controlling corporate deviance

Abstract 0 line effectiveness of sanctions applied to corporate oflenders has not been adequately studied. in part because of the absence of any appropriate research strategy. This absence stems from the tendency. since Sutherland. to conceptualize corporate crime as individual rather than organizational behavior. This article outlines a research procedure based on the organizational nature of corporate crime and uses it to evaluate the impact of prosecutions under Australia's l'kade Ractices Act. The article concludes that the sanctions applied have considerably reduced the likelihood of corporate recidivism.

CONTROLLING CORPORATE DEVIANCE

ANDREW HOPKINS Australian National University

he effectiveness of sanctions applied to individual offenders is an issue which has generated a vast amount of empirical

research (see Lipton et al., 1975). By contrast, the impact of sanctions applied to corporations, or complex organizations generally, is a subject about which we know next to nothing (apart from Sutherland's path-breaking work, 1949, and the recent replication by Goff and Reasons, 1978). In view of the considerable interest which social scientists are now showing in the phenomenon of crime by complex organizations (for example, Schrager and Short, 1978; Ermann and Lundman, 1978; Gross, 1978; Dershowitz, 1961; Kriesberg, 1976; Stone, 1975), the virtual absence of evaluative studies in this area seems surprising.

One reason for this gap in the literature is the fact that to date there appears to have been no appropriate research design for assessing the impact of sanctions applied to corporations. This article suggests such a design and uses it to assess the impact of sanctions imposed under consumer protection legislation in Australia.

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CRIMINOLOGY, Vol. 18 No. 2, August 1980 198-214 @ 1980 American Society of Criminology

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Hopkins / CORPORATE DEVIANCE 199

Legal sanctions can have an impact in two distinct ways. They may have a specific preventive effect on the offender to whom they are applied, reducing the likelihood of his recidivism, and they may have a general preventive effect on law- abiding people who might otherwise be tempted to break the law (Andenaes, 1974). We shall be concerned here with the impact of sanctions on those to whom they are applied. The question then is this: Do sanctions applied to corporate offenders prevent or reduce the likelihood of recidivism?

This was essentially Sutherland's question (1949). In his examination of the records of 70 of the largest corporations in the United States, he found that every one had been convicted of at least one offense, and 38 had had 10 or more convictions during the corporate lifetime. Such a record would be conclu- sive evidence of the failure of sanctions in the case of individual offenders, and Sutherland simply assumed that the same could be said for corporate offenders. His purpose in writing about corporate crime was to expose the preferential treatment accorded white collar offenders, and to this end he chose to minimize the differences between corporate and individual criminality. One one occasion, after noting that 60% of the corporations he studied had been convicted in criminal courts, and had an average of approximately four convictions each, he observed that "in may states persons with four convictions are defined as habitual criminals (Sutherland, 1949: 25). On another occasion he likened corporate criminals to recidivist thieves:

The criminality of corporations, like that of professional thieves, is persistent: a large proportion of the offenders are recidivists. Among the 70 largest industrial and mercantile corporations in the United States 97.1% were found to be recidivist in the sense of having two or more adverse decisions [1949: 2181.

It was because he assumed that corporate and individual criminality were essentially equivalent that Sutherland had no

200 CRIMINOLOGY / AUGUST 1980

hesitation in concluding that sanctions applied to corporations had been a total failure.

This tendency of Sutherland‘s to anthropomorphize corporate crime has, however, been severely criticized. Emerson points out that the 70 corporations which Sutherland treated as single individuals were actually gigantic, rambling enter- prises, often with tens of thousands of employees, and subject to hundreds of statutes and thousands of administrative regulations. “Consequently (he says), it would not be surprising if these large corporations ran afoul of the law with a fair degree of frequency” (1940: 583). Moreover, if the sales division of a corporation engages in price fixing at one time, and at another, one of its factories is found to be emitting pollutants into the atmosphere in greater quantities than is allowed by law, it is hardly very illuminating to treat the company as a recidivist offender. As Geis puts it, the

superficial tabulation of decisions against.. . corporations.. . falls far short of providing essential data on the internal dynamics of the offences . . . and constitute(s) a serious shortcoming in Sutherland’s study of white collar corporate crime [ 1962: 1691.

To put the point a little more directly, the superficial tabulation of decisions against corporations gives very little indication of the impact of the legal sanctions imposed.

There is a second, rather different, reason why recidivism statistics for corporations are uninterpretable. Even more so than is the case for individual criminality, the number of corporate offenses detected and prosecuted is a function of the resources available to enforcement agencies. Under these circumstances it would be foolish to assume that recorded crime rates, or recidivism statistics for corporations, were at all indicative of the number of offenses actually occurring.

Given the inappropriateness of crude recidivism statistics for assessing the impact of sanctions on corporate offenders, we need to design evaluative research of a rather different


nature. This can be done if, in contrast to Sutherland, we take seriously the distinction between corporate and individual criminality. Corporate crime is crime by large-scale organizations, and as such there are frequently organizational factors leading to its occurrence, factors for which there are no real counterparts in the case of individual crime. Frequently, in other words, corporate violations can be attributed to organizational defects. Stone has asserted that in fact empirical instances of corporate crime always involve defective organizational procedures. If, for example, “botulism bacilli are appearing in a company’s soups, there are some organizational reasons for it, institutional weaknesses that will not go away until there have been changes in the corporation’s purchasing standards, its cooking procedures, or its quality control requirements. The firm needs better systems of information, better definition of role and structures of authority, better technical programs, better allocation of resources” (Stone, 1976: 87). Stone argues that one specific defect which is invariably a feature of corporate offenses is inadequate information flow systems within the corporation. “In literally every case of corporate wrongdoing that was autopsied by myself and a group of USC law students, it turned out that someone down the corporate hierarchy was aware that trouble was brewing (usually for the company, in the last analysis, as well as for the public). For a variety of reasons, the bad news never landed on the desk of someone who had both the authority and the inclination to do something about it” (Stone, 1976: 89). People at the top are protected by “the natural screening of bad news that exists in every organization. The lower levels simply ‘know’ that the executives don’t want to hear that tests on a promising new drug were producing cataracts in laboratory animals, or that next year’s automobile model has a tendency to roll over” (Stone, 1976: 87).

It must be made clear at this point that to assert that a violation was due to an organizational defect is not necessarily to assert that the offense was unintentional, or that individuals


cannot be held accountable. It may be that an organizational procedure is intentionally defective, or that individuals at the top are aware of the “natural” screening devices protecting them from bad news, and thus direct personal responsibility, but have deliberately refrained from rectifying the problem. Thus, to identify organizational factors as giving rise to an offense is not necessarily to exculpate the corporation or its chief executives.

When a violation is indeed due to some organizational defect, we can assess the impact of sanctions by investigating whether or not the company has subsequently corrected the defect. Such is the methodological strategy of this study. Of course, even when a correction has been made we cannot be sure that the offense will not occur again. But, when a company has changed its defective procedures (assuming that this has been done in good faith, of which more later), we can reasonably conclude that the risk of recidivism has been reduced, and that the sanction has been, to this extent, effective.

THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT

The present study makes use of the strategy outlined above to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions imposed under the Australian Government’s Trade Practices Act of 1974 (for a discussion of the social and political origins of this legislation, see Hopkins, 1978a). The Act contains two basic sets of prohibitions: against anticompetitive business practices, and against practices which mislead or deceive consumers. Before November 1977 there was only one successful prosecution for anticompetitive business practices. However, 19 companies were the subjects of successful criminal prosecutions under the consumer-protection provisions of the Act. In each case the company was fined, with fines ranging from a few hundred dollars to a maximum of $100,000. The research reported here concerns the impact of prosecution on these companies.


The criminal prosecution of corporations (as opposed to individuals) raises in acute form the problem of intent. Traditionally, the criminal law holds a man guilty of an offense only if he intended to commit it. Obviously, though, it will often be difficult to impute intent to a corporation. The 1974 Act overcame this problem by imposing strict liability on corporations for their behavior, that is, holding the corporation guilty, regardless of whether it or its management intended the violation. The following escape clause was, however, provided:

It is a defense if the defendant establishes- (a) that the contravention in respect of which the proceeding was

instituted was due to a mistake, to reliance on information supplied by another person, to the act or default of another person, to an accident or to some other cause beyond his control; and

(b) that he took reasonable precautions and exercised due dili- gence to avoid the contravention.

In other words, if the defendant company could show that it had made serious efforts to avoid contravening the Act, it would not be held responsible for the violation; if no such efforts were made, the company was guilty regardless of the state of knowledge or the intentions of the management. At the time of the study, none of the companies prosecuted had successfully availed itself of this defense.

ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEFECTS

The first step in seeking to apply the method discussed above is to identify the organizational defects, if any, which contrib- uted to the commission of the offenses. This was accomplished by a careful study of court records: transcripts of proceedings, judgments, and documentary exhibits presented to the court. Since the evidence presented to courts is not always accurate,


the conclusions drawn here must be treated with correspond- ing caution. Four distinct types of organizational defect were identified in this way. These will be discussed in turn.

By far the most common defect was the failure by management to check adequately the accuracy of promotional material going to the public. The case of Sperry Rand may be taken as representative of this failure. Among its other activities, the company distributed Japanese calculators on the Australian market. Its policy was to offer a three-month warranty on these products, and the warranty ticket accompanying each calculator specified this period. However, promotional brochures which the company made available to the public were printed in Japan, where a twelve-month warranty period applied, and the brochures arriving at the head office in Australia carried this twelve-month guarantee. For a while, company staff in Australia overcame this problem by fixing a sticker over the offending words on each brochures before sending them out to distribution points. But in time this procedure became too onerous, and it was decided to have the brochures overprinted in Australia in such a way as to obliterate the incorrect information. This decision, made by the advertising manager, was conveyed by his secretary to the printer. Due to a misunderstanding between the secretary and the printer, the offending words were not obliterated, but this was not discovered by the secretary when she returned to collect the overprinted brochures. No checks were made to ensure that the job had been done as intended, and the brochures were distributed to the public still bearing the wrong information. The case came to attention when someone who had purchased the calculator with the understanding that the warranty period was twelve months complained when she discovered from the warranty ticket that the calculator was, in fact, covered for only three months.

Even when a checking procedure is in operation, it may be quite ineffective unless it is carried out by the appropriate people. The Mazda case exemplifies this failure. The company


had commissioned an advertising agency to develop a series of advertisements for its entire range of cars. These advertisements were to be based on information supplied by the company. One of the advertisements prepared in this way claimed that all Mazdas had servo-assisted brakes, when in fact, two models in the range did not. This advertisement was checked by both the general manager and the sales manager of the company, neither of whom was familiar with technical details about the Mazda range, and both of whom were unaware that two of the models were without servo-assisted brakes. Had the checking procedure involved the service manager as well, the mistake might not have occurred.

This type of organizational defect, the failure to check adequately promotional material going to the public, was a contributory factor in 10 of the 19 cases prosecuted.

A second organizational defect identified in this study was the failure to deal adequately with complaints received from the public after misleading or inaccurate advertisements had begun to appear. This problem occurred in two cases. On both occasions a member of the public phoned the company complaining that the advertisements were inaccurate. In one case this complaint was apparently ignored totally, while in the other, the Mazda case, the company made some effort to correct the particular advertisement about which the complaint had been received, but neither investigated whether the same error was present in other advertisements in the series (which it was), nor checked to see whether the correction ordered had been carried out correctly by the advertising agency (which it had not). In neither case was any record made of the fact that the complaint had been received. If the companies had had some system whereby complaints from the public, together with details of company response, were recorded, the reaction to these complaints might have been more adequate.

A third organizational defect was the failure of top management to inform salesmen of all relevant facts about the


product, thus encouraging salesmen to fabricate favorable information. Two such cases involved the sale of used cars. Among the cars sold by the firms were some which were acquired in second-hand condition from the manufacturer, General Motors. A number of these had been used only by GM personnel and were, not unreasonably, described as former executive cars. Others had been leased by GM to a car rental firm for some fifteen months before being returned to GM for disposal. Buyers for the used car companies were accustomed to buying both types of cars from GM and knew full well at the time of purchase which was which. But this information was not passed on to the salesmen in the car yards, with the result that salesmen invariably described all such cars as former executive or ex-GM cars. Had documentary evidence of the history of these cars been available to both salesmen and prospective buyers, this misrepresentation could not have taken place.

A fourth organizational defect occurred in the case of a used car firm prosecuted for falsely representing to a customer the mileage travelled by a car. It was apparently the standard practice of this firm to replace the speedometer before selling a car, whenever it was felt that the car’s speedometer needle flicked unduly. Replacement speedometers were taken from a stock maintained for this purpose. No attempt was made to ensure that the mileage reading on the replacement speed- dometer was correct, with the result that the replacement speedometers frequently underrepresented the distance travelled by the car.

One (and sometimes two) of these defects was present in 15 of the 19 companies prosecuted. In four cases, however, no organizational factor was involved. The following case was typical of these. The director of a small family-owned company decided to auction off a number of antiques owned by the company. In the catalog of items for sale, which she personally prepared, a number of items were misdescribed in such a way as to enhance their value. In this case, responsibility for the


offense was clearly the director’s. (Although obliged for constitutional reasons to prosecute the company, the Trade Practices Commission has tended in such cases to prosecute the individual for being “knowingly concerned” in the commission of the offense for which the corporation is prosecuted. In this way, the Commission is able to hold individuals criminally responsible where it is appropriate to do so.)

CULPABILITY

Throughout this discussion, the question of culpability has been left hanging. As mentioned earlier, the Act imposes what amounts to strict liability on corporations: it does not require that the prosecution prove that the defendant intended to commit the offense. Thus, a finding of guilt does not necessarily imply that an offense was intentional. Nevertheless, a close reading of the transcript evidence does enable one to form a judgment as to the degree of culpability involved. For instance, in two of the cases in which no organizational defect was involved (including the case discussed above), it seems fairly clear that the offense was intentionally committed. However, in most cases where organizational defects were implicated, the offense was probably the result of carelessness rather than of any intention to deceive. For example, in the Sperry Rand case the advertising manager asked his secretary to give instructions for certain printing work to be done. He failed to verify that this had been done as required. He could reasonably have been expected to be aware of the possibility of mistakes and to have checked the final copy; not to have done so was negligent. Similarly, the failure of the Mazda management to check that the corrections ordered to its advertisements had been made, and its further failure to check that other advertisements in the series were not also in need of correction, must be regarded as negligent. (In the words of thejudge, the company was guilty of “gross carelessness.”)


There were, however, some striking exceptions, all involving the sale of used cars. The firm which replaced defective speedometers without ensuring that the mileage reading was correct must have been aware that customers would be mislead. Likewise, the firms which failed to pass on to their salesmen vital information about the real history of used cars acquired from General Motors could hardly have been unaware of the possibilities of deception.

THE CORRECTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEFECTS

Having established that the great bulk of violations of the consumer-protection provisions of the Trade Practices Act (1 5 out of 19) were due to organizational defects, the next step was to investigate whether the companies concerned had remedied these defects following the prosecution. Information for this phase of the study was obtained in a series of interviews ranging in length from half an hour to two hours, with top company personnel. Interviews were semistructured in that certain questions were asked in every case, but interviewees were given plenty of opportunity to tell their own stories. Initial contact was made by a letter outlining the nature of the research and asking for an appointment. All companies approached agreed to be interviewed except three; in one case, the company had been given legal advice not to cooperate, in a second, the managing director indicated that he was too busy to see me, and a third company declined on the grounds that it was appealing the conviction. A detailed account of the information obtained in these interviews is available in a separate publication (Hopkins, 1978b). What follows is a summary.

The question of interest is whether or not the firms concerned changed their operating procedures in such a way as to make further violations less likely. This question could not always be answered on a yes/ no basis, even in individual cases.


It is not possible, therefore, to provide precise summary statistics, and the following discussion is unavoidably discur- sive in nature. I shall proceed in terms of the type of organizational defect involved.

Of the ten cases where the offense was attributable to inadequate checking procedures, six took action which, on the face of it, reduced the risk of further violation. Action usually involved the drafting and circulation of memos specifying who was responsible for checking the accuracy of promotional material, and laying down guidelines for the checking procedures to be followed. Of the remaining four cases, two made no changes at all in operating procedures, and two made minor changes which, while reducing the likelihood of a recurrence of the particular offense for which they were prosecuted, did nothing to correct the general weakness revealed by the prosecution. For example, Sperry Rand no longer distributes promotional material in Australia which is printed in Japan, but it has not introduced any more general precautions against distributing misleading promotional material.

The second type of organizational defect, identified in two cases, was the failure to deal adequately with complaints by members of the public about the misleading nature of advertisements being screened. In one case, a company instituted a more adequate procedure for recording complaints which, it hopes, will prompt a more adequate response; the other case involved a company which declined to be interviewed.

The third type of defect was the failure of management to pass on detrimental information about the product to salesmen. One of the three companies concerned declined to be interviewed, but the other two have both taken steps to ensure that customers are fully acquainted with relevant information. In one case, used car salesmen are now required to sign a form once a month declaring, inter alia,

that as a signatory to this statement, I clearly understand that it is my duty to familiarize myself with the history of any vehicle


which k am selling in order to convey this information to any customer or prospective customer; [and] that any breach of these policies or any actions on my part which will cause damage to the Company’s reputation as a reputable and fair trader, will result in my instant dismissal.

The fourth defect concerned the replacement of defective speedometers in used cars. The company involved now notes the mileage of cars when they are acquired, and records this information on a form which is available to prospective buyers. In this way, it hopes to prevent further offenses.

In brief, of the 15 companies in which offenses were attributable to Organizational defects, nine made significant changes designed to reduce the likelihood of recidivism. Two made minor changes which, while forestalling the possibility of an exact repetition of the offense in question, failed to rectify the general weakness which the offense had uncovered. Two companies made no changes at all, and for two, no information was available. Where organizational defects were involved, therefore, the prosecution can be said to have led to significant organizational improvements in at least 60% of cases. On the face of it then, the prosecutions have had a substantial preventive effect on the companies concerned.

There are two qualifications which need to be made to this conclusion. First, the improved procedures, even if adhered to scrupulously, cannot guarantee that no further violations will occur. Moreover, it would be foolish to assume that the companies will adhere at all times to these procedures. The risk of violation will be correspondingly increased.

Second, and related to this point, the changes made can only have the preventive effect imputed to them if made in good faith, that is, if management sincerely intends to avoid further violations. Clearly, no matter what the standard procedures are, they will not be able to prevent offenses which are intended.

One way to assess the intentions of management in relation to future offenses is to consider whether or not the offense for

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Hopkins / CORPORATE DEVIANCE 21 I

which the company was prosecuted was intended. There were five cases in which organizational defects were apparently either intentional, or the result of management turning a blind eye. However, three of these cases involved used car firms whose managements expressed acute awareness that further offenses might result in suspension of their licences to trade (used car dealers are required by state legislation to be licensed). They seemed, therefore, genuinely concerned that the organizational changes made following conviction should be effective. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that on the whole, the organizational changes made were genuinely intended to reduce the likelihood of further offenses.

SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Given that the prosecutions have indeed had a considerable effect, the question which naturally arises is: why? In a few cases the operative factor was the fear that a license to trade might be revoked. In most cases the answer is not so obvious.

One possibility is that the fines imposed operated as a financial deterrent to further offenses. It is difficult, however, to make any assessment of this possibility. Certainly, the fines imposed, with few exceptions, amounted to an insignificant fraction of annual profit. But, from the point of view of deterrence theory, a more meaningful comparison would be between the amount of the fine and the financial gain accruing from the offense. The problem, though, is that since most of the offenses are in the nature of misleading advertising, the financial gain involved is not quantifiable.

Another possibility is that companies feared a reaction by consumers. According to management, however, the prosecutions had no discernible effect on sales, with two exceptions. In one case, sales actually increased by 15%, which management attributes to favorable publicity their product received during the prosecution. In the other case, sales dropped substantially,


and for two years the company, previously a profitable concern, incurred operating losses. It is noteworthy, however, that the company does not attribute this loss of profitability to a consumer reaction, but rather to the company’s own internal loss of morale, and to failure to push its products as vigorously as it had previously. The absence of any discernible consumer reaction against companies which had been prosecuted for offenses against consumers is perhaps one of the most striking findings of this study.

The impression gained in interviews is that, for most companies, the real mechanism of deterrence was concern about loss of reputation, both that of the company and, more particularly, that of individual managers. This concern stemmed not from any fear that loss of reputation would lead to a consumer reaction, but because top management felt personally stigmatized by any imputation that the company had acted unethically or illegally. A quotation from an internal memo of one of the companies prosecuted will serve to illustrate this point.

The fact that the now well-known circumstances were an oversight and not designed to mislead the public is meagre consolation-the unfortunate culmination of the events of omission is that unfavourable publicity has focussed its harsh light on the reputation of our company, which we had all fondly hoped would stand proudly as a paragon of virtue in the automotive industry. Another regrettable side issue is that the Public Officer of our company will probably have to face the legal barrage in the witness box, even though he was not actively concerned in the checking of the offending advertisement.

Some wider implications of this study can now be addressed. First, and briefly, Stone (1975) has asserted that fines are an ineffective way to control crime by corporations. He argues that courts, or even legislators, must intervene in company affairs to order the organizational changes which a prosecution reveals to be necessary. This study suggests, however, that such


intervention may not be required, since in many cases the threat of prosecution and fine is sufficient to induce companies to make the necessary organizational changes themselves.

Second, the present study has implications for the theoret- ical speculations recently advanced by Ermann and Lundman (1978) about the circumstances in which attempts by regulatory agencies to control organizational deviance will be effective. They distinguish between control agencies on the basis of whether or not they enforce laws designed to protect the prime beneficiaries of an organization. For example, in the United States, the SEC protects the prime beneficiaries of corporations, the shareholders, whereas the FTC and the EPA are concerned with the protection of consumers and the public at large from illegal corporate behavior. Ermann and Lund- man hypothesize that control agencies whose function is to protect the prime beneficiaries of an organization will be more effective than agencies which protect other interest groups from the organizations concerned. To test this hypothesis one would need to conduct research which compares the effectiveness of different types of regulatory agencies; a study of one agency is clearly inadequate. Nevertheless, the study of one agency conducted here does cast some doubt on the hypothesis. The Trade Practices Commission aims to protect consumers, who are not the prime beneficiaries of corporations, from illegal corporate behavior. Yet the prosecutions it has initiated do seem to have been relatively effective. Of course, to assert that the prosecutions have been relatively effective is really begging the question; the challenge of comparative research posed by Ermann and Lundman remains unmet.

REFERENCES

ANDENAES, J . (1974) Punishment and Deterrence. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan

DERSHOWITZ, A. (1961) "Increasing community control over corporate crime: a Press.

problem in the law of sanctions." Yale Law J. 71 (September): 289-306.


EMERSON, T. I. (1950) "Book review." Yale Law J. 59: 581-585. ERMANN, M. D. and R. LUNDMAN (1978) "Deviant acts by complex organiza-

tions: deviance and social control at the organizational level of analysis." Soc. Q. 19 (Winter): 55-67.

GEIS, G. (1962) "Towards a delineation of white-collar offences." Soc. Inquiry 3 2 160-171.

GOFF, C. and C. REASONS (1978) Corporate Crime in Canada: A Critical Analysis of Anti-Combines Legislation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

GROSS, E. (1978) "Organizational Crime," in P. R. Wilsonand J. Braithwaite (eds.) Two Faces of Deviance: Crimes of the Powerlessand Powerful. Brisbane: Queens- land Univ. prtss.

HOPKINS, A. (1978a) Crime Law and Business: The Sociological Sources of Austra- lian Monopoly Law. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.

--- (1978b) The Impact of Prosecutions Under the Trade Practices Act. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.

KRIESBERG. S. (1976) "z)bcisionmaking models and the control of corporate Crime." Yak Law J. 85, 8: 1091-1129.

LIPTON. D.. R. MARTINSON, and J. WlLKS (1975) The Effectiveness of Come tional Treatment. New York: Praeger.

SCHRAGER, L. and J. SHORT (1978) 'Toward a sociology of organkationsl Crime." Social Problems 25 (April): 407-419.

STONE, G. (1976) "Stalking the wild corporation." Working Papers (Spring). -- (1975) Where the Law Ends. New York: Harper & Row. SUTHERLAND. E H. (1949) White collar Crime. London: Holt, Rimhart &Winston.

Andrew Hopkins (MA. . Australian National University; Ah. D.. University of Connecticut) teaches sociology at n e Australian National University in Canberra. His research interests are in the sociology of law. and corporate and white collar crime, on which subjects he has published a book and several articles. He is, at present, working on the issue of class bias in the criminal law (as opposed to the criminal justice system).

controlling corporate deviance

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