1

Introduction

Africa is widely viewed by the rest of the world as a dark continent without hope or remedy

to its myriad of problems; mired by wars, conflicts, hunger and plethora of diseases. The

continent in attempt to correct this myopic view claims that it was marginalised from outset

and has no option than to be independent, even if it has to constantly seek for advice and help

in all ramifications from the Western world. Now, all the African countries have gained

independence, but most of the countries continue to experience chaos and unrests politically,

socially and economically. However, history has shown that one of two scenarios usually

happens when a country gets independence. It is either the country go on to develop and

prosper as in the instances of Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa or it under develops

further; leaving its citizens to rethink why they had to struggle so hard to get the

independence they craved for in the first place. The latter scenario is the part Nigeria has

fallen into since gaining independence in 1960 from its former metro pole, Britain.

One of the reasons Nigeria has gone backwards in economic development is because of

corruption. The reports and cases of this subject are numerous which necessitated that I

conduct the study on graft in Nigeria. I found out that one major cause of widespread level of

corruption in the country is the failure of the government institutions. The overlap between

corruption and the governing institutions is a call for concern in this country. Thus, I

hypothesise that large scale corruption in Nigeria is a manifestation of institutional failure. In

essence, corruption is the dependent “variable”1 while weak institution is the independent

variable that has exacerbated corruption. The big question to be answered in this research

essay is; how has institutional failure been experienced in Nigeria case? Other questions that I

have answered in this essay are; what institutions are mostly affected by corruption? What

countervailing institutions exist to deal with the problem of widespread corruption? Why

don’t these institutions function? As such, the main aim of this study is to find a possible

solution to the problem.

This essay has been divided into four sections; the first section deals with the provision of

some background information on Nigeria; definition of concepts; the underlying theory of

this essay as to the causes of corruption in Nigeria context; and the rationale for the research.

1Giddens, A., “Asking and Answering Sociological Questions” in Giddens, A. (5th Edition) Sociology, Polity

Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 82.

2

This section also talked briefly on the methodology while the second section will be a

discussion on the institutional failure in Nigeria with regards to the institutions mostly

affected; and the experiences of failure of these institutions. On the third section, the

countervailing institutions in fight against graft will be scrutinised to see whether or not they

do function appropriately. The last section will be the concluding part in which ways to

combat this problem has been suggested.

Background and Rationale

Some background information on Nigeria, definition of concepts, the underlying theory of

this essay, and the rationale for the research will be discussed in this section. I will also talk

briefly on the methodology. Nigeria has been identified to provide answers to this research

question because of the large scale practice of this social malaise in its society. In fact, it is

way of life in this most populous African Country as portrayed by its detractors and friends

alike. It is populous both for the wrong and right reasons. It is important to do a case study on

this “giant of Africa” because it is dubbed the corruption capital of the world. On the other

hand, the country is in a very unique position to show other African countries how they ought

to become a “developmental state” as least if not a developed state. With a population of

140,000,0002 and mass human and natural resources, the country has no excuse to give for

failure to progress hitherto.

Nigeria is the fourth largest producer of oil in the world and a member of the Organisation of

Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) with oil as it major export revenue of about 95%. The

country depends mainly on oil to generate government revenue with cocoa and rubber the

other sources. Despite its buoyancy from oil revenue the country has remained stagnant as its

population live on less than $1 a day. This former British colony has experienced political

instability more than any other country on planet with more than a dozen of military heads of

state so far. One of the excuses for the incessant military rule and coups is the claim to reed

the country of corruption and when the military juntas take over, they become more corrupt

than their predecessors. Currently, the country has 36 states, 1 capital territory with 6 geo-

political zones of the North-East, North-West, North-Central, South-West, South-East and

South-South3.

2The World Factbook, Nigeria, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html, 20

May 2009, p. 1.

3Ibid. p. 1.

3

Nigeria has been practising “democracy” for a decade now without interruptions from the

military whose wings have apparently been clipped. Its constitution ensures presidential

system of government, which has the executive, legislative and the judiciary as some of its

institutions. We shall find out how these institutions are fighting or aiding corruption in the

study with vis-à-vis their relationships and checks and balances. The country’s democracy

has been branded a “quasi-democracy” because the masses do not usually get the actual

results after elections, albeit multi-parties involvement. One party, the Peoples Democratic

Party (PDP) has dominated and become hegemonic4 in the politics of the country. Nigeria

adopted English as its official language during independence and has three other major

languages (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) from the major tribes, and 250 dialects from the other

minority groups5.

Different archival documents, literature, journal, documentaries, news, articles in both

electronic and print media were used in conducting this research. Nonetheless, there is more

originality in the analyses and information provided in this essay having lived and

experienced most of issue in Nigeria in earlier part of my life for over 25 years. The

analytical framework and causal links is grounded on process tracing to identify the link

between all the variables as regards the cause-effect links6. In as much as there is no literature

review in this work, these weaknesses have been taken care of through conceptual

definitions. Against the back drop of renewed preparedness of the current government of

President Umaru Yar’Adua to fight corruption through “rebranding” of Nigeria7, it is

important that people get to read and understand comprehensive information about the main

root of the problem.

Explanations have been given for most of the concepts in this paper for more understanding

of the answers to the research question. Also, it is very important that the definition of

corruption and other related words are conceptualised and provision have been made for

them. Without getting entangled with the definitions, I have kept them as simple as possible

to avoid tautology.

4Singewood, A., “Culture and Domination: Gramsci and the Concept of Hegemony” in A Short History of

Sociological Thought, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 116-118.

5Ibid. p. 1. 6Alexander George, “Case studies and theory development,” Unpublished Draft Paper presented to

the Department of Political Science , Stanford University, Stanford, 1996, 11.

7Emman O., “FG approves N130m for Rebrand Nigeria project”, Vanguard Online Edition 2 April 2009.

Accessed on 5 April 2009 at http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/32618/42/.

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In view of the aforesaid, to say Nigeria is underdeveloped is understatement because it may

degenerate from being a “predatory state”8 to a “quasi state” if nothing is done to minimise

graft soon in that country. At the moment its peers are countries like Angola and Ghana. So,

predatory state would mean a situation where the rulers of a country use state offices for self

enrichment by illegitimate means. This is also called kleptocracy while a quasi state9 is one

that enjoys formal recognition by the international community and independence, but do not

have the capacity to govern efficiently. A good example is Somalia and consequences of this

kind of state is piracy in the international waters with recent melodrama of “operation

Phillips”10. So, one is not being hypercritical by saying that Nigeria has become a total

disappointment in terms of not providing exemplary leadership in the continent.

Still on the concepts, corruption can be “defined as a pervasion or change from good to bad

[which] involves the violation of established rules for personal gain or profit”.11 Corruption

manifests itself through different channels and no country can claim not to have practiced one

form of corruption or another. On a global level, countries often have interests abroad which

may not be secured by military means or garner support through traditional method of

diplomacy. Realists argue that the most viable means of securing those interests is through

bribery in form of foreign aid to that country where the country’s interest is. Governments

usually offer bribes to other governments for political advantage through this means12.

In order to answer the research question, I looked at some theories to explain the causes of

corruption in Nigeria. The general argument has been whether corruption increases as a result

of the culture of the society or its structure and I looked at both sides of the equation. The

causes can be scrutinised from two different views from the works of Tevfik F. Nas et al

(1986); firstly the individual characteristics and secondly the structure of Nigeria society.

8Nel, P. and McGowan, P., “Theories of International Relations” in Nel, P. and McGowan, P. (eds.): Power,

Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa, University of Cape Town Press,

Cape Town, 2002, p. 355. 9Nel, P. and McGowan, P., Op. Cit. p. 356.

10“Saving Captain Phillips: American alive, pirates dead, let's hope more to follow”, WSJ.COM, 13 April 2009.

Accessed on 19 April 2009. at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123958568421112479.html.

11Dike. V. E., Corruption in Nigeria: A New Paradigm for Effective Control,

http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/gen/corruptiondikehtm.html, 30 March 2009, p. 1.

12Nel, P. and McGowan, P., Op. Cit. p. 31.

5

The individual level explanation conceptualises corrupt practise as a result of greed or

weakness of the person concerned or inadequate officials to withstand temptations. Greed in

this case becomes a very strong motivation to engage in a deviant behaviour13. The level of

one’s corruptions is equal to the level of creed and there is a correlation between greed and

corruption.

This is linked to Durkheim’s theory of social fact in which corruption has independent

existence at the social level, which is complemented by individual behaviour. Social facts are

internalised by individuals through the socialisation process14. Meaning, people behave

depending on how they see and perceive others behave. This theory may not be too critical,

but it is important in the sense that most corrupt practices in Nigeria appear to be pathological

and innate. There is this Nigeria mentality (Nigeria factor) of “everyone is doing it”, which is

locally interpreted as “shine your eyes”. This begins even at infantry age, for instance. False

age can be given to teachers so that a child can start primary school even when the child has

not reached the required age to do so.

Also, Durkheim talked about solidarity as the level of relationships between individuals and

other groups guided by shared moral sentiments and beliefs reinforced by common emotional

experiences. Solidarity transforms from organic society to mechanical society with different

level of integration which further result into individualism. He argued that individualism

undermines the collective consciousness in any sort of solidarity and violation of collective

sentiments through deviant behaviour is punished by deterrent to future deviation to re-

establish the dividing line between socially approved and disapproved behaviour15. Today’s

society in Nigeria does not share the same common values and norms, but is rather controlled

by laws and they are not interdependent on one another obtainable in organic society because

different cultures, religion and profession now exist. Besides, there is no harsher punishment

as the case may be for those who engage in corrupt practices. Only the poor and those who

are not connected nor have contacts with those in power are punished. Ironically, the degree

of corruption involved by these poor people is infinitesimally minute compared to those who

waltz freely because they have contacts.

13Tevfik F. Nas et al., “A Policy-Oriented Theory of Corruption”, in The American Political Science Review,

Vol. 80, No. 1, March 1986, p. 109.

14Johnson, D. P., Sociology Theory, Macmillan, New York, 1986.

15Ibid.

6

Finally, Durkheim is of the view that there are conflicts in common interest as a result of loss

of identification with larger society. Individuals pursue their particular interests at the

expense of the welfare of society as a whole. Also, he maintained that one of the unfortunate

consequences of individualism is anomie or lawlessness16. Suffice to say that people seek for

employment in public or government establishments to offer their services; it is an

opportunity to squander money to satisfy their self aggrandizement. In Nigeria, it is called

“sharing of national cake” and “chop I chop”. Nigeria becomes a cake which must be shared.

While these explanations provide understanding as to why some of Nigeria officials and its

citizens are corrupt or can become corrupt, they are not enough to explain the extent of

corruption in Nigeria because of problem that has to do with generalisation17.

Not all Nigerians are corrupt as it has produced some prominent personalities who have

proved their mettles. Nigeria has produced Noble laureates in intellectual work such as Wole

Soyinka. The country has also produced some respected people like Ken Saro-Wiwa18 and

Dele Giwa19 who chose to die rather than been infiltrated. The country has also produced

someone who has been serving the country for over a decade. She seems to have a vaccine

preventing her to be hooked to the disease and that person is Professor Adora Akunyili. She

was the former Director of the dreaded National Agency for Food and Drug Administration

Control (NAFDAC) and now she is the country’s minister of Information and

Communication to rebrand the country20. These people have proven that one has that innate

ability to behave properly irrespective of temptations.

16Ibid.

17Ibid. p. 109.

18Akintunde, M., “Secrets of the Grave”, in Africa Today, Vol. 6, No. 4, April 2000, pp. 24-26.

19Soyinka, K., “How They Snuffed out His Life”, in Africa Today, Vol. 7, No. 10, October 2001, pp. 10-16.

20Ujah, E., “Spectrum Licence scale: Akunyili Queries Ndukwe” Vanguard Online Edition, 21 May 2009.

Accessed on 21 May 2009 at

http://www.vanguardngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36287&Itemid=43.

7

Further more, for broader level of analyses, there are two types of structural-level

explanation; organisational or bureaucratic and quality of citizen involvement. The

organisational or bureaucratic approach to corruption varies, but the most vital theme is that

impediments created by bureaucratic organisation are the failure to achieve public purposes.

This theme is labelled “bottleneck theory” or redtapism. People attempt to circumvent official

channels through bribery or other illegal means to achieve their goals21 which is ubiquitous

every where in Nigeria. Take for example in the driving licence department under the aegis of

the Federal Road Commission of Nigeria where there are usually no plates for numbering

vehicles. The usual story and claims are “there is no plate number check by next week” and

when one goes back the next week, the same story is repeated. However, offering of

something extra as bribe or “kick backs” will ensure that one gets the plate number the same

day. In essence, people result to offering bribes to get what they want rather than expending

energy and time for weeks and months without getting the desired service. Some authors like

Leff (1964), Huntington (1968) and Leys (1965) cited in Pierre-Guillaume Meon and Kkalid

Sekkat used the term “grease the wheel” and “sand the wheel” hypotheses22 to explain the

above demonstration.

Similarly, the quality of political participation in a democratic environment is a deterrent to

graft. The aim behind none partisan balloting and at-large local government elections are to

improve the level of involvement by the people and breaking electoral support for political

machines and politicians. Re-election of corrupt politician raises eye brows about the quality

of democratic participation. Inability to scrutinise officials through mass participation in

elections will encourage the politicians to pursue their parochial interests at the expense of

the public23. Again, it is very common in Nigeria that what happens is “selection” of deputies

and not election through hegemonic ideology of coercion and consent24. The electoral

officials know before hand who wins an election no matter who is the preferred candidate of

the masses. This is worst where there is an incumbent who wants to be re-elected. It is rare in

the history of Nigeria where an incumbent loses an election due to what is termed in as

“power of incumbency”.

21Ibid. p. 109. 22Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Sekkat, K., “Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of

Growth?”, in Public Choice, Vol. 122, No. ½, January 2005, pp. 71-74.

23Ibid. p. 109.

24Ibid. pp. 116-118.

8

Due to the secret balloting system of election in Nigeria, it is very difficult for the public to

measure who really won an election other than the result given by the Independent National

Election Commission (INEC). Perception and public opinion is not enough to contest the

result in the electoral tribunals for redress because they deal with the facts produced by INEC

and not the truth as long as the favoured candidate is also ready to grease the palms of the

members of the electoral tribunals. An attempt was made to eradicate electoral frauds in the

country by Professor Humphrey Nwosu, former boss of the defunct National Election

Commission (NEC) through option A4 (open-secrete ballot system) during the military

regime of Retired General Ibrahim Babangida. Babangida did not understand very well how

the system works and before he could conceptualise it fully, Late Chief Moshood Abiola won

the 1993 presidential election contrary to the wishes of the military cadre25.

Option A4 ensures that election results are announced in each polling centre within a short

period of time after ballot casting in the presence of the voters and the witnesses of the

respective candidates. People were in leverage position to ask questions if conflicting results

were published later after elections. Option A4 has since died a pre-mature death in Nigeria

because the powers that be want to use the flawed usual secret ballot system that they can

easily manipulate26. The two theories discussed herein posit that corruption in Nigeria has

both cultural and structural explanations and this now leads to discussion on the institutional

failure and its experience in the country.

Institutional failure in Nigeria

This section will answer the questions of how has institutional failure been experienced in

Nigeria case and what institutions are mostly affected by corruption? All the government

institutions in Nigeria are affected by corruption, but for the purpose of this essay it is

important that I deal with just three key most affected institutions- the executive, the

legislative and the judicial arm of government. Multitudinous indiscipline and corruption in

Nigeria can best be described as a trickle down of the bad exemplary misdemeanours of its

rulers. I am of the view that an efficient institution (government) will be in good stead to

minimise corruption because good leadership provides good citizens.

25Osoba, S.O., “Corruption in Nigeria: A Historical Perspectives”, in Review of African Political Economy, Vol.

23, No. 69, September 1996, p. 383.

26Ibid. p. 383.

9

Both the parliamentary system of government and the presidential system have been adopted

by the country after independence and the contemporary ruler ship have been using these

three arms of government as well. Even the military rule made use of this three arms with the

difference been that in military rule, the executive and the legislative were merged into a

name called the Armed Forces Ruling Council or the Supreme Military Council as the case

may be. These various arms were meant to provide checks and balances on each other to

ensure the rule of law in the country, but neo-partrimonialism scampered the entire settings.

The executive arm has become too strong and dominant thereby creating sycophants in the

other arms of government.

During the military era, the judiciary was almost none existence because military tribunals

were created to deal with high profile cases, which the high courts and the supreme

(constitutional) court was suppose to handle. Besides, so many decrees were promulgated by

the military cabal to rule the country in parallel to the Nigerian constitution. Laws and

decisions became the prerogative of the military leaders as their words also became laws. The

notion of “other from above” and “obey the last order” means that anything the military

leaders say or want goes. Torture and mass arrests of those who dared the military personnel

ensured that any person or soldier who was the acolyte of the leaders could do anything or

loot any amount of money s/he could lay hands on. The three tiers of government (the

federal, state and local government) were controlled by the military government to the extent

that the salaries of the civilians in the civil service were no where to be found. Those in the

civil service resulted to bribery to put food on the table for their families and pay school fees

for their dependants.27

The interest of military juntas in high profile cases of corruption were only motivated if the

perpetrator is not in their caucus, thereby allowing corruption to spread in every facet of the

society. It is recalled that despite all the tranquillity and unity that existed in the military,

there were divisions and dichotomies beneath what the general public could see. This was

evidenced in the number of coups that took place in Nigeria. Apart from the civil war that

broke out in the country between 1966 through 1970 mainly because of corruption; nepotism

and patronage became the other of the day28.

27Osoba, S.O., Op. Cit. p. 377.

28Osoba, S.O., Op. Cit. p. 375.

10

It was during the military regimes in Nigeria that oil was discovered. Instead of oil becoming

a blessing for the country, it tuned out to be a curse in the sense that oil wealth was

distributed disproportionately among few elites and to section of the population that supports

the military. Security and military tools were built to quash those people seen as oppositions.

As a result of this, patronage was common with political posts and employments

opportunities depending on the clique one belongs to rather than on merit. Similarly, getting a

good job in public service depended on connections/contacts rather than qualifications and

skills. The country was turned into a “rentier state” whereby earning income was according to

the level of people in government one knew or how connected and not how qualified or how

hardworking. These military activities resulted in brain drain as talented skilled professional

left the country in search of employment elsewhere. It is usually the middle class of a society

that form pressure group against a government. In Nigeria’s case not only were they

polarised, majority also left the country29.

The institutional failure during the military rule encouraged the oil companies to do as the

pleased in Nigeria. Oil companies become mechanisms of underdevelopment in the region

through lack of investment proper. Investments where possible; were done in isolated

enclaves just to expand their operations and export oil to Western (colonial) countries without

really developing the local economies of the country. Their activities generated less

employment per dollar invested and to compound issues, the top officials of the oil

conglomerates colluded with the ruling government to loot and siphon the State funds to

foreign bank accounts. These funds were in turn loaned to developing countries with high

interest repayment rates.30 For example, more than $472 billion (equivalent of six Marshall

Plans) was generated in oil revenue by the Nigerian government (both military and civilian)

between 1970 and the early 2004, but it all went into private pockets of the ruling elites31.

29Skocpol, T.: Social revolution in modern world, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1994, p. 242. & Neuwirth,

R., Oil-From Blessing to Curse, http://www.michnews.com/cgi-bin/atman/exec/view.cgi, 28 February 2006, p.

2.

30Graaff, J.: Poverty and Development, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 2003, p. 38. & Thomson, D.:

Crime and Deviance, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 2004, p. 41.

31George B.N. Ayittey, “ Nigeria’s Struggle with Corruption” Testimony before the Committee on International

Relations’ Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations House Sub-Committee

on Africa, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C, Thursday, May 18, 2006. Accessed on 5 April

2009 at http://ipn.lexi.net/images/uploaded/6-447c66ef0f2dc--Nigeria_%20Corruption_Ayittey.pdf.

11

Yet, they were not contended with emptying the country’s treasure; but indebted the country

as more funds were sought for in forms of loan from International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

to the tune of $36 billion. An audit report by Pius Okigbo in 27 September 1994 revealed that

$12.4 billion of Nigeria’s debt was embezzled by the military rulers between 1988 and

199432.

Furthermore, the environmental degradation and pollution caused by the exploration and

spillage of oil and gas in Nigeria are very noticeable. Oil explosions either by accident or

purposely caused has resulted in loss of lives on many occasions, especially in Niger-Delta.

Attempt to challenge the activities of these oil companies led to the hanging of an

environmentalist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine others in 1995 under the leadership of Late

General Sanni Abacha. Niger-Delta has continued to burn hitherto with about 1,000 lives and

$23.7bn lost to a crisis created by rebellion of the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger

Delta (MEND) as at 200833.

One of the craziest things the past military regimes did was to allow the oil refineries to

deteriorate, without servicing them and this has led to perennial fuel, diesel and paraffin

scarcity in a country that is the forth largest oil producer in the world. Instead of maintaining

the refineries, the country started importing the aforementioned products and sold at mark up

of 400%. The contracts for these importations were handled by the associates of the military

regimes34.

The lack of opposition to the military government created avenue for the various successive

governments not to embark on any meaningful development project in the country. Education

system has collapsed and will not be discussed for the purpose of this essay. The

governments prefer to handle plethora of white elephant projects, which will pave ways for

corrupt practices through over-invoicing and inflated contracts. Besides, the corrupt

government official would shift government expenditures to areas they will collect bribes

easily.

32 George B.N. Ayittey, 2006. 33Barber, J.: Mandela’s World, David Phillip Publisher, Cape Town, 2004, p.

108-109, & Robinson, S., “Nigeria’s Deadly Days”, in TIME, Vol. 167, No. 21, 22 May 2006, pp. 18-23 &

Adebayo, S and Shobiye, H., “Nigeria lost 1,000 lives, $23.7bn to N’Delta crisis in 2008 – Report”, The Punch,

10 April 2009. Accessed on 10 April 2009 at

http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art2009040911503357, p. 1 34Ibid. p. 383.

12

For instance, Nigeria for over a decade has embarked on becoming one of the world’s steel

producers and commissioned the Ajaokuta Steel Complex since General Ibrahim Babangida

regime. This project has become very complex in the sense that for years, 98% of the

construction has been completed, but the remaining 2% has become source of embezzlement

of funds for various governments. The project usually gets mentioned and funds allocated for

its completion in the annual budgets, but its completion remains a mirage35.

The civilian administration is no less corrupt than the past military administration because the

activities of these civilian administrations ushered in the advent of military rule in Nigeria.

For starters, Late Nnamdi Azikiwe as the then premier of Eastern Nigeria was implicated by

the Foster Sutton Tribunal of Enquiry into the African Continental Bank (ACB) to have

abused his powers and diverted huge sums of Eastern Nigerian government into his own

coffers. Similarly, the G.B.A. Coker Commission of Inquiry of 1962 into the Western Nigeria

public corporations discovered that Late Obafemi Awolowo and his idealogugues in the

leadership of the Action Group government of then Western Nigeria enriched themselves at

the expense of the Cocoa Marketing Board- property of the people of Western Nigeria. These

and other wrong signals from the civilian government such as the Action Group crisis of

1962; census crisis of 1962-63; federal election crisis of 1964; Tiv rebellion of 1964-65; and

Western Nigeria election crisis of 1965 was enough for the military to step in36.

The three arms of government in the successive “democratic” governments are in serious

marital tripartite relationship not devoid of love triangle. In Gramscian model, the political

system is winner takes all, whereby the executive arm appoints deputies in both the judiciary

and the legislative arm through political arrangement of “selection” as I have discussed on the

first section of this essay. Essentially, the three arms of government work together to clean up

the county’s treasury to themselves and leave the country to rot. The executive arm collects

all the revenue and distribute in accordance to the ruling clicks through award of inflated

contracts. Most of the government officials and senators are directors of one form of company

or another who are awardees of these contracts.

35Isiaka, P., “Nigerians, routinely indicted abroad for corruption, are let off at home”, Businessday Online, 23

March 2009. Accessed at

http://www.businessdayonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3842:nigerians-

routinely-indicted-abroad-for-corruption-are-let-off-at-home&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=18.

36Osoba, S.O., Op. Cit. p. 375.

13

The senate is a mere meeting place to endorse what has been discussed in dinner parties and

nocturnal meetings in lieu of making laws that the should benefit the general masses. It is not

a coincidence that electricity supplies in Nigeria are almost none existent for over 2 decades

now. Also, 70% of the 34,000 kilometres of federal roads have become death traps because

they are not motorable37.

A good example of this marriage affair is cited in the probe panel instituted by the current

administration of President Umaru Yar’Adua into the embezzlement of $16 billion by the

Olusegun Obasanjo administration. The House of Representatives Ad-hoc committee chaired

by Ndudi Elumelu was empowered by the President to investigate the matter and they

discovered that the alleged money was defrauded indeed by the past administration. The

report was presented to the senate on 9 October 2008, but the members of the senate;

supposedly loyal to the past administration discarded the report claiming that such report

does not exist38. The paradox of the whole matter is that Elumelu has now been implicated as

being the one who embezzled the fund 7 months after making the investigation. He and his

Senate counterpart, Nicholas Ugbane, and eight others were on 14 May 2009 arraigned

before an Abuja High Court over this case39.

Apart from the fact that the legislatures protects the executive arm and get their rewards even

after the expiration of their two tenures through other political appointments such as

becoming Ambassadors or ministers, they also make sure that they squeeze out as much fund

as possible by demanding bribes before they can ratify laws from the executive arm. For

instance, former Education minister in Nigeria, Fabian Osuji was a law maker and conceded

the fact that bribery is a common thing and practice at all facet of government. He took a

dose of his own medicine when the successive lawmakers demanded $800,000 from him to

approve a budget in his ministry, but got caught for offering only half of the demanded sum40.

37Edike, T., “Senate declares S-East roads worst”, Vanguard Online Edition, 4 April 2009. Accessed at

http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/32778/43/.

38Binniyat, L., “From hero to villain: The story of the Reps Power Probe Panel”, Vanguard Online Edition, 22

March 2009. Accessed at http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/31610/122/.

39AKINTOLA, K. & AKPE, A., “EFCC arraigns power committee chairman, others over alleged N5.2b scam”

Businessday Online, 15 May 2009. Accessed on 17 May 2009 at

http://www.businessdayonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2753:efcc-arraigns-

power-committee-chairman-others-over-alleged-n52b-scam-&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=18. 40Ibid. p. 1.

14

The judicial sector, which is the last resort for aggrieved members of the society, comprises

the magistrates, judges and the police who are collaborators to the clandestine activities of the

two already discussed arms of the government. Weak judiciary leads to breakdown of

institutionary fabric (the executive and the legislative arms). “Awaiting trial” of suspects in

Nigeria is a common thing and the meaning of “justice delayed as justice denied” is music to

the ears of the country’s judicial system. People can stay in detention for 20 years without

being taken to courts and by the time the go to court at all, they have over served the time for

their punishments if found guilty. Those who have affluence and influence are usually the

ones that get court hearings just to clear their names of any allegation and not that they will

be convicted. So, bribery and corruption among the members of the judiciary is very common

in this context as court paper works and charge sheets or docket disappear from the court

filling cabinets without trace. In 2005, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (the highest

court) of Nigeria was implicated in corruption and this tells the scope of this issue of

corruption in the judiciary41.

Police officers world wide are known to be corrupt even in countries with minimal level of

corruption. It is not flabbergasting that the Nigeria police top the rank of corruption chart of

all the government institutions according to a research conducted by the Institute for

Development Research. The case of the Nigeria police is very unbearable because unlike

other government institutions whose staffers participate in corruption secretly, the officers of

the Nigeria police do theirs openly. Illegal road blocks are avenue for the police men to extort

money from the citizen in pretext of checking for stolen vehicles. To see a detainee in a

police cell, one has to bribe. This is just to mention a few. In February 2006, Nigeria police

Chief, Inspector General Tafa Balogun was sent to early retirement having only spent two

years on the post after being implicated in money-laundering to the tune of $52 million in his

various bank accounts42. This evidence speaks volume for itself because if the police Chief

can behave this way, what moral justification does he have to tell his subordinates how to

behave responsibly? The answer is not far fetched because corruption is likely to occur

whenever an administrator transposes the expected purposes of an organisation thereby

41Amuche, A., “How Nigeria’s weak institutions aid corruption” Businessday Online, 25 March 2009. Accessed

at http://www.businessdayonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3904:how-nigerias-

weak-institutions-aid-corruption&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=18.

42Ojo, J., “Tafa Balogun's N16bn loot missing”, The Sun News Online, 15 April 2009. Accessed on 15 April

2009 at http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/news/national/2009/apr/15/national-15-04-2009-01.htm.

15

forcing participants to follow what otherwise would be deemed unacceptable ways of doing

things. The countervailing institutions in fight against graft has been scrutinised below to see

whether or not they do function appropriately.

Nigeria’s war on corruption as bandits trying to stop gangsters from stealing

This part will answer the questions of what countervailing institutions exist to deal with the

problem of widespread corruption in Nigeria and why don’t these institutions function? The

Nigerian government has been reminded and pressured constantly to do something about

peculation in the country through such bodies as the Transparency International (TI); United

Nations (UN); World Bank (WB); Organisation of Economic Cooperation Development

(OECD); International Monetary Fund (IMF); and African Union (AU). The IMF has

reduction of corruption as one of its loan condition. Also banks are being pressured to

disclose information on suspicious huge money in private accounts in the West. However,

Asia countries have taken over money laundering activities to aid these illegal deals. WB

through its institute WBI in 1999 proposed conditionality to support reform by raising

awareness and support the civil society in anti-graft campaign43.

In Nigeria’s context, the civil society has apparently given up. This is because when

corruption is widespread, individuals do not have incentives to fight it, especially when those

who suppose to start the fight are themselves corrupt. Nigeria is obliged under UN

Convention against corruption, but sovereignty in the international system means no country

can be bullied into how it fights corruption, not even sanctions. TI only releases a perception

index about corruption through annual index report and some countries see it as just a mere

perception. Currently, it places Nigeria in the 121 on its list44.

On the regional level, Article 2 of the AU Convention on Corruption and Related Offences

set out the objectives to be achieved by the convention45.

43Haarhius, C.M.K. and Leeuw, F.L., “Fighting Governmental Corruption: The New World Bank Programme

Evaluted”, in Journal of International Development, December 2004, pp. 549-550.

44Amoda, J.M., “Transparency International’s annual corruption perception index”, Vanguard Online Edition,

30 March 2009. Accessed on 30 March 2009 at http://www.vanguardngr.com/content/view/33765/48/.

45Kututwa, N.: African Anti-Corruption Commitments: A Review of Eight NEPAD Countries, African Human

Security Initiative, www.africareview.org, 2005, p. 2.

16

AU mandates it members to adopt legislative measures to combat corruption, establishment

and strengthening of anti-corruption authorities or agencies, to ensure transparency and

accountability in the management of public affairs, and administer reforms and codes of good

practice. Again, this mandate has no effects or whatsoever as the body can only determine the

level of corruption in a country through peer review of the African Peer Review Mechanism

(APRM), possible only when a country wants to be reviewed. Only recommendations are

made after the exercise, which carries no drastic effect on the country46.

Attempts by various governments in Nigeria to stop this menace can best be described as

charade and window dressing in the sense that there has not been the political will behind the

efforts, institutions and measures taken to stop this menace. Those in government can fight

this problem effectively if they choose to do so the same way that they ensured that there is

no president-in-self-perpetuity in Nigeria. The country has in the past created some

institutions and measures like; judicial commissions of enquiry; code of Conduct Bureau;

Public Complains Commissions; Mass Mobilisation for Social Justice and Economic

Recovery (MAMSER); National Open Apprenticeship (NOA); War Against Indiscipline

Council (WAIC)47 and none of them has made any significant impact except WAIC to some

extent, but did not last. I will come back to this.

The birth of the third republic in Nigeria one decade ego raised false hope as people thought

that the disease will be combated with section 15 (5) of the Nigerian constitution of 1999

providing for transparency, accountability and good governance. The country acknowledged

the fact that police alone cannot handle high profile corrupt cases because they may not have

the capability to unravel the entire deal and understand how the crime was committed.

Secondly, they may not have the necessary political clout to investigate those involved vis-à-

vis high ranking government officials etcetera. President Yar’Adua’s predecessor, in June

2000 signed into law the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act

2000, which established the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences

Commission (ICPC)48.

46Ajulu, R., “The NEPAD: Why NEPAD must succeed”, in Foundation for Security and Development in Africa,

Accra, Ghana, 2002, P. 29.

47Osoba, S.O., Op. Cit. p. 384.

48Kututwa, N., Op. Cit. p. 26.

17

This unit was charged to enforce anti-corruption in Nigeria, which include; to investigate and

report offender and to protect whistle blowers. To ensure that the unit is controlled and not to

trample upon the shoes of the big shots in the society, its chair and members are nominated

by the president. Besides, ICPC has no power to investigate the President of the country and

his vice, and the Governors and their deputies. Rather, it can appoint independent counsel by

designating the Chief Justice (CJ) of Nigeria to do so49.

ICPC became a tooth less bull dog that can bark, but can not bite. The fact that it can only

report after investigation and cannot prosecute and also the fact the CJ will constitute another

counsel to reinvestigate a case before the CJ can prosecute makes the function of the ICPC

meaningless. In cases where the governors and president is involved, which is very rare under

ICPC they will be referred to the senate to conduct impeachment without getting jailed.

Secondly, the institute was short staffed and under funded. In 2002, only 50% of ICPC

budget was made available. In 8 years it was able to prosecute only 150 cases, averaging 20

cases annually50.

The government of Obasanjo also initiated a “Due Process” policy in October 2001 to

enforce compliance in budgeting, procurement and expenditure. This has been hampered by

Official Secrets Ordinance of 1942 in which civil servants cannot divulge official

information. So, transparency was none existent. Procurement is usually advertised in at least

two national dailies or government gazette six weeks before submission. However,

unsuccessful bidders have no law backing them to seek official review of procurement

decisions51.

It was apparent that the country was losing the battle on this front and in 2004, the Economic

and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 was made; establishing the Economic and

Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). It was charged with investigating, arresting and

prosecuting erring public officers (elected or appointed). To its credence, the institute dealt

with high profile cases without fear or favour such as the probing of former Vice-President

Atiku Abubakar and the former president’s daughter, a senator and other governors. There

were number of success in conviction of appointed public office holders52.

49, 50, 51Kututwa, N., Op. Cit. p. 57, Ojeifo, S., “Senate Seeks to Give ICPC Power to Initiate Investigation”, in

Vanguard, 3 April 2009, p. 1 and Kututwa, N., Op. Cit. p. 73.

52Obayiuwana, O., “Rebel with a Cause”, in NewAfrican, May 2009, p. 50.

18

That of the former police Boss, Balogun who was sent to jail was a good example. Under the

leadership of Nuhu Ribadu, the institute had 275 convictions53. The cases of elected high

ranking officials were not successful due to the diplomatic impunity they enjoyed. Section

308 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution offers a blanket impunity to the President, the Vice-

President, the Governor and their deputies. No civil or criminal litigation should be brought

on the mentioned office holders while they are still in their offices, accordingly54. This cog

means EFCC had to wait for these politicians to be impeached before they can be tried in

courts. The delays in the processes of impeachment enable the offenders to discard as much

evidence as possible with their executive powers. For example, despite overwhelming

evidence by EFCC, diplomatic immunity prevented them from prosecuting Chief Diepreye

Alamieseigha, the former governor of Bayelsa State. He was charged in United Kingdom

(UK) for money laundering as $3.3 million was found in cash on him and bank accounts55.

The level of success on convictions by EFCC brought out the demons in the politicians and

Ribadu was not only removed from office immediately the former President left office, he

was demoted and rusticated from Nigeria Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (a think

tank institute) where he enrolled. Assassination on his life was missed narrowly and he has

since fled to UK56. Fighting corruption in Nigeria is very dangerous as the corruption czar

may not only lose his job, but also his life if the case concerns the politicians. WAIC as I

mentioned earlier in this section was scrapped sooner as it was created, and the authors;

Buhari and Idiagbon overthrown from office. In Ribadu’s words; “if you go after petty

criminals, nothing will happen to you. But if you go after grand corruption, you’re taking on

the politicians and they have money, they will come after you”57. This similar view was

echoed by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda on none trivial of political will in fight

against corruption in his address to seminar of Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in

Uganda in December 1994. According to him;

53Obayiuwana, O., Op. Cit. p. 50.

54-55George B.N. Ayittey, 2006.

56Obayiuwana, O., Op. Cit. p. 49.

57Ibid. p. 50

19

The real problem is that the guards in Africa have themselves got to be guarded and this is clearly a vicious

circle. Without moral authority in our top leadership, it is very difficult to eliminate corruption. And

unfortunately, it is at the top that the real thieves that cripple national development are to be found58.

Apart from political interference, one other problem these institutions face it that the country

has no identity card system whereby every person has identity number. It is not easy to trace

accounts of these public officers locally in the event of their inability to take their loot

abroad. So, taxation which could have helped in tracing who have which money in the bank

is very difficult. Most of the time, tracing people with large sums of money in local bank

accounts is a wide goose chase because one person can have multiple international passports

with different names.

The current government has failed to build on the success of EFCC by chasing shadows

rather than dealing with the real issue. In 2007 in Davos, Switzerland, President Umaru

Musa Yar’Adua acknowledged that something seriously has to be done to sanitize the

country as even the system that brought him to power is corrupt. He made this statement

during his discussions with representatives of multinational corporations who have organised

the Partnership Against Corruption Initiative59. Yar’Adua underscored corruption’s

dehumanizing effect aided by the immunity protection of the top office holders in the country

by stating that:

One of the raging debates in Nigeria today is the issue of constitutional immunity from prosecution conferred on

the President, Vice President, governors and deputy governors. It is a raging issue and I have confidence that the

next constitutional amendment will strip these public officials of this immunity and I am personally in support

of that60.

Rather than sponsoring a bill to change this section of the constitution, he came up with

another moribund programme; “rebranding Nigeria”. The main source of corruption is known

to all and sundry. The ailment of the sick patient has been successfully diagnosed, which

requires the correct medicine and dose. Giving the patient the wrong medicine is a ploy to

worsen the situation or cause the demise of the patient. Those in power have refused to do the

right thing and in the next section, the concluding part; I proffer some solutions despite the

fact that the problem appears unmanageable.

58Kututwa, N., Op. Cit. p. 13.

59-60Dike. V.E., Op. Cit. p. 1.

20

Guarding the guard as the key to combating corruption

I have so far looked at the way in which institutional failure has encouraged widespread

corruption in Nigeria as weak institutions lead to weak controls of agencies. The conundrum

of choosing between military or democratic rule as the best government to combat or

minimise this problem does not apply herein, in the sense that nothing separates the two types

of government in this regard. Nigerians cannot continue to hope that some government that

will eschew moral values will be available someday and proffer solution. Government

reforms and the engagement of civil society in this fight are not new, the civil society and the

media now seems to be suffering from fatigue proliferated by long years of shouting against

corruption. So they probably have to be left alone at the moment, which makes it inevitably

imperative that some amendments be made on the country’s constitution to put some sense

into the heads of those occupying positions in the executive, judiciary and legislative arm of

government.

The constitution as it is, promotes these illicit activities in the government and that is why the

efforts to reduce graft must start at the top members of the society. Getting these three arms

in order will trickle down to every facet of the society and this is the only way that the level

of corruption can be minimised. The focus should be on the government and not the citizens.

The citizens will follow the footsteps of their leaders when deem right. Therefore, I hereby

make the following recommendations:

1. The reintroduction of the Option A4 (open-secrete ballot system) in the electoral system

for the 2011 election will ensure that distinguished members of the populace are elected into

office to avoid the corrupt politicians rigging the election. There is no better person to

manage INEC at the moment other than Professor Humphrey Nwosu. The government should

reemploy him to carry out this task if they are serious in combating electoral fraud.

2. The electorates should have the power to recall any of the senators who is deemed to have

comprised his position by engaging in graft and other related offences. Leaving the senators

to finish their tenures when they misbehave give them the opportunity to gain enough

grounds and money to bribe themselves into second tenures.

3. The constitution should make provision for the appointment of the CJ by the opposition

parties and not to be appointed by the ruling government. The CJ tenure should be 8 years of

two terms so that h/she bows out when the ruling government finishes its tenure. This

21

appointment must take place immediately after the new President is elected. The current idea

in which the President, the Governors and 2-thirds of the senate votes can remove the CJ does

not necessarily guarantee the independence of the judiciary. The ruling party is just one party

while opposition parties are many and the CJ will not be tempted into being allegiance to any

party.

4. Similar to the appointment of the CJ is the appointment of the Auditor-General of the

Federation (AGF). An independent AGF from the executive arm guarantees that he does his

job without fear or favour. It does not make sense that the AGF as currently obtainable

answers to the Presidency.

5. The anti-corruption chief should also be appointed in similar manner as in 3 and 4 above to

avoid being used by the incumbent to witch hunt opposition members or accused of being

partisan. Enough protection should be given to the person even after his tenure. The person

must not necessarily come from police background.

6. ICPC should be disbanded and all the members of staff of the unit redeployed to EFCC to

assist EFCC as it needs more human capital.

7. The national identity card scheme must be taken seriously to ensure that the citizens of the

country have national identity numbers. At birth, babies should be given Identity numbers

within 3 months of birth by the Internal Affairs Ministry. No corpse should be buried without

a death certificate. This plus and minus during birth and death will prevent duplication of

identity. The issue of taxation will be easy to handle.

8. Unsuccessful bidders have no law backing them to seek official review of procurement

decisions and this law should be enacted.

9. Section 308 (1) of the Nigerian Constitution which offers blanket impunity to the

President, the Vice-President, the Governor and their deputies should be amended so that

civil or criminal litigation should be brought on the mentioned office holders where there is

substantial evidence.

22

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