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Cooperation Failure or Secret Collusion? Absolute Monarchs and Informal Cooperation

Melissa Carlson

University of California, Berkeley

Barbara Koremenos University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Forthcoming at the Review of International Organizations

Abstract: Despite sharing attributes that existing scholarship argues promote international cooperation, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have very few formal international agreements with each other. Does this absence of formal agreements imply a cooperation failure? We argue that absolute monarchies frequently cooperate with each other but do so informally. At the domestic level, absolute monarchs pursue their personal interests by unilaterally and non-transparently developing and implementing policies. These norms of domestic policymaking engender an absolutist logic, which shapes how absolute monarchs selectively use informal and formal cooperation at the international level. When cooperating with each other, absolute monarchs maximize mutual private benefits through similarly unilateral and non-transparent policymaking, producing secret, cartel-like informal international agreements. Using the 10 Million International Dyadic Events data, we develop a dyadic data set of informal and formal cooperation from 1990 to 2004. We find that joint absolute monarchical dyads have higher levels of informal cooperation and lower levels of formal cooperation than joint democratic dyads and dyads of mixed regime types. We also draw on the Continent of International Law dataset to demonstrate that, when absolute monarchs enter into formal agreements with leaders of other regime types, they rationally and strategically accept the formal design mechanisms necessary for optimal cooperation. We assess the causal mechanisms underlying the absolutist logic through an in-depth case study of the informal, secret 2014 Riyadh agreements that outlined security cooperation between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Acknowledgements: We are very grateful to all those interviewed for this project. We thank Jonas Tallberg, Michael Mosser, Nicole Simonelli, and Mark Dincecco, and workshop participants at University of Michigan (CPRD) and UC Berkeley (MIRTH) for comments on earlier drafts. Julia Gysel and Raya Saksouk provided excellent research assistance. Finally, we thank the four anonymous reviewers for their careful reading and insightful feedback. This project has been approved through UC Berkeley IRB protocol 2017-10-10405.

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1. Introduction The extent to which pairs of states engage in formal types of cooperation varies in dramatic and, as explained below, surprising ways. The United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), hosted by the United Nations (UN), features the most comprehensive list of formal international agreements to date. Article 102 of the UN Charter encourages states to register their agreements with the UN, stating that:

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945).

Given the near universal membership of the UN, agreement registration with the UNTS is informative about broader patterns of cooperation in the international community. Particularly striking is the extent to which the same state formally cooperates at different rates depending on its partner. For example, while Saudi Arabia and the United States (US) have registered 53 agreements with the UNTS, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have registered only one. The substantial difference in the number of UNTS-registered bilateral agreements between Saudi Arabia and the US on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other, stands in tension with one of the main empirical findings of the international cooperation literature: States with similar domestic institutions, such as joint democratic and joint autocratic dyads, are more likely to enter into agreements with each other (Leeds 1999; Mattes and Rodriguez 2014). In this view, the low incidence of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is puzzling. Both are dynastic monarchies, territorially contiguous, and possess the wealth and resources necessary to enter into formal agreements.1 Both have similar cultural backgrounds, tribal networks, and Islamic legal systems.

1 Wealthy states make around three times more agreements than poor states. This pattern is consistent across issue areas. See Koremenos (2017).

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The lack of formal cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not isolated. Rather, it is indicative of a broader pattern: Despite possessing extremely similar characteristics that conventional wisdom indicates are important for international cooperation, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have registered few – if any – agreements with their fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states. For example, while the UAE and Kuwait are party to 97 and 118 bilateral agreements respectively, the UAE has only seven agreements, and Kuwait only three, with fellow GCC member states.2 Although the GCC was established 37 years ago, only its charter is registered with the UNTS, and a mere four other agreements have been made public.3 Why do these states have significantly fewer formal (or at least visible) agreements with each other than expected? The answer to this question has crucial implications for our understanding of the conditions that produce – or stymie – diverse forms of cooperation between members of the international community. Identifying factors that reduce states’ propensity to enter into formal agreements or influence states’ preferences for certain forms of cooperation is critical given that formal agreement design facilitates cooperation that might otherwise not have occurred (Koremenos 2016).4 We seek to determine whether these pairs of states rarely cooperate or whether they use informal rules and procedures to structure their interactions. If the latter is the case, we want to know why these states select informal cooperation and whether this choice imposes costs on their citizens. We argue that absolute monarchies do frequently cooperate, but they do so informally. Drawing on the international cartel and firm literatures, we define informal cooperation as that in which partners determine their commitments through privately developed and mutually agreed upon understandings rather than legally binding contractual obligations

2 See Table 7 for a comprehensive comparison of the number of UNTS agreements each GCC state has with fellow members versus the number it has with all other states. 3 The other four public agreements are the Convention on the Implementation of Judicial Decisions, Awards, and Declarations; the Economic Agreement between Cooperation Council Countries; the Convention on the Conservation of Wildlife and Natural Habitats; and the Agreement Establishing the Monetary Union of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 4 For example, the formal delegated monitoring that accompanies formal treaties, like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are often key to its effectiveness. Conversely, the International Atomic Energy Agency has highlighted that North Korea has continued to develop nuclear weapons despite the 2018 informal nuclear weapons arrangement between the US and North Korea, in which North Korea committed to complete denuclearization (Haas 2018).

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(Levenstein and Suslow 2006; Coe and Vaynman 2015). Informal agreements tend to be secret, verbal, and enforced through cartel–like behavior wherein parties set and adhere to norms that promote their narrowly–defined mutual interests, minimize mutual risk, and determine forbearance (Pressey and Vanharanta 2016). Existing explanations suggest that variables like domestic legal system (Powell 2010, 2013, 2015) and oil exportation (Ross and Voeten 2015) influence states’ preferences for informal types of cooperation. However, we suggest that a much more fundamental characteristic influences states’ preferences for informal cooperation: rule of law, particularly rule under law. In absolute monarchies, executives preserve their power by implementing policies and establishing institutions unilaterally. Decision-making is highly personal, non-transparent, and not subjected to well-defined and established laws. Any checks on absolute monarchs’ exercise of power – if they exist – are largely informal and not institutionalized. We argue that absolute monarchies’ domestic policymaking practices reproduce themselves at the international level, creating incentives to informally cooperate instead of entering into formal agreements. In contrast to existing scholarship (Lai and Reiter 2000; Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2018), we argue that absolute monarchies receive distinct private benefits from informality, spurring them to engage in informal cooperation more frequently than democratic regimes. We argue that, when absolute monarchies cooperate with each other, they do so according to an absolutist logic. Specifically, the highly personal, non–transparent, and unconstrained policymaking at the domestic level not only makes similarly secretive, cartel-like collusion possible but also helps absolute monarchs realize their mutual, narrowly–defined interests. Additionally, because the commitments made in informal cooperation are dynamic and shaped by monarchs’ shared understandings of compliance, absolute monarchs can update what constitutes agreement compliance in response to changes in their political, economic, or social environment. Doing so reinforces and enhances monarchs’ ability to stabilize their control over the domestic sphere while reaping the private benefits of informal cooperation. As elaborated in Section 5, after the 2011 Arab uprisings, GCC monarchies and Jordan developed an informal security agreement – and revised the terms of cooperation three different times thereafter – to

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align their domestic authoritarian policies which, not surprisingly, were aimed at bolstering regime stability. To assess our hypotheses, we develop a mixed-methods research design. First, we use King and Lowe’s (2003) 10 Million International Dyadic Events data to develop a novel data set of informal and formal cooperation from 1990 to 2004. Exploiting this data, we demonstrate that joint absolute monarchical dyads have higher levels of informal cooperation than joint democratic dyads and dyads of mixed political regime types. Second, we draw on the Continent of International Law (COIL) dataset (Koremenos 2016), which features a random sample of UNTS agreements from 1925–2004, 5 to demonstrate that absolute monarchies use formal design mechanisms when engaging with other regime types. Lastly, we assess the causal mechanisms driving informal cooperation through an in–depth case study of informal agreements among Gulf monarchies, highlighting informal territorial agreements concluded in the 1960s and the secret 2012–2014 Riyadh security agreements. Studying informality that manifests itself in nonpublic agreements presents various methodological challenges. We respond by employing multiple datasets and case study evidence that exhibit temporal variation and cover both bilateral and multilateral settings. Our findings make several distinct contributions to the international cooperation literature. First, we understand little about the circumstances under which states choose to cooperate informally instead of designing formal agreements. We argue that, in the dyadic context, the extent to which leaders implement domestic policies (non)transparently and unilaterally critically influences how they cooperate internationally. By providing new insights about absolute monarchies and cooperation, we lend increasing sophistication to the literature on the various domestic and international factors that promote states’ use of informal and covert tools of statecraft. Second, we make a distinct contribution to the growing international relations and comparative politics literature on variations in autocratic regime types. By highlighting that domestic policymaking in absolute monarchies differs from that in personalist, single party, and military regimes, we advance a more fine–grained theory of autocratic

5 The majority of agreements in the COIL dataset were signed between 1970–1999.

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institutional constraints than currently exists; we also demonstrate that this distinction critically influences autocrats’ choices about the design of international cooperation. Lastly, we fill a gap in existing literature on informal cooperation. Scholars who have explored informal cooperation consider it a recent phenomenon6 and largely focus on bureaucratization around informal institutions dominated by Western, democratic, and major powers, such as the G8 and G20 (Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Abbott and Snidal 2000, Avant and Westerwinter 2016). We demonstrate that informal agreements have been central to cooperation among absolute monarchies for decades. This paper proceeds as follows: First, we highlight why existing explanations for states’ propensity to cooperate informally – namely oil wealth, possessing an Islamic legal system, and being democratic – cannot explain the puzzling descriptive statistics highlighted above. Second, we present our theory and research design. We then describe our empirical results, both quantitative and qualitative. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analyses regarding states’ use of informality to facilitate the provision of private goods, such as regime security, that distinctly benefit state executives. Indeed, understanding how autocratic monarchs informally cooperate to secure personal benefits is critical as this form of cooperation often negatively affects the citizens of these states. 2. Existing Explanations International cooperation scholarship indicates that states with a similar regime type more readily enter into treaties and alliances (Leeds 1999; Lai and Reiter 2000; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). Within this body of literature, scholars have found that joint democratic dyads have higher rates of cooperation than joint autocratic dyads (Lai and Reiter 2000). Because democratic leaders are constrained by their citizens and face legislative and judicial checks on their policy decisions, they can make more credible commitments than autocracies, increasing the likelihood that they form secure, sustainable agreements with each other (Leeds 1999; Mattes and Rodriguez 2014).

6 A notable exception is Kahler (2000), who traces variation in the legalization of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific from their conception to the Asian economic crisis of 1997/1998. Specifically, Kahler (2000) examines changes in the precision of member states’ obligations, non-interference in member states’ domestic affairs, and the presence of third-party dispute resolution mechanisms.

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Similarly, greater economic interdependence between democracies may boost their levels of formal cooperation (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). Recently, scholars have examined how institutional variation across autocratic regimes influences their propensity to cooperate with democracies and other types of autocracies. Autocratic leaders who are held accountable for their actions by political parties or military juntas have restricted policy flexibility and thus are able to make credible commitments (Weeks 2008, 2012; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). However, this literature cannot explain low levels of formal cooperation among Gulf states. Because Gulf states are characterized by similar absolute monarchical regime types, existing literature leads us to expect that Gulf states should have relatively higher levels of formal cooperation than state dyads with mixed regime types, but not democratic or single party dyads (Mattes and Rodriguez 2014). This makes the absence of formal cooperation among these states even more puzzling. Emerging scholarship does identify political regime type as an important driver of state preferences for informal cooperation. However, this work largely argues that democracies receive distinct benefits from informal agreements, implying they informally cooperate at higher rates than autocracies (Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2018). Specifically, democratic governments face a variety of institutionalized constraints on domestic policymaking (Tsebelis 1995, 1999), making it costly for democracies to secure consensus and ratify formal international agreements (Mansfield and Milner 2012; Snidal and Thompson 2003). Democratic leaders can avoid these costs by cooperating through informal institutions, which require little to no involvement of domestic veto players (Aust 1986, Lipson 1991, Abbott and Snidal 2000; Westerwinter 2013). Because autocracies often lack institutionalized veto players, they do not face the same costs as democracies when implementing foreign policy, and thus do not receive the same benefits from participation in informal institutions (Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2018). While this explanation provides insight into why democracies participate in informal institutions, it cannot fully explain varying rates of formal and informal cooperation between dyadic partners of different regime types. Specifically, it cannot explain autocracies’ propensity to participate in formal agreements with certain states but not

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others. Moreover, as demonstrated in Table 2 below, dyads of absolute monarchies have significantly higher mean levels of informal cooperation than joint democratic dyads. Grouping autocracies into a homogenous category misses the potentially important role that domestic autocratic institutions, such as the presence or absence of veto players, play in the development of states’ foreign policies.7 In our theory section, we highlight the distinct benefits absolute monarchs receive from informal cooperation relative to other regime types. Aside from regime type, scholars have identified other domestic characteristics that may reduce the likelihood of formal cooperation. For example, because oil–exporting states can easily attract foreign investment and gain access to foreign markets without making costly commitments to international institutions, these states have lower incentives to join international organizations, accept international judicial bodies’ compulsory jurisdiction, and agree to binding arbitration (Ross and Voeten 2015). While this scholarship illustrates why oil–exporting states may be less likely to join particular international institutions, economic incentives alone cannot sufficiently explain the conditions under which states decide to engage in institutionalized cooperation across various issue areas. Similarly, scholars have found that shared cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and, in particular, religious backgrounds encourage both formal and informal cooperation (Barnett 1996; Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds et. al 2002). For example, countries with Islamic legal systems may be less likely to make legal commitments and more likely to use non–binding methods of dispute resolution because non–formalized reconciliation is emphasized in the Sunna (Powell and Wiegand 2010; Powell and Mitchell 2007; Mitchell and Powell 2011: 50). While we agree that domestic practices influence levels of cooperation, the causal mechanism linking religious legal norms and a state’s decision to adopt particular modes of cooperation is unclear. Because authoritarian leaders often circumvent domestic laws and constitutional constraints to achieve particular political goals, it is not obvious how laws on the books, including references to Sharia law, actually influence leaders’ behaviors. For example, in September 2017, the Saudi monarchy issued a decree rescinding the ban

7 Weeks (2008) and Mattes and Rodriguez (2014) make a similar criticism. Both demonstrate that various types of autocracies, distinguished by the civilian or military nature of the leader and presence of veto players, influence conflict and cooperative behavior.

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on women driving. Although Sharia law had been used to justify the ban for decades, the Council of Senior Scholars – the kingdom’s top clerical body – supported the decision (Hubbard 2017). Many speculate that, rather than a sudden change in the Council’s interpretation of Sharia law, the monarchy lifted the ban to encourage female employment in non–oil industries as part of its plan to diversify its economy (Revesz & Stevenson 2017). 3. Theory In this section, we define informal cooperation and articulate the benefits that state leaders stand to gain – and the costs they may incur – when informally cooperating. We then explain why absolute monarchies gain more from informal cooperation than other autocracies. Lastly, we describe the collusive, cartel–like behavioral logic of informal cooperation and briefly address why this logic does not extend to interactions between absolute monarchies and other regime types.

3.1. Distinguishing between formal and informal cooperation

We distinguish between formal and informal cooperation by whether the text of an agreement is public and registered with an international or regional organization. Our definition of informality focuses on cooperation that is secret, non–transparent, and not registered with an organization. This distinction allows us to differentiate between completely informal agreements on the one hand and formal (or at least public) agreements that have varying design characteristics (or lack thereof) sometimes associated with informality. Our definition of informal cooperation thus excludes agreements that are legally binding but lack delegated dispute resolution and/or precise terms.8 We also exclude cooperation conducted by informal intergovernmental organizations like the G5 because commitments made are public, implying actors can be held partially accountable.

8 At least half of formal treaties do not incorporate dispute resolution mechanisms. These treaties most likely do not need such provisions, but that does not imply the cooperation embodied in these treaties is informal. See Koremenos (2007; 2016).

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As per our definition, informal agreements can be wholly secret or parties may publicly acknowledge their existence while keeping their specific commitments and/or the agreement text (if it exists) secret (Schachter 1977; Westerwinter 2015). Informal agreements often consist of oral bargains or implicitly understood rules and norms shaped by parties’ shared understandings of how they should act and which violations will be punished or excused (Lipson 1991). All informal agreements are politically binding on partners’ future actions (Schachter 1977; Westerwinter 2015). What drives our definition of informal agreements? Although many scholars have noted that some cooperation is optimally left completely informal (Downs and Rocke 1990; Lipson 1991), these critical insights have not been systematically tested or refined. Recent scholarship has elucidated the role of informalism within the context of legally binding, formal cooperation. For example, some scholars have examined informal governance and decision-making within the European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (Kleine 2014; Stone 2011, 2013). Other work investigates formal agreements that possess particular ‘informal’ characteristics, such as imprecise or vague wording, weaker obligations, and low levels of delegation (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Abbott et. al 2000). Lastly, scholars have examined the conditions under which states formally incorporate certain design features and consciously leave other design features informal (Koremenos 2013b, 2016). While this scholarship provides insight into the conditions under which states draw on a combination of formal and informal mechanisms to cooperate, we seek to explore whether certain pairs of states wholly fail to cooperate or if their cooperation is completely informal. Our definition allows us to theoretically refine and empirically test predictions developed by the seminal work of the early 1990s, represented by Downs and Rocke (1990) and Lipson (1991). We also elucidate the benefits particular leaders reap - and the costs their citizens incur - when cooperation is completely informal.

3.2 The benefits and costs of informal cooperation Informal agreements can confer a variety of benefits, particularly those that privately accrue to state executives. First, the commitments within informal agreements are neither

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public nor transparent, allowing state executives to bypass bureaucratic control and oversight from national, regional, and international institutions (Lipson 1991; Deeks 2017). As such, informal agreements allow state executives to quickly and more easily conclude agreements that may have sensitive implications for state sovereignty and capacity (Deeks 2017). Second, non–transparency allows state executives to strategically limit public information about their commitments and violations.9 Specifically, when a government highlights its partner’s violation, it may encourage that partner to defect from the agreement entirely, particularly if third parties become involved. As a result, governments may want to actively withhold information about their partner’s violation in order to ensure that the agreement stays in place (Lindley 2007; Carnegie and Carson 2018). Additionally, governments may be unwilling to divulge information about their partner’s behavior if doing so reveals the methods by which that intelligence was obtained (Carnegie and Carson 2019). The non–transparency of informal agreements allows governments to internally resolve violations without threatening the agreement overall and the process by which governments monitor agreement compliance. Third, non–transparency allows state executives to secure private goods, such as regime stability and security, in ways that violate international legal norms and/or conventions to which these same states have formally committed. State leaders cannot easily use public international institutions to facilitate domestic policy coordination that provides them private benefits like regime stability but violates their citizens’ human rights. Similarly, greater transparency can empower other state and nongovernmental actors to protest policies and pressure partners to adhere to international legal norms (Carnegie and Carson 2017; 2018). As described in our case study, GCC countries collectively agreed to implement a set of autocratic policies after the Arab uprisings, including cross–border policing and punishment of citizens that criticized any GCC monarchy. In so doing, GCC monarchs provided each other protections and violated their commitments to international human rights covenants: All GCC member states have ratified the Arab

9 As demonstrated in our case study, the 2012–2014 secret security agreements required parties to automatically extradite opposition members without evidence of wrongdoing.

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Charter on Human Rights, which guarantees protections from arbitrary and unlawful interference in individuals’ privacy and the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and Kuwait and Bahrain have also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which stipulates similar protections (Human Rights Watch 2014). Fourth, the non–transparency of informal agreements allows parties to adapt their commitments to more effectively pursue policies that maximize mutual self–interest (Bruggeman 2001; Neyer and Wolf 2003). Specifically, leaders can agree to interpret their commitments differently than originally understood at the time of agreement formation in response to changes in the political and economic environment. We are not arguing that parties can more easily renege on their informal commitments. Rather, we maintain that, relative to their formal counterparts, informal agreements expedite the process of updating what commitments entail and facilitate the use of discretion when deciding which violations to punish; this allows parties to maximize mutual benefits in a particular political context.10 As elaborated in the case study, Gulf monarchies updated the 2012 Joint Security Agreement pact twice in 2014 in order to add and clarify commitments and punishment mechanisms.

Although informal agreements provide distinct private benefits to state leaders, they can also impose costs directly and indirectly on a variety of different actors. First, certain cooperation problems – such as domestic commitment problems – are only effectively resolved through public agreements (Goldstein et al. 2000). These types of problems are particularly prominent in human rights and some economic sub–issue areas (Koremenos 2016). For example, the public nature of human rights treaties allows citizens to take their governments to court and hold them accountable for violations (Simmons 2009). Given the cooperation problems underlying these issue areas, informality may lead to less effective problem solving or to cooperation failure.

Second, by allowing state executives to bypass international legal norms and oversight from third party governments, informal cooperation may weaken these norms by reducing

10 Formal agreements with informal elements foster a similar dynamic. The implicit, discretionary punishment mechanism in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been used to maximize the interests of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (Koremenos 2013a).

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their value for compliant governments. Leaders who engage in informal cooperation, then, hamper their ability to reap benefits from norm compliance when they formally cooperate with other partners. Relatedly, for issue areas in which reciprocity is an optimal response, it is difficult if not impossible to condition one’s behavior when other actors keep their actions invisible (Kreps 1990; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990). For example, the recent torture and assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi – which was carried out in the Saudi consulate in Turkey and likely ordered by the Saudi Crown Prince – violated the international legal norm of extraterritorial enforcement, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Ratner 2018). State partners have a shared security interest in adhering to these rules: “Keep your hit–men off my territory and I’ll keep mine off yours; use your embassies and consulates for diplomatic purposes, and we’ll leave them alone” (Ratner 2018). Given the secrecy with which this policy was carried out, it is difficult for other states to hold the correct actor accountable, reducing the likelihood of punishment and thereby weakening these norms. Third, and perhaps most important, the private benefits that leaders receive from informal cooperation often come at the expense of other domestic actors, particularly citizens. As indicated previously, informal cooperation may incentivize leaders to grant and revoke citizens’ rights in an arbitrary manner. For example, the Saudi monarchy increased the number of elected seats in municipal–level advisory councils from half to two–thirds and allowed women to vote and run as candidates in the 2015 elections. Less than two years later, the monarchy restricted political participation by ordering the widespread arrest of prominent organizations and activists that questioned or declined to support the government’s blockade of Qatar (Freedom House 2018). And because informality increases the difficulty of resolving domestic commitment problems, it compounds the costs imposed on citizens. Moreover, the individualistic and non–transparent nature of informal agreements may divert political power away from institutionalized veto players like political parties by excluding them from critical foreign and domestic policy decision–making. Fourth, state executives who engage in informal cooperation may have their decision–making power restricted, or may be removed from office, by veto players who seek to

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sanction the leader for opportunistic behavior. The likelihood that state executives face these costs of informal cooperation largely depends on variations in the transparent and multilateral nature of decision–making across different regime types. As elaborated in the next section, absolute monarchs face few – if any – of these costs when implementing secret agreements. For example, Jordan’s agreement to monitor and punish its citizens for criticizing Gulf monarchies led to the arrest of prominent leaders in the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the only viable political opposition group in the country; these arrests facilitated the fragmentation of the IAF in 2015 (Laub and Daraghmeh 2015). Table 1 summarizes the benefits that state executives may gain and the costs they may bear when engaging in informal cooperation.

Table 1: The Benefits and Costs of Informal Cooperation Benefits Costs

• Allows state executives to bypass bureaucratic control and oversight and to disregard the preferences and interests of domestic actors

• Allows state executives to

strategically control information about commitments and violations

• Allows state executives to pursue self-

interested policies that violate their international legal commitments and/or their citizens’ human rights

• Allows parties to adapt their

commitments to more effectively pursue policies that maximize mutual self–interest in response to political or economic changes

• Prevents resolution of certain commitment problems that are only resolvable through public agreements

• Reduces state executives’ ability to

benefit from norm compliance when formally cooperating with other partners

• Imposes costs on domestic actors,

particularly citizens

• May encourage veto players to punish state executives by removing them from office or restricting their decision-making power

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3.3. Absolute monarchies and preferences for informal cooperation We assume that, akin to all autocrats, absolute monarchs seek to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Kinne 2005). Despite this similar goal, leaders across autocratic regime types use vastly different domestic strategies to ensure their political survival (Kinne 2005; Weeks 2008, 2012). In absolute monarchies, state executives preserve and consolidate their political power by enacting and enforcing policies secretly and arbitrarily, particularly in terms of providing due process to the accused (Stepan, Linz, and Minoves 2014). By doing so, monarchs make themselves indispensable to their countries’ political system and bolster their resilience to internal and external threats. For example, in 2013 and 2014, the Jordanian and Saudi monarchies both passed similar domestic laws that broadened the legal definition of terrorism to include harming the reputation and/or standing of the state and its foreign relations (Abuqudairi 2014; al-Buluwi 2014). The deliberately vague language of these laws gave state authorities extreme leeway in determining what acts of protests (including posts on social media) were acts of terrorism (Yom 2016a). Outside the realm of security policy, scholars have highlighted how Gulf monarchies use vague and ambiguous language when developing environmental and educational policy (Haimerl 2013; Luomi 2014). The absence of constraints on monarchs’ behavior is critical to maintaining opaque rule of law. In absolute monarchies, executives unilaterally develop and implement policies in the domestic sphere without institutional, religious, or ideological constraints (Anderson 1991; Chehabi and Linz 1998). Legal institutions purposefully lack the ‘teeth’ necessary to create policy precedent and ensure consistent implementation. Within these regimes, executives control all aspects of the legal system. While the monarch and parliament may interact, the parliament cannot restrict or sanction the monarch in most areas. Similarly, the judiciary is appointed by and serves at the will of the monarch (Stepan, Linz, and Minoves 2014). Unlike in single party regimes and military juntas, executive powers in absolute monarchies are not subject to checks by established intra–government bodies (Weeks 2008; 2012). Any checks and balances that do exist are informal, such as intra–family or intra–tribal alliances. These constitutive characteristics of absolute monarchies

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– namely unitary and non–transparent policymaking – transfer to the foreign policy realm and shape how these leaders design cooperative agreements.11 We argue that other autocratic leaders cannot easily enact cartel-like and secret forms of international cooperation – and thereby reap private benefits – because of the relatively greater transparency with which they implement domestic policies. In single party and military regimes, decision–making power is diffused throughout formal intra–governmental coalitions – whether a political party or a military council – rather than concentrated in a single leader. These intra–governmental coalitions monitor and check leaders’ behavior, particularly by potentially removing the leader from power (Weeks 2008; 2012). Because of these institutional constraints, domestic policymaking in these autocratic regimes is necessarily more transparent than it is in absolute monarchies (Peceny and Butler 2004). Put differently, leaders in single party and military regimes maximize their chances of political survival by implementing policies multilaterally and transparently so as to balance their interests with the interests of the party or junta. This transparency calculus not only constrains their ability to engage in cartel–like types of international cooperation; it also disincentivizes them from doing so. In fact, single party regimes and military juntas are more likely to cooperate with democracies than are other autocratic regime types given similar institutional transparency and formalized checks on leader behavior (Mattes and Rodriguez 2014). Although scholars have largely equated personalist leaders and absolute monarchs as erratic and unchecked policy makers (Weeks 2008; Ezrow and Frantz 2011), we argue that absolute monarchies are distinct from personalist regimes in ways that directly shape their opportunities for secret, cartel–like cooperation. First, absolute monarchies are less likely to experience leadership and regime turnover than are personalist regimes (Hadenius & Teorell, 2006; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014), allowing absolute monarchs to consolidate their positions and develop idiosyncratic strategies concerning the rule of law and the autonomy of state bureaucracies; over time, these strategies create and reinforce

11 Extant scholarship indicates that domestic behavioral norms in particular regime types influence preferences for international organization design. For example, constitutive characteristics of democratic regimes, such as openness towards civil society, rule of law, accountability, and transparency, affect democracies’ preferences for openness towards transnational actors in international organizations (Tallberg, Sommerer, and Squatrito 2016).

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expected patterns of behavior within the dyadic context (Stepan, Linz, and Minoves 2014).12 As such, the insulation of absolute monarchs to regime overturn gives them particular advantages over personalist leaders with respect to the credibility of their commitments when engaging in secret, cartel–like cooperation. Second, we anticipate that the insulation of absolute monarchs to regime overturn allows them to have lower levels of accountability and transparency in domestic policy implementation relative to personalist regimes. To illustrate, we draw on Uzonyi, Souva and Golder’s (2012) measure of audience cost capacity, which ranks countries based on the difficulty of organizing against the leader and on how costly it is for a challenger to emerge. Wilcoxon rank–sum tests13 indicate that absolute monarchs are significantly less likely to face audience costs than are personalist regimes (p<0.05). We also draw on Williams’s (2015) Accountability Transparency Index, which measures regime transparency based on whether the information provided by the government actually allows audiences (citizens, other government officials, the international community, etc.) to hold the leader accountable. Student t–tests14 indicate that, on average, absolute monarchies have significantly lower levels of transparency than personalist regimes (p<0.05). When absolute monarchs cooperate with each other, they are jointly able to engage in non–transparent and non–constraining foreign policies, resulting in informal cooperative agreements. Specifically, the absolutist logic reinforces the individualistic style of absolute monarchs’ interactions in the dyadic context. Absolute monarchs possess a shared understanding, or common knowledge, of how other absolute monarchies rely on unilateral policy implementation and weak legal norms to maintain regime stability and consolidate power. Indeed, absolute monarchs’ commitments to each other are inherently personal, with credibility and reliability grounded in the relationship between the monarchs rather than in an institutional framework. Similarly, direct interactions between individual monarchs are couched in informal social, economic, and political networks that connect each royal family. In the case of the GCC, absolute monarchs share kinship ties, bolstering

12 Illustratively, extensive scholarship explores Arab monarchies’ relative resilience to the 2011 Arab uprisings compared to their personalist counterparts (Bellin 2012; Bank, Richter, and Sunik 2015). 13 The Wilcoxon rank–sum test is a nonparametric hypothesis test that assesses whether the average ranks of two subgroups significantly differ from one another. 14 Specifically, we conduct a two–sample, unpaired student t–test. This test assesses whether two subgroup means are equal.

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their sense of personal obligation to their partners’ interests and reinforcing elite–level decision–making. For example, because the Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari royal families are closely connected through various blood relations, intermarriages, and tribal networks, political issues often become familial issues (Ramesh 2017), and decision–making consistently features the same core elite (Bank, Richter, and Sunik 2014). After the Arab uprisings in 2011, these informal familial ties played a key role in facilitating direct lines of communication among the Gulf monarchs, frequent summits between foreign ministers, and ‘royal–only’ ministerial meetings (Yom 2016b). Our definition of informal cooperation is not equivalent to partners who follow mutually beneficial policies because they share a harmony of preferences. Existing research demonstrates that the presence (or absence) of a harmony of preferences does not necessarily influence how states choose to cooperate (Koremenos 2013; 2016). Indeed, many state partners that share a harmony of preferences formalize these preferences through public, registered agreements. Moreover, absolute monarchs often face complex cooperation problems when informally cooperating, like incentives to defect and domestic shocks that alter their expected gains from cooperation. Our argument is that, in the dyadic context, absolute monarchies prefer and select to use secret, cartel–like cooperation to overcome these problems rather than cooperate formally. As elaborated in our case study, while Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab monarchies collectively desired to guard against internal instability caused by the Arab uprisings, they disagreed about how to pursue this policy (e.g. whether to allow the funding of particular Islamic political groups) and maintained distrust over whether their partners would pursue the agreed policy (e.g. the Gulf monarchies repeatedly revised their agreement because they believed Qatar was violating its commitments).

3.4. Cartel–like cooperation Because of the personalistic, collusive nature of the commitments that absolute monarchs make to each other, we anticipate that their informal cooperation resembles behaviors observed in international cartels. Cartels occur when a group of firm executives that produce similar goods informally agree to pursue certain policies (namely, manipulating supply and fixing prices) to capture joint benefits (Griffin 2000). Within cartels,

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cooperation is dynamic, centered on pursuing mutual interests with specific partners rather than adhering to broader legal norms (Bruggeman 2001; Neyer and Wolf 2003). Illustratively, the US Department of Justice highlights that cartels often do not survive changes in executive leadership (Griffin 2000). Clearly, executives do not collude to coordinate policies to benefit customers but to bolster executives’ interests, namely shoring up power (Griffin 2000; Awaya and Krishna 2016). Sustained cooperation thus reflects the members’ understanding of the actions each should take to secure mutual political benefits (Coe and Vaynman 2015). For example, after the onset of the Arab uprisings in 2011, GCC monarchies began to view themselves as members of a pan–royal community under attack (Yom 2016a); they responded by “fall[ing] back on the norms that bind their regime[s] together” (Yom 2016a). Specifically, the Gulf and Jordanian monarchies agreed to prosecute individuals who criticized any Arab monarchy and extradite political opposition at the request of their monarchical brethren. Key to the successful functioning of cartels is non–transparency and shared understandings of agreed–upon behaviors (Griffin 2000; Green, Marshall, and Marx 2014). Relevant scholarship suggests that cartels rely on shared perceptions of threats and social relationships to create similar preferences for – and disapproval of – certain behaviors (Richards, Patterson, and Acharya 2001; Munger 2006). Behavioral norms are reinforced through expectations of reciprocity and constant communication among members, tying them to a ‘common fate’ (Costa and Kahn 2007; Genesove and Mullin 2001). Cartel members – in our case, heads of state – maintain shared understandings and non-transparency by travelling to meet each other frequently (Genesove and Mullin 2001; Awaya and Krishna 2016). As illustrated in Table 3 in our Findings section, around one third of all informal cooperative events involve dyads hosting meetings, visiting each other, and engaging in discussions. According to the US Department of Justice, executives may hold secret, conspiratorial, ‘unofficial’ meetings in conjunction with official meetings or use meetings within formal organizations to ‘cover’ their discussions about joint policy coordination (Griffin 2000). During these meetings, executives determine whether members have mutually adjusted their policies appropriately and whether additional

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mutual adjustments are warranted (Genesove and Mullin 2001; Awaya and Krishna 2016). Frequent meetings also allow executives to share and track sensitive information about violations, serving as an informal monitoring mechanism (Genesove and Mullin 2001; Harrington 2006; Pressey and Vanharanta 2016). Cartel members develop compensation schemes that redistribute benefits if an executive violates the agreement to ensure that other cartel members still have incentives to continue cooperating (Griffin 2000). Absolute monarchs may also use ad hoc threats of violence, the curtailment of diplomatic ties, and cuts in aid to create incentives for future cooperation (Berman 2009; Berman and Laitin 2008; Skarbek 2011). In fact, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE met with the Qatari Crown Prince to address Qatar’s perceived violation (i.e. continued support of Islamic groups critical of the Gulf monarchies), the Saudi and UAE monarchs demanded more costly commitments from Qatar, such as shutting down Al–Jazeera, to offset Qatar’s past violations and prove its commitment to their informal security agreement.

3.5. Cooperation in mixed–dyads When absolute monarchies engage with democracies and other autocratic regime types, their differing constitutive characteristics will result in different forms of cooperation. In these heterogeneous dyads, partners will likely develop formal agreements in the sense that the text is public and registered with international or regional organizations. With respect to the design provisions of these agreements, while absolute monarchs may prefer less formalization, like vague and ambiguous language and wholly informal dispute resolution mechanisms, it is not likely that these preferences will align with the preferences of, say, democratic regimes (who are almost always a subset of the membership of any UNTS agreement). In mixed dyads, partners lack the opportunities and shared understandings that shape the absolutist logic underlying absolute monarchs’ cartel–like cooperation. Of course, in the context of heterogeneous dyads, it is possible that the monarchs themselves prefer more formal agreement design given the absence of longstanding and familial ties that help enforce informal measures. 4. Research Design

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We develop a mixed methods research design: First, we draw from King and Lowe’s (2003) 10 Million International Dyadic Events data to assess whether joint monarchical dyads informally cooperate more – and formally cooperate less – than jointly democratic dyads. Second, we exploit the COIL data set to examine whether absolute monarchies that cooperate with other regime types use the necessary formal design provisions in their agreements or tend to only ratify agreements with less formal provisions. Third, we conduct a case study of informal cooperation among Gulf monarchies, beginning with Gulf monarchies’ informal territorial agreements developed in the 1960s and ending with the secret 2014 Riyadh agreements.

4.1. Dyadic Data Set Construction

Identifying and developing a measure for informal cooperation is challenging given we can only study informal cooperation that is observable or secret agreements that are later publicized. Still, informal cooperation, even when secret, can potentially manifest in observable behavioral exchanges between states. Frequent meetings between state executives, public assurances by state executives of policy coordination and collaboration, the hosting of and/or attendance at high–level meetings, and policy consultations between or among state executives, among other behaviors, are probable indicators of informal cooperation. To create a measure for informal cooperation, we draw from the 10 Million International Dyadic Events data (Bond et. al 2003; King and Lowe 2003). International events data consists of daily accounts reported in the open press of who engaged in what action towards whom. Specifically, King and Lowe (2003) use the VRA Reader software to pull daily events from Reuters Business Briefing news stories from 1990 to 2004 and classify them based on the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) typology. King and Lowe (2003) then map IDEA events onto the Goldstein (1992) conflict–cooperation scale. The Goldstein cooperation scale ranges from –10 to 8.3. Each event type is assigned a relative score on this scale based on the intensity or magnitude of cooperation or conflict embodied in each type of event. Negative scores indicate increasingly hostile events and positive scores indicate increasingly cooperative events. To illustrate, the most negative, intense

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event on the scale is a declaration of war or military attack (–10). The most positive, intense form of cooperation is the provision of military assistance (8.3). Neutral events, such as a private transaction or a sports contest, are coded as 0. The complete list of all IDEA event types and their corresponding score on the Goldstein cooperation scale can be found in Section 1 of the appendix.15 By identifying different types of events and assigning them a theoretically meaningful measure of positive/negative intensity, international events data allow scholars to trace – and compare – relationships between pairs of states over time. Examining informal cooperation in this particular time period minimizes the likelihood that states’ cooperative behavior is influenced by the pressures of the bipolar international system, including Cold War ideological and bloc politics. Moreover, by collecting daily media reports, King and Lowe’s (2003) events data allow us to trace the aforementioned ‘observable’ behaviors that coincide with informal cooperation and thereby create a fine–grained measure of the intensity of informal cooperation within state dyads. A number of other studies of international cooperation and conflict have also relied on events data (for example, Leeds 1999; Colaresi 2004a, 2004b; Pevehouse 2004; Fordham 2005; Murdie and Davis 2012; Mattes and Rodriguez 2014). Because we anticipate that informal cooperation resembles coordination within international cartels, we draw on behavioral screening techniques developed by the US Department of Justice and academics to detect international cartels to identify IDEA events indicative of informal cooperation. For instance, informal, collusive cooperation is likely when executives and heads of different governments regularly travel to meet each other, develop and accept potential partners’ proposals, frequently communicate, and discuss how to address joint problems (Marshall and Marx 2012; Green, Marshall, and Marx 2014). In particular, collusion is likely when heads of state gather publicly to express solidarity and collective support for or confidence in each other’s domestic policies or jointly reaffirm that they will continue to pursue particular policies (Marx and Marshall 2012). The comprehensive list of the IDEA events and their corresponding Goldstein

15 The appendix and replication data can be found on the Review of International Organization website.

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cooperation scores that we included in our measure of informal cooperation are listed in Table 1.

To construct our measure of informal cooperation, we first filtered events to keep only those that occurred between state governments. Next, we eliminated duplicates by keeping only one observation for the same event that occurred between the same actors on the same day. Doing so ensures that our measure of cooperation intensity is conservative. We then assigned each event a score on the Goldstein scale corresponding to Table 1 in King and Lowe (2003). To obtain the average level of cooperation for state dyads in a given year, we summed dyads’ Goldstein cooperation scores and divided by the total number of cooperative events that occurred in that particular year. We provide more detail about the construction of our dependent variable in Section 1 of the appendix. Our measure faces several limitations. First, our measure only captures observable informal cooperation. Because we cannot capture informal cooperation that is entirely secret, our measure likely reports lower average levels of informal cooperation between certain state dyads. Second, because events data draws from news reports, it is possible

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that the same event may be featured multiple times in the same news story. As such, certain types of events between certain types of dyads may be over (or under) reported in the dataset. We minimize this bias by dropping all but one observation of the same event between the same actors on the same day. Similarly, using the average level of cooperation intensity – rather than the frequency with which actors engage in certain types of events – also minimizes over and under-reporting bias of some dyads and events relative to others (Mattes and Rodriguez 2014, 522; Leeds 1999). Third, it is possible that the events we include in our measure of informal cooperation do not actually correspond to informal agreements. To assess the accuracy of our measure, we identified an informal agreement that occurred during the time period of our data set and explored whether informal cooperative events in our data set correspond with this agreement. Gulf monarchs signed an informal joint defense agreement at an annual GCC advisory summit in Bahrain on December 30, 2000 (Henderson 2001; Brown and Katzman 2001). While the text of this agreement was never published, public statements by the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense in 1999 suggest that this agreement stated that an attack on one Gulf state would be considered an attack on all (Henderson 2001). It is important to note that Gulf monarchs had reached agreement on the substance of the defense pact at the end of 1998; rivalries between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain led these monarchs to boycott meetings throughout 1999, stalling the agreement signing until 2000 (Henderson 2001). As a first step towards identifying whether events in our data set correspond with this informal agreement, we looked for whether the December 30, 2000 meeting hosted by Bahrain appeared in our data set – it did. We also wanted to ensure that this event was not coded in our measure of formal cooperation as a formal agreement signing. Indeed, there is no observation coded as a formal agreement signing occurring on that date in our data set. Because this informal agreement was developed through a variety of discussions and meetings in 1998, we then explored the distribution of informal cooperative events prior to and after the December 2000 summit, visualized in Figure 1. As expected, Figure 1 confirms that there was a sharp increase in discussions and meetings between Gulf monarchs in 1998 as well as a drastic increase in agreeing and accepting and engaging in

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negotiations in 2000. Collectively, these descriptive trends suggest that the events we include in our measure of informal cooperation do capture informal agreements.

We have two distinct measures of formal cooperation. First, we follow the same procedure described above to create a variable that indicates the intensity of formal cooperation between state dyads in a given year. When identifying IDEA events indicative of formal cooperation between states, we selected events that either explicitly involve publicly signing a formal, written-down agreement or are highly likely to result in publicly signing and ratifying an agreement. We provide a list of all IDEA events, their descriptions, and their corresponding Goldstein score in Table 2.

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Our second measure of formal cooperation tries to overcome our concerns regarding how the Goldstein cooperation scale ranks individual formal cooperative events given our definition of formal and informal cooperation. As seen in Table 2, it is unclear why the provision of humanitarian, military, and economic aid are ranked as more intense than making a substantial agreement as well as why promises of humanitarian, military, and economic support are ranked as more intense than collaborating. Indeed, making a substantial agreement or collaborating directly involve signing written, public agreements while providing or promising aid does not necessarily involve these same formal actions. Because we distinguish formal and informal cooperation based on whether an agreement text is public, undercounting events that produce a public agreement may bias our results.

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To overcome this potentially problematic ranking of formal cooperative events, we construct a dummy variable that indicates whether state dyads engaged in events that result in a public, signed agreement at least one time in a given year. These events include ratifying/making a substantial agreement or collaborating. To construct our explanatory variables, we code states that received a score of six or higher on the POLITY IV democracy scale as democracies (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010; Mattes and Rodriguez 2014). For all other states, we employ Geddes et al.’s (2014) categorization of autocratic regime types, which differentiates among personalist, military, monarchy, and single party regimes. We created an additional binary variable coding whether a state is an absolute monarchy. Included in this category are monarchies that have hereditary succession and whose leaders rule absolutely (they face neither audience costs nor constraints). Specifically, we took the list of states Geddes codes as monarchies and then eliminated monarchies who scored higher than 1 on the Political Constraints Index; this index scores states based on the feasibility of policy change contingent on existing political institutions. After scoring each partner, we constructed dummy variables indicating the dyadic combination of regime types. To identify control variables, we draw from competing explanations of low levels of formal cooperation – or preferences for informal cooperation – outlined in the section on existing literature. First, we integrate Powell’s (2015) binary classification of whether a given state has an Islamic legal system (i.e. a state whose legal system is substantially based on or influenced by Sharia law) to construct a binary variable that indicates whether both states in a dyad have an Islamic legal system. Second, we use Ross and Voeten’s (2015) dummy variable that indicates whether a state is a major oil exporter (i.e., its oil exports make up at least 50 percent of total exports in a given year) to construct a binary variable that indicates whether states in a given dyad are both major oil exporters. Since many monarchical regimes are in the Middle East, we control for whether both states in a given dyad are in the Middle East.16 We also draw on the COW territorial contiguity data set to code whether two countries in a given dyad shared a land or sea border. Finally, we

16 When defining countries in the Middle East, we include all 22 Arab League members as well as Israel and Turkey.

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control for whether state dyads have major power status,17 are jointly wealthy,18 are characterized by stability,19 and have alliance ties.20

4.2 Monadic Data Set Construction

We argue that absolute monarchs receive distinct benefits from informal cooperation and thus rationally select to use informal mechanisms when partnering with fellow monarchs rather than public, formal agreements. A key aspect of our theory is that, when cooperating with leaders of other regime types, absolute monarchs will use formal design mechanisms to optimize the benefits they receive from cooperation. To probe this part of our theory, we draw from Koremenos’ (2016) Continent of International Law (COIL) data set. COIL consists of a random sample of all bilateral and multilateral agreements registered with the UNTS across the issue areas of economics, environment, human rights and security with registration dates through 2006.21 Koremenos (2016; 2013b) codes the underlying cooperation problems 22 and design characteristics of these agreements, including the degree of precision and delegated dispute resolution, both of which we engage.

4.3. Case study

Lastly, we assess the causal mechanisms driving the relationship between rule of law (or absence thereof) in absolute monarchies and informal international cooperation through an in-depth case study of the informal interactions between GCC member states that

17 Major powers, particularly Western, democratic major powers, may have more influence over agreement design relative to their partner (Drezner 2008; Stone 2011). 18 We define a state as wealthy if they are in the top 25% of total GDP, drawing from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 19 Drawing from Mattes and Rodriguez (2014), this variable captures whether states in a dyad have experienced previous armed conflict. 20 This is a binary variable that indicates whether a dyad is part of the same alliance, drawing from the ATOP data set. 21 Each COIL agreement was carefully examined by separate sets of coders to determine whether or not it met the inclusion criteria (Koremenos 2013b). The majority of excluded agreements (agreements that did not meet the inclusion criteria) are between one state and an IGO. COIL was created to test theories of state–to–state cooperation and hence is compatible with our inclusion criteria regarding what counts as informal cooperation elaborated above. 22 The COIL research agenda’s premise is that states choose particular design features because those provisions help them most effectively resolve the problems that arise when they attempt to cooperate.

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produced the secret 2014 Riyadh Agreements. Similarly, conducting this case study allows us to assess process–based aspects of informal, collusive cooperation that cannot be easily captured through events data. For example, firm and management scholarship highlight that two strong indicators of informal, collusive cooperation are 1) when different actors’ policies are strongly and positively correlated (essentially uniform across several related policy dimensions) and 2) when there is low variation in how these actors implement these policies (Harrington 2006). As elaborated in the case study below, Arab monarchs uniformly pursued related domestic security policies, such as arresting and extraditing individuals critical of other monarchical regimes. We recognize that information about informal cooperation, particularly agreements that are secret and sensitive in nature, is difficult to access and often biased. To overcome these problems in our case study, we draw from a diverse set of primary-source materials, including historical documents, agreement texts, and officials’ public statements. We also draw from ten in–depth interviews conducted by Carlson with relevant policy makers and academics in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and the US.23 Triangulating across these sources helps us minimize potential bias and strengthens the inferences we draw from the available data. 5. Findings

5.1. Regime Type and Informal Cooperation Table 3 presents descriptive statistics about the frequency of different informal cooperative events that appear in the data set. Partners most often accept or agree to proposals and invitations, with this type of event characterizing almost 40% of informal cooperation. Senior Hungarian and Romanian officials agreeing to cooperate to encourage Romanian refugees in Hungary to return voluntarily constitutes one example of this type of event. Engaging in discussions and negotiations are the next most frequent type of informal cooperation. An example of engaging in negotiations includes the president of the French National Assembly holding talks with leaders of Romania’s new government,

23 For more information about how Carlson conducted these interviews, see the online appendix.

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marking the first high–level Western delegation to visit Romania since the revolution. Traveling to meet and hosting a meeting are the next most frequent events. Examples include Iraqi President Saddam Hussein arriving in Jordan for an unannounced visit and Russian President Boris Yeltsin hosting the Japanese Prime Minister for an informal meeting aimed at establishing close personal relations between the two leaders. Descriptive statistics about the frequencies of different types of formal cooperation are presented in Table A.3 in the appendix.

Figure 2 illustrates relative trends of informal cooperation over time by dyad type. Specifically, the figure shows the frequency of informal cooperation as a percentage of total cooperative events for each dyad type and year. Interestingly, Figure 2 suggests that informal cooperation among joint democratic dyads has slightly decreased over time – in 1997, joint democratic dyads’ informal cooperation dipped and remained below the mean intensity of informal cooperation (horizontal dashed line). Conversely, informal

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cooperation among joint monarchical dyads remains relatively higher than joint democratic dyads, except for a dip in 1999.24

As a first step toward examining absolute monarchies’ propensity for informal cooperation, we compare mean scores on the Goldstein cooperation scale across dyad types. Table 4 presents mean levels of informal cooperation between various dyads to probe whether dyads of absolute monarchies are significantly different with respect to this form of cooperation. There are 210 joint absolute monarchy dyads (0.12 % of the dyadic observations in the data set), with a mean intensity of informal cooperation of 1.08. 25

24 The percentage of formal events that occurred between absolute monarchical dyads substantially dropped in 1999 as well, indicating that there were lower levels of cooperation overall in this year. It is possible that this overall decrease in cooperation can be attributed to tensions between Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar Islands. 25 With respect to Table 4, the frequencies in the ‘Number of Observations’ column add up to over 100 because Islamic law states overlap with other regime type categories. Also, the category ‘Other dyads’ consists of at least one government that Geddes (2014) coded as having a ‘mixed’ regime type, e.g., a mix of military-personalist characteristics.

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Table 4 indicates that joint absolute monarchy dyads have the highest mean level of informal cooperation and have significantly higher than mean levels of informal cooperation than joint democratic dyads.26 Moreover, all other joint autocratic dyad types have significantly lower mean levels of informal cooperation than absolute monarchies. Additionally, mean levels of informal cooperation for mixed dyads of absolute monarchies and other regime types (absolute monarchy-democracy, absolute monarchy-single-party, absolute monarchy–military, absolute monarchy-personalist) are significantly lower than the joint democratic baseline, supporting our argument that states selectively use formal and informal cooperative mechanisms within a dyadic context and that joint absolute monarchy dyads behave in a cartel–like fashion relative to other pairs.

26 Our data set has a low number of joint monarchical dyads for two reasons. First, the time period of events examined spans 1990 to 2004. This, coupled with the exclusion restrictions outlined in section 4.1, implies that the only absolute monarchies included are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Swaziland, and Brunei.

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In Table 5, we use the generalized estimating equations (GEE) method to estimate generalized linear and logit population-averaged models. GEE population-averaged models allow us to examine changes in the mean levels of informal cooperation given a change in dyad type. Put differently, using a GEE model allows us to obtain the average effect of dyad type on informal cooperation (Zeger and Liang 1986). In addition to modeling the average response effect across all clusters, GEE models recognize the time-series, cross-sectional nature of our data and, because they estimate population-averaged coefficients from correlated data, are particularly useful when comparing an outcome variable across subgroups within a population (Zorn 2001). Previous scholarship that examines the effect of regime type on various types of international behavior has used this modeling technique (e.g. Oneal and Russett 2001; Mattes and Rodriguez 2014).

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Table 5 demonstrates the effects of regime type on the intensity of formal and informal cooperation across pure and mixed dyads, using joint democratic dyads as the baseline category.27 Our Informal and Formal cooperation models indicate that joint absolute monarchy dyads informally cooperate significantly more – and formally cooperate significantly less – than joint democratic dyads.28 Indeed, joint absolute monarchical dyads are the only dyad types that informally cooperate significantly more and formally cooperate significantly less than joint democratic dyads. As illustrated in our models, joint Islamic law states (joint ILS) informally cooperate significantly more than joint democratic dyads, although not at the same levels as joint absolute monarchical dyads. Although not statistically significant, the positive coefficients on formal cooperation indicate that Islamic law state dyads formally cooperate more intensely than joint democratic dyads. This finding challenges the competing hypothesis that Islamic law leads states to prefer non-binding, informal cooperative measures as opposed to formal cooperation. Our findings also support our theoretical expectations that the relatively higher transparency in domestic policy implementation in single-party and military juntas may lead them to avoid informal, cartel–like cooperation. Indeed, joint single party dyads, joint military dyads, democracy–single party dyads, and democracy–military regime dyads are significantly less likely to informally cooperate relative to joint democratic dyads. Even more important as confirmation of our theoretical expectations regarding the absolutist logic, we find that absolute monarchies are significantly less likely to engage in informal cooperation with all other regime types. Because democratic, single party, military, and personalist leaders lack the long-standing familial ties and predictable domestic behavioral norms that absolute monarchs share, absolute monarchs choose (or at the least, accept) to formally rather than informally cooperate with other regime types.

27 When we include joint democratic dyads into each model, the coefficients of the joint democracy variable are statistically significant and positive. 28 Because the events ‘Collaborate,’ ‘Mediate talks,’ ‘Agree to mediate,’ ‘Request to mediate,’ and ‘Promise to mediate,’ may indicate informal cooperation, we ran the same models above including these events in our measure for informal cooperation. Our results are robust to these category changes.

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Because monarchies are largely time invariant, it may be that other factors associated with joint monarchical dyads confound the effect on informal cooperation. To deal with dyad–invariant heterogeneity and minimize potential omitted variable bias, we also estimate a random effects model incorporating the same control variables. Our results are robust to this model change. In fact, joint ILS’s positive effect on Formal Average cooperation and the joint Absolute Monarchy’s negative effect on Formal Average cooperation become statistically significant. We present the full estimations for our random effects model in Table A.4 in the appendix. Moreover, because joint absolute monarchy dyads are not mutually exclusive from joint ILS (i.e. there are dyads that are coded as jointly monarchical and jointly ILS), it is important to disaggregate and assess the differential effects of Islamic legal systems and absolute monarchical regime type in the dyadic context. As a first step towards assessing these variables’ effects, we calculate the Pearson’s correlation co-efficient for joint ILS and joint absolute monarchies, which is 0.23, indicating that these variables are positively – but weakly – correlated. Second, we present two additional population–averaged models in Table A.5 and A.6 in the appendix, dropping joint absolute monarchy in the first and dropping joint ILS in the second. The significance of the coefficients for both variables remain robust across the models for both informal and formal cooperation.

5.2 Do Absolute Monarchies Make Rational Design Choices? We assess whether states’ regime type influences the likelihood that the UNTS–registered agreements possess two formal design characteristics: precise language29 and delegated dispute resolution.30 Our independent variable is binary and captures whether at least one state signatory is an absolute monarchy.31 Because certain design characteristics have been

29 For the measure of precise language, we draw from Koremenos (2016), who codes the precision of an agreement, namely the “degree of precision surrounding the main prescriptions, proscriptions, and/ or authorizations embodied in an international agreement” (2016: 159). The precision variable is ordinal and takes 4 ascending values: (1) very vague; (2) somewhat vague; (3) somewhat precise; and (4) very precise. 30 For the measure of delegated dispute resolution, we draw from Koremenos (2016), who codes formal (i.e. delegated) dispute resolution mechanisms as whether third–party arbitration and adjudication are stipulated within an agreement. 31 Our other regime binary variables are coded similarly. For example, our variable ‘Personalist Regimes’ codes whether at least one state signatory has a personalist regime.

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shown to vary with the particular underlying cooperation problems the agreements address, we control for the relevant cooperation problems (Koremenos 2016). Table 6 presents the results of these models with coefficients and odds ratios in adjacent columns, using democracies as the baseline for comparison.32 Among UNTS agreements in the COIL sample, those with at least one absolute monarchy33 are not significantly less likely to be characterized by the use of precise language or the inclusion of delegated dispute resolution mechanisms. Conditional marginal effects indicate that the probability that an agreement contains very precise language (i.e. Precision=4) increases by 10 percentage points when one of the parties is an absolute monarchy; this increase is not statistically significant. The probability that an agreement includes delegated dispute resolution decreases by 14 percentage points when one of the parties is an absolute monarchy; this change is also not statistically significant. These null results reject the idea that absolute monarchs have a non-instrumental preference for informality.34 Rather, our COIL analyses indicate that, when absolute monarchs cooperate with leaders of other regime types, they use the formal design mechanisms necessary to resolve the underlying cooperation problems. Our findings are consistent (i.e. the coefficients lack significance and maintain their direction) even when systematically dropping the Islamic legal system and absolute monarchy variables. The full model specifications are in Table A.7 in the appendix.35

32 It is important to note that we include issue area dummies and use human rights as the baseline for issue area comparison (the excluded variable) because the COIL sample is random conditional on issue area. As such, the coefficients on the issue areas are relative to human rights agreements. For example, Table 4 indicates that economic agreements are nearly 3 times as likely to be precise as human rights agreements. 33 Monarchies are defined within the time period of the COIL data set, which draws on all of the international agreements published in hard copy volumes through the registration date of 2006. 34 Our results also reject the notion that Islamic law states have a non–instrumental preference for less formalized dispute resolution, further weakening the competing explanation that ILS states tend to use informal design characteristics. It is important to note that, for absolute monarchy and Islamic legal system, the Pearson’s correlation co-efficient is 0.35, indicating the weak correlation between the variables. 35 We should note that our results remain robust (i.e. lack significance) when we run the model with robust standard errors unclustered on issue area. Our results also remain robust when we include Uncertainty about the State of the World and Uncertainty about Behavior, two cooperation problems that Koremenos (2016) includes in her analysis of delegated dispute resolution but for which she finds no theoretical justification and no statistical significance.

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5.3. Case study

All GCC member states are conservative monarchies based on tribal political structures (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 164–167). Despite the fact that Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have parliaments or family coalitions that potentially constrain the head of state’s behavior, all ten stakeholders interviewed stated that parliaments in these countries were, at best, weakly able to constrain monarchs’ behaviors and only in specific

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issue areas, such as domestic economic policy.36 Of all interviewees, no one could identify a single government official, institution, or family coalition that could check or constrain the behaviors of the King and Crown Prince in each GCC state, particularly in terms of foreign policy development and implementation. For example, the current monarch has historically held the position of foreign minister in Qatar and the UAE. Similarly, the Saudi King overhauled all top government positions in December 2018, helping the Crown Prince further consolidate power after heavy international criticism for the assassination of Saudi–born journalist Jamal Khashoggi. This shake-up included appointing a new Minister of Foreign Affairs and reshuffling members of the Supreme Council, which is headed by the Crown Prince (who incidentally is also deputy prime minister and defense minister) and largely responsible for the Kingdom’s security policy (Batrawy 2018). Gulf monarchies have historically conducted all substantive security and political cooperation through informal elite–level discussions. In the late 1950s, the Saudi Arabian and Emirati monarchs resolved their territorial dispute through an unwritten agreement in which Saudi Arabia dropped its claims to the Buraimi/al–Ain region in exchange for the UAE allowing a Saudi land corridor through Khor al–Udaid (Schofield 2011). Similarly, although Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman resolved additional territorial disputes and natural resource distribution through the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah, the text of the treaty remained secret until the countries agreed to publish it in 1995 – a full two decades after the agreement was originally concluded (Schofield 2011). In the case study below, we demonstrate that, even after the formation of GCC in 1981, Gulf monarchies continued to use informal agreements rather than GCC institutions and bureaucracy to facilitate their bilateral and multilateral cooperation. We show how the few agreements registered with the GCC are vague, provide for informal, bilateral dispute resolution, and allow member states to place substantively important contingencies on their commitments, facilitating monarchs’ ability to engage flexibly in elite-driven cooperation. We then detail how, after the Arab uprisings began in 2011, Gulf monarchies tacitly agreed to implement harsh policies against domestic opposition critical of other GCC regimes. The Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, used

36 This finding informed our coding of absolute monarchs in our large–N analysis.

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multiple collusive agreements to consolidate political power and prevent the emergence of new regime types in the Gulf, specifically the democratic–oriented political model presented by Muslim Brotherhood. However, because Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain believed that Qatar continued to violate this implicit agreement, they entered into several informal agreements in 2012 and 2013. Qatar’s continual noncompliance with these agreements led to a diplomatic crisis, which was successfully mediated by Kuwait and resulted in additional supplementary agreements.

5.3.1. Lack of Formal Cooperation Among GCC Members As mentioned in the introduction, GCC members states have few formal agreements with each other, particularly compared to the large number of UNTS agreements each has with states outside the region. Table 7 lists the total number of bilateral and closed multilateral agreements registered with the UNTS that each GCC member has with other GCC and non–GCC members.37

Table 7: Frequency of UNTS Agreements for GCC Member States

GCC member state Total agreements with other GCC members

Total agreements with non–GCC states

Saudi Arabia 15 (9.7%) 139 (90.3%) Kuwait 3 (2.5%) 115 (97.5%) Qatar 7 (8.0%) 80 (91.9%) United Arab Emirates 7 (7.2%) 90 (92.8%) Oman 4 (4.4%) 87 (95.6%) Bahrain 8 (12.3%) 57 (87.7%)

*Percentage of GCC member states’ total bilateral and closed multilateral agreements listed in parentheses.

Although Gulf countries are unlikely to register agreements with international organizations like the UNTS, it is possible that they develop, register, and publish formal agreements through the GCC. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and

37 As a comparison, Liechtenstein has a total of 68 UNTS–registered bilateral agreements, 34 of which (i.e. 50%) are with Switzerland.

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Qatar formed the GCC in 1981 largely in response to regional security threats, including the 1979 Iranian–Islamic revolution, the 1980 Iran–Iraq war, and the rising threat of Islamic fundamentalism elsewhere in the region (Nuruzzaman 2015).38 Article 4 of the GCC Charter states that its main objective is to facilitate and strengthen member states’ economic, financial, social, and cultural cooperation. To do so, it established two main intergovernmental bodies: the first is the Supreme Council, which consists of the heads of state, specifically the monarchs of the six member states, and formally meets once a year; the second is the Ministerial council, which consists of the six member states’ foreign ministers,39 who formally meet every three months. These bodies are supplemented by the GCC Secretariat, which coordinates these activities and oversees the implementation of the GCC policies (Guazzone 1988: 147). Despite establishing these bodies, the GCC Charter, and its subsequent agreements and regulations, extensively rely on ambiguous language to describe terms of member states’ commitments, as well as the mechanisms available for member states if disputes arise. For instance, Article 10 of the Charter states that the Supreme Council can convene a “Commission for the Settlement of Disputes,” on an ad hoc basis tailored to the specific needs of disputing member states. Although the Charter does not define what constitutes a dispute, member state government officials have made statements indicating that they consider economic, territorial, and military disputes to fall under the purview of the Commission (Pinfari 2009). Moreover, because the Commission acts as a nested recommending body within the Supreme Council, it cannot bind member states to adhere to any formal resolution reached. Although member states have effectively mediated and resolved intra–member disputes, these mediation efforts have occurred outside the (albeit vague) dispute settlement and arbitration mechanisms outlined in the GCC Charter (Nuruzzaman 2015).40 More often than not, member states involved in disputes directly appeal to other Gulf monarchies to

38 Nine of the ten individuals interviewed agreed that the GCC was formed largely in response to the threat posed by the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Several individuals indicated that GCC member states sought cooperation in order to stabilize and prevent upheaval among their domestic publics. 39 Note that foreign ministers in GCC member states are often the monarchs themselves. 40 Additionally, of the ten interviews conducted, all participants agreed that the six GCC member states cooperate at elite levels, outside of the GCC bureaucracy.

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step in as third–party mediators rather than operate through formal GCC organs (Pinfari 2009). In fact, of the three border disputes that have occurred between Gulf states, all have been unilaterally mediated by other GCC member states. For example, Saudi Arabia unilaterally mediated the Harwar Island dispute between Bahrain and Qatar in 1986 and 1987; official GCC involvement was limited to overseeing the Saudi–brokered agreement ex post. Kuwait mediated the 1992 territorial conflict between Qatar and Saudi Arabia without formally convening the Commission (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004). Although these successes won the GCC significant recognition as an effective mediator, GCC bureaucracy and institutions made no direct institutional efforts in resolving these disputes (Barnett and Gause 1998; Guazzone 1988; Tow 1990; Nuruzzaman 2015). To emphasize the lack of formal, binding regulations within GCC bureaucracy, the GCC is undergirded by only four formal agreements (excluding its Charter)41 and ten laws and regulations, all published through the GCC Secretariat.42 Comparatively, the European Union has more than 40 treaties43 and more than 290 general regulations pertaining to agriculture alone.44 Table 7 lists the four formal agreements registered with and published through the GCC Secretariat and provides information on whether each mentions dispute resolution mechanisms, whether these mechanisms stipulate only ad hoc, informal resolution between members, and whether they allow member states to place contingencies on their commitments. Table 8 indicates that only half of the agreements explicitly mention dispute resolution; the two agreements that do mention dispute resolution encourage parties to resolve these disputes bilaterally, outside GCC bureaucracy. Moreover, all four agreements allow member states to place contingencies on fulfilling substantive commitments outlined in the agreements, ranging from non-fulfillment due to ‘local situations,’ to refusing judicial decisions that would threaten the sovereignty or order of the state required to implement the decision.

41 It is important to note that the 2010 Agreement Establishing the Monetary Union was only signed by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. As such, this agreement collapsed because the UAE and Oman remained outside the monetary union. 42 For the complete list of GCC laws and regulations, see Table A.8 in the Appendix. 43 See Other Treaties and Protocols, EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/treaties/treaties-other.html. Accessed on July 2, 2018. 44 See Directory of European Union Legislation, EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/browse/directories/legislation.html?root_default=CC_1_CODED%3D03&displayProfile=allConsDocProfile&classification=in-force#arrow_03. Accessed on July 2, 2018.

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Table 8: GCC Agreements and their Characteristics

GCC Agreement Year

Ratified Dispute

Resolution? Only Informal Resolution?

Contingencies?

Convention on the Implementation of Judgements, Disputes, and Judicial Declarations

1997 No -

Member states can refuse to execute judicial delegations if their implementation relates to a political crime committed by the state or if such execution may prejudice the sovereignty or public order of the state.

Economic Agreement between the GCC states

2002 No -

Member states may be temporarily exempted from applying provisions depending on local situations.

Convention on the Conservation of Wildlife and Natural Habitats

2004 Yes

Yes: disputes are resolved through direct negotiations between the parties.45

Member states can place reservations on any of the required methods of killing a particular species. Members can also withdraw from the agreement at any time via an official letter.

Agreement Establishing the Monetary Union of the Gulf Cooperation Council

2010 Yes

Yes: disputes are resolved in an amicable manner in accordance with agreed upon arbitration rules between the parties.46

Only Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain signed; other GCC states may join if they meet the necessary criteria for economic performance and approval of the Supreme Council.

In addition to these agreements, there are ten laws and regulations appended to the GCC Charter (these ten laws and regulations are listed in Table 2 in the Appendix). Of these ten regulations, more than half pertain to regulating livestock movement, wildlife conservation, and environmental protection; the other half concern trademark and patent systems.

45 This is the only form of dispute resolution mentioned in the agreement. 46 This is the only form of dispute resolution mentioned in the agreement.

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Besides the creation of the largely symbolic Peninsula Shield Force in 1982, GCC member states did not pass any security or military related agreements, regulations, or provisions under the auspices of the GCC until 2011 when Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent troops to help Bahrain quell domestic unrest stemming from the 2011 Arab uprisings (Bronner and Slackman 2011). As explained in the following section, after the 2011 military intervention, GCC member states developed a Joint Security Agreement to harmonize intra–GCC security policies to address terrorist threats and other emerging internal security issues in 2012, the text of which was not public (Toumi 2012).

5.3.2. The 2012 Joint Security and 2013-2014 Riyadh Agreements As demonstrated in the previous sections, GCC member states eschew formal regional bureaucracy when coordinating their security policies, preferring to address security issues informally as they arise (Tripp 1995: 293). After the onset of the Arab uprisings in 2011, GCC member states implicitly understood that, in order to maintain their stability, they would need to pursue coordinated policies to stymie domestic opposition to and criticism of GCC monarchies (Smith–Diwan 2017). Because of regime similarity, specifically the absolute power with which Gulf monarchs rule, GCC member states recognized that criticism of one GCC regime could and would be applied across all Gulf monarchies, weakening their legitimate authority. GCC member states understood that their collective reassertion of state authority over nonstate Islamic political actors would stabilize and thus mutually benefit all authoritarian monarchies affected by the Arab uprisings (Smith–

Diwan 2017). In particular, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as early opponents of political Islam, saw the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as other Islamic political groups as a threat to their strategic positioning in the region (Beck 2015). GCC member states viewed the Qatari monarchy, which, as one interviewee stated, has traditionally promoted Islamic pluralism among domestic political actors as a way to develop its regime, as violating this norm of autocratic consolidation. Specifically, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain accused Qatar of funding terrorism and Islamic extremist groups, including some associated with Iran, and providing safe haven for these groups, thereby threatening the security of Gulf states (Beck 2015).

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GCC member states, led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, entered into several informal agreements with Qatar to formalize this norm of autocratic security cooperation from 2012 to 2013. Although the Qatari monarchy publicly denied the accusations, in March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain broke diplomatic relations with Qatar by recalling their ambassadors (Smith-Diwan 2017). They accused the Qatari monarchy of undermining their key security concerns and interfering with their internal affairs by promoting Islamic extremism through Al Jazeera and other media networks and supporting the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the region (Aljadani, Mear, and Raimi 2014). Kuwait, as the acting mediator, was able to resolve this dispute within several weeks (Smith–Diwan 2017). The first informal agreement we focus on is the Joint Security agreement signed by all six GCC member states in November 2012 (Sciutto and Herb 2017). This agreement expanded and upgraded the 2000 Joint Defense Agreement mentioned previously (Henderson 2001; Europa Publications 2003). It is important to note that Jordan and Morocco – other absolute monarchies affected by the Arab uprisings – assented to the 2012 agreement without formally signing (Al-Rasheed 2015; Yom 2016b). While GCC member states publicly acknowledged the agreement and endorsed the agreement at the annual GCC advisory summit, the Joint Security agreement was never registered with or published by the GCC Secretariat or any other regional organization (Toumi 2012; Sciutto and Herb 2017). Moreover, human rights organizations criticized public, official statements about the substance of the agreement as ‘vague’ (Human Rights Watch 2014). Although meetings, summits, and discussions among these eight monarchies drastically increased in 2011, a vast majority of these interactions were hidden from international and regional media outlets (Al–Quds Al–Arabi 2011). As elaborated below, these continual meetings, as well as agreement requirements that facilitated communication and monitoring among regime intelligence officers, enabled a shared understanding of actions that constituted agreement compliance and violation. According to public statements made by those party to the agreement, the Joint Security Agreement gave executive authorities and their intelligence and security infrastructure a

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variety of extrajudicial and extra–territorial powers to monitor the political opposition across GCC member states, bypassing traditional legal checks (Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 2016). Specifically, agreement provisions require signatories to share their citizens’ and residents’ personal data with other GCC member states’ intelligence departments and call for extradition if other GCC members find that citizens or residents of any GCC state have ‘interfered’ with their sovereignty and internal affairs. The agreement itself does not define what behaviors constitute interference in the domestic affairs of other GCC states and does not specify safeguards that protect the rights of the accused. Agreement implementation was left solely to GCC states’ interior ministers (Human Rights Watch 2014). According to the GCC Secretary General Abdullatif Al Zayani, the security agreement allows GCC governments, Jordan, and Morocco to track down and prosecute ‘lawbreakers’ and ‘criminals’ across these countries, irrespective of their nationality (Toumi 2012). By doing so, these monarchs collectively protected their partners from the Arab uprisings’ negative consequences for each member states’ individual national security and regime stability. It is important to note that GCC monarchs signed and implemented this agreement in spite of attempts by national-level veto players to reject the agreement on legal grounds. For example, although the Kuwaiti parliament’s foreign affairs committee rejected the Joint Security agreement, strongly objecting because it violated Kuwait’s territorial sovereignty (and thus the country’s constitution), Emir Al-Sabah pushed ahead with the ratification of the agreement in domestic law (Human Rights Watch 2014). Although the Joint Security agreement did not formally come into effect until December 2013, GCC member states, Jordan, and Morocco collectively prosecuted their citizens for criticizing other GCC governments or their rulers beginning in 2011. For example, in October 2013, an appeals court in Kuwait upheld a decade-long prison sentence for a blogger who criticized the Bahraini and Saudi Arabian Monarchs. In June 2013, the Saudi regime established a terrorism court, which sentenced individuals to prison for supporting the uprisings in Bahrain (Human Rights Watch 2014). In 2014, Jordan imprisoned Zaki Bani Irshaid, then deputy head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing in the country,

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for criticizing the UAE’s decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization (Al–Khalidi 2014). Specifically, the Jordanian state security prosecutor charged Bani Irshaid with “souring relations with a friendly country” (Al–Khalidi 2014).

In 2016, the Kuwaiti criminal court sentenced Abdul Hamid Dashti, a member of the Kuwaiti parliament, to 14 years in prison for offending Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (Gulf News Report 2016). In addition to the 2012 Joint Security agreement, the King of Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti Crown Prince, and Qatari Prince held extensive, secret deliberations in Riyadh in November 2013 regarding obstacles to security cooperation among GCC states. To identify, clarify, and abolish issues that ‘muddle’ their relations, the executives composed and signed a handwritten agreement they collectively called the Riyadh Agreement. Less than two pages long, this agreement obligates signatories to neither directly nor indirectly interfere in the internal affairs of other GCC member states (Sciutto and Herb 2017). Specifically, under the agreement signatories cannot grant asylum or nationality to any individual that had engaged in opposition activity against other GCC monarchical regimes. The agreement explicitly states that signatories cannot provide support to any deviant groups or antagonistic media that threatens the security and stability of GCC member states through political influence. Although the agreement did not define what it meant by ‘deviant groups,’ subsequent provisions specified the Muslim Brotherhood and Yemeni factions broadly. In November 2014, the Kings of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and the Crown Princes of Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar, secretly met in Riyadh to “cement the spirit of sincere cooperation and to emphasize the joint fate and the aspirations of the sons of the Gulf Cooperation Council” (Preamble to the 2014 Supplementary Riyadh Agreement). During this meeting, the heads of state composed and signed the second iteration of the Riyadh Agreement. The agreement text references the previous handwritten agreement, the executive measures therein, and committee reports of its implementation collectively developed by GCC states’ chief intelligence officers. As in the original 2013 agreement, GCC monarchs agreed to not directly or indirectly support, employ, or provide refuge to “any persons or a media apparatus that harbors inclinations harmful to any Gulf Cooperation Council state” either domestically or abroad. The agreement commits state

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signatories to take all legal measures against any individual that encroaches on the domestic affairs of other GCC member states, including “putting him on trial and announcing it in the media.” GCC monarchs also agree to provide financial and military support to the Egyptian government and cease all media activity that criticizes or denounces the Egyptian regime, explicitly identifying news broadcast on Al-Jazeera and Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr. The supplementary text to the 2014 agreement further details signatories’ commitments. It specifies that all media networks owned or financed directly or indirectly by a GCC member state must not discuss topics that may harm other GCC monarchs and their governments; it establishes a formal list of such media outlets to be updated periodically. Similarly, it requires member states to not grant citizenship to any individual involved in opposition activities against their governments, requiring GCC member states to provide the names of opposition members that reside in their country to their fellow signatories. The supplementary text emphasizes that signatories must not financially or politically support entities that threaten other GCC member states, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood and groups in Yemen and Syria. It specifies that signatories must expel non-citizen Muslim Brotherhood members within a mutually agreed-upon time frame. Lastly, the agreement requires that GCC governments shut down all academies and centers that encourage and train GCC citizens to work against their own government. The first article of the 2014 agreement explicitly mentions an extreme but vaguely worded punishment mechanism: any state that does not commit to any of the articles in the Riyadh Agreement, its measures, and supplementary intelligence reports violates the entirety of the agreement. The ancillary agreement to the 2014 supplementary agreement details the monitoring mechanisms mentioned above. Specifically, it establishes annual meetings for foreign ministers to review relevant reports of agreement implementation and requires regular bilateral meetings between intelligence officials. It also allows GCC monarchs to take all necessary measures against states that violate the agreement, although it never specifies the nature of these measures. GCC member states are required to fully commit to and implement everything stated in these documents within one month from the date of the agreement. The agreement text states that the chief intelligence officers will monitor each state’s implementation of the agreement and regularly submit

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reports to their respective leaders. The last article of the agreement explicitly states that the goal of this supplementary agreement is to ensure the security and stability of GCC member states. Collectively, the informal agreements developed and signed by GCC monarchs from 2012 to 2014 indicate that GCC monarchs, particularly Saudi Arabia, attempted to use increasingly formal design mechanisms in attempts to force Qatari compliance. Specifically, while the 2013 Riyadh agreement was hand-written, contained ambiguously-worded commitments, and did not mention any punishment or dispute resolution mechanisms, the supplementary 2014 agreements were extremely specific about GCC member states’ obligations, and included somewhat vague, but strong punishment mechanisms for agreement violations.47 Although the texts did not specify the ways in which monarchs were supposed to implement these informal agreements, GCC member states selected to use increasingly formal and precise language when personalist norm-based obligations were insufficient to curry partners’ compliance. This suggests that, although absolute monarchies prefer informal cooperation, they may also incorporate formal design characteristics into their informal agreements. In summary, Table 8 compares the expected behaviors of absolute monarchies outlined in our theory to the observed behaviors of Gulf monarchies.

Table 9: Comparing Theoretical Implications and Observed Behaviors Expected Behaviors

Observed Behaviors of Gulf Monarchies

The use of formal organizations to mask collusion

Gulf monarchies (and Jordan) do not use formal GCC mechanisms, justifying actions through post-hoc claims that they acted under GCC auspices.

The use of informal and non-transparent dispute resolution mechanisms

Historically, third-party Gulf monarchs resolve territorial disputes between Gulf states; GCC charter outlines ad hoc dispute resolution between member states.

Regular meetings between heads of state

In addition to mandated meetings of the two GCC Councils (which both consist of all Gulf monarchs),

47 Although many multilateral disarmament agreements are similarly vague because they delegate punishment authority to the UN Security Council (which may or may not decide to act), delegation to the UNSC is formal and public; the deliberations and votes regarding actual punishment are semi-public. Moreover, the membership of this third party is also not best characterized as a cartel.

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meetings drastically increased in 2011; these meetings were hidden from media outlets.

During meetings, heads of state share sensitive information and discuss joint problems

2012-2014 secret security agreements mention information-sharing mechanisms between countries’ intelligence agencies.

Heads of state publicly express solidarity and collective support for each other’s domestic policies

During 2012 GCC Advisory Summit, representatives of Gulf monarchs publicly expressed successful agreement on how to coordinate security policies.

Heads of state pursue domestic policies that are uniform across related policy dimensions

After 2011, GCC monarchs pursued domestic policies that targeted domestic opposition and criticism against GCC monarchies.

Heads of state implement these domestic policies in similar ways

Kuwait, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Bahrain arrested, sentenced, and imprisoned critics of other monarchies in the region.

Policy implementation explicitly violates partner governments’ sovereignty

The 2012-2014 secret security agreements required sharing sensitive security information and automatic extradition of critics without evidence of wrongdoing.

Evidence of attempts to redistribute benefits/punish violators for noncompliance

2012-2014 secret security agreements demanded that members implement more costly policies to curtail opposition/criticism and punishment for violations in increasing detail/formality.

It is important to note that, while this case study examines informal cooperation among authoritarian monarchies in the Arab world, GCC monarchies have also informally cooperated with the two other absolute monarchies outside the region: Brunei and Swaziland. Although Brunei has one UNTS-registered agreement with Oman,48 neither Brunei nor Swaziland has any other UNTS-registered agreements with GCC member states. However, GCC member states have engaged in informal cooperation with both Brunei and Swaziland. Saudi Arabia established formal diplomatic relations with Brunei in 1987, which was undergirded by a ‘Confidential Memorandum of Understanding’ signed between the two monarchs in 1990 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2017). Since then, Saudi Arabia and Brunei have entered into seven agreements, ranging from health cooperation to agreements facilitating trade and investment. Importantly, not one of these

48 Entitled “Agreement between the Government of His Majesty The Sultan and Yang Di–Pertuan of Brunei Darussalam and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman for air services between and beyond their respective territories,” this agreement was signed in 1988.

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agreements is registered with an international or regional body, nor are any of the agreement texts public. 6. Conclusion In a dyadic context, states’ regime type plays a critical role in how they cooperate. Specifically, we find that particular dimensions of domestic policymaking, namely the degree of transparency, the presence or absence of veto players, and the degree of flexibility, shape preferences for informal versus formal cooperation. Returning to the question posed at the outset of this paper regarding whether absolute monarchies are failing to cooperate or if they are cooperating outside formal, observable mechanisms, we demonstrate that, on average, dyads of absolute monarchies informally cooperate significantly more than joint democratic dyads and dyads of different regime types. Similarly, our analysis indicates that absolute monarchical dyads have lower levels of formal cooperation relative to joint democratic dyads. We provide support for our theoretical assumption that absolute monarchies rationally select formal and informal cooperation (as well as formal and informal design provisions) depending on whom they cooperate with in the dyadic context. While not democratic or liberal, the ‘absolutist logic’ that guides autocrats’ preferences for cooperation is quite rational. We cast doubt on two competing explanations. First, the results of our events data analysis and our assessment of states’ preferences for particular design provisions suggest that the Islamic nature of states’ legal systems does not influence rates of informal cooperation. Second, we find that whether both members of a dyad are major oil exporters has no significant effect on their propensity to enter into either formal or informal types of cooperation. Our findings contribute to existing scholarship in three important ways. First, our findings elucidate the conditions under which certain states substitute formal agreements with informal cooperation. We demonstrate that, depending on their partner’s regime type, state executives may prefer to cooperate informally to facilitate the private provisions of public goods rather than operate within a formal institutional context. Our case study evidence indicates that absolute monarchs use informality across different substantive

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issue areas, ranging from territorial agreements to security pacts. Second, we develop a more detailed theoretical distinction between institutional constraints in different autocratic regime types. By doing so, we demonstrate that variation in autocratic regimes’ domestic policy implementation critically influences the types of cooperation they engage in with different partners. Lastly, we leverage an innovative, multi–method research design to systematically assess the conditions under which states engage in cooperation that is wholly informal, allowing us to identify and elucidate trends in difficult-to-observe forms of international cooperation. The scope of our findings, however, is limited to our definition of informality. It is likely that democracies’ and other types of autocracies’ different constitutive features lead them to engage in other kinds of informal cooperation. Indeed, existing scholarship suggests that democracies may be more likely to use more bureaucratized and transparent informal international institutions than other regime types (Vabulas and Snidal 2013). Our findings open various avenues for future scholarship regarding the effectiveness of completely informal cooperation and its costs. First, we do not know whether the type of informal cooperation practiced by absolute monarchs is sustainable or effective. Can certain cooperation problems be credibly solved without public and binding mechanisms like those provided by international courts? Our case study suggests that the behavioral norms that undergirded the cartel–like informal agreement between GCC monarchies – and the threats of punishment for agreement violation – were not sufficient to curtail Qatar’s behavior. Second, future research should examine the conditions under which absolute monarchs do use formal design mechanisms within their secret, informal agreements. Indeed, our case study shows that GCC member states increasingly used precise language in attempts to restrict Qatar’s behavior. Do such design provisions correspond to the types of design provisions states use when formally cooperating? Finally, further research should explore in greater depth how this type of informal cooperation imposes costs on citizens. That absolute monarchs could informally cooperate in ways that undermined their public commitments to their citizens (some of which were made through the ratification of UN human rights agreements) indicates the critical normative implications of the absolutist logic.

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Cooperation Failure or Secret Collusion? Absolute Monarchs and Informal Cooperation

Online Appendix SECTION 1: Dyadic Data Set 1.1. Description of Coding for Dependent Variables Our measure for informal cooperation draws from King and Lowe’s (2003) 10 Million International Dyadic Events data set. The data set includes all intra and inter-state events that occurred between international organizations, state governments, and non-state actors from 1990 to 2004. The data set is available on Gary King’s dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/FYXLAWZRIA). King and Lowe (2003) use the Virtual Research Associates, Inc (VRA) Reader software, which processes data directly from the Reuters Business Briefing (RBB) newswire and/or from a precompiled database of RBB news stories. The VRA Reader software takes advantage of the common journalistic practice in which reporters write lead sentences that summarize the articles’ main points – specifically, it extracts the articles’ first sentence, identifies the two actors involved and their geopolitical characteristics, and generates a summary of all events described in the sentence. The software numerically codes the type of event according to the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) typology, which contains 157 different event type categories (Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, and Taylor 2003). Event types range from requests to threats, denials, and military actions. The IDEA framework expands McClelland’s (1978) World Events Interactions Survey (WEIS) ontology by including additional event types and differentiating among event subtypes. Most importantly for this article, the VRA Reader software’s documentation provides a mapping of IDEA individual event categories onto Goldstein’s (1992) conflict-cooperation scale.

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In order to aggregate the 10 Million International Dyadic Events data, map their IDEA codes onto the Goldstein cooperation scale, and obtain our measure for informal cooperation, we followed these steps:49 1) Filtering the data set for international events: Because the 10 Million International Dyadic Events data contains events that occur at the domestic and international levels, we filtered the data to only include events that occurred between two different countries – i.e. international events. As such, we excluded all events where both actors involved were located within the same country. 2) Filtering the data set for state governments: Because the 10 Million International Dyadic Events data contains events that occur between various state and non-state actors, international events include those that occur between individuals, businesses, NGOs, IGOs, or parties located in two different countries. Since we are interested in cooperation that occurs between state governments, namely inter-state interaction controlled by the national executives, we excluded all events where one or both of the actors involved was not the state government. 3) Eliminating duplicate observations in the data: We next eliminated duplicate observations. It is possible that, within the 10 million events data, there are multiple news stories that mention the same event, creating duplicate observations. We thus eliminated all events that involved the same two countries, the same event, and the same date. Although this means we lost distinct cooperative events between the same two countries on the same day, we made this more conservative choice rather than inadvertently include duplicates because multiple news stories reported the same event. 1.1.1. Creating the Informal Cooperation dependent variable We then mapped the unranked IDEA event categories onto the Goldstein conflict-cooperation scale (Goldstein 1992) using Table 1 from King and Lowe (2003). It is important to note that King and Lowe (2003) used a preliminary data set, which was then replaced by the updated 10 Million International Dyadic Events data. As such, some of the IDEA scores listed in Table 1 do not perfectly match the IDEA event scores in the updated 10 million events data. However, because Table 1 contains descriptive statements of the type of event, we were able to match the IDEA scores in the table to those in the

49 It is important to note that we followed the same procedures outlined in Mattes and Rodriguez (2014) to collapse the 10 Million International Dyadic Events data into international events between state governments (i.e. events under the control of the national executive).

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updated data and assign the corresponding Goldstein score. We provide an excel file that has the scores from Table 1 and the updated scores used in our data analysis, in the file named XXXXXXX. The Goldstein cooperation score ranges from 0 to 8.3. Table 1 from King and Lowe (2003) that matches IDEA event codes with Goldstein scores follows.

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TABLE 1. The IDEA ontology

Goldstein IDEA Definition Goldstein IDEA Definition

8+3 072 extend military aid !2+8 12 accuse7+6 074 rally support !3 161 warn7+6 073 extend humanitarian aid !3 16 warn7+4 071 extend economic aid !3+4 122 denounce or denigrate6+5 081 make substantial agreement !3+8 194 halt negotiations5+4 064 improve relations !4 1134 break law5+2 0523 promise humanitarian support !4 1132 disclose information5+2 0522 promise military support !4 1131 political flight5+2 0521 promise economic support !4 113 defy norms5+2 052 promise material support !4 1123 veto4+8 083 collaborate !4 1122 censor media4+8 08 agree !4 1121 impose curfew4+7 05 promise !4 112 refuse to allow4+5 051 promise policy or nonmaterial

support!4 111 reject proposal

3+5 0432 forgive !4 11 reject3+5 04 endorse or approve !4+4 2122 political arrest and detention3+4 093 ask for material aid !4+4 2121 criminal arrest and detention3+4 092 solicit support !4+4 212 arrest and detention3+4 043 empathize !4+4 171 nonspecific threats3+4 041 praise !4+5 1963 administrative sanctions3 082 agree or accept !4+5 1961 strike2+9 065 ease sanctions !4+5 196 strikes and boycotts2+8 054 assure !4+5 19 sanction2+8 033 host meeting !4+9 151 demand2+5 062 extend invitation !4+9 15 demand2+2 0655 relax curfew !5 201 expel2+2 0654 demobilize armed forces !5 20 expel2+2 0653 relax administrative sanction !5+2 1813 protest defacement and art2+2 0652 relax censorship !5+2 1812 protest procession2+2 0651 observe truce !5+2 1811 protest obstruction2+2 0632 evacuate victims !5+2 181 protest demonstrations2+2 063 provide shelter !5+6 193 reduce or stop aid2+2 06 grant !5+8 172 sanctions threat2+2 0431 apologize !6+4 175 nonmilitary force threats2 013 acknowledge responsibility !6+4 17 threaten1+9 066 release or return !6+8 2112 guerrilla seizure1+9 032 travel to meet !6+8 2111 police seizure1+6 0933 ask for humanitarian aid !6+8 21 seize1+6 0932 ask for military aid !6+9 183 control crowds1+6 0931 ask for economic aid !6+9 1814 protest altruism1+6 09 request !6+9 18 protest1+5 1011 offer peace proposal !6+9 174 give ultimatum1+5 101 peace proposal !7 2231 military clash1+5 03 consult !7 195 break relations1+2 102 call for action !7 1734 threaten military war1+1 01 yield !7 1733 threaten military occupation1 031 discussions !7 1732 threaten military blockade0+8 10 propose !7 1731 threaten military attack0+6 012 yield position !7 173 military force threat0+6 011 yield to order !7+6 1827 military border violation

(continued)

622 International Organization

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Once we matched the updated IDEA event categories with Goldstein scores, we only kept IDEA categories that corresponded with observable implications of informal cooperation between countries. The IDEA events that we included in our measure of informal cooperation are listed in Table A.1.

that drove the construction of WEIS or IDEA, or those embodied in a joint con-flict and cooperation scale+The Reader was originally developed as an extension of Phil Schrodt and his

colleagues’ Kansas Events Data System ~KEDS!,22 and indeed they deserve creditfor pioneering this line of research in political science, developing the first work-ing software programs that code news reports, and producing most of the machine-generated events data used in actual substantive research in the field+Although theVRA Reader also owes much to Schrodt’s developments, VRA ~and Schrodt! re-port that the two systems—and TABARI, Schrodt’s new open-source reader—donot share code+ The main differences between KEDS and the Reader are that the

22+ Schrodt, Davis, and Weddle 1994+

TABLE 1. Continued

Goldstein IDEA Definition Goldstein IDEA Definition

0+1 091 ask for information !7+6 1826 military border fortification0+1 024 optimistic comment !7+6 1825 military mobilization0 99 sports contest !7+6 1824 military troops display0 98 A and E performance !7+6 1823 military naval display0 97 accident !7+6 1821 military alert0 96 natural disaster !7+6 182 military demonstration0 95 human death !8+3 224 riot or political turmoil0 94 human illness !8+7 221 bombings0 72 animal death !9+2 2236 military seizure0 27 economic status !9+2 2123 abduction0 26 adjust !9+2 211 seize possession0 25 vote !9+6 2228 assassination0 24 adjudicate !9+6 2227 guerrilla assault0 2321 government default on payments !9+6 2226 paramilitary assault0 2312 private transactions !9+6 2225 torture0 2311 government transactions !9+6 2224 sexual assault0 231 transactions !9+6 2223 bodily punishment0 23 economic activity !9+6 2222 shooting

!0+1 094 ask for protection !9+6 2221 beatings!0+1 022 pessimistic comment !9+6 222 physical assault!0+1 021 decline comment !9+6 22 force!0+1 02 comment !10 2237 biological weapons use!0+9 141 deny responsibility !10 2235 assault!1 14 deny !10 2234 military occupation!1+1 0631 grant asylum !10 2233 coups and mutinies!2+2 192 reduce routine activity !10 2232 military raid!2+2 121 criticize or blame !10 223 military engagements!2+4 132 formally complain!2+4 131 informally complain!2+4 13 complain

Note: IDEA codes and their definitions ordered by level of conflict on the Goldstein conflict-cooperation scale+ Formore detailed documentation on each category, including full examples and exceptions, see the up-to-date version ofIDEA at ^http:00www+vranet+com0IDEA0&+

Tool for International Conflict Data 623

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Table A.1: IDEA Events Indicative of Informal Cooperation

Goldstein Score

IDEA Code

Event Event Class

Event Description

7.6 074 Rally support SRAL Gatherings to express or demonstrate support, celebrations and all other public displays of confidence; includes protest vigils and commemorations.

5.4 064 Improve relations IMPR Begin, improve or resume an activity or relations, extend diplomatic or other formal recognition.

4.8 823 Agree to negotiate ATNE Agree to or express willingness to engage in talks or negotiations.

4.8 08 Agree AGRE All agreements not captured by ATME, ATNE, ATSE.

3.4 092 Solicit support SOLS Request political support or solicit political influence.

3 082 Agree or accept AGAC Accept invitations and proposals. 2.8 054 Assure ASSR Assure or reassure that some

promised or ongoing support or positive interest will continue.

2.8 033 Host meeting HOST Hosting a visitor at one's residence, office or home country.

2.5 062 Extend invitation INVI Extend an invitation to visit. 1.9 032 Travel to meet VISI The act of traveling to visit another

location for a meeting or other event. Also includes the return travel.

1.5 03 Consult CONS The act of seeking information or advice

1.5 103 Offer to Negotiate PTMN Propose or put forth plans to meet, negotiate or discuss.

1 031 Discussions DISC Meetings (at any location), consultations and negotiations, in person or via telecommunications; includes talks, exchanges of gifts and other formal communications.

1 312 Engage in negotiation

NEGO Negotiate with other parties on particular issues.

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To aggregate the Goldstein scores into a yearly measure of average cooperation among state dyads, we summed the total values of a dyad’s Goldstein scores in a given year and divided by the total number of events in that year. As mentioned in the article, we chose to use the average level of cooperation in a given dyad-year rather than the frequency of cooperation because intensity-based measures minimize potential bias from the over-reporting of events between particular dyads. 1.1.2. Creating the Formal Cooperation dependent variable To create the measure for formal cooperation, we followed the same procedure outlined above. However, the types of cooperative events we included in the formal cooperation variable differ from those included in our measure of informal cooperation; As described in the main text, we selected events that either explicitly involve signing formal agreements or are highly likely to involve signing a formal agreement. These events are listed in Table A.2.

Table A.2: IDEA Events Indicative of Formal Cooperation

Goldstein Score

IDEA Code

Event Event Class

Event Description

8.3 72 Extend military aid

EMAI Extending military and police assistance, including arms and personnel, includes both military and police peacekeeping.

7.6 73 Extend humanitarian aid

EHAI Extending non-military / non-economic assistance, including civil training, development assistance, education & training.

7.4 71 Extend economic aid

EEAI Extending (must include the delivery) monetary aid and financial guarantees, grants, gifts and credit.

6.5 046 Ratify decision/make substantial agreement

RATI Ratify or accede to an agreement or treaty; the target of a ratify event is the decision or document being ratified as opposed to the parties to the agreement.

5.2 523 Promise humanitarian support

PRMH Promise of emergency relief supplies or assistance.

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5.2 522 Promise military support

PRMM Promise of armaments or military assistance.

5.2 521 Promise economic support

PRME Promise of economic or financial assistance.

5.2 52 Promise material support

PRMS Promise of material support, including economic or financial assistance, armaments or armed assistance or emergency relief supplies or assistance

4.8 082 Agree to settlement

ATSE Agree to or express willingness to accept a comprehensive peace proposal, settlement or resolution.

4.8 821 Agree to peacekeeping

ATPK Agree to or express willingness to accept peacekeeping forces in one's territory. Includes agreeing to weapons inspections.

4.8 083 Collaborate COLL Form alliance, or associate with, merge, join, accompany, and coordinate activities; includes extraditions.

4.8 08 Agree to mediate

ATME Agree to or express willingess to accept mediation of a conflict. The target of this event form is the mediator.

4.7 05 Promise PROM All promises not otherwise specified. 4.7 55 Promise to

mediate AMED Promise to or commit to mediate.

4.5 51 Promise policy support

PROO Promise of non-material support.

3.5 4 Endorse ENDO All endorsements not otherwise specified.

2.2 651 Observe truce TRUC Observe or declare a truce or cease-fire during an armed (military) engagement.

1.6 935 Request mediation

REME Solicit, ask or call for third party/ies to mediate.

1.6 936 Request withdrawal or ceasefire

RWCF Request withdrawal or ceasefire.

1.5 101 Offer peace proposal

PTRU Offer incentives for peace, suggest talks, propose resolution.

1.5 104 Offer to mediate

PTME Propose, suggest or offer to mediate.

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1 311 Mediate talks MEDI Agree to or express willingness to accept mediation of a conflict. The target of this event form is the mediator.

1.2. Descriptive Statistics of Formal Cooperation

1.3. Dyadic data set robustness checks/additional analyses 1.3.1. Random Effects Models

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Table A.4 presents our analysis in Table 5 of the text, using random effects models instead of GEE population-averaged models. When replicating our models of Informal and Formal Average cooperation, we use a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) random effects model, taking into account first order autoregressive correlation (columns 1 and 2). We present a logit random effects model for our Formal Cooperation binary dependent variable (column 3).

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1.3.2. Dropping Joint Absolute Monarchy and Joint Islamic Law State

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SECTION 2: Monadic Data Set 2.1. Dropping Joint Absolute Monarchy and Joint Islamic Law State

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SECTION 4: Case study Supplements Carlson conducted a total of 10 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with relevant policy makers, government officials, and academic experts between January and March 2018. We received approval from the International Review Board to conduct these Interviews, protocol #2017-10-10405. Carlson conducted all interviews over Skype. We chose to report our data collection strategies this way in order to maximize transparency while maintaining the anonymity and confidentiality of interview participants and individuals observed. We must maintain participants’ confidentiality and anonymity because the issues discussed in these interviews and discussions are politically sensitive and participants could face retribution if they are connected to the findings of this study. Specifically, we list the date the interviews were conducted, how the interviews were conducted, and a general description of the individual interviewed. Interview No: Date Conducted: Description of Interviewee: Interview 1 February 14, 2018 US-based policy expert on Gulf political Islam Interview 2 February 15, 2018 US-based academic expert on Gulf monarchies Interview 3 February 25, 2018 Qatari-based policy expert on Gulf Security Interview 4 February 26, 2018 US policy expert on Omani politics Interview 5 February 27, 2018 Former US government official based in Qatar Interview 6 March 1, 2018 US-based academic expert on Gulf foreign policy Interview 7 March 1, 2018 Former Kuwaiti government official Interview 8 March 3, 2018 Former Bahraini government official Interview 9 March 5, 2018 Formal US government official based in UAE Interview 10 March 10, 2018 US-based policy advisor on Gulf foreign policy Carlson used snowball sampling to identify individuals to interview. Specifically, Carlson began contacting as many individuals with relevant experience or ‘starting points’ from disconnected networks. To do so, Carlson contacted academics with relevant research experience and journalists who report on Gulf politics and asked them to recommend three other individuals to interview. Once Carlson interviewed these individuals, Carlson asked each for three individuals with relevant experience to interview, creating a ‘snowball’ sample. SECTION 5: Tables on GCC Agreements

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Table A.8: Laws and Regulations of the GCC Law/Regulation Year Signed GCC Regulations 1981 Statute of the Patent Office 1981 Rules of Procedure of the Technical Office of the GCC

1985

Regulations of the Patent System 1996 Model Law (System) of Trademarks 1996 General Environment Regulations 1997 Common System for the Protection of Living Aquatic Resources

1998

Standard System for Registering and Handling of Veterinary Preparations

1998

Consolidated Forest and Pasture Law 1998 Standard System for Wildlife Conservation and Development

1998

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