,

I

CGI j:o. 1~9'161

, Published by tho Dircctol'nto of Int<llli(l'lnc6

Contral Intolligence Atoncy

THE SITUATION IN SOUTII VlE'rl'~\M

.' SANITIZED ~",*,A /A:tY/?6 (24 - 30 Soptcllbor 1()G4)

Authority - .'1 . ~i/?? CON TEll T S , ,y ,Im'f .' ~AR', ~" . ..Q/?/?R

. I.

A~

B.

SITUATION Wl'flIIN SOu"!'!! VIE'J'IIAr.!

THE WEEK III PERSPECTIVE

POLITICAL SITUATION

Rhade revolt settled, but issues remain (P. 1); Binh Dinh province

o disorders call~orth. emergency measures (p. 1); High National Council formally launched (p, 2); General Hl"k's optimism about the

. Council appeal's ill-founded (P. 2); teBSion among miIi tary keeps coup rumors circulating; Khiem and Thao sent overseas (p. 3); further govern­ment changes reflect h~anh's anxie­ties (P. 3); labor troubles sub-side (P. 3); smoldering 3uddhist­C2tholic tensions could !Inite at any time (P. 3); spreading goverCllftent paralysis crea"tes exploitable power vacuu~s (p. 4); Saigon government activity slow;; (p. 4). .

~!ILITARY SITUATION

Slight decline in Viet Cong military operations noted (p. 5); successful Viet Cong guedlla pattern persists (P. 5); little significance seen in decline

Page

iii

iii'

1

•

5

.

..

(P. 5); ARVN actiYi:.:t~y-=~~p~p~e~a~rs~~ ____ ~ ______ ~~ ___ r I -I . . ii COpy r . 1 2 NOV 1976

BAcKGn~¥.NWlN<£a{N"tSl0HNSON.lIBRARY NO 'FOaB_ a" ~ 1:''' .....

-8:EC:R:BT- . P"IFMED ff,f 96 ...

•

r •

, , "

,

C,

I:ot" .... lly u".U .. chd I,y pOlitical conditions (p, G); ... _ Cl'ut Una Dnd conScl'tption p,'o­g,'alllS Ing (p, 7); casu"lty ""d' T/eapons loss figures continuo to favo," Viet Con" (p, 7),

h~ONOHIC SITUATION

Mino" :fluctuations in pdce levels noted (P. 8); i;ood rice harvests reported, but OKP01't Pl'OSPl!cts are poor (p, 3).

THIRD COUNTllY DEVELOPMENTS

Saison and Ban&kol< plotting to <.Ise ' 1("-" !;<!l. against Sihanouk (p, 9)-;­Sihanouk seeks fir_r ChiC"",

o co_i t .... nt in Poipi'ng (1', 10),

III, DEVBLWHENT:s IN Tift: Bl.«:

Hnnoi-l'eiping reaction to t'hot pursui tIt tluthol'izatit>n relatively r.lild (P. 11); hiSh-Illvel DRV "erega­tion atte"diltg Peiping celebration (p, 11); routine replaCeMents of bloc diplo~~ts in Hanei (p,,11),

, . ,

G

11

•

" .

'!I-i-l -.-,,,.-C-O-p·'-y-'-----.:,,.-; NO

aM?lES

. SECRET 0, •• -

" " -". --

. -. "' ....... ,., ... ", . ..

0(

i ! i . . __ .. _-1 .. ______ ....... :'-1.. ~,.

TH~ILAND I

-~~. ':l::t~ " .~' "W.o .. ,,-­•

~ .i , ,

;-- .. "'--""'--

. I

00:;. ..... '" : C('I.F (IF

.'1!.,: A ,y.

.............. _ ..... , .........

... ~ .. H ...... 'U .... , .. ....". .. "".

. ,

:'.h ••. ,.·." ....

.7

i T-':O ";' }~L.;''''''

. i

"

I CORPS ZONE "" ......

~.

\ ~on •. , -.

ZONE ,'.

•

•

. , -- ~ ~

-

II CORPS ZO)lE

MILITARY BOUNDARIES· As of 15 April 1964

,~ .. 'n'" MiIItQ', ' .. t .... ltoundoty • __ Incfep.nlent or •••• uncl.."

____ Dlvl.lonhund."

•

'.

· . • ,

· '

I '

'.

"

•

1. SITUATION WITHIN SOU1'H VIETNAM ~ _._---

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE: . . .. ' '. .' ,-·.,..1.

The Situation remains fragile, but Premler.I{hanh appears .. , to have survived the Immediate crises of the Rhade revolt and the labor unrest which last week sel'iol\sly threatened his re-gime. Subsurface tensions persist between Buddhists and .., Catholics and could erupt Into renewed open clashes at any .

. tlnle. The Buddhists are USing the lull to strenghten their po­sition In the armed forces. The Buddhlst-ol'iented People'li .

. Revolutionary CQmmittee continues to expand its influence in Central Vietnam. . .

Government paralysis continues and may be getting worse. One bright Sign, however, is General Minh's continued interest

"hrth<l wClll'k of the l'ecently inaugurated-High National Council. Minh's apparent commitment of his considerable prestige to . this effort to orsanize a provisional civilian regime contrasts with his previol!s apathy alld reluctance to engage himself per­sonally in the continuing st.arch for political stability.

If Khanh can make his ouster of GeMral Khlem and other controversial figures in the military e stllbllshment stick, the possibility of an urly coup will have been diminished, and he may hitve somewhat more room for maneuver in his. struggle to hold the administration together until power can be turned over to the projected civilian regime.

The Viet Cong are keeping significant pressure on the government in the form of a nationwide campaign of terror~ Ism and harassments. They retain the initiative and have the capability to step up the level of activities at will, des­pite periodic fluctuations which probably have the purpose of "catching their breath." Significantly, the weekly average of Communist-initiated incidents has increased from 342 on 1 January 196410 apprOXimately 5.50 today. This progres-sive rise Is s~'~~~~~,~~~~~~ of increased Vie,...t::c;o;n.::g~-:-":"' __ I strength and of an r,

. . ,':','

',;,', .

. ',' .. - , ... ," ",':,/;. , . ';" ",', . '" ., ,. :.1

'/-'

•

• ~ S14CnET

" NO fOllEIG~ P(f;SEM

nACKCHOUl'n llS~; ONf,Y

As paralysis of the government 8l,rcads, thEr Viet Con" can be 'expected to exploit the ,situation with wide­spread terrorism, Including political agUation and sub­version.;

-

..

, ,

-•

•

f/ , i Iv COpy... i

• "11 . . *. ~ BACKGRI-t~O~~S JOHNSON.lIBRARYJ'

NO FO~8SBM • , _

-.. , . . • ': ,-, , . ." .,' .

"., ,':

"

• • •

I' "

" "

. '

,

-, '-','

,

~;o }~O:UU(j:r

D/iC!:;G:lOtIND If .. :a ONJ.Y

A. POI,ITICAL SITUA'rION

1. Tho IIhlde .'ovolt in Oal'lac nlld Quane Duc p.'ovillces appoars to havo subsi ... d, but tho circum-stonces undo.' which 'it was tinally broueht un"or .,' , conh'ol ''''y contain tlla see<19 of" luturo dlUieu1;" tios for tbo' govo.'nmcnt. On 27 September, ,six ' ,

'government coapnnios occupied Don Sieu· Pa. which bold out the longest of any of tho fivo CIDG camps

'involved in the .'ovolt. This' nction came otte¥, Some sixty VietnaMeso hostaeos h"d bean rescuod Iroll tho' ' cnmp th.-oueh tho intel'vontionof Ibnedean mUitary, advisors. Premier Khnnh lntor in tho day' particl": pntcd in a ceremony tit tho caMp to .ark rostoration of . covern.ent conhool. .

AlthouSh Khan" toolt a sanorally moderate lino in his address to the tribesmen, the government'. show of forco in compelling: Bon Sal" Pa's capitulation could )"aise tl"ibest:len f~ doubts as to the sincerity

~f profossed government intentions ~ r~mOve tbo' causes of tribal discontent.

" ' , . , ',,<~' • ,.'

Khanh later indicated to AMbassador Taylor that he considered the IIh.do uprising satis­factorily l'osolved, lIis outline of plans for futuro handling of tribal problems .included moving' some of the CIDG units involved to ne", locations, assignment of new Vietnamese Special Fo~ces units containing some Montagnard officers, aBd .arly convention of another Mbntagnard conference to 0&31 with pro~lems raised at an August meeting wi til tl'"ibal leaders in' Pleiku. Khanh claimed that only the leaders of the evolt would be punisbed--If they can be found. ,

General lIestmoreland,\and RVlIAF Chief of :staff General Vien are to meet soori to worle out Dew ground rules' governins the often uncomfortable rolationships In CIDG camps betweon tho Vietnamese military, the US Special Forces, and tribal CIDG units.

2. Continuing unrost in Qui Nhon and outlying areas in Binh Dinh Province, preCipitated on 20 3ep-' tember by activities of the People's Revolutionary' Council, has led to declaration of a state of amor-. goney for tho entire The decree, among . f ' .

-1- ' COpy JOHNSON:LJ8RARY ,... .

... . .. .. ..'

, ' ... . .. ,', ... ' .... : ..... .• ' ~.J' "~" .,t.', ,,<," . ~fi:·£.;.;:(:~·;, .'i ~~~"f" ;:,;!.,{;;.:..:,~.:,<~

I , !.

- -

~C](g7!-"

NO }o'(Ja~JGN fn :;:~j i~M IlJ\Cl:GJtWlID la;g OXJ.Y

. ---

other thincs, b.ns all de",onstl-atiolls, ImbUe ~ c:atherins" _nnd sh-nes untll :Cu.-ther notico. Two battalions have been flo"n into Qui Nhon to help tho local Garrison _nintain order. 'three persons wero killed .nd othel-S wounded last week as goverru.ent.· :Corces fired on ~emonstrators in a belated effort to restore order.

3; The Hi~h National Council was officially lAuDChed on 26 Septellber. 6ight of its'i7 lIe.,!;ers sat on the Council of Notables, abolished !~st spring by Kha~h as a holdover from the Minh regime. The People's RevolutioJ>Ory CO""'ittee, the rapidly ex-

, pandinc newpoJ.itical movement in Cenh-al Vietnam, is represented by its founder, Dr. Le Kbac Quyen, and one of his deputies, sit on the new Council. The Council is fairly representative of the various re1i­Cious and politic.l croupincs, but it includes no military representation and its membership is not especially distinguished. Its newly elected chair­man is Phon 100ac stiu, an elderly' nation. list politi-·

eo cian whose long iJJlprisollJltent by Dieln has left him in a weakened physical and mental state.. General Minh has stated tt\at he will provide the ttlinJc~' betw~en the Council and the Dilitary.

4. General ~inh 28 September I , ,

-

told the Ambassador on

•

-'

5. Tension within the military establ1slun~nt during the week gave rise to mOl"e than the usual nUlilber

, . rl . -2- cony "r : 'I ., r: _ _ .

BJI~KGaOUNO USE ONLY "f ,NT.l!r'AJ!N£S JOHNSON.lIB~~RY J

- -

r

-- .

.' :

-

l

'. I,

I I , I I "

I' I

, "

,

-

,

, '

of coup ,'IIJn01'S. 'rh" tenGion .. _y havo b"en related to' reports thet the )'ollng scnerals had renel/ed-p.'es- ' suro on Khanll to pureo tllo a"" of s""h din'rao 8\'OUl'" liS tho D.lat gene,'als, tho offlc"rs "Q"ponsiblo for " ' the 13 SeptelOb"r coup attelftpt,G.n ... ·al Khiem, Dnd as_ sorted other oUic.,·s objectionable to tbe )'oune' " , generals." ' Al thollch the latter h:lvO denied tho, cave', Khanh an ul tim. tum backing up their dellU\nds, tllG ns-," 5 ianment abrond of Khiem nnd Khanll '5 pnss aide, Col. Phn01'Ngoc Thao, reflects Khllnh's distrust of tbese. officcrs and sUGS.sts that pre6sure had been brought to bear on the Pl·.mier for their removal.

6. Othar government chances announced on 30 $eptombeL" included Khanh's acceptance of tho re­signation of Deputy Premier Do Muu, ",ho' has been the> target of criticism from a number of "roups, Dnd Ceneral Nguyan Cao,.a former land development offi-

, ~ ... . ,

cial who most recently had been serving in tho Premior's officG.. The bnckground of these suddenly announcod . changes is not ye'e'" available', but it would allpellr

o that Khl'lnh, in allian<;:G with or under pressure trom tho young genel·als, h:.s movQ:d to forestall a poss ible coup attcmot by o:£:CicorS sharing the selltimonts of

'. ,((,O~_I,

, ~I\\.J

7.. There have been no further outbreal~ of labor trouble in Saigon since the gencral strilte last weelt, but indications that the gover"l"ent is llither unablo or unwilling to carry out its promise of inter­v"ning w1th the manngelDent of the ¥imite" Textile 1.1111 on behalf of workors may foreshadow further O".Jtbreaks in tho ncar futul·e.

s. The Embassy, in a new look at Buddhist-, Catholic tensiOns, comments that bad feeling still, smOlders just below the> surface and could ignite> again at an, tine. A spate ofnnti-Buddhist documents has appeared recently a ttempting to linle Buddhism \'lith. CommuniS", and clniming that Buddhist policy is aiced at tho elimination of Catholicism from Vietnam. ThG

•

"

.:-; . .'

-

, .'.

)';0 l'O!n:ICU lli5S£11 )1,\ ;:C("IIlIil'O U$B O~I.¥

•• ... ,

govorn..,nt hos ncquiesced in Buddhist demands tOr organization ot DI1<Idhist cOll1lllittees .In ,,11 AlIV. units at cOMpany level and .bove •. Tho _""'assy believos that· much of the mutual suspicion between Buddhists :lnd " Cathol1.,. is inspired by tho Viet. COile. .(EMB1BL 988) .'. . , . '9 •. ' In another assessment, the Embassy find., that paralysis In eovornment, steMming trom the re­cent political convulSiOns, is spreadlne from Saigon' to outlying areas. This Is sald~o bo particularly true In Contl'al VIetn:u., where til" roluctance ot local security authol'I ties to .control dOlOonstratlons Is creatine a vacuum of authority wllich Dr. Quyon's People's Revolutionary COlnmltteGs are rapidly till1ne. There nOl. are locn! PRC chapters In most coast:ll. cities ot Central Vi6tnam. Theso chapter.s are tallor­made for Viet Cong penetration and manlpuiation.

10. In Saigon itself, many ministries :Ire des­cribed as merely ·marking time, concentrating on rou­tine b'lsines!t. Ministers· nnd secand-Ievel bureau_ crats a~o freely expre~sing·thcir pessimism over the 'lutur! to .!!robassy officer.s. Altbough pacification planLi~~ continues in the GVN National 'Security COUQ­cil, ' ..• e Bmb3ssy has the feeling that the decisions t:lken . rO not baing implemented with any great enthu-13sm jr to any significant degree.

•

" -, ~f -4- COpy ~', 1

BACK~~~ USE ONLY l' NO,F~INES JOHNSON.LlB.~~RY ,

... , , ' . , .. ,- , ,.: . ..

"

• .' ,

"

PI r , •

',< ,

,

, ',; ',' :,:,

B. MILITARY SItUATION *" ". ' . '- "",

, 1 • .' In a ", .. k punctuat..s by .. ountinc pOlltlcai proble.s lor the Sdlon gOl(ernment,' CqtllDunist .. '"" inithted activity dec;l1ned, mexleratoly in intonsity. The 700, incidents reported, however, Al'O' cOlUlider.- ; ably above this year's weekly average of approxi" mately 5~0. Armed attacks nlso declined. Eight large-scale nctions (four of battalion and four of company size) W9re reported for ,the entire montb of September;.of these, one battalion operation and two company-sized attaclts occurred during the ~ast week. In one isolated instance, coverament troops stood their Iro~nd and inflicted heavy casualties on the attnckers when an estimated Viet Cong battAlion attacked a Popular Force outpost in Kien Hao Province on 23 September. The Com­mUDists lost 42 killed and 26 weapons; friendly casualUes were only nine. The Viet Cong devoted considerable effort to disrupting goverrunent lines of co .. municaUons last week, especially the rail­road in the northern coastal provinces. The riSing rnc~dence of sabotago continues.

Communist activities over th~ past several wecks suggest no radical depal'"tvre from. established patterns; it is the sa"", guerrilla warfare, consist­ing principally of terrorism interspersed with attacks 3ininst se)~~ted tara.ts, repeated week after we_k but with increasing intenSity, subtly applied throughout the nation. In the northern provinces the Viet Cong continue to concentrate their activities against the rural populace; i~ the delta Where CommuBist collaboration with the peasant is closest, Communist actions are directed more against military targets. As usual, Viet Cong activities were heaviest in II and IV ~orps areas.

The decline of Communist activity this week probably reflects a normal fluctuation in the' cyclic activity pattern, r.ther thon any shortages or any decision made by higher Viet Cong ,authority. While the Viet Cong are certainly responsive to material requirements which ~an affect the level of their activities, it is not believed that theT presently suffer any serious shortages--an eyalua­tion supported by th;ir liberal expenditure. of ,

ONCOPY. -5_

•

•

l t. , .

, ,

i . ,

:-- ~ " , ' ." .

•

•

- .. 'iJ.;La~l' • "

:;Q 1·9nnJo:1l1~ Dl S:.'F.M B.\('I:GIIOt'NO l:~1l V;.LY

. '

ammunition. Recently, wh,n a c~v.r .. ent Ranser battalion flu$h~ a largo'Viet Cong torco in Vinh Binb Province n~'r the Dassac River, the battalion commander sp<>ke ,of the unu~ual number of lIeavy weapons--machine guns and lIIortars--used by tho Vl.t Cong, saying "Too IDtlny. too .. any."

"

, 3. GoverNneftt military operations last

waele "ere'lligbllghted by actions to counter tile Montagnard revolt in Quang Duc and Oarl~c pro­vinces, beginning on 20 Septemher. The t~mpo of ARVN ground operations increased slightly, witb s".l1-unlt actions reaching an' all-tille weekly high of mOre than 17,000; only a negligible nu~ber made contact with the Viet CoPe, ho ... ver. Govern,. mant large-unit operations decreased slightly, and the nUlllber making contact with the Viet Cong , reached the lowest point since late July. The

_la,ge nUlllper of J:I11ibry operations sugjlests that the unsettled political conditions have as yet had littlo visible effect on militnry nctivity.

• They al>pear to be increasingly lIIech.nicol in nature and ineffoctive, however.

•

The most significant ARVN nilitary opera­tion taking place is a search-and-clear operation . in the extreme nOlthern provinces. The intelligence section of the 1st Division was concerned over . reports indicating that Viet Cong infiltration into the north had reached a point where it posed a serious threat to the government's ability to control the area. Communist activity in the area has in­creased steadily, including assassinations qf key personnel. Although the Viet Cong force in the area bas been estimated at two companies, reports and prisoner interrogations confirm that a con­siderable amount of infiltration by sea into the area bas occurred, according to COMl-SMACV. Govern­ment operations in the coastal area are des11ned to disrupt Communist activities, and to dnte h~ve achieved some success. While the senior adVisor to ' the let Division indicates that there are insuffi­cient power boats to provido ndequate coastal surveillance, US Navy personnel state that the effectiveness of the const.l surveillance could be improved with the util1zntion of existing governnent naval .

.' -6- COpy

, .

. " .'. '.'

-

.'

•

, • •

•

I ,

•

" . :,:,

'" 3. POO .... J;~~:l: govei ... eat'Il, r all lndic:aUon' 5olllt!) Vlttt.,.".. tbe ' p ...... nt rate,. tllo rocrult:ed .. ', ill Sapt ... bo .. will· , 1,7QO, 1n' contrut to 3, SOO July, and 3,900 ~o .. J!lne;' ,ore meeting, wUh " simila .. lick of .'1. Gove.· ..... nt ' instal!l11ty, "ceneral ent· ..,ong the' pOPllla';' tion, troop move.~"ts on,sllort, notice,'And constant pollc), cbanges' a .. a factors .'elJtriCUng both tbe ' voluntur and cOl>$cription proS.'.lIns, 'according to COHUS~CV. ~ila figures are in."plete, pres~nt indicatioas are that .dlitar), desertions to .. AUII""t will be lip sUShUy' ova .. the Jul), rate. There are no figures availtble for September. .

4. Government losses genorally declined slightly While Viet Cong l~sses rose slightly last week. C~v.rament casualties totalled 708 (181 KIA~ as co",pared to 889 (236 KIA) in the preceding week, ~while Viet Cone casualties .. _sa to 317 (279 KIA) from 232 (239 KIA). GovernMent weapons lossos totalled 278 compared to the previous 521; COM­munist weapons losses rose to 104 from 92, but the ratio still favors th!> Viet Congo

•

", ,. . '. ",

.!" . , ".," "_ .. "S~·.'" "~ ..

i:' , .. Ii:, ~ . ,! ' j ... ' , W:,' ,.

,._ I

si..te ., Af'D

rt",ew

..sJ~C}11lT. " ::0 :rOH;;:JG~ I'Jl.1~,:;,;!,t

nM;,:mtO!.:;,D O;.>K C!;J,Y

O. £COIIOIiIO SITUATION

.. •

1. The general price levol declined during the .... ek. and prices in the most sensitivo catogori"". including basic food. appearoJ steady by tho weekend. Gold prices and tho piaster exchanso rato on the Saigon black ,..,·),ot fell. but both roSO again at the end of the week. Tho black market piastor cxchanco rate-had reached a 10w·duriDg the week of 133 pia. tel's for 1 dollar. a level still above that reached during tho first half of 1964.· Olission Weekly)

2. The 1964/65 dol ta rice crop now is estimated to equal tbe 4.3 million tons harvested in tho delta during the 1962/63 crop year. The present rice crop in tho coastal lowlands also appears to be good. al-' though the effects of recent typhoons have yet to be assessed. The rice export picture remair~ clouded, hO'l/lever, because the government has encountorod dif­ficulty in marketing its rice abroad. Al though rteo stocks in Saigon are approximately 150 thousand tons.

"rice exports throush August aCIIOIlDted to only 65 thou­sand tons. Total 1964 rice exports arB unlikoly to axce"d ona-third of the 325,000 to 350,000 tollS export.d in 19,33. (llissio" Weekly. AID Weekly Report)

•

-

"1---~8------- ---":"'_--,. i COpy .

.~.

. ' JOHNSON_lIB~~RY

. .

.'

,

A. CA~lA - ,j"~, , :,t' '

.,'. ",,' ,

'(" . ""<'

" , ,

.'. . .... TIler. is no eviclenefl of KI" ... r Seref. lEorces

in Cambodia or of important Khmer Sere1 .7ftpath7 a.on*~ the.ea.od I an poop Ie, There are, hOlllever, _r .. us ' nrmed KII ...... Seret in South VietnD .. anol ThaU.an6.

2 ,Although thl!. Kh .... Sereuove .. ent I.s p~oba"J.\I' not capable of deposins Sihanouk}-I' ,any in-

CTea~e in :\ ts aettv! ty "'ill add to Sihanou"'" S""S& of i.sohtl.on and strenithen his beUef that ""ly :II close .. ali.""",ant ,.1 tb Pe1ping .. ill protectCa .. boclla" security.

• 3, Sihanouk nOW is in Peipinr; in seereh of . '

support. In speeshes prior to hLs departure, Slh.neu~ indioated that he was puttinl,hishe1t priority Oft gettine a statement flo .... the Chinese that all attack on Cambodia WGule be an attack 011 Chl~a. Re apparent­ly DOW considers inadequate Peipinc'a previous pla'ce of "all out support" and detel' .. ination to "stand be­siele" Call1boclia 1f it is attac1tecl loy the US' 01" its "18c!;;eys • • t . .

In the pa3t the Chl~ase heva b.en meet cautious in responui". to Sihanouk;'s overtures, 0_ there is no indication t~At they Dro willine to'ltve hi. the guarantees he ~wts-no~--~:-:-~~~:-~~~~~';"J~

COpy " ;

-9-

, . , . ,

I I'· ..

4.' lIihnnoulc hopes that a clo$Gr acco"'0<!/1-tion with COllllllunlst China will not onl)' datar an)' l_diato threat f,'oll Iouth Viotna., but COft$tituto a lone-l'nnse hedu" against what be vi."" as the somewhat MOra d.lstant but eqUllUy danl.rous tlu-eat of a unified Vietnam 'under lIanol's h.ecellony. At tho same ,ti ... , he p.-obably realizes that ln signins any ftgr,": ... nt .,ith Peiping and Hanol, he wl11 bo c1vina South \'letnam a pl-etext for· the attack On ~.mbO<li:t which be feai-s--unless the agreement in­cludes Chinese Communist c~amlteants at~ona enough to dissuado Saicon.

•

•

•

, ,

,

-

;1 -lO~ COpy . -~ '. DAKC~ROUND USE ONLY - f

NO F, ~1jWgef\D~i!n~S JOHNSON.UllRARYJ' '6'B€11ET _ . _

. -

-

"> .

. JiJ •. D6VJI,.OPMBHffJK1'/lS aLOC .. .. . ---:'~!ft<,\,~""---:;-:-: ' .. '" ;~~ i;.: ...• ;"':"':~',.>.". .. ,. ',"-'

.;·1.· Thein.lU.sl ~e"cthnot· lIoth' Hlincl aM . Paipl", to.nnlMoln~""cllitth;at, VS .,Ultar),airC:faft .' ~~. ,,,een.·~u.t.hori,,e<I to' pursue .tta'!l'inS C~iat . o1rcraft",il\fo Irorth Vietn ... 0 ... COOI'NiQillt Chilla. · ... a

cOlllper.til/el)' IlUd.. Th • .c_unista' C:lIlled the'. ' dec:ision ."'.uth~b,at1on to:~jntl'ude ••• on an)' pretext ... (and). another grave step; .. to ca ...... )' out Pl'Oyocatio~ '\n.o'. ~t.cndthe' anrasaiva .ar in. . Indochina. ~~,".' .. ,' . "'.

. i •

2. pelpi~g seized 0'; tho TASS reporting of the latest Tonkin Gulf incident to toke .noth .... s,",I,& at tt.. VSSlt's 'celuct."ce to support the DRV. Referring to the clai .. that the US destro,ers sank three ships, peoPle;a Daily on 18 September jeered: "I!va IIcNiiiiara ears to utter (this cl31m,)" and called the report a TASS axclusive. ' ......... .....

. 3. The incl'eu1nc W1Ir .. th of Iranoi-Paiping rebUo ....... s bdicatod by the .rriv.l of a high Korth Vietnamese delegatton, led,b), Premier Ph~ Van DenB, for Pelping's National Day celebrations, and Ph& .. 's arrival s~ate.eftt expressing cratitude f6r ChiRese assistaDCe during the Tonkin Gulf crisis,

4. Several bloc dipl~ats ia ~anoi--tbe SOviet, Rumanian and Bulgarian Gabassadors--•• re replaced in Septe~ber, probably in nor •• l rot.tion at the conclusion of three-year tours. Soviet .. Abbassa~or Tovmasayan left earlier in the year, so that a chars' headed the So.iet eabassy at the time of the Tonkin incidents. The new envoy, tlya Shchervakov, is a recoBaized Soviet authority on China; he has been seCORd .an. in the Soviet s.bassy in Peiping since June 1963.

. ' " . ,

·,'.''',,,1.

-11-

. .

"

Copy

. '

,