregate data by
gender to determine
extent of gender balance
and use desk review and
SKIs to assess how EF
achieved that level of
gender balance
3. Provide aggregate
answers to other
questions to stimulate
additional questions
prior to field work
4. Compile and synthesize
all data to construct
ordinal ratings to permit
comparisons across EF
countries
What are the strengths and
weaknesses of the EF as a
model for advancing US
development objectives?
- Were there sector or
country areas where the
EF model had a
comparative advantage
in delivering
development assistance
compared to other forms
of USAID assistance in
terms of speed,
flexibility, and
innovation?
- How do grantees and
other beneficiaries report
on their experience in
working with the EF and
its partners, and how did
this compare to working
with other donor
programs, i.e., were
procedures open and
transparent, how difficult
was it to meet reporting,
financial and other
requirements of USAID
compared to others, etc.
1. Desk review
2. Structured key
informant
interviews
3. Electronic
surveys
4. Group
interviews
5. Review of
evaluation
evidence
1. Administrative and
management data
from EF (desk
review)
2. Grant portfolios
(desk review)
3. Secondary data
sources, as listed in
text (desk review)
4. Eurasia Foundation
staff (SKIs)
5. USAID current and
former staff (SKIs)
6. Network
Foundation
leadership (SKIs)
7. EF grantees
(Survey and group
interviews)
8. SI’s Advisory
Committee (review
of evidence)
1. Analyze EF strategies
and grant-making
patterns to determine
whether EF changed
operating models
2. Compare EF’s
interactions with
grantees to those of
other donor grant
programs
3. Use Advisory
Committee expertise to
analyze advantages and
disadvantages of the
foundation model
XI
- How did EF coordinate
with USAID Missions
and other USAID
programs in
implementation?
Has EF-DC succeeded its
efforts to establish and
build sustainable
foundations through its
partnership network prior
to the end of core grant
funding?
- What steps has EF-DC
taken to ensure the
financial sustainability of
its partner network
beyond the end of core
grant funding?
- Does each of the partner
foundations have the
financial, managerial,
and operational capacity
to ensure ongoing
program growth and
sophistication?
- Is EF-DC’s Capacity
Mapping Initiative
(CMI) successful in
accurately measuring the
organizational capacity
of partner foundations
and addressing the key
areas that allow for this
determination?
1. Structured
key informant
interviews
2. Desk review
3. Electronic
surveys
1. EF grantor
organization
leaders (SKIs)
2. Capacity Mapping
Initiative (Desk
review)
3. SI’s Advisory
Committee (Desk
review)
4. Other quasi-public,
quasi-private
foundations such as
TAF (Desk review)
5. Administrative and
management data
from EF (desk
review)
6. Other donor
organizations that
provide funding to
EF and its Partner
foundations
(electronic surveys)
1. Analyze EF investment
strategies and actual
investment patterns to
assess efforts to achieve
financial sustainability
2. Analyze the CMI and
EF’s institution building
to determine the
effectiveness of EF’s
capacity building efforts
3. Assess EF strategies and
investments over 10
years and analyze EF’s
theories of change
4. Develop a funding data
matrix to determine
similarities and
differences between
EF’s approach and that
of other similar
foundations
Component Two: Evaluation of NEE in Belarus
How effective are NEE
programs?
- To what degree are NEE
programs effective?
- What are the internal and
external factors
influencing the level of
success of NEE
programs?
- Would a smaller and
more targeted portfolio
influence the success and
1. Desk review
2. Structured
key informant
interviews
1. NEE strategy and
operational plans
(desk review)
2. NEE staff (SKIs)
3. Non-EF
stakeholders (such
as grantees and
beneficiaries)
(SKIs)
4. EF-DC and Kiev-
based staff (SKIs)
1. Examine and assess
M&E output against SI
report standards and
rating systems
2. Use SKIs to determine
“what works and why”
XII
visibility of NEE
programs?
Does NEE’s current
program portfolio
contribute to achieving
USAID/Belarus’s SOs?
- In what way does the
NEE portfolio contribute
to achieving
USAID/Belarus's SOs?
- How can NEE modify
and adjust its portfolio to
better achieve
USAID/Belarus SOs?
1. Desk review
2. Structured
key informant
interviews
1. NEE strategy and
operational plans
(desk review)
2. USAID staff
(SKIs)
3. NEE grantees
(SKIs)
4. NEE staff (SKIs)
1. Produce a matrix and
“degree of fit”
assessment to compare
portfolio with USAID’s
SOs
What are the strengths and
gaps in NEE’s organizational
capacity
- What are the key
constraints and capacity
gaps that effect the
NEE’s sustainability?
- Does the CMI tool of the
EF offer opportunities to
address the identified
capacity gaps, compared
to USAID’s OCA tool
and other tools used by
the evaluators?
- How effective is the
current mode of
operation/division of
labor, with
EF/Washington
providing management
oversight and EF/Kiev
providing technical and
financial oversight of the
NEE? Could the
delivery of services
through the EF Network
to the NEE be improved?
1. Capacity
Diagnostic
Tool
2. Structured
key informant
interviews
1. NEE staff (SKIs)
2. EF-DC and Kiev-
based staff (SKIs)
3. USAID staff in
Belarus and Kiev
(SKIs)
4. Possibly also staff
of other partner
foundations to
identify where they
are in terms of
capacity
development to
share best practices
(SKIs)
1. Use the Capacity
Diagnostic Tool to
identify gaps in NEE
organizational structure,
staff, and procedures
2. Assess the utility of the
CMI in addressing
capacity gaps within the
NEE
3. Examine the success of
the division of labor
through SKIs
THREATS TO VALIDITY
Given the broad scope and relative limited resources of the evaluation, the evaluation design and
methodology has some significant internal and external threats to validity.
Internal Threats to the Validity
Selection Bias
XIII
The most significant threat to validity faced by the evaluation team was a strong selection bias in
interviewees. Given time and budget limitations, the individual PFs were asked to help arrange individual
and group interviews. Interviewees were thus purposefully sampled and likely biased towards providing
positive reflections as the PFs had an incentive to avoid selecting those that were known to have had a
negative experience. The evaluation team attempted to overcome this potential bias by triangulating
interview responses with survey and secondary data.
It should also be noted that the grants reviewed were classified by the individual PFs and that no
classification key was available for the team to review. The evaluation team did not systematically review
all the classifications and there is a possibility that they would have classified some differently had they
had a standard definition to follow. Some of the grants could also fit into multiple categories and the team
made subjective judgments on which single category was most representative of the grant’s focus.
Instrumentation Effect
The interview protocols were developed by the team during their first couple of days in-country.
Although the protocols did not change significantly over the course the evaluation, certain questions and
phrasing were refined throughout the interviews. While this potentially threatened the reliability of early
interview responses, the evaluators are confident that the degree of consensus around the major findings
highlighted in the report was not affect by this threat.
External Threats to Validity
“Pleasing the Interviewer,” Courtesy Bias, and other Experimental Effects
As with most interview data collection, there was a possible courtesy or “pleasing the interviewers” bias
in the responses of the interviewees. Interviewees were provided with a standard introduction to the
evaluation before being asked any questions and were likely also informed of the evaluation’s purpose
during the scheduling of the interview by the PFs. The interviewees were thus aware that they responses
might influence the judgments of the evaluators and could be biased towards skewing their responses in
the hopes of supporting their PFs, telling the evaluators what the interviewee that they might like to hear,
or other potential biases introduced during this type of data collection.
Evaluator Effect
The evaluation design’s heavy qualitative focus also resulted in the potential for subjective judgments and
the opinions of the evaluators’ influencing their data collection. The team tried to mitigate this risk by
having at least two people present during interviews and also triangulating their interview data with
survey and other secondary data.
XIV
ANNEX C – LIST OF PEOPLE CONTACTED
Interviewees for Component I
Name Title and Organization Country
Alexis Loeber American Embassy/USAID/Moscow Russia
Andrei Kortunov American Embassy/USAID/Moscow Russia
Natalia Shuranova Director of Financial and Analytical Department,
FNE
Russia
Masha Eismont Director of the Independent Print Media
Program, FNE
Russia
Charles Maynes Senior Advisor, FNE Russia
Svetlana Kurchenkova Project Manager, FNE - Small Business Projects Russia
Elena Golovko Project Manager, FNE - The World of
Professions through Education
Russia
Andrei Kortunov President, FNE Russia
Sergey Golubev Project Manager, FNE - Community Universities Russia
Nargisa Valamat-Zade FNE - Educational Block Russia
Oksana Fodina FNE - Educational Block Russia
Mikhail Troitskiy Associate Director, MacArthur Foundation Russia
Vyacheslav Bakhmin FNE - Mott Foundation Russia
Sergey Martyshenko FNE - SUAL Russia
Anna Koshman Association of Independent Regional Publishers Russia
Elena Agranat British Embassy Russia
Irina Ryazanova FNE - CSPP Russia
Alexis Loeber Counsellor, EU-Russia Cooperation Programme Russia
Mark Pomar US-Russia Foundation Russia
Ms. Naila Hashimova President, EPF Azerbaijan
Ms. Ilaha Rasulova Program Manager, Citizen Journalism E-Media
Program, EPF
Azerbaijan
Mr. Gurself Alivey Caucasus Research Resource Centers PF Azerbaijan
Mr. Zaur Zamanov Political Officer, British Embassy Azerbaijan
Mr. Kenan Shikhlinksy BP Representative Azerbaijan
Ms. Gunay Zeynalova Youth Economic Development Program PF Azerbaijan
Tamilla Mammadova Azerbaijan
Vazgen Karapetyan Associate Country Director, SATR Program
Manager, Arm-Az Program Manager, SCCP
Program Manager
Armenia
Mara Ayvazyan Program Development Manager Armenia
Suren Yeganyan Finance Manager, EPF and CRRC Armenia Armenia
Heghine Manasyan CRRC Armenia Director Armenia
Anna Sargsyan Program Manager, Fellowships and CSW,
CRRC
Armenia
Gegham Sargsyan NDI Yerevan Office Armenia
Gayane Ghukasyan Expert, lecturer at YSU Armenia
Samvel Manukyan Expert, Researcher Armenia
Nairuhi Jrbashyan Expert, Researcher Armenia
Kristine Antonyan Lecturer, YSU Armenia
Yulia Antonyan Lecturer, YSU, CRRC-Arm Fellow Armenia
Zhanna Andreasyan CRRC-Arm Expert, Social Cohesion Project Armenia
Rouben Gevorgyan Trainer, lecturer, YSU Armenia
Alla Bakunts DG Portfolio Analyst, UNDP Armenia Armenia
Deana Arsenian Vice President, International Program, and
Program Director, Higher Education in Eurasia,
United States
XV
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Varya Meruzhanyan SATR Project Manager United States
Zaqar Boyajyan Deputy President of UNIBANK Armenia
Isabella Sargsyan Armenia-Azerbaijan Program Manger Armenia
Gevorg Ter-Gabrileyan Country Director, SATR Chief of Party Armenia
Haykanush Iskandaryan EPF grants manager, Arm-Az grants manager Armenia
Anahit Khachatryan EPF AOR, Project Management Specialist
USAID/Armenia
Armenia
Gayane Grigoryan Deputy Program Officer Armenia
Anna Poghosyan Civic Journalist Armenia
Marianna Grigoryan Journalist Armenia
Vahe Nersesyan Animator Armenia
Vahagn Antonyan Film Director Armenia
Artashes Arakelyan Civic Journalist Armenia
Maria Karapetyan Civic Journalist Armenia
Lusine Sargsyan Photographer/Journalist Armenia
Karine Aghajanyan Blogger/Journalist Armenia
Naira Sultanyan Project Manager/Political Officer, UK FCO Armenia
Olya Azatyan Project Support Officer, UK FCO Armenia
Gareth Wynn Owen Deputy Head of Mission,UK FCO Armenia
Arthur Ghazaryan SATR, Business Strand Coordinator, Union of
Manufacturers and Businessmen of Armenia
Armenia
Tevan Poghosyan Executive Director of International Centre for
Human Development, SATR Program Manager
Armenia
Boris Navasardyan President, Yerevan Press Club, SATR Media
strand Coordinator
Armenia
Sorin Mereacre President, EEF Moldova
Ana Olaru Director of Finance, EEF Moldova
George Zarubin President, EPF Moldova
Dato Jashiasvili CFO, EPF Moldova
Azalia Dairbekova President, EFCA Moldova
Bermet Tuibaeva PM Kyrgyzstan
Anida Shergalieva Senior GCM, Central Asia News Service Kyrgyzstan
Cholpon Dootalieva Chief Accountant Kyrgyzstan
Dinara Toktosheva Executive Director, EFCA Kyrgyzstan
Bektur Iskenderov Kloop Kyrgyzstan
Galina Gaparova Kloop Kyrgyzstan
Aijan Toktosheva Youth of Osh Kyrgyzstan
Tamara Djoldosheva Project Director, EFCA Kyrgyzstan
Dinara Musabekova Executive Director, EFCA Kyrgyzstan
Nazgul Asangozhoeva Central Asia News Service Kyrgyzstan
Alina Saginbaeva Project Director, Central Asia News Service Kyrgyzstan
Samagan Aitymbetov Editor, Central Asia News Service Kyrgyzstan
Nazarali Pirnazarov Journalist, Dushanbe Kyrgyzstan
Erkin Konurbaev USAID/CAR Kyrgyzstan
Aijan Urustamova Financial Officer, KICB Kyrgyzstan
Erika Bayalieva Financial Officer, Kompanion Kyrgyzstan
Gulzada Duishebaeva EdNet Kyrgyzstan
Nurgazy Tashiiev Career Center of Osh State university Kyrgyzstan
Talant Toktaliev Career Center of Kyrgyz Economic University Kyrgyzstan
Miraida Batkulova International Academy Kyrgyzstan
Aidai Tulemisheva Credit Borrower Kyrgyzstan
Amantai Toktorov Intern at Begemot Kyrgyzstan
Maksat Abdukarimov Intern Kyrgyz law academy Kyrgyzstan
XVI
Urmat Jumashaliev Internal control manager of Atalyk Group Kyrgyzstan
Dinara Mamytova Consultant at Jogorku Kenesh Kyrgyzstan
Aigerim Joldosheva PM, EFCA Kyrgyzstan
Cholpon Dootalieva Chief Acct, EFCA Kyrgyzstan
Edil Kalashev National WTO Expert Kyrgyzstan
Kubat Kanimetov Country Manager Kyrgyzstan
Kubat Rahimov Contractor Kyrgyzstan
Roman Pogojev Contractor Kyrgyzstan
Askar Beshimov Contractor Kyrgyzstan
Myles Smith Kyrgyzstan
Umida Khaknazar Kyrgyzstan
Nurbek Sariev Head of Osh office Kyrgyzstan
Bagdagul Abdikarimova CFO, EFCA Kyrgyzstan
Dildora Khamidova Project Manager, EFCA Kyrgyzstan
Mirbek Babakulov Partner/mobilizer Kyrgyzstan
Leilek Daanishmani Partner/mobilizer Kyrgyzstan
Gazbek Kalmuratov Partner/mobilizer Kyrgyzstan
Ravshan Abdullaev Executive Director, EFCA Tajikistan
Parviz Akobirshoev Financial Manager, EFCA Tajikistan
Rinat Khusnullin Program Manager, EFCA Tajikistan
Farangis Mamadieva Program Manager, EFCA Tajikistan
Audrey Janin Development Reporting and Evaluation
Manager, EFCA
Tajikistan
Sharipov Mahmadnazir President of American Chamber of commerce
(AmCham)
Tajikistan
Ilkhom Makhkambaev Executive Director, AmCham Tajikistan
Said Sharipov Former EFCA's financial manager (2006-2009),
AmCham
Tajikistan
Nazarali Pirnazarov Permanent Representative of CA-news in
Tajikistan, member of TRCN
Tajikistan
Vadim Sadonshoev Former EFCA's program manager for the project Tajikistan
Ben Gibson State Department, liaises with AmCham Tajikistan
Rinat Khusnullin Program manager, EFCA Tajikistan
Ravshan Abdullaev Executive Director, EFCA Tajikistan
Anna Shukurova Executive Director, Union of professional
consultants of Tajikistan
Tajikistan
Nurali Shukurov General Director, Union of professional
consultants of Tajikistan
Tajikistan
Lutfiddin Tuychiev Entrepreneur Tajikistan
Nigina Alieva Communications, The World Bank Tajikistan Tajikistan
Kristina Bagramyan Program Manager Ukraine
Victoria Marchenko Program Manager, Civil Society and Media,
UNITER/Pact, USAID
Ukraine
Yuriy Piskaluk Program Manager Ukraine
Maryna Nyxhnyk Regional Development Manager Ukraine
Trond Moe Board Member Ukraine
Elena Sayenko Program Manager Ukraine
Viktor Karpenko Evaluation Officer Ukraine
Victor Liakh Executive Director Ukraine
Oksana Regional (Ukr, Bel, Mold) Programs Ukraine
Mr. Turo Matilla Second Secretary, Embassy of Finland Ukraine
Yaroslav Yurtsaba National Project Manager, OSCE Ukraine
Elena Sayenko Program Manager, EEF Ukraine
Anna Schiraya PR and Media Connections Ukraine
XVII
Roland Kovats COP Ukraine
Irina Bilous COP Ukraine
Susanne Drakborg Country Manager, World Childhood Foundation Sweden
John Riordan Ukraine
Andriy Nesterenko USAID Ukraine
Dinu Toderascu Program Officer, Black Sea Trust Romania
XVIII
ANNEX D – LIST OF EF’S GENDER INDICATORS
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
199,692 97,511 276,544 166,461 100,652 75,530 48,724 63,025 19,507 1,047,646
61,025 46,237 56,596 54,688 33,217 37,554 30,112 24,558 110,100 454,087
28,872 10,213 25,110 21,539
4,130 2,754 3,870 14,335 2,681 113,504
1,729 1,126 1,706 1,727 1214 631 1586 611 299 10,629
7,420,000 3,029,398 5,272,214 5,379,768 1,563,246 1,524,184 1,383,097 201,292 306,055 26,079,254
178,532 5,211 8,098 9,893 3,671 12,898 8,107 1,980 2,203 230,593
451 398
403 646 266 138 269 192 109
2,872
806 308 576 3,758 2390 1,570 1074 1,001 0 11,483
3,190 3,990 5,561 1,556 561 53 254 738 21 15,924
46,458 47,428 152,802 83,717 52,171 42,661 24,511 29,896 7,913 487,557 47%
153,234 50,083 123,742 82,744 48,481 32,869 24,213 33,129 11,594 560,089
37,672 23,515 28,470 25,816 17,859 22,219 14,241 10,814 54,760 235,366
23,353 22,722 28,126 28,872 15,358 15,336 15,871 13,744 55,340 218,722 48%
XIX
ANNEX E – GRANT AGREEMENT SOW
Background
One of the major lessons of the past decade of Western assistance in the former Soviet Union is that reform cannot
be sustained from the top alone. Some of the most significant changes in the region over the past ten years have been
wrought by private citizens at the local level. At this level, experimentation can take place and the impact of actions
taken is readily seen. People develop a personal stake in change because they see that it can benefit their lives and
livelihoods.
Local successes have been so significant that they should now be sustained and expanded. It would be a historic
miscalculation if the West followed the advice of some Western observers and decided that since
government-to-government and large-scale international programs have not fulfilled initial expectations, the
former Soviet Union is an area where Western assistance programs cannot work effectively, and,
consequently, should be terminated. On the contrary, the experience of the past ten years strongly suggests that the
West should increase its engagement of the region -- although not necessarily the size of its financial commitment.
And, most importantly, it should re-orient its support to focus on bottom-up, grass-roots activity.
The Eurasia Foundation was created explicitly to deliver a bottom-up, grass-roots grants program in Eurasia. The
impetus to create the Eurasia Foundation was based on a joint U.S. Department of State and USAID initiative. The
foundation was proposed in 1992 as an autonomous, private entity to further U.S. development and policy objectives
in the former Soviet Union. It began its technical assistance program in May 1993 with an initial grant of $75
million from USAID and has maintained a core program of approximately $25 million a year from USAID ever
since. In 1997, the foundation received a second grant from USAID of $104.35 million to continue its programs at a
comparable level. Since 1995, the foundation has raised over $30 million from non-U.S. government sources to
provide additional support to its programs.
The Eurasia Foundation is a publicly-funded, privately-managed foundation whose purpose is to support programs
at the grass roots level designed to help the citizens of Eurasia build local institutions that will serve their own
best political, social, and economic interests.
Today, the Eurasia region is moving into its second phase of transition but at uneven rates. The first phase of macro-
level state building and of the dismemberment of the command economy is not fully complete, and strengthening of
democratic political institutions remains critical. The second phase of micro-level political consolidation and
incremental economic growth must now begin. On the individual country and local levels, the reform agenda
remains extensive. Governments in the region face a daunting set of challenges:
improving the overall business climate;
stimulating domestic production and creating new jobs, primarily through the growth of small business;
raising general living standards outside the capital cities;
improving legislation, enforcing existing laws, and increasing
the effectiveness of government, especially at the local level;
combating corruption, not just at the top but at the level that affects the ordinary citizen; and
central to all of the above, expanding opportunities for citizen participation in political and economic
decision making, especially by affirming civil rights and supporting healthy democratic mechanisms to
buttress the role of citizens in a democratic society and ensure oversight, transparency, and accountability
of all authorities.
Since the early 1990s, small groups of private citizens have begun to take an active and constructive role in the post-
Soviet transformation. They have begun to engage directly with authorities to shape the civic and economic
landscape, and, in some cases, to provide crucial social services on the local level. Citizens are also more actively
asserting their proper role in democratic society as the source of political power. This means citizens and their
elected representatives can and do assert their interest in transparency and accountability. At the same time, the
August 1998 financial crisis had a silver lining not only in Russia but elsewhere as well, given Russia's influence on
regional economies. The sharp evaluation of the ruble gave a boost to local producers, now shielded from foreign
competition.
XX
In some parts of the region, small-scale entrepreneurs are still battling against legal and financial barriers. In other
places, such entrepreneurs are for the first time beginning to generate modest amounts of financial capital that can be
invested in local private initiatives. New ventures are gradually beginning to replace some of the old industrial
enterprises, sclerotic government structures, and outdated institutions.
But reform efforts are still thinly rooted. Indigenous grass roots reform efforts urgently need support in order to
accelerate and strengthen the push for reform.
Purpose
The purpose of continued USAID funding for the Eurasia Foundation is to support an independent institution that
will combine public and private resources to advance economic and political reform in Eurasia, through small
grants, loans, and multi-donor technical assistance programs. The foundation will reach out to a wide range of
diverse groups in Eurasia with both open-door and targeted assistance. It will seek to identify and, to the extent
possible, fund the most promising and sustainable Eurasian institutions and programs and those initiatives
established in other U.S. Government- funded efforts. It will operate largely through small grant and lending
programs, but may formulate other innovative and effective mechanisms on occasion, such as establishing consortia
or cooperative projects with other donors, to give special attention to strategically important challenges.
Foundation Experience
A board of private U.S. citizens incorporated the Eurasia Foundation, which was created with the help of funding by
the U.S. government nearly nine years ago. The foundation has proved remarkably successful in managing
professionally in a highly challenging environment. (Note that the Eurasia Foundation was incorporated in the
District of Columbia on April 29, 1992. The Foundation received its 501 (c)(3) nonprofit status ruling from
the Internal Revenue Service on December 15, 1992. The first USAID grant agreement was awarded on May 18,
1993. The second USAID agreement was awarded on September 30, 1997.) In addition to its grantmaking, the
foundation has also assumed a leadership role in identifying and working with non-U.S. Government funding
sources to create consortia and to respond to important, but under-assessed challenges - for example, economics
education, and the financial viability of regional media.
Outside evaluations, one in 1995 and a USAID-funded and directed evaluation in 2000, have given high marks to
the foundation for its programs. The USAID-directed evaluation, which was delivered in February 2001, noted that
the foundation has a solid record of accomplishment and, subject to satisfactory progress in correcting certain
weaknesses identified in the evaluation -- a process well under way -- deserves further support from USAID.
Program Areas
The Eurasia Foundation 1 s program aims to address three goals that correspond broadly to USAID strategic
objectives:
private enterprise development
o Goal: Accelerated development and growth of private enterprises (SO 1.3 and SO 1.4)
Civil society (including media and nongovernmental organizations)
o Goal: Increased, better informed citizens participation in political and economic decision-
making (SO 2.1 and SO 2.2)
public administration and policy
Goal: More effective, responsive, and accountable local government (SO 1.2 and SO 2.3)
As the only private foundation that promotes both economic and democratic development in twelve countries of
Eurasia, the foundation is unique in its ability to sponsor cross-programmatic projects that address two and often
three of these objectives. Such initiatives would, for example, aim to reduce corruption by involving private business
associations in dialogue directly with local governments and supported by reports through the media. Cross-
programmatic projects correspond to USAID SO 4.2.
Contributions to actual 80s will vary country-to-country depending upon the foundation 1 s programs and the
development needs and demands of the specific country. The foundation will coordinate with USAID in Washington
and the local USAID missions in planning its programs.
Experience from countries across Eastern Europe and Eurasia suggests that the most advanced economic reformers
have also made the most progress in consolidating democracy. At the same time, the foundation believes that the
most efficient means to address the three goals noted above is to improve the region 1 s human resources, financial
XXI
resources, and enabling environment. For each of the goals above, the foundation will invest in these three
functional areas:
Human resources. A democratic society with a modern economy requires people with forward-looking vision and
the appropriate skills. The foundation promotes the establishment of international caliber programs to train
entrepreneurs, economists, journalists, nonprofit professionals, public servants, and legal practitioners,
among others.
Educational institutions and professional associations can improve skill levels, heighten ethical and professional
standards, and promote appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks.
International partnerships transfer necessary skills, encourage educational and professional development, and help
integrate citizens into the global community.
Financial resources. Capital is needed for businesses to grow, for nonprofit organizations to operate, and for local
governments to function. The foundation works to increase local sources of funding for small businesses and
private organizations as well as to promote sound financial structures in the public sector. Through programs with
financial intermediaries such as banks, credit unions, cooperatives, and microcredit organizations, the foundation
helps infuse capital into the small business sector while fostering sound professional and ethical business
practices. The foundation also supports financial skills training in both the public and private sectors, and promotes
volunteerism and philanthropy as mechanisms for nurturing self-sustaining nonprofit organizations.
Enabling environment. Democratic societies cannot fully form without strong safeguards for civil rights, and healthy
democratic mechanisms that ensure that citizens can demand accountability and transparency from their governing
bodies. And a market-based democracy cannot flourish without appropriate policies, ethical practices, and
access to information in a law-based environment. The foundation seeks to improve the enabling environment by
promoting rational laws and policies, by supporting civil rights and basic freedoms, by reducing barriers to the entry
of new businesses, by encouraging responsible and independent media to contribute to public discourse, by
supporting reform-minded local governments and NGOs, and by supporting efforts to eliminate corruption in
business and public affairs. In Soviet times, the rule of law did not exist. In a modern democratic society, sound laws
should guide market relations, limit arbitrary government power, and protect civil liberties. Otherwise, the human
and financial capacities within the host countries will not reach full potential.
Program Implementation
The foundation meets its programmatic goals through several instruments. These include:
Small "Open Door" Grants to NIB Organizations. The majority of the foundation's grants are awarded in
response to needs identified and solutions presented by local institutions. As one of the rare institutions
operating in a demand-driven manner at the grass-roots level, the foundation will continue to support open-
door grant making as essential to the reform process. Unsolicited applications are a barometer of local
buy-in for change. As civil society develops and organizations demonstrate an increased capacity to lead
reforms at the regional or national level, the foundation will gradually increase the percentage of its support
in favor of sustainability of these organizations and guided grantmaking, as noted below. The balance
between reactive and proactive grantmaking will be decided on a country basis and approved annually by
the Board of Trustees.
Larger Partners hip Grants to Non –NIS Organizations . Partnership grants are awarded to a U.S.
grantee or other non Eurasia organization that provides technical assistance to a Eurasia partner
organization on a program within the foundation's mandate. The purpose of partnership grants is to build
capacity in the NIS for international caliber programs. To ensure the success of the project, partnership
applicants will either have a record of cooperation or there will be a strong demonstration of demand from
the local partner for cooperation with a non-Eurasia partner invited proposals. An invited application is
solicited by the foundation to meet specific programmatic goals. Invited applications advance a field
through a decisive concentration of funding with a multiplier effect, such as training-of trainers,
replication of a successful program, catalyzing a new industry, or stimulating new services. As a prime tool
in the foundation's country strategy, invited applications are included in the operating plans of each
grantmaking office. They are governed by internal policies to ensure a competitive and transparent
selection process. Beginning with this Grant, they will be monitored on a country basis and recorded as
proactive grantmaking.
XXII
Competitions. The foundation may award small grants through competitions that are managed primarily by
the field offices. Proposals are either solicited through a publicly announced Request for Applications or a
restricted list of organizations. Thematic topics contribute to the foundation's strategic goals, are included
in the field office's operating plan, and complement USAID activities. Competitions often involve co-
funding from non-USAID sources, as well as provision of non-grant assistance such as training and
networking opportunities. Recent examples include a business school partnership program in Belarus and
anti-corruption campaigns in Russia, Georgia, and Armenia. Grants generated through competitions are
monitored and recorded as proactive grantmaking.
Recoverable Grants. On an exceptional basis, the foundation may award "recoverable" grants for projects
that may generate sufficient revenues to return a portion or all of the grant funds to the foundation.
Recycled funds would be added to the grant funds and used to support new grants. Recoverable grants must
be consistent with the foundation's grantmaking criteria.
Cross-Border Programs. The foundation's independence and reach make it possible to support experimental
projects that operate across borders. In the Caucasus, for example, the foundation has launched the
South Caucasus Cooperation Program to encourage cross-border cooperation among Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. During the Grant period, the foundation intends to increase the sharing of
knowledge across borders by linking like-minded organizations through networking or other project
related activities. At present, no other institution has the capacity to deliver programs across borders on a
large scale in the politically volatile Caucasus and other areas like it.
Foundation Projects. In cases where the foundation can play a vital role in economic and democratic reform
in Eurasia by actively implementing or manging a program instead of through sub-recipients, the
foundation will establish a project. Such projects will often bring groups of non-U.S. Government donors
together to address commonly identified but neglected reform challenges. Current examples of such
programs include the Media Viability Fund (MVF), the Economics Education and Research Consortium
(EERC), and the Small Business Loan Program (SBLP). Any new projects will support USAID SOs
discussed in Section D, Program Areas.
In the past, such projects have enabled the foundation to leverage significant funds from non-U.S.
Government sources such as foreign governments, private individuals, foundations, and corporations. In
undertaking projects, the foundation seeks to incubate institutions that can ultimately be launched as
independent and self-sustaining operations. The following are the three projects that the foundation
currently implements:
o Media Viability Fund (MVF). The MVF is a joint effort of the Eurasia Foundation and the Media
Development Loan Fund (MDLF) to promote a financially independent news media. The program
provides loans to independent regional media for equipment (through MDLF) and technical
consulting in financial and media management.
o Economics Education and Research Consortium (EERC). The EERC promotes increased capacity
at world-class levels in economics through teaching and research and their connection to sound
federal policy. In Russia, the EERC provides small research grants and a series of complementary
seminars, publications, and practical application of research. In Ukraine, the EERC administers a
Master's in Economics program at the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Small Business Loan
Program (SBLP). The Eurasia Foundation has developed business loan programs in selected
regions to supplement technical assistance and training available to small private businesses by
providing access to capital on appropriate terms. These programs seek to establish local models of
market-based, sustainable lending in participating financial sector institutions. The foundation's
lending activities place a strong emphasis on providing training and technical assistance to
borrowers and to participating financial institutions alike.
Program Income
In the course of carrying out its activities under the Grant, it is anticipated that the Eurasia Foundation will be
XXIII
generating program income. By far the most significant source of program income for the Eurasia Foundation is
loan repayment under the Small Business Loan Program (SBLP). The Eurasia Foundation adds the earnings from
the SBLP attributable to returns of loan principal back to its loan pool, thereby enabling it to make additional loans.
In the event of a loan loss, the foundation reduces its available loan pool by that amount. In order to meet loan
losses, the foundation uses earnings attributable to returns of interest on loans made under the SBLP. Since the
inception of the program, loan losses have totaled 4.68 percent prior to recovery through sale of collateral. In
accordance with the preceding, program income to the Eurasia Foundation may include the receipt of principal on
SBLP loans and interest derived therefrom, provided that such program income may only be used for additional
lending activities under the SBLP; and provided further that such program income as may be attributable to return of
interest (but not return of principal) on loans made under the SBLP may be used to meet loan losses under the
SBLP. (Under no circumstances shall Grant funds be used to cover loan losses.) Program income derived from
activities other than the SBLP may be used to further eligible objectives of the Grant, as provided by 22 CFR Part
226, § 226.24 (b)(1)
Endowment/Trust
As the Eurasia Foundation seeks to diversify its funding sources and further leverage U.S. government funds by
attracting non-U.S. government financial support, an effort has been launched to obtain an endowment or trust
consisting of matching public and private funds. An endowed Eurasia Foundation will ensure that the U.S.
government remains engaged with the former Soviet Union in a way that reduces political exposure and is in line
with calls by the U.S. Congress to modify its operating practices around the world. Until the endowment/trust has
been assembled, the Eurasia Foundation would continue to depend primarily on annual allocations from USAID
under this Grant, as well as expected significant funding from other sources. Accordingly, during the life of the
Grant USAID will consider how some of the funds that would be obligated under this Grant could be directed
toward an endowment/trust. The actual mechanism and operational details will be worked out over the course of the
Grant.
Strategy Development
Each year, in consultation with USAID, grant offices will prepare a rolling, three-year program strategy that sets out
annual operating plans against an evaluation of past performance and progress toward future goals. The grant office
strategies will fall broadly within the foundation's mandate and strategic plan as well as the USAID country mission
objectives. In preparing its program strategy, offices will identify a smaller number of fields of interest within the
foundation’s mandate where it will guide grantmaking for more focused results. In identifying fields of interest, the
grant staff applies knowledge of country trends, needs, and experience in both the foundation’ s grant portfolio and
in programs funded by other donors. Generally, each office selects at least one field of interest in each of the
foundation’s three program areas: private enterprise development, public administration and policy, and civil
society.
In some cases, programs will take a cross-programmatic approach that engages more than one segment of society,
such as the media, public officials, business groups, or academia. These strategies form the basis for annual budget
preparation, discussion and approval or modification. The Board of Trustees of the Eurasia Foundation approves the
annual budgets and the strategic plans of each office.
This process will be annually coordinated with appropriate USAID field missions 1 staff to ensure that the
foundation's annual operating plans address the relevant mission SOs. The annual coordination process will be
conducted with reference to the development of USAID's Annual Report (formerly R4) and strategic plan. The
program plan discussed above will also list indicators that can be used to gauge each Eurasia grant office's success
in making progress toward meeting the foundation's planned objectives.
Reporting
The Eurasia Foundation is required to provide an annual report to the CTO at USAID/Washington as defined by the
Schedule of the Grant. The report shall provide actual accomplishments, lessons learned and results according to the
indicators identified in the annual strategic planning process described in Section H. ("Strategy Development")
above. The report will consist of a narrative regarding the results of foundation programs vis-a-vis USAID Strategic
Objectives, including relevant information regarding the foundation's program implementation mechanisms
mentioned above, expenditure summaries, grant lists and loan lists categorized by Strategic Objective disaggregated
by country, and the foundation management benchmarks and results monitoring indicators set forth in Section J.
("Evaluation") below (and any additional benchmarks and/or indicators as may be agreed upon during the period of
XXIV
the Grant) . In addition to annual reports, the foundation will provide a semi-annual report to the CTO at
USAID/Washington consisting of a summary of progress towards addressing indicators in the annual operating plan,
a complete grant list, and the benchmarks and results monitoring indicators referenced in the previous sentence.
XXV
ANNEX F – SPENDING ACROSS SOS BY COUNTRY
$0
$200,000
$400,000
$600,000
$800,000
$1,000,000
$1,200,000
$1,400,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Central Asian Republics
Civil Society
Private EnterpriseDevelopment
Public Administration andPolicy
$0
$200,000
$400,000
$600,000
$800,000
$1,000,000
$1,200,000
$1,400,000
$1,600,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Ukraine
Civil Society
Private EnterpriseDevelopment
Public Administration andPolicy
$0
$500,000
$1,000,000
$1,500,000
$2,000,000
$2,500,000
$3,000,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Russia
Civil Society
Private EnterpriseDevelopment
Public Administration andPolicy
XXVI
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Moldova
Civil Society
Private EnterpriseDevelopment
Public Administration andPolicy
$0
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
$300,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2011
Belarus
Civil Society
Private EnterpriseDevelopment
Public Administration andPolicy
$0
$1,000,000
$2,000,000
$3,000,000
$4,000,000
$5,000,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Caucasus
Civil Society
Private EnterpriseDevelopment
Public Administration andPolicy
XXVII
ANNEX G – INTERVIEW GUIDES
Draft EF/PF Senior Staff Interview Guide
(Presidents, PF Board Members, CFOs, Senior POs and PMs)
Eurasia Foundation Senior Staff Guide: Moldova Meetings and PF
Draft by: Richard N. Blue, Social Impact. EF Evaluation Team Leader
Date: September 23, 2012 I. Background and Purpose statement
Good morning/afternoon. Our firm, Social Impact, is working with the United States Agency for
International Development to assess the relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of their
assistance to the Eurasia Foundation. We would like to speak with you as part of our ongoing
evaluation to hear about your experience and impressions of working with EF.
II. Confidentiality Statement
This survey guarantees respondent confidentiality and your participation in this survey is
voluntary. All data will be used in an aggregate form that will make it impossible to determine
the identity of the individual responses. Access to raw data will be tightly restricted to only those
individuals directly involved in data analysis.
III. Respondent SES data
1. Country of Origin__________________
2. Name of Organization __________________________
3. Current Position and responsibilities (probe)___________________
4. How long with EF/PF (# years)_________________
5. Gender: M/F
6. Experience with other organizations prior to EF-PF? (Open ended)
7. Familiarity with current funding and programs? (Probe)
a) Interviewer rating respondent's familiarity with EF-PF:
1. Very Familiar with all aspects
2. Familiar with Specific aspects (e.g., finance)
3. Familiar with some programs
4. Familiar in a general way but not in detail (e.g. Board member)
5. Not very familiar, new to PF.
IV. Questions
Background
IV.1 How would you describe the PF's primary Mission in your country?
Impact and Effectiveness of PF (Question for PF leadership - if Respondent not in
leadership, go to V.)
XXVIII
IV.2 Please describe your major program goals and strategy overall.
IV.3 How successful has your PF been in achieving the program goals and objectives
since it became an independent partner? (Read and circle response)
A. Very Successful B. Somewhat Successful C. Limited or not very successful
D. Not successful
IV.4 What are the major reasons for this success, if so?
IV.5 What are the major challenges facing the PF in realizing your goals?
V. USAID Strategic Objectives and Programming
The USG through USAID has provided $XXX millions to support EF's contribution to 3
main USAID Strategic Objectives, Private Enterprise Development (SO1), Civil Society
Development (SO2) and Public Policy and Public Administration development at the local
level (SO3). Partner Foundations have further refined these Objectives into specific
programs, such as media, youth, etc.
V.1. From the perspective of your PF, how would you rate the effectiveness and
impact of each of these three broad programming areas since your PF was
established? (scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being most effective)
a) SO1. Enterprise Development: _____________________________
b) SO2. Civil Society Development_____________________________
c) SO3. Public Policy and Public Administration __________________
V.2. For the most effective programs, what are the most important causes related to
strong positive impact? (Probe)
V.3. Which areas have been most difficult and why? (Probe)
V.4 From your perspective, in the future will your PF continue to program in the
same general areas, or do you anticipate moving into other programming
areas? (Probe and circle one.)
a) Will continue same general programs for foreseeable future
b) Will continue but refine the program objectives to fit our country needs and
opportunities
c) Will adjust to priorities of our future donors and supporters
d) Will focus on those areas most relevant to our society and government's interests.
VI. Relationship with Eurasia Foundation Washington and Network
1. From your PF (or EF) perspective, how would you describe your current relationship
with EF Washington?
What are the positive sides of the relationship between your EP and EF
XXIX
Washington?
What are the negative sides of the relationship between your EP and EF
Washington? (Probe)
2. Please tell which of the following statements comes closest to your view about the
EF/DC relationship in the next few years as it relates to present and future success of
your PF. (read and ask KI to choose one)
a. Very Positive ,helpful and necessary to our future
b. Generally helpful and still important to us
c. Somewhat helpful but not essential for our future
d. Useful, but increasingly irrelevant to our future
e. Not helpful and increasingly a threat to our future.
f. Other____________________________________
3. What are the major benefits your PF has gained from associating with EF and the
Network? (Probe and rate as below)
(Interviewer circles each one mentioned based on open ended response)
a. Assistance with organization performance and capacity building (mentions Capacity
Mapping tool/exercise)
b. Assisted with establishing financial management, audit, and financial accountability
procedures used by our PF.
c. Assisted us in using USAID core grant for operating expenses.
d. Assistance with our external donor fundraising and proposal development
e. Networking opportunities with other PFs is useful for identifying common
problems/solutions.
f. We gain a certain amount of international status and respect for being in the EF
association.
g. Other:_________________
VII. Sustainability of Partner Foundation in future
1. Turning to the future of your PF over the next 3 to 5 years (Russia, Armenia, etc,), are you
confident that you will be able to attract donor support for your foundation's programs?
(Probe and ask Respondent, are they)
a. Very Confident
b. Fairly Confident
c. Somewhat Doubtful
d. Very doubtful
e. Other:_________________
XXX
2. Where do you think the donor support will come from in the future? (probe, read and circle
choices mentioned)
a. Local private companies and foundations
b. Our government
c. Foreign government assistance programs
d. USAID Mission
e. US Private foundations (e.g., Mott, others)
f. Multi-lateral organizations (WB, UN, others)
g. Other:_________________
3. (For Leadership) Does your PF have in place a Fund raising and Development strategy and
program?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Working on it
d. Don't know
4. Are you able to convince other donors to also allow you to charge your overhead and
operating costs as a part of the grant funding? (read choices and ask KI to select one closest
to their view)
a. Yes, almost always
b. Yes, most of the time
c. Sometimes, but only if we make a strong case
d. No, donors don't like to pay for overhead
e. Other:_________________
Sustainability: Organizational Capacity and Procedures
The Eurasia Foundation has worked with each of the PFs to strengthen organization
capacity, introduce international standards for financial management and accounting,
helped to strengthen the Board of Directors and other organizational policies and
procedures.
1. Have these organizational procedures become institutionalized in your PF, or do you
expect substantial changes to occur as you become increasingly independent and "local"?
(probe) Read choices and ask KI to select one.
a. We are a strong organization and see little reason to change.
b. We will retain international standards, audits, and appropriate accountability for
financial management, but will continue to evolve our own programming and
reporting procedures.
XXXI
c. We will maintain high standards but adjust in accordance with our own countries
laws and practices.
d. While EF's capacity building assistance has been useful, we will probably move
away from many of these practices as they are simply too difficult and costly to
retain in the future.
e. Other:_________________
2. Is EF-DC’s Capacity Mapping Initiative (CMI) successful in accurately measuring the
organizational capacity of partner foundations?
3. Is CMI clear, understandable, easy to use? How often do you use it in your PF and how
the process is organized and who is involved?
4. How do you follow up CMI results, how recommendations are implemented and what
actions are taken?
VIII. The Foundation as a model for providing assistance
USAID has asked us to examine the advantages and disadvantages of the foundation
model as a means for delivering foreign assistance. As a Foundation leader/officer,
how would you respond to this question?
1. What would you say are the advantages?
2. What are the dis-advantages?
3. Are there circumstances in which the foundation approach would be better than a
standard USAID type Mission program?
Are there other issues, observations or information you would like to share with us, or questions
you may want to ask of us about this assessment?
Thank you for your time and your full cooperation. END.
XXXII
Grantee/Beneficiary FGD Guide
Eurasia Foundation Evaluation
Grantees/Beneficiaries (Component One)
Date of Interview ____________
In Person or Phone____________ Participants: Total___________ (___M/____F)
IX. Background and Purpose statement
Good morning/afternoon. Our firm, Social Impact, is working with the United States Agency for
International Development to assess the relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of their
assistance to the Eurasia Foundation. We would like to speak with you as part of our ongoing
evaluation to hear about your experience and impressions of working with EF.
X. Confidentiality Statement (read to KI)
This survey guarantees respondent confidentiality and your participation in this survey is
voluntary. All data will be used in an aggregate form that will make it impossible to determine
the identity of the individual responses. Access to raw data will be tightly restricted to only those
individuals directly involved in data analysis.
XI. Background of Focus Group
Distinguishing features of group:_________________________________
XII. Knowledge of Eurasia Foundation 1. What type of assistance/support did you receive from FNE/EFCA/EPF/EEF?
2. How would you describe your experience working with FNE/EFCA/EPF/EEF?
a. Was the grant application process clear and easy to negotiate?
Please describe any problems:
b. During grant implementation, how was your relationship with the EF office? (Probe for
positive and negative occurrences)
c. How would you describe the reporting relationship with EF?
d. Did EF staff provide any assistance that helped your organization beyond the grant
making?
e. What kinds of actions/approaches might have been more helpful in carrying out your
program responsibilities?
f. How would you rate the relationship?
XXXIII
Very positive and helpful Generally positive and helpful
Somewhat positive and helpful Not at all positive and helpful
3. Have you worked with other donors? If yes, how did the experience compare to working with
FNE/EFCA/EPF/EEF?
a. Ease of application and administration?
b. Helpfulness of Grantor staff
c. Overall effectiveness in terms of achieving project/program objectives?
4. What was the outcome of your grant/project?
5. Did you face any challenges/constraints in implementing your program? Did/could
FNE/EFCA/EPF/EEF have done anything to help you overcome these challenges/constraints?
Thank you for your time and willingness to discuss these issues.
XXXIV
EF-DC SKI Guide
Eurasia Foundation Evaluation
Special Guide for EF Headquarters Staff
Date of Interview ____________
Introduction: Confidentiality Protocol
• The evaluation team will collect information on individuals’ names, organizations, and positions.
A list of key informants will be made available as an annex to the final evaluation report, but
those names and positions will not be associated to any particular findings or statements in the
report.
• The team may include quotes from respondents in the evaluation report, but will not link
individual names, organizations, or personally identifiable information to those quotes, unless
express written consent is granted by the respondent. Should the team desire to use a particular
quote, photograph, or identifiable information in the report, the evaluators will contact the
respondent(s) for permission to do so.
• All data gathered will be used for the sole purposes of this evaluation, and will not be shared with
other audiences or used for any other purpose.
Respondent Background:
6. EF Position:
7. Years with EF:
8. Gender:
9. Principle Responsibilities at EF (Describe):
Questions:
1. By 2000, EF had developed several “flagship” institution building projects including
a. Economics Education and Research Consortium
b. Media Viability Fund
c. Small Business Loan Program
12 years have passed. How would you describe the status, strengths and weaknesses or issues
with each of these initial projects?
Has EF developed new “flagship” projects? Yes No
Please explain:
2. Looking over the period 2002-2006, and then 2006 to present, how would you assess the extent to
which EF programs have contributed to USAID’s 3 main Strategic Objectives? Let’s start with
a. Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprise
b. Increased, better informed citizens’ participation in political and economic decision
making.
XXXV
c. More effective , responsive and accountable local government
3. EF has established 5 EF Partner Foundations, beginning with Moscow in 2004, EFCA in 2005,
EPF (Caucasus) in 2007, Ukraine 2007, and Moldova 2010. How would you describe the success,
strengths and weaknesses of each of these PFs from your perspective?
a. Russia FNE
b. EFCA (CAR)
c. EPF (Caucasus)
d. Ukraine
e. Moldova
4. We’ll be reviewing funding sources and talking to some of the donors who contribute to various
PFs, but how would you rate the “sustainability” of each of the PFs as you look out over the next
3 to 5 years?
a. Russia (especially in the light of new law regarding foreign donations)
b. EFCA (the only PF to be short of funding target)
c. EPF
d. Ukraine
e. Moldova
5. As PFs rely more on funding from other sources in the future, how do you think this will affect
the major program categories: Youth Engagement, Local Economic Development, Public Policy
and Institution Building, Independent Media and Cross-Border Programs. Do you expect to see
major changes in this agenda, especially in those states that regress to a more authoritarian
political climate?
6. As you look to the future, how do you see the relationship between EF Washington and the PFs
evolving?
7. Turning to NEE, the legal-political status is quite different, and the role of Ukraine PF is
essential.
How do you see the NEE program evolving over the next 5 years? What are the key opportunities
and constraints that affect programming in this kind of political climate?
XXXVI
ANNEX H – ELECTRONIC SURVEY
XXXVII
XXXVIII
XXXIX
XL
XLI
XLII
XLIII
XLIV
XLV
XLVI
XLVII
ANNEX I – INDIVIDUAL PF CASE STUDIES
Case Study: FNE
FNE is the oldest of the PFs set up after EF-DC decided on a new strategy for ensuring the long term
viability and sustainability of its local offices. FNE has become a self-styled “social development
agency,” which does not make grants through open competitions but is rather an organization promoting
specific program objectives. FNE has developed a decentralized management structure with several major
program areas, each led by a senior staff expert who has considerable autonomy for program development
and management.
Originally established as EF’s Russian grant making office, FNE’s relationship with EF continued from
2004 to 2012 through three main channels. First, EF retained a position on the board of directors of FNE.
Second, EF provided technical assistance for organizational strengthening and financial
accountability/management. Third, perhaps most important, the USAID core grant was apportioned
among the emerging PFs including FNE. In the period 2004 to 2012, EF core grant funding accounted for
32 percent of all funding for FNE. The impact of this funding was substantially enhanced by the fact that
the core grant was “unrestricted,” that is, not attached to any particular program. EF core grant funding
paid for salaries and overhead when other donor sources were reluctant to do so. The USAID Core Grant
ends in December 2013.
EF has also engaged FNE through the establishment of an active network of EF Partner Foundations,
which meet regularly to share experiences, solutions, and common problems. FNE interlocutors indicated
that such sharing was useful and they would continue to benefit from their participation in the network. At
the same time, no one thought the network was critical to the future success of the FNE in Russia.
With regard to the board of directors, in 2012, after the untimely death of EF Trustee Sarah Carey, two EF
Trustees continue to sit on the FNE Board: Randy Bregman SALANS, and Lawrence English, BARING
VOSTOK. Both individuals have experience and investments in Russia.
FNE has created a separate board of trustees which includes one American, Randy Bregman of SALANs
international law firm.
Advancing US Strategic Objectives
As FNE’s program has evolved, its overall structure has taken on content of a Russian program,
determined largely by two main factors: 1) what Russian sources are prepared to finance, and 2) what fits
the issue agenda and vision of FNE. What foreign sources such as USAID, the Mott Foundation and the
MacArthur Foundation are prepared to support has continued to be important, but increasingly less
essential to the long term vision of FNE.
The following excerpt from the FNE 2012 annual report demonstrates the breadth of FNE’s programming
vision:
SPHERES OF OPERATION
• Implementation of complex regional and municipal socio-economic development programs
• Modernization of the regional general education system, as well as primary and secondary
vocational education systems
• Management modernization at institutions of higher learning
• Support of international activities by Russian educational institutions
• Development of technology transfer systems at institutions of higher learning
• Development of regional innovation support infrastructures
XLVIII
• Development of youth initiatives
• Support of local initiatives and community engagement in regional socio-economic development
• Support of housing and utility system reforms
• Coordination of migration processes
• Development of conflict prevention systems at the regional and local levels
• Support of small and medium-sized businesses in Russia’s regions and municipalities
• Support of regional and municipal mass media organizations
• Support of Russian civil society institutions in their international engagement endeavors88
The USAID final grant agreement with EF stipulated three strategic objectives. These are:
1. Private Enterprise Development
Goal: Accelerated development and growth of private enterprises (SO 1.3 and SO 1.4)
2. Civil Society (including media and nongovernmental organizations)
Goal: Increased, better informed citizens participation in political and economic decision‐making
(SO 2.1 and SO 2.2)
3. Public Administration and Policy
Goal: More effective, responsive, and accountable local government (SO 1.2 and SO 2.3)
The three SOs are sufficiently broad that most of the FNE program “spheres” can be subsumed under one
or more of the USAID objectives. However, the FNE program has increasingly shifted toward supporting
improvements in Russian higher education, mainly in collaboration with the Government’s Ministry of
Science and Education, and with the support of the US-Russia Foundation among others. The last two
program spheres listed by FNE, regional mass media and Russian civil society, are largely financed
through specific agreements with USAID.
It should also be noted that FNE programs operate in 32 localities throughout Russia’s very large
territory. Relatively few programs operate in Moscow. This gives FNE a national scope that is un-
matched by any other non-governmental agency in Russia.
FNE’s international reach is impressive. Three of the eight members of the board of trustees come from
the US (2) and Poland (1). FNE has a major program of collaboration with university centers of
excellence around the world as shown in this table:
FNE Programs: Collaborations with foreign universities 2005-201289
USA 8
Europe (west) 13
Europe (east) 8
Israel 4
China 3
Current Sustainability
According to the 2012 FNE Annual Report, FNE has nearly regained its overall funding amount, having
88
New Eurasia Foundation (FNE) 2004-2012 Report (English Version). The report covers the period 2004-2012 and
represents the most comprehensive compendium of FNE's evolution, program areas, management structure and
funding base as it evolved over the eight year period. 89
FNE Report 2004-2012 p.39
XLIX
recovered from the impact of the 2008 recession, which affected the both the global and the Russian
economy. In 2012 the EF core funding made up 11 percent of FNE's overall funding. EF’s core funding
from USAID will terminate in 2013.
FNE has substantially shifted its funding base to Russia supporters. Of the 81 separate funding sources
that have provided support to FNE, all but 24 are Russian, including four government ministries, 21
public universities, 15 Russian businesses, 11 Russian charitable foundations and NGOs, and six private
individuals. Among the 24 organizations providing support, five have been USG funded organizations,
including EF-DC, and four are US-based foundations such as the Mott Foundation.
However, it is also true that US foreign sources, among others, have been the principal source of FNE
support over the 2004-2012 period, constituting 71 percent of all funding, with 32 percent coming from
EF alone. Russian sources constituted about 20 percent of the total.
FNE’s effort to shift its funding base to Russia sources has shown gradual success, with 41 percent of
funding coming from Russian government and private corporate sources. EF-DC support had declined to
11 percent, but reliance on international donors and international private sources continued to represent
close to half of FNE’s funding.
FNE also receives funding from USAID Moscow, which is channeled through the EF Washington office.
These funds support the Independent Regional Media support program. Other funding from USG sources
includes support for the USAID Moscow funded, but Eurasia Foundation Washington managed civil
society partnership program. The program brings together American and Russian civil society
organizations engaged in providing services and dealing with a variety of community level programs that
support disadvantaged and marginalized elements of both populations.
The Russian Economic and Political Context
Russian private charitable and foundation development is still in the early stages. Corporate foundations
tend to support social development activities in the regions where they are located, For the most part the
program areas, such as youth programs, community development, and the like, are non-controversial.
Russian government support for FNE has been concentrated in two areas, mainly higher education and
what FNE refers to as “territorial development,” (i.e., those often neglected regions far away from
Moscow).
FNE has been remarkably successful in developing positive relationships with the Russian government
and the Russian political leadership. However, this may be changing, and may threaten several of the
more sensitive program areas.
During and after the most recent 2012 Russian elections, the Russian Federation, under the leadership of
President Vladimir Putin, passed several important laws that could affect the sustainability of FNE, and
even its independence as a private, not-for-profit social development agency. Potentially threatening laws
and actions that may affect citizens’ right to organize, criticize, and to work with international funding
entities are:
Requiring any Russian private NGO receiving funds from non-Russian sources to register
as a “foreign agent,” which in Russia holds a negative connation of “spy.”90
Libel Law has been shifted from the commercial back to the criminal code, with severe
fines imposed.
90
The International Center for Not for Profit Law (ICNL) has published a number of detailed analyses of this law.
L
USAID Russia was terminated in September 2012, therefore ending a major source of
funding support for two FNE programs; regional independent media and civil society
cooperation.
Pressure has mounted against the US-Russian Foundation, an endowed foundation
focused on economic and business development and the commercial rule of law. This
foundation is a registered Russian foundation which provides funding support to FNE.
The more general rise in Russian nationalism and concurrent xenophobia has been promoted by the Putin
regime as a means for solidifying its political base, especially outside of Moscow and Saint Petersburg.
FNE's leadership has worked carefully to avoid portraying itself as having a “special relationship” with
the United States, or even with the Eurasia Foundation, its founding organization. FNE President Andrei
Kortunov is well respected and well-connected in Russia leadership circles. His strategy has been to
develop FNE as a Russian agency with strong and diverse international ties, of which the United States is
but one of many. Whether this strategy is sufficient to weather the current storm remains to be seen.
LI
Case Study: EPF-Armenia
Institutional Arrangements: Evolution and Current Status
The field office of EF in Armenia began operating in Yerevan in 1995, supporting EF centrally-funded
small grants and programs such as the Small Business Loan Program in Armenia91
(1996), the Media
Strengthening Program (1997), the South Caucasus Cooperation Program (1998) and Caucasus Resource
Research Centers (CRRC) (2002). In 2007, EF launched the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), an
umbrella regional office for the local offices in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; the Armenian office
was registered locally and was officially operating by February 2008.
As a division of EPF, the Armenian office shares a board of trustees with the Georgian and Azeri offices,
which is comprised entirely of citizens outside of Armenia. The tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan
prevents inclusion of citizens from either country. EPF-Armenia also has an Advisory Committee of four
Armenians. The current staff of 23 cover management, finance, human resources, media/
communications, grants and program management, internet technology and administrative services. Staff
are led by Armenian Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan, who joined the office as country director in 2007, and by
Associate Country Director Vazgen Karapetyan, both of whom studied and lived abroad for significant
periods of time92
. While there is no evidence that EPF-Armenia staff are as reliant on the leadership as
staff may be at other partnership foundations (PF), remarks from interviews suggest that the EPF director
is well-respected. Ter-Gabrielyan can claim positive standing with the UK Embassy, which has consulted
with him as a subject matter expert in the past regarding the nature of the embassy’s conflict portfolio and
has set up meetings between him and the UK ambassador on issues beyond the scope of UK-supported
EPF projects. A staff person credits the director with increasing overall quality of output and for
envisioning the strategy necessary to ensure continued improvement of staff capability.
EPF-Armenia’s full program for 2012 operated at USD $1.7 million. The PF expected to spend about $1
million in core USAID funding during 2012-2013, using only about a third of it in 2012 (supplemented
by current Sida funding) and the rest in 2013. The PF is also receiving $2.3 million over two years from
USAID/Armenia, $1 million over 1.5 years from Sida, and small amounts of funding from other bilateral
donors, including Belgium, Finland, Poland and Britain. The World Bank provides some funding through
EPF-Armenia to CRRC Armenia, though that is expected to cease when CRRC becomes independent of
the PF. While EPF-Armenia receives some funding from the private Gulbenkian Foundation, it is not
supported by any private corporation funding. It receives no funding from the Armenian government.
Fundraising is managed in the regional office, but EPF-Armenia employs a development manager who
collaborates closely with Tbilisi. According to staff, recent fundraising has had some successes – in 2012
the PF submitted an estimated 12 proposals and won four – but donors have slowly faded away, making
EPF-Armenia now “heavily dependent on USAID core funding.” Though easy to raise money for small
projects ($20-60K), success comes less frequently at the $100K level. Europe in particular has proven
difficult to break into; the PF has applied to European donors 15 times over the last three years and has
only been successful once; some of these proposals were submitted elsewhere and received funding,
according to Ter-Gabrielyan. Staff disagree on how difficult it is to convince donors to pay for
administrative costs, but regardless, the PF hopes to lessen these costs by securing a small office.
Country Context
91
Evolved into the Izmirlian-Eurasia Universal Credit Company, which became operational in 2004. 92
Ter-Gabrielyan earned his Master’s in Public Administration from Bowling Green State University and spent 1993-2007 outside of Armenia, working eight years in London with International Alert and then relocating to Moscow as a freelance consultant. Though Karapetyan has worked for EPF since 1998, he took a short hiatus to study public policy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
LII
Relations between Armenia and Turkey and Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to stagnate, and in the
latter, some say may deteriorate further. Turkey continues to deny the Armenia Genocide, and segments
of both the Turkish and Armenian populations oppose the Protocols. Azerbaijan continues to apply
pressure to the Turkish Administration discouraging normalization of relations with Armenia. Following
Turkey’s waning interest, Armenia’s has lessened as well.93
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
Azerbaijan remains unresolved, and tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan worsened when the latter
pardoned Ramil Safarov in September 2012 for the 2004 murder of an Armenian solider at a NATO-
sponsored English course in Hungary. The lack of regional cooperation has increased demand for
programming in this arena94
but simultaneously makes achieving progress a challenge.
From the perspective of EPF staff, neither the government nor private corporations currently carry enough
wealth to be in a position to fund EPF programs, regardless of program focus. Despite a precipitous fall in
GDP after Armenia’s independence from the Soviet Union, the GDP saw steady growth between 1994
and 2008, but this trend was interrupted in 2009 when GDP contracted significantly following the global
financial crisis. Armenia experienced one of the most severe drops in the region.95
Regardless of wealth, EPF staff are not optimistic that the national government will soon become a
prominent donor. One notes that working with the government would be problematic both because the
government is oftentimes “unfriendly” and because EPF is not a big enough player. Another points out
that the local NGO sphere is “struck by nepotism” and because ministers tend to have their own NGOs,
EPF-Armenia has limited opportunities to truly compete for government funding. Only youth banks have
been able to secure modest funding from municipal governments.
Has the PF served and will it continue to serve US interests with respect to broad programming
areas?
The official EPF Mission is “to empower people to effect change for social justice and economic
prosperity through hands-on programs, helping them to improve their communities and their own lives.”
With respect to current programs, the country director asserts that the current program portfolio indeed
focuses heavily on human rights, freedom of expression, civil society peace building and democracy, and
that ideally there should be no switch to a focus on economic development in the near future. The deputy
director agrees that recently EPF-Armenia has done little to support either public administration or private
enterprise, instead concentrating efforts predominantly in civil society. The most recent Annual Report
(2011) allocating funding according to programming supports these statements with figures: cross-border
cooperation (56%), civic participation (15%), media development (14%), research (10%), youth (4%),
public administration (1%).
Overall, staff feel that while outcomes are nearly impossible to measure, the PF has been effective to
some degree in all three of the USAID SOs listed in the original grant agreement: public administration
(PA), civil society (CS) and private enterprise (PE). The country director expressed high satisfaction in
the quality of the PF’s products and services, noting that while this may seem minor, these quality outputs
are critical to achieving impact. The one staff member who rated the PF’s performance in the SOs rated
CS highest (5), followed by PE (4),based on a small CSR program that established social enterprises in
various parts of Armenia, and another PA (3). The staff person stated that EPF-Armenia was likely the
driving factor in establishing at least 25-30 out of 150 of the strong, sustainable local NGOs throughout
the country that are currently active and function as the core of emerging civil society.
The evaluation team strove to examine programs in each of the three USAID SOs, though because the
current overall portfolio of the PF tended toward CS, most of the activities reviewed are CS-focused. The
93
SATR beneficiary 94
Both USAID and UK Embassy noted a desire for cross-border programming. 95
Armenia 2012 MCP Gap Analysis
LIII
team had the opportunity to review in some depth the following current or recent programs:
South Caucasus Cooperation Program (SCCP) (CS)
Support to Armenia Turkey Rapprochement (SATR) (CS with elements of PE)
Armenia-Azerbaijan Cross Border Project / Unbiased Media Coverage (CS)
Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) (varies, though preliminary outputs center on
education; ultimate goal is improved PA)
Responses from staff and donors on their perceptions of the success96
of these programs garnered modest
endorsements overall.97
One person involved in its early development of the SCCP regarded it as a
successful venture, stating further that the anticipated partnerships —between 30 and40 through linkage
and contract grants—were indeed created and sustained. and . A staff person working with the program
today was more reserved in judgment, though noted that she was not aware of any evidence of whether
partnerships developed via SCCP have endured and could not state any lasting effects of the project,
“though it does not mean they do not exist,” she said. Neither staff person believes that the project
succeeded in developing any sustainable trilateral partnerships.
The views on SATR were similarly mixed. While donors and beneficiaries alike could point to a number
of tangible outputs—business conferences, media products (cartoons, videos, books, etc.), and new
partners—outcomes were harder to pin down. A midterm evaluation found that “although the project does
function, the impact of its activities has been modest. Few people know about the project or its activities,
which are not sustainable at present due to the problematic design of the consortium and problems with
implementation.” One beneficiary noted that the implementers faced serious challenges due to the lack of
political will in Armenia, and a donor pointed out that while EPF has established contacts and networks
of organizations both in Armenia and in Turkey, the objective to significantly expand that reach was not
fully met, particularly in Turkey.
The Armenia-Azerbaijan Cross Border project appears to have been successful at the participant level, but
to have struggled to expand its reach beyond immediate beneficiaries. One participant commented that his
cartoon project was good but wondered whether his efforts were but a “drop in the sea.” Similarly, an
evaluation of the project found that the expected long-term impact was too ambitious for the intended
interventions, and that while raising awareness of the need for unbiased media coverage was within the
project’s control, the actual publishing of unbiased reports was not. Furthermore, while trainees are likely
to have gained new knowledge and skills, they are neither prominent nor sufficiently active journalists for
their behavior to significantly deter biased media reports.
CRRC received the most consistently positive responses from EPF staff, CRRC staff, beneficiaries and
donors. Though achievement of the broad goal—building the capacity of local social science researchers
and promoting evidence-based policy analysis—may be difficult to confirm, identifying success in
achieving desired outcomes98
proved a more feasible task. Multiple beneficiaries confirmed and praised
access to quality research resources and shared that they regularly use CRRC data in their research,
though none were able to provide specific examples of collaborating with policy practitioners. EPF-
Armenia staff familiar with the PF’s financials noted that CRRC brings in more money than any other
program and has the highest prospects for remaining sustainable; the group is expected to spin off from
96
Whether the program accomplished the objectives initially agreed upon. 97
Given the difficulties associated with measuring outcomes and impact, particularly for such broad goals, it is not
surprising that stakeholders were hesitant to comment on whether outcomes had been achieved. 98
According to webpage: “to increase the accessibility of high-quality research resources, to strengthen capacity and to increase the dialogue and collaboration between social science researchers and policy practitioners”
LIV
EPF-Armenia in the next couple of years. Despite its notable successes, stakeholders identified areas for
improvement as well. While one donor expressed a need for CRRC to improve dissemination of and
demand for its products, another pointed out issues with implementation quality99
and CRRC’s inability
to provide analysis and interpretations of their data, a weakness also self-identified by CRRC.
A review of grants made by EF-DC and EPF-Armenia using USAID core funds to support development
efforts in Armenia shows that while CS received the majority between 2001 and 2010, PE is not far
behind, having peaked in 2001 and falling since. PA, on the other hand, received only about half the
amounts allocated to the other two SOs (see Figure 1 below.)100
Is the PF well-positioned to be sustainable as core funding comes to an end? Is there a strategy?
From an organizational capacity standpoint, EPF-Armenia appears well-positioned to be sustainable. The
staff are so dedicated to the job, as one member explained, that though contractors tend to pay more than
EPF’s market-level salaries, the hours are flexible, and there is a “family feel” to the organization along
with a sense of ownership and purpose. Both staff and donors noted Ter-Gabrielyan’s high attention to
detail to the quality of work produced by staff and grantees, superior internal communication practices,
staff’s professional demeanor and staff expertise. Ter-Gabrielyan explains that he felt a need to “change
business as usual” when he came on-board and as EPF-Armenia shifted from a grant-making to a program
implementing organization, thereby hiring new people who he ensured were extremely qualified and the
“real stars” in the country. EPF-Armenia still inherited the expertise of the grant managers from earlier
days, but Ter-Gabrielyan challenged staff who remained to concern themselves with program content and
outcomes rather than only management. Staff and donors recognized the PF’s reliable grant management
tools, solid financial management procedures and overall high international standards, allowing one donor
to “sleep at night knowing [the project] is being managed well.” The PF switched its GMS recently to
allow it to connect grants to the financial department.
EPF-Armenia carries other both positive and negative traits in the eyes of potential donors. The director
considers one of its biggest selling points the EPF-Azerbaijan office, as it makes EPF one of the few
organizations with this relationship. This perspective was seconded by donor who noted the difficulty of
achieving this connection between other organizations, even when they’re encouraged by funding
opportunities. The PF also prides itself as a neutral party. A donor supported this perception, noting the
importance of messages being delivered by a neutral organization. They have confirmed this reputation
99
Meeting deadlines, insufficient focus group management, substandard desk research, poorly written report 100
Classifications were recorded by EF and may differ from how USAID would classify activities.
Figure 1
Civil Society
Private
Enterprise
Development
Public Administration
and Policy Total
2001 $303,801.00 $607,374.28 $75,382.99 986558.27
2002 $462,957.25 $423,644.37 $286,024.80 1172626.42
2003 $146,359.76 $418,925.33 $464,356.63 1029641.72
2004 $462,752.16 $444,761.69 $83,595.29 991109.14
2005 $95,961.96 $90,790.65 $297,865.10 484617.71
2006 $319,341.06 $175,193.42 $16,942.00 511476.48
2007 $310,965.15 $36,175.00 $13,615.00 360755.15
2008 $621,518.72 $22,917.26
644435.98
2009 $141,176.29
$33,843.73 175020.02
2010 $3,345.02 $17,240.38
20585.4
Total $2,868,178.37 $2,237,022.38 $1,271,625.54 $6,376,826.29
LV
for neutrality with others in the NGO community, public focus groups and colleagues.
With respect to traits that may hinder the PF’s ability to become sustainable, staff cite issues that affect
fundraising. For example, staff believe there are mixed views by donors on whether EPF-Armenia is truly
“local” or not, and believe that the perception of the organization as “American” has stymied fundraising,
particularly with the Europeans.101
A more concrete roadblock than the name, however, may be the
international board, as USAID Forward encourages doing business with both locally registered and
locally managed entities. Furthermore, staff acknowledge that the PF is significantly more expensive than
other local NGOs due to fees paid to Washington and Tbilisi offices, and a donor estimated EPF’s
administrative costs at approximately 20-24 percent of project costs, above the typical Armenian max of
10 percent.The deputy noted that a strategic fundraising plan is ongoing, but staff seem to agree that all
members need to be engaged in securing funds. Leadership believes that substantial funding is only
possible from USAID or other bilateral donors; multilateral organizations can be counted on for small
provisions. The PF expects no funding from either local private companies/foundations or the national
government for at least the next 10 years. Local businesses may offer in-kind donations. All staff who
responded regarding the future of fundraising at the PF stated that they are “fairly confident” the PF will
be able to attract donor support for the foundation’s programs over the next few years. The director
cautions that the PF will survive without core funding but as a very different organization. In short, the PF
will adjust its priorities to future donors and supporters. The PF will become more opportunistic,
exploring new areas such as cultural rehabilitation (renovating churches, educational program, etc., which
appeals more to Armenian diaspora than civil society or democracy), as well as sports and health. Ter-
Gabrielyan expects that the PF will not be able to meet social obligations (i.e., granting maternity leave),
so rather than using employment contracts they will issue service contracts. Procedures may need to
become more flexible, no longer meeting international standards, and a high quality of work will no
longer be ensured.
PF as a “foundation” and the current and future relationship between the PF and the EF in DC.
For the most part, staff commented little on the benefits/challenges associated with being a foundation or
with being tied to EF-DC. Staff responsible for grants management cited the legal “foundation” status as a
local registered organization a boon, noting that this allows the organization to provide services for
payment, whereas as merely a representative office, it could not. Views of staff on the PF’s relationship
spanned the gamut from “very positive, helpful and necessary to our future” to “somewhat helpful but not
essential to our future” to not having enough interaction with the central unit to have an opinion. The
primary example of collaboration given was help with proposal writing from one EF-DC staff member
when requested by EPF-Armenia; others mentioned EF-DC involvement via the CMI tool or simply
noted that EF-DC would assist whenever EPF-Armenia requested the support. The EPF regional office in
Tbilisi was identified by one staff member as the closer partner, working with EPF-Armenia on regional
bids, reviewing other proposals and responding quickly to all questions and requests for help.
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On the contrary, two donors noted the association with Americans as an attractive and reassuring quality, with one specifying that they “almost always give preference to US organizations when they submit good bids.”
LVI
Case Study: EEF- Moldova
Background
EEF-M is the newest of the partnership foundations, established in 2010. They have a staff of 14 and an
annual budget of $1.5 million. They are led by Sorin Meracre, who started with the EF in 1998 as a
project assistant and who has been President since 2010. Current programs focus on local economic
development, good governance, and social action.
Local Economic Development
Goal: to enhance economic development in Moldovan communities by engaging local authorities,
civil society and the private sector.
Objectives:
Public-private partnerships established, aimed at effective implementation of local economic
and social development programs
Increased participation of youth in community development
Duration: 2010-2011
Budget: $250,000
Funding source(s): Swedish Government, DANIDA
Good Governance
Goal: enhance civic engagement by monitoring reforms and facilitating cooperation between the
government, civil society organizations, the media, and the public in the areas of European
integration, free and fair elections, and anticorruption.
Objectives/outcomes:
Increase the level of civil society input in the decision-making process and increase
transparency of government agencies’ activities
Strengthen print media in Moldova by supporting an Independent Press Council (IPC) and
Audit Bureau of Circulation
Support the development of sustainable media in Moldovan regions through grants, loans and
technical assistance to emerging media outlets
Improve implementation of the government’s anti-corruption policy
Promote free, fair and democratic elections on the national, regional and local levels in
Moldova
Duration: 2010-2011
Budget: $1,000,000
Funding source(s): Swedish Government, DANIDA
Social Action
Goal: To promote the social engagement of private companies in addressing the needs of the
vulnerable groups
Objectives/outcomes:
To promote the concept of corporate social responsibility in Moldova
To increase opportunities for social integration and employment for social orphans in
Moldova
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Budget: $232,000
Funding source(s): Swedish Government, DANIDA
New program areas include social entrepreneurship, addressing lack of employment and social
opportunities for vulnerable groups, and Transnisteria, focusing on the deep divide between societies on
both banks of Nistru River due to the unsolved political conflict.
While EEF-M is the newest partnership foundation they have rapidly gained the trust and confidence of
the donor community. A recent Sida evaluation of EEF-M concluded:
EEF’s systems for internal control have been found to be impressive, reliable and relevant to the
organization
EEF’s financial management policies, procedures and routines are consistent, adhered to and
result in clear and reliable reports.
EEF’s board of birectors is actively and regularly involved in the organization’s development, in
fundraising and in program monitoring.
EEF uses the Results Based Management Methodology in its program and project work but needs
to focus also on measuring and monitoring outcomes.
Success Story
EEF-M leadership regards the coalition for free and fair elections as their greatest success. The program
was funded by the Sida with additional support provided by USAID, among other donors.
EF reporting to Sida concludes that the program met its overall objective of developing a coordinated and
effective method for Moldovan civil society organizations to promote free, fair and democratic
parliamentary elections in 2005. Specific results achieved include:
An effective nationwide network of civil society organizations engaged in non-partisan
elections-related activities was established.
Efficient mechanisms ensured coordinated public oversight over the election process. Aspects of
the election process included political party campaigns, local election committee and polling
station activities, and/or ballot counting.
Public monitoring of election-related legislation and procedures increased. Violations were noted
and addressed in accordance with the appropriate legislation.
Election coverage in national and local mass media was monitored on a regular basis; the results
of this monitoring were widely disseminated.
Voters had increased and diversified access to information on election legislation, election rules
and procedures, and on the candidates’ political platforms. Voters from more than 600
communities participated in election-related civic activities, including public debates and other
community actions.
According to the final OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission report, “civil society organizations
were active in monitoring the electoral process. The main domestic non-partisan organization to observe
the 2005 elections was the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections ‘Coalition 2005,’ which was
created on May 12, 2004 and included almost 200 civil society groups.”
Country Context
Moldova’s progress with respect to USAID’s three strategic objectives—private enterprise development,
civil society, and public administration— has been between average and good by regional standards. Data
for this section is drawn from USAID’s Monitoring Country Progress (MCP) report. Performance is
LVIII
ranked on a scale of one to five, with five being the best. In each case a composite score for the northern
tier countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have graduated from US assistance is shown for
comparison. With respect to private sector development, Moldova is in the middle of the pack with a
good trend line regarding private sector growth. They lag Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Belarus, but are well
ahead of Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Russia.
With respect to the development of civil society, Moldova is one of the strongest performers, and shows
excellent progress in recent years. Kyrgyzstan and Russia are average while Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus are the worst performers. To gauge progress in public administration the graphic
below draws on Freedom House data on “more effective, responsive, and accountable local government.”
LIX
Moldova ranks in the middle, behind top performers, Ukraine and Georgia, but well ahead of Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus. In this area there has been significant backsliding across the board
and a large gap compared to the northern tier countries on Central and Eastern Europe.
Analysis of Foundation
A. Alignment with USAID SOs
Clearly the predominate focus of EEF-M has been in the area of civil society. Fully 83 percent of the
$2,112,269 in grants made from 2001-2011 were categorized as civil society. In response to a question in
which area EEF-M has been more effective and had the most impact, senior leadership ranked civil
society as a five and declined to rank either private enterprise development or public administration as
they had done little or no work in these areas.
This focus is a result at least in part due to guidance and directions given by the US Embassy. In
Moldova, there was close cooperation between EEF-Moldova and the Embassy between 2003 and 2004.
Because the Embassy was coordinating the efforts of all implementing partners and wanted a focus on
media and election observers in preparation for the parliamentary elections, they guided EEF down this
path. The Embassy told the foundation that there were other USAID providers working in private sector
development.
B. Sustainability
Leadership is “very confident” about continued donor funding. As noted above, leadership has already
secured significant funding from Sida to cover their major programs for the next four years which
includes overhead costs. They have a written business strategy that runs through 2013 and are in the
process of writing a new one for 2014-2017. Their annual budget since they were launched in 2012 shows
a strong upward trend line.
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Year 2010 2011 2012 2013
Annual Budget $1,222,496 1,603,751 1,515,173 $2,302,445
Looking longer term, EEF-M is still highly dependent of donor funds with little or no support from
indigenous sources of funding from either the private sector or government. This is in part a reflection
that Moldova is a very small country and the poorest in Europe. While EEF-M has successfully ended
reliance on core funding from USAID they are in turn reliant on other donors, primarily Sida. In addition,
they have not made any plans to purchase office space, which could help lay the ground work for
sustainability when donor funding inevitable begins to decline.
C. Relations with EF
Senior leadership on EEF-M characterizes the relationship with EF-DC as “very good.” They find EF-Dc
to be generally helpful and still important. Major areas where they have received support include:
Assisted with establishing financial management, audit, and financial accountability procedures
used by EEF-M
Assisted EEF-M in using USAID core grant for operating expenses
Assistance with external donor fundraising and proposal development
Networking opportunities with other PFs is useful for identifying common problems/solutions,
for example, they learned of youth bank in Georgia and copied in Moldova
The Eurasia Foundation has worked with each of the PFs to strengthen organization capacity, introduce
international standards for financial management and accounting, and to strengthen the board of directors
and address other organizational policies and procedures. The principal tool for assisting the PFs is EF-
DC’s Capacity Mapping Initiative (CMI). In general, senior EEF-M staff found the tool to be very
concrete and verifiable and helpful maintain high standards. They also found it very clear and
understandable.
EEF-Moldova was not involved in the CMI development. EF conducted an evaluation using the CMI tool
in 2011 covering four of the six topic areas: financial management, funds development, HR and staff
development, and communication. Program management and leadership were not covered. Eurasia
foundation DC staff conducted interviews and looked at files. A summary report was prepared and
presented to the board. Based on recommendations an implementation plan was prepared and its progress
has been reported regularly to the board. They are considering repeating the CMI assessment every two
years. EEF-M is also considering proposing CMI as a tool for use by local NGSs, as the Georgia office
did. This will engage NGOs in a self-assessment exercise and help change their mind set on how to
improve management practices.
D. Foundation Model
EEF-M leadership felt that the strength of the Foundation Model was their ability to take a long-term
view. They do not operate within a defined period of performance and can establish long-term
relationships with local partners. They are a local institution, which is integrated into the local landscape.
They are a trusted partner on the ground. They feel that groups that rely on ex-pats have less local
knowledge resulting in higher costs and higher risks.
They highlighted the fact that the foundation approach also provides continuity. This avoids the start and
stop nature of most contracts. They're able to maintain a strong staff, which is important since contracts
with a limited life have trouble keeping good people due to the pull of high paying NGOs. Some issues
require a consistent long-term approach, while changing attitudes and behaviors requires time and a more
a generational approach.
LXI
Country Case Study - Tajikistan
EF first opened a representative office in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in 1996. As part of its drive to establish
partner foundations throughout the region, the foundation set up Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia
(EFCA) as an independent organization in 2006. Public Foundation EFCA-Tajikistan was registered in
2009 as a nonprofit organization according to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Civic
Associations. The foundation is registered as a non-membership organization with a geographical span of
activities that covers the whole country. The goal of the foundation is to support the development of
private entrepreneurship and civil society institutes in the Republic of Tajikistan. The by-laws do not
provide detailed information about the foundation’s founders but define their reserved matters/core
competencies to include decision making about the establishment of the foundation and approval of its
statute, election and approval of the first advisory board, allocation of the foundation’s property, and
appointment of foundation’s director once the foundation is established. The founders are not entitled to
the foundation’s property. While the foundation is a non-membership organization, its by-laws include a
chapter on terms and conditions of membership in the foundation. The governing bodies of the foundation
are the advisory board and the director general. The advisory board performs strategic and controlling
duties according to the statute and the special regulation developed for the board. The advisory board
meets at least two times a year and it should not exceed 19 people in composition. The director general is
appointed by the advisory board and represents an executive body of the foundation. He/she can delegate
some of his/her responsibilities to the executive director of the foundation. The organizational chart of the
foundation depicts only the position of the executive director and does not mention the advisory board or
the director general.
EFCA-Tajikistan has young executive director who was appointed in October 2010 after winning the
competition for this position of the foundation. Since 2009 the executive director worked for the
foundation as the program and communication Manager and in 2010 became an acting director of the
foundation. The Dushanbe office currently has 14 staff members and in May 2012, the Tajik office
created the following Departments: i) Financial and Grant Management Office (three people); ii) Program
Dept (six Program Assistants and Program Managers); and iii) Development, Evaluation and Monitoring
Departments (two staff and interns). The Foundation receives interns for three or six months, from the
University of St. Edwards in Scotland and from NYU, to write proposals and support development.
EFCA-Tajikistan has been doing this since 2007.
The review of the foundation’s by-laws has revealed a mixture of grant-making and operational activities
of the foundation. First of all, there is a conflict between Clause 1.6 about the non-membership nature of
the foundation and Article 4, which describes the procedure for acquiring and canceling membership to
the foundation. Two governing bodies of the foundation lack clear-cut division of the
lawmaking/constituent and controlling responsibilities as the advisory board has both duties according to
the statute. In reality, the advisory board approves contracts above $5,000, develops and endorses the
strategy, reviews the contracts and monitors the implementation. The peculiarity of the foundation is that
all three foundations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan have a common board of birectors but the
by-laws do not mention it. Therefore, the foundation should adjust the statute to the operational activities
and consider revision of: i) membership/non-membership status of the foundation; ii) relevance of the
position of the director general; iii) formal arrangement of relations with the board of directors of the
regional office. The adjustment can be done either by introducing changes to the by-laws or by
developing separate regulations.
Mission of the EFCA – Tajikistan is to help people focus on civil society and economic development.
Major program areas include: 1) Youth programs – empower and engage; 2) Civil society – strengthen
capacity and build bridge between people and government; and 3) Vulnerable groups – integrating them
into society and provide support. Other areas include: economic development; local governance; access to
justice; media; and charity development. At present the foundation carries out the following projects:
LXII
1. Building Tajik Youth Confidence in Democracy. Youth in the country remain marginalized
and lack the necessary mechanisms in the current system to express their views. This project
aims to build the trust and confidence of Tajik youth in democracy. Moreover, it aims to
empower young people to become agents of change in their communities. The project will
seek to engage youth between the ages of 16 and 24 in the process of democratization by
creating a framework whereby young people can stand for and win elections to a Youth
Council (YC) in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) of Tajikistan. Funded
by UNDEF in the amount of $250,000, implementation began in January of 2012 and will
last 24 months.
2. Access to Justice. Supported by the US Embassy, 14 months since June 2012. The project is
funded in the amount of$93,000.
3. Equal Before the Law: Access to Justice in Central Asia Program (EBL) is a joint program of
EF and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland aimed at increase of access to justice for
vulnerable populations in Central Asia, in particular for rural women, at-risk children and
persons with disabilities. Funded by the Finish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for three years, it
began in January 2011 (Tajik part - $1,087,000).
4. Reducing Youth Radicalization in Tajikistan is aimed at reducing of the threat of political and
religious radicalization in five of the poorest districts of the Sugd and Khatlon regions of
Tajikistan.The initiative provides NGOs with the knowledge, tools and opportunities to
facilitate a coordinated approach among stakeholders to address the triggers of radicalization.
The project also works with young people to engage them in the social, political and
economic sectors of their community, making radical religious movements less attractive
options (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, two years since June 2010, $170-180,000,
until the end of 2012).
5. Community development’s the overall objective is to improve the exercise of fundamental
democratic rights and electoral processes at a local self-government level in 15 communities
in Fayzabad, Nosiri Khisrav and Khuroson districts. EFCA and partners work closely with
local self-governments, local councils, civil society activists and other community members
to increase their knowledge and skills on exercising fundamental democratic rights.
Supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, since 2010 the project is in its
second year, $110,000.
At this stage the foundation qualifies itself as a combination of half grant making and half operational
organization. The core competencies of the foundation include civil society, local governance, youth bank
and project and grant management. Main activities of the foundation are grant giving, training deliveries
and consultation support. The foundation uses its own staff and invites independent outside experts to
carry out its activities. The beneficiaries of the foundation are rural communities, journalists, youth in
rural areas, vulnerable groups and NGOs. The foundation cooperates with the local and international
organizations and local self-government bodies; it also tries to build partner relations with the national
government in order to implement projects and perform its main activities.
Tajikistan’s context is a very important factor that influences EFCA – Tajikistan activity. Tajikistan is a
Central Asian country of 7.6 million people (January 1, 2011) facing major development challenges in
eradicating hunger and poverty. Over 73 percent of the population of Tajikistan lives in rural areas and 46
percent is under the age of 19. The country is faced with geographic challenges, as it is 93 percent
mountainous with limited access to other regions. The Tajik government relies largely on foreign state-led
investment and loans from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Iran, as well as assistance from international
financial institutions, for major infrastructure projects. One million or more Tajiks—up to 50 percent of
the labor force—are labor migrants, and 40-50 percent of more of the remaining population lives in
poverty. Almost one-fourth of households in Tajikistan receive some remittances from migrant workers.
LXIII
These remittances reportedly account for almost one-half of Tajikistan’s GDP, making the country first in
the world in terms of such dependency. Other problematic issues include corruption and inefficiency of
public services, tensions in Pamir and the Presidential election in 2013.
Today in Tajikistan, it is possible to identify organizations that have achieved significant success in
cooperation with governmental structures both at the village, district, and oblast level. Moreover, there are
unique examples of cooperation between civil society organizations and state bodies that has led to
permanent change in legislation and state practice. However, CSOs differ in terms of the scale of their
projects and direction of activity. There are CSOs whose activity is connected with public transformation
and influencing the development of legislation and state practices. At the same time, some CSO activity is
connected with that transformation on a local scale and the CSO’s work becomes more focused on the
needs of local development. For all civil society organizations a priority of activities is to increase the
cooperation between CSOs and state bodies and structures. Cooperation with state structures provides an
opportunity to achieve optimum results in the realization of CSO activity, which has already been
affirmed through practice in the third sector. Partnership and cooperation between the non-governmental
sector and state structures seems to be an uneasy. The social-ideological context of cooperation between
the non-governmental sector and state structures has been caused by the difficult transition period of the
independent national state of Tajikistan.
The Tax Code defines “charitable activity” and the Government may provide material and financial
support to youth organizations, children’s organizations, charitable organizations and organizations of the
disabled; may provide favorable tax policy; may give children’s organizations the right to use school
buildings, non-scholastic establishments, clubs, palaces and houses of culture, sports facilities and other
structures, free of charge or on favorable terms. Significantly, however, no tax privileges are provided for
charitable organizations in Tajikistan. There are no legal barriers to resources. An NGO may engage in
economic activities to the extent they advance the purposes for which the organization was created, but
may not pursue the generation of profit as its primary purpose. Profit from the economic activities of
NGOs, including charities, is generally taxed in the same manner as for commercial organizations. There
is little awareness of corporate social responsibility in the Western sense in Tajikistan. Many, if not most,
corporations have contributed to the Roghun dum campaign, but many of these contributions were
coerced. Some corporations do engage in voluntary community assistance on an ad hoc basis.
Whether the PF has served US interests with respect to broad programming areas and investments.
Here use the existing tables showing alignment of PF programs with USAID's threeobjectives.
Given various forces influencing the PF, will the country programs continue to relate to the set of
broad US interests?
Based on grantee data the Tajikistan programs have been very strongly oriented to Private Enterprise
development. However, detailed analysis shows that supported projects were not always correctly
qualified with an appropriate strategic objective, this does not allow making informed conclusions about
the balance of funds across the three strategic objectives (SOs). When private enterprise (PE) and civil
society (CS) development were main program areas of the EFCA-Tajikistan, public administration (PA)
was a lower priority. As shown in the table below, PE accounted for 51 percent of grants, followed by CS
at 32 percent and PA at 17 percent.
LXIV
Year Civil Society
Private Enterprise
Development
Public
Administration and
Policy
Total Grant
Amount
2000 63,065.00 181,627.25 58,915.65 303,607.90
2001 143,907.59 155,003.24 50,492.80 349,403.63
2002 49,398.09 176,065.93 99,014.22 324,478.24
2003 75,557.00 215,438.82 50,539.00 341,534.82
2004 181,447.68 150,137.00 53,790.00 385,374.68
2005 106,331.54 29,390.00 36,868.00 172,589.54
2006 39,819.00 87,286.18 14,228.00 141,333.18
2007 25,187.00 62,200.88
87,387.88
2008
1,468.00
1,468.00
Total $684,712.90 $1,058,617.30 $363,847.67 $2,107,177.87
It proved challenging to identify a balance of recent programs across the three SOs. The following
programs were reviewed by the evaluators:
SO 1: Private Enterprise 1. American Chamber of Commerce Project (2008)
2. Civil Society Poverty Reduction Project (2009-2011)
SO 2: Civil Society 3. Youth banks or Decreasing Youth Radicalization Project (2010-
2012)
4. Central Asia News Service (7/07-3/11) Through Tajikistan Regional
Correspondents Network.
The Foundation provided a seed grant to launch the American Chamber of Commerce (ACC) in 2008.
The main activities of the ACC include advocacy/lobbying and promotion of favorable business climate.
Despite the frequent turnover of directors the organization managed to develop proper arrangements and
increase the number of its members by attracting representatives of local businesses. The ACC
contributed to Tajikistan signing several UN conventions and adopting 10 new laws vital for doing
business in the country and at the international level. Unfortunately, the ACC does not keep in regular
contact with the Foundation and it is completely unaware about its activities. However, they did conduct a
joint charitable ball. The organization is open and ready for close cooperation with the Foundation.
The Civil Society Poverty Reduction project was implemented between June 2009 and August 2011 with
support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the amount of
$72,340. The project aimed to strengthen the capacity of local NGOs working with vulnerable groups in
Khatlon and the Districts under Republican subordination on poverty reduction issues and to address
poverty among vulnerable groups in society. A total of 11 grants were given to NGOs to conduct income
generating activities. In addition, 40 NGOs participated in three NGO clubs in Kulob, Qurgonteppa and
Dushanbe. Each NGO developed an action plan to combat poverty in their community. The vulnerable
primary target groups NGOs are working with to alleviate poverty includes orphaned children, poor
and/or refugee women, and disabled women and men in the Khatlon and DRS regions. ,. Seven local
NGOs implemented income-generation projects to improve the living conditions of vulnerable groups by
assisting beneficiaries and their families in generating income to support their long-term economic needs
and reduce their social vulnerability. The target groups utilized skills acquired during trainings and
workshops to run the following income generation activities and businesses: sewing, shoe-repairing,
livestock farming, milk processing, and crop farming. For example, public organization “Parastor” near
Dushanbe implemented a two-month course on small business enterprises and a year-long machine
LXV
sewing course for girls. A mini-sewing workshop equipped with sewing machines was established, and
the beneficiaries made and sold finished goods. The funds generated from the sale of goods were used to
buy new fabric and was reinvested into the school where the girls lived and studied. In general, three out
of five of the supported projects increased beneficiaries’ income. All participants improved their job skills
that not necessary helped them to get jobs. One project is still operating a sustainable business, and two
are still functioning.
The Reducing Youth Radicalization in Tajikistan project that aims to engage youth in their communities
in order to make radical groups appear less attractive. The program, which started in the summer of 2010,
has established Youth banksYouth banks in five areas of Tajikistan: Isfara, New Mastchoh, Muminabad,
Shurobad and Shartuz. The project is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. A total of
28 young people are active in the project and have been given nine days of training in project
management and the issues of radicalization. The budget for this program is $172,867, and it is expected
to finish at the end of 2012. Each Youth Bank gets $5,000 in grants to develop space for extracurricular
activities for youth outside of the mosque. Initiatives support youth involvement in sports, community
initiatives, or whatever is important to them. The project is seen as Somewhat Successful. EFCA-
Tajikistan succeeded in sending out a message to youth that it is good to be engaged and there is more
than religion to focus on in their life. Partner NGOs went into schools to increase the level of information
available to youth to introduce the concept and to generate support from school teachers and directors in
terms of free access to school and space through in-kind contributions. Moreover, local authorities
support the project as well. However, there were some internal and external challenges faced by the
projects. Some external issues include a great diversity in the capacity of these regions especially between
the north and the south – some have no internet and others have no computer literacy. There was an issue
with youth bank administration because youth were not registered with organizations and thus did not
have bank account so any means to accept the funding. In addition, there was a high turnover of youth –
the project would train youth and then some youth would leave the country or get married, and so
additional youth needed to be identified and trained. For example Mascho have not been able to do
anything yet because of this turnover. In Shartuz have more girls – 9 of 12 members are girls – whereas
all others are male. In some cases, girls did participate and parents agreed, but then they were pressured
by teachers and others not to participate so dropped out. The internal challenges include two major
interconnected issues. First, there was issue with fraud that resulted in firings of several people. As a
result there were delays with some project activities and deliverables. The donor was informed and agreed
on a plan with the EFCA-Tajikistan to solve the fraud issue. Second, the project manager was changed in
the middle of the program. It should be mentioned that the issue of fraud was solved in an open,
transparent and honest manner that showed maturity of the EFCA-Tajikistan leadership.
The Central Asia News Service Regional Project (7/07-3/11) was implemented via the Tajikistan Regional
Correspondents Network. During the project the network had five correspondents; at the time of the
evaluation only one correspondent was working. In general the project is assessed as very instrumental
and important since it provided a possibility to build the capacity of journalists, to develop and introduce
standards of journalist ethics, to receive information from alternative sources and get experience in
working for the international mass media. The network correspondents not only gathered and transmitted
information, and prepared news reviews about Tajikistan, but also promoted new professional standards
among their colleagues. They continue the educational activities now when the project is over by
delivering various trainings and workshops for journalists and CSOs. The challenges the project has faced
include reluctance of journalists to raise issues that might upset the public authorities (very high degree of
self-censorship), great dependency of journalists on their income and living conditions such as electricity
to run computers and access to the Internet. The sustainability of the project and the correspondents
network could be improved by establishing a representative office of the Agency in Tajikistan and by
ensuring a regular update of the project website in all languages (www.ca-news.org).
Since the partner organization has been registered the foundation successfully transforms into an
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operational organization losing its grant making talent, but maintaining the program and financial
procedures and management in place as well as strong financial management and strong financial control.
In the opinion of the foundation the key success factors include: board and governance structures; an
empowered board that makes decisions and drives policy; driven by local staff and dependency from
stakeholders and local NGOs; getting active people and communities involved; addressing key issues;
work with partners and credit them for the foundation success; trust of stakeholders; good staff and trust
relation to staff from leadership; very targeted technical and capacity building work with NGOs; not
overlapping with government or other NGO activity.
EFCA-Tajikistan faces challenges from various sides:
Government sees the Foundation as a threat after the Arab Spring as there is lack of
understanding by the national government which does not want to cooperate with NGOs,
especially ones that is seen as supported or funded by the US. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
a special Department on International Organizations that has a meeting with the Foundation every
2-3 months to check what the EFCA – Tajikistan is doing. Also, the Ministry of Justice will have
meetings with all NGOs and tell them not to do certain things. Although working with the local
government is easier, there is little decentralization in Tajikistan and de facto, everything still
comes from the top. In addition, the Tajik government will likely adopt a law like Russia on
foreign agents and it might happen next year.
Donors. In some cases the USG through its rules and rulings has determined that the EFCA –
Tajikistan is not eligible to compete for funding reserved for local organizations. Also, some
RFAs are not necessary focused on important issues for Tajikistan. For example, the youth
radicalization project (funded by Danish) was a response to published cartoon on Mohammed in
newspaper. But it is older people that need to be addressed on radicalization issue rather than
youth.
Other external factors include corruption, lack of NGO transparency and accountability as well as
their low representation of their communities and time needed for development of stable civil
society and for visibility of the NGO activity results.
However, the biggest challenges for the EFCA are internal one. They include: balancing between
mission or/and donor driven foundation; consolidation of the programs and focusing on core
competencies; high staff turnover as staff going to UNDP, Oxfam and OSCE because they pay
higher salaries. EFCA – Tajikistan hires a lot of young people and after a year or two they move
on. In addition, communication, positioning, and marketing of the EFCA-Tajikistan is a big
challenge as the Foundation has new status (a local operational organization) that requires new
PR approaches, communication channels and messages.
Whether the PF is or will become sustainable as EF Core Funding comes to an end. This will entail
an examination of the PF "strategy" for fund raising, but also whether the PF can maintain
international standards for audit, accountability, transparency, and the like. Here also the issue of
leadership may be a factor.
In the 2010-2014 sustainability plan prepared by EF there were specific fundraising targets established for
Eurasia Foundation Washington headquarters (EF-DC) and the five partner foundations, including EFCA.
Each partner foundation should increase the percentage of its own budget from non-directed sources (not
through sub-awards from EF-DC) by an average of five percent annually over the four year period from
the 2010 baseline. For the first reporting period of June 2010-June 2011 EFCA (Central Asia) reached 92
percent of target. As for the year ending May 2012 EFCA is slightly below at 86 percent of target. While
EF network has broadly met their financial sustainability targets to date, country context and available
sources of funds are different not only for each partner foundation, but even for different countries in the
same region.
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EFCA – Tajikistan’s 2012 budget is $564.747 that supports implementation of five to six projects and 14
staff members.
Most of the interviewed EFCA-Tajikistan current staff is ‘fairy confident’ about the ability to secure
future funding and funding is secured by the end of 2013. Now EFCA-Tajikistan is expecting results from
10 submitted proposals. Proposals were submitted to a variety of European, USA and multi-lateral donor
organizations. However, EFCA-Tajikistan had recently faced a situation when the foundation was
excluded from several US Department of State grant competitions reserved for local institutions because
of an interpretation that they are an international organization. Currently the Foundation has no USAID
Mission programs as the latest one the Foundation applied for was an agricultural project that was
rejected due to “no agricultural expertise” even though the proposal was great.
EFCA – Tajikistan does not have a strategic or fundraising plan as there is an organizational strategy for
EFCA on a regional level for 2012 – 2014. The Foundation has an annual budget and operational plan for
Tajikistan that identifies needs for fundraising and internal needs, but is more about money than strategy.
In 40 percent out of all attempts the EFCA – T gets indirect costs covered and European donors are very
flexible on this (for example. Danish and Finnish allow seven percent while UNDP does not allow
anything at all). EFCA – T established overhead costs at 7.2 percent level. With donors, by building this
in we don’t ask them to buy us hardware and other stuff – we can tell them this is built into the indirect
rate
All financial reports are submitted to EFCA regional office. EFCA regional office bought all three
country offices 1C accounting software. Every year EFCA-T undergoes A-133 audit and sometimes
project audit if it envisioned in the project. It is envisioned that future support might come from local
private companies and foundations, foreign government assistance programs, USAID Mission, private
foundations, and multi-lateral organizations.
PF as a “Foundation,” and the current and future relationship between the PF and the EF in
Washington, DC. Brief history of EF-PF relationship with respect to up-grading organization
effectiveness and performance...and current status re international standards. The importance of
the EF CORE GRANT should be assessed.
After the EFCA-Tajikistan was registered, the foundation has cooperated with EF on various projects.
The Foundation reports to the regional office of EFCA on a monthly basis . The majority of polled
individuals assess the relations with the EF/DC in the next few years as Generally helpful and still
important to us. In the opinion of the polled individuals the positive aspects of cooperation with the EF
included common grants and financial systems, solid reputation, branding, experience, materials, and
expertise. In some cases, the foundation acted as a partner in bids (ie EBL) and local entity could not win
or handle a a million dollar project. Among the negative sides of the relationship between EP and EF
Washington the people mentioned the following ones: as funding declined, started to lose resources like
Grants Manager in DC that oversaw all grants policy; still have some M&E from DC but reduced
resources; DC is too slow to respond and too expensive to work with since DC salaries are seven to eight
times more than local salaries.
Among the major benefits PF has gained from associating with EF and the Network the EFCA –
Tajikistan respondents mentioned: assistance with organization performance and capacity building
(capacity mapping tool/exercise); assistance with establishing financial management, audit, and financial
accountability procedures; assistance with our external donor fundraising and proposal development;
networking opportunities with other PFs is useful for identifying common problems/solutions; gaining of
a certain amount of international status/reputation and respect for being in the EF association; seen as an
honest broker because we have done this in the past and are not seen as being critical of the government;
this network is very important benefit. This includes using CRRC or EERC as institutions to provide
technical assistance. In other cases, EFCA –Tajikistan leverages and employs past program experience.
For example, a Ferghana Valley program was modeled after a similar program in the Caucasus.
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The procedures put in place by EF-DC were strong and contributed to the reputation and organizational
capacity. However, some changes were made in 2010 when EFCA-Tajikistan became an independent
organization. Among introduced minor changes. EFCA – Tajikistan reduced the size of a grant to be
approved by the Advisory Board to $5k while, for example, in Kazakhstan it is $15k. Other changes
might be introduced if the foundation needs them or NGO legislation requires it. It was also noted that
EFCA is seen as an international and not a local organization by some donors, like the US Embassy and
SOROS, and perception of EFCA -Tajikistan as an international organization actually hurts them.
As for the core grant, EF/DC assisted the foundation in using USAID core grant for operating expenses.
Since2010 the foundation has $79,000 from the EF; this money will be spent on civil society or economic
development programs and 10-15 percent will go to the overhead expenditures.
There are significant advantages the leadership and PF staff observe such as the Foundation’s knowledge
and experience in working with NGOs; ability to develop NGO organizational capacity and implement
projects in the $100k to $1 million range while local NGOs can do less than $100k; ability to work with
NGOs that USAID could not work with as they do not meet international standards and build their
capacity. In addition, the Foundation has become one of the strongest NGOs in the country with a good
understanding of international standards; well-trained local staff with knowledge of local tradition and
with connections in government as well as an important combination of staff skills (professional with
human). Contractors leave after 3-5 years and permanent funding from one source allows for strong
organizational development, stability in the long term, and ability to earn reputation.
The disadvantages include strong connections to the US that not only raises suspicion, but also makes PF
being seen as a US entity and not a local organization. As a result EFCA is contemplating rebranding and
not using EF title. In addition, there are needs to rebrand and even reposition with US Embassy as well as
with other international donors and organizations. Also, there is a strong perception of PF as of grant
making foundation.
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Country Case Study Kyrgyzstan
Background and Country Context
The Kyrgyzstan Partner Foundation (PF) was established in 2005 as part of EFCA. The Bishkek office
currently has 23 staff members and an annual budget of $1.6 million, and the Osh office has seven staff
members and an annual budget of $495,000. The current portfolio includes country specific and regional
programs, and some programs are jointly implemented with the Osh office, which also manages its own
cross border activities.
EFCA Kyrgyzstan has been very focused on civil society (CS) activities. Their core programmatic areas
include local community development and governance, youth, CSR, vulnerable Groups, cross
border/conflict resolution, and media. Several staff members defined their mission as building the
capacity of local organizations and also noted that working at the local level is a comparative advantage
for them because other organizations are more involved at the national level. Current funding partners
include USAID Kyrgyzstan Mission, DRL, the Ministry of Finland and the OSCE.
In terms of country context, political instability, corruption, and conflict issues in the south influence the
programmatic direction of donors and the PF. While corruption and a lack of government capacity have
made it very difficult for the foundation to work at the national level, EFCA Kyrgyzstan is well
positioned to work at the local level due to its networks and knowledge. The relatively democratic
conditions in Kyrgyzstan provide opportunities for civil society development as well as work in media.
Civil society remains vibrant, but weak. NGOs are the second largest employer in the country, following
government, but capacity remains low. This provides the PF with a competitive advantage as a strong
local NGO that adheres to international standards, and also allows them to position themselves as an
expert in NGO capacity building.
However, the rich donor environment has contributed to staff turnover issues, which remains a threat for
the future of the organization. The Kyrgyz Office has a new Executive Director, although she was
previously a Program Manager, and the Osh team is all relatively new. Weaknesses in program
management and implementation were identified that appear to be related to staff turnover.
Economic development remains quite low and there is a very limited opportunity to engage with the
private sector. However, the strong mining sector and presence of Canadian mining company Kumptor
has led to some work in CSR and local governance issues, which EFCA Kyrgyzstan sees as a potential
growth area.
Whether the PF has served US interests with respect to broad programming areas and investments.
Here use the existing tables showing alignment of PF programs with USAID's 3 objectives. Given
various forces influencing the PF, will the country programs continue to relate to the set of broad
US interests?
The Kyrgyzstan programs have been very strongly oriented towards civil society in both grants and other
donor funded initiatives. In terms of grants, in the early years there was a relatively even balance between
private enterprise (PE) and civil society (CS), but over time the focus shifted heavily towards CS, with
public administration (PA) a lower priority. This is consistent with the findings for Central Asia overall.
As shown in the table below, CS accounted for 59 percent of grants, followed by PE at 32 percent and PA
at nine percent.
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While the evaluators sought to identify a balance of recent programs across the three SOs, this proved to
be a challenge due to the strong emphasis on CS. The following programs were reviewed by the
evaluators:
Professional Youth Journalism Development Program in Central Asia – PYJDP - (9/12-12/12)
Central Asia News Service – CANS - (7/07-3/11)
Education Loan Program – ELP- (5/09-5/12)
Regional Trade (2007-2011)
Cross Border Youth Cooperation Project – CBYCP- (3/10-3/12)
All were categorized as CS programs, with the exception of the Regional Trade initiative which was
considered a PE program. However, for this program, the primary role of EFCA was to organize and
manage a contracting process for numerous technical specialists. This was leveraging their experience as
a grant making entity, and did not demonstrate a core competency in the PE area. Thus, the only program
area explored by the team in depth was CS.
The evaluation found mixed results in terms of program success in the CS programs. The evaluators
considered whether or not the program met its indicators; staff, donor and beneficiary interviews on the
specific programs; and consideration of sustainability and/or legacy of programs.
The two media programs reviewed – both CANS and PYJDP (implemented by local partner KLOOP) –
appear successful and demonstrate a core competency of EFCA in regional media activities. PF Program
Managers categorized these as between “Very Successful” and “Somewhat Successful”. PYJDP, a $500k
program funded by DRL, exceeded its key indicators in terms of number of attendees, graduates,
internships, and website hits. The program expanded to include five languages and news from all
countries in Central Asia. CANS (www.ca-news.org), a $295k program funded through DRL, also had
the goal of increasing coverage of Ferghana Valley. CANS leadership was pleased with the results, which
included increasing website visitors to 26 thousand a day, and producing over 150 articles a day in three
languages. Both are implemented jointly with EF-DC.
Row Labels Civil Society
Private Enterprise
Development
Public Administration
and Policy Grand Total
2000 $144,270.17 $43,008.20 $27,536.23 214814.6
2001 $109,107.84 $109,260.73 $10,992.55 229361.12
2002 $98,854.01 $116,814.11 $68,668.05 284336.17
2003 $210,738.88 $273,106.71 $37,865.00 521710.59
2004 $610,193.36 $287,011.18 $153,959.33 1051163.87
2005 $380,792.50 $76,113.77 $1,864.00 458770.27
2006 $224,647.65 $117,261.00 $11,881.00 353789.65
2007 $122,036.78 $53,103.79 $4,914.66 180055.23
2008 $40,008.50
40008.5
2009 $59,192.00
59192
2010 $1,081.00
1081
Grand Total $2,000,922.69 $1,075,679.49 $317,680.82 $3,394,283.00
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In terms of legacy, both KLOOP and CANS felt that the overall goal of improving journalism standards
had been met. Both organizations are making progress toward financial sustainability, although both
remain donor dependent. KLOOP has developed some fee for services, including commercial
photography classes and subscriptions and advertising, and CANS currently receives 50 percent of its
revenue from subscription fees and ad revenue. Both identified areas where they developed organizational
capacity through working with EFCA, including accounting, budgeting and proposal preparation, but felt
EFCA could have been more active in supporting them to plan for sustainability.
The two other CS programs reviewed by the team did not meet expectations from the perspective of the
donor, beneficiaries and counterparts. Both of these programs were funded by Mission RFAs and include
the Education Loan Program (ELP), a $500k effort that ran from May 2009-2012, and the Cross Border
Youth Cooperation Project (CBYCP), a $457k program that ran from March 2010-2012. The goal of ELP
was to promote a new DCA with two banks that was introducing student loans on the market, and then to
support students who received loans in getting jobs and internships through an association of University
Career Centers (EdNet). The CBYCP paired four villages on the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border to carry
out joint community projects as a conflict mitigation effort.
The ELP partner banks made about 150 loans combined and one of the banks had expected to make more
than 1,000. There were many issues with the PR materials and events led by EFCA that required
significant involvement by partners and the donor, including editing all materials. The job fair events also
did not meet expectations in terms of turnout and capacity building of the career centers to carry out this
activity in the future.
The CBYCP components included youth engagement, developing a school of conflict management, and a
youth bank. While some positive aspects were noted, including a 3-day training on youth banks, it was
not clear that the program had an impact in mitigating conflict. During the project unrest broke out
amongst youth in the region and EFCA did not develop specific interventions to respond to this
development. Some deliverables were late or not produced, including a public outreach strategy,
brochures and a movie to highlight program successes. With the latter, money had to be returned to
USAID because the film was completed after the POP. The youth bank grants component also had issues.
Some required construction for which EFCA did not seek BEO approval, and the sustainability of these
efforts was not clear.
Thus, there was a range in the quality of the programs reviewed. One of the key factors that contributed to
success included high quality partners and NGOs (such as KLOOP and CANS), but this was not universal
since the existence of strong local partners in ELP (banks and EdNet) did not guarantee results. General
issues with implementation can be linked to significant staff turnover for both Bishkek and Osh based
staff involved in these projects. For ELP, the Program Manager changed twice and the IT staff person
tasked to create a website changed three times. For CBYCP, there were three different Program
Managers, the 3rd
of which arrived with five months left; the Chief of Party also changed. Donors and
partners also noted that the staff assigned to the projects did not seem to have the requisite skills in
specific areas, including education and conflict mitigation. There were also issues with poor planning and
project management, which was acknowledged as a weakness by the PF’s own staff.
This demonstrates that the greatest challenge to the EFCA Kyrgyzstan going forward will be retention
and skill development of its own staff. PF leadership noted that they will continue to operate in the same
general program areas in the future, which will remain CS oriented, but did express the need to adjust
based on donor priorities in the future. As the Kyrgyzstan PF completes the transition to a local
organization that is potentially more donor driven, the need to ensure adequate technical skills could be a
challenge. The quality of programs must be maintained to enable the organization to successfully compete
for funds. The weaknesses in project management and technical skills should be addressed to continue
strong implementation and remain results oriented.
Is the PF (EFCA Kyrgyzstan) well positioned to be sustainable as EF Core Funding comes to an
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end. Is there a strategy in place for fundraising and can the PF meet international standards for
audit, accounting, transparency and the like.
Currently, EFCA Kyrgyzstan receives little core funding, and as of 2009 had anticipated that all
remaining core funds would be used for matching in programs or to support office and payroll functions.
The 2009 Grant Proposal to EF-DC outlined a strategy for EFCA to transition from core funding and
several changes have since been made, although not all of the proposed changes were implemented,
including eliminating the Bishkek Executive Director position.
EFCA has come close to meeting sustainability plan targets - from June 2010-May 2011, EFCA achieved
92 percent of its target with $3.04 million raised, and from June 2011-May 2012 reached 86 percent of
their target with $2.98 million raised. However, this is not specific to Kyrgyzstan. According to the most
recent fundraising report, covering April-August 2012, Kyrgyzstan had won three awards totaling $1.28
million or 54 percent of total EFCA fundraising, which shows a relatively strong fundraising position.
Kyrgyz PF staff interviewed also expressed a high degree of confidence regarding their financial
sustainability in the future. Leadership responded that they were “Very Confident” or “Fairly Confident”
about their ability to attract donor funds over the next three-to-five years. They also felt that funds would
be generated from all sources listed except for the host Kyrgyz Government. EFCA also benefits from
having an established overhead rate of about seven percent that was developed by the 2nd
EFCA President
and allows them to recover these costs from all donors, with the exception of USAID.
A few threats to future financial sustainability were identified. One key issue relates to the status of the
organization, which is not perceived as truly local and is competing for funds as a local organization in
some cases. The Kyrgyz PF is planning to hire a PR specialist to rebrand and reposition the organization,
and EFCA may change its name as part of this process. The perception of the PF will impact its future
fundraising capability and there needs to be a clear understanding among donors of who they are and
what they do. This raises the question of whether US interests will be met in the future if the branding of
EF and its US affiliation are lost.
Another question is how their development team will be funded in the future. Currently, the Development
Manager position is covered from Local Core Funds, and this transition occurred in November 2011. This
position has been held by a locally based expat and does not require allowances associated with expat
staff; however, going forward the office must generate sufficient revenue to cover this position.
The leadership stated that EFCA Kyrgyzstan will maintain international standards for audit and
accounting in the future, but that procedures will evolve as needed. However, there is a specific issue with
the Kyrgyzstan office that deserves mention. Two of their current programs are USAID Mission funded
cooperative agreements that were structured on a reimbursement (rather than advance) basis. This
includes a $1.3 million transparency in local government project and a $1.2 million women’s peace bank
project. This was evidently done in response to USAID audit findings that had not been adequately
addressed in terms of cost allocation issues. EFCA has requested a change in the terms and USAID
Central Asia RCO recently conducted an audit, but the results are not yet known. EFCA Kyrgyzstan does
not have the resources to manage these two large programs on a reimbursable basis and the loss of these
programs would be a substantial hit to their current portfolio. Thus, EFCA Kyrgyzstan will need to ensure
that accounting and finance practices remain consistent with international standards to ensure current
levels of program funds.
PF as a “Foundation,” and the current and future relationship between the PF and the EF in
Washington, DC.
The leadership and PF staff all characterized the relationship with EF-DC as either “Generally helpful and
still important to us” or “Somewhat helpful but not essential for our future”. The current relationship is
seen as “formal” and primarily related to finance and reporting. The grants management system (GMS)
and the legacy of accounting and financial management systems were seen as the greatest benefits of the
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relationship. Once they transition to full independence, the PF will cover the costs and management of the
GMS, which is currently covered by EF-DC.
An additional positive aspect of the relationship is that EF-DC identifies and leads joint bidding on
opportunities. However, the view was also expressed the view that EF-DC was not helpful in attracting
significant funds when the transition to a sustainable entity began in 2005. Thus, there is a distinction
made when they bid together and EF-DC takes the lead in identifying and preparing the bids, vs. when the
PF undertakes bids on its own, where they feel they get little support from EF-DC. Furthermore, the staff
sited the expense of EF-DC staff and their NICRA on joint programs as a downside to the relationship.
The reduction in core funding has also led to a decline in human resources provided by EF-DC. For
example, the loss of a DC based grants manager to support the field and a decline in M&E has been noted
by field based staff. It is unlikely that EFCA will pay for this in the future, although they will pay for EF-
DC to conduct next year’s CMI audit. However, staff did not indicate that the CMI tool had a major
impact on their organizational capacity or operations.
The network, rather than EF-DC, may be more beneficial to EFCA going forward. Staff noted that the
network provides direct benefits through exchanges with other PFs that allows for learning opportunities
and they are looking at doing bids together with some other offices, including an upcoming EU tender on
women’s issues. However, it was also noted that they seek to leverage the network to make it more useful
and this is an area they continue to explore.