corporate reputation in the volkswagen emissions scandal · world: the volkswagen emissions scandal...

CorporateReputationintheVolkswagenEmissionsScandalTheRoleofInvolvement,Emotions,ResponsibilityandPerson-CompanyFit

MasterThesis

MasterMediaStudies–MediaandBusinessErasmusSchoolofHistory,CultureandCommunicationErasmusUniversityRotterdam

StudentName: LouisaWanjekStudentNumber: 437075

Supervisor: Dr.YijingWang

June20,2016

I

CorporateReputationintheVolkswagenEmissionsScandalTheRoleofInvolvement,Emotions,ResponsibilityandPerson-CompanyFit

AbstractWhilesomescholarsarguethatastrongreputationcanprotectanorganizationfrom

reputationallossduringacrisis,othersbelievethatahighreputationleadstohigher

expectationsamongthepublic,whichareviolatedduringacrisisandmaketheorganization

suffer.Astheroleofcorporatereputationinthecrisiscontextisstillinconclusiveinliterature,it

isthusofinteresttoinvestigatetowhatextentitaffectstheoutcomesofaglobalcrisisfora

corporation.Inthisstudy,theemissionsscandalofthehighlyreputedcorporationthe

VolkswagenGroup(VW)wasinvestigated.Thefocusisonwhetherthecrisisresultedin

reputationallossofandanincreasednegativeword-of-mouthintentiontowardstheVWGroup

amongtheGermanpublic.TheSituationalCrisisCommunicationTheory(SCCT)isemployedto

conceptualizethecrisiscontext.Inadditiontocrisisresponsibilityandanger,whichhavebeen

identifiedaskeypredictorsofcrisisoutcomesintheSCCT,thisstudyalsoexaminestwo

potentialpredictors:Thenewlyintroducedconceptcrisisinvolvement,andthepositivethusless

regardedemotion-sympathy.Moreover,theimpactoftheperson-companyfitisinvestigatedin

thiscrisiscontext.

Usingaquantitativeonlinesurvey,thisstudyinvestigatesthemechanismthroughwhich

theemissionsscandalinfluencedtheVolkswagenGroup’sreputationandthenegativeword-of-

mouthintentionamongtheGermanpublic.Theseoutcomesarecomparedbetweentheaffected

andnon-affectedGermanpublic.Thedataconsistsof1475Germanrespondentsintotalandthe

dataanalysiswasconductedbyemployingthestructuralequationmodelingmethod.Theresults

suggestthattheGermanrespondentsevaluatethepost-crisisreputationoftheVWGrouponly

onamodestlevel,though,theirintentiontoexpressnegativeword-of-mouthisratherlow.Both

emotions-angerandsympathy-amongtheGermanpublicmediatetheimpactofperceived

crisisresponsibilityandcrisisinvolvementonpost-crisisreputationandnegativeword-of-

mouthintention.However,theimpactofcrisisresponsibilityonangerandthatofangeronboth

crisisoutcomesisstrongeramongtheaffectedGermanpublicthanthenon-affectedGerman

public,whilenodifferenceisobservedwithrespecttosympathy.Nexttothis,person-company

fitisidentifiedasmoderatorintherelationships.Itweakenstheimpactsofcrisisresponsibility

andcrisisinvolvementonanger,aswellstrengthenstheimpactofcrisisresponsibilityon

sympathy.

II

TheresultsofthisstudyimplyanextensionoftheSCCTframeworkthroughidentifying

theroleofcrisisinvolvementandperson-companyfitinthecrisiscontext.Managerial

implicationsareprovidedwithregardtocorporatecrisiscommunication.Corporationsshould

considerthatnotonlyangermightinfluencethepost-crisisreputationandnegativeword-of-

mouthintentionbutalsosympathy.Thisimpliesthatcorporationsshouldontheonehand

mitigateangerandontheotherhandreinforcesympathyinordertosavethemselvesfrom

negativecrisisoutcomes.Toachievethis,oneoptionsistocarryoutlowperceivedcrisis

responsibilityandcrisisinvolvement.Further,asperson-companyfitmayvarythenegative

crisisoutcomesforbothaffectedandnon-affectedgeneralpublic,itisimportantfor

corporationstobuildastrongrelationshipwithcurrentandpotentialcustomers.

Keywords:CrisisCommunication,CorporateReputation,NegativeWord-of-Mouth,Crisis

Responsibility,CrisisInvolvement,Emotion,Anger,Sympathy,Person-CompanyFit,SCCT

�

III

AbbreviationsAT - AttributionTheory

DV - DependentVariable

Engl. - English

EV - ExpectancyViolation

IV - IndependentVariable

KMO - Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin

MI - ModificationIndex/ModificationIndices

NWOM - NegativeWordofMouth

SCCT - SituationalCrisisCommunicationTheory

SE - StandardError

SEM - StructuralEquationModeling

SIT - SocialIdentityTheory

VW - Volkswagen

VWGroup - VolkswagenGroup

WOM - WordofMouth

IV

TableofContents

ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................................................................I

ABBREVIATIONS...........................................................................................................................................III

1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................1

2. THEORETICALFRAMEWORKANDLITERATUREREVIEW.......................................................62.1. CORPORATEREPUTATIONINCRISISCOMMUNICATION.................................................................................62.1.1. TheSituationalCrisisCommunicationTheory..................................................................................9

2.2. POST-CRISISREPUTATION..................................................................................................................................112.3. NEGATIVEWORD-OF-MOUTH...........................................................................................................................132.4. IMPACTOFPERSONALPERSPECTIVESINCRISISCOMMUNICATION...........................................................152.4.1. Crisis-Emotions.............................................................................................................................................152.4.2. CrisisResponsibility....................................................................................................................................182.4.3. CrisisInvolvement.......................................................................................................................................202.4.4. Person-CompanyFit...................................................................................................................................23

2.5. CONCEPTUALMODEL..........................................................................................................................................26

3. METHODOLOGY...................................................................................................................................273.1. CHOICEOFMETHOD............................................................................................................................................273.2. SAMPLEANDSAMPLINGMETHOD....................................................................................................................283.3. DATAANALYSIS....................................................................................................................................................293.3.1. Pre-Test,DataCleaningandPreparationfortheDataAnalysis............................................30

3.4. RESPONDENTS......................................................................................................................................................323.5. OPERATIONALIZATIONANDMEASUREMENTS................................................................................................323.5.1. Post-crisisreputation.................................................................................................................................333.5.2. NegativeWordofMouthIntention(NWOM)..................................................................................353.5.3. CrisisResponsibility....................................................................................................................................363.5.4. CrisisInvolvement.......................................................................................................................................373.5.5. Mediators:AngerandSympathy..........................................................................................................383.5.6. Anger.................................................................................................................................................................383.5.7. Sympathy.........................................................................................................................................................393.5.8. Moderator:Person-CompanyFit..........................................................................................................40

4. RESULTS.................................................................................................................................................434.1. TESTINGOFMEDIATIONEFFECTS....................................................................................................................484.2. HYPOTHESES9THROUGH12–MODERATIONEFFECTS..............................................................................494.3. COMPARISONOFAFFECTEDANDNON-AFFECTEDPUBLICS........................................................................50

V

4.4. FURTHERFINDINGS.............................................................................................................................................52

5. DISCUSSIONANDCONCLUSION......................................................................................................535.1. INTERPRETATIONOFRESULTS..........................................................................................................................535.2. MANAGERIALIMPLICATIONS.............................................................................................................................595.3. CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................................................................605.4. STRENGTHSANDLIMITATIONS.........................................................................................................................615.5. FUTURERESEARCH..............................................................................................................................................63

REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................................65

APPENDICES..................................................................................................................................................76APPENDIXA-QUESTIONNAIRES...................................................................................................................................76AppendixA1-QuestionnaireGerman.................................................................................................................76AppendixA2-QuestionnaireEnglish..................................................................................................................81

APPENDIXB–OVERVIEWOFITEMS.............................................................................................................................86APPENDIXC–FURTHERTABLES..................................................................................................................................88

VI

ListofFiguresandTables

FIGURE1:CRISISSITUATIONMODELOFSCCT(BASEDONCOOMBS,2007A)...........................9

FIGURE2:CONCEPTUALMODEL............................................................................................................26

FIGURE3:MEASUREMENTMODELFORPOST-CRISISREPUTATION.........................................34

FIGURE4:MEASUREMENTMODELFORNWOMINTENTION........................................................35

FIGURE5:MEASUREMENTMODELFORCRISISRESPONSIBILITY..............................................36

FIGURE6:MEASUREMENTMODELFORCRISISINVOLVEMENT..................................................38

FIGURE7:MEASUREMENTMODELFORANGER................................................................................39

FIGURE8:MEASUREMENTMODELFORSYMPATHY.......................................................................40

FIGURE9:MEASUREMENTMODELFORPERSON-COMPANYFIT................................................41

FIGURE10:STRUCTURALMODEL…...............…...…..............................................................................44

TABLE1:SUMMARYOFRESULTS..........................................................................................................45

TABLE2:BOOTSTRAPPINGRESULTSFORMEDIATIONEFFECTS...............................................49

TABLE3:MULTIGROUPANALYSIS-AFFECTEDPUBLICVS.NON-AFFECTEDPUBLIC..........51

TABLEB1:CORRELATIONMATRIXPOST-CRISISREPUTATION..................................................88

TABLEB2:CORRELATIONMATRIXNWOM........................................................................................88

TABLEB3:CORRELATIONMATRIXANGER........................................................................................88

TABLEB4:CORRELATIONMATRIXSYMPATHY................................................................................88

TABLEB5:CORRELATIONMATRIXINVOLVEMENT........................................................................89

TABLEB6:CORRELATIONMATRIXCRISISRESPONSIBILITY.......................................................89

TABLEB7:CORRELATIONMATRIXPCFIT.........................................................................................89

TABLEB8:EXPLORATORYFACTORANALYSISPOST-CRISISREPUTATION............................90

TABLEB9:EXPLORATORYFACTORNWOM.......................................................................................90

TABLEB10:EXPLORATORYFACTORANALYSISCRISISRESPONSIBILITY...............................91

TABLEB11:EXPLORATORYFACTORANALYSISCRISISINVOLVEMENT...................................92

TABLEB12:EXPLORATORYFACTORANALYSISANGER................................................................92

TABLEB13:EXPLORATORYFACTORANALYSISSYMPATHY........................................................93

TABLEB14:EXPLORATORYFACTORANALYSISPERSON-COMPANYFIT.................................93

1

1. IntroductionItisacasethatdominatedthenewsformonths–notonlyinGermanybutalsoalloverthe

world:theVolkswagenemissionsscandal(VolkswagenfurtherstatedasVW).Germany,beinga

countryinwhich“oneinsevenpeopleearntheirliving,directlyorindirectly,fromautomaking“

(Bender,2015,para.3)andwhereVWcarsarethe“mostfamousexport“(Bender,2015,para4),

wasshocked.Whatfollowedthescandal’sdisclosurewasalargeproductrecallthatis

comparabletothatoftheToyotarecallin2010-andfromthis,theToyotabrandhasnot

completelyrevived,yet(Murphy,2015;Vizard,2015).

TheVolkswagenGroup(furtherstatedasVWGroup)isaGermanautomobile

manufacturer.Entailingtwelvebrands,suchasVolkswagen,Audi,Seat,Skoda,Porscheand

Lamborghini,itis“thelargestcarmakerinEurope”(“TheGroup”,2014).OnSeptember18,

2015,thecorporationwasaccusedofintentionallymanipulatingVWandAudicarswith

sophisticatedsoftwaretobypassCleanAirActstandards–thisincidentbecameknownasthe

VWemissionsscandal.Thesoftwarewasinstalledinmillionsofdieselcarsandenabledthecars

toproduceupto40timesmoreemissionthanpermitted(Geier,2015;Kollewe,2015;

Woodyard,2015).Thisisespeciallysignificant,astheVWGroupsolditscarswiththepromise

ofhavinglowemission(Vizard,2015).SincethentheVWemissionsscandalhasspreadtoother

countriesincludingtheUnitedKingdom,GermanyandAustralia(Kollewe,2015),having

affectedmorethan11millioncarsofthebrandsVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaandPorscheworldwide

(Kollewe,2015),ofwhich2.4millionaloneinGermany(heiseonline,2016).Sincetheemissions

scandalhasledtoseveralissuesforthecorporation,suchasfallingshares(Geier,2015)and

decreasingsales(“VWglobalsalesfell“,2016),itcanberegardedasacrisisforthecarmaker.

Productrecallsconstituteasevereandoften-facedproblemintheautomotiveindustry(Birchall

&Milne,2009)andalthoughcommunicationinproductrecallcrisesissignificant,itisnotwell

researcheduntilnow(Laufer&Jung,2010).Moreover,as“Volkswagenexecutivessetoutto

deliberatelyandcriminallybreakthelaw”(Vizard,2015,para.7),theVWemissionsscandalis

anespeciallyseverecrisis.Lastly,researchoutsideNorthAmericaisscarce(Lee,2004)anda

greaterunderstandingofinternationalcrisesisneeded(Coombs,2014).Thus,analyzingtheVW

emissionsscandalwouldaddvaluetothefieldofcrisiscommunicationresearchandwould

providecorporationswithvaluableknowledgeabouthowcrisiscommunicationcanbeapplied

inordertosaveanorganization’sreputationfromacrisis(Coombs,2007a).

TheVWGrouphadbeenknownforitssolidityandreliability(Griffin,2015)andhadhad

astrongreputationforyears(Fombrun,2015).Notonlywasthecorporationrankedamongthe

2

first15companiesintheGlobalRepTrak1001inthepastthreeyears(ReputationInstitute,

2013,2014,2015),italsohad,accordingtothereputationmonitoroftheeconomicresearch

instituteDr.Doebler,thehighestreputationofallDAX30companiesin2015withintheGerman

population(Reidel,2015).Areputationiswidelyacceptedasanintangibleassetforan

organization(Coombs,2007a;Coombs&Holladay,2006)andafavorablereputationcan

provideseveraladvantages,suchascredibilityamongcustomers,commitmentofemployees

andabetterfinancialperformance(Fombrun&vanRiel,2004).Acrisis,suchastheVW

emissionsscandal,canhoweverleadtonegativeoutcomesforanorganization(Coombs,2007a).

Itcan,forexample,harmacorporatereputation(Coombs,2007a;Coombs&Holladay,2008)

andcausepeopletousenegativeword-of-mouth(NWOM),meaningtomakenegative

statementsabouttheorganization(Schultz,Utz&Göritz,2011).Itisthusofinterestofthisstudy

whethertheVWemissionsscandalaffectedthecorporation’sreputationandwhetherithas

causedpeopletoexpressNWOMabouttheVWGroup.

Despitethelargeextentoftheemissionsscandal,themajorityoftheGermanpopulation

remainedfaithfultotheVWGroupafterthescandalhadbecomepublic.Accordingtoasurvey

thatwasconductedtwoweeksafterthebreakoutofthescandalbythemanagementconsultancy

Prophet,twothirdsoftherespondentsstatedthattheystilltrustedVW.75percentsaidthat

theywouldcontinuetobuyVWcars“iftheylikedthevehicleandtheprice“(Prophet,2015,as

citedinLöhr,2015)and63percenthadtheopinionthatthescandalwouldbeforgottenwithina

year(Prophet,2015,ascitedinLöhr,2015).TakingintothefactthattheVWGrouphadhada

favorablereputationforyears,thisstudyaimstoexaminehowtheGermanpublicassesspost-

crisisreputationofthecorporationandwhattheirevaluationsreplyon.Severalscholarshave

addressedtheroleofafavorablepre-crisisreputationinpreviousstudies.Ontheonehand,they

claimthatastrongreputationcanprotectanorganizationfromreputationallossduringacrisis

(e.g.Coombs&Holladay,2006).Ontheotherhand,scholarsarguethatahighreputationleads

tohigherexpectationsamongthepublic,whichareviolatedduringacrisisandresultinthe

sufferingoftheorganization(e.g.Rhee&Haunschild,2006).Thus,theVWGroup’spost-crisis

reputationisexploredinthisstudy.

AccordingtoLee(2004),researchoncrisiscommunicationhasbeenconductedontwo

stages.Firstly,responsestrategiesinspecificcriseshavebeenassessedandsecondly,the

characteristicsofcrisesthatforecastthechoiceofsuitableresponsestrategieswereidentified.

However,mostexistingresearchwasnotaudience-oriented(Lee,2004)andlittleresearchhas

1TheRepTrakPulseisameasurementforthepublicopinionofcompaniesdetectedbyanannuallyconductedglobalsurveybytheReputationInstitute.Therating„describeshowmuchconsumerstrust,likeandadmireacompany“(Fombrun,2015)andcanthereforebeevaluatedasausefulindicatorforacompany’sreputation.

3

includedconsumervariables,suchasemotionsorinvolvement(Choi&Lin,2009a).Thisis

crucial,though,inordertoassesshowindividualsbothunderstandandreacttoacrisis(Lee,

2004)andthuswhicheffectsthecrisishasfortheorganization.Hence,anincreasingnumberof

authors(e.g.Coombs&Holladay,2002;Dawar&Pillutla,2000)havecalledforresearchonthe

publicopinionofsuchevent(Choi&Lin,2009b).Moreover,severalscholarshavesuggested

includingindividualvariablesincrisiscommunicationresearch(Coombs&Holladay,2014;Lee,

2004).Thepresentstudyrespondstothisperceivedbiasinresearch(Coombs,2014)and

focusesontheroleofindividualvariablesthatarepossiblycausingdifferentcrisisreactions.By

includingsuchindividualperspectives,knowledgeaboutindividuals’perceptionsofand

reactionstothecrisiscanbegained.Basedonthisknowledge,managerialimplicationscanbe

madeonhowcorporationscanreactproperlytoacrisis.

AsCoombsandHolladay(2014)pointout,crisisexperthaveaninterestinthe

knowledgeaboutcrisisreactionsofimportantpublics.Thereby,importantpublicsare

customersbutnotonlycustomers(Coombs,2007a)andthusalsonon-stakeholdersandnon-

affectedpeople.Oftheexistingstudiesincrisiscommunicationresearch,manyfocusedonthe

reactionsofstakeholderstocrises,though(e.g.Coombs&Holladay,2014;Choi&Lin,2009b;

Kiambi&Shafer,2015).BynotonlyincludingaffectedpeopleorstakeholdersoftheVWGroup,

thisstudyprovidesinsightsofhowalsolessinvolvedpeopleperceiveandreacttoacrisis.This

enablesthecomparisonofperceptionsandcrisisoutcomesbetweenaffectedandnon-affected

publics,whichmakesthisstudyevenmoreworthwhile.

Crisisresponsibilityhasbeenfoundtoplayakeyroleintheperceptionofacrisis

(Coombs,2007a;Coombs&Holladay,2005;Kiambi&Shafer,2015).Responsibilityrelatesto

whetherpeoplebelievethatthecompanycanbeblamedforthecrisis(Coombs,1995).

Dependingontheperceivedresponsibility,peoplethenexperiencedifferentemotions.Anger

andsympathyhavebeenidentifiedasmainemotionsinthecontextofacrisis(Coombs&

Holladay,2005)andareassumedtocausebehavioralresponses(Coombs,2007a).Beinga

product-recallcrisis,theVWemissionsscandalcanbecategorizedasapreventablecrisis

(Coombs,2007a;Choi&Chung,2013)andisthusprobabletobeattributedwithahighlevelof

responsibility.Ahighlevelofresponsibilityhasbeenfoundtoleadtomoreanger(Choi&Lin,

2009b)andlesssympathy(Coombs&Holladay,2005;Jin,2014).Emotionsinturncanhavean

impactonpeoples’evaluationofanorganization’spost-crisisreputationandcaninfluence

behavioralintentions,suchastheintentiontoexpressNWOM(Coombs,2007a).

Nexttothis,theconceptofinvolvementhasbecomeofinterestincrisiscommunication.

Theconceptreferstoaperson’ssubjectiverelevanceaboutatopic(McDonald&Härtel,2010)

andahigherlevelofinvolvementinacrisiswasfoundtocausemoreangerandlesssympathy

4

(McDonald,Sparks&Glendon,2010).However,crisisinvolvementisnotmuchresearched,yet

(Choi&Lin,2009a).Furthermore,companiestodayaimtohaveastrongrelationshipwithits

customersbecauseitprovidesseveraladvantages,suchasloyalty(Bhattacharya&Sen,2003).

Thecustomer-companyrelationshiphasbeenarguedbyBhattacharyaandSen(2003)byusing

socialidentitytheory.Thetheoryreferstothefeelingofgroupaffiliationandisrelatedtovalues

andemotions.Consumerswhoidentifystronglywithacompanyactinasupportivemanner

(Chu&Li,2012).ThepresentstudytransfersthisconcepttotheGermanpublicastheperson-

companyfit.ItisarguedthatGermanshaveanoverallhighidentificationwiththeVWGroupdue

tothecorporation’shighreputationandtherelevanceofthecarmakerforGermans.Itis

exploredwhethertheperson-companyfithasanimpactontherelationshipofinvolvementand

responsibilitywithemotionsintheVWcrisis.

Thepresentstudyexaminestheabove-mentionedtheoreticalconceptsbyusingthe

SituationalCrisisCommunicationTheory(SCCT)(Coombs2007a)asgroundwork.SCCTisa

usefultheoryforunderstandingcomponentsofacrisisinordertoapplypropercrisis

communicationandthustoprotectanorganizationfromreputationaldamage(Coombs,2007a).

However,notalloftherelevantconceptsandposedlinksbetweenconceptsareincludedin

Coomb’sSCCT.Thus,theexistingframeworkisnotonlytestedonarealcrisisbutalsoextended

byaddingtheconceptsofinvolvementandperson-companyfitaswellasthelinkbetween

emotionsandreputationtotheframework.

Concluding,thisthesisaimstoresearchtheoutcomesoftheVWemissionsscandaland

therolethattheVWGroup’sreputationplayedinthecrisis.Itfurtherexaminestheimpactof

individualperspectivesonsuchcrisisoutcomes.Thefollowingresearchquestionsarehence

introduced:

RQ1:HowdoGermansperceivetheVWGroup’sreputationandtowhatextentdotheyhave

theintentiontoexpressnegativeword-of-mouthabouttheVWGroupaftertheoccurrence

oftheemissionsscandal?

RQ2:Towhatextentdocrisisinvolvement,crisisresponsibilityandemotions(i.e.anger

andsympathy)influencetheVWGroup’spost-crisisreputationandpeople’snegativeword-

of-mouthintention?Andwhetherandhowdotheimpactsvarybetweenaffectedandnon-

affectedGermanpublic?

RQ3:Whetherandhowdoesperson-companyfitaffectthecrisisoutcomesinthiscontext?

5

Afterhavingintroducedthetopicofthisthesisandtheresearchquestions,thesecond

chapterpresentsthetheoreticalframeworkunderlyingthisstudyaswellasresultsofprevious

research.Accordingtothetheoreticalconstructsthatarerelevantforthisstudy,thechapterwill

bestructuredintosub-sectionsthatwillconcludewithoneormorehypotheses.Followingthis,

thethirdchapterwillgiveanoverviewoftheresearchdesignaswellastheoperationalizationof

thetheoreticalconstructsandthemeasurementmodelsoftheperformedstructuralequation

modeling.Inthefourthchapter,theresultsofthedataanalysisarepresented.Thesefindings

willbefurtherdiscussedinchapterfiveofthisthesisbeforemanagerialimplicationswillbe

given,limitationsprovidedandrecommendationsforfutureresearchgiven.

6

2. TheoreticalFrameworkandLiteratureReviewInthischapter,therelevanttheoreticalconceptswillbereviewedaswellaspriorresearch

findingspresented.Attheendofeachsub-chapter,thetheoreticalknowledgeisappliedtothe

VWemissionsscandal,whichwillthenleadtothehypothesesofthisstudy.Inorderto

summarizeandvisualizethetheoreticalframework,aconceptualmodelwillbeprovidedatthe

endofthischapter.

2.1. CorporateReputationinCrisisCommunicationBusinessscandalsofthepastyearshaveindicatedhowimportanttheestablishing,maintaining

andprotectionofreputationisfororganizationsofallkinds(Doorley&Garcia,2007).Inorder

tounderstandthecompletesignificanceofreputation,though,itiscrucialtofirstdefinethe

concept.Untilnow,severaldifferentviewsonreputationcanberecognized(Love&Kraatz,

2009)andmanydifferentdefinitionsofreputationexist(vanRiel&Fombrun,2007).Forthis

study,thedefinitionofCoombsandHolladay(2006)isused.Accordingtotheresearchers“[a]

reputationisanevaluationstakeholdersmakeaboutanorganization”(Coombs&Holladay,

2006,p.123).Thereby,stakeholdersareindividuals,groupsororganizationsthathave”interest

orconcerninanorganization”andcaninfluenceorbeinfluencedbyit(“Stakeholder”,n.d.).

Someexamplesforstakeholdersarecustomers,employeesandshareholders(“Stakeholder”,

n.d.).

Areputationisdependentonanorganization’spastactions(Kiambi&Shafer,2015;van

Riel&Fombrun,2007)andisgeneratedfromcognitiveassociations,whicharederivedfrom

informationthatstakeholdersreceiveaboutanorganizationovertime(Fombrun&vanRiel,

2004;Rhee&Haunschild,2006;vanRiel&Fombrun,2007;Turketal.,2012).Thisinformation

canbegainedthroughpersonalexperiencewiththecompany,secondhandinformationofother

personssuchasfriendsorcolleaguesandthemassmedia(Bromley,2000;Coombs,2007a;

Fombrun&vanRiel,2004;vanRiel&Fombrun,2007;Turketal.,2012).Thereby,direct

personalexperiencehasthegreatestimpactonreputation,whereasmostoftheinformation

stemsfromthemassmedia(Coombs,2007a;vanRiel&Fombrun,2007).Stakeholderscompare

theirinformationaboutanorganizationinordertoevaluatewhetheritmeetstheirexpectations

oftheorganization’sactions(Fombrun&vanRiel,2004).Incaseofanexpectationgap,meaning

thattherespondents’expectationsarenotmetbytheorganization,issuesfortheorganization

canemerge(Coombs,2007a;Reichart,2003).

Asevaluations,reputationscanbefavorableandunfavorable(Coombs,2007a)orin

otherwordspositiveornegative(Walker,2010).Favorablereputationsareacceptedas

7

intangibleassetsthathavebeenrelatedtopositiveoutcomesforanorganization(Coombs,

2007a;Coombs&Holladay,2006;Rhee&Haunschild,2006),orasFombrunandvanRiel(2004)

putit:“Agoodreputationislikeamagnet:Itattractsustothosewhohaveit”(p.3).Such

benefitscanbebothtangibleandintangible(Doorley&Garcia,2011).Intangiblepositive

outcomesincludeforinstancetheperceptionofacompany’sproductsasmoreattractive,a

highercredibilityamongcustomersandahighercommitmentofemployees(Fombrun&van

Riel,2004).Thiscanpotentiallybetranslatedintotangiblepositiveoutcomes,suchasthe

advantageofpayinglessforsuppliers(Davies,Chun,daSilva&Roper,2003;Doorley&Garcia,

2011)oranimprovedfinancialperformanceofanorganization(Fombrun&vanRiel,2004;

Turketal.2012).Thisisforinstancebecauseagoodreputationcanaffectthereceivingof

positivefeedbackfromfinancialanalystsandgainingmoreandalsomorefavorablemedia

coverage(Daviesetal.,2003;Fombrun&vanRiel,2004).Companieswithabadreputationon

theotherhandcanhavemoredifficultiesindrawingattentionofinvestorsandreceivingfunding

(Aula&Mantere,2008,ascitedinKiambi&Shafer,2015)aswellascanreceivemorenegative

mediacoverage(Daviesetal.,2003).CorporateReputationhasadditionallybeendemonstrated

toinfluencestakeholder’sresponsestoproduct-harmcrises(Laufer&Coombs,2006),suchas

emotionsandbehavioralintentions(Coombs,2014).Concluding,apositivereputationisof

importanceforanorganizationandcanevenbeseenas„thesinglemostvaluedorganizational

asset“(Gibsonetal.,2006,p.15).

Basesontheseadvantages,FombrunandvanRiel(2004)arguethat"reputations[…]

mustbenurturedandprotected"(p.7).Thisisespeciallythecaseintimesofcrisis.Accordingto

Coombs(2007a),acrisiscanbedefinedas“asuddenandunexpectedeventthatthreatensto

disruptanorganization’soperationsandposesbothafinancialandareputationalthreat.Crises

canharmstakeholdersphysically,emotionallyand/orfinancially“(p.164).Acrisiscanoccur

whenstakeholdersperceiveviolationsoftheirexpectationsofanorganization(Coombs,2014).

Manydifferenttypesofstakeholders,includingemployees,suppliers,customersand

stockholders,canbenegativelyaffectedbyacrisis(Coombs,2007a).Thus,crisescancreate

victims,meaningpeoplewhoareactuallyharmedbyit,andpotentialvictims,referringtothose

whocouldbeaffectedbytheincident.Inadditiontothis,acrisiscangeneratewitnesses,

meaningpeoplewhogaininformationaboutandrespondtoacrisis(Bies,1987,ascitedin

Coombs&Holladay,2007,p.300).Thereby,mostofthestakeholdersarenotdirectlyaffected

(Coombs&Holladay,2005)butallofthesethreetypesofpersonsmightfeelsomesortof

”emotionalinvolvementinthecrisis“(Bies,1987,ascitedinCoombs&Holladay,2007,p.300)

andareconnectedtotheorganizationduetotheincident(Coombs&Holladay,2007).Thus,the

presentstudyisinterestedinthereactionsofnotonlyvictimsbutalsonon-victimsand

thereforeconsidersthereactionsofthegeneralGermanpublic.

8

Asmentionedabove,crisesusuallycausenegativepublicity(Daviesetal.,2003;Dean,

2004).Asmoststakeholdersgaintheirinformationaboutacrisisfromnewsmediaandthe

Internet,badpublicitycanresultinpeoplethinkingbadlyofanorganization,whichmaydamage

theorganization’sreputation.This,inturn,maychangethewaystakeholdersperceiveand

interactwiththeorganizationandmaythenleadtoalossoftheabove-mentionedbenefitsthata

favorablereputationprovides(Coombs,2007a;Coombs,2014).Inaddition,acrisiscanresultin

stakeholdersquestioninganorganization’scredibility(Arpan,2002),endingtheirrelationswith

anorganizationand/orsayingnegativethingsaboutit(Coombs,2007a).

Ascrisescanhavesuchnegativeeffectsforacompany,thesignificanceofcorrectly

managingtheeventshouldnotbeunderestimated(Laufer&Coombs,2006)andtimely

decisionsaboutthecrisisresponseshouldbemade(Doory&Garcia,2007;McDonaldetal.,

2010).Whenacrisishasoccurred,organizationshavetocommunicatewithstakeholdersfor

severalreasons.Firstofall,theyprovideinformationonhowtoshieldthemselvesfromthe

crisis(instructinginformation)andinformationthatsupportsthemwithpsychologically

managingtheincident(adjustinginformation).Onlythenextstepistoaddressthereputational

threatbyusingseveralreputation-buildingstrategies(Coombs,2007a;Coombs&Holladay,

2005,2009).Thereby,anadequatecrisisresponsecanfunctionasabenefitandmighteven

increasetheorganization’sreputation.Aninadequatecrisisresponseontheotherhandcan

damageanorganization’sactions,itsreputationandthreatenitsexistence(Doorley&Garcia,

2007).

Crisiscommunicationgenerallyrefersto„thecollection,processing,anddissemination

ofinformationrequiredtoaddressacrisissituation“(Coombs,2010,p.20).Asespecially

avoidablecrisescanendangeranorganization’sreputation,themaingoalofcrisis

communicationistorebuildboththeorganization’sreputationandthestakeholder’strust(Utz,

Schultz&Glocka,2013).Thus,crisismanagement,includingcrisiscommunication,and

reputationmanagementarehighlyintertwined(Carroll,2009).Crisiscommunicationis

furthermoreaprocessthatcanbedividedintothethreephasespre-crisiscommunication,crisis

communicationandpost-crisiscommunication(Coombs,2010).Pre-crisiscommunication

addressesthepreparationforpossiblethreats,crisiscommunicationregardsthedecisions

duringthecrisisaswellastheprovidingofinformationtothepeopleandpost-crisis

communicationincludestheanalysisofpreviouscommunicationandthepossibleprovisionof

“follow-upcrisismessages“(Coombs,2010,p.21).Especiallyinthecontextofproductrecalls,

effectivecommunicationisessentialbecauseitpotentiallyreducesdamage(Desai,2014).Asthe

VWemissionsscandalhasalreadygonepublicoversixmonthsago,theVWGroupiscurrently

situatedinthepost-crisiscommunicationphase.Ithastobekeptinmind,though,thatnew

detailsaboutthecrisisarestillbeingrevealed.

9

2.1.1. TheSituationalCrisisCommunicationTheoryInordertobuildandtesttheory,onelineofresearchinthefieldofcrisiscommunicationhas

begantodeveloptheSituationalCrisisCommunicationTheory(SCCT)(Coombs,2004,2007a;

Coombs&Holladay,2002;Kim&Cameron,2011).TheSCCTmodel(seefigure1)hasbeen

developedsince2002(Coombs&Holladay,2002)andprovidesastructureforthe

comprehensionof“howcrisiscommunicationcanbeusedtoprotectreputationalassetsduring

acrisis“(Coombs,2007a,p.163).Itcanbeappliedtodifferenttypesoforganizations(Coombs,

2007a)andtakesanaudience-centeredapproach,whichdeterminestheimpactofimportant

aspectsofthecrisissituationonthestakeholders’perceivedreputation(Coombs,1998;Coombs,

2007a).Knowledgeabouthowstakeholdersreacttoacrisiscanthenagaininfluencea

company’spost-crisiscommunication(Coombs,2007a).EmpiricalresearchbasedonSCCT

offersdirectionsforcrisismanagersonhowresponsestrategiescanbeusedinordertosavea

reputationfromacrisis(Coombs,2007a).Thismakestheframeworkespeciallyvaluable.

Previousresearch(e.g.Choi&Chung,2013;Coombs&Holladay,1996;Dean,2004)has

confirmedsuchbenefitoftheusageoftherightcrisisresponsestrategy(Coombs&Holladay,

2008).

Figure1:CrisisSituationmodelofSCCT(basedonCoombs,2007a)

10

SCCToriginatedfromAttributionTheory(AT)(Weiner,1985)(Coombs,1995;2007a),

whichisa“theoryofmotivationandemotion”(Weiner,1985,p.548)thatsuggeststhat

individualsseekforunderlyingcausesofeventsthathappenaroundthem(Weiner,1985).

Peopleconstantlyask‘why’becausetheyhavetheneedtocomprehendandcontroltheir

environment(Weiner,1985).AccordingtoFolkes(1988),studiesaboutATinthecontextof

consumerbehaviorfoundthatconsumersmakeattributionsforinstanceforwhytheyhave

boughtaproductortofindthereasonforwhyaservicefailed.ThetwokeyaspectsofATare

unexpectancyandnegativitybecausetheyinduceaperson’sneedtolookforthereasonofan

incident(Weiner,1985,1986;Coombs,2007b).Sincecrisesareperceivedasunpredictable,

negativeevents,stakeholdersassociateblametotheinvolvedactorsinacrisis(Coombs,2007a,

2015;Dean,2004;Laufer&Coombs,2006).

Inordertoreactproperlytoacrisis,thepotentialcrisisthreatforanorganization’s

reputationneedstobeassessed.AsCoombs(2007a)explains,“threatistheamountofdamagea

crisiscouldinflictontheorganization’sreputationifnoactionistaken”(p.137).Thereby,the

reputationalthreatisdeterminedbythethreedeterminantsinitialcrisisresponsibility,crisis

historyandpriorreputation(Coombs,2007a).Usingatwo-stepprocess,crisismanagers

estimatethethreattoareputation.First,theyevaluatetheinitialcrisisresponsibility,whichis

basedonthetypeofthecrisis.AccordingtotheSCCT,crisescanbedividedintothreetypes,also

knownasframes,whicheachpresentaspecificaspectoftheparticularcrisis:victimcrisis,

accidentalcrisisandlastlythepreventableorintentionalcrisis(e.g.human-errorproductharm

ororganizationalmisdeed).Eachcrisistypedefineshowmuchresponsibilitythestakeholders

attributetotheorganization.Ofthethreetypes,theintentionalcrisishasthestrongest

attributionofcrisisresponsibilityandposesaseverereputationalthreat(Coombs&Holladay,

2002;Coombs,2007a).AccordingtoClaeys,CaubergheandVyncke(2010),inthecaseof

preventablecrises,evenallresponsibilityisassignedtotheorganization.Basedonthecrisis-

type,theSCCTthenproposesdifferentstrategiestorespondtothecrisis(Coombs,2007a).The

dieselenginemanipulations,whichresultedintheVWemissionsscandal,wereperformedby

employeesoftheVWGroup.Moreover,severalmanagersofthecorporationknewaboutthese

illegalactions(Neate,2016,para.1,10).Aspreventablecrisesinvolve,forexample,

managementmisbehavior,whichintentionallyendangersstakeholdersand/orbreakslaws

(Coombs,2004;2007a),theemissionsscandalandrecallofVWcarsclearlyfallsintothe

preventablecrisiscluster.Asthisisthemostseverecrisistype,itmakestheexaminationofits

consequencesespeciallysignificant.

Inthesecondstageoftheassessmentofthereputationalthreat,theintensifyingfactors

crisishistory,referringtowhethertheorganizationhashadalikelyeventbefore,andpre-crisis

reputation,meaningthereputationbeforethecrisis,areexamined(Coombs,2007a).The

11

existenceofacrisishistoryoranegativepre-crisisreputationwillreinforcethereputational

threatofanorganization(Coombs,2007a).However,crisishistorywasfoundnottobeas

importantasthepre-crisisreputationofacompany(Coombs&Holladay,2001).Thus,prior

reputationisconsideredtobemoreimportantandwillthereforebeofinterestthisstudy.

2.2. Post-crisisreputationAsexplainedinthepreviouschapter,onenegativeoutcomefororganizationsinacrisisisthe

lossofreputation(Coombs,2007a;Coombs&Holladay,2008;Dutta&Pullig,2011;Kiambi&

Shafer,2015).Inthiscontext,itisassumedthatthepublic’sevaluationofacompany’s

reputationbeforethecrisisinfluencesthecompany’srecovery(Turketal.,2012).Thereby,

differentpointsofviewexist.

Ontheonehand,itcansimplybesupposedthatafavorablepriorreputationoperatesas

abankaccountthatconsistsofreputationalcapital(Alsop,2004,ascitedinCoombs&Holladay,

2006).Reputationalcapitalreferstoanorganization’s“stockofperceptualassetsandsocial

assets”(Fombrun&vanRiel,2004,p.32).Ahigherreputationalcapitalcouldresultinmore

supportiveactionsbystakeholders(Fombrun&vanRiel,2004).Asacrisiswillcausesomeharm

toanorganization’sreputation,italsoleadstoalossofreputationalcapital(Coombs,2007a).If

anorganizationhasafavorablepre-crisisreputation,thusmeaningthatithasplentyof

reputationalcapital,itcanallowitselftospendorlosesomecapitalinacrisis.Inthatcase,it

sustainsastrong,favorablereputationafterthecrisis(Alsop,2004,ascitedinCoombs&

Holladay,2006;Coombs,2007a;Dowling,2001).Thisindicatesthatorganizationswitha

favorablereputationcansufferasmuchasthosewithanunfavorablereputationbutwillstill

maintainabetterreputationaftersuchanevent(Claeys&Cauberghe,2015).Thus,agoodpre-

crisisreputationindicatesthatanorganizationisharmedlessandrecoversmorerapidly

(Coombs,2007a).

Anothermorecomplexexplanationisthatafavorablepriorreputationcanfunctionasa

shield(Claeys&Cauberghe,2015)orhalo(Coombs&Holladay,2006)thatprotectsan

organizationfromthelossofreputation(Coombs&Holladay,2006;Ulmer,2001).Thetheories

underlyingthisassumptionareexpectancyconfirmationtheoryandcognitivedissonance

(Claeys&Cauberghe,2015;Coombs&Holladay,2006).Itisassumedthatindividualshave

expectationsaboutsocialissuesandthattheytrytoavoidexperiencingcognitivedissonance.

Thismeansthatindividualstrytoobtaininformationthatcorrespondswiththeirprioropinions

ofanissue.Becausepeopletrytodiminishcognitivedissonance,conflictinginformationis

interpretedinawaythatiscoherentwiththeindividuals’previousbeliefs(Claeys&Cauberghe,

2015;Coombs&Holladay,2006;Edwards&Smith,1996;Perloff,2010).Likewise,ifpeople

12

receivecrisisinformationaboutafavoredorganization,theymightfacecognitivedissonance

(Perloff,2010,ascitedinClaeys&Cauberghe,2015,p.65).Consumerswithapositiveattitude

maytendtopaymoreattentiontopositiveinformationandavoidnegativeaspectsaboutthe

organization(Coombs&Holladay,2006;Claeys&Cauberghe,2015).Thisformofinformation

processingcouldthenresultintheavoidanceofreputationalloss.Additionally,stakeholders

couldtoacertainextentrejectthefactthatthecrisisoccurredandthusholdontotheir

favorableopinionaboutit.Hence,thecrisiswillnothavealargeeffectontherelationship

betweenstakeholdersandorganizations (Coombs&Holladay,2001,2006).Consequently,anorganizationwithafavorablepre-crisisreputationwouldsufferlessreputationallossthanan

organizationwithanunfavorablepre-crisisreputation.GrunwaldandHempelmann(2011)even

assumethatthecognitivedissonancemechanismonlytakesplaceforwell-knownandwell-

reputedorganizations.AstheVWGroupdidhaveafavorablepre-crisisreputation,itisassumed

thatthisprocessisapplicable.

Severalscholarshaveinvestigatedtheroleofagoodpre-crisisreputationandare

positiveaboutitsbenefitsforanorganizationduringacrisisbyhelpingtoprotectacompany’s

reputationalassetsaswellasbeinganaidtoitsrepair(Coombs&Holladay,2006).Studies

foundforinstancethatagoodpriorreputationinfluencedthepublic’sopinionandbehavioral

intentionstowardstheorganization(e.g.Carroll,2009;Lyon&Cameron,2004),resultedina

betterevaluationof(e.g.Kiambi&Shafer,2015)andledtoamorepositiveattitudetowardsthe

organization(e.g.Turketal.,2012).KiambiandShafer(2015)thusevaluateagoodreputation

ascriticalforanorganizationandemphasizethenecessitytoestablishafavorablepre-crisis

reputation.However,sincemostexistingresearch“isopinionbasedratherthanwell

researched”(Dowling,2001,p.252),thereisashortageofempiricalevidenceforthis

assumption(Coombs&Holladay,2006).Thus,moreempiricalproofisneededinorderto

provideadviceontheprotectionofanorganization’sreputationfromacrisis(Coombs,2007a;

Rousseau,2006;Kiambi&Shafer,2015).Moreover,theshieldingfunctionofagoodreputation

hasnotoftenbeenconfirmedinpreviousstudies(Claeys&Cauberghe,2015).Coombsand

Holladay(2006)onlyfoundevidencefortheoccurrenceofahaloeffectcouldfororganizations

withanextremelyfavorablepre-crisisreputation(Coombs&Holladay,2006).However,Claeys

andCauberghe(2015)wereabletovalidatetheshieldingeffectandfoundevidenceforthe

consumers’endeavortoavertcognitivedissonanceregardingtheirpre-crisisattitudetowards

anorganization.Theconsumerswerenotonlytoassociatelowercrisis-responsibilitytothe

organizationbutalsodisregardednegativepublicity.Thus,consumerswereaversetoaltertheir

originalattitudetowardsanorganization(Claeys&Cauberghe,2015).

Despitetheabove-describedrelevanceofagoodpre-crisisreputationfororganizations,

someresearchers(e.g.Dean,2004;Grunwald&Hempelmann,2011;Rhee&Haunschild,2006)

13

arguethatafavorablereputationcanalsoleadtonegativeconsequencesforanorganizationina

crisis,beingconcerned“aboutthepossibilitythatagoodreputationwillbackfireandinflicteven

moreseveredamagetofirms”(Sohn&Lariscy,2015,p.238).Comparedtoaloworaneutral

reputation,afavorablereputationcouldleadtohigherexpectationsofanorganizationamong

stakeholders(Rhee&Haunshild,2006;Sohn&Lariscy,2015).Iftheseareviolatedinacrisis,

well-reputedorganizationswillbepunishedmoresternly(Sohn&Lariscy,2015),forinstance,

bycausingtheorganizationstopayhigherrestitutionsinordertoresolvetheincident

(Grunwald&Hempelmann,2011).SohnandLariscy(2015)callthisthe‘boomerangeffect’ofa

favorablereputationandjustifythisphenomenonwiththeexpectancyviolations(EV)theory.

Contradictingtocognitivedissonance-basedviews(Sohn&Lariscy,2015),thistheorysuggests

thatinsteadoffullyignoringordenyingcontradictinginformation,peopletendtocomparetheir

pre-interactionexpectationswiththetargetobject’sbehaviors(Burgoon&LePoire,1993).The

violationofaperson’sexpectancyratheroperatesasatriggerforcognitiveprocessing,hence

affectingthetarget’spost-interactionjudgmentinasensethat“positiveandnegativeviolations

(disconfirmation)leadtomorepositiveandnegativeinteractionoutcomesrespectivelythan

doesconformitytoexpectations”(Burgoon&LePoire,1993,p.69).Initially,theEVtheorywas

developedfortheclarificationofinternalcommunication(Sohn&Lariscy,2015).Aspeopleare

likelytohumanizeorganizations(Daviesetal.,2003;Love&Kraatz,2009)andstakeholders

considerthemasexchangepartnerswithcharacteristicssuchasreliability,whichtheyare

evaluatedon(Fombrun,1996;Love&Kraatz,2009;Sohn&Lariscy,2015),thistheoryisalso

suitabletotheinteractionofstakeholdersandorganizations(Sohn&Laricsy,2015).

Althoughmostresearchershaveaddressedtheadvantagesofagoodreputationduringa

crisis,otherscholarsargueforamorepessimisticview.Asabove-described,opponentempirical

findingsexist,whereastheoptimisticviewisleading(Sohn&Lariscy,2015).Givensuchan

ongoingdebate,thestudyathandexploresthepost-crisisreputationoftheVWGroupafterthe

emissionsscandalhasoccurred.

2.3. NegativeWord-of-MouthBesidesthepotentiallynegativeeffectonreputation,crisescanalsoinfluenceanindividual’s

behaviorintentions,suchasNWOMintention(Coombs,2010;Coombs&Holladay,2008).Word-

of-mouth(WOM)cangenerallybedefinedasinformal,non-commercialperson-to-person

communicationamongcommunicatorsaboutbrands,products,servicesororganizations

(Anderson,1998;Harrison-Walker,2001;Richins,1984;Goyette,Ricard,Bergeron&

Marticottte,2010).Inthecontextofthisthesis,WOMrelatestostatementsthatstakeholders

makeaboutacorporation(Schultzetal.,2011),namelytheVWGroup.WOMcantakeplaceface

14

toface,byphone,emailoranyothercommunicationchannels(Silverman,2001).WOMcan

furtherbeofpersonalorigin,forinstancefromfriendsorfamily,andofimpersonalorigin,such

asjournalists(Goyetteetal.,2010).WOMhaslongbeenacceptedasadominantpowerin

buildingconsumers’opinionsandbehaviors(Brown&Reingen,1987;Herr,Kardes&Kim,

1991)andisevenreferredtoas„themostpowerfulforceinthemarketplace“(Silvermann,

2001,p.47).ThisismainlybecauseWOMisnormallygeneratedbycrediblesourcesandisthus

believedtohaveastrongerimpactconsumers’judgmentsthaninformationobtainedthrough

commercialprintsources,likeadvertising(Silvermann,2001;Herretal.1991),becausetheyare

more“accessible”and“diagnostic”(Herretal.,1991,p.459).Inaddition,WOMcaneasilyreach

alargeamountofpeopleduetoitsabilitytospreadquickly(Silvermann,2001),especially

throughnewchannels,suchasonlineforums(Hennig-Thurau,Gwinner,Walsh&Gremler,

2004).

WOMcanbepositive,neutralornegative(Anderson,1998).NWOM„denigratesthe

objectofthecommunication“andrefersto„aconsumerresponsetodissatisfaction“(Richins,

1984,p.697).Asitisdamagingtoacompany’ssuccess(Richins,1984),NWOMcanbeseenasa

threattoorganizations(Coombs,Fediuk&Holladay,2007).PositiveWOMontheotherhandis

anadvantagefororganizations(Coombs,Fediuk&Holladay,2007).Moreover,itwasfoundthat

NWOMhasamoreintensiveinfluenceoncustomerevaluationsthanpositiveWOM(Herretal.,

1991;Laczniak,DeCarlo&Ramaswami,2001;Mizerski,1982).Moreprecisely,itsignificantly

influencestheevaluationofbrands(Laczniaketal.,2001),products(Rea,Wang&Stoner,2014)

andorganizations(Kiambi&Shafer,2015).Additionally,itisconsideredtobeanantecedentfor

consumerbehavior,forinstance,itmaychangeaperson’spresentandfuturepurchasedecisions

(Chu&Li,2012;Coombs&Holladay,2007;Schultzetal.,2011).

NWOMisconsideredtobeparticularlypowerfulandproblematicbecauseitcanreach

manyreceivers,includingpeoplewhodidnotknowabouttheincidentbefore.Itcanalsopersist

(online)evenafteracrisisandevenafterpeoplehavealreadyforgottenabouttheincident.

Therefore,itisathreattoorganizations(Coombs,2007a,2010,2014;Coombs&Holladay,

2007)andasmanagersaimtopreventthepossiblenegativeoutcomesofNWOM(Coombs,

2007b,2007a)theythustrytoavoidNWOM.

ScholarshavearguedthatstakeholdershaveatendencytouseNWOMinacrisis(e.g.

Coombs&Holladay,2007;Coombsetal.,2007;Kiambi&Shafer,2015).Thisrelationshiphas

beeninvestigatedinseveralstudies.Utzetal.(2013),forinstance,foundintheirresearchabout

theFukushimaDaiichinucleardisasterthatrespondentsusedmoresecondarycrisis

communication,suchasNWOM,inthecaseofanintentionalcrisis.Furthermore,Kiambiand

Shafer’s(2015)studyrevealedthatanorganizationwithabadpre-crisisreputationtendsto

15

undergomoreintentionsofNWOMthanthosewithagoodreputation.However,moreempirical

researchonNWOMincrisiscommunicationisneeded(Kiambi&Shafer,2015).

DuetopossiblenegativebehaviorsfollowingNWOM,theconceptisofhighimportance

forcorporations.AstheintentiontouseNWOMcanbeevokedinacrisis,thepresentstudy

examinestheoccurrenceofNWOMintheVWemissionsscandal.SincetheVWemissions

scandalcanbecategorizedasanintentionalcrisis,theNWOMintentionoftheGermanpublicis

expectedtoberatherhighafterthecrisis.Onthecontrary,theVWGrouphadhadavery

favorablereputationpriortotheemissionsscandal,whichiswhytheNWOMintentioncouldbe

potentiallylow,aswell.ThepresentstudythusfurtherinvestigatestheGermanpublic’s

intentiontoexpressNWOMabouttheVWGroup.

2.4. ImpactofPersonalPerspectivesinCrisisCommunicationStudiesinthefieldofcrisiscommunicationhavemainlyappliedtwotheoriesinordertoexplore

publics’responsestoorganizations’usageofcrisiscommunicationstrategies(Coombs&

Holladay,2014),namelycontingencytheory(e.g.Jin&Cameron,2007)andSCCT(e.g.Coombs,

2007;CoombsandHolladay,2007).Thereby,researchoftentimesfocusedonfictitious

companiesandcrisissituations(e.g.Dean,2004;Claeys&Cauberghe,2015).Thismadeit

difficulttoincludeindividuals’attitudestowardsacompanyintheanalysis(Dean,2004).

Severalresearchers,however,suggesttheincorporationofindividualvariables,suchas

involvementoremotionswhenanalyzingtheimpactofcrisesoncorporatereputation(e.g.Choi

&Lin,2009a;Choi&Lin,2009b;Claeys&Cauberghe,2015;Dean,2004).AccordingtoChoiand

Lin(2009b),notmuchisknown“abouthowapotentiallyaffectedpublicwillrespondtoacrisis

andhowtheirresponsesshouldbeincorporatedintoSCCTwhentestingthatmodel“(p.199).

However,thereissignificanceinthecomprehensionofstakeholderreactionstocrises(Härtel,

McColl-Kennedy&McDonald,1998;Kim&Cameron,2011)becauseitcanbeusefulknowledge

fortheorganization’spost-crisiscommunication(Coombs,2007a).Thus,theaimofthepresent

studyistoexaminetheimpactofpersonalperspectivesontheabove-explainedpossible

outcomesofacrisis.Throughthis,thestudywilldrawaconnectionbetweentheindividualand

corporateleveloftheVWemissionsscandal.

2.4.1. Crisis-EmotionsAsnotmuchresearchhasaddressedemotionsincrisissofar(McDonaldetal.,2010),scholars

havebeguntoinvestigatetheroleofemotionalresponsesinthecontextofsucheventsinrecent

years(e.g.Choi&Lin,2009a,2009b,2009c;Coombsetal.,2007;Jin,2009,2010;Jin,Pang&

Cameron,2012,2014;Kim&Cameron,2011).Theemotionsfeltbystakeholderstowardsan

16

organizationcanhaveanimpactontheorganization’sdevelopmentandsurvival,makingthe

comprehensionofaffectsespeciallyessential(Coombs&Holladay,2005).AsCoombsand

Holladay(2005)furtherposit,crisiscommunicationcanmoreeffectivelyprotectan

organization’sreputationwhenitconsidersthestakeholder’saffectivereactions(Coombs&

Holladay,2005)becausecrisismanagerscanrespondmoreproperlytotheincident(Laufer&

Coombs,2006).

AsCoombs’SCCTframeworkusesanaudience-directedapproach,itcanbeappliedfor

thecomprehensionofstakeholders’reactionsincrises(Jin,2010).CoombsandHolladay(2005)

arguethatcriseswillnotonlytriggerattributionsbutalsocreateemotionalresponsesamong

individuals(Coombs&Holladay,2005).InaccordancewithAT,angerandsympathyhavebeen

statedtobethemainemotionsinthecontextofpost-crisiscommunication(Coombs&Holladay,

2005,2008).Althoughthesetwoemotionshavedifferentvalences,sympathyhasapositiveand

angerhasanegativevalence,theyarebothprobabletobefeltbynon-victimpublics(Jin,2014).

Transferredtothestudyathand,thiswouldsignifythatthegeneralGermanpubliccouldfeel

emotionsabouttheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal.

Angertowardsaneventismainlyfeltwhenpeopleattributeresponsibilitytocertain

agents,suchasorganizations,foraviolationorsorrow(Iyer&Oldmeadow,2006).Lindner

(2006)arguesthatindividualsfeelangerwhentheyfeelhurtandwhenevertheyaretreated

withdisrespect.Transferredtoanorganizationincrisis,itwouldmeanthatpersonswouldfeel

angertowardstheorganizationwhentheybelievethattheorganizationistobeblamedforthe

event(ascitedinJin,2010,p.527).Sympathyontheotherhandisevokedthroughthe

“awarenessofothers’suffering[…]especiallywhenthesufferingisseenasundeserved“

(Salovey&Rosenhan,1989;ascitedbyIyer&Oldmeadow,2006,p.637).Thiscanbeexplained

bythefactthatsympathyinvolvesasenseofcompassionthatiscausedbythedistressofthe

otherperson(Gruen&Mendelsohn,1986).IyerandOldmeadow(2006)indicate,though,that

notallpeoplewhoobserveotherssufferalsofeelsympathy.Theysuggestthatsympathyisnot

onlyevokedbythefeelingforsomeoneelsebutthatitalsorequiressomedistancefromwhatis

happening.Basedonthis,itisarguedthatmostprobablypeoplewhoperceiveacrisisbutare

notdirectlyaffectedbyitwouldtendtofeelsympathy(Jin,2014).Incaseofanorganization

experiencingacrisis,itcanbeassumedthatapersonwouldfeelsympathytowardsthe

organizationwhenevaluatingtheorganizationasvictimthatissufferingduetothehappening.

Inlinewiththis,severalstudiesfoundthatpersonsexperiencedifferentemotionsbasedonthe

crisistype(e.g.Jin,2009;Jinetal.,2012).

Beingonlyconfrontedwithstakeholderswhofeelangerorsympathytowardsan

organizationwouldnotbeverysignificantfororganizationsincrisis.However,Coombsand

17

Holladay(2005)arguethatemotionswillhaveanimpactonastakeholder’sfuture

organizationalinteractions,suchassupportingtheorganization(Coombs&Holladay,2005),

andarethereforecrucialtoconsider.Furthermore,Liu,AustinandJin(2011)explainthat

certainemotionshavebeenrelatedtoundesirablecrisisoutcomes.InthemostcurrentSCCT

model,emotionisincorporatedasapredictorforbehavioralintentionsbutnotforreputation

(seefigure1,arrowE)(Coombs,2007a;Choi&Lin,2009b).Jin,PangandCameron(2007)

argue,though,thatemotionsinacrisiscanhaveanimpactonpeople’sopinionaboutan

organization.ChoiandLin(2009b)thusproposedandtestedarevisedmodelthatcontained

suchadirectpathfromemotionstoreputation.Theyfoundthatangersignificantlypredictedthe

company’sperceivedreputation:Ahigherlevelofangerledtoaworsereputation.This

highlightsthesignificanceofemotionsinSCCTandtheneedtotakeemotionalreactionsinto

accountwhenaimingtoprotectanorganization’sreputation(Choi&Li,2009b).Basedontheir

findings,ChoiandLi(2009b)suggestarevisedSCCTmodelthatcontainsadirectlinkfrom

angertoreputation.

Onthecontrary,onlyfewstudiesincrisisresearchhavecenteredontheimpactof

positiveemotions,althoughthesignificanceofpositiveaffectsincommunicationhasbeen

apparent(Jin,2014).Forinstance,FolkmanandMoskowitz(2000)claimthatpositiveemotions

canemergetogetherwithdistressinastressfulsituation.Asfortherelationshipofsympathy

andpost-crisisreputation,itcanbeassumedthatpersonswhofeelsympatheticforan

organizationhaveapositiveattitudeandthusratetheorganization’sreputationbetterthan

thosewhodonotfeelsympathyfortheorganization.Basedonthisbackground,thefollowing

hypothesescanbeformulated:

H1:AngerhasanegativeimpactontheVWGroup’spost-crisisreputation.

H2:SympathyhasapositiveimpactontheVWGroup’spostcrisisreputation.

AlthoughbeingconsideredasapredictorforbehavioralintentionsinSCCT(Choi&Lin,

2009b;Coombs,2007a),potentialeffectsofcrisisemotionsonbehaviorhavenotmuchbeen

investigated,yet(Coombs&Holladay,2005).Suchresearchwouldhelp,though,“todevelop

effectivecrisismanagementstrategies”(McDonaldetal.,2011,p.333).Onepossiblenegative

behavioralintentionthatistriggeredbyemotionsisthatofNWOM(Coombs&Holladay,2007;

Coombs,2007a,2014).

AsLernerandTiedens(2006)explain,severalstudieshaveconfirmedthatangrypeople

believethattheyhavetheabilitytomakeanimpactonormanageacertainsituationandtrigger

abehavior.Inlinewiththis,angerhasbeenfoundtoleadtoNWOMintentionbecausepeople

wanttoexpresstheirfeelingsorwanttoavenge(Wetzer,Zeelenberg&Pieters,2007).Coombs

18

etal.(2007)positthatunhappycustomershaveahigherproclivitytotellclosepersonsabout

productsandservicesthanthosewhoarehappy.Theauthorsfurtherarguethatstakeholders

whoareangrybecauseofacrisisarelesslikelytousepositiveWOMbutmorelikelytouse

NWOMinstead.Theauthorscallthisthe“negativecommunicationdynamic”(Coombsetal.,

2007).However,intheirstudyabouttherelationshipbetweencrisisresponsibility,angerand

WOM,bothresponsibilityandangerwerefoundtoincreasepositiveWOMinsteadofNWOM.

Coombsetal.(2007)concludethatthemoderatelevelofangertowardsthecrisisintheirstudy

maynothavebeensufficienttodeveloptheirproposednegativecommunicationdynamic.They

suggestexaminingtheimpactofangerinfuturestudies.Otherstudies,though,havefound

evidencefortherelationshipbetweenangerandNWOM.Forinstance,Utzetal.’s(2013)study

revealedthatangerhadanimpactonsecondarycrisiscommunication,suchasNWOM.

Moreover,thehigherthelevelofnegativeemotions,theleastthepersonshadbehavioral

intentionsthatweresupportiveforanorganizationandthemoretheytendedtouseNWOM

(McDonaldetal.,2010).McDonaldetal.(2010)evenfoundthatangerwasoneofthestrongest

predictorsfortheintentiontouseNWOM.

Sympathy,ontheotherhand,couldnotplaysuchanimportantroleinacrisisbecauseits

positiveaffectmightnotinfluencestakeholderstoalargeextent(Coombs&Holladay,2005).

ResultsofastudybyStockmyer(1996)revealforinstancethatsympathytowardsanaffected

companydidnotinfluencepeopletopurchasefromitafterthecrisis.CoobsandHolladay(2005)

suppose,“customersaremorelikelytocomplainaboutabadexperiencewithaproductor

servicethanreportapositiveexperience“(p.275).Moreover,thescholarsarguethatsympathy

mightresultinsupportingactionsbystakeholders(Coombs&Holladay,2005).Furtherresearch

isnecessary,though,inordertoassesstheactualbenefitsofsympathyforcrisiscommunication

(Coombs&Holladay,2005).Thus,itcanbearguedthatsympathytowardsthecorporation

wouldnotleadtoNWOMandahigherlevelofsympathywoulddecreasetheNWOMintention.

Hence,thefollowingcanbehypothesized:

H3:Angerincreasestheintentionfornegativeword-of-mouthabouttheVWGroup.

H4:Sympathydecreasestheintentionfornegativeword-of-mouthabouttheVWGroup.

2.4.2. CrisisResponsibilityInordertoshieldanorganizationfromacrisis,understandingabouthowtheincidentcauses

damagetotheorganizationisneeded(Coombs,2015).Previousresearchhasrecognizedfour

situationalfactorsthatsupportthecomprehensionoftheharmfulimpactofacrisis,oneofthem

crisisresponsibility(Coombs,2015).Sinceitisanessentialconceptforunderstanding

“stakeholders’reactionstocrisisresponses“(Browm&Ki,2013,p.2)andtakesonapivotalpart

19

inSCCT(Coombs,2004;2007a;2015),itisespeciallysignificantforthepresentstudy.

Crisisresponsibilityreferstotheamountofresponsibilityforacrisisthatstakeholders

attributetoanorganization(Coombs,1998,2004),alsocalledtheblameoftheorganization

(Coombs,1998).Asexplainedinchapter2.1.1,theconstructisderivatedfromAT(Coombs,

2015),inwhichcausalattributionsplayapivotalrole(Weiner,1985).Responsibilitycaneither

beattributedtothepersonororganizationembroiledinthecrisisevent(internal)or

circumstantial(external)factors(Coombs,2010).Theattributionofinternalorexternal

responsibilityisessentialininducingaffectivereactionsorbehaviorstotheactorsthatarepart

ofthecrisis(Weiner,1986).Inthecaseofahighdegreeofinternalresponsibility,behavioral

reactionsarenegative.Ontheotherhand,iftheexternalresponsibilityisperceivedtobehigh,

behavioralreactionsarepositive(Weiner,2006).Theprocessofblamingisbasedonthe

knowledgethatapersonpossessesaboutwhetheranorganizationisresponsibleforacrisisand

whetheritcouldhavecontrolledoravoidedthecrisis(Jin,2010).

Asexplainedinchapter2.1.1,basedonthecrisistype,managersareabletodetect

whetherstakeholderstendtoconsidertheorganizationasresponsibleforthecrisisornot

(Coombs,2015).TheVWemissionsscandalfallsintothecategoryofapreventablecrisis,thus,a

highattributionofcrisisresponsibilitytheVWGroupisexpected(Coombs,2007a).The

emphasizingofcertainaspectsofacrisis,thereforeframingitinacertainway,caninfluencea

person’sopinion(Coombs,2007a;Druckman,2001)andonhowstakeholdersevaluatethecrisis

(Coombs&Holladay,2002).Forinstance,existingresearchinthefieldofcrisiscommunication

hasfoundadirectlinkbetweencrisisresponsibilityandreputation(e.g.Coombs,2004,2007a,

2014,2015;Coombs&Holladay,1996;2002;Laczniaketal.,2001;Turketal.,2012)and

behavioralreactions(Coombs,2007a),suchaspurchaseintention(Laufer&Coombs,2006)and

NWOMintention(Coombs,2015).

Furthermore,aspeopleascriberesponsibilityforanevent,theywillexperiencevarious

commonemotions(Weiner,1985;Coombs,2007a).MainemotionsinATareangerand

sympathy(Coombs,2007a).InlinewithAT,CoombsandHolladay(2005)positthat“[c]risis

responsibilityshouldberelatedtotheaffectcreatedbyacrisis”(p.269).TheSCCTcontainsthe

so-called‘CrisisResponsibility–AffectProposition’(seefigure1,arrowC),whichindicatesthata

strongerassociationofcrisisresponsibilityhasapositiveimpactonthefeelingsofanger

whereasalowerassociationofcrisisresponsibilityithasapositiveimpactonsympathy

(Coombs,2007a;Coombs&Holladay,2005).Themoreresponsibilityastakeholderattributesto

anorganization,thegreatertheriskofthecrisis(Coombs,2014).

Previousstudieshavedemonstratedtheoccurrenceofcertainemotionsdueto

stakeholders’attributionsofcrisisresponsibility(Utzetal.,2013).Severalstudiesfoundthat

20

personsexperiencedifferentemotionsbasedonthecrisistype(e.g.Jin,2009;Jinetal.,2012).

Thereby,intentionalcrisescreatethestrongestangerduetothehighlevelofcrisis

responsibility(e.g.Coombs&Holladay,2005).Inaccordancewiththis,ChoiandLin(2009b,

2009c)foundthatangerwasthemostandsympathytheleastoccurringemotionafteraproduct

recallcrisis.ResultsofChoiandLin(2009b)furtherrevealedthatcrisisresponsibility

significantlypredictedemotionssuchasanger,surpriseorfear,whereasangerhadthestrongest

relationtoresponsibility.However,theycouldnotproveanassociationofresponsibilitywith

sympathy.Thisresultcouldbeduetothesmallsamplesizeofsympathy(n=2)inthecontent

analysis,though,whichmayhaveledtoinsignificantresults(Choi&Lin,2009b).Inlinewith

this,CoombsandHolladay(2005)foundthatcrisisresponsibilitywasstronglypositively

correlatedwithanger.Theauthorsalsofoundthough,thatcrisisresponsibilityisstrongly

negativelycorrelatedwithsympathy.Basedonthis,McDonaldetal.(2010)proposethata

strongercrisisresponsibilityprognosticatesstrongeremotions.Thus,whenapersonor

organizationisjudgedresponsible,angerisexperiencedandbehavioralactionsarenegative.On

theotherhand,whenapersonororganizationisnotjudgedasresponsible,sympathyisevoked

andactionsarepositive(Kiambi&Shafer,2015;Weiner,1985;Weiner,2006,ascitedin

Coombs,2007a).Basedontheseassumptionsandempiricalresults,thefollowingcanbe

hypothethized:

H5:AhigherlevelofperceivedcrisisresponsibilityleadstomoreangertowardstheVW

Group.

H6:AhigherlevelofperceivedcrisisresponsibilityleadstolesssympathytowardstheVW

Group.

2.4.3. CrisisInvolvementDespitethecallforincludingtheconceptofstakeholderinvolvementintocrisiscommunication

research(e.g.Dean,2004;Coombs&Holladay,2005;McDonald&Härtel,2000)onlyfewstudies

haveinvestigatedthemeaningoftheconceptinthiscontext(Choi&Lin,2009a).Asaresultof

thenoveltyofinvolvementincrisiscommunication,studiesthatdidincorporatetheconceptdid

notconsideritinthesamemanner.Thismakesthecomparisonandgeneralizationofresults

difficult.Forinstance,whilesomescholarsincludedproductinvolvement(e.g.Choi&Lin,

2009a;Choi&Chung,2013),otherappliedcrisisinvolvement(e.g.McDonaldetal.,2010).Since

theemissionsscandalandnottheproductsoftheVWGroupareofinterestofthisstudy,the

involvementwiththecrisisanditsconsequencesareexamined.

Asmanyresearchersconsiderpersonalimportance(Petty&Cacioppo,1981)or

relevanceasthecrucialaspectofinvolvement(e.g.Celsi&Olson,1988;Zaichkowsky,1985),the

21

conceptcangenerallybedefinedas“aperson’sperceivedrelevanceoftheobjectbasedon

inherentneeds,valuesandinterests(Zaichkowsky,1985).Thus,thelevelofperceivedpersonal

relevancedefineshowmuchaconsumerisinvolved“withanobject,situationoraction”(Celsi&

Olson,1988,p.211).CelsiandOlson(1988)implythatsomethingisofpersonalrelevancewhen

consumersregarditasself-relatedorsomehowcrucialforaccomplishingindividualaimsand

values.Generally,theconceptofinvolvementisusedinthecontextofproductsorbrands(Peter

&Olson,1990,ascitedinMcDonald&Härtel,2000,p.801;Zaichkowsky,1985),however,

consumerscouldalsobeinvolvedwithvariousissues,suchasevents(Peter&Olson,1990,as

citedinMcDonald&Härtel,2000,p.801;Petty&Cacioppo,1986).

Inthecaseofanindividual’ssubjectivesenseofpersonalrelevance,itcanbereferredto

“feltinvolvement“(Celsi&Olson,1988).Itisaperceptionthatistiedtoanobjectoreventand

solelyexistsatparticulartimesandsituations,whichemphasizesthesituationalroleofthe

concept(Celsi&Olson,1988).AccordingtoCelsiandOlson(1988),feltinvolvementhas

motivationalcharacteristics,whichhaveanimpactoncognitiveprocesses,includingattention

andcomprehension,andonbehavior,suchasconsumptionbehavior.AsPettyandCacioppo

(1981,1986)argue,involvementhasaninfluenceonpeople’smotivationformessage

processingandthusontheirattitudechange.Whilehighlyinvolvedconsumerprocess

informationonthecentralroute,meaningtheypaymoreattentiontothequalityofthe

arguments,low-involvedconsumersprocessitontheperipheralrouteandwillratherpay

attentiontoaspectssuchasthesourcecredibilityofthemessage.Thus,thehigheraperson’s

involvement,themoredifficultitistochangetheirattitude.

Researchinthefieldofpublicrelations(Heath&Douglas,1990,1991,ascitedinChoi&

Chung,2013)hashighlightedthecrucialroleofinvolvementregardingaudience’sreceptivityto

informationandissues.Theconceptofinvolvementwasfirstappliedtothefieldofcrisis

communicationandtoorganizationalcrisesbyMcDonaldandHärtel(2000)(Choi&Lin,2009a)

becausetheyassumedthatpersonalrelevanceisimportantforthedeterminationofcrisis

outcomes(McDonald&Härtel,2000).Accordingtotheauthors(2000),mostoftheexisting

crisiscommunicationresearchappliesATinordertoproveconnectionsbetweenattributions

andangeraswellaspurchaseintention.AlthoughATviewstheevaluationofindividual

relevanceofaneventascritical,itdoesnotintegrateitintothemodel.Thus,thescholars

suggestconsideringAffectiveEventsTheory(AET)(Weiss&Cropanzano,1996)inorderto

examinetheroleofbothpersonalrelevanceaswellasemotionsincrisis.Moreprecisely,AET

suggeststhatthelevelofpersonalrelevancedefinestheintensityoffeltemotions(McDonald&

Härtel,2000).

22

Applyinginvolvementtocrisisevents,McDonaldandHärtel(2000)arguethatthe

conceptdefineswhetherapersonisawareofamessageandhowmuchattentionheorshepays

toit.Inthecaseofacompanycrisis,aperson’sintrinsicsourcesofpersonalrelevance,suchas

itsgoals,valuesorneeds,butalsochangeablesituationalsourcesofpersonalrelevanceinthe

consumer’senvironment,includingthemediacoverageofsuchevent,determinehisorher

motivationtodevoteherselforhimselftoamessage.Theleveloffeltinvolvementwouldthen

influencetheprocessesofattributionandemotion,whichwouldinturnhaveanimpacton

behaviorintentionsafteracrisis(McDonald&Härtel,2000;Choi&Lin,2009a).Accordingto

Weiner(1995),eventsthataremorepersonallyrelevantleadtostrongeremotions.Thus,

McDonaldandHärtel(2000)arguethatinvolvementisanimportantfactorindefiningthe

effectsofacompanycrisisbecauseitcaninfluencethelevelofpeople’sattentiontoamessage

andthustheefficiencyofcrisiscommunication.Moreprecisely,thescholarsproposethata

consumer’sinvolvementwithacompanycrisispredictsthelevelofemotions.Asfelt

involvementinfluencesconsumer’sanger,McDonaldandHärtel(2000)proposethatthelevelof

feltinvolvementdefinestheintensityofangertheyfeelinacompanycrisis.Furthermore,since

crisisvariablesareconsiderstobe„dynamicandchangeable“(McDonald&Härtel,2000,p.801),

feltinvolvementistemporary.Thus,asangerisassumedtoresultfromfeltinvolvement,itis

alsomomentary.Thisindicatesthatangerwilldisappearastimepasses,exceptforin„high

impactcrisesthatgenerateextremelyhighlevelsofanger“(Coombs&Holladay,2007,p.302).

Basedonthis,CoombsandHolladay(2005)supposethatconsumerinvolvementcouldincrease

theemotionsand/orcrisisresponsibilitythatwerecreatedinacrisis,whichcouldleadtoan

extensionofSCCT.

FollowingMcDonaldandHärtel’s(2000)introductionofinvolvementtothefieldofcrisis

communication,severalresearchers(e.g.Choi&Chung,2013;Choi&Lin,2009a;McDonaldet

al.,2010)haveappliedtheconceptofproductinvolvement,meaningaperson’sperceptionof

relevanceregardingaproduct(Choi&Chung,2013),tocrisiscommunication.ChoiandChung

(2013),forinstance,foundthatinvolvementhadasignificanteffectonreputation.Astudyon

crisisinvolvement,conductedbyMcDonaldetal.(2010),revealedthatinvolvementand

responsibilitycausedbothpositiveandnegativecrisisemotions.Thestrongesteffectswere

foundforanger,fearandsympathy.Incomparisonwithresponsibility,though,crisis

involvementwasonlyaweakpredictorforemotions(McDonaldetal.,2010).Inlinewiththis,

ChoiandLin(2009a)foundintheirstudythathighandlowinvolvedconsumersperceivea

crisisdifferentlyandfoundalinkbetweenproductinvolvementandangerfortheMattel

productcrisis.TheauthorsconcludethattheinclusionofconsumerinvolvementintotheSCCTis

a„logicalnextstepforfutureresearchincrisiscommunication“(p.21).

23

BasedonChoiandChung’s(2013)argumentationfortheToyotarecallcase,fortheVW

emissionsscandal,itcanbeassumedthattherearespecificgroupsofpeople(e.g.current

ownersofacaroftheVWGrouporownersofanaffectedcar)whoarelikelytoregardtheVW

emissionsscandalaspersonallyrelevant.Thus,itcanbeexpectedthattheyhaveahigherlevel

offeltinvolvementwiththeVWemissionsscandalthanthosewhoarenotownersofsuchcars.

Basedontheaboveexplainedtheoreticalassumptionsandempiricalfindings,itcanfurtherbe

assumedthatpeoplewithahigherlevelofcrisisinvolvementwillfeelmoreangerandsympathy

towardstheVWGroupafterthecrisis.Consequently,thefollowinghypothesiscanbeproposed:

H7:AhigherlevelofinvolvementwiththeVWemissionsscandalleadstoahigherlevelof

angerafterthecrisis.

H8:AhigherlevelofinvolvementwiththeVWemissionsscandalleadstoalowerlevelof

sympathyafterthecrisis.

2.4.4. Person-CompanyFitAsBhattacharyaandSen(2003)state,anincreasingnumberofcompaniesseektoachieve

significantandenduringrelationshipswiththeircustomersbecausetheymaybringseveral

corporatebenefits.Suchbenefitsincludecustomerloyalty(Bhattacharya&Sen,2003;

Lichtenstein,Drumwright&Braig,2004),emotionallyattachedcustomers(Lichtensteinetal.,

2004),theusageofpositiveWOM(Bhattacharya&Sen,2003),betterevaluationsofand

attitudestowardsthecompany(Einwilleretal.,2006;Sen&Bhattacharya,2001)aswellas

commitmentwiththecompany(Kim,Lee,Lee&Kim,2010).Severalofthesestudieshave

appliedtheconceptofconsumer-companyidentificationtotherelationshipbetweenconsumers

andacompany(e.g.Lichtensteinetal.,2004;Bhattacharya&Sen,2003)becauseitisbeneficial

forexplainingpeople’scausesandmotivesforassociatingwithcompanies(Pérez,2009;Du,

Bhattacharya&Sen,2007;Marín&Ruiz,2007).Otherstudiesexaminedtherelationship

betweenemployeesandtheircompany,(e.g.Berger,Cunningham&Drumwright,2006;Kimet

al.,2010),customersandbrands(e.g.Underwood,Bond,&Baer,2001)oralumniandtheir

formercollege(e.g.Mael&Ashforth,1992).ManyofthesestudiesappliedSocialIdentityTheory

(SIT)toexplainsuchidentificationprocesses(e.g.Ashforth&Mael,1989;Bhattacharya&Sen,

2003;Dutton,Dukerich&Harquail,1994;Kimetal.,2010;Mael&Ashforth,1992;Pérez,2009)

aswellastheconceptoforganizationalidentification(Ashforth&Mael,1989;Bhattacharya&

Sen,2003).

SITreferstoasocial-psychologicaltheorythatwasmainlyestablishedbyTajfeland

Turner(e.g.Tajfel,1974;Tajfel&Tuner,1985)(Ashforth&Mael,1989).Thetheorypostulates

thatpeoplearelikelytocategorizethemselvesintosocialgroups,suchasgenderorreligious

24

groups(Ashforth&Mael.1989;Tajfel&Turner,1985)becauseitenablesthem„tosituate

themselvesintheirsocialenvironment“(Pérez,2009.p.179).Socialidentificationthereby

refersto„theperceptionofonenesswithorbelongingnesstoagroup,involvingdirector

vicariousexperienceofitssuccessesandfailures“(Ashforth&Mae,1989,p.34).

AshforthandMael(1989)transferredtheconceptofsocialidentificationtoan

organizationalcontextandarguethatorganizationalidentificationisaparticulartypeofsocial

identification.Theorganizationtherebyfunctionsasasocialcategorythatmight“fulfill[…]

motivesfortheindividual”(Ashforth&Mael,1989,p.22)andthattheindividualusestobuild

upself-confidence(Ashforth&Mael,1989).Duetal.(2007)arguethattheconsumer-company

identificationisapsychologicalattachmentwiththecompanythatdrivesbehaviors,whichare

favorabletothecompany(Duetal.,2007;Pérez,2009).SITpostulatesthatindividualswho

identifythemselveswithacompanyaremorelikelytojudgethecompanypositivelyinorderto

increaseandenhancetheirself-concept(Tajfel&Turner,1979;ascitedinPéres,2009).A

consumerthatidentifieshim-orherselfwithacompanyhasamentalconnectionwithit

(Duttonetal.,1994;Bhattacharya&Sen,2003)andwillthenadjusthisactionstothecompany’s

aimsandinterests(Mael&Ashforth,1992).Thus,AshforthandMael(1989)assumethata

higherlevelofidentificationincreases“supportforandcommitmentto“thecompanyaswellas

„loyaltyto,andpridein,the[company]anditsactivities“(p.26).Peoplewhohaveastrong

identificationwithanorganizationbehaveinawaythatiscoherentwiththeorganization’s

„values,beliefsandculture“(Xiao&Hwan(Mark)Lee,2014,p.1242).Moreover,theidentity

withacompanyisrelatedtovaluesoremotionsthattheindividualexperiencesforbeingpartof

agroup.Whentheindividualevaluateshisidentitytobeequaltothatofthegroup,hecaneasily

connecttoit,indicatingthatemotionalidentificationtendstobecreatedorimproved.If

consumersstronglyidentifythemselveswithacompany,theywillbecomesupportivetowards

theorganization.Theywillnotonlyshowloyaltytothecompanybutwillalsoshowenthusiasm

aboutcompanyactivities(Chu&Li,2012).

AccordingtoDuttonetal.(1994),organizationalidentificationtakesplacebasedonthe

individual’sperceptionoforganizationalattributesorperceivedidentity.Thereby,the

individual’sidentificationisdependentonhowattractiveheorsheevaluatestheorganization

(Duttonetal.,1994).Itisarguedthatcorporatereputationpositivelyinfluencestheemergence

ofcustomeridentificationbecauseacompanymaybeperceivedasmoreattractive

(Bhattacharya&Sen,2003;Duttonetal.,1994;Keh&Xie,2009).KehandXie(2009)givetwo

reasonsforthis:Firstly,well-reputedcompanieshaveatendencyfor“superiorfinancial

profitability,productsorservices,andfrequentmediacoverage,whichsubsequentlyenhance

theirrelativeadvantageanddistinctiveidentityinthemarketplace,whichinturncontributeto

theiridentityattractiveness“(Keh&Xie,2009).Secondly,agoodreputationstandsforhigh

25

prestige,meaningthattheorganizationisregardedinapositiveway(Bergami&Bagozzi,2000).

Intheirstudy,KehandXie(2009)foundthatcorporatereputationpositivelyinfluenced

customeridentification.Basedonpreviousdefinitions,organizationalidentificationisinthis

contextreferredtoasthedegreetowhichapersonfeelsconnectedtotheorganizationand

defineshim-/herselfwiththeorganization(Bhattacharya&Sen,2003;Ashforth&Mael,1989;

Xiao&Hwan(Mark)Lee,2014).

Socialidentification„withacollectivity“canevenemergeinthecasethatno

interpersonalconnectionorinteractionexistsandcanstillhaveastrongeffectonemotionand

behavior(Ashforth&Mael,1989,p.26).Basedonthis,itcanbearguedthatcustomersofcars

oftheVWGroupbutalsonon-customerscanfeelcertainidentificationwiththecorporation.

ThiswouldsignifythatGermansasawholecoulddevelopsomesortofidentificationwiththe

corporation.AccordingtoAshforthandMael(1989),theidentificationwithagroupcaneven

endurewhen“groupfailureislikely”(p.35).Transferredtoanorganization,afailurecouldbe

forinstanceacrisis.Therefore,itcanbeexpectedthatevenaftertheemissionsscandal,the

identificationwiththecorporationwouldremainhigh.However,Bergeretal.(2006)arguethat

changedbehaviorsofmembersofanorganizationcanresult in changed beliefs and

identification.

FortheGermanpopulation,whichevaluatedthereputationoftheVWGroupespecially

high,itcanbeassumedthattheidentificationwiththecorporationishigh.Asmentionedabove,

theidentificationwithabrandoranorganizationhasresultedinpositiveandmoresupportive

outcomes,includingpositiveemotionalresponses.Basedonthesefindings,itcanbeexpected

thatahigheridentificationwiththeVWGroupresultsinsuchpositiveoutcomes,meaningthat

theperson-companyfitinfluencesthewaypeoplefeelabouttheVWGroup.Duetothis

supportivemanner,itcanbeexpectedthatperson-companyfitweakenstherelationshipsof

involvementandresponsibilityandangeraswellasenhancestherelationshipsofinvolvement

andresponsibilitywithsympathy.Thiswouldforinstanceindicatethatpersonswhoperceivea

highresponsibilityforthecrisismaytendtoexpresslessangerwhentheirperson-companyfit

ishigh,comparedtothosewhoidentifywiththecompanyless.Thus,thefollowinghypothesis

canbestated:

H9:Ahigherperson-companyfitweakenstherelationshipbetweenperceivedcrisisresponsibilityandanger.

H10:Ahigherperson-companyfitintensifiestherelationshipbetweenperceivedcrisisresponsibilityandsympathy.

H11:Ahigherperson-companyfitweakenstherelationshipbetweencrisisinvolvementandanger.

26

H12:Ahigherperson-companyfitintensifiestherelationshipbetweencrisisinvolvementandsympathy.

2.5. ConceptualModelInsummary,inthischapter,twelvehypotheseswereformulatedbasedontheoreticaland

empiricalknowledge.Figuretwoillustratestheconceptualmodelofthepresentstudy,which

providesavisualoverviewofallhypotheses.Thereby,thetwoemotionsangerandsympathy

takeonamediatingroleintherelationshipbetweencrisisresponsibilityandcrisisinvolvement

withpost-crisisreputationandNWOM.Moreover,themoderatingfunctionofperson-company

fitintherelationshipsbetweencrisisresponsibilityandcrisisinvolvementwiththetwo

emotionsisportrayed.

Figure2:ConceptualModel

27

3. MethodologyThethirdchapterstatesandexplainsthemethodologythatwasappliedinordertotestthe

above-explainedconceptualmodel.Itthusprovidestherationaleforthedecisionsmade

regardingtheresearchdesign,datacollection,samplingmethodaswellasthe

operationalizationofthetheoreticalconceptsthatarerelevantforthisstudy.

3.1. ChoiceofMethodInordertoanswertheresearchquestionunderlyingthisstudy,thedecisionforaquantitative

methodologywastaken.AsBabbie(2011)pointsout,quantitativeresearchmethodsoftenusea

deductiveapproach,implyingthattheresearcherformulatesseveralexpectationsthatarebased

ontheory.Thesearethentestedinordertofindoutwhethertheyactuallyoccur(Babbie,2011;

Zhou&Sloan,2009).Besidestestingsuchhypotheses,quantitativeresearchmethodsenablethe

investigationofrelationsbetweenvariables(Punch,2014).Additionally,suchresearchmethods

permitnotonlygeneralizationsbutalsothepredictionofcertaineffects(Zhou&Sloan,2009).

Astheaimofthepresentstudyistotestrelationshipsbetweentheoreticalconcepts,a

quantitativemethodologywasthebestoptionforthisstudy.

Moreprecisely,aquantitativeonlinesurveywasconducted.Oneaimofquantitative

surveysistomakestatementsaboutspecificpersonsthatarerelevanttoaresearch(Brosius,

Haas&Koschel,2012).Furthermore,asurveyisoftenusedtoaskforthebehavior,attitudes,

expectationsandcharacteristicsofpeopleanditallowstheself-classificationoftheparticipants

(Neuman,2014).Asexplainedabove,thisstudyisinterestedinpersonalperspectives,whichare

alllatentvariables.AccordingtoTheo,TingTsai&Yang(2013),latentvariablesare

unobservableand“cannotbemeasureddirectly”(p.4).Thus,theymustbedefinedby

indicators,whichareforinstancemeasuredbyself-reportedresponsesonanattitudescale

(Byrne,2013).Hence,asurveyisanappropriateresearchmethodforthisstudy.

Anonlinesurveyisaspecialtypeofasurvey,whichhasseveraladvantagesthatare

relevantforthisstudy.Firstofall,themethodisinexpensive,fastandlocation-independent.

Furthermore,thedropoutrateandtheresponsetimearecaptured.Besides,thismethod

providesanonymityandissuitableforsensibletopics,suchaspersonality(Möhring&Schlütz,

2010).Anonlinesurveyalsoenablestherandomizationofitems,whichcanpreventthe

occurrenceofsequenceeffects(Scholl,2009).Lastly,77.6percentoftheGermanpopulationare

internetusers(Statista,2016),makingthismethodsuitableforreachingalargepartofGermans.

However,besidestheseadvantages,themethodalsohasseveraldisadvantagesthatneedtobe

considered.Themostimportantdisadvantageistheself-selectionoftherespondents,which

28

oftentimesleadstoalowresponserate(Möhring&Schlütz,2010).Therespondentsdecideon

theirownwhethertheywanttoparticipateinthesurveyornot.Thismakesthedrawingofa

randomandrepresentativesamplebarelypossible(Punch,2014;Scholl,2009).Nevertheless,

duetothemajorityofadvantages,theapplicationofthismethodissuitable.

Lastly,thechoiceforthisspecificmethodologycanbesupportedbythedemandfor

quantitativesurveymethodsincrisiscommunicationresearch.Overthepastyears,researchin

thefieldofcrisiscommunicationhasincreasedrapidly(Kim&Cameron,2011)butexisting

researchhasmostlyusedcasestudymethods(Coombs&Holladay,2008;Kiambi&Shafer,

2015).Althoughcasestudiesprovidevaluabledescriptivedata(Coombs&Holladay,2008),they

oftentimesofferlittletheoreticalunderstandingofcrisiscommunication(Dean,2004)andare

hardtogeneralize(Carroll,2009).AccordingtoRousseau(2006),achangetoevidence-based

managementincrisiscommunicationisnecessary,though,inordertobasemanagerialdecisions

onscientificevidence.Overthelastdecade,researchinthefieldhasstartedtoapply

experimentaldesignmethods(Kiambi&Shafer,2015),meetingthecallforquantitative

research(Dawar&Pillutla,2000;Dean,2004).However,mostexperimentsfocusedonfictitious

organizationsand/orcrises(e.g.Claeys&Cauberghe,2015;Dean,2004;Kiambi&Shafer,2015).

Thisleadsmayhaveleadtotheproblemofartificialitybycreatingafavorablereputation

throughonlyoneexposure(Lyon&Cameron,2004)andmayhavehadanimpactontheresults

ofsuchstudies(Kiambi&Shafer,2015).Intheirreviewofcrisiscommunicationresearch,

JohnsonAvery,WeaverLariscy,KimandHocke(2010)implytousesurveymethodsinorderto

improvethemethodologicaldiversityinthefield.Thepresentstudythuscontributestoexisting

researchbyapplyingaquantitativesurveymethodthatexaminesarealcrisisofanon-fictive

corporation.Byusingaquantitativesurveymethodandincludingindividualperspectives,it

furtherdrawsaconnectionbetweentheindividualandthecorporatelevelinacrisis.

3.2. SampleandSamplingMethodAsaforementioned,thisresearch’stargetpopulationcomprisestheGermanpublic.Asthis

populationisverylarge,itisexpensiveanddifficult“tocollectinformationfromeveryoneinthe

group”(deVaus,1996,p.60).Therefore,asampleofthepopulationwasobtained.

Asoneofthesamplingmethod,thepurposivesamplingwaschosen.Purposivesampling

isaformofnon-probabilitysamplinginwhichtheresearcherdecides,basedonselection

criteria,whichpersonissuitableforthesample(Babbie,2011;Walliman,2006).Althoughthis

samplingmethoddoesnotensurerepresentativeness,usefulinformationcanstillbesupplied

(deVaus,1996).Additionally,sinceaspecifictargetaudiencehasbeenidentifiedforthisstudy

(i.e.theGermanpublic),thissamplingmethodseemsplausible.Besides,thesnowballsampling

29

methodwasapplied.Snowballsamplingreferstoasamplingtechniquewherefurther

participantsarereachedthroughotherrespondents(Babbie,2011)byforwardingittotheir

relativesandfriends(Zhou&Sloan,2011).Althoughthissamplingmethodhasseveral

disadvantages,suchasnotenablingtogainarepresentativesampleandthusmaking

generalizationsimpossible(Brosiusetal.,2012),itissuitable.Thisismainlyforthereasonthat

itenablestoreachalargenumberofparticipantswithinashortamountoftime(Möhring&

Schlütz,2010).Lastly,theconveniencesamplingmethodwasapplied.Thissamplingmethod

referstousingthosepersonsasparticipantswhoareinstantlyaccessible(Walliman,2006).

Thus,itenablesthereachingofalargeamountofpeopleandisthusappropriateforthisstudy.

Duetotheonlinenatureofthesurvey,theparticipantswererecruitedonline.Firstofall,

emailsweresenttosecretariesofGermanuniversitiesaskingtoforwardthesurveytotheir

studentsthroughinternalmailinglists.Additionally,thelinkwaspostedinseveraldifferent

GermanFacebookgroups,suchas“DuitseenNederland–DeutscheinHolland”(engl.“Germans

intheNetherlands”),“VWAbgasSkandalMotorEA189”(engl.:“VWemissionsscandalengine

EA189”)or“IchhaltezuVolkswagen,egalwaspassiert”(engl.“IwillstandbyVolkswagen,no

matterwhathappens”).Lastly,thelinktothesurveywassharedontheresearcher’sown

FacebookwallandsenttoherownpersonalnetworkviaE-Mailandmessages.Allpotential

participantsreceivedthelinktogetherwithashorttextaskingfortheparticipationinthestudy

andarequesttoforwardthelinktothesurveytotheirpeergroup.Thisapproachallowedto

reachapopulationthatisbeyondtheresearcher’sownpersonalnetwork.

3.3. DataAnalysisInordertotestthehypothesesinChapter4,structuralequationmodeling(SEM)isapplied.For

thispurpose,thetwosoftwareIBMSPSSStatistics22andtheSPSSrelatedsoftwareAmosare

used.SEMreferstoacollectionofstatisticalanalysismethodologiesthatareusedtotest

hypothesesaboutthedirectandindirectrelationsbetweenvariables(Byrne,2013;Hoyle,1995,

ascitedinTheoetal.,2013;In’nami&Koizumi,2013;Raykov&Marcoulides,2000).The

hypothesizedmodelisbasedontheoryandistestedinonesimultaneousanalysiscontainingall

proposedvariables.Dependingonthefitofthemodel,theaprioripostulatedrelationships

amongthevariablescanbesupportedorrejected(Byrne,2013;Raykov&Marcoulides,2000).

ThevariablesintheSEMcanbebothobservedvariables,alsocalledindicators,aswellaslatent

variables(Theoetal.,2013).Incomparisontoothermultivariatetechniques,SEMhasseveral

advantages.First,duetoitsconfirmatoryapproach,itenablesthetestingofhypotheses.Second,

SEMtakesintoaccountspecificestimatesoferrorvarianceparametersandisthusmore

accuratethanothermethods.Third,SEMconsidersbothobservedandlatentvariables.It

30

investigatestherelationshipsbetweenthetwokindsofvariablesbutalsotherelationsamong

differentlatentvariables(Byrne,2013;In’nami&Koizumi,2013;Nachtigall,Kroehne,Funke&

Steyer,2003).Infact,SEMwasevendevelopedtoanalyzetherelationshipsbetweenlatent

variables(Nachtigalletal.,2003).Lastly,noeasilyapplicablealternativemethodsareexistent

thatposemultivariaterelationsorestimateindirecteffectsthroughamediatingvariable(Byrne,

2013;In’nami&Koizumi,2013;Nachtigalletal.,2003).

Basedonthesecharacteristics,itcanbearguedthatSEMisasuitablesetof

methodologiesforthisthesis.Firstofall,thisstudyaimstoanalyzetherelationshipsbetween

latentvariables,suchasinvolvement,angerorreputation,whichweremeasuredbyseveral

indicators(seechapter3.5).Inaddition,theconceptualmodelandthehypothesesthatare

underlyingthisresearchandwillbetested(seechapter2)arederivedfromtheory.Finally,SEM

enablestheestimationoftheindirecteffectsofthemediatingvariablesangerandsympathyin

theproposedconceptualmodel.

3.3.1. Pre-Test,DataCleaningandPreparationfortheDataAnalysisTheonlinesurveyquestionnaireforthisresearchwasconductedusingQualtrics.Beforethe

actualsurveywasinitiated,thequalityandfunctionalityoftheresearchinstrumentwastested

inapretest(Möhring&Schlütz,2010;Zhou&Sloan,2009).Forthepurposeofthistest,three

personsreceivedthelinktothequestionnaireandthreepersonsreceiveditasadigitaltext

documentoraprintedquestionnaire.Throughthis,valuablefeedbackonthecomprehensionof

thequestionsandsuggestionsforimprovementweregained.Mostimportantly,questionswere

evenfurtheradjustedtotheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandalandsomeitemswere

eliminatedfromthequestionnaireoftheactualsurvey.

Thedatacollectiontookplacebetween3and19April2016.Inthistimeperiod,atotalof

2072peopleparticipatedinthesurvey.Oftheseparticipants,1510finishedthequestionnaire,

makingtheresponserate72.91percentandthusquitehigh.However,thissampleincluded30

respondentswhowerenotofGermannationality(e.g.Turkish,RussianorItalian)andthushad

tobeexcluded,astheydidnotfitintothetargetpopulation.Additionally,respondentsthatwere

identifiedtohavegivenwronganswers,suchasanageof“00”or“0”wereexcludedfromthe

sample.Lastly,onepersonwhoneededlessthantwominutestocompletethewholesurveywas

excludedbecauseitcanbeassumedthathe/shedidnotanswerthequestionsinanelaborate

way.Thisleadstoafinalsampleof1475cases,whichwereincludedintheanalysis.

Furthermore,aspartofthedatacleaningprocess,someitemsthatwerereverse-coded

hadtoberecoded.Throughthis,aneasierinterpretationofthedataanditsusageforthe

analysiswasenabled.Anexampleitemfromthereputationscale,whereahigheragreementof

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anitemreferstoahigherreputation,is“TheVWGroupisbasicallydishonestconcerningthe

emissionsscandal”.Finally,openanswersforeducationandnationalitywereexaminedandif

necessaryaddedtotherightvariables.Thiswasforinstancethecaseforpersonswhoopenly

answeredthattheyhadobtainedahighschooldiploma.

InordertoapplySEMthedataneedstocomplywithseveralassumptions(Kline,1998).

Firstofall,thedatasetshouldnotcontainanymissingdata(Kline,1998).Asonlyrespondents

whofinishedthewholequestionnaireweremaintainedinthedataset,thiswasnotthecaseand

thefirstpremisemet.Second,nomulticollinearity,meaningnostrongintercorrelationsbetween

variables,shouldoccur(Kline,1998).Forthispurpose,correlationsbetweenall37variablesof

thisstudywerecalculated.Mostofthecorrelationsaresignificantbutweakormoderate.

However,alsosomesignificantstrongcorrelationscouldbedetected,especiallyamong

variablesoftheconceptsperson-companyfitandinvolvement.Allofthesevaluesarebelow.8,

though,andthecorrelationsareonlywithinconceptsandnotbetweendifferentconcepts.Thus,

allvariablesweremaintainedinthedatasetbutthestrongcorrelationswerekeptinmindfor

thedataanalysis(forallcorrelationmatrices,seeAppendixC).Accordingtothethirdpremise,

thedatashouldnotcontainanymultivariateoutliers.Thisassumptionisalsofulfilled,asoutliers

havealreadybeendeletedinthedatacleaningprocess.Next,thedatasetwasexaminedinterms

oflinearityandhomoscedasticitybutnodeviationsweredetectedandthispremiseisalso

accepted.Last,thedatawasinvestigatedregardingitsnormality.Despitethefactthat

“maximumlikelihoodmethodsarerobustagainstnon-normality,itisstillimportanttoassess

whetherthedatasatisfytheassumptionofnormality”(In’Nami&Koizumi,2013,p.34).Forthis

purpose,theskwenessandkurtosisofthedatacanbetested(In’Nami&Koizumi,2013).Ifthese

valuesarezero,“datanormalityisensured”(In’Nami&Koizumi,2013,p.34).Inliterature,there

isnoconsensusaboutwhichlevelofnon-normalityisacceptable(In’Nami&Koizumi,2013),

however,West,FinchandCurran(1995)suggestthatthevaluesforskwenessandkurtosis

shouldnotexceed2and7.Forthepresentstudy,theselimitvaluesareused.Thetestfor

skewnessandkurtosisrevealedthatnovariablesshowedanydeviationsfromthedesired

valuesexceptfortwovariablesoftheconceptperson-companyfit.Thereby,thetwovariables

“WhensomeonecriticizestheVWGroup,itfeelslikeapersonalinsult”and“Thesuccessesofthe

VWGrouparemysuccesses”showedabnormalitiesregardingtheirskewnessvalues

(skewnessinsult=2.138;skewnesssuccesses=2.016).Thus,thesetwovariablesareexcludedfromthe

datasetinordertoassumethepremiseofnormalityforallconcepts.

32

3.4. RespondentsOfthe1475respondentsthatwereincludedinthedataanalysis,44.9%arefemale(N=662)and

55.1%male(N=813).Further,therespondentsarebetween17and70yearsold.However,the

meanageis25.48(SD=7.09)andthemedianisonly24.Regardingtheeducationallevelofthe

participants,itcanbenoticedthattheyareratherhighlyeducated.Only.3%(N=5)donothave

anykindofhighschooldiploma,.5%(N=7)statedtohavegainedthelowesthighschool

diploma(“Hauptschulabschluss”)andfurther4.1%(N=60)haveobtainedthemiddleleveled

highschooldiploma(“Realschulabschluss”).Mostoftherespondents,however,claimedtohave

thehighesthighschooldiploma(“Abitur”/”(Fach-)Hochschulreife”)(60.3%,N=889)and

further34.1%havealreadyobtainedauniversitydegree(N=503).Inadditiontothis,threeof

therespondentshavealreadyfinishedtheirPhD.Lastly,sevenrespondents(.5%)madeanopen

answerfortheireducation,whichwasastatementabouttheircurrentoccupationandmadeit

impossibletoclearlyidentifytheirhighesteducationlevel.

Besidesthisdemographicinformation,thequestionnaireaskedwhethertherespondents

ownedatleastonecarofthebrandsVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaorPorsche,whichwereaffectedby

theemissionsscandal.50.8%(N=749)oftheparticipantsindicatedtocurrentlyownacarof

suchbrands.Ofthese749respondents,themajoritydoesnotownanaffectedcar(73.7%,

N=552)andonly21.8%statedtoownanaffectedcar(N=163).Further4.5%(N=34)claimedto

notknowwhethertheircarwasaffectedbytheemissionscandalornot.

3.5. OperationalizationandMeasurementsInthissub-chapter,theoperationalizationofthetheoreticalconceptswillbepresented.

Additionally,descriptivestatisticsofthetheoreticalconceptswillbeprovidedaswellas

measurementmodelsdeployedandtested.Inthecontextofasurvey,operationalizationrefers

tothetransformationoftheoverallresearchquestionintospecifictest-questionsthatcanbe

askedintheactualquestionnaire.Forthis,themeaningandthecontentoftherelevant

constructshavetobeexplored(Möhring&Schlütz,2010).Forthepurposeofthisstudy,already

existingandpreviouslytestedmeasurementswereusedandadjustedtothetopicathand,

meaningthattheywereadaptedtotheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal.Sincethesurvey

wasdirectedattheGermanpublic,thequestionnairewasgeneratedinGerman.Thus,measures

thatwereoriginallyconstructedinEnglishlanguageweretranslatedintoGerman.Forthis

process,existingGermantranslationswereusedaswellastheback-translationmethodapplied.

Inaddition,whenformulatingthequestionnaire,theusageoftheterm“crisis”wasavoided,asit

isnegativelyconnotated(Doorley&Garcia,2007).Instead,itwasreferredtothe“VWemissions

scandal”.ForthefullquestionnairesinEnglishandGerman,seeAppendixAandforthe

33

overviewofallitems,seeAppendixB.

3.5.1. Post-crisisreputationThedependentvariablepost-crisisreputationwasmeasuredusingthefive-itemversionofthe

ten-itemOrganizationalReputationScale(Coombs&Holladay,1996,2002;Coombs,2004).This

scalewasoriginallyadaptedfromMcCroskey’s(1966)Charactersubscaleformeasuringethos

(Coombs&Holladay,2002).Theshorterfive-itemscalehadahighCronbach’salphavalueof

α=.87(Coombs&Holladay,2002)andofα=.81(Coombs,2004)inpreviousstudiesandwasthus

appropriatetoapply.Inthepresentstudy,thescalewasmeasuredusingaseven-pointLikert

scalewithverbalizedendpoints(1=stronglydisagree,7=stronglyagree).

Beforethemeasurementmodelofthepost-crisisreputationwasdeployedandtested,an

exploratoryfactoranalysis(EFA)wasconductedinordertoexplore,whethertheconceptonly

consistsoftheproposedonedimension.AstheKaiser-Meyer-Olkin(KMO)measurehadavalue

of.706andtheBartlett’stestforSphericitywassignificant,itwasappropriatetoconductthe

factoranalysis.ToallEFA’sdeployedinthisstudy,themaximumlikelihoodfactoringwitha

Varimaxrotationwasapplied.ThisisfirstlybecausetheAmossoftwareusestheMaximum

Likelihoodestimationmethod(Theoetal.,2013)andsecondlybecausethisparticularmethodis

especiallysuitableforlargesamples(Weiber&Mühlhaus,2014),asitisthecaseinthisstudy.

AccordingtotheKaisercriterionoftheEFAofpost-crisisreputation,theextractionofonlyone

factorisproposed,confirmingthetheoreticalassumptionofonesinglereputationdimension.

Furthermore,allfiveitemshaveasufficientfactorloading(seeAppendixC).

Next,themeasurementmodelofthepost-crisisreputationistestedusingthe

ConfirmatoryFactorAnalysis(CFA)inAmos.Having5degreesoffreedom,themodelisover-

identifiedandcanthusbetested.However,thesignificantChi-Squaretestindicatestherejection

ofthemodel(χ2(5)=681.385;p=0.000).Ithastobenoted,though,thattheChi-Squaretest

becomeseasilysignificantforlargesamples(Theo,TingTsai&Yang,2013).Therefore,theChi-

Squarevalueshouldbeseeninrelationtothedegreesoffreedom,whichresultsinameasure

thatshouldnotexceedavalueof2,5(Weiber&Mühlhaus,2014).Inthepresentcase,thevalue

isexceededbyfar(χ2/df=136,277)andalsoothermodelfitindicesdonotofferanacceptable

modelfit2(GFI=.837;NFI=.738;CFI=.739;RMSEA=.303).Thus,amodificationofthe

measurementmodelwasimplied.Inordertogainabettermodelfit,co-variancesbetweenthe

errortermsoftheitemswithinthisconstructwereallowedandthemodelwiththebestfit

2FortheRMSEA,valuesof≤.08signifyanacceptableandvaluesof≤.05signifyagoodmodelfit(Browne&Cudek,1993).FortheGFIandCFI,valuesof≥.90signifyanacceptableandvaluesof≥.95agoodmodelfit(Weiber&Mühlhaus,2014).ThesameisthecaseforNFI(Bentler,1992).

34

indiceswasthenselected.Forthismodelmodification,theproposedmodificationindices(MI)

wereregardedandtheco-varianceswiththehighestmodificationindicesconsidered.Basedon

this,aco-variancebetweentheerrortermsoftheitemsreputation1andreputation5

(MI=422.22)wasaddedtothemodel.Astheoverallmodelfitwasstillnotsatisfactoryafterthis

modification,anotherco-variancewasaddedbetweentheerrortermsoftheitemsreputation1

andreputation4(MI=68.82),resultinginanalmostsufficientmodelfit(seefigure3).Although

themodelfitcouldnotbeconsideredasgood,thismeasurementmodelwasmaintaineddueto

tworeasons:First,theseco-variancesweretheoreticallyplausible:reputation1andreputation4

bothrefertotherespondent’sbeliefoftheVWGroup’sgoodintentionsregardingtheemissions

scandalandreputation1andreputation5bothrelatetothesamestatementthatisoncephrased

positively(reputation1)andoncephrasednegatively(reputation5).Moreover,addingotherco-

variancesdidnotleadtoabettermodelfit.3

Samplesize=1475;standardizedestimatesχ2(3)=13.386;p=0.004;χ2/df=4.462;GFI=.996;NFI=.995;CFI=.996;RMSEA=.048

Figure3:MeasurementModelforPost-CrisisReputation

Forthedescriptionofthepost-crisisreputation,anindexofthefivereputationitems

wasformed(N=1475),representingthemeanpost-crisisreputationoftheVWGroup.According

tothat,theaveragereputationoftheVWGroupaftertheemissionsscandalisM=3.7(SD=1.25;

Min=3.22;Max=4.4)onaseven-pointLikertscale.Thus,thepost-crisisreputationliesslightly

abovethescale’smiddleof3.5,indicatingamoderatepost-crisisreputation.Forthepresent

study,theinternalconsistencyfortheorganizationalreputationscalewasα=.795,whichimplies

analmostgoodreliability.

3Theprocessofallowingtheerrortermstocorrelatewithinamodelandselectingthemodelwiththebestfitwasalsoappliedtotheothermeasurementmodels(i.e.foreachconstruct)thathadfourormoreitems.However,itcouldnotbeappliedfortheconstructofonlythreeitems.

35

3.5.2. NegativeWordofMouthIntention(NWOM)InordertomeasuretheintentionforNWOM,threeitemsfrompreviousstudieswereapplied

(e.g.Coombs&Holladay,2008,2009;Kiambi&Shafer,2015).Inpriorstudies,thescalehada

reliabilitycoefficientofCronbach’sα=.76(Coombs&Holliday,2008)andα=.71(Coombs&

Holliday,2008;Kiambi&Shafer,2015).Asampleitemofthismeasurementis“Becauseofthe

emissionsscandal,IwouldsaynegativethingsabouttheVWGroupanditscarstootherpeople”.

Aspost-crisisreputation,thisconceptwasalsomeasuredusinga7-pointLikertscale

(1=stronglydisagree,7=stronglyagree).

Asforthepreviousconcept,anEFAusingmaximumlikelihoodfactoringwithaVarimax

rotationwasalsoappliedtoNWOM.HavingaKMOvalueof0.667andasignificantBartlett’stest

forSphericity,theperformanceofanEFAwasappropriate.Astheoreticallyassumed,the

extractionofonlyonefactorfortheconceptisproposedandallthreeitemshaveasufficient

factorloading(seeAppendixC).However,aCFOcouldnotbeperformedbecausethemodelhad

nodegreeoffreedomandwasthusunder-identified.

Inordertosolvethisissue,aconstraintwasimposed.Imposingaconstraintreferstothe

procedureoffreelyestimatingparametersthatwere“fixed-to-zero”before(Kline,1998,p.132).

AsthefirstandtheseconditemwithwhichtheNWOMintentionwasmeasuredarerelatively

similar,itcanbearguedthatthepathestimatesofbothconstructscanbesetto1.Asa

consequence,anadditionaldegreeoffreedomwasgainedandthusthemeasurementmodel

couldjustbeidentified.Althoughthefitofthismeasurementmodelwasnotideal,astheChi-

SquareandRMSEAvaluesweretoohigh,thismodelwasmaintainedbecausenobettermodelfit

couldbeachieved(seefigure4).


Figure4:MeasurementModelforNWOMintention

ForthedescriptionoftheNWOMintention,anindexofthethreemeasureditemswas

formed(N=1475).Accordingtothat,theaverageNWOMintentionoftherespondentsisquite

36

low(M=2.27;SD=1.43;Min=2.26;Max=3.29).TheCronbach’salphacoefficientofthisstudywas

α=.780,indicatinganacceptable,almostgood,reliability.

3.5.3. CrisisResponsibilityToassesswhethertheVWGroupwasheldresponsibleforthecrisis,thenewlyinventedscaleby

BrownandKi(2013)wasusedandmeasuredona7-pointLikertscale(1=stronglydisagree,

7=stronglyagree).The12-itemsscaleconsistsofthethreedimensionsintentionality,locality

andaccountabilityandhadareliabilityofα=.95(Brown&Ki,2013).Asaresultofthepretestof

thepresentstudy,thescaleforcrisisresponsibilitywasreducedtoaneight-itemscale,makingit

shorterandlessrepetitive(seeAppendixA).

Inordertoexplorewhethertheconceptconsistsofoneoremoredimensions,anEFA

wasperformed.AstheKMOmeasurehadavalueof.704andtheBartlett’stestforSphericity

wassignificant,theEFAwasappropriatetoconduct.AccordingtotheKaisercriterion,the

extractionofthreefactorsissuggested,confirmingBrownandKi’s(2013)theoretical

assumptionofthethreedimensions“intentionality”,“accountability”and“locality”.Asthe

seconddimension(firstfactor)accountsformostoftheexplainedvariance(25.13%)and

consistsoffouroftheeightvariableswithacceptablefactorloadings,onlythisdimensionwas

usedforthefurtheranalysis(seeAppendixC).

Asanextstep,themeasurementmodelofthefourremainingitemsofthecrisis

responsibilitymeasurewastestedinaCFAinAmos.With2degreesoffreedom,themodelwas

justover-identifiedandcouldthusbetested.AsthelowChi-Squarevalueindicated,themodel

hadagoodfit(χ2(2)=2.685;p=0.261),whichwassupportedbyotherfitindices(GFI=.999;

NFI=.998;CFI=.999;RMSEA=.015).Hence,nomodelmodificationwasappliedandtheoriginal

modeloffouritemsmaintained(seefigure5).


Figure5:Measurementmodelforcrisisresponsibility

37

Theindexofthefourcrisisresponsibilityitems(N=1475),formedinordertodescribe

theconceptcrisisresponsibility,showsthattheparticipantsaveragelyassignedaquitehigh

crisisresponsibilitytotheVWGroup(M=5.91;SD=1.19;Min=5.63;Max=6.18).Theinternal

consistencyofthemeasurementwasα=.686,thusratherlowbutjustacceptable.

3.5.4. CrisisInvolvementThecrisisinvolvementoftheparticipantswasmeasuredbyusingthesix-item,7-pointbipolar

scalebyWigleyandPfau(2010).ThescaleisbasedontheinvolvementscalebyZaichkowski

(1985)andhadareliabilityofα=.95inapreviousstudy(Wigley&Pfau,2010).However,after

thepretest,thisscalewasreducedbytheitempairsignificant/insignificantbecausethe

distinctionfromotheritempairswasclearenough.Furthermore,therespondentswereasked

whethertheyhavebeenowningacarofthebrandsVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaorPorscheand,ifso,

whetherithadbeenaffectedbytheproductrecall,assumingthatthoseparticipantswhowere

affectedwouldperceivetheemissionsscandalasmorerelevant.

TheKMOmeasurehadavalueof.810andtheBartlett’stestforSphericitywas

significant,indicatingthatanEFAwasappropriatetoperform.TheEFAoftheinvolvement

conceptproposedaonefactorsolution,whichwasinlinewiththetheoreticalassumptionsof

onesingleinvolvementdimension.Allfiveitemshadasatisfactoryfactorloading(seeAppendix

C).Furthermore,themodelwasover-identifiedandcouldthusbetested(df=5).Aswiththe

conceptofpost-crisisreputation,thismeasurementmodelalsohadaveryhigh,significantChi-

Squarevalue(χ2(5)=490.858;p=0.000),implyingtherejectionofthemodel.Inlinewiththis,

othermodelfitindicesdidnotsuggestanacceptablemodelfit(GFI=.886;NFI=.882;CFI=.883;

RMSEA=.257),either.Sincethethirditemofthescale(meansnothing/meansalot)washighly

correlatedwiththefourthandfifthitems,itwasexcludedfromthemodel.Moreover,a

constraintwasimposedforthefirstandfifthitembecausetheirpathestimateswerethesame

(β=.88)andtheyweretheoreticallyverysimilar(unimportant/important,irrelevant/relevant).

Theimpliedmodificationofthemeasurementmodelthusledtoanadjustedmodeloffouritems

thathadagoodfit(seefigure6).

Aswiththepreviousvariables,ameanindexfromthefourremainingmeasureditems

wascreated(N=1475)inordertopresentthedescriptiveanalysisoftheconcept.Accordingto

theindex,theaveragecrisisinvolvementoftheparticipantswasM=4.27(SD=1.57;Min=3.41;

Max=4.57),whichindicatesthattherespondentswereinvolvedwiththeVWemissionsscandal

abovethescale’saverage.Theinternalconsistencyofthefour-itemcrisisinvolvementscalewas

α=.852,indicatingalmostanexcellentreliabilityofthescale.

38


Figure6:MeasurementModelforCrisisInvolvement

3.5.5. Mediators:AngerandSympathyTheemotionsangerandsympathyfunctionasmediatorvariablesinthepresentstudy.A

mediatorvariableisathirdvariablethat“reflectsanintermediatelinkbetweenanindependent

anddependentvariable”(Pawar,2009,p.110).Appliedtothisstudy,thismeansthatthetwo

independentvariablescrisisinvolvementandcrisisresponsibilityaffectangerandsympathy

whichinturninfluencethedependentvariablespost-crisisreputationandtheintentionfor

NWOM.AsrecommendedbyZhao,Lynch&Chen(2010),thebootstrappingmethodwasapplied

inordertotestmediationeffects.Bootstrappingisamethodthatisusedfor“estimating

propertiesofestimatorsbasedonsamplesdrawnfromtheoriginalobservations”(Bollen,1990,

p.117).Itisausefulapproachforthisstudybecauseitenablestheestimationofdirect,indirect

andtotaleffectsandprovidesthe95%confidenceintervalsofeacheffect(Bollen,1990). Themediatorvariablesangerandsympathywereassessedusingtwofour-itemscales

fromMcDonaldetal.(2011).Theauthorscriticized“theabsenceofscalesusingwordsthat

incorporateconsumers’owncrisisemotionlexiconandwhicharepsychometricallyrobust“

(McDonaldetal.,2011,p.337).Thus,theydevelopedandtestedscalesspecificallyforcrisis

emotions(McDonaldet.al.,2011).Theangerscalecontainedtheitemsangry,disgusted,

annoyed,outragedandhadareliabilityofα=.91(McDonaldetal.,2011).Thesympathyscale

positedbyMcDonaldetal.(2011)consistedoftheitemssympathetic,sorry,compassion,

empathyandhadaninternalconsistencyofα=.83.Inthisstudy,bothconceptsweremeasured

usinga7-pointLikertscalewhereas1means“notatall”and7means“verymuch”.

3.5.6. AngerTheKMOmeasurehadavalueof0.780andtheBartlett’stestforSphericitywassignificant,

indicatingthattheperformanceofanEFAwassuitable.Inlinewiththetheoreticalassumptions,

39

theKaiser’scriterionsuggestedtheextractionofonlyonefactorandallfactorloadingswere

sufficient(seeAppendixC).Havingtwodegreesoffreedom,thismeasurementmodelwasjust

over-identified,whichiswhyaCFAcouldbeperformed.However,thehighChi-Squarevalue

(χ2(2)=87.598;p=0.000)andthehighRMSEAvalue(RMSEA=0.170)indicatedtherejectionof

themodel.Onthecontrary,othermodelindicessuggestedanacceptablemodelfit(GFI=.974;

NFI=.968;CFI=.969).However,byapplyingtheabove-expainedadjustmentmethods,abetter

measurementmodelcouldbefound.Addingaconstrainttothepathestimatesofitem1(angry)

anditem2(annoyed)aswellasaddingaco-variancebetweentheerrortermsofitem2

(annoyed)anditem3(disgusted)(MI=45.47)werenotonlytheoreticallyreasonablebutalso

resultedinamodelwithanacceptablefit(seefigure7).Sinceotherco-varianceswithlower

modificationindicesdidnotincreasethemodelfit,onlythisco-variancewasadded.

Samplesize=1475;standardizedestimatesχ2(2)=20.272;p=0.000;χ2/df=10.136;GFI=.993;NFI=.993;CFI=.993;RMSEA=0.079

Figure7:Measurementmodelforanger

Asforthepreviousconcepts,ameanindexthatisrepresentingtheaveragelevelofpost-

crisisangertowardstheVWGroupwascreated.Theindexofthefouritemsshowsthatthe

participants’angerafterthecrisiswasbelowaverage(M=3.32;SD=1.59;Min=2.56;Max=3.97).

Thereliabilityscoreforthisstudywasα=.855,implyingagoodinternalconsistencyofthe

measurement.

3.5.7. SympathyInordertofindoutwhetherthefouritemsthatmeasuredsympathyrepresentonedimension,

anEFAshouldbeperformed.AccordingtotheKMOmeasureof0.720andthesignificant

Bartlett’stestforSphericity,suchananalysiswasappropriate.Confirmingthetheoretical

assumptionsofsuchuni-dimensionality,theEFAofferedonlyonefactorforsympathywith

sufficientfactorloadingsforeachitem(seeAppendixC).TherelationbetweentheChi-Square

valueandthedegreesoffreedomintheCFAwasnotacceptable(χ2(2)=179.480;p=0.000)and

40

alsotheRMSEAvalueindicatesapoorfitofthemeasurementmodel(RMSEA=.245).Other

modelfitindices,ontheotherhand,impliedanacceptablemodelfit(GFI=.942;NFI=.918;

CFI=.919).Nevertheless,asthemodificationindicessuggested,anadjustmentofthe

measurementmodelshouldbemade.Theproposedco-variancebetweentheerrortermsof

item1anditem4hadthehighestmodificationindex(MI=159,73),wastheoreticallyplausible

andresultedinamodelwithagoodfit.Thus,thismeasurementmodelwasselected(seefigure

8).

Samplesize=1475;standardizedestimatesχ2(1)=1.481;p=0.224;χ2/df=1.481;GFI=.999;NFI=.999;CFI=1.0;RMSEA=0.018

Figure8:Measurementmodelforsympathy

Forthedescriptiveanalysisofsympathy,anindexwascreatedthatconstitutesthe

averagelevelofsympathytowardstheVWGroupafterthecrisis.Astheindexindicates,

participantsdidonaveragenotfeelverysympatheticabouttheVWGroupaftertheemissions

scandal(M=2.14;SD=1.22;Min=1.84;Max=2.59).Thereliabilityscorefortheindexisα=.799,

indicatingagoodinternalconsistencyofthefour-itemmeasurement.

3.5.8. Moderator:Person-CompanyFitThefinalconceptthatisofinterestforthisstudy,person-companyfit,functionsasamoderator

variable.Amoderatorvariablecanbedefinedasavariablethatinfluences“thedirectionand/or

strengthoftherelationbetween”theindependentanddependentvariable(Baron&Kenny,

1986,p.1174).Inthecaseofthisstudy,thismeansthatthedegreeofperson-companyfitis

assumedtoinfluencetherelationshipsoftheindependentvariablescrisisinvolvementand

crisisresponsibilitywiththemediatorvariablesangerandsympathy.Itisexpectedthatthe

person-companyfitstrengthenstherelationshipofcrisisresponsibilityandinvolvementwith

sympathybutweakenstherelationshipofthetwoindependentvariableswithanger.

Themoderatorvariableperson-companyfitwasmeasuredusingeightitems.These

41

itemswerepreviouslydevelopedbyLin,Chen,ChiuandLee(2011)basedonscalesbyKehand

Xie(2009)andMaelandAshforth(1992)aswellasitemsofMaelandAshforth(1992)

themselves.Thescalewasmeasuredusinga7-pointLikertscale(1=stronglydisagree,

7=stronglyagree).

Astwoitemswereexcludedduetotheirhighskewnessvalues(seeChapter3.3.1),an

EFAwasperformedinordertoexaminewhetherthesixremainingitemsrepresentonesingle

dimension.AccordingtotheKMOmeasure(KMO=.831)andthesignificantBartlett’stestfor

Sphericity,anEFAwasapplicable.AstheperformedEFAsuggestsaone-factorsolution,the

theoreticalassumptionofonedimensionofperson-companyfitcanbeconfirmed.Supporting

this,allfactorloadingaresufficient(seeAppendixC).Havingninedegreesoffreedom,this

measurementmodelwasclearlyover-identifiedandaCFAcanbeperformed.However,thehigh

Chi-Squarevalue(χ2(9)=295.618;p=0.000)andthehighRMSEAvalue(RMSEA=0.147)indicated

therejectionofthemodel.Ontheotherhand,othermodelindicesalreadysuggestedan

acceptablemodelfit(GFI=.935;NFI=.916;CFI=.918).Nevertheless,amodelwithamuchbetter

fitcouldbefoundbyeliminatingitemtwoanditemeightoftheconcept(seefigure9).

Samplesize=1475;standardizedestimatesχ2(2)=5.149;p=0.076;χ2/df=2.574;RMSEA=0.033;GFI=.998;NFI=.998;CFI=.998

Figure9:Measurementmodelforperson-companyfit

Aswiththepreviousconcepts,ameanindexofthefourremainingitemswascreated

(N=1475)inordertopresentthedescriptivesoftheperson-companyfit.Accordingtotheindex,

therespondentshaveanaveragelylowperson-companyfit(M=2.73;SD=1.32;Min=1.98;

Max=2.07),whichindicatesthattherespondentsdonothighlyidentifythemselveswiththe

company.Theinternalconsistencyoftheperson-companyscaleisα=.802,indicatingagood

reliabilityofthescale.

Inordertotestthefourhypothesesofthemoderationeffects,twointeractionvariables

arecreated.Forthis,thescoresoftwolatentvariablesaremultipliedforeachmoderator

42

variable(Schumacker&Lomax,2004).Moreprecisely,forthefirstmoderator,thestandardized

meanindexofcrisisresponsibilityismultipliedbythestandardizedmeanindexofperson-

companyfit.Inlinewiththis,forthesecondmoderator,thestandardizedmeanindexofcrisis

involvementismultipliedbythestandardizedmeanindexofperson-companyfit.Next,the

skwenessandkurtosisofthetwointeractionvariablesareexamined.Forthefirstmoderator,

bothvaluesexceedtherequiredvaluesof2forskewnessand7forkurtosis(skewnessmoderatorI=-

3.66;kurtosismoderatorI=21.11).However,asthismoderatorvariableiscentraltotestingthe

hypothesesofthisstudy,itismaintained.Thedeviationshavetoberememberedforthe

interpretationofthedata,though.Forthesecondmoderatorvariable,noproblematicvaluescan

bedetected.Thus,bothmoderatorvariablesareaddedtothemodelinordertotestthe

moderatingeffects.Nexttothis,correlationsbetweenthetwomoderatorvariables,theperson-

companyfitindexandtheindependentvariablescrisisresponsibilityandcrisisinvolvementare

addedtothemodel.Sincethemoderatorvariablesaregeneratedfromtheseothertwovariables,

correlationsbetweenthemareexpectedtooccur.

43

4. ResultsAfterthetheoreticalconceptshavebeentested,thischaptercontainsthetestingofthetwelve

hypotheses,includingthemediationandmoderationeffects.Theinterpretationanddiscussion

oftheresultswillfollowinchapterfive.

Inordertotestthehypotheses,allabove-describedmeasurementmodelsareincludedin

aFullLatentVariableModel,whichisbasedonthetheoreticallyderivedconceptualmodel(see

chapter2.5).ThisisbecausetheFullLatentVariableModelenables“thespecificationof

regressionstructureamongthelatentvariables”(Byrne,2001,p.6).Themodelconsistsofboth

theoverallmeasurementmodelandthestructuralmodel(Byrne,2001).Thereby,theformer

describestherelationshipsbetweeneachlatentconceptwiththeirobservedindicators(see

Chapter3)andthelatterdescribestherelationshipsbetweenthelatentvariables(Byrne,2001).

Thus,theimpliedcausalrelationshipsbetweenthelatentconcepts,asposedinthehypotheses

ofthisstudy,canbetestedbyusingthestructuralmodel(Caruana&Erwing,2010).Before

beingabletotestthehypotheses,themodelfitoftheFullLatentVariableModelhastobe

examined.Despitetheadjustmentsthatwereundertakenforeachmeasurementmodel(see

Chapter3),theoverallstructuralmodeldoesnothaveagoodmodelfit(χ2(12)=183.733;

p=0.000;RMSEA=0.099;GFI=.973;NFI=.964;CFI=.966)becausetheChi-Squarevalueisbyfar

toohighandtheRMSEAvalueisnotacceptableeither.AsthehighChi-Squarevaluecanbe

explainedbythelargesamplesizeandthevaluesoftheotherthreemodelfitindicesaregood,

themodeliskeptforthisanalysis,though.Figuretenshowsthestructuralmodelwithwhichthe

relationshipsbetweenthelatentvariablesaretestedandtableonegivesanoverviewofallpath

estimates4.

Hypothesis1

Thefirsthypothesisassumesthatangernegativelyinfluencesthepost-crisisreputationofthe

VWGroup.Itwasfoundthatangerhasahighlysignificantnegativeimpactonthepostcrisis

reputation.ThismeansthattheangriertherespondentsaretowardstheVWGroupinthe

contextoftheemissionsscandal,theworsetheyevaluatethepost-crisisreputationofthe

corporation.Moreprecisely,whenangergoesupby1,thepost-crisisreputationgoesdownby

.192.Thus,thefirsthypothesisissupported.

4Throughouttheresultsanddiscussionsections,thestandardizedbetaestimatesarepresented.

44

Note:***p≤.001,**p≤.01,*p≤.05

Samplesize=1475;Standardizedestim

atesareportrayed

χ2(12)=183.733;p=0.000;χ

2 /df=15.311;RMSEA=0.099;GFI=.973;NFI=.964;CFI=.966

Figure10:StructuralM

odel

45

Table1:Summaryofresults

Paths ModelSpecifications

Beta

coefficient

SE Percentile

confidence

intervals

Lower Upper

Directeffectsofmediators

onDV(bpaths)

AngeràReputation -.436*** .018 -.470 -.397

SympathyàReputation .505*** .018 .469 .540

AngeràNWOM .644*** .016 .613 .676

SympathyàNWOM -.255*** .017 -.288 -.220

IVtomediators(apaths) ResponsibilityàAnger .213*** .021 .170 .252

InvolvementàAnger .587*** .018 .551 .621

ModeratorIàAnger -.078*** .026 -.131 -.030

ModeratorIIàAnger -.089*** .021 -.127 -.047

Person-CompanyFitàAnger -.065** .022 -.106 -.021

ResponsibilityàSympathy -.220*** .024 -.267 -.173

InvolvementàSympathy -.064*** .019 -.102 -.028

ModeratorIàSympathy .050** .030 -.002 .114

ModeratorIIàSympathy -.027 .025 -.078 .022

Person-CompanyFità

Sympathy

.635*** .021 .590 .675

DirecteffectsofIVonDV(c

paths)

ResponsibilityàReputation -.344*** .025 -.391 -.294

InvolvementàReputation -.272*** .025 -.320 -.223

ResponsibilityàNWOM .209*** .022 .164 .249

InvolvementàNWOM .381*** .022 .335 .422

DirecteffectsofIVonDV

whenmediatorsare

included(c’paths)

ResponsibilityàReputation -.060** .023 -.105 -.014

InvolvementàReputation .032 .024 -.018 .078

ResponsibilityàNWOM -.040* .020 -.081 -.001

InvolvementàNWOM -.0.042 .023 -.086 .004

Rsquared

Reputation .548

NWOM .556

Anger .458

Sympathy .550

Note:***p≤.001,**p≤.01,*p≤.05Samplesize=1475;StandardizedestimatesareportrayedLevelofconfidenceforconfidenceintervals=95%Numberofbootstrapresamples=2,000

46

Hypothesis2

ThesecondhypothesispostulatesthatsympathypositivelyinfluencestheVWGroup’spost-crisis

reputation.Theanalysishasshownthatsympathyhasahighlysignificantpositiveeffectonthe

VWGroup’spost-crisisreputation.Aspeoplefeltmoresympathetictowardsthecorporationin

thecontextoftheemissionsscandal,theyratedtheVWGroup’spost-crisisreputationhigher.In

fact,whensympathyincreasesby1,theevaluationofthepost-crisisreputationincreasesby.272.

Comparedtotheimpactofangeronthepost-crisisreputation,theeffectofsympathyiseven

stronger.Hence,thesecondhypothesisissupported,aswell.Furthermore,bothpredictorsof

post-crisisreputationexplain54.8percentofthevarianceofpost-crisisreputation(R2=.548).This

meansthatthetwoemotionsdeterminethevarianceofpost-crisisreputationtoalargeextentbut

notcompletely.

Hypothesis3

Accordingtothethirdhypothesis,angerincreasestheintentionforNWOMabouttheVWGroup.

Astheanalysishasshown,angerhadahighlysignificantnegativeimpactontheparticipants’

NWOMintention.ThemoreangertherespondentsfelttowardstheVWGroupregardingthe

emissionsscandal,thehigherwastheirintentiontosaynegativethingsaboutthecorporation.

Whenangerincreasesby1,theNWOMintentionrisesby.500.Thisimpactwasevenstronger

thanthatofangeronpost-crisisreputationandthatofsympathyonpost-crisisreputation.

Concluding,thishypothesiscanalsobesupported.

Hypothesis4

HypothesisfourpostulatesthatsympathyhasanegativeimpactontheintentionforNWOMabout

theVWGroup.ItwasfoundthatsympathysignificantlydecreasedtheNWOMintentionofthe

respondents.Assympathygoesupby1,therespondents’NWOMintentiongoesdownby.242.In

comparisontoanger,sympathyhadaweakereffectontheNWOMintentionoftheparticipants,

though.Additionally,theimpactofsympathyontheNWOMintentionisweakerthanthatof

sympathyandangeronthepost-crisisreputation.Nevertheless,thefourthhypothesiscanbe

supported.Nexttothis,bothpredictorsofNWOMexplain55.6percentofthevarianceofthe

dependentvariable(R2=.556).Thus,thetwoemotionsdeterminemorethanhalfofthevarianceof

NWOM.

47

Hypothesis5

Thefifthhypothesisstatesthatthehigherthelevelofperceivedcrisisresponsibility,themore

angertherespondentsfeeltowardstheVWGroup.Theresultsofthedataanalysissupportthis

hypothesis.Whentheperceivedcrisisresponsibilityincreasesby1,thefeelingofangerraisesby

.293.Hence,respondentswhobelievedthattheVWGroupwasresponsiblefortheemissions

scandalexpressedmoreangertowardstheGroup.

Hypothesis6

Incontrarytohypothesisfive,hypothesissixpostulatesthatahigherlevelofperceivedcrisis

responsibilityleadstolesssympathytowardstheVWGroup.Asindicatedbythedataanalysis,the

morecrisisresponsibilitytherespondentsascribedtotheVWGroup,thelowerwastheirfeeling

ofsympathytowardsthecorporation.Whentheperceivedcrisisresponsibilitygoesupby1,the

feltsympathytowardstheVWGroupgoesdownby.247.Incomparisontotheimpactonanger,

crisisresponsibilityhasaminimalstrongereffectonsympathy.Concluding,thesixthhypothesis

canbesupported.

Hypothesis7

Hypothesissevenassumesthatinvolvementhasapositiveimpactonanger.Theresultsofthe

analysissupportthisassumption:ThemoreinvolvedtherespondentswerewiththeVW

emissionsscandal,theangriertheyweretowardstheVWGroup.Infact,whentheinvolvement

withtheVWemissionsscandalincreasesby1,theangerrisesby.576.Basedonthehighly

significantpositiveimpactofcrisisinvolvementonanger,thishypothesiscanbesupported.

Hypothesis8

Onthecontrarytohypothesisseven,hypothesiseightpostulatesthatahigherlevelofcrisis

involvementleadstoalowerlevelofsympathytowardstheVWGroup.Thedataanalysisrevealed

thatcrisisinvolvementhadasmallsignificantnegativeimpactonsympathy.Whenthe

involvementwiththeemissionsscandalincreasesby1,thesympathyfelttowardstheVWGroup

decreasesby.051.Comparingthebetavaluesoftherelationshipsbetweeninvolvementandthe

twoemotionsangerandsympathy,itbecomesclearthatinvolvementhasamuchstrongerimpact

onangerthanonsympathy.Nevertheless,hypothesiseightcanbesupported.Inaddition,45.8

percentofthevarianceofanger(R2=.458;)and55percentofsympathy(R2=.550)arepredictedby

crisisresponsibilityandcrisisinvolvement.Thismeansthatbothemotionscanbeexplainedby

thetwoindependentvariablestoalargeextentbutnotcompletely.

48

4.1. TestingofMediationEffectsNext,itwastestedwhetherthetwoemotionsangerandsympathyfunctionasmediatorsthat

formanintermediatelinkbetweenthetwoindependentvariablescrisisinvolvementandcrisis

responsibilityandthetwodependentvariablespost-crisisreputationandNWOM.Accordingto

BaronandKennedy(1986),threerequirementsmustbefulfilledinordertoarguethatavariable

isamediator.First,theindependentvariablesignificantlypredictsthedependentvariable(c

path).Second,themediatorvariablesignificantlypredictsthedependentvariable(bpath)and

last,whenthemediatorisaddedtothemodel,therelationshipbetweentheindependentand

dependentvariables(cpath)isreduced(c’path)(Baron&Kennedy,1986;Little,Card,Bovaird,

Preacher&Crandall,2007).Asitisdisplayedintableone,thesethreeassumptionsaremetforthe

relationshipsbetweenthevariables-thusmediationeffectsoccur.Sincethedirecteffects

betweencrisisresponsibilityandbothcrisisoutcomes(i.e.post-crisisreputationandNWOM)

remainsignificantafterbothmediatorsareadded(c’paths),partialmediationsoccurinthese

relationships(Littleetal.,2007).Asfortherelationshipsbetweencrisisinvolvementandboth

crisisoutcomes,fullmediationsoccurbecausethedirecteffectisnotsignificantanymoreonce

bothmediatorsareaddedtothemodel(c’path)(Littleetal.,2007).

Tabletwoprovidesanoverviewofallmediationeffectsofthismodel,includingthe

bootstrappingresults.Itisshownthatallmediationeffectsarehighlysignificant,meaningthat

angerandsympathyfunctionasmediatorsforalleffectsbetweentheindependentanddependent

variables.Whilenegativemediationeffectsoccurintherelationshipsbetweencrisisresponsibility

andcrisisinvolvementwithpost-crisisreputation,positivemediationeffectsexistinthe

relationshipsofthetwoindependentvariableswithNWOMintention.Thereby,themediation

effectintherelationshipbetweencrisisinvolvementandNWOMintentionisthestrongest.

However,notonlythetotalmediationeffectsofbothemotionsineachrelationshipareofinterest

butalsotheirseparateeffects.Astabletwoshows,angerhasastrongermediatingeffectthan

sympathyinallrelationshipsexceptforthatofcrisisresponsibilityandcrisisreputation.Thereby

thestrongestmediationeffectofangeroccursintherelationshipbetweencrisisinvolvementand

NWOM.Whilebothemotionstakeonamediatingroleinthisstudy,theseresultsindicatethat

angerisamoreimportantmediatorintheVWemissionsscandalthansympathy.

49

Table2:BootstrappingResultsforMediationEffects

Indirect effects of IV on DV through proposed mediators (ab paths)

Percentileconfidenceintervals

Beta SE Lower UpperDV=Post-CrisisReputation IV=CrisisResponsibility Total -.204 .015 -.233 -.174 Anger -.093 .010 -.113 -.073 Sympathy -.112 .013 -.139 -.087IV:CrisisInvolvement Total -.288 .016 -.318 -.256 Anger -.258 .013 -.285 -.231 Sympathy -.032 .010 -.051 -.014DV=NWOM IV=CrisisResponsibility Total .193 .015 .163 .222 Anger .138 .014 .110 .165 Sympathy .056 .007 .044 .072IV:CrisisInvolvement Total .394 .016 .364 .427 Anger .380 .016 .350 .413 Sympathy .016 .005 .007 .026Note:***p≤.001,**p≤.01,*p≤.05Samplesize=1475Levelofconfidenceforconfidenceintervals=95%Numberofbootstrapresamples=2,000

4.2. Hypotheses9through12–ModerationEffectsThefollowingfourhypothesesaddressthemoderatingroleofperson-companyfitonthe

relationshipsofcrisisinvolvementandcrisisresponsibilitywiththetwoemotions.Hypothesis

nineassumesthatahigherperson-companyfitweakenstherelationshipbetweenperceivedcrisis

responsibilityandanger.Thissignifiesthatifpeoplehaveahighpersoncompanyfit,theywould

feellessangereveniftheyattributehighcrisisresponsibilitytotheVWGroup.Asthetestingof

themoderationeffectofthisrelationshipshows,theinteractioneffectbetweencrisis

responsibilityandperson-companyfithasasignificantweaknegativeeffectonanger.This

indicatesthatwithahigherperson-companyfit,theinfluenceofcrisisresponsibilityonanger

decreases,leadingtolessanger.Thus,thishypothesiscanbesupported:Person-companyfit

functionsasamoderatorinthisrelationship.

Hypothesistenpostulatesthatahigherperson-companyfitintensifiestherelationship

betweenperceivedcrisisresponsibilityandsympathy.Thismeansthatifpeoplehaveahigh

50

person-companyfit,theytendtofeelmoresympathytowardstheVWGroupdespiteaperceived

crisisresponsibility.Thiswouldindicatethatcrisisresponsibilitymatterslessifpeoplehavea

highperson-companyfit.Resultsofthedataanalysisrevealthattheinteractioneffectbetween

crisisresponsibilityandperson-companyfithasaweaksignificantpositiveimpactonsympathy.

Hence,thishypothesiscanbeaccepted,aswell:Person-companyfitmoderatestherelationship

betweencrisisresponsibilityandsympathy.

Hypothesiselevenassumesthatahigherperson-companyfitwillweakentherelationship

betweenfeltcrisisinvolvementandanger.Thissignifiesthatifpeoplehaveahighperson-

companyfit,theywouldbelessangrywiththeVWGroupregardingtheemissionsscandaleven

thoughtheyarehighlyinvolvedwiththeemissionsscandalitself.Resultsindicatethataweak

significantnegativeeffectoccurredandthusthehypothesisforthisinteractioneffectcanbe

supported:Person-companyfitfunctionsasamoderatorinthisrelationship.

Lastly,hypothesistwelvepostulatesaninteractioneffectofperson-companyfitandcrisis

involvementonsympathy,indicatingthatahigherperson-companyfitwillintensifythe

relationshipbetweenfeltcrisisinvolvementandsympathy.Inthecaseofhighinvolvement,ahigh

person-companyfitwouldleadtomoresympathytowardstheVWGroupaswithlowperson-

companyfit.Testingthisassumptionshowsaminimalnegativebutnotsignificanteffect.This

leadstotherejectionofthelasthypothesis:Person-companyfithasnomoderatingeffectonthe

relationshipbetweeninvolvementandsympathy.Summarized,elevenofthetwelvehypothesesof

thisstudycanbeaccepted.

4.3. ComparisonofAffectedandNon-AffectedPublicsInordertoexaminewhethertheabove-foundeffectsdifferforpeoplewhohavebeenaffectedby

theVWemissionsscandalcomparedtothosewhowerenotdirectlyaffectedbyit,amultigroup

analysiswasperformed.Asexplainedinthequestionnaire,affectedpeoplearethosewhoowna

carofthebrandsVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaorPorschebecausethesehavebeenaffectedbythe

emissionsscandal.Consequently,non-affectedpeoplearetheoneswhodonotownsuchcars.Itis

assumedthattheeffectsofresponsibilityandinvolvementonangeraswellasthatofangeron

post-crisisreputationandNWOMwouldbestrongeramongaffectedpeoplecomparedtothose

whowerenotaffected.Onthecontrary,theeffectsthatinvolvedsympathywouldbeweakerfor

theaffectedgroup.TheChi-Squaredifferencetestofthemultigroupanalysisrevealsthatthetwo

testedmodels(affectedvs.non-affected)aresignificantlydifferent.Whilethemodelofthe

affectedparticipantshasaChi-Squarevalueofχ2(12)=65.915(p=0.000),themodelofthenon-

affectedparticipantshasaChi-Squarevalueofχ2(12)=148.345(p=0.000).Inordertofindout

whichspecificrelationshipsdifferthetwomodels,thesinglepathestimateswereregarded.For

51

this,singlepathswerecomparedbyfreelyestimatingthetwomodelsexceptforsinglepathsthat

wereconstrained(Byrne,2013).

Table3:MultigroupAnalysis-affectedpublicvs.non-affectedpublic

Paths ModelSpecifications Affected Non-affected Difference Beta

coefficientSE Beta

coefficientSE Beta

coefficientDirecteffectsofmediatorsonDV

AngeràReputation -.438*** .008 -.435*** .008 -.003(p=.006)

SympathyàReputation

.550*** .010 .494*** .009 .056(p=.353)

AngeràNWOM .672*** .014 .640*** .014 .032(p=.001)

SympathyàNWOM -.286*** .017 -.247*** .013 -.039(p=.756)

IVandmoderatorstomediators

ResponsibilityàAnger

.226*** .029 .204*** .026 .022(p=.026)

InvolvementàAnger .584*** .020 .583*** .020 .001(p=.150)

ModeratorIàAnger -.104*** .031 -.074*** .029 -.030(p=.698)

ModeratorIIàAnger -.112*** .030 -.085*** .027 -.027(p=.352)

PersonCompanyFitàAnger

-.076*** .022 -.069*** .022 .007(p=.845)

ResponsibilityàSympathy

-.218*** .022 -.217*** .023 .001(p=.211)

InvolvementàSympathy

-.056*** .014 -.062*** .014 -.006(p=.716)

ModeratorIàSympathy

.054* .023 .042* .023 .012(p=.099)

ModeratorIIàSympathy

-.034 .022 -.028 .020 -.006(p=.556)

PersonCompanyFitàSympathy

.630*** .016 .634*** .015 -.004(p=.826)

Rsquared Reputation .608 .534 NWOM .623 .554 Anger .426 .459 Sympathy .521 .551 Note:***p≤.001,**p≤.01,*p≤.05Samplesizeaffected=163,Samplesizenon-affected=1312;Chi-Squareaffected=χ2(12)=148.345(p=0.000);Chi-Squarenon-affected=χ2(12)=148.345(p=0.000)Standardizedregressionweightsofstructuralweightsareportrayed

52

Tablethreeprovidesanoverviewofthepathestimatesofbothmodelsaswellasthe

differencesforeachpath.Itbecomesclearthatthedifferencesbetweenthepathestimatesare

verysmallandmostofthemarenotsignificant.Theonlysignificantdifferencebetweenthetwo

modelscouldbefoundintheeffectthatcrisisresponsibilityhasonangerandontheimpactthat

angerhasonbothcrisisoutcomes.Accordingtotheanalysis,responsibilityhadaslightlystronger

impactonangeramongtheaffectedpublic.Moreover,angerhadaminimalstrongernegative

impactonpost-crisisreputationandaminimalstrongerpositiveimpactonpeople’sNWOM

intentionamongthosewhowereaffected.Thissignifiesthatamongparticipantswhowere

affected,crisisresponsibilityresultedinmoreanger,whichinturnledtoaworseevaluationof

theVWGroup’spost-crisisreputationandastrongerintentiontoexpressNWOMcomparedtothe

notaffectedparticipants.Althoughthesedifferencesareminimal,thecrucialroleofangerinthis

studyisunderlined.

4.4. FurtherFindingsFinally,thedataanalysisrevealedsomefurtherrelevantfindings.Forthetestingofthe

moderationeffects,theconceptperson-companyfitwasaddedtothemodel.Resultsofthe

analysisshowedthatperson-companyfitnotonlyhasamoderatingroleinthismodelbutalso

directlyaffectsonthetwoemotionsangerandsympathy.Moreprecisely,person-companyfithad

aweaksignificantnegativeimpactonanger(β=-.065;p=.002)andastronghighlysignificant

positiveimpactonsympathy(β=.635;p=.001).Whentheperson-companyfitincreasedbyone,

angerdecreasedby.067andsympathyincreasedby.542.Thismeansthatparticipantswho

identifiedthemselvesmorewiththeVWGroupfeltslightlylessangerandbyfarmoresympathy

towardsthecorporationcomparedtothosewhoidentifiedthemselveslesswiththeVWGroup.

Thereby,theeffectsizeperson-companyfithasonsympathyisstrongerthanalleffectsofthetwo

independentvariablesonthetwoemotions(seetable1).

53

5. DiscussionandConclusionInthischapter,theprecedingresultsofthedataanalysiswillbeinterpretedanddiscussedagainst

thebackgroundoftheabove-explainedtheory.Thereby,theresearchquestionswillbeanswered

aswellasmanagerialimplicationsgiven.Inaddition,conclusionsfromtheresultswillbedrawn,

strengthsandlimitationsofthepresentstudypresentedaswellasimplicationsforfuture

researchproposed.

5.1. InterpretationofResultsOneofthemaininterestsofthisstudywastheexplorationoftheVWGroup’spost-crisis

reputationandtheNWOMintentionoftheGermanpublic.Inthiscontext,itwasarguedthatthe

corporation’sfavorablepre-crisisreputationcouldhavefunctionedasahalothatprotectedthe

VWGroupfromreputationlossandnegativebehaviorintentionsafterthecrisis.Ontheother

hand,thefavorablepriorreputationcouldhaveincreasedexpectationsofthecorporation,which

wereviolatedduetotheemissionsscandalandthusresultedinnegativecrisisoutcomes.Results

indicatethattherespondents’evaluationoftheGroup’spost-crisisreputationwasmodest

(M=3.7;SD=1.25)andtheirNWOMintentionwasverylow(M=2.27;SD=1.43).Withrespecttothe

post-crisisreputation,itwasassumedthattheVWGroup’sfavorablepriorreputationwouldsave

thecorporationreputationalloss.Duetothemoderatereputationafterthecrisis,theexistenceof

thehalo-effectcanbechallenged,though.However,notonlythepre-crisisreputationbutalso

otherfactorscanaffectanorganization’spost-crisisreputation(seechapter2.1.1)andthusneed

tobeconsideredwheninterpretingthisoutcome.Thehighlevelofcrisisresponsibilitythatis

attributedinanintentionalcrisisortheVWGroup’spriorcrisishistoryandcrisisresponsesneed

tobeconsidered.AsrespondentsattributedahighlevelofcrisisresponsibilitytotheVWGroup,

thiscouldhavehadastrongeffectonthecorporation’spost-crisisreputation.Infact,thepost-

crisisreputationcouldhaveevenbeenlowerwithoutsuchafavorablepriorreputation.This

wouldthenbeanargumentfortheoccurrenceofthehaloeffect.

ThelowNWOMintentionoftheparticipantswasverysurprising,consideringthefactthat

theemissionsscandalwasanintentionalcrisisthatleadtotheascriptionofahighcrisis

responsibility.However,asKiambiandShafer(2015)found,peoplehavealowerintentionto

expressNWOMforahighreputedorganizationcomparedtoalowreputedorganization.Thus,the

favorablepre-crisisreputationcouldnotonlyhaveprotectedthecorporationfrommore

reputationallossduetotheemissionsscandalbutalsofromnegativebehaviorsandbehavioral

intentionsdirectedtotheVWGroup.Thiswouldmeanthatpeopledidnotwanttoengagein

NWOMaboutVWGroupduetotheirpositiveattitudeaboutthecorporationpriortothecrisis.

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Thiswouldsuggesttheshieldingfunctionofafavorablepre-crisisreputationregardingnegative

behaviorintentionsandindicatethattheVWGroup’spriorreputationdidplayanimportantrole

inprotectingitfromNWOM.

Onefurtherexplanationfortheoccurrenceofamodestpost-crisisreputationandalow

NWOMintentionamongtheGermanpubliccouldbethecountry-of-origineffect.Previousstudies

haveimpliedthatconsumersapplyaproduct’scharacteristics,suchasthecountryoforigin,asan

evidenceforproductqualityinordertocompareaproduct’squalitytothatofothers.Thecountry

oforigintherebysignalsstereotypesofproducts(Lee,Yun&Lee,2005),forinstancethe“made

in”tag(Yun,Lee,andSego2002).Whileapositiveimageofanationresultsinapositive

assessmentofitsproducts,anegativeoneleadstoanegativeassessment(Zhukov,Bhuiyan&

Ullah,2015).Transferringthecountry-of-origineffecttoacorporatelevel,EtayankaraandBapuji

(2009)concludefromtheirliteraturereviewofproductrecallsthatthemagnitudeofcompany

lossesdependsnotonlyontheseverityofthecrisisorthecompany’sreputationbutalsoonthe

imageofthecountry.AstheVWGroupisaGermancorporationandthelabel“madeinGermany”

hasbeenassociatedwithahighproductquality(Haucap,Wey&Barmbold,1997),itcanbethus

assumedthatitpreventedthecorporationfrommorenegativecrisisoutcomes.

Moreoverthepresentstudyinvestigatedtherespondents’emotionalresponsestotheVW

emissionsscandal.Basedonthecrisistype,aratherhighlevelofangerandalowlevelof

sympathytowardstheVWGroupwereexpected.Despitetheseassumptions,therespondentshad

onlyamoderatedegreeofangertowardstheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal(M=3.32;

SD=1.59),thusnotconfirmingthepriorassumption.However,asthestandarddeviationwasquite

highforthisemotion,itcanbeconcludedthattheparticipantsdidhardlyagreeregardingtheir

levelofanger.TakingtheVWGroup’sfavorablepre-crisisreputationintoaccount,itcouldbe

assumedthatitprotectedtheGroupfrombeingfacedwithahighlevelofanger.Kiambiand

Shafer(2015)forinstancefoundintheirstudythatrespondentswerelessangrytowardsan

organizationwithafavorablepre-crisisreputationthantowardsanorganizationwithaprior

unfavorablereputation.Anotherexplanationforthismodestlevelofangercouldbethetime

betweentheoutbreakoftheemissionsscandalandthesurvey.AccordingtoCoombsandHolladay

(2007),emotionalresponsescandecreaseovertimebecausethestakeholdersforgetabouta

crisis.Asthisstudywasconductedaboutsixmonthsafterthefirstinformationontheemissions

scandalwaspublished,itcouldbethecasethattherespondentsweresimplynotangryanymore.

Onthecontrary,theassumedlowlevelofsympathyfeltbytherespondentswasconfirmed

bythisstudy(M=2.14;SD=1.22).Thisprovesthatalsopositiveemotionscanemergeinacrisis,as

FolkmanandMoskowitz(2000)hadproposed.CoombsandHolladay(2005)foundthatthemost

sympathywasfeltinthecaseofavictimcrisisinwhichlowresponsibilitywasattributedtothe

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organization.Anintentionalcrisisontheotherhandresultedinalowlevelofsympathy.TheVW

emissionsscandalcannotonlytheoreticallybecategorizedasanintentionalcrisiswithahigh

crisisresponsibility,butalsotherespondentsofthisstudyattributedahighresponsibilitytothe

corporation.Therefore,itisinlinewithpreviousexpectationsthattheyfeltonlylittlesympathy

towardstheVWGroupaftertheemissionsscandalhadoccurred.

Regardingtheeffectofbothemotionsonthetwoinvestigatedcrisisoutcomes,itwas

foundthatangerhadanegativeimpactontheVWGroup’spost-crisisreputationandsympathya

positiveeffectonthiscrisisoutcome.Thus,thesefindingsarenotonlyinlinewiththatofChoiand

Lin(2009b)butalsoexpandit,asnotonlyaneffectofangerbutalsoofsympathyonreputation

wasfound.Moreover,theseresultsconfirmoneextensionoftheSCCTmodelwithadirectpath

fromemotionstoreputation,asChoiandLin(2009b)proposed.Further,itisespecially

interestingthatsympathyhadanevenstrongereffectonreputationthananger.Thisimpliesthe

importanceofconsideringnotonlythenegativebutalsoespeciallythepositiveemotionina

crisis.

Moreover,bothemotionshadanimpactontheparticipants’intentionforNWOM,with

angerresultinginahigherintentiontoexpressnegativestatementsabouttheVWGroupand

sympathyleadingtoalowerNWOMintention.ThesefindingsarethusinlinewithMcDonaldet

al.’sstudy(2010),whichfoundthatahigherlevelofangerresultedinahigherNWOMintention.

Furthermore,theresultsconfirmedpartofthenegativecommunicationdynamicthatwasposed

byCoombsetal.(2007).However,whileCoombsetal.(2007)didnotfindevidencefortheir

hypothesisandconcludedthatthemoderatelevelofangerwasnotenoughtoresultinNWOM,the

studyathandprovedthatalreadyalowlevelofangerstronglyincreasedpeople’sintentionto

expressNWOM.Duetoitseffectsize,thesignificanceofangerisevenmoreemphasized.However,

assympathywasfoundtodecreasepeople’sNWOMintention,thispositiveemotionshouldnotbe

leftouteither.Thus,whileangerhadahigherimpactonreputationthanontheNWOMintention,

sympathyhadastrongereffectonpeople’sintentiontouseNWOMthantheirevaluationofthe

VWGroup’spost-crisisreputation.Nevertheless,allfoureffectswerequitehigh,underliningthe

decisiveroleofbothemotionsinthecontextoftheVWemissionsscandal.

Besideshavingfoundevidencefortheimpactsofbothemotionsonthetwocrisis

outcomes,thepresentstudyalsoconfirmedthemediatingroleofangerandsympathyinthe

relationshipsofcrisisresponsibilityandcrisisinvolvementwiththepost-crisisreputationand

NWOMintention.Thereby,angerformedanespeciallystronglinkbetweenthetwoindependent

variablesandNWOM.Overall,sympathydidnotmediatetherelationshipsbetweenthe

independentanddependentvariablesasstronglyasanger,withoneexceptionbeingthelink

betweencrisisresponsibilityandthepost-crisisreputation,wheresympathyhadaslightly

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strongerimpactthananger.Thisemphasizesthesignificanceofavoidingangerinacrisiseven

further.

SincetheVWemissionsscandalcanbecategorizedintheintentionalcrisiscluster,itwas

assumedthattherespondentswouldattributeahighlevelofcrisisresponsibilitytotheVW

Group.ResultsshowthattherespondentstendedtobelievethattheVWGroupwasresponsible

fortheoccurrenceoftheemissionsscandal(M=5.91;SD=1.19).Hence,thisstudy’sfindings

confirmthisproposedassumption.Wheninterpretingthesefindings,itshouldbeconsidered,

though,thattheinitialmeasurementofcrisisresponsibilitywasreducedinthedataanalysis

process.Astheremainingitemsbelongtotheaccountabilitydimensionoftheoriginal

measurementbyBrownandKi(2013),theresponsibilitysolelystandsfor“thedegreetowhich

theorganizationcouldhaveavoidedthecrisis“(p.14).Thus,wheninterpretingtheVWGroup’s

crisisresponsibilityinthisstudy,itdoesnotrefertointentionality,meaning“thedegreetowhich

thecrisiswascreatedpurposefullybyamemberormembersoftheorganization,”norlocality,

referringto“thedegreetowhichthecrisisisaninternalmatter”(Brown&Ki,2013,p.14).Hence,

theparticipantsbelievedtoahighextentthattheVWGroupisaccountablefortheemissions

scandalandthatitcouldhaveavoidedthecrisisfromoccurring.

Thisstudyrevealedthatcrisisresponsibilityresultedinbothangerandsympathy,thus

confirmingCoombs’(2007a)andCoombsandHolladay’s(2005)assumptionsthatcrisis

responsibilitytriggersthetwomainemotionsofAT.AshypothesizedandinlinewithSCCT

(Coombs,2007a),ahigherperceivedcrisisresponsibility,thusholdingtheVWGroupaccountable

fortheoccurrenceoftheemissionsscandal,resultedinmoreangerbutlesssympathytowardsthe

corporationcomparedtothosewhoassignedlesscrisisresponsibilitytotheVWGroup.Thereby,

theeffectsofcrisisresponsibilityonbothemotionshadapproximatelythesamestrength.Thus,

contradictingtoChoiandLin’s(2009b)study,thepresentstudyalsofoundevidenceforthe

relationofresponsibilityandsympathy,thereforeconfirmingitsroleasapredictorforpositive

andnegativeemotionsinacrisis.

Meetingthecallforexaminingtheconceptofinvolvementincrisiscommunication

research(McDonald&Härtel,2000),thisstudyincorporatedcrisisinvolvementasapredictorfor

emotions.BecauseoftheVWGroup’simportancefortheGermanpopulationanditsfavorable

priorreputation,itwasarguedthattheemissionsscandalwouldbeperceivedashighlyrelevant

bytheGermanpublic.Furthermore,theemissionsscandalwasquiteunexpectedanddeveloped

toasevere,internationalcrisis.Thisisanotherreasonwhyitwasassumedthatitdidmatterto

theGermanrespondents.Thisstudy’sresultsindicate,though,thattherespondentswereonly

involvedonamodestlevel(M=4.27;SD=1.57),thusnotconfirmingthisassumption.Onepossible

explanationforthisisthechangeabilityanddynamicoftheconceptoffeltinvolvement

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(McDonald&Härtel,2000).Itcouldbethecase,thatthefeltcrisisinvolvementwasespecially

highwhentheemissionsscandalfirstwentpublic.However,asfeltinvolvementisapersonal

statethatcanchangeovertime(Celsi&Olson,1988),itmightbethecasethatthelevelofcrisis

involvementhasdecreasedsincethen.Inaddition,theemissionsscandalcouldhavebeen

perceivedaslessrelevantbecausemoreandmoreinformationonalsootherautomotive

manufacturerswhohavemanipulatedcarswerepublished(e.g.Weingartner,2015).

ResultsprovideevidenceforthesignificanceoftheconceptintheVWemissionsscandal.

Respondentswhoweremoreinvolvedwiththeemissionsscandal,meaningthattheyperceived

thecrisisaspersonallyrelevant,feltsignificantlyangriertowardsthecorporation.Thisfinding

supportsMcDonaldandHärtel’s(2000)andCoombsandHolladay’s(2005)assumptionsthatthe

levelofinvolvementdeterminesaperson’sintensityofemotionsinacrisis.Consideringthe

strengthofthiseffect,crisisinvolvementwasveryimportantforpredictingangerintheVW

emissionsscandal.Theimpactofcrisisinvolvementwasevenstrongerthanthatofcrisis

responsibilitywhendetermininganger.ThisiscontrarytothefindingsofMcDonaldetal.(2010),

whofoundthatcrisisresponsibilitywasamoreimportantpredictorforemotionalreactionsina

crisisthaninvolvement.GiventhefactthatMcDonaldetal.(2010)usedthesameinitial

measurementforcrisisinvolvementbyMcQuarrieandMunson(1992),thisfindingisespecially

interesting.Theseopposingfindingscanbeexplainedbythedifferentresearchapproachesthat

wereusedbyMcDonaldetal.(2010)andinthestudyathand.WhileMcDonaldetal.(2010)used

anexperimentalapproachwithanartificialairlinecompanythathasexperiencedanartificial

crash,thepresentstudyusedasurveymethodandarealcrisisscenario.Regardingtheinfluence

ofcrisisinvolvementonsympathy,thisstudyfoundthatahigherleveloffeltcrisisinvolvement

resultedinlesssympathytowardstheVWGroup,thusconfirmingtheresultsofMcDonaldetal.’s

(2010)study.Theimpactofcrisisinvolvementonsympathywasratherlow,though,comparedto

thatonanger.Furthermore,incomparisonwiththeeffectthatcrisisresponsibilityhadon

sympathy,theeffectofcrisisinvolvementwasonlyabouthalfasstrong,whichisinlinewiththe

studyofMcDonaldetal.(2010)aswell.Concluding,crisisinvolvementwasastrongerpredictor

foranger,whilecrisisresponsibilitywasastrongerpredictorforsympathy.Thisindicatesthe

crucialroleofinvolvementinacrisisandimpliestheincorporationoftheconceptintheSCCT

framework.

Inordertodrawaconnectionbetweentheindividualandcorporateleveloftheemissions

scandal,theidentificationofGermanswiththeVWGroupwasincludedinthisstudyasthe

person-companyfit.DuetotheVWGroup’sfavorablepre-crisisreputation,itwasassumedthat

therespondentswouldhaveahighidentificationwiththecorporation.Despitethisexpectation,

therespondentshadanaveragelylowperson-companyfit(M=2.73;SD=1.32)andthusalow

identificationwiththeVWGroup.Onereasonforthelowlevelofidentificationcouldbethe

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impactoftheVWemissionsscandalontheparticipants’identificationwiththecorporation.

Althoughthequestionsabouttheperson-companyfitwereaskedbeforeevenmentioningthe

emissionsscandalinthequestionnaireinordertokeeptheimpactofthecrisisaslowaspossible,

itcouldstillbethecasethattheemissionsscandalaffectedtheparticipants’identificationwith

thecorporation.ThisiscontradictingtoAshforthandMael’s(1989)assumptionthatthe

identificationwithagroupenduresevenafterthefailureofagroup.Ontheotherhand,itisinline

withBergeretal.(2006)whosuggestthatchangedmembersofanorganizationcanaffectbeliefs

andidentification.AnotherpossiblereasoncouldbethesizeandcompositionoftheVWGroup.As

thecorporationconsistsofseveralsubsidiaries,productsandbrands,itcouldbeverydifficultfor

peopletoidentifythemselveswiththecorporationasawhole.Instead,itcouldbethecasethat

theyaremorelikelytoidentifythemselveswithcertainbrands,suchasVWorPorsche,or

products,suchastheVolkswagenCamperT2.

Itwasarguedthattheleveloftherespondent’sidentificationwiththeVWGroupwould

affecttherelationshipsofcrisisresponsibilityandcrisisinvolvementwiththeemotional

responsesangerandsympathy.Resultsofthisstudyshowthatperson-companyfitfunctionedas

amoderatorintherelationshipsbetweencrisisresponsibilitywithbothemotionsandbetween

involvementandanger.InthecasethatpeopleidentifiedthemselvesmorewiththeVWGroup,

theinfluenceofcrisisresponsibilityandcrisisinvolvementonangerwasweakened,resultingin

lessangertowardstheVWGroup.Moreover,ahigheridentificationwiththeVWGroup

strengthenedtheimpactofcrisisresponsibilityonsympathy,leadingtomoresympathy.Further

findingsalsorevealed,thatperson-companyfitnotonlymoderatedsuchrelationshipsbutalso

directlyaffectedbothemotions.Thereby,ithadaparticularlystrongimpactonsympathy.Allof

thesefindingsimplythatbuildingastrongerperson-companyrelationshipcanreducethe

negativeemotionalreactionandincreasethepositiveaffect.Thisunderlinesthesignificanceofa

highperson-companyfitintheVWemissionsscandal.TheyalsoconfirmAshforthandMael’s

(1989)argumentthatmoreidentificationresultsinmoresupportforthecorporation–inthis

caseemotionalsupport.However,thisstudydidnotfindprooffortheassumptionthatahigh

corporatereputationresultsinahighidentificationwiththecompany(Bhattacharya&Sen,2003;

Duttonetal.,1994;Keh&Xie,2009).Nevertheless,theseresultssuggesttheconsiderationof

person-companyfitincrisiscommunicationandSCCT.

Finally,followingKiambiandShafer’s(2015)suggestionofcomparingvictimsandnon-

victimsofacrisis,thisstudyperformedacomparisonbetweenparticipantswhowereaffectedby

theemissionsscandalandthosewhowerenotaffected.Itwasfoundthatcrisisresponsibility

increasedthelevelofangermoreamongaffectedpublicscomparedtonon-affectedpublics.

Furthermore,angerhadastrongernegativeeffectontheperceivedpost-crisisreputationofthe

VWGroupandastrongerpositiveeffectontherespondents’intentiontoexpressNWOMamong

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theaffectedparticipants.Thus,angerleadtomorenegativecrisisoutcomesamongtheaffected

personsthanamongthegeneralpublic.Assumingthataffectedpeopleregardedtheemissions

scandalasmoreself-related(Celsi&Olson,1988)andthusevaluateditasmorepersonally

relevant,itseemsplausiblethattheirangeralsohadmoreseverenegativeoutcomesthanfor

peoplewhowerenotaffected.Thisresultparticularlyemphasizesthatdifferentgroupsof

stakeholderscanreactdifferentlytoacrisisandthatespeciallyaffectedpeoplecouldreactmore

negativelytosuchanevent.

5.2. ManagerialImplicationsBasedontheresultsofthisstudy,severalpracticalsuggestionscanbemade.Asthisstudy

confirmed,angerplaysapowerfulroleinacrisis.Notonlydiditnegativelyinfluencethe

participants’evaluationontheVWGroup’spost-crisisreputation,italso,andmorestrongly,

increasedtherespondents’intentiontoexpressNWOMaboutthecorporation.Thestudyfurther

foundthatalreadyalowlevelofangercouldresultinthesenegativecrisisoutcomes.Moreover,

thisstudyrevealedthatsympathyfunctionedasapredictorforpost-crisisreputationandNWOM

intention,aswell.Althoughcorporationsaimtoavoidnegativeconsequencesandenhance

positiveoutcomesofacrisis,theycannotcontrolpeople’semotions.Whattheycaninfluence,

though,arethedrivingforcesofangerandsympathy.

Thisimpliesfirstofall,thatcorporationsshouldunderstandandtakeseriously(Choi&

Lin,2009b)bothemotionalresponsesandtheirconsequencesinordertoreactproperlytoa

crisis(Laufer&Coombs,2006).Inordertomitigateangerandreinforcesympathy,theyshould

carefullycommunicatewiththeirpublicsbasedontheiremotionalstateatacertainmoment.For

this,corporationsshouldconstantlymonitornewscoverageandthepublic’sreactionstoacrisis,

suchasonsocialmediaplatformslikeTwitterandFacebook.Basedonsuchknowledge,

corporationscouldthenidentifyandapplythebestresponsetotheincident(Jin,2014).Byusinga

propercrisisresponse,whichforinstancefocusesonthewellbeingoforcaringforvictims,also

theattributionofcrisisresponsibilitycouldbeweakened.Thisisespeciallysignificantascrisis

responsibilitywasfoundtoaffectthelevelofangerandsympathy.Thus,byreactingproperlytoa

crisis,theusageoftherightcrisisresponsestrategycouldpreventtheoccurrenceoforreducethe

levelofangerandenhancethelevelofsympathy.

Evenmoreimportantly,thisstudyhasrevealedthatcrisisinvolvementisanevenstronger

predictorofangerthancrisisresponsibilityandalsohasanimpactonsympathy.Thus,when

respondingtoanincident,corporationsshouldconsiderpeople’sdegreeofinvolvement(Choi&

Chung,2013)andthereforeadjusttheirresponsestoeachgroupofpeople.Thereby,theyshould

payspecialattentiontotheirdifferentgroupsofstakeholders,suchascustomersorshareholders,

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astheyareassumedtoevaluateacrisisasparticularlyrelevant.Asthisstudyhasshown,alsothe

generalpublicshouldnotbeforgotten,though,whenrespondingtoacrisis.Thus,public

statements,forinstanceinthemedia,shouldbeprovidedbytheaffectedcorporation,aswell.

Thisstudyhasfurtherfoundevidencefortheimportanceofastrongperson-companyfit

forreducingangerandincreasingsympathyinacrisis.Basedonthisstudy’sfindings,itisimplied

thatcorporationsshouldbuildandmanageastrongrelationshipnotonlywiththeirstakeholders

butalsothegeneralpublic.Forthis,corporationsshouldgettoknowtheneedsandwantsof

differentpublics,forinstancebyconductingregularsurveys.Thisway,corporationscannotonly

performproperrelationshipmanagementwithpublicsbutcanalsoofferandcommunicate

productsandservicesthatthepublicscanidentifywith.Thesecouldbeforinstancebethosethat

dogoodfortheenvironmentorsociety,thusmeetingtheincreasingdemandforenvironmentally-

friendlyproducts(iwd,2013).

Lastly,resultsofthisstudyimplythatcorporationsshouldbeawareabouttheoccurrence

andeffectofemotionalresponsesonpost-crisisreputationandNWOMintentionevenseveral

monthsafteracrisishasoccurred.Thus,suchcorporationsshouldnotonlyimplementsuch

actionsrightafteracrisishashappenedbutalsointhelongterm.

5.3. ConclusionTheaimofthisthesiswastoexplorecrisisoutcomesoftheVWemissionsscandal,analyzethe

impactofpersonalperspectivesontheseoutcomesaswellascomparetheserelationships

betweenaffectedandnon-affectedpublics.Thereby,thisstudyfocusedontheGermanpublic’s

evaluationoftheVWGroup’spost-crisisreputationandtheirintentiontouseNWOM.Applying

theSCCTasgroundworkandextendingtheframeworkwiththeconceptsofcrisisinvolvement

andperson-companyfit,aswellasthelinkbetweenemotions(i.e.angerandsympathy)andpost-

crisisreputation,thisthesisexaminedtheroleofcrisisresponsibility,crisisinvolvement,

emotionsandperson-companyfitinthecrisiscontext.AstheVWGrouphadagoodpre-crisis

reputationandahighrelevanceasacarmanufacturerespeciallyinGermany,theVWemissions

scandalwasevaluatedasparticularlyrelevantinthiscountry.Thus,asurveyamongtheGerman

publicwasconductedforthepurposeofthisstudy.Both,thehighnumberofparticipants

(N=2072)andthehighresponserate(72.91%)ofthissurveyconfirmedtherelevanceofthe

emissionsscandalforGermans.

Thisstudyhasshownthatalloftheconceptsplayedanimportantroleinthetested

relationships.FindingsrevealedthattherespondentsevaluatedtheVWGroup’spost-crisis

reputationonlyonamodestlevel,leadingtotheassumptionthatthecorporationdidnotmaintain

itsfavorablereputationafterthecrisis.Thestudyfurtherfoundthattherespondents’NWOM

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intentionwasratherlowafterthecrisis.Thus,itwassupposedthattheVWGroup’sfavorable

priorreputationcouldhavesavedthecorporationfrombeingconfrontedwithahigherlevelof

NWOM.Besides,thisstudyconfirmedtheeffectsofemotionsintheemissionsscandaloncrisis

outcomes.Whileangerledtoamorenegativeperceptionofpost-crisisreputationandtoahigher

intentiontouseNWOM,sympathyresultedinamorefavorablepost-crisisreputationandalower

intentiontouseNWOMabouttheVWGroup.Hence,evidencewasfoundfortheinSCCTexistent

linkbetweenemotionsandNWOMintentionbutalsofortheproposedlinkbetweenemotionsand

post-crisisreputation.Moreover,thesignificanceofthetwoemotionalresponseswasevenmore

emphasizedbyprovingitsmediatingrolesintherelationshipsbetweencrisisresponsibilityand

crisisinvolvementwithpost-crisisreputationandNWOMintention.Thereby,angerwasfoundto

beastrongermediator,highlightingtherelevanceofthisnegativeaffectinacrisis.However,

sympathywasalsoshowntobeimportantinpredictingcrisisoutcomes,thusconfirmingits

proposedrelevanceinthecrisis.

Furthermore,thisstudynotonlyconfirmedthecrucialroleofcrisisresponsibilitybutalso

thatofcrisisinvolvementasapredictorforemotions:Bothconceptsincreasedthelevelofanger

anddecreasedthelevelofsympathyamongtherespondents.Hence,itwasproventhatcrisis

involvement,whichisarathernewconceptinthecontextofcorporatecrises,isarelevant

predictorforcrisisemotions,aswell.BesidestestingtheextensionoftheSCCTframeworkwith

crisisinvolvement,thisstudyalsoincludedtheconceptofperson-companyfit.Accordingtothe

findings,person-companyfitmoderatedthelinksbetweencrisisresponsibilityandbothemotions

aswellasbetweencrisisinvolvementandanger.Thereby,astrongeridentificationwiththeVW

Groupresultedinmoresympathyandlessanger.Finally,thecomparisonofalleffectsamong

affectedandnon-affectedpublicsshowedthatcrisisresponsibilityresultedinmoreangeramong

theaffectedpubliccomparedtothenon-affectedpublic.Inaddition,theimpactofangerwas

strongeramongtheaffectedthanamongthenon-affectedGermanpublic,whilenodifferencewas

observedregardingsympathy.

Hence,havingconfirmedelevenofthetwelveposedhypotheses,thisstudynotonlyfound

evidenceforexistingpathsoftheSCCTframeworkbutalsofortheproposedextensions(i.e.the

linkbetweenemotionsandpost-crisisreputation,aswellastheincorporationofinvolvementand

person-companyfit).Thus,greatvaluewasaddedtocrisiscommunicationresearchbyvalidating

theframeworkforthisrealcrisisscenario.

5.4. StrengthsandLimitationsThisstudyaddedvaluetoexistingcrisiscommunicationresearchforseveralreasons.Firstly,it

notonlyfoundevidenceforexistingpathsoftheSCCTbutalsoforproposedextensionswhen

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testingtheframeworkinarealcrisisscenario.Thereby,thisstudynotonlymetthecallfor

researchbyexaminingthepersonalperspectivesemotionsandinvolvementinacrisis.Italso

confirmedtheimpactofbothemotions(i.e.angerandsympathy)onpost-crisisreputationandthe

significantroleofcrisisinvolvementasapredictorforemotionalresponses.Thus,notonly

productinvolvement,asproposedbyChoiandLin(2013),butalsocrisisinvolvement,wasfound

tobeimportantwhenstudyingcrisisemotionsandshouldbeincorporatedintheSCCT.Nextto

this,thisstudyappliedperson-companyfittotheorganizationalcrisiscontextandfoundevidence

foritsimpactonemotions.

Inaddition,theVWemissionsscandalconstitutedasignificantcasetostudy.Itenabledthe

investigationofasevereandinternationalproductrecallcrisisoutsideoftheUnitedStates.By

analyzingthiscrisis,theartificialityofafictitiousorganizationand/orcrisiswasavoided.

Moreover,andmoreimportantlythecomparisonofeffectsbetweenaffectedandnon-affected

groupswasenabledanditwasrevealedthatangerhadastrongerimpactoncrisisoutcomes

amongaffectedpersons.Inadditiontothis,thepresentstudycontributedtoexistingresearchby

applyingaquantitativesurveymethod,thusgoingbeyondcasestudyresearch,whichhadbeen

dominatingthefieldofcrisiscommunication.Inthiscontext,thehighnumberofparticipants

shouldbementionedthatenabledtheapplicationofSEMforthedataanalysis.

Despitethesestrengthsandtheencouragingresultsofthisstudy,certainlimitations

shouldbetakenintoconsiderationwheninterpretingthesefindings.Firstofall,thestudyathand

onlymeasuredtheVWGroup’sreputationafterthecrisisbutnotthatbeforetheoccurrenceofthe

emissionsscandal.AlthoughseveralsourcesagreeontheVWGroup’sfavorablereputationbefore

thecrisis,noreputationlosscouldbeexplicitlybedetectedbasedonthisstudy’sresults.

Moreover,thepost-crisisreputationwasonlymeasuredonceandthusthedynamicoftheconcept

ofreputationwasnotconsidered.However,anorganization’sreputationdevelopsovertimeand

canchangequicklyduetotheappearanceofnewevidence(Choi&Chung,2013).Inthiscontext,it

hastobeconsideredthatthisstudywasconductedabouthalfayearafterthefirstinformationon

theemissionsscandalwasdisclosed.Thiscouldhavehadaneffectontheevaluationofthe

perceptionofthepost-crisisreputationaswellasontheotherrelevantconceptsofthisstudy,

meaningforinstancethatthereputationhadalreadyrecoveredorthelevelofangerhadalready

decreasedduetothetimepassed.

Furthermore,thisstudyappliedSCCTbutdidnotincludeallelementsoftheframework.

Forinstance,itdidnotconsidercrisisresponsestrategiesthatwereusedbytheVWGroupto

reacttothecrisisortheVWGroup’scrisishistory.Theseareimportantfactors,though,when

evaluatingcrisisoutcomes(seechapter2.6.).

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Anotherlimitationofthisistheway,inwhichperson-companyfitwasincludedinthe

study.Firstly,asmentionedinchapter5.1.1.,itcouldhavebeendifficultfortherespondentsto

evaluatetheiridentificationwiththeVWGroupbecauseitisalargecorporationwithseveral

brandsandproducts.Peoplemightratheridentifythemselveswithabrandorproductthough,

insteadwithsuchalargeentity.Secondly,thescalethatwasusedtomeasureperson-companyfit

includedsomeitemsthatweredifficulttoanswerbyrespondentsbecausetheyinitiallystemfrom

theconceptofemployer-employeeidentification.Asseveralrespondentsleftacommentabout

thisdifficultyofansweringinthefeedbackfieldintheendofthesurvey,itissupposedthatthis

problemhadoccurred.

Nexttothis,themodelfitofthestructuralmodelwasonlyacceptableandnotashighas

desired.Thishastobeconsideredwheninterpretingtheresultsofthisstudy.Finally,some

limitationsarearesultofthechoiceofmethodandsamplingmethodthatwasusedforthedata

collection.Althoughsurveymethodshavethestrengthtomeasurepeople’sopinionsand

behaviors,itisdebatablewhethertheyarethebestmethodtomeasureemotionsaswell.

Moreover,itshouldbeconsideredthatduetotheself-reportinginasurvey,somepeoplecould

havethetendencytoanswerinasociallydesirablemanner.Asaresultoftheusageofpurposive

samplingandtheself-selectionofrespondents,norepresentativesamplecouldbeachieved.

Instead,thesampleconsistsofmostlyyoungandhighlyeducatedrespondentswhileolderand

lowereducatedpartsoftheGermanpopulationareunder-represented.Thisbiasneedstobe

takenintoconsiderationwheninterpretingtheresultsofthisstudy.

5.5. FutureResearchAstheVWemissionsscandaloriginatedintheUnitedStatesandevolvedintoaninternational

crisis,itwouldbeworthwhiletoreplicatethepresentstudyintheUnitedStates.Conductingthe

samestudyinanothercountrythatwasaffectedbytheemissionsscandalwouldalsoshedmore

lightintothemeaningofboththeVWGroupandtheemissionsscandalforGermanyandother

countries.OnlywhencomparingresultsfromaGermansamplewiththatofothernationalities,

thefullsignificanceofthisstudy’sresultswouldbecomeclear.Inaddition,theVWemissions

scandalconstitutesasuitablecaseforalong-termstudy.Byrepeatingthesamesurveyin

Germanyaftersometime,valuableknowledgeaboutthelong-termcrisisoutcomescouldbe

gained.Basedonthis,suggestionscorporationsonhowtohandleacrisisinthelongruncouldbe

given.

Moreover,futurestudiesontheVWemissionsscandalcouldincludeotherindependentor

dependentvariablesthathavenotbeenconsideredinthepresentstudy.Forinstance,other

behavioralintentionsthatareofinterestfororganizations,suchastheintentiontore-purchasea

64

productortheboycottofacorporation,couldbeincorporated.Inadditiontothis,thecrisis

historyandcrisisresponsestrategiesthatwereusedbytheVWGroupcouldbeinvestigated,for

instance,regardingtheirimpactonthecorporation’spost-crisisreputation.Inthiscontext,the

roleoftheVWGroup’sformerCEOMartinWinterkornwouldbeanaspectworthconsidering.As

previousresearchhasshown,defensivecrisisresponseandCEOvisibilityinimmediatecrisis

responsewasthemostefficientforgeneratingthemostpositiveattitudeandmostpositive

purchaseintentioninacrisis(Turketal.,2012).

Thepresentstudyhasfoundevidenceforthesignificantroleofinvolvementinacrisis.

SincetheconceptisstillnewinbothcrisiscommunicationresearchandtheSCCTframework,

though,prospectiveresearchshouldcontinuetoinvestigatecrisisinvolvementinthiscontext.

Additionally,inpreviousresearch,involvementhadbeenoperationalizedindifferentways,for

instanceasproductinvolvementorascrisisinvolvement.Inordertoconfirmtheimportanceof

thisconceptandtheresultsofthisstudy,moreconsistentresearchisnecessary.Thesameapplies

forperson-companyfit.Thestudyathandintroducedtheconceptasaninfluencingfactoron

emotionsinacrisis.Although,thisrelationshipcouldbeconfirmedtoalargeextentinthisstudy,

futureresearchshouldcontinuetoexploreperson-companyfitanditseffectsonemotionsand

crisisoutcomes,suchaspurchaseintention,inorganizationalcrises.

Finally,inordertogainarepresentativesampleandthusgenerizableresults,thisstudy

shouldbereplicatedusinganon-purposivesamplingmethod,suchasquotasampling.Thiswould

enabletheinclusionofindividualswithcertainrelevantcharacteristicsinthesampleandhencea

lessbiasedsample(Möhring&Schlütz,2010).

65

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Appendices

AppendixA-QuestionnairesAppendixA1-QuestionnaireGerman

SehrgeehrteTeilnehmerin,sehrgeehrterTeilnehmer,vielenDank,dassSiesichdazubereiterklärthaben,anmeinerUmfrageüberdenVolkswagenKonzern(imFolgenden:VWKonzern)teilzunehmen.DerVWKonzernumfasstunteranderemdieAutomarkenVW,Audi,Seat,Skoda,LamborghiniundPorsche.DieUmfrageistTeilmeinerMasterarbeitanderErasmusUniversitätRotterdam.DemnachhatdieUmfragekeinerleikommerziellesInteresseunddieErgebnissedienenausschließlichwissenschaftlichenZwecken.DerFragebogendauertnuretwa10Minuten.BeidenFragengibteskeinerichtigenoderfalschenAntworten–esgehtalleinumIhrepersönlicheMeinungundEinstellungengegenüber,sowieErfahrungenmitdemVWKonzern.AlleDatenwerdennatürlichstrengvertraulichbehandeltundanonymisiertausgewertet.SiewürdenmirmitIhrerTeilnahmesehrhelfen.SolltenSieFragenhabenoderandenErgebnissenderStudieinteressiertsein,könnenSiemichgerneunter437075lw@student.eur.nlkontaktieren.VielenDankimVorausfürIhreTeilnahme.LouisaWanjekErasmusUniversitä[email protected]___1. ZuallererstwürdeichgernevonIhnenwissen,obSiejemalsvomVWKonzerngehört

haben?□ja□nein

2. MenschenkönnenganzunterschiedlicheMeinungengegenüberdemVWKonzern

haben.WieistesbeiIhnen,wiesehrstimmenSiedenfolgendenAussagenzu?BitteordnenSiesichfürjedeAussageaufderSkalazwischen1bis7ein,wobei1„stimmeüberhauptnichtzu“und7„stimmevollundganzzu“bedeuten.MitdenZifferndazwischenkönnenSieIhreMeinungabstufen.

IchidentifizieremichstarkmitdemVWKonzern,wennichmitanderendarüberspreche.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

IchbevorzugeAutosvomVWKonzern,wennichsiemitdenenvonanderenAutomobilherstellernvergleiche.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

IchstehedemUnternehmensimagevomVWKonzernpositivgegenüber.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

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WennjemanddenVWKonzernkritisiert,fühltessichfürmichwieeinepersönlicheBeleidigungan.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Ichbinsehrdaraninteressiert,wasandereüberdenVWKonzerndenken.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

ErfolgedesVWKonzernsfühlensichanwiemeineeigenenErfolge.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

WennjemanddenVWKonzernlobt,empfindeichesalspersönlichesKompliment.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

WennderVWKonzernindenMedienkritisiertwird,istesmirpeinlich.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

WieSievielleichtmitbekommenhaben,hatderVWKonzernzugegeben,absichtlichMotorenvonDiesel-Fahrzeugenmanipuliertzuhaben,umdieerlaubtenHöchstwertefürEmissioneninPrüfungssituationeneinzuhalten.SeitSeptember2015sindweltweitetwa11MillionenAutosderMarkenVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaundPorschebetroffen.DieserVorfallwirdoftalsder„VW-Abgasskandal“bezeichnet.DiefolgendenFragenbeziehensichaufIhreMeinungüberdenVWKonzernnachdemdieInformationenüberdenAbgasskandalöffentlichwurden.3. HabenSiejemalsvomVW-Abgasskandalgehört?

□ja□nein4. BesitzenSiederzeiteinAutoderMarkenVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaoderPorsche?(Filter)

□ja□nein5. IstIhrAuto/mindestenseinsIhrerAutosvomAbgasskandalbetroffen?Mitbetroffen

istgemeint,dasseszudenAutomodellenderMarkenVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaoderPorschegehört,dievomVWKonzernindieWerkstattzurückgerufenwurden.

□ja □nein □Weißnicht 6. DiefolgendenAussagenbetreffenIhrenEindruckvomVWKonzernunddem

Abgasskandal.WiesehrstimmenSiediesenAussagenzu?BitteordnenSiesichfürjedeAussageaufderSkalazwischen1bis7ein,wobei1„stimmeüberhauptnichtzu“und7„stimmevollundganzzu“bedeuten.MitdenZifferndazwischenkönnenSieIhreMeinungabstufen.

BezüglichdesAbgasskandalsistderVWKonzernbesorgtumdasWohlseinerAnspruchsgruppen(z.B.Kunden,Mitarbeiter,Investoren).

1□□□□□□□□□□7

DerVWKonzernistinBezugaufdenAbgasskandalimGrundeunehrlich.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

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IchtrauedemVWKonzernnichtzu,dieWahrheitüberdenAbgasskandalzuerzählen.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

IchwürdeunterdenmeistenUmständenwahrscheinlichglauben,wasderVWKonzernüberdenAbgasskandalsagt.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

BezüglichdesAbgasskandalsistderVWKonzernnichtbesorgtumdasWohlseinerAnspruchsgruppen(z.B.Kunden,Mitarbeiter,Investoren).

1□□□□□□□□□□7

7. InwiefernstimmenSiedenfolgendenAussagenzu?BittedenkenSieauchhieranden

VWKonzernimZusammenhangmitdemAbgasskandal.BitteordnenSiesichfürjedeAussageaufderSkalazwischen1bis7ein,wobei1„stimmeüberhauptnichtzu“und7„stimmevollundganzzu“bedeuten.MitdenZifferndazwischenkönnenSieIhreMeinungabstufen.

IchwürdeFreundeoderVerwandteermutigen,aufgrunddesAbgasskandalskeineAutosvomVWKonzernzukaufen.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

WegendesAbgasskandalswürdeichzuanderenLeutennegativeDingeüberdenVWKonzernunddessenAutossagen.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Ichwürdejemandem,dernachmeinemRatfragt,auchnachdemAbgasskandalAutosvomVWKonzernempfehlen.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

8. WennSieandenAbgasskandaldenken,wasempfindenSiegegenüberdemVW

Konzern?BitteordnenSieIhrEmpfindengegenüberdemVWKonzernmitdenfolgendenAdjektivenaufderSkalazwischen1und7ein.Dabeibedeutet1„überhauptnicht“und7„sehr“.MitdenZifferndazwischenkönnenSieIhrEmpfindenabstufen.

WennichandenVWKonzernunddenAbgasskandaldenke,binich...

wütend überhauptnicht 1□□□□□□□□□□7 sehrverärgert überhauptnicht 1□□□□□□□□□□7 sehrangewidert überhauptnicht 1□□□□□□□□□□7 sehrempört überhauptnicht 1□□□□□□□□□□7 sehr

WennichandenVWKonzernunddenAbgasskandaldenke,empfindeich...

Verständnis überhauptnicht 1□□□□□□□□□□7 sehrMitleid überhauptnicht 1□□□□□□□□□□7 sehrMitgefühl überhauptnicht 1□□□□□□□□□□7 sehrSympathie überhauptnicht 1□□□□□□□□□□7 sehr

9. WasdenkenSieüberdenAbgasskandalselbst?

BittebewertenSieIhreEinstellunggegenüberdemAbgasskandalmitdenfolgendenAussagen.

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DerAbgasskandal(ist)…unwichtig □□□□□□□□□□ wichtignichtbesorgniserregend □□□□□□□□□□ besorgniserregendbedeutetmirnichts □□□□□□□□□□ bedeutetmirvielspieltkeineRollefürmich □□□□□□□□□□ spielteineRollefürmichirrelevant □□□□□□□□□□ relevant

10. WiesehrstimmenSiedenfolgendenAussagenzu?

BitteordnenSiesichfürjedeAussageaufderSkalazwischen1bis7ein,wobei1„stimmeüberhauptnichtzu“und7„stimmevollundganzzu“bedeuten.MitdenZifferndazwischenkönnenSieIhreMeinungabstufen.

DerAuslöserfürdenAbgasskandalwareinevorsätzlicheHandlungvonjemandemimKonzern.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

JemandimKonzernhatdieUrsachefürdenAbgasskandalwissentlichherbeigeführt.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

DerKonzernhattedieFähigkeit,dasAuftretendesAbgasskandalszustoppen.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

DerAbgasskandalwarvomKonzernvermeidbar. 1□□□□□□□□□□7DerKonzernhättedenAbgasskandalvermeidenkönnen. 1□□□□□□□□□□7DerKonzernsolltefürdenAbgasskandalzurVerantwortunggezogenwerden.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

DerAbgasskandalwurdedurcheineSchwächeinderOrganisationverursacht.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

InterneorganisatorischeProblemehabenzumAbgasskandalbeigetragen.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

11. ZumAbschlussmöchteichSiebittennocheinpaarAngabenzuIhrerPersonzumachen.

11.1. BittegebenSieihrGeschlechtan:□weiblich□männlich

11.2. WiealtsindSie?BittegebenSieIhrAlterinJahrenan:

___Jahre

11.3. WasistIhrhöchsterBildungsabschluss?□(noch)keinAbschluss□Hauptschulabschluss(Volksschulabschluss)□Realschulabschluss(MittlereReife)□Abitur/(Fach-)Hochschulreife□(Fach-)Hochschulabschluss□Andere,undzwar:______________________

80

11.4. WasistIhreNationalität?□Deutsch□Andere,undzwar:______________________

DamitsindSienunamEndederBefragungangekommen.FallsSienochAnmerkungenoderKritikhaben,könnenSiegernenochfolgendesFeldausfüllen.

EndeVielenDanknocheinmalfürIhreTeilnahmeundIhrerUnterstützungbeimeinerAbschlussarbeit!Ichwürdemichfreuen,wennSiedenuntenstehendenLinkzumeinerUmfragenochanIhreFamilie,Freunde,BekannteoderKollegenweiterleitenwürden.JemehrPersonenanmeinerUmfrageteilnehmen,destoaussagekräftigersinddieErgebnissemeinerStudie.https://erasmushcc.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_a9MJdOahXuuae4BSolltenSieFragenzumeinerStudiehabenoderandenErgebnisseninteressiertsein,könnenSiemichgerneunter437075lw@student.eur.nlkontaktieren.EineZuordnungIhrerE-Mail-AdressemitdenAngabenimFragebogenistnichtmöglich.BesteGrüßeLouisaWanjek

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AppendixA2-QuestionnaireEnglishDearparticipant,thankyouverymuchfortakingpart inthissurveyabouttheVolkswagenGroup(following:VWGroup).TheVWGroupcomprisesamongothers thebrandsVW,Audi,Seat,Skoda,LamborghiniandPorsche.ThesurveyispartofmyMastersThesisattheSchoolofHistory,CultureandCommunicationoftheErasmusUniversityRotterdam.Thus, thissurveydoes not have any commercial interestand the results are only used for scientific purposes. The questionnaire will take about 10minutes. There are no right andwrong answers - I am simply interested in your attitudes andopinionstowardstheVWGroup.Allofyouranswerswillbecompletelyanonymousandtreatedconfidentially.Yourparticipationwouldhelpmeverymuch.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsorifyouareinterestedintheresultsofmystudy,pleasedonothesitatetocontactme([email protected]).Thankyouinadvanceforyourparticipation.LouisaWanjekErasmusUniversityRotterdam437075lw@student.eur.nl---

1. Firstofall,IwouldliketoknowifyouhaveeverheardoftheVWGroup?□yes □no

2. PersonscanhaveverydifferentopinionsabouttheVWGroup.Howaboutyou,howmuchdoyouagreewiththefollowingstatements?Pleaseratehowmuchyouagreewiththestatementsonascalefrom1to7,whereas1meansthatyou“stronglydisagree”and7meansthatyou“stronglyagree”.Withthenumbersinbetween,youcangraduateyouropinion.

I have strong identification with the VW Group when talking toothersaboutit.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

IprefercarsoftheVWGroupwhencomparingitwiththatofotherautomobilemanufacturers.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

IampositiveaboutthecompanyimageoftheVWGroup. 1□□□□□□□□□□7WhensomeonecriticizestheVWGroup,itfeelslikeapersonalinsult.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

IamveryinterestedinwhatothersthinkaboutVWGroup. 1□□□□□□□□□□7ThesuccessesoftheVWGrouparemysuccesses. 1□□□□□□□□□□7WhensomeonepraisestheVWGroup,itfeelslikeapersonalcompliment.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

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IfastoryinthemediacriticizestheVWGroup,Ifeelembarrassed. 1□□□□□□□□□□7Asyoumayhaveheard,theVWGrouphasadmittedtohaveintentionallymanipulatedenginesofdieselcarstoincreasetheirperformanceonemission,whenbeingtested.SinceSeptember2015,about11millioncarsofthebrandsVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaandPorschehavebeenaffected.Thisincidentisoftenreferredtoasthe“emissionsscandal”.ThefollowingquestionswillaskyouropinionabouttheVWGroupaftertheinformationaboutthis“emissionsscandal”hasbeenrevealed.

3. HaveyoueverheardoftheVWemissionsscandal?□yes□no

4. DoyoucurrentlyownacarofthebrandsVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaorPorsche?□yes□no

5. Hasyourcar/atleastoneofyourcarsbeenaffectedbythe“emissionsscandal”?WithaffecteditismeantthatyourcarbelongstothoseofthebrandsVW,Audi,Seat,SkodaorPorschethathavebeenrecalledbyVW.□yes□no □don’tknow

6. TheitemsbelowconcernyourimpressionoftheVWGroupandthe“emissionsscandal”.Howmuchdoyouagreeordisagreewiththesestatements?Pleaseratehowmuchyouagreewiththestatementsonascalefrom1to7,whereas1meansthatyou“stronglydisagree”and7meansthatyou“stronglyagree”.Withthenumbersinbetween,youcangraduateyouropinion.

Regardingtheemissionsscandal,theVWGroupisconcernedwiththewell-beingofitspublics(e.g.customers,employees,investors).

1□□□□□□□□□□7

TheVWGroupisbasicallydishonestconcerningtheemissionsscandal.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Idonot trust theVWGroupto tell the truthabout theemissionsscandal.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Undermostcircumstances,IwouldbelikelytobelievewhattheVWGroupsaysabouttheemissionsscandal.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Regardingtheemissionsscandal,theVWGroupisnotconcernedwiththewell-beingofitspublics(e.g.customers,employees,investors).

1□□□□□□□□□□7

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7. Towhatdegreedoyouagreewiththefollowingitems?PleasethinkagainoftheVWGroupinthecontextoftheemissionsscandal.Pleaserateyouragreementwiththestatementsonascalefrom1to7,whereas1meansthatyou“stronglydisagree”and7meansthatyou“stronglyagree”.Withthenumbersinbetween,youcangraduateyouropinion.

IwouldencouragefriendsorrelativesnottobuycarsfromtheVWGroupbecauseoftheemissionsscandal.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Becauseoftheemissionsscandal,IwouldsaynegativethingsabouttheVWGroupanditscarstootherpeople.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Evenafter theemissionsscandal, Iwouldrecommendcarsof theVWGrouptosomeonewhoaskedmyadvice.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

8. HowdoyoufeelabouttheVWGroupduetothe“emissionsscandal”?Foreachadjectivebelow,pleaserateyourfeelingstowardstheVWGrouponascalefrom1to7,whereas1means“notatall”and7means“verymuch”.Withthenumbersinbetween,youcangraduateyourfeelings.

WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...

angry notatall 1□□□□□□□□□□7 verymuchannoyed notatall 1□□□□□□□□□□7 verymuchdisgusted notatall 1□□□□□□□□□□7 verymuchoutraged notatall 1□□□□□□□□□□7 verymuch

WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...

sympathetic notatall 1□□□□□□□□□□7 verymuchsorry notatall 1□□□□□□□□□□7 verymuchcompassion notatall 1□□□□□□□□□□7 verymuchempathy notatall 1□□□□□□□□□□7 verymuch

9. Whatdoyouthinkoftheemissionsscandalitself?Pleaserateyourattitudetowardstheemissionsscandalwiththefollowingitems.Theemissionsscandalis...unimportant □□□□□□□□□□ importantofnoconcern □□□□□□□□□□ ofconcernmeansnothing □□□□□□□□□□ meansalotdoesnotmatter □□□□□□□□□□ matterstomeirrelevant □□□□□□□□□□ relevant

10. Howmuchdoyouagreeordisagreewiththefollowingitems?Pleaseratehowmuchyouagreewiththestatementsonascalefrom1to7,whereas1meansthatyou“stronglydisagree”and7meansthatyou“stronglyagree”.Withthenumbersinbetween,youcangraduateyouropinion.

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Thecauseoftheemissionsscandalwasanintentionalactbysomeoneintheorganization.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Someoneintheorganizationknowinglycreatedthecauseoftheemissionsscandal.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Theorganizationhadthecapabilitytostoptheemissionsscandalfromoccurring.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Theemissionsscandalwaspreventablebytheorganization. 1□□□□□□□□□□7Theorganizationcouldhaveavoidedtheemissionsscandal. 1□□□□□□□□□□7The organization should be held accountable for the emissionsscandal.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

The emissions scandal was caused by a weakness in theorganization.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

Internal organizational issues contributed to the emissionsscandal.

1□□□□□□□□□□7

11. Finally,Iwouldliketoaskyoutoprovidesomegeneralinformationaboutyourself.11.1. Pleaseindicateyourgender:

□Female□Male

11.2. Howoldareyou?Please,indicateyourageinyears:

___years

1.1. Whatisyourhighestlevelofeducationachieved?□IhavenotyetcompletedHighSchool□HighSchoolDiploma(lowest)□HighSchoolDiploma(middle)□HighSchoolDiploma(highest)□UniversityDegree□Other:______________________

1.2. WhatisyourNationality?

□German□Other:______________________

FeedbackYouhavereachedtheendofthesurvey.Ifyouhaveanyfurthercommentsorsuggestionsonthequestionnaire,pleaseletmeknowbyfillinginthefollowingfield.

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TheEndThankyouagainforyourparticipationandsupportingmyMaster’sthesis!Iwouldbegladifyousentthefollowinglinkofthesurveytoyourfamily,friendsorcolleagues.Themorepeopleparticipateinmysurvey,themoreinformativewillbetheresultsofmystudy.https://erasmushcc.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_a9MJdOahXuuae4BIfyouhaveanyquestionsaboutmystudyorareinterestedintheresults,feelfreetocontactmevia437075lw@student.eur.nl.Anassociationofyoure-mailaddresstoyourstatementsinthequestionnaireisnotpossible.Kindregards,LouisaWanjekContact:[email protected]

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AppendixB–OverviewofItems

ItemName Operationalization

Reputation1 Regardingtheemissionsscandal,theVWGroupisconcernedwiththewell-beingofitspublics(e.g.customers,employees,investors).

Reputation2 TheVWGroupisbasicallydishonestconcerningtheemissionsscandal.

Reputation3 IdonottrusttheVWGrouptotellthetruthabouttheemissionsscandal.

Reputation4 Undermostcircumstances,IwouldbelikelytobelievewhattheVWGroupsaysabouttheemissionsscandal.

Reputation5 Regardingtheemissionsscandal,theVWGroupisnotconcernedwiththewell-beingofitspublics(e.g.customers,employees,investors).

NWOM1 IwouldencouragefriendsorrelativesnottobuycarsfromtheVWGroupbecauseoftheemissionsscandal.

NWOM2 Becauseoftheemissionsscandal,IwouldsaynegativethingsabouttheVWGroupanditscarstootherpeople.

NWOM3 Evenaftertheemissionsscandal,IwouldrecommendcarsoftheVWGrouptosomeonewhoaskedmyadvice.

Anger1 WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...angry.

Anger2 WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...annoyed.

Anger3 WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...disgusted.

Anger4 WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...outraged.

Sympathy1 WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...sympathetic.

Sympathy2 WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...sorry.

Sympathy3 WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...compassion.

Sympathy4 WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeel...empathy.

Involvement1 Theemissionsscandalis...unimportant/important.

Involvement2 Theemissionsscandalis...ofnoconcern/ofconcern.

Involvement3 Theemissionsscandalis...meansnothing/meansalot.

Involvement4 Theemissionsscandalis...doesnotmatter/matterstome.

Involvement5 Theemissionsscandalis...irrelevant/relevant.

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Responsibility1 Thecauseoftheemissionsscandalwasanintentionalactbysomeoneintheorganization.

Responsibility2 Someoneintheorganizationknowinglycreatedthecauseoftheemissionsscandal.

Responsibility3 Theorganizationhadthecapabilitytostoptheemissionsscandalfromoccurring.

Responsibility4 Theemissionsscandalwaspreventablebytheorganization.

Responsibility5 Theorganizationcouldhaveavoidedtheemissionsscandal.

Responsibility6 Theorganizationshouldbeheldaccountablefortheemissionsscandal.

Responsibility7 Theemissionsscandalwascausedbyaweaknessintheorganization.

Responsibility8 Internalorganizationalissuescontributedtotheemissionsscandal.

PCFit1 IhavestrongidentificationwiththeVWGroupwhentalkingtoothersaboutit.

PCFit2 IprefercarsoftheVWGroupwhencomparingitwiththatofotherautomobilemanufacturers.

PCFit3 IampositiveaboutthecompanyimageoftheVWGroup.

PCFit4 WhensomeonecriticizestheVWGroup,itfeelslikeapersonalinsult.

PCFit5 IamveryinterestedinwhatothersthinkaboutVWGroup.

PCFit6 ThesuccessesoftheVWGrouparemysuccesses.

PCFit7 WhensomeonepraisestheVWGroup,itfeelslikeapersonalcompliment.

PCFit8 IfastoryinthemediacriticizestheVWGroup,Ifeelembarrassed.

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AppendixC–FurtherTables

TableB1:CorrelationMatrixPost-CrisisReputation

Reputation1 Reputation2 Reputation3 Reputation4 Reputation5Reputation1 1 Reputation2 .29** 1 Reputation3 .31** .58** 1 Reputation4 .40** .43** .55** 1 Reputation5 .70** .39** .49** .34** 1Note:*p≤.05,**p≤.01;Samplesize=1475;PearsonCorrelation

TableB2:CorrelationMatrixNWOM

NWOM1 NWOM2 NWOM3NWOM1 1 NWOM2 .64** 1 NWOM3 -.57** .44** 1

Note:*p≤.05,**p≤.01;Samplesize=1475;PearsonCorrelation

TableB3:CorrelationMatrixAnger

Anger1 Anger2 Anger3 Anger4Anger1 1 Anger2 .73** 1 Anger3 .59** .48** 1 Anger4 .61** .66** .52** 1


TableB4:CorrelationMatrixSympathy

Sympathy1 Sympathy2 Sympathy3 Sympathy4Sympathy1 1 Sympathy2 .32** 1 Sympathy3 .46** .71** 1 Sympathy4 .54** .45** .57** 1


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TableB5:CorrelationMatrixInvolvement

Involvement1

Involvement2

Involvement3

Involvement4

Involvement5

Involvement1

1

Involvement2

.63** 1

Involvement3

.59** .52** 1

Involvement4

.52** .47** .72** 1

Involvement5

.78** .63** .55** .52** 1


TableB6:CorrelationMatrixCrisisResponsibility

Resp1 Resp2 Resp3 Resp4 Resp5 Resp6 Resp7 Resp8Resp1 1 Resp2 .50** 1 Resp3 .20** .17** 1 Resp4 .26** .27** .35** 1 Resp5 .27** .28** .36** .65** 1 Resp6 .21** .22** .21** .36** .33** 1 Resp7 .17** .14** .16** .09** .11** .09** 1 Resp8 .20** .18** .15** .13** .13** .10** .60** 1Note:*p≤.05,**p≤.01;Samplesize=1475;PearsonCorrelation

TableB7:CorrelationMatrixPCFit

PC_Fit1 PC_Fit2 PC_Fit3 PC_Fit4 PC_Fit5 PC_Fit6 PC_Fit7 PC_Fit8PC_Fit1 1 PC_Fit2 .59** 1 PC_Fit3 .48** .57** 1 PC_Fit4 .67** .44** .38** 1 PC_Fit5 .58** .40** .34** .52** 1 PC_Fit6 .73** .45** .40** .71** .56** 1 PC_Fit7 .70** .43** .39** .71** .52** .79** 1 PC_Fit8 .46** .30** .24** .54** .46** .47** .50** 1Note:*p≤.05,**p≤.01;Samplesize=1475;PearsonCorrelation

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TableB8:ExploratoryFactorAnalysisPost-CrisisReputation

Items FactorLoadings

Regardingtheemissionsscandal,theVWGroupisconcernedwiththewell-beingofitspublics(e.g.customers,employees,investors).(Reputation1)

.651

TheVWGroupisbasicallydishonestconcerningtheemissionsscandal.(Reputation2)

.636

IdonottrusttheVWGrouptotellthetruthabouttheemissionsscandal.(Reputation3)

.691

Undermostcircumstances,IwouldbelikelytobelievewhattheVWGroupsaysabouttheemissionsscandal.(Reputation4)

.640

Regardingtheemissionsscandal,theVWGroupisnotconcernedwiththewell-beingofitspublics(e.g.customers,employees,investors).(Reputation5)

.694

Cronbach’sAlpha .795

Eigenvalue 2.196

%ofVariance 43.93

Note:MaximumLikelihoodwithVarimaxrotationwasapplied;KMO=.706;factorloadingsbelow.4arenot

includedinthetable

TableB9:ExploratoryFactorNWOM


IwouldencouragefriendsorrelativesnottobuycarsfromtheVWGroupbecauseoftheemissionsscandal.(NWOM1)

.904

Becauseoftheemissionsscandal,IwouldsaynegativethingsabouttheVWGroupanditscarstootherpeople.(NWOM2)

.707

Evenaftertheemissionsscandal,IwouldrecommendcarsoftheVWGrouptosomeonewhoaskedmyadvice.(NWOM3)

.627


Eigenvalue 1.708

%ofVariance 56.94


includedinthetable

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TableB10:ExploratoryFactorAnalysisCrisisResponsibility


accountability locality intentionality

Theemissionsscandalwaspreventablebytheorganization.(Responsibility4)

.803

Theorganizationcouldhaveavoidedtheemissionsscandal.(Responsibility5)

.780

Theorganizationhadthecapabilitytostoptheemissionsscandalfromoccurring.(Responsibility3)

.423

Theorganizationshouldbeheldaccountablefortheemissionsscandal.(Responsibility6)

.397

Theemissionsscandalwascausedbyaweaknessintheorganization.(Responsibility7)

.905

Internalorganizationalissuescontributedtotheemissionsscandal.(Responsibility8)

.646

Someoneintheorganizationknowinglycreatedthecauseoftheemissionsscandal.(Responsibility2)

.691

Thecauseoftheemissionsscandalwasanintentionalactbysomeoneintheorganization.(Responsibility1)

.643

Cronbach’sAlpha .686 .751 .664

Eigenvalue 1.692 1.285 1.012

%ofVariance 21.16 16.06 12.66


includedinthetable

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TableB11:ExploratoryFactorAnalysisCrisisInvolvement


Theemissionsscandalisunimportant/important(Involvement1) .869

Theemissionsscandalisirrelevant/relevant(Involvement5) .856

Theemissionsscandalisofnoconcern/ofconcern(Involvement2) .730

Theemissionsscandalmeansnothing/meansalot(Involvement3) .709

Theemissionsscandaldoesnotmatter/matterstome(Involvement4) .660


Eigenvalue 2.961

%ofVariance 59.21


includedinthetable

TableB12:ExploratoryFactorAnalysisAnger


WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeelangry.(Anger1)

.855

WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeelannoyed.(Anger2)

.842

WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeeloutraged.(Anger4)

.752

WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeeldisgusted.(Anger3)

.643


Eigenvalue 2.419

%ofVariance 60.48


includedinthetable

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TableB13:ExploratoryFactorAnalysisSympathy


WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeelcompassion.(Sympathy3)

.908

WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeelsorry.(Sympathy2)

.760

WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeelempathy.(Sympathy4)

.640

WhenIthinkoftheVWGroupandtheemissionsscandal,Ifeelsympathetic.(Sympathy1)

.529


Eigenvalue 2.093

%ofVariance 52.33


includedinthetable

TableB14:ExploratoryFactorAnalysisPerson-CompanyFit


IhavestrongidentificationwiththeVWGroupwhentalkingtoothersaboutit.(PCFit1)

.890

WhensomeonepraisestheVWGroup,itfeelslikeapersonalcompliment.(PCFit7)

.772

IamveryinterestedinwhatothersthinkaboutVWGroup.(PCFit5) .662

IprefercarsoftheVWGroupwhencomparingitwiththatofotherautomobilemanufacturers.(PCFit2)

.652

IampositiveaboutthecompanyimageoftheVWGroup.(PCFit3) .558

IfastoryinthemediacriticizestheVWGroup,Ifeelembarrassed.(PCFit8) .549


Eigenvalue 2.863

Variance 47.72%


includedinthetable

corporate reputation in the volkswagen emissions scandal · world: the volkswagen emissions scandal...

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