VVe never accepted.

VVe were as tall treesbending when the strong wind blowsbut who knowsubmission is just for a time

VVe stowed anxiety in our heartscourage in our handsbullets in our homes

Tenderness and hatred impelled us

Our sons measured their heightby the length of guns

The anguish of waiting weighed on uslike an endless yearning

Happy those who live in our timein freedombuilding freedom

FRELIMO New Year's Greeting, 1970

© copyright, Fall, 1971 by Africa Research Group, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts.

BUILDING FREEDOM:MOZAMBIQUE'S FRELIMO

Edited by: Carol Bengelsdorf

Elsa Roberts

Published by the Africa Research Group, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

PREFACE

This pamphlet presents the philosophy, purposes and programs of FRBLIMO, the MozambiqueLiberation Front. It is an in-depth study of one movement for national liberation; as such, it is only partof the Africa Research Group series on the situation in Southern Africa today. It is designed tocomplement the longer book, Race to Power: the Struggle for Southern Africa.

Race to Power focuses on who has power in Southern Africa today, how they got it, how they use it andhow they hope to preserve it. It discusses African movements for national liberation only in the contextof their opposition to the White governments and their Western supporters. In focusing on Whitepower in Southern Africa, the book presents only half of the story. This pamphlet, and its counterpartsin the series, tell the other half: the response by the African movements to continued White control.

There are movements for national liberation in all of the Southern African countries ruled by Whites.The movements in the Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau arecurrently gaining control over large areas of land. Although the three territories are separated by manythousands of miles, the fact that all three are 'ruled' by Portugal has created the necessity for theliberation forces of each area to work closely together. In the early sixties, MPLA (Popular Movementfor the Liberation of Angola), FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) and PAIGC (Party for theIndependence of Guinea and Cape Verde) entered into a formal alliance called CONCP (Conferenceof the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies). Although each movement works out thestrategy for its own territory separately, this alliance has become important in the political struggle inSouthern Africa. Its main function is to publicize and win support for the Africans' struggle for in­dependence. In addition, it often represents the movements to the United Nations and world opinion.

There are also highly organized nationalist movements in the White-ruled countries of South Africa,Namibia (South W-est Africa), and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). There is a close alliance between thesegroups and those comprising CONCP. This alliance arises out of the need to confront the powernetwork in Southern Africa.

In Race to Powe~ we outlined how White minority rule 'regionalized' the conflict between Blacks andWhites in Southern Africa. We discussed several of the ways the White governments work together toensure their continued control. In response the nationalist movements, and their supporters in in­dependent Africa, have been forced to regionalize their opposition to White domination. Bystrengthening ties and creating an alliance between the liberation movements they have confronted theWhite government's strategy.

Every white-ruled country of Southern Africa has more than one nationalist organization. Thesemovements vary greatly in efficacy and in the extent that they are supported by the Africanpopulation. CONCP works with one movement from each of the non-Portuguese White-ruled coun­tries: the ANC (African National Congress) of South Africa, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People'sUnion) of Zimbabwe, and SWAPO (The South West African People's Organization) of Namibia.Because of CONCP's importance to the independence struggles in Southern Africa, the movements itrecognizes are included in this series. Together, they make up a network that puts independence forAfrican peoples as the most important issue in Southern Africa today.

The story in this pamphlet will be told from the inside - by people actually engaged in the movementsfor national liberation. It will be told in their words, sometimes directly in English, sometimes tran­slated from Portuguese. In either case, it is in the language of political committment. In reading thispamphlet, it is important to bear in mind that the narration comes from the perspective of in­volvement. In many cases the story is written for supporters of the movement and the writer assumesthis perspective is shared by the readers.

'J'"oR6f 1l~~EL.O

~A.EI.JHO

... hJA6E SIHPLE IA)DRDS

ON otJ~ PtDPLE'J So CJLS.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter One:Prelude to Armed Struggle

I. Background to OrgaI1!ization: Resistancen. The Need for Organization

In. The Birth of FrelimoIV. The Necessity for Armed StruggleV. The Call to Arms

Chapter TwoThe War

I. The Story of Ohipanden. The Military Chronology: 1964-1969

m. How FRELIMO Fights ,Character and Organiza1Jion of the ArmyThe Army and the People

VI. The Role of Women in the Revolution

Chapter ThreeThe New Mozambique

I. Political Structuren. Economic Organization

IlL EducationIV. Health

Chapter FourMozambique Today

I. Eduardo Mondlanen. Overall Strateglies of the Portuguese

m Reports from tlhe Front - 1970

Conclusion

A Note on Sources

1

3

8

16

23

29

..52

Ten years ago a small group of Mozambicans organized a party whose goal was to free Mozambiquefrom Portuguese rule. Today large areas of the country are controlled by the Mozambican peoplethemselves. Their struggle is not so much a war against the Portuguese as it is a war for the n'ght tocontrol their own lives. For them, Portuguese colonialism has meant suffering in countless ways _political, economic, social and cultural. They have had enough of this suffering, and are trying now tobuild a new society where they can work together in their own land.-I<

"The purpose of our struggle is not only to destroy. It is first and foremost aimed at building a newMozambique where there will be no hunger and where all men will be free and equal. We are fightingwith arms in our hands because in order to build the Mozambique that we want we must first destroythe Portuguese colonial system ... only after this will we be able to use for ourselves our labor and thewealth of our country."

(Message to the Mozambican people from The Central Committee; Sept. 25,1967)

In this pamphlet Mozambicans will tell us about their struggle: How they organized a party, why theydecided to use arms against the Portuguese, what war means for them today, and how they are buildinga new life. They will talk about the problems which face them and their hopes for a new Mozambique.They will tell us what it means to them to take their lives into their own hands and try to change them.

What do we want?

We want to free our country, Mozambique. We want to reconstruct our land, we are fighting in orderto have a free Nation.

A free Nation means: to have no more slaves, to have schools for all, health services for all, work forall, land for all to .cultivate and produce food.

FREE NA TION is doing away with hunger;

FREE NATION is to end misery;

FREE NATION is to do away with illiteracy;

FREE NATION means doing away with the exploitation of the black man by the white man, of thenational by the foreigner, of man by man;

FREE NATION means the elimination of all the concessionary monopolies dealing in cotton, sugar,sisal, tea, which benefit only one person or a small number of people;

FREE NATION means to have justice and respect for human beings.

(Mozam bique Revolution, 1965)

*Italicized print indicates editorial comment; roman printindicates quotations from FRELIMO. Sources are noted atthe end of the pamphlet.

1

2

ZIMBA&WE

CHAPTER ONE

PRELUDE TO ARMED STRUGGLEIf you want to know who I amexamine with careful eyesthat piece of black woodwhich an unknown Maconde brotherwith inspired handscarved and workedin distant lands to the North.

Ah, she is who I am:empty eyes despairing of possessing life,a mouth slashed with wounds of anguish,enormous, flattened hands,raised as though to implore and threaten,body tattooed with visible and invisible scarsby the hand whips of slavery ...tortured and magnificent,proud and mystical,Africa from head to toe,- ah, she is who I am!

If you want to understand mecome and bend over my African soul,in the groans of the Negroes on the docksin the frenzied dances of the Chopesin the rebelliousness of the Shanganasin the strange melancholy evaporatingfrom a native song, into the night ...

And' ask me nothing moreif you really wish to know me ...for I am no more than a lump of fleshin which, its cry swollen with hopethe revolt of Africa has merged.

Noemia de Souza

Background to organization:Resistance

Resistance to foreign rule took several forms inthe early decades of the century. In rural areaspeople tried to counter Portuguese ex·ploitation by setting up cooperatives, but thesenew economic structures were soon crushed.by colonial authorities. However, in the cities,where Africans had closer contact with thePortuguese the seeds of African nationalsimbegan to grow. In 1920, urban Africansorganized the African League. Its goals in­cluded national unity, unity between thepeoples of different colonies, and unity ofgppressed black people everywhere. Othernationalist organizations crystallized duringthe 1920's. However, when Salazar becamedictator of Portugal in 1926, theseorganizations were outlawed and broken up.

By the late 1940's three groups of Africanswere struggling against Portuguese colonialismthrough secret political organizing and actions.

The first of these groups was the intellectuals(especially those few who had been to Por­tugal), who had come to regard the Portuguesenotion of "national unity" between Portugaland the colonies as hypocritical. Their political

consciousness took the form of cultural ex­pression, since overt political organization wasillegal. Through poetry and prose they playedon three main themes: 1) reaffirmation ofAfrica as their mother country and culturalheritage,' 2) the call to revolt ofblack people all .over the world, and 3) the sufferings of or­dinary black people throughout PortugueseAfrica.

The second group was composed of secondaryschool students who formed an organizationcalled NESAM; they worked to build a senseof pride in their African heritage andMozambican nationhood. NESAM was bannedin 1964, but from it have come many of thenationalist leaders who are today fighting thePortuguese.

Workers from the towns and plantationsformed the third of these groups. In 1947 and1948 they conducted a series of strikes onMozambican docks and plantations. Severalhundred people were deported to a smallisland off the coast of West Africa inretaliation. In 1956 Portuguese police killed 49striking African dock-workers.

3

By the late 1950's it became clear that sporadiclocal resistance would result only in repressionand death. The Portuguese proved this overand over through incidents such as themassacre at Mueda on June 14, 1960. Here isan eyewitness report:

How did that happen? Well, some of these men·had made contact with the authorities andasked for more liberty and more pay ... Aftera while, when people were giving support tothese leaders, the Portuguese sent policethrough the villages inviting people to ameeting at Mueda. Several thousand peoplecame to hear what the Portuguese would say.

Then the governor invited our leaders into theadministrator's office. When they cameoutside, the governor asked the crowd whowanted to speak. Many wanted to speak, andthe governor told them all to stand on one side.

Then without another word he ordered the·police to bind the hands of those who had ~..stood on one side, and the police began beatingthem. When the people saw what was hap­pening, they began to demonstrate against thePortuguese, and the Portuguese simply or­dered the police trucks to come and collect·these arrested persons. So there were moredemonstrations against this. At that momentthe troops were still hidden, and the peoplewent up close to the police to stop the arrestedpersons from being taken away. So thegovernor called the troops, and when theyappeared he told them to open fire. They killedabout 600 people. Now the Portuguese say theyhave punished that governor, but of coursethey have only sent him somewhere else.

(Mozambique Revolution, April-June, 1970)4

Enough of these massacresI have suffered for five hundred yearsI can bear it no longerthis forced labor

I suffered on the railwaysin the fields of cottonin the timber mills and on the sisal plantationsI can bear it no longer

I can bear it no longerthis was the cry of the peopleof those who have suffered~nce the first day of. the invasionThe people say: Enough.

D.S. MAGUNI

The need for organization

After this massacre, things in the north couldnever return to normal. Throughout the regionit had aroused the most bitter hatred againstthe Portuguese and showed once and for allthat peaceful resistance was futile.

Thus, everywhere it was the very severity ofrepression that created the necessary con­ditions for the development of a strong militantnationalist movement. The tight police statedrove all political action underground. .. theexcesses of the regime destroyed all possibilityof reforms which, by improving conditions alittle, might have secured the main interests ofcolonial rule from a serious attack for sometime to come.

The first attempts to create a nationwide ...movement were made by Mozambicansworking in neighboring countries, where theywere beyond the immediate reach of PIDE, the(Portuguese) secret police. At first the oldproblem of inadequate communications led tothe establishment of three separatemovements ...

The accession of many former colonies toindependence in the late fifties and early sixtiesfavored the formation of 'exile' movements andfor Mozambique, Tanganyika's inde'pendence,gained in 1961, seemed to offer new scope. Allthree movements established separateheadquarters in Dar es Salaam (the capital ofTanganyika) soon afterwards.

(Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle forMozambique)

Tanganyika, today called Tanzania, is the Northern neigh­bor of Mozambique and a convenient base for liberationmovement headquarters.

The birth of FRELIMO

In the early sIxtIes, the need for unity ofliberation movements became clear.Eduardo Mondlane, one of the forces behindthe drive towards unity and the first presidentof the united movement, FRELIMO (theMozambique liberation front), tells what led upto his political involvement:

I myself am from the 'Gaza district of southernMozambique', and, like many of us, my in­volvement with resistance of one form oranother goes back to my childhood. I beganlife, as most Mozambican children do, in avillage, and until the age of ten I spent my daysherding the family livestock with my brothersand abs9rbing the traditions of my tribe andfamily. That I went to school at all lowe to thefar-sightedness of my mother, who 'was myfather's third and last wife, and a woman ofconsiderable character and intelligence. Intrying to continue my education after primaryschool, I experienced all the frustrations anddifficulties in store for an African child at­tempting to enter the Portuguese system.Eventually I managed to reach South Africa,and with the help of some of my teachers Icontinued studying on scholarships to collegelevel. It was during this period that my workwith NESAM, and so my serious troubles withthe police, began. When I was. offered ascholarship to America, the Portugueseauthorities decided to send me to Lisbon in­stead. During my brief stay there, however, Iwas harassed so constantly by the police that itinterfered with my studies, and I made efforts

5

to take up my scholarships in the UnitedStates. Succeeding, I studied sociology andanthropology at Oberlin and NorthwesternUniversities, and then worked for the UnitedNations as a research officer in the Trusteeshipsection.

Meanwhile I kept in touch as far as possiblewith developments in Mozambique, and Ibecame increasingly convinced from what Isaw and from my occasional contacts throughthe UN with the Portuguese diplomats thatnormal political pressure and agitation wouldnot affect the Portuguese stand. In 1961 I wasable to visit Mozambique on leave from theUN, and travelling widely saw for myself howconditions had changed, or not changed, sinceI had left. On my return I left the UnitedNations to engage openly in the liberationstruggle, and took a job lecturing at SyracuseUniversity which left me the time and op­portunity to study the situation further. I hadestablished contacts with all the separateliberation parties, but I had refused to join anyof them separately, and was among thosecampaigning strongly for unity in 1961 and1962.

(Mondlane, Struggle)

After September 1962, a single party wasformed, but, Mondlane says, "It took two yearsof hard work, planning and learning from ourmistakes and failures before we were able toset out confidently on an active path towardsliberation."

At the first congress of FRELIMO, the aims ofthe party were defined. Some of these are:

-to further the unity of Mozambicans;-to employ directly every effort to promote

6

the rapid access of Mozambique to in­dependence;-to promote by every method the social andcultural development of the Mozambicanwoman;-to promote at once the literacy of theMozambican people, creating schoolswherever possible;-to encourage and support the formation andconsolidation of trade union, student, youthand women's organizations;-to cooperate with the nationalistorganizations of the other Portuguese colonies;-to procure all requirements for self defenseand resistance of the Mozambican people;-to procure diplomatic, moral and materialhelp for the cause of the Mozambican peoplefrom the African states and from all peace andfreedom loving people.

(Mondlane, Struggle)

The necessity for armed

struggle

it was only after the formation of FRELIMOthat the decision was made to wage a militarystruggle against the Portuguese:

Although determined to do everything in ourpower to try to gain independence by peacefulmeans, we were already convinced. .. that awar would be necessary.

Despite all this, attempts were made to usepersuasion, encouraged by the acceptanceelsewhere of the principle of self­determination. But such efforts were neverrewarded with any kind of 'dialogue.' The onlyreaction to them was prison, censorship, andthe. strengthening of the pIDE, the secret

police. The character of the PIDE is itself animportant factor. For it has a strong traditionof violence - its officers were trained by theGestapo - and it enjoys .a considerablemeasure of autonomy, allowing it to actoutside the control of the official law ...

By 1961 two conclusions were obvious. First,Portugal would not admit the principle of self­determination and independence, or allow forany extension of democracy under her ownrule, although by then it was clear that her own'Portuguese' solutions to our oppressedcondition, such as assimilation by multi-racialcolonatos, multi-racial schools, local electionsetc., had proved a meaningless fraud.Secondly, moderate political action such asstrikes, demonstrations and petitions, wouldresult only in the destruction of those who tookpart in them. We were, therefore, left withthese alternatives: to continue indefinitelyliving under a repressive imperial rule, or tofind a means of using force against Portugalwhich would be effective enough to hurtPortugal without resulting in our own ruin.

This was why, to FRELIMO leaders, armedaction appeared to be the only method.

(Mondlane, Struggle)

The call to arms

To c?eate conditions for a successful armedstrugft!~ we had, on the one hand, to preparethe' population inside Mozambique; and, onthe other,. to recruit and train people for theresponsibilities which such a struggle wouldimpose.

There already existed within Mozambique themakings of a structure through which the workof preparation could proceed. Almost all thosewho gathered in Dar es Salaam to formFRELIMO were part of underground forcesinside Mozambique; the three parties whichmerged had members in various regions, andthese, together with the NESAM network ...formed the basis of an organization which thenhad to be consolidated and expanded. Throughthis, the aims of the party had to be explainedto the population; the people had to beorganized into cells, the general level ofpolitical consciousness raised, the activity ofthe cells co-ordinated ...

Favourable conditions already existed: thesuffering caused by the colonial system; thedesire to take action; the courage anddetermination that a war demands. AllFRELIMO had to provide was the practicalunderstanding and the organization ...

The problem of training involved not only themilitary aspect. The deficiencies of the'Portuguese educational system meant that ourmovement was desperately short of trainedcadres in all fields. We could see that thesuccess of future armed action would createthe need for people with a variety of technicalskills and a certain level of basic education ...We had, and have, the task of making up for

years of diligent neglect under the Portuguese..IX ........\And so a military programme and an.'..,·" ,educational programme were conceived sideby side as essential aspects of our struggle. ..

,~ ",

,I7

If you ask mewho I am,with this face you see, you others,branded with marks of eviland with a sinister smile,

CHAPTER TWO

THE WAR

8

I will tell you nothingI will tell you nothing

I will show you the scars of centurieswhich furrow my black backI will look at you with hateful eyesred with blood spilled through the yearsI will show you my grass hutcollapsedI will hike you into the plantations wherefrom dawn to after night-fallI am bent over the groundwhile the labortortures my body with red-hot pliers

I will lead you to the fields full of peoplebreathing misery hour after hour

I will tell you nothingI will only show you this

And thenI will show you the sprawled bodiesof my peopletreacherously shottheir huts burned by your people

I will say nothing to youbut you will know why I fight.

Armando Guebuza

The story of Chipande

On September 25, 1964 the first militaryoperation of FRELIMO was launched. Thestory of Alberto-Joachim Chipande shows howthe movement developed to this point throughthe eyes of one person:

I myself decided to join the struggle becauseevery man should be free, or if he has to,.should fight to be free ...

I first heard about a certain organization for­liberation in 1960. That was MANU ...Certain leaders worked among us. Some ofthem were taken by the Portuguese at themassacre at Mueda on 14 June 1960 ... Afterthat experience I had a still stronger feeling forthe need to get our liberty. And when everyoneelse considered what had happened they beganto act as well, and they supported MANU.

And then in 1962, when FRELIMO was formedin Dar es Salaam, its leaders invited somedelegates from inside Delgado to go and talkwith them. People who had previously sup­ported MANU began supportingFRELIMO ...

After the formation of FRELIMO I became anorganizer inside Delgado. This is how weworked. We had formed an agriculturalcooperative at Mueda, and when FRELIMO'sleaders knew of this they sent delegates insideDelgado to ask the leaders of ourcooperative. .. to support FRELIMO.They. .. agreed that they would use thecooperative as long as possible as a means ofpolitical organization. We had only a fewpeople in the first year, and then in the secondyear we cultivated cotton... And ourcooperative developed. Many joined; and sothe Portuguese company (in Mueda) got shortof labour, and we began selling our cotton evento that company. We leaders worked hard andvoluntarily; we took no percentage of the crop,we had no profit in money... Then thatPortuguese company complained to theauthorities that our cooperative was really ananti-Portuguese political organization. In 1959the .le~der -Lazaro _Kavandame - wasarrested and sent to Porto Amelia. But weweren't demoralized; we continued. Then themassacre occurred and they banned ourcooperative movement.

At the end of 1960, Lazaro came back, and wetalked things over about how to find new waysof working. The authorities said they wouldallow no organization with many members in it- 30 was the most they would allow. Weagreed to that and founded a cooperative with25 members to grow rice. In the first year weproduced a good harvest, we had money in thesavings bank, enough to pay wages and we alsobought a tractor... In 1962, after the for­mation of FRELIMO, people began givingactive support. We had many contacts withDar through secret messengers, and we beganissuing membership cards. We startedorganizing people. Some of them werearrested, and again we came under Govern­ment suspicion.

This time it was different. Now the Portuguesewanted our groups to work for the destructionof FRELIMO. They said that we should sendmen to Dar to create confusion. We sent ourvice-chairman, and the Portuguese gave himmoney for his journey. But we gave him adifferent task. We gave him a letter to theleaders in Dar to explain why he had themOiley, and this money we told him to give to~ELIMO and we found the necessary money,ourselves. So really this man went to Dar as adelegate to the First Congress of FRELIMOwhile pretending to the Portuguese to be theiragent. He came back after the Congress andtold the Portuguese that there were conflicts inDar between the various groupings inFRELIMO ...

Then he went again in September as ourdelegate. But this time it went wrong. ThePortuguese weren't so simple as to accept whathe said just like that. They sent our comradeagain, but they also sent another man to spy onhim. .. When our comrade came back, hewent again to the Portuguese and told them

nothing had changed - the groups iil Dar stillcouldn't agree with each other; but the real spyhad meanwhile given the Portuguese a verydifferent and real report. So after our comradecame back the second time, the Portuguesestarted arresting and interrogating ourcomrades - that was in January 1963. In'February they arrested Lazaro, the chairmanof FRELIMO in our region, and the next daythey arrested our comrade who'd been thedelegate ...

After that there were many arrests, and PIDEagents were all over the place. Many died inprison; others came back with broken health.We had a comrade working in the ad­ministrator's office at Mueda. He warned us byletter about those who were going to bearrested. .. On 13 February, early in themorning, the administrator of Mueda camewith armed police to the Catholic missionwhere I was a teacher ... But we - LourencoRaimundo, also a secretary of our cooperative,and I - had decided not to sleep there. Wemade off when we heard the noise of the truckscoming. We stayed all day in the bush, andwhen night fell we walked to Tanzania. We

.walked from the thirteenth to the eighteenth,and then that night we crossed the Rovumainto Tanzania.

We got to Lindi and there we were met by arepresentative of FRELIMO. We told himwhat had happened. Many refugees came tooat that time, because of the Portugueserepression. We held a meeting and decided.that some members of our cooperative shouldgo back into Mozambique, because we knew itwas our duty to mobilize the people, and thatwithout us the people would not have leaders.We decided that the partly educated youngermen should go to Dar for further training,while the older men should go back into

Alberto .Joaquim Chipand,·

Mozambique and hide there to go on withmobilization ...

In Dar the leaders asked us what we wanted todo. We said, to join the army. They asked us,didn't we want scholarships? No, we said, tofight. So our leaders made contacts withcountries ready to help, and the first wasAlgeria. In June 1963 we went to Algeria andtrained there until the spring of 1964. On 4June we got orders, 24 of us, to meet thePresident of FRELIMO, and he told us wewere chosen for a missio~. Next. day we wentdown to Mtwara. On 15 August we were or­dered by the representative of FRELIMO toleave that night. We crossed the .frontier, andthere inside .Delgado we found waiting for usthe arms and equipments for my group, sixFrench rifles, twelve pistols, five cases of handgrenades. . . We took these and started for theSouth, through the forest, but with orders notto begin till we had the word from ourleaders ... We were not to attack Portuguesecivilians, not to maltreat prisoners, not to steal,to pay for what we ate ...

9

10

My group had orders to go towards PortoAmelia. We found it hard, because theenemy was patrolling day and night along theroads and even the bush paths. At one point"my group had to wait a couple of days beforewe could get past. We had good contacts, butbecause of the Portuguese patrols, it wasarranged that at dangerous points only oneman should receive us. We suffered from foodshortage. And we had to take off our boots forfear of leaving tracks for the Portuguese tofollow; we walked barefoot.

We advanced to Macomia. From there wecouldn't get on to Porto A~elia, because thePortuguese had set up a blockade and they'dmobilized the people against the bandits ...The bandits used to pillage Indian shops, andthe Portuguese said we were like that. Thisheld us back. The Indians informed thePortuguese of our tracks. We came to theconclusion that we should start the struggle.We were already fifteen days' walk from thefrontier with Tanzania. So while there inMacomia, not able to get any further andwanting to start, we sent messengers to Dar totell them the details of the situation and ex·plain the dangers of delaying while the armedbandits were around ...

On 16 September we got our orders from Darto begin on 25 September; that was at ameeting of our group leaders. We decided thateach should go to his own area and begin.Through organizers we planned that the peopleshould rise at the same time - a real nationalinsurrection. To defend the people after that,each group should form militias and explainthings to the villagers, while also sabotagingthe roads, and, of course, attacking the Por­tuguese soldiers and administration. That wasthe outline of the plan we made ...

(Mondlane, Struggle)

THE MILITARY CHRONOLOGY: 1964-1969

September 25, 1964: the first military offensive- several administrative and military postsin Cabo Delgado attacked.

November. 1964: attacks extended to Niassa,Zambezia and Tete;. Portuguese, un­prepared, are unable to maintain defenses infour provinces at once. FRELIMO con­solidates position in Cabo Delgado andNiassa.

1965-mid-1966: no FRELIMO major of­fensives: mining of roads, ambushes,strengthening and consolidation of militaryand political" position, and training of newrecruits by FRELIMO.

Mid-1966-mid-1967: over 30 Portuguese basesattacked.

Late 1967: fighting extended in all regions;control in Cabo Delgado to the river Lurio,surrounding Porto Amelio (the capital);control in Niassa to the Marrupa-Maua line;to the south, the Catur zone; to the west,conditions for reopening the struggle in Teteand Zamhezia are created.

March, 1968: military operations begin in TeteProvince.

How FRELIMO fightsToday over one fifth of Mozambique iscompletely freed from Portuguese control.Beyond these 'liberated' zones, anotherprovince, one of the most importanteconomically and politically is contested. Thisis the Tete province, which contains con­siderable resources, is crossed by importantlines of communication, and is' the site of the

projected Cabora Bassa Dam. The dam, beingbuilt largely by South African interests, will beassociated with a major development planwhich will benefit mainly outside capitalistinterests and Portuguese settlers. It is con­sidered one of the major targets in the newphase of the war.

MOZAMB/QUE=GtIfUAl SauMwn 1910

TANZANIA

ZAM8lA

FRELIMO successes do not come because ofadvanced know-how. FRELIMO has no air­craft; it uses arms retrieved from the enemy orsupplied by friendly foreign nations. Guns arescarce. FRELIMO success is based on acombination of good organization, knowledgeof the land, support by the general population,and determination. This section will examinesome of these factors that contribute toFRELIMO success.

Character and orpnlzation of the army

The army is representative of the population atlarge, in that the vast majority of the guerrillasare peasants initially uneducated, illiterate andoften unable to speak any Portuguese; butthere is also a scattering of those who have hadsome education within the Portuguese system.The majority naturally come from the areas atpresent affected by the fighting, because it isthere that widespread campaigns of politicaleducation and training programmes arepossible. There is, however, a continual streamof people from further south, from all overMozambique, who escape in order to join thestruggle; and at the beginning, many peoplefrom refugee camps, who had fled from everydistrict of Mozambique to escape r~ression,

joined in as soon as a structure to contain themhad been created. In the army, people fromdifferent areas accordingly mingle, so thateach unit contains representatives from dif­ferent tribes and different areas fightingtogether. In this way, tribalism is being ef­fectively combated within the forces, and anexample is being set to the rest of thepopulation.

This is not the only way in which the armyleads the way to social change. By accepting.women into its ranks, it has revolutionizedtheir social position. Women now playa very

11

12

active part in running popular militias, andthere are also many guerrilla units composedof women. Through the army, women havesfarted to take responsibility in many areas;they have learned to stand up and speak atpublic meetings, to take an active part inpolitics... When a women's unit first visits avillage which is not yet sufficiently involvedwith FRELIMO, the sight of armed womenwho get up and talk in front of a large audiencecauses great amusement, even incredulity;when the villagers are convinced that thesoldiers in front of them really are women, theeffect on the astonished men is often so force­ful that the rush on recruits is very muchgreater than the army can cope with or thanthe area can afford to lose.

The army is helping to raise the standard ofeducation as well as of general politicalconsciousness. Recruits are taught whereverpossible to read and write, and to speakPortuguese, and even where an organizedteaching programme cannot be arranged, theyare encouraged to help each other to learnthese basic skills. Indeed, the Portugueseauthorities are increasingly suspicious ofordinary peasants who speak Portuguese,because they know that these are more likelyto have learned it in the FRELIMO army thanin a Portuguese school. The army alsoorganizes various specific training programmessuch as radio work, accounting, typing, as wellas in subjects more narrowly orientated to thewar...

It is clear from these comments that the role ofthe army goes far beyond simply fighting thePortuguese. Like the party, it is a nation­making force. It prepares not just soldiers butfuture citizens, who pass on what they learn tothe people among whom they work.

Leadership is not based on rank but on theconcept of responsibility; the leader of acertain body is referred to as the man'responsible' for it. There were some leaderswho had had a little schooling; but very few ofthese, even among those in the most importantpositions today, had gone beyond primaryschool...

After fighting began, the army was enlargeddramatically with new recruits from the areasof action; and in order to use this growingforce efficiently, the organization had to berapidly improved. The army itself wasorganized into battalions subdivided intodetachments, companies and units. This hasmeant that, while small-scale operations canstill be carried on over a very wide area ofcountry, we also have available much largerforces for more important actions, such asattacks on Portuguese bases or against theMueda air-base...

In addition to the guerrillas, the people:-.·militias help carry out the war:

..While there is fighting in an area, they (themilitias) coordinate their activities with theguerrillas, reinforce them when necessary, andsupply them with information about theparticular locality. When the guerrilla forceshave liberated an area, the militia can thentake over the. organization of defence, ofproduction and supply, leaving the main forcesfree to move on to a new fighting area. Inregions where there is not yet an active armedstruggle, militias are formed in secret whosetask is to prepare the ground for guerrillafighting; to mobilize the people; to observe thePortuguese forces; to arrange supplies andassistance for the guerrillas as they move intothe region.

In a sense, these people's militias are the back­bone of the armed struggle. The guerrillascarry the main offensive and do most of thedirect fighting, but it is the work of the militiaswhich makes it possible for them to operate...

Miguel Ambrosio, company commander fromCabo Delgado: I have fought in Zambezia andNiassa, far from my own region and my owntribe. I have fought in the country of theChuabos and the Lomes ... The Chuabos, theNyanjas and the Lomes received me even morewarmly than if I had been from their ownregion. In Western Niassa, for example, I cameacross Comrade Panguene, and although he isfrom the south, you couldn't distinguish himfrom the people of the region: he is like a sonof the region. The people understand that weare all Mozambicans... The people are unitedand help us. Otherwise, for instance, wecouldn't go into enemy areas; it is the peoplewho give us all our information about themovements of the enemy, their strength andtheir position. Also, when we start working inan area where we have no food, because wehave not yet had the opportunity to grow any,the people supply us and feed us. We also helpthe people. U~itftiashave been formed ina region, we protect the people in their fieldsagainst the action and reprisals of thecolonialists; we organize new villages when wehave to evacuate the people from a zonebecause of the war; we protect them againstthe enemy.

(Mondlane, Struggle)

The army and the people

The people are a constant source of in­formation and supply for FRELIMO, whilethey are a further source of danger to thePortuguese. FRELIMO's forces live for themost part off what they produce in the fightingareas, and what has to be transported is takenon foot through the bush between the smallcentres which have been established. As aresult, FRELIMO has no vulnerable supplylines, no military or economic strategicpositions to defend. The loss of a single smallbase or area of crops is not very serious; it hasno significance beyond the immediate loss ofresources.

(Mondlane, Struggle)

Visitors to Mozambique described therelationship as follows:

We saw many examples of the complete unisonbetween the army and the civilian peasantfarmers. At one of their meetings, for instance,an army commander asked the Youth Leagueto assign some if its members for a patrol, asthe army was occupied elsewhere. This theydid - and the group included both boys andgirls. On another occasion, in one of thecamps, the peasants arrested two soldiers whohad left the camp without permission. Civiliansactually arrested the military. Their sub­sequent treatment was extremely interesting.For they were not punished, but given anideological lecture before the whole camp,including reprimands by the local people. Thecommander invited general opinion andeveryone was allowed to speak. Some monthsearlier three Portuguese deserters had beenfound wandering in the bush by some peasantswho immediately brought them to the army.

(Mozam bique Revolution. 1967)

13

14

The role of women

It was in October, 1966, in a meeting of theCentral Committee, that FRELIMO decidedthat the Mozambican woman should take amore active part in the struggle for nationalliberation, at all levels. It was decided that sheshould receive political and military training inorder to make her more capable of fulfillingwhatever tasks the revolution might demand ofher. Thus, a few months later, in the beginningof 1967, the first group of women from CaboDelgado and Niassa began their training. Atfirst this was merely an experiment to discoverjust what contribution women could make totl1e revolution - how they would use theirinitiative, whether they were in fact capable offulfilling certain tasks. The "experiment"proved highly successful and this first group ofwomen became the founder members of thewomen's detachment, and were scatteredthroughout the interior each with her specificassignment. It was soon discovered that theycould play a very important role both in themilitary and political fields, but especially inthe latter.

One of the prime functions of a women's armyis, quite naturally, just like the men's army,participation is combat. In Mozambique thewomen's military activities are usually con­centrated in the defence of the liberated areas,thus freeing the men for the offensive actionsin the zones of advance. However, many of thewomen prefer the more active combats in theadvance zones, and choose to fight alongsidethe men in ambushes, and mining operations,where they have proved themselves as capableand courageous as any of their male comrades.As another aspect of this function, we havealso women working in the Department ofSecurity constantly on the look-out for enemyinfiltration.

Josina Machel, a political commissar in thewomen's detachment of FRELIMO,head ofthe section of social affairs and a fighter on thefron t line, died on April 7, 1971 from illness.Sh~ was 25 yeat:s old.

Although highly effective in the field ofcombat, their contribution has been lessnoticeable (just because of their relativelysmall numbers compared with the men) thantheir activities in the political field, where theirimpact has been far out of proportion to theirnumbers. Since 1967 the women havedemonstrated that they have a key role in themobilization and political education of boththe people and the soldiers themselves. In thiswork we explain to the people the need tofight, what kind of struggle we are waging, withwhom we fight, and against whom, what arethe reasons for our'struggle, what are our aims,and why we chose an armed struggle, what areour aims, and why we chose an armed struggleas the only means to independ~nce. We ex­plain the work we are doing and the results wehave achieved so far. We explain how we aredependent to a certain extent on foreign aidand which countries and organizations arehelping us, and that, despite this help, we mustbe as self-reliant as possible. -

In this connection, it is stressed that thesuccess of the revolution depends on thecombined efforts of everyone such that no onecan be omitted, and thus the traditional rather"passive" role of women must be changed sothat their abilities are used to the full. Womenare encouraged to give their opinions inmeetings, to participate in the various com­mittees, etc. Here we have the rather difficulttask of fighting old prejudices that women'sfunctions should be confined to cooking,rearing children, etc. It has been proved thatwe women can perform this task ofmobilization and education better than themen for two reasons. Firstly, it is easier for usto approach other women, and secondly, themen are more easily convinced of the im­portant role of women when confronted withthe unusual sight of confident and capable

female militants who are themselves the bestexamples of what they are propounding..

In addition to its political work, the women'sdetachment also has extensive duties in thefield of social welfare. We assist and givecomfort to families who have lost relatives inthe war. This is extremely delicate workrequiring a great deal of patience. We also runthe FRELIMO orphanage, which not onlycares for orphans, but also children separatedfrom their parents due to the war. Some of ourwomen are trained in first aid so that they canhelp the medical assistants in the healthcentres. Many of our women are also workingin the Department of Education in. theirliteracy campaigns and in the primary schools.Here again we have to overcome the outdatedprejudices of fathers and husbands regardingthe idea of education for women. But we aregradually winning the battle for they realizethat a literate and educated woman makes farmore constructive contribution to therevolution than an ignorant one.

Thus, apart from its strictly military functionsthe women's detachment has importantpolitical duties on two levels. At one level it ischarged with the mobilization and education ofthe people, to increase the effectiveness oftheir participation by developing their politicalunderstanding of the war. This we do foreveryone, irrespective of sex, although we havea unique opportunity to reach our own sex thatis denied to our male comrades. Once this hasbeen achieved, we work at the next level ofencouraging even more active participation byinviting people to follow our example, to leavetheir homes and train as fighters, nurses,teachers, etc. In this way the size of thewomen's detachment has increased con­siderably since that first experimental group.

(Josina Machel, "The role of women in theRevolution," Mozambique Revolution, 1970.)

A guerrilla woman of the women's detachment with a captured rifle.

15

CHAPTER THREETHE NEW MOZAMBIQUE

A mango does not become a great tree in its first day, but like a growing mango tree, we are deeplyrooted in the soil that is our people, and the masses are now tasting the first fruits.

(Samora Machel, September 25, 1970)

The relationship between armedstruggle and nation-building

Black mothercradles her childand forgets .

.that the grains of maize are withering in the earththat the store of groundnuts vanished yesterday

She dreams of wonderful worldsWhere her child will go to schoolThe school where The Men go to learn.

Where her child will run and play in the street,In the street where The Men walk.

wonderful worldswhere her child will be able to live

Marcelino dos Santos

-16

The task ofcreating a new life is integrally partof the process of gaining freedom.

One of the chie'f lessons to be dr~wn fromnearly four years of war in Mozambique is thatliberation does not consist merely of drivingout the Portuguese authority, 'but also ofconstructing a new country; and that thisconstruction must be undertaken even whilethe colonial state is in the process of being

destroyed. We realized this in principle betorewe began fighting, but it is only in thedevelopment of the struggle that we havelearned quite how rapid and comprehensivecivil reconstruction must be. There is noquestion of making a few provisionalarrangements and waiting until we control OUIwhole country before deciding how to governit. We are having now to evolve structures andmake decisions which will set the pattern fOJthe future national government.

(Mondlane, Struggle:

Politica.l. Structure

In the liberated areas, the political structure isthe party. In the villages, people's, militias arecreated which are dependent on the local partyorganization and on the military leadership ofthe zone; their power rests on the nationalistand revolutionary forces. Besides this,economic life is organized so that theproducers work in cooperatives under thedirection of the local party; this takes awaYIfrom the chief his traditional role as organizerof the economic life and at the same time putsan end to the exploitation of the peasant by anyprivileged group. It should also be stressed thatthis process is not a 'dictatorship of the party';the party is an open organization, and itsmembers are drawn from the wholepopulation, with the majority being, as is themajority of the population, peasants; its role isto provide a political framework above thelocal level. There is no deep distinction bet­~een party and population: the party is thepopulation engaged in political action. _

Public meetings, held through the local party,are an important part of life in the liberatedareas. At these, non-party members can hearmore about FRELIMO and about the struggle,can voice their opinions, ask questions andenter into discussion. At the present time theadministrative life of villages is beingreorganized on the basis of people's com­mittees elected by the whole population, andthe way is being prepared for the extension ofthis system to the district level.

The void left by the destruction of the colonialstate posed a practical problem which had notbeen clearly envisaged by the leadership; aseries of services disappeared along withPortuguese rule, particularly services' of a

17

commercial nature, while the people con­tinued to exist and to require such services.The inadequacy of the colonial administrationmeant that there were also many social needsthat had never been met but which werenevertheless strongly felt by the population.Thus, from the time of the first victories in the'war, a great variety of administrativeresponsibilities fell on FRELIMO. Apopulation of some 800,000 had to be served.First and foremost, their material needs had tobe satisfied, an adequate food supply assured,and other important articles such as clothes,soap or matches provided; then medical andeducational services had to be established, andadministrative and judicial systems organized.

For a time the problem was acute. We hadbeen unprepared for the extent of the workbefore us, and we lacked experience in most ofthe fields where we needed it. In some areas,shortages were very serious; and where thepeasants did not understand the reasons, theywere withdrawing their support from thestruggle and in some instances leaving theregion altogether. During the two years afterthe struggle began, the battle to build upservices was at least as important as themilitary one. By 1966 the crisis was past. Theworst shortages had been overcome, andembryonic structures had been formed forcommerce, administration, health andeducation. The New Mozambique wasbeginning to take shape.

(Mondlane, Struggle,)

18

Ecorwmic organization

Production is of extreme and immediateimportance, since it is necessary for the sur­vival of the population, of the army and of anycivilian services. In this context, food is ob­viously the first need.

With the overthrow of the colonial system, the,companies which had imposed the productionof cash crops either through plantation or thesystem of forced cultivation, withdrew. Thepeople were free to organize agriculture asthey wished and to concentrate on their ownneeds. As a result, after the war liberated aregion, there was a return to the production ofsuch basic food crops as maize, cassava, millet,beans, and groundnuts. But the war imposedadditional demands on food producers.Although the military grow their own foodwherever possible, there are inevitably largesections of the army which cannot be self­sufficient; also, to avoid reprisals from thePortuguese, it has been necessary in manyareas to evacuate peasants and install them innew villages, where they need to be suppliedwith food until the first harvest from their newfields; in some areas a part of the crops isregularly destroyed by Portuguese action.

The people are constantly encouraged to clearmore land for cultivation and to grow morefood, and this campaign has been so successfulthat, despite the hazards and upheavals of thewar, more land is actually under cultivationtoday than there was during the colonial ad­ministration. Even after the first year of war,more food was being produced than before.Now in some areas, as at' Nga'iela, 80 per centof the land cultivated had not previously beenproductive.

Tne greatest impetus to production has clearlycome from the abolition of the companies, andfrom the fact that the people now themselvesprofit from their work...

FRELIMO is at present studying various waysof developing agriculture, to improve yields,promote variety an~ develop the productton ofcrops for export. The high plateau of Niassa isideally suited for market gardening, and we arehoping to introduce the diet of the populationand eventually provide a source of income forthem.

(MOIidlane, Struggle)

As soon as the armed struggle begins in anyarea commercial activities are reduced to thevery minimum. The Portuguese colonial armycannot tolerate the possibility of any com­mercial activities taking place betweenfreedom fighters and any Portuguese or Asiantraders. Consequently whenever the armedstruggle starts in any province or district inMozambique the Portuguese authorities orderthe closure of commercial establishmentsexcept for those which directly serve thePortuguese army'.

Since our people must continue to live as muchof a normal life as possible despite the war, wehave had to establish our own shops in as manydistricts as possible. Using the proceeds fromthe exports of agricultural surplus we importessentials, including salt, oils, textiles and somehousehold equipment, which are then sold,through our shops, to the local population. Inthe liberated areas now there are 47 travelingtraders organized by FRELIMO to providesuch basic commercial services.

(Mozambique Revolution, 1967)

The patriot is not only hewho fights the aggressorswith weapons.NO!The honest manwho works the soil of his countryand waters it with his sweatHe too is a revolutionary.

Manuel Gondola

19

EducationWhen the Portuguese withdrew educationalfacilities in those areas affected by the armedstruggle, from the point of view of the Africanpopulation, there was little enough to with­draw: under Portuguese administrationAfricans are normally excluded altogetherfrom secondary education; primary educationis so scarce that no more than a 5 per centliteracy rate had been achieved over the wholecountry; there were no African graduates.What education was provided was heavilyorientated towards supporting the colonialregime; it consisted mostly of Portugueselanguage, Portuguese history and religiousinstruction. Thus, in setting up educationservices in the liberated zones FRELIMO hashad to start from scratch, with little trainedpersonnel, without textbooks and without asyllabus.

FRELIMO has set up the framework toorganize educational services. Already in theliberated areas 100 schools have been startedwhich provide primary education for about10,000 children. The student-teacher ratiovaries from 250: I to 25: I and there is asuperintendent of schools in the district. Sometextbooks have been written and more are inpreparation. The education department ofFRELIMO is in the process of working out asyllabus which will be relevant to the needs ofthe people and the liberation struggle. Owingto the lack of one predominant nationallanguage, the children still have to begin theirschooling by learning Portuguese. However,other subjects taught are: the history of theMozambican people, geography of Mozam­bique, arithmetic, basic health and hygiene,and civics. Civics lessons explain the reasonsand purposes of the national liberationstruggle, so giving the student the basis of anunderstanding which will enable him to take a

20

more active and advanced role in the struggle.There is also a programme of manual workdesigned to counter the general aversion towork caused by the Portuguese system offorced labour..

It is not only the children who are anxious tolearn. When school is over, in many districts,the teacher still has a good part of his work infront of him, running an adult literacy class.However the organization of adult education isstill at an embryonic stage and data still has tobe collected about numbers, aptitude andmethods.

A class in

The lack of m~terials and staff is a majorproblem. FRELIMO is importing variousschool equipment to the bush schools butmany of them have to make do with veryrudimentary materials. The teachers them­selves have often only' received pnmarreducation and 4ad no~pecial instru~tion·inteaching.

This last problem should gradually bealleviated by the work of the more advancededucational programmes run from Tanzania.

(Mozambique Revolution, 1967

HealthIn the liberated areas the people are in greatneed of all kinds of so<;ial services, includingmedicine. Once the Portuguese army wasforced to retreat from these areas, the officialhealth services, were withdrawn along with theadministration, the schools, where there wereany, and those missionary institutions whichdepended on the favours they enjoyed fromthe Portuguese colonialist government. Im­mediately after the beginning of the armedstruggle in some of these areas the Portugueseadministrative centres and the mission stationswere turned into military garrisons for thePortuguese army, and where any medicalservices continued they were reserved for thetreatment of wounded soldiers.

This situation forced the MozambiqueLiberation Front to provide some alternativeservices for those Mozambicans who chosefreedom and were lucky enough to findthemselves in the midst of areas controlled bythe liberation forces. We therefore had noalternative but to accept the responsibility ofgiving as much assistance as possible to all thepeople living in liberated and semi-liberatedareas.

In order to make this possible we established amedical structure capable of planning,organizing and directing such medical servicesas w~ could afford to maintain.

Inside Mozambique, FRELIMO establishedseveral health centres in each liberated area.These centres are of various kinds and dif­ferent types of medical assistance are given tothe sick members of the civilian population aswell as to those who are from time to timewounded by the Portuguese terrorists. Themedical centres vary from one district toanother, depending on the kind of equipmentthat we are able to provide.

(Mozambique Revolution, 1967)

"At night in the liberated areas the peopleof the villages gather by the fire and singand dance in complete freedom, as in thetime before the arrival of the Portuguese.The old people tell the children about thecrimes the Portuguese practised againstthe people, when they occupied that

territory. They tell them about episodes inthe liberation struggle, the courage of ourguerrillas. The Portuguese oppression inthese regions appears now as a shadowthat has passed."

But what we have done is still very little. It isvery little compared with what still needs to bedone. We have destroyed the colonial machinein certain areas - but we have to destroy itcompletely, everywhere. We have liberatedsome regions of Mozambique but we mustliberate the whole territory of Mozambique.About 800,000 Mozambicans are now free, butwe must free all the seven million whichconstitute our people. We are giving educationto some thousands of young Mozambicans ­but we must create conditions under which allMozambicans will have the opportunity tostudy. We have liquidated some of the com­panies which exploit our labour and our wealth- but. we must liquidate all the companieswhich exploit us, all the thiefs of our land.

(Message from the Central Committee to theMozambican People, Sept. 25, 1%7)

"When millet sprouts up in our fields, it is because we had previously prepare.d the ground and wateredthe seed with the sweat of our own work. The future is always built on the every day work of our handsand minds."

(1963 New Years message to FRELIMO militants from the Central Committee)

21

[

22

-

NoSeek me not.

.I am not lost.

I liveStrong and determinedFollowing the pathCut by FreedomThrough the fangs and claws of oppression

CHAPTER FOUR

MOZAMBIQUE TODAY

Eduardo Mondlane

I liveIn my peopleFiring my guns and bazookasAlong the road to peace.

I liveIn the body of my mother-earthUsing the strength that is mine

I liveOne with the massesWith a protectionThat shelters me,With hatred for the enemy,Complete and unreserved.

And if it is my shots which are heardAnd I who still fight on,It is because I shall never retreat.Never, never, never,Until my people prevail.

Bebe, 1%7

Eduardo Mondlane was the founder and firstpresident of FRELIMO. On February 3, 1969he was killed by a bomb sent to him throughthe mail in DarEs Salaam, Tanzania. This daymarks the end of an important chapter in thehistory ofFRELIMO. Today Samora Machel isthe president ofFRELIMO and Marcelino DosSantos is the vice-president. One year after theassassination, FRELIMO published thistestament to the role Mondlane played inFRELIMO:

A great sadness enveloped our people. Con-. fused, they wondered how it could havehappened; disconcerted, they remembered thelesson learned in battle -look for the cause ofdefeats in our own weakness - and wonderedif the organization itself might have some weakpoints. The militants understood that suddenlya heavier load had fallen on their shoulders;the people demanded explanations andclarification. For a few weeks the militaryoffensive slowed down, the militia stoppedcultivating and the people stopped tran­sporting material. Each of us asked ourselves

about the future of the organization and of ourstruggle. And there were many among us whothought that with Mondlane a whole heritageof possibilities had been lost.

His presence was the guarantee and the symbolof our efforts: the efforts to determine thenature of our struggle; the efforts to define thenature of the enemy, not by the color of hisskin but by his activities against the interests ofthe people; the effort to give FRELIMO a basesolid enough to ensure that the Organizationcould survive and the revolution continuewithout depending on the physical presence ofone individual; the effort to make FRELIMOindependent in its relations with othercountries, accepting only aid which was givenwith absolute respect for our struggle and ourpeople.

In all of these efforts he was at the forefront. Inparticular, he was the first and most en­thusiastic in the effort to educate, to preparepolitically, to give to the largest number ofpeople the weapon of knowledge, even when

23

they showed doubt or indifference. His deathappeared to us (and this was the intention ofour enemies) as a threat to all of that. And, infact, it did unleash dangers, hatred and otherminor upsets. We had always been consciousof how such an event could be used as aweapon against the Front. Mistrust andsuspicion set in around us.

And nevertheless, during this period, disciplinewas maintained. The militants showed calmand strength and exhorted the people not todespair. They reminded the people of thecauses and the aims of our struggle, whyMondlane had died, and. why he had lived.They recalled his teachings - that forMozambicans the choice was not betweenliving and dying, but between living freely andliving in slavery. The people and the soldiersunderstood that this was a bigger political test,harder than a battle against armed Portuguese,demanding more courage than resisting dailybombings, being a part of the effort towardsself"efficiency. In this way they confronted thisnew challenge and pledged that this heritagewould be saved by all means. -

Today, one year after the death of Mondlane,we can say that this pledge has been kept. Wehave achieved a greater unity. We have openednew schools for our children, and new medicalcenters for the wounded and sick. We haveincreased production so that most of theregions are self-sufficient in food. We havelearned much - we learn every day. Theheritage was not only saved but developedeven more.

(Frelimo Information, 1970)

24

Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel at the Second Congress of FRELIMO,1968

25

Today the war goes on. In 1970 the principalareas of action were the Tete province andCabo Delgado province. The following twoexcerpts from FRELIMO reports show how theshape of the war is changing - what theportuguese are doing in the face of continuedFRELIMO successes and how the Mozam­bicans are confronting new Portuguese tactics.

The first excerpt examines overall strategiesfor the war; the second looks at particulardevelopments in 1970.

Overall Stratelfies of the

Portuguese

Facing the development of our activities, how.has the enemy reacted?

On the one hand, by strengthening itsrepression, on the other by utilizing apsychological approach borrowed from thetradition of French colonial repression inAlgeria and America in Vietnam, trying to sowtrouble and dissatisfaction among the peopleby encouraging tribal and racist feelings. Butabove all the enemy has resorted to increasedcooperation with the white powers which areentrenched in the south of Africa, namelySouth Africa and Rhodesia. The SouthernAfrican alliance, particularly whereMozambique is concerned, can only becompletely understood after a consideration ofthe close links which unite on economic,political and - in the broad sense of the word- cultural levels, the settler minorities whichare now in South Africa, Rhodesia andMozambique. Established for the sole profit ofthe colonialists, cooperation in this southernhorn of Africa can only strengthen, making thearea a bridgehead for the recolonization of the

African continent. Its effect can already bedangerously felt through the alternative threatsand attempts at seduction practised on theAfrican countries of the region.

The third element in the Portuguese tactics isthe compromising of international capital inthe exploitation of the colonies so that, asPortugal's Foreign Minister said, they willbecome "more committed to the defense ofour Overseas Provinces." (Angola, Mozam­bique, Guinea-Bissau). A prize example is theCabora Bassa construction project, whichrepresents at the same time the two objectivesof colonial policy in Mozambique: thestrengthening of economic integration of thewhite powers in Southern Africa and thecomplicity of international capital in main­taining her colonial presence in Africa.

This dam, on the river Zambezi in theMozaIJlbican province of Tete, is an essentialpart of the economic integration of thealliance; it will supply cheap electric power toSouth Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Malawi,and eventually to the other countries of thearea. The construction and finance, estimatedat $360 million, have been left to an in­ternational consortium comprising SouthAfrican, French, West German and otherinterests.

However, the most serious political con­sequences relate to the scheme for importing afurther one million white settlers, which wouldbe made possible by the acquisition of 2,500hectares of newly-cultivable land. No one candoubt that this number of settlers wouldconstitute in effect a human dam opposed tothe liberation of the African people, not only inMozambique but throughout the region. Thestrategic implications are obvious - the SouthAfrican Prime Minister Vorster has said that"the frontier of South Africa is now at the

Zambezi" - but apart from that it is throughthis project that the true nature of investmentsmade under the Portuguese flag is totallyexposed in its hostility to our people.

Results that can already be seen on the groundare the participation of South African troops inground and air operations in the province ofTete.

Armando GuebuzaReport on the LiberationStruggle in Mozambique(presented, Rome, 1970)

Report from the Front

1970

The Portuguese appear to have some difficultyin deciding on a consistent approach to theirproblems in Mozambique. Only a little over 18months ago the Governor General told theLegislative Assembly that in Cabo Delgado andNiassa districts guerrilla infiltration had been"progressively eliminated." Later at theopening session of the Governing Council hesaid that the situation in Cabo Delgado andTete was "graduallly returning to normal." Yetonly a· year later that felt compelled to launchthe largest offensive they have ever undertakensince the start of the war six years ago·. It seemsthat they try to compensate for what theycannot achieve militarily by interminablepropaganda about the end of the war being insight.

In fact, however, our military reports indicateexactly the opposite. A comparison betweenour activities in the twelve month period July1968-June 1969 and the following year July1969-June 1970 is surely overwhelming proofthat our forces are progressing from strength tostrength.

Apart from this increase in the scale of ouroperations, there have been no spectacularchanges in our strategy or programmes. Thelast military review a year ago traced thegradual evolution of the struggle through theearly days of isolated mines and sabotage, thenmore and more ambushes and regular attacksagainst fortified posts culminating in highlyorganized offensives using all these tactics totheir best advantage. This we continue to do.

Our fighters are concentrating on intensifyingtheir activities in the areas where they arecurrently operating and firmly consolidatingtheir position. The enemy continues to holdout in isolated encampments with their landcommunications severed. Our peoplecharacterize our military situation and defineour strategy by referring to the African saying:"To kill a snake in a hole, don't put your handinside it; pour in hot water and the snake willcome out - then kill it." !,he Portuguese areisolated in their posts, their "holes." Wecreate conditions that force them out - bycutting their communications and hence theirsupplies and by constant harassment. Oncethey are out, more vulnerable, then we attack.

To go back just twelve months, in May 1969four lorries heading for Mueda hit our minesand were blown up, putting 16 enemy soldiersout of action. The following January we blewup more conVoys, on the 7th and 22nd, and inFebruary the post of Miteda itself was bom­barded. In May the enemy made a concertedeffort to reopen the road, but our mines againdestroyed two vehicles, one on the 2nd andanother on the 18th, killing seven soldiers.Three days later they tried again - this timewith a tractor in front - but again it wasdestroyed together with a lorry and they wereforced to return to Mueda yet again. One June1st they sent out yet another convoy, this timepreceded by a group on foot to detect our

26

NI

M's"IO 1U" 11I

CABO DELO~...__~01~

mines. But when they found one and started todefuse it, it exploded killing three of them. Theremainder of the squad refused to continueand everyone returned to Mueda. Three dayslater our fighters ambushed a group of Por­tuguese soldiers near Miteda, killing six, andtwo days after that a further convoy that triedto get through was ambushed. Two vehicleswere damaged, a number of soldiers killed, andthe others forced to retreat. It is a similar story011 other main roads - Muidumbe-Nangololoeleven times, Mueda-Sagal fourteen times,both in a littie over twelve months; Diaca-Sagalfifteen times in six months. .

The isolation, both in terms of the physicalaspects of the war terrain and of the freedomof movement, coupled with the insecurity ofnever knowing when or from where the nextattack will take place, has very adverse effectson the morale of the Portuguese troops,particularly the conscripted men who form thevast majority. Our forces have always beenaware of this fact, both from their con­versations with prisoners and deserters andfrom their observation of the enemy in ac­tion ...

This marked escalation in our activities overthe last 12 to 18 months, despite manyproblems, could not have been achievedwithout the full participation of the' civilianpopulation. .. Previously, the major par­ticipation of the populations in the struggle waslimited to the defense of their zones, thetransportation of material, the supply of foodto the militaty bases and the provision of in­formation on the movements of the enemy.Today the people also participate actively inthe offensive activities, with militias fightingside by side guerrillas. All the problems of thedevelopment of the struggle are discussedtogether by both groups and at the same timethe guerrillas participate actively in the tasks of

national reconstructIOn. The distinctionbetween civilian and military becomes less andless discernible ...

And the enemy is well aware of this. It wasalready mentioned in our last report how thePortuguese were now acknowledging that"control of the people" was the crucial factorin the battle, and had begun various measuresof "psychological warfare" to win over thelocal population by inculcating in them anappreciation of Portuguese values and way oflife. The Portuguese are now seeking to in­creasingly involve the African populations inboth defense and development by at­tempting to establish garrisons of locallyrecruited troops and by speeding up variousdevelopment programmes, of which theirvarious settlement schemes are aU' integralpart.

Following the American and British examplesof using "strategic villages" to better controlthe activities of the local population, Portugalhas been spending vast sums of money

. (reportedly $2.5 million in 1968) on theestablishment of these "strategic villages"(aldeamentos). During October 1969 the"Noticias" of Lourenco Marques published" aseries of articles on the new aldeamentos. Itdescribed one, Marere in -Cabo Delgado, asbeing under 24-hour vigil from all sides, withsentinels posted openly or in trenches anddefended by the army, the militia, the PublicSecurity Police (PSP) and the Fiscal Guard. Itis a significant indication of life in these set­tlements that more and more people arefleeing from them into the liberated zones.

The reason for this seems to be that thePortuguese are caught in an insolubledilemma. They have observed from the ex­perienced of FRELIMO that with the supportof the people anything can be achieved, even

. against overwhelming odds. They therefore tryto seduce the populations with their"development programmes," not realizing thatthis will achieve nothing as they will not givethe one thing the people really want - theirfreedom. Moreover, any positive effects thatthese measures might have are far outweighedby the necessity to resort to more and morerepressive actions in order to stay in control.

A recent UN report based on studies by an AdHoc Working Group of experts established bythe United Nations Commission on HumanRights states that:

"Evidence as a whole revealed that with theintensification of guerrilla activities, thePortuguese military and police are in­discriminate in their methods of capture andmore often than not of innocent men, womenand children who are herded into con­centration camps there to suffer beatings andhumiliations. A witness likened the treatmentof African prisoners to 'tortures reminiscent ofNazi heydays.' "

Portuguese tortures27

"Portuguese reprisals, in the form of takinghostages, following a scorched earth policy,massive and continuous aerial bombardmentsand indiscriminate killing, are a normal featureof the war in the three Portuguese colonies ofAngola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau)."

"The general pattern of evidence revealssevere conditions of torture by the use of suchinstruments as 'palmatoria' - a flail or paddlewhich inflicts severe pain on hands and feet ­electric shock appliances and outrightbeatings. Inflicting torture is one of the mostcommon features in the Portuguese territoriesapplied' by police, prison and militaryauthorities."

There has been marked increase in the ac­tivities of the dreaded PSP and PIDE (nowrenamed Directorate Ge'neral ot Security) inMozambique. In December 1963 the Director­General of PIDE visited the territory and in thesame month the number of PIDE personnelwas increased by almost 40 per cent from 475.to 662. A more recent indication of this trend isthe 1969 military budget which increased thePIDE allocation by 20 per cent and that ofpublic security by 24 per cent. There Was also a124 per cent increase for prisons; the prisonpopulation in Mozambique exceeds 250,000.Official Portuguese figures for 1968 show that atotal of 13,549 Africans were arrested by thePSP during the year, 5,715 of them for "crimesagainst public peace and order." 182 werehanded over to PIDE. According to a report in"Le Monde" in November 1969, some 3,000Africans are being detained without courtaction in the prisons of Machava andMabalane for having refused to denouncemembers of FRELIMO ...

By far the most important means of controland repression in the colonies is the armedforces themselves, who now number more than

28

60,000 in Mozambique. Over the past 18months there has been considerablereorganization of the military to cope with thedeteriorating position overseas. The Por­tuguese Ministries of the Army and Defensewere merged in order to effect closer in­tegration of military and logistic operations.Parallel measures in the colonies were in­tended to deal more efficiently with "sub­version" by bringing abO'Ut a closercollaboration between military commandersand administrative authorities. Changes inregulatioas governing military service havebecome a regular feature of the Portuguesescene as the manpower demands of the warscontinue to rise. Latest amendments in Sep­tember 1969 and February 1970 concernedcompulsory extensions of certain officers inthe reserve and certain classes of demobilizedtroops, provision for tlW recall of officers ofcertain classes, and the annual training ofreserves.

All these measures hardly conform with of­ficial statements about guerrillas being"progressively eliminated," but then neitherdoes the latest huge offensive mounted by thePortuguese in Mozambique.

Operation Gordian Knot: Beginning in May1970, the Portuguese began a huge offensiveagainst FRELIMO forces, designed to "put anend to the war once and for all." Events in theprevious few months had led it to be expected.In January the arrival of two ships in the samemonth with a total of 3,000 new troops was anearly sign that a major effort was about to takeplace. In addition, the civilian Governor­General was replaced by a military man,major-engineer Arantes e Oliveira, and theCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces wasreplaced by Portugal's "top expert" in guerrillawarfare, General Kaulza de Arriaga. He waspreviously one of . the advisers of the Por-

tuguese Military General Staff and was one ofthe founders of the colonial regime. Soon afterhis appointment, the General paid a viSit to theUSA where he had lengthy talks with GeneralWestmoreland on the American tactics used inSouth Vietnam. He then .arrived in Mozam­bique to put into practice his new-foundknowledge, announcing that "in a few weeksFRELIMO forces will have been liquidated."

According to the communique issued by thePortuguese High Command, they deployed inthis offensive 35,000 troops· supplied with15,000 tons of military equipment. In additionto the regular troops they used a special corpsrather like the marines, called "special hun­ters" (cacadores especiais) and also com­mandos. Much new war material was broughtin - such as jets (which were being used inTete and Niassa but which appeared for thefirst time in Cabo Dalgado on 29th May 1970),and increased numbers of bombers andhelicopters, armoured cars and anti-mine cars.For the two weeks following May 20th, thePortuguese carried out daily bombing raidswith squardons of 164-20 planes, including jets,bombers, reconnaissance planes, propagandaplanes (equipped with loudspeakers) andhelicopters. They then attempted to attackthree of our bases with ai~lifted and artilleryforces, but all they succeeded in doing was toburn a few huts - the bases. had already beenmoved elsewhere some time previously: thenature of our war determines that we do nothave fixed bases. Yet despite this they issuedalmost daily communiques about thedestruction of "dozens" of FRELIMO bases,the capture of "many tons" of equipment,death of "hundreds of terrorists." In fact theydid not cause us any serious losses, either inmen or material, nor did the offensive in anyway affect our control over the area ...

l-

This offensive was extremely important toFRELIMO, but not in the way the Portugueseanticipated. It was important because itconstituted the first real test for us, and wewere able to face up to that test. It revealed thelevel of development of our struggle, how solidour organization is, how high is the fightingspirit of our fighters and our people. The factthat we were able to confront victoriously, inone operation, 35,000 Portuguese soldiers(more than half the Portuguese army' inMozambique) equipped with the most modernweapons and with the constant support of astrong air force, demonstrates... that ourpeople are absolutely determined to defend atall costs our revolutionary achievements andmarch on to new fronts. What was wrong withthe Portuguese "show of force" was that it

,completely ignored the determination ofour people, our determination to be free.

(Mozambique Revolution 1970),

BULLETIN: As this pamphlet goesto press, we have received wordthat Portuguese troops in theCabo Delgado province have beenforced to withdraw from five stra­tegic posts over the last fourmonths. FRELIMO operations fromMay 9 to June 18 in various areasresulted in 73 Portuguese soldeirsbeing killed and 16 vehicles be­ing destroyed. One total of 17prisoners were freed and onebridge was destroyed by guerrillas.

"Our life is the war. If we sleep two or three days without hearing of the war it seems that we have nolife. Food, clothes, etc., do not matter to us ... We know how to distinguish the whizzing of theweapons of the enemy. Where there is a fight we are able to tell: 'Now that was our fighters who fired.Now it was the enemy who fired.' When our weapons sing, our hearts become filled with joy, becausethat means that the enemy is feeling our force, our children are teaching them that our country wantsto be free and will be free."

(Kapingo Namumbi, Chairman of a local FRELlMU branch)

It is beautiful to see an ideal cherished intensively for a long time take shape and be converted intoreality. Especially when that ideal means freedom, peace, progress - in short, happiness - for awhole people. Moreover, when the· realization of that ideal is not accidental, does not comehaphazardly but is the fruit of a common work, of the conscious efforts of thousands and thousands ofmen, women and children, who accept suffering sacrifices, animated by a firm will to see that dream,that they have dreamed for a long time, become concrete. It is beautiful to see the liberation of ourcountry, Mozambique, take shape.

Life in the liberated areas is a simple life, marked and inspired by the Revolution. The morning starts at'about 5 a.m. The people go out for their work - to the shambas, to carry water, to pound maize, topeel off the cassava, to build storehouses, to cut wood, to chop timber to build houses, etc. Theguerrillas and the militias go to patrol work. The children go to schools.

The conscience of the Revolution is present in all the work, and manifests itself in the force put into allactivities by the, people. There is an immense number of cultivated fields in the liberated areas. In someareas, as in Namachude (Cabo Delgado) and Ngazelo (Niassa) about 80 per cent of the land iscultivated.. ln some other areas production is less, due mainly to the lack of rains and to the monkeys,which devastate the fields, as for example in Cuero. But the people work with intensity, with per­severance. We know we are producing for ourselves, and not for the Portuguese colonialist "boss."And this gives us a new spirit.

There is, it is true, the problem of air-bombings. The Portuguese, unable to conquer our guerrillaforces, take revenge on the civilian population, bombing all the villages they can spot. However, theharm caused by those air-bombings is now less than at the beginning of the war, because the peopleknow how to build anti-aircraft shelters and to camouflage themselves. The crops were destroyed byair-bombings in some areas. Our people accept this situation with a revolutionary spirit and optimism.One peasant told how last year an aircraft dropped one bomb in his field, drying up the earth in an areatwenty meters in diameter. "That place where the bomb fell was the one which produced the most," hesaid.

29

30

In t~e field of education, there are more than 20,000 students in· Mozambique in theFRELIMO schooJs. There are only primary schools as yet, many of them i~ the _open air. There is ~ack

of teachers - in many zones, for example in Namkaba-ehinde, there is only one teacher for more than12(fstud«:mts: Material for teaching is almost non~exisient; the students 'have to write'C)D a blackboardwith dry cassava as chalk. Instead of paper or slates they use a piece of wook, which they later scrapewith a knife to erase what they wrote. Many of the students have to walk several miles to the nearestschool. On the way they often have to hide themselves from aircraft. However, the number of studentsincreases, in spite of all difficulties, and the progress they make is considerable.

In every Province, District, Locality and Circle, there are committees entrusted with the ad­ministration of that zone, responsible for the maintenance of order, the supervision of production,organization of the schools, direction of the militias, etc.

Every day the guerrillas make reconnaissance, to prevent surprise attacks. When they locate theenemy, the guerrillas take the necessary steps; to assur.e the protection of the population in hide-outsor to prepare defenses; to inform the military base in order to prepare the intervention of a strongerguerrilla force if necessary. Other guerrillas watch the movements of the enemy. And at the rightmoment, the ambush takes place.

This is the reality that is today liberated Mozambique. We have reason to be satisfied with the resultswe have already achieved in the struggle for the liberation of our country. Of course we shall not sleep

.over our successes. On the contrary, these successes encourage us to continue the struggle with evengreater determination. Because they prove that, in spite of all difficulties - and they are many - thefinal victory is certain. Our country, our people want to .be free and will be free.

'Editorial, Mozambique Revolution,

·How can we tell you the size of our Dream?!

During centurieswe waitedthat a Messiah might free us ...

Until we understood.

Todayour Revolutionis a great flowerto which each daynew petals are added.

The petals are the landreconquered,the people freed,the fields cultivated,schools and hospitals.

Our Dream has the sizeof Freedom.

FRELIMO, 1969

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A note on sources:

Mozambique Revolution is the official English language journal published by FRELIMO. It appearsseveral times a year, and can be obtained from FRELIMOheadquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.(FRELIMO, Box 15274, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania)

The Struggle for Mozambique is a Penguin book written by Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's firstPresident, shortly before his assassination. It is the single best description and analysis of Portuguesecolonialism and the struggle for freedom in Mozambique.

FRELIMO Information is the official French language journal published by FRELIMO in Algiers.

FRELIMO communiques and interviews have also been used, as indicated in the body of this book.

For other sources of information, see the companion volume to this book, Race to Power: the Strugglefor Southern Africa, available from the Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge,Massachusetts, 02138.

Building Freedom: Mozambique s FRELIMO was edited by:

Carol Bengelsdorf, who has worked extensively in East Africa and in Latin America and has writtenseveral articles on problems of education in these areas. She has taught at Harvard University and atM.l.T.

Elsa Roberts, who is involved in developing curricula and training teachers in the area of culturedifferences of minority group children. She has been associated with the African Studies Program atNorthwestern University and has worked in East Africa.

Cover by Coby Everdell Lettering and maps by Mike Prokosch

Photographs courtesy of FRELIMO .

This pampWet is part of the Africa Research Group series on Southern Africa. It is designed to be readin conjunction with Race to Power: the Struggle for Southern Africa, a book which analyzes the whitepower structure in Southern Africa, and its bases of support among the Western powers. PampWets onthe other nationalist movements in Southern Africa will be available in October, 1971.

Africa Research Group is an independent, non-profit research and educational organization based inCambridge, Massachusetts. It prepares materials on Africa, especially on African-American relations,for distribution in the United States and Africa. The Group contributes regularly to newspapers andmagazines in the United States and Africa, and offers a range of publications on issues relating to thedevelopment of Africa. A complete literature list is available on request.