v. , CONTRIBUTION OF VX~ASPATI MI& TO

THE VEDANTA SYSTEM.

The term' Vedanta i s a p p l i e d t o the lJpani?ads s i n c e t h e y

form the c o n c l u d i n g p o r t i o n s of t h e Veda. The system of

I n d i a n ph i losophy which i s based on the u p a n i l a d e is a l s o

c a l l e d Vedanta. The f i r s t available work which made a n a t t e m p t

a t orcjanieing and unders t and ing t h e ~ ~ a n i i a d i c d o c t r i n e w i t h

a l o g i c a l approach h a s been t h e ~ e d a n t a s t t r a s of Badafiya?a.

Here an a t t e m p t i s 'made t o p r e s e n t t h e Vedanta d o c t r i n e by

answering o b j e c t i o n s raised from t h e p o i n t of view of s3nkhya,

Y ~ ~ A , ~ ~ z ~ a and ~ a i d e s i k a a s e v i d e n t from t h e V e d a n t a s c t r a s

there were many Vedanta t h i n k e r s whose views were w e l l known

before t h e w o r k was w r i t t e n . Fo r i n s t a n c e , t h e o p i n i o n s of

t h r e e i s a r y z s x f m s r a t h y a , Audal3mi and ~ ~ d a 5 ~ t s n a as r e g a r d s

the r e l a t i o n between J i v a and Brahman a r e r ecorded i n t h e ' t

Vedantas3t ras . T t goes t o t h e c r e d i t of Sr i sankar'a+rya

t h a t h i s commentary on ~ e d a n t a s c t r a s has been t h e first a v a i l -

a b l e Vedantsbhi!ya. The d o c t r i n e of Vedanta e s t a b l i s h e d by 8

Sankar ' lcPya th rough t h i s BhSsya and t h e BhZ)ygs on t h e 6

BhagavadgIta end t h e ~ ~ a n i s ' a d s i s c a l l e d Advai ta . I t is w e l l

known t h a t Gaudapzda had fo rmula ted some o f t h e t e n e t s of

Advaita i n , h i s , ~ B n d j k y s k z r i k a . Y e t , the c r e d i t of being the . I

founderof Advaita a s a system should go t o ~ a n k a r % $ r y a .

The most important doctrine in h n k a ~ d v a i t a is that of ~ d h y i s a . This Adhyisa' is cal led as Avidya. Ptrabrahman

is one and without a second, It is the Supreme Reality. Every- thing else is superimposed on ~ r a h m a n . The super impos i t ion

of l t m a t v a (selfhood) on the non-self i s ~ d h ~ s a . ' It is this

~ d h G s a t h a t has been the b a s i s of a l l t h e process. of Pram%?a,

and Pram%ya. I n o r d e r t o elucidate t h e n a t u r e of ~ d h y z s a ,

t h e AtBrya has thoroughly examined the nature of t h e t h r e e

stages ( ~ v a s t h 2 t r a y a ) - Jagrat (wakefu l ) , Svapna ream) and .

Sutupti (~reamles~). The c o n c l u s i o n drawn through this

i l l u s t r a t i o n i s t h a t o u r Atman i s Brahman and eve ry th ing i s

Brahman. Then a s regards t h e means of a t t a i n i n g Mskqa, t h e

Advaita view Propounded by & a n k s r ~ c g r y a i s t h a t knowledge

a lone i s t h e meant t o ~5k:a. . ~tahrn 'a tmaikaj rana i s the on ly

means t o ~ z k s a . Karma and Upzsana a r e n o t t o t a l l y r e j e c t e d I .r .*

by Sankaracarya b u t i n h i s o p i n i o n they come under t h e purview

of ~ d h y i e s . The r i tes of worship are cons ide red r e l e v a n t .

as f a r as t h e y p u r i f y t h e mind. F u r t h e r , i n & a k a r ~ d v a i t s

two kinds of Mukti a r e accepted. ~ f t e r t h e r e a l i s a t i o n of

Brahman i.e., t h e J i v a i s Brahman, t h e r e is no f u r t h e r . s a m s z r a

a t a l l , T h i s is c a l l e d ~ id rehamukt i , But more emphasis i s

l a i d on ~ i v a n m u k t i o r ~ a d ~ s m u k t i which i s a t t a i n e d i n t h i s

very l i f e t h r o u g h the r e a l i s a t i o n of Brahmaika tva.

#

These b a s i c d o c t r i n e s of Advai ta propounded by sankar;i:a'rya

have found greeter e l u c i d a t i o n and expansion i n t h e hands of

l a t e r t h i n k s r s on Advaita such ae ~ a n d a n a r n i l r a , the au thor of

~rahmasiddhi ~urelvarlck~a I the author of ~aiikarmyasiddhi

and vzrtikas, Padmap'rda the author of Pancap'idika, e tc . I

On a l l the basic doctrines of Advaita these thinkers have

contributed their views.

I ~ i $ a s p a t i Misra has i n h e r i t e d t h e e n t i r e t h i n k i n g on these I

t e n e t s o f Advaita from ~ankarzczrya t o PadmapIda. He i s t o

some e x t e n t inf luenced by ~endanorni:ra, ye t , his e l u c i d a t i o n

of the d i f f e r e n t t e n e t s o f Advaita has been unique and o r i g i n a l .

The present s tudy of ~h'rrnati on ~ ' a n k a r ~ ~ g r ~ a ' s Brahmes>rabhltya

aims to bring up the c o n t r i b u t i o n of G c a s p a t i ~ i l r a t o Advaita

Vedanta.

V.':aspsti ~ i d r a refers t o t h e concept of aviciya i n t h e I

mangala s loka of h i s Bhzmati i t s e l f :

~ n i r v % p y i v i d f a dvitaya racivasya prabhavat; ~ i v a r t z yasya i te v iyadan i l a tej=bhavanayah ~ a t a s ~ i b h l t vi:vam 5aramaparamucgivaSamidHm

~ama'nah tad brahm~parimitasukhajr%namarnrtam. 1 I I

I offer m y s a l u t a t i o n s to brahman which i s of the nature

of unl imi ted b l i s s , i n t e l l i g e n c e and immorta l i ty , the i l l u s o r y

appearance of which p r i n c i p l e coupled w i t h the twofold

indesc r ibab le avidya ( n e s c i e n c e ) , have been t h e f i v e elements

of ether, wind, fire, water and e a r t h from which a r o s e t h i s

univeree with t h e v a r i e t y of t h e moveable and irnmoveable

objec ts .

I It i s r i n t e r e s t i n g t o observe h e r e t h a t ~ z ~ a s p a t i Misra

refers t o two kinds of svidya as shown by him later i n h i s

COmmentary. He has called t h e s e two kinds of avidya as

' kiranavidya ' and * ksry&idya ' : - '

1 I BrahfnasFtxa sqak!rabh%ya, publ ished by Tuk5r.m JZyaji,

ed i t ed r&a hot.. by ~ u ~ s n i ~ n a n t h k r i r h n a $ ~ s t r y a M ~ S u d t v

* u a Kdry akiranadvay adhara ahanGrispdam saarir i.' I

~ n t a h k a r a 6 d i s u * adhyasyati. e 0

sans kiryas t u anirvacan$ I an'ldyavidy'advaya pidhzna

apanayadna b h a v h y a t i , ptat isirapihita nartrdvs prat isirzpanay a dvarz rang avyaprute'na. 3

syHdZttat m2bhut b r a h r n a s ~ k s ~ t k ~ r a h . 4

~ a a ~ a ~ d a r dana vidhvas t i tlrnarasit i dvidh; k b y a ksranar $a. 7

Thus, he has re f erred t o kzranzvidya and kzryxvidya

severa l times i n h i s commentary, but he has cn'ot direct ly

pointed out as to which i s t h e former and which i s the l a t t e r .

However, it is. possible to understand tha t k3ranxvidya is i n

t h e form o f non-apprehension of d i f f e r e n c e , a s the k>rav=vidya

and t h a t t h e wrong apprehension a s the k z r y h i d y a . These

conceptions can be gleaned from the fo l lowing statements i n

the tlhzmati,

1) Avidyi h i sarvinartha b'ijamiti sfti'smrti a purE?idi;u

.prasiddam. ~aducc'edzya vedantah pravrt t ih iti . I a a

v a k s F . Pratypgitmani an%tlo2iyylrsa eva ssrviinartha h i tuh , na punah rajatzd ih vibhsvana i t i sz eva

' 8 avidya .

Nescience i 6 the root Cause of a l l ev i l s . This i e well

known in the orti, smti , itih'asa and pu12na. Hence, the 1 I I b I

adhy;sa of the non-self on the self being the root cruse of

all evils , i t is indeed c a l l e d avidya. This i s what t h e

bhzsyakHsa has e x p l a i n e d l a t e r .

2) vivekzgraha adhyzsa iti y= Jan;.

Here, the a u t h o r is commenting on o a t y ' i n f i m i t h u n ~ k r i t y a , n v o a

a s t a t e m e n t from t h e bh%sya. It means t h a t adhyasa i s a

case of wrong apprehens ion due t o non-apprehension of d i f fer-

ence between what i s atman and what is anatman.

Thus, f i t a s p a t i d s r a seems t o agree w i t h Mendana lira i n s a y i n g t h a t the two k i n d s of avidya i n t h e i r kzryakzrana

relat ion are found i n the wakeful and dream s t a t e s . Again,

following Mandans ~ i i r a , he s t a t e s t h a t v i ~ Q Z ~ a s a m s k S r a and

layar8pagrahana persist i n t h e su!upti ( dreamler a s t a t e ) .

Speaking about the s u s u p t i s ta te , the b h ' a ~ ~ y a k i r a says t h a t

j i v a becomes o n e with parabrahrnan i n t h a t s t a t e . The ca rd ina l

d o c t r i n e of vedanta i s tha t the j aga t c o n s i s t i n g of pr+, gtc. ,

irouea from t h e paramatman. Hence, i n u n i t y w i t h brahman

j i v a i s i n a a t a t e of slumber, which i s o f t h e nature of

"88amb%dhatva and svaecati and it is of the n a t u r e c h a r a c t e r - 0 s

ised by t h e ebsenee of special forms o f knowledge created by

U P Z ~ ~ . On the point t h a t j i v a i s i n a s t a t e of slumber D

chara~terlsed by niasa&3dhatv. and s v a ~ c a t ' s , ~ s ' c a s p a t i M i r r a

expla ins that atman i n that s t a t e is nissamb'odah and because

of that it has the form similar t o tha t of svaccat; It i s I I

not rvagtat; i t e e l f . This i s because j i v a has laya and

vikd~pasamtkira. The comparison t h a t it has a form like the

form of s v a ~ ~ a t ; is merely on the ground t h a t i t has no

vikbzpa c o n s i s t i n g i n any process of a c t i v i t y . H e f i n d s t h e

same idea conta ined i n the bh'afyak%r'als remark t h a t it has a

form c h a r a c t e r i r e d by the absence of s p e c i a l cognitions

crea ted by upzdi , such as the cogn i t i ons of ghata, pa ta , etc .

I t i s f u r t h e r brought o u t t h a t i f v i j gana a lone would have

been mentioned, t hen , it would amount to saying t h a t j i v a

would be brahman i t s e l f wi thout d i e tinc tion and without

separa t ion and t h a t such an eternal s t a t e would be f ree from

up'adi. Nor can i t be s a i d t h a t it i s without v i j n s n a because

t h e j i v a has n o t t o t a l l y g iven up t h e na ture of brahman.

When the vikbZpasamsk%ra nourished by avidya marked by laya

r e s u l t s i n a c t i v i t y , t h e n t h e r e would be t h e product ion of

Specia l forms of knowledge and it would result i n t h e j i v a s

losing t h e nature of paramatman a f t e r s t a t e s of wakefulness

end sleep:

T a 6 t yatra srya 'stman; yat'o nisramb5dh; a t a ? ~ ~ a ~ c a t i r J ~ a m i v a r u ' p a m a s y e t i * I svaccat3rupo • I svagcat i i v a i 8 y i v i k ~ ~ p a y % h samsk%ra? t a t r a b h i v i t . S a m u d i c a r a ~ ~ r t t i . * a ; i k~ ipabh%vam~t repa upamgnam. ~ t a d ~ v ; v f b h a j y a t a - upadibhi? an t rhkara? id ibhi? janitarn Lad vi:)savijzanam ghatap'etedivi jiranyn ta!fahl t a u v . r ~ ~ ; m Iltmana? yadi v i jFanami t y l v a

ucy'eta, ta tah tadavisis tam anavaccinnam sat, brahsiva a I I I I

cyst, t a t Fa n i t y a m i t i na up'edi janitarn, n;pi tatrahitam

svari~am, brahfia svabh'avas ya aprah'anz t , , , yadi t u I

layala ksa; I vidy'opabhrumhit; vikkpasamskirah samudi- carat i , tad; v i$esav i j zan i t pad i t svapnajHgarSvast~tah b

9 paradtmanZ rtpa brahmasartpam igamanarniti.

This o p i n i o n is however found i n the ' Pancap'hdika also . of ~admapzda, b u t the explanat ion found i n YaneapZdika t h a t

t he inert power of nescience is found i n the e x t e r n a l a s well

as the internal objects and t h a t it is the up'ad8nakZrana of

adhyba, I s not e x p l i c i t in the Bh"aat3.. But, there is a

s p e c i a l p o i n t i n t h e Bh5mati. It can be set f o r t h thus:

"The internal e e n s e s e t c . are n o t a s soc ia t ed with the ac t i -

v i t y o f proceeding towards cognit ions , A t the time of great

d e l u s i o n they get absorbed i n the indeterminate n e s c i e n c e

( a n i r v % y ~ v i d y ~ ) and remain i n the form of s u b t l e powers

with t h e p r o p e n s i t i e s of nese ienc e which possess the perplexi-

t i e s of karma. When their time i s r i p e , being prompted by

the' w i l l of the Lord, they come out l i k e t h e l e g s of a

tortoise hi therto hidden i n i ts body and'also like the bodies

of frogs h i t h e r t o hidden i n the mud but coming o u t a t the

f a l l of f irst rains, and assume their names and forms a s

bef 0x9 @ .

a * avidyayarn l l n a h I s5kId?as'aktirtp'ena a kanavikIipadvidy.a$ visan'abhi) $ah avat is tanta eva . . . t% ca avadhim prHpya

I

parafidvar8cci @ @ praetiitah yath'a kbmadhe nifina'nyang8ni tat; nissaranti, yath'b v i vartlp#yr pripta mrdbh'avlni

e @

mandtkadarlr~ni I tad v'asan'avasitatay'a 9han'aghanas;ra sahitzni punarmandGkadehabhlvam anubhavanti , t a t h i p3rvav5san~va~Bt ptrvasamHna n'amar'upSvi utpadyante, tatr%dam abhidh'iyate sam7na n'amar'ClpatvZditi. 10

The subtle power spoken of here resembles t h e avidy'idakti

spoken of by the advocate8 of m;lgvidya. I n t h a t case, I

~ i ~ a s p a t i bAi~ra Should be understood a s propounding adhyxsa

itself a s avidya and i t s p o t e n t i a l form i tse l f a s t h e laya-

laksansvidya. Then it i s necessary t o conclude t h a t %:aspati

~igra's adhygsavgda i s d i f f e r e n t from the adhyzsavzda of the

bhi iayak~ra. Ascoxding to the bhhyak%ra, avidya is the root

cause of adhyesa. . He does no t c a l l adhyasa i t s e l f as avidya.

~ i s a r ~ a t i on the o t h e r hand, with h i s concept ion of

two avidy5s (av idysdvaya) cons iders the p o t e n t i a l avidya

(m?llividya) a8 the k'.xap%iidya and adhygsa a s kzryividya

( resulting a v i d y a ) .

2, THE DEFINITION OF ADHY'ASA

The bh'asyaksra @ defines adhyasa as "snrti r'upah paratra I I

1 Grvadrrta avabh'asa?** , t h a t is, adhy%sa is tho appearance

of what is seen before in another i n the form of recollection.

While e x p l a i n i n g t h i s d e f i n i t i o n . v;qaspeti h4iLra pu t s

forward h i s l a n i r v a F s n ~ y e vzda ' . He e x p l a i n s avsbhisa a.

1*avasanna? avanata? v i b h ~ s a ? " ~ . that i s , a n apprehension

which is s u b l a t e d o r discarded. This avabhzsa consists in

the bIdha i n t h e d e n i a l of it by another cogn i t ion ( o r

apprehension) . Thus, it amounts t o say ing t h a t it is false

knowledge. The n a t u r e of t h i s f a l s e knowledge I s brought o u t

by t h e two a d j e c t i v e s 'smrti r?pa1 and 'pJ'rvaciista*, t h e I

a d j e c t i v e pzrvacllsta meaning Iwhat was seen bef ore1 refers

t o t h e ' z ropan lya ' (what is t o be superimposed), which is false.

What is to be superimposed i s somethtng t h a t was seen before.

It need not be really e x i s t i n g here and now. Although it was

true when it was eeen b e f o r e , i t is now 'anirv\$ya ' ( indetermi-

na te ) , and hence .it is false. If it i s s a i d t h a t i t i s t h e

same a s what was s e e n be fo re , i t could be a c a s e of 'pratyabhig%al

( r e c o g n i t i o n ) . But , edhyzse i s no t pratyabhig%a, b u t slfl~ti

rzpa. I n pratyabhig"na t h e o b j e c t i s i n f r o n t of US, while

it is n o t the cage i n s?~ti o r r e c o l l e c t i o n . I n o rde r t o show

that the r e a l object i s n o t be fo re us i n adhycasa a l so , . -

the adjective smrti I a s p a is given. Another purpose of t h i s

a d j e c t i v e 5s to distinguish adhyzsa from t h e avabhasa of t h e

v a l i d type. As f o r i n s t a n c e ,

, ~ v a s t ima tyzm g a v l pGrvadrstasya gGtvasya p a r a t r a k~l~lcfy8rn avabh%gah

~ i t a l l p u t r ; p8 rvac l~s t a sya d ivada t t a sya p a r a t r a rnZhicmaty&n avabh'asah. 3

Since t h e term avabh'asa i s found used with r e f e rence t o v a l i d

cogn i t i on such as ' r k a s Y a avabh%sa?' , I p l t a s y a avabh%sa?' , etc . , it i s necessary t o d i s t i n g u i s h this v a l i d avabhzsa from

the avabhasa which i s adhyssa. The idea t h a t adhyzsa is a

f a l s e avabhzsa i s c r e a t e d by t h e a d j e c t i v e smrtirCpa. S ince , a

smrti is shown t o be f a l s e , as i t s o b j e c t i s not before u s , . . i t i s p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s avabhlasa as a false appre-

hension 'avasannah b h % s a ~ ' o r 'avamatah bh3sak' . This

adjective hgs been exp la ined by v;caspati ~ d r a as:

Srnrtzh riipamiva riipam as ya i ti smrt i rcpah . 4 m. a I.

It may be observed here t h a t t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was g iven by

Padmapjda in h i s ~ a n p a ~ z d i k a .

Applicat ion of the d e f i n i t i o n t o t h e d i f f e r e n t cases of

adhyTsa:

A f t e r . expAaining the gene ra l definition of adhyzsa,

I viqaspati Misra has shown how it is f r e e from the defects of

1 a t i v y ' l p t i f and 'avy'apti ' . It i s a l ready shown how smrti .a I

differ8 from pratyabhiTna. S ? f t i per ta ins t o an object which

j , ~ not before us w h i l e p ra tyabh i f i a p e r t a i n s t o an object

which i s before us. Since t h e present d e f i n i t i o n of adhyzsa

ha8 t h e ad,jactive 'sr$ir'upa1 . I t does no t apply t o the case

of pratyabhij&. Thus, it is f r e e from t h e d e f e c t of

a t ivy2p t i . It is a l s o f ree from t h e d e f e c t of avyzp t i because

it applies t o t h e cases of t h e f a l s e apprehensions l i k e dream

cogni t ion , ye l low conch s h e l l , r e f l e c t i o n of t h e f a c e , etc.

F i r s t l y , t h e case of dream c o g n i t i o n can be taken up'.

fn the dream, t h e r e is t h e memory of t h e f a t h e r e t c . due t o t h e

defect of sleep, it is no t real ised t h a t t h e objects Like

the f a t h e r e t c . a r e n o t a c t u a l l y be fo re us. I n t h a t s i t u a t i o n ,

there is a s u p e r i m p o s i t i o n of what was r e e n be fo re i n the

spatio-temporal setting of t h e dream. Thus, t h e de f in i t ion

of a d h y h a a p p l i e s t o t h e case of dream cogn i t ion .

Secondly, t h e c o g n i t i o n l i ke ' f i t a h (ankahf I$ a l s o a

case of adhyZsa due t o t h e mixing up of t h e yellow C O ~ O U ~ of

the bile matter with t h e c lea r rays of l i g h t emerging o u t ,

The whiteness of the, conchshe l l i s no t grasped. ~t i s not

realisad. tha t there can be no r e l a t i o n between the yellow co lour

and the CQnchshell. Then the r e l a t i o n between t h e yel low ~ 0 1 0 ~

gold o r . thqy. l low c o l o u r and the bi lwa f r u i t or t h e l i k e

which War 8e.n before superimposed on t h e conchshel l before US

This is how the d e f i n i t i o n of adhyssa app l iss t o the case of

t h e apprehens ion of the conchshe l l as yellow.

T h i r d l y , t h e case of the r e f l e c t i o n of t h e Pace i n t h e

mirror can be considered . Here t h e lustre of the eye is

pushed back by t h e s t r o n g e r lustre of t h e sun. Then, the

r e f l e c t i o n of t h e f a c e i s grasped, Because of i l l u s i o n , it

i s n o t r e a l i s e d t h a t t h e f ace i s f a c i n g t h e mirror and t h a t

t h e mirror i s b e f o r e t h e face. Thus, w e g e t t h e i l l u s o r y

c o g n i t i o n of the r e f l e c t i o n as the face. This i s a case of

what was s e e n b e f o r e , namely t h e m i r r o r b e f o r e the face.

Thus , t h e d e f i n i t i o n of adhyzsa a p p l i e s t o t h i s f a l s e c o g n i t i o n

a l s o .

I t may be obse rved here t h a t i n a p p l y i n g t h e d e f i n i t i o n

of adhyzsa t o the above cares, i n o rder t o show t h a t it i s

not open t o tho d e f e c t of ' a v y z p t i ' , v;caspati ~ i / r a has indeed

made use of t h e arguments of Mandana ~ d r a g iven i n connect ion

With t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of v i p a r l t a k h y ' a t i .

I Second ly , it is n e c e s s a r y t o n o t e t h a t vZ$aspat i Misra

differs from Padmapgda, t h e a u t h o r o f ~ancap ' ladika i n t h e

concept ion of adhyzsa. The d i f f e r e n c e l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t

Padmaplda has spoken of adhya'sa as a r i s i n g from the combi-

na t ion of the t h r e e causes of samskZre, dGta and indr iya -

u The ramrksra i s in t h e form of r e c o l l e c t i o n ( s m r t i ) o I 6

DEt~ i r i n the fom of absence of c l e a r l i g h t ptc . , and

indriyasamy~ga is the contact of the eye w i t h t h e objec t before

us. This kgra?atritaya janyatva of adhy'esa is grasped by

padmap'ada from the d e f i n i t i o n of adhyasa g i v e n i n the b h b y a .

gut, M t a 8 p a t i ~ i i r a does not refer t o this klranatritaya

janyatva a s the d e f i n i t i o n of adhyisa. He is only e x p l a i n i n g

sdhyioa a8 a ease of misappxehension of what was seen before

i n what is now present before u s , thus resembling s ~ ~ t i i n i t s

form.

It i s interesting t o note that Vscaspati ~ i i r a has kept

the ' a n i r v a ~ a n l y a k h y ~ t i ' which s t a n d s o u t a s t h e culminat ion

of v ipar i takhy5t i i n Mandana ii;rats brahmasiddi as the bas is

and s u b s t a n t i a t e s i t i n h i s Bhzmati. Although t h e r e i s a

r e f e r e n c e t o a n i r ~ a ~ a n ~ ~ a v ~ d a i n the P a n ~ a p z d i k a , it has not !

assumed t h a t much of importance i n i t a s it has assumed in

Bhgmati. As i n P a n ~ a p Z d i k a so i n Bhzmati, t h e r e i s an expla-

nation though wi th g r e a t e r emphasis of a n i r ~ s ~ a n ~ ~ a k h ~ ' a t i

a f t e r d i s c u s s i n g about t h e d i f f e r e n t concept ions of adhy2sa

according t o d i f f e r e n t s c h o o l s of thought . I t is i n t h i s

c o n t e x t t h a t t h e e x p o s i t i o n of t h e d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s of er ror

by ~ S ~ a s p a t i ~ i d r a becomes r e l e v a n t .

~ z c a a p a t i ~ i t r a d i s c u s s e s v a r i o u s t h e o r i e s of e r r o r

namely, .Asa tkhy=t i , 1tmakhy;ti. Akhfati and ~ n ~ a t h z k h y z t i

and r e f u t e s them f rotn t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e ~ n i r v a c a n l y s khfa ti

of a d v a i t a .

The t h e o r y of e r r o r by name ~ s a t k h y ' a t i i s of t h e J~nyny.-

v k n s ' ( ~ i d h ~ ~ m i k ~ ~ u d d h i s t r ) . As s t a t e d by as pa ti' ~ i : r a ,

the S a l i e n t p o i n t of t h i s theory i s t h a t t h e o b j e c t t h a t is

Presented i n an i l l u s o r y c o g n i t i o n is t o t a l l y non-existent . . .:.. ,

( a s a t ) . ' in other words, i n a n i l l u s o r y c o g n i t i o n a non-existent . ,

Object, for s i l v e r , r a j a t s i n i u k t l r a j a t a c o g n i t i o n

is apprehended a existent. This theory is refuted by ~ z c a s p a t i I

t h e p o i n t s o f .bkhylitiv'lda of the ~ f a b h a k a r a ' s

it . It i s urged t h a t the world which I s absolutely

n o n e e x i s t e n t and which is devoid of any true essence cannot

be the objec t of e x p e r i e n c e * Hence, t h e super impos i t ion of

such a wor ld on t h e i n t e l l i g e n t self i s t o t a l l y o u t of q u e s t i o n .

The Buddhists might say t h a t though objects of exper ience a r e

t o t a l l y devoid of any c a p a c i t y t o appear , the r e s p e c t i v e

c o g n i t i o n s g i v e rise t o t h e appearance of non-exis tent through

t h e power o f nesc ience . Thus, t hey a r g u e t h a t nesc ience i s

r e s p o n s i b l e fo r making t h e non-exis tent t o appear. A s a g a i n s t

t h i s it i s askedt 'What is t h a t f a c u l t y of cognition by which

the n o n - e x i s t e n t o r t h e u n r e a l i s made t o appear7 What is i t s

capac i ty? ' . I f it is s a i d t h a t i t i s u n r e a l , i s it e f f e c t e d

o r o n l y made known by it? The a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t is e f f e c t e d

cannot be a c c e p t e d because such a t h i n g i s imposs ib le i n t h e

case of what i s u n r e a l . I t canno t be a l s o s a i d t o have been

made known b e c a u s e t h e r e is no o t h e r c o g n i t i o n involved here

o the r t h a n that which makes manifest. If it is urged t h a t

what is manifested, b e i n g u n r e a l , r e q u i r e s a new c o g n i t i o n

t o be associated with it, it would r e s u l t i n i n f i n i t e regress. , .

The 1 ~ n ~ a v : d i ~ c a n n o t a l s o m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of

the u n r e a l i s the very e s s e n c e of c o g n i t i o n because i n such a

s i t u a t i o n , . the . . , : r e l e v a n t g u e s t i o n would be a s t o what i s t h e , s ,

relation. b,stween. the real and the unreal. If t h e Buddhist

sayl,thdi:fde.iieiation of c o p n i t i o n whish is r e a l is made ' ' *r,.s-..... ..... .. .I. . . . .

determinate under the cont ro l of what i r unreal, he in open

t o t h e ridicule as put by V i c a s p a t i ~ i d r a : 'How unfor tuna te i s

th is Poor cognition which a t t a i n s t o determinat ion even

through t h e unreal! ' :

~ h z bata ayam a t i n i r y f t a h p r e t y a y a t a p a s v l yasya

a s a t y a p i n i r c p a n y a y a t a t e . 1 . @

Even when t h e Buddhis t modi f i e s h i s p o s i t i o n by say ing t h a t

c o g n i t i o n i s n o t controlled by t h e u n r e a l , but t h e very n a t u r e

of c o g n i t i o n i s such a s n o t t o appear a p a r t from t h e u n r e a l ,

h i s p o s i t i o n does n o t improve i n a s much as h i s argument i s

t o t a l l y d e f e c t i v e . T h i s i s exposed by ~ i ~ a s ~ a t i ~ i l r a when

he says:

"How u n f o r t u n a t e indeed i s t h i s p a r t i a l i t y for the u n r e a l which l i n k s c o g n i t i o n i n v a r i a b l y t o the u n r e a l a l t h o u g h it does n o t o r i g i n a t e from i t o r remains a s of t h e same n a t u r e . " ~ h ' o b a t a asya a s a t paksap'ats? yadayam a t a d u t p a t t i ? a tad i tmi ca t a d a v i n ~ b h i v e n i y a t a ? p r a t y s y a iti. TasdP t at ianta asa t a ? $ a r I r e n d r i y i d y a p i n i s t a t t v a ? nanubhavavi$ayah b h a v i turn a r h a t i . 2

Thus f o l l o w i n g t h e mlrnimsaki, V i t a s p a t i ~ i d r a concludes t h a t

the totally non-ex ia ten t canno t become t h e o b j e c t ' o f exper ience .

If s i lver were , to be a b s o l u t e l y non-exis tent , i t should remain

unaP~rehended ,for ever. The q u e s t i o n of superimposing it on

L Brahmai i t& $.~karsbhi?ya publ i shed by Tuksrarn ~ l y a j i. edited -. :,

:ith Yac'r 6 A n a n t h k r i # h n a $ ~ ~ t r y and V ~ S U ~ ~ V ~ a k r h m a n -

'astry P.08 lkar, . . Nimayrs3gar Press, Bombay, 1917. ih, .

the other does not arise, Hence, absolutely non-exis tent

t h i n g canno t be apprehended as existent.

The theory of itmakhy:ti i s accepted by t h e vijn"aanavains

(ycga$5ra Buddh i s t s ) . According t o t h i s theory , t h e o b j e c t

p r e s e n t e d i n an i l l u s i o n i s completely mental. It i s wrongly

p r o j e c t e d as something e x t e r n a l . For i n s t a n c e , i n t h e

d u k t i r a j a t a n y z y a it i s t h e mental image of s i l v e r t h a t

m a n i f e s t s a s an e x t e r n a l o b j e c t on being superimposed on the

s h e l l . There are no e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s accord ing t o the

vi jn"aav3dins. There are on ly i d e a s o r vijn"an8s. I n t h e

& k t i r a j a t a n y s y a t h e i n t e r n a l i d e a of s i l v e r appears t o be

e r e a l e x t e r n a l o b j e c t . V j q a s p a t i ~ i i r a h a s g iven an

e x p o s i t i o n of t h i s t h e o r y as a prima-facie view i n h i s ~ h z r n a t i .

According t o vijn"anav=dfns, e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s a r e on ly e x t e r n a l

f a l sehood p r o j e c t e d by t h e impress ions of beginninglesa avidya.

It i s t h e form of c o g n i t i o n t h a t i s imposed on it. I n I

conformity with the Buddhis t view G c a s p a t i Misra g i v e s t h e

arguments t o j u e t i f y t h e theory . I t i s a g e n e r a l r u l e ' t h a t

whatever i s exper ienced i n a p a r t i c u l a r form should be accepted

in t h a t very fom, When a c o g n i t i o n of greater force sublate8

it, there i s a s u b l a t i n g c o g n i t i o n i n t h e form of ' t h i s i s not

" lver ' . ,It shou ld be noted h e r e t h a t t h i s s u b l a t i n g c o g n i t i o n % ' . '

' , I

i8 only , rublqting , . the ' t h i s element'. It means t h a t the . , . . , . , . attribute I thisnass 1 a l o n e is s u b l a t e d , b u t n o t t h e s u b s t r a t e

s i l v e r a l s o * This must be accepted because when t h e s u b s t r a t e

~ i l v e r i s sublated, both the si lver and i t s a t t r i b u t e ' t h i s -

ness' i s s u b l a t e d m The c o g n i t i o n is t h a t s i l v e r which i s

~ u b l a t e d in respect of i t s externality i s by presumption

t o the knowledge w i t h i n us. Hence, the impos i t ion

o u t s i d e i s of the form of cogn i t ion .

I After s t a t i n g this t h e o r y of e r ro r , Vacaspati Misra formu-

l a t e s i t 8 r e f u t a t i o n w i t h arguments. He asks - i f s i lver e tc .

are of t h e form of c o g n i t i o n , how should you establish it?

Should it be e s t a b l i s h e d by exper i ence i .e., pe rcep t ion o r

by i n f e r e n c e ? I f t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e i s accepted , t h e n it

must be e i t h e r t h e c o g n i t i o n of s i l v e r o r the c o g n i t i o n t h a t

s u b l a t e s it. It canno t be the p e r c e p t i o n of s i l v e r because

i t r e v e a l s s i l v e r which has t h i s as i t s s u b s t r a t e b u t n o t

what is w i t h i n . I n t h a t case, t h e c o g n i t i o n would be of the

form of 'I am s i l v e r 1 i n as much as the c o g n l s e r i s no t

d i f ferent from t h e c o g n i t i o n .

The v i j n y n a v z d i n may a r g u e t h a t t h e d e l u s i v e c o g n i t i o n

i t se l f determines its own form t o be e x t e r n a l and hence, i t

does no t appear a8 a s u b s t r a t u m o r I o r aha?kira. He may

further argue t h a t it is on ly from t h e s u b l a t i n g c o g n i t i o n

tha t t h e form of c o g n i t i o n can be known. A t h i s c o n t e n t i o n

Vitaspati M ~ & ~ pu t* the counter -ques t ion - What is t h e n a t u r e

Of t h a t 8ubiating c o g n i t i o n ? Doe8 i t d i s t i n g u i s h t h e object

before u8 from ~ i l v r r or doer it a l s o show of it t h a t its

nature i s of the form of cogni t ion. To state these questions

the Buddhists may say that the sublat ing cogni t ion performs the funct ion of making known the prior e x p e r i e n c e as having

the form . , of cogni t ion . 6 t a o p a t i ~ i ( ~ h i t s a t this very

p o i n t saying t h a t it smacks of f t h e opponent ' s i gnorance i n

as much ag the sublat ing cognition can never make known the

~ r i o r e x p e r i e n c e a s having t h e form of c o g n i t i o n ,

The opponen t can t r y t o m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e f a c t of t h e

n e g a t i o n of t h e P r e s e n c e of s i l v e r b e f o r e us reveals t h a t

s i l v e r i s o f t h e form of cognition o n l y and it i s not

e x t e r n a l . V s ~ a ~ p g t i ~ i : r a doe8 n o t accept t h i s . He contends

t h a t t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e presence of silver means t h e nega t ion

of t h e non-apprehens ion o f t h e non-proximity of silver,

Through such a n e g a t i o n t h e o b j e c t becomes non-proximate o r

remote t o t h e c o g n i s e r . Then, where is the scope f o r

t a k i n g i t as t h e form of c o g n i t i o n ? T h e r e f o r e , t h e nega t ion

of t h e presence of s i l v e r proves o n l y the u t t e r d i f f e r e n c e

of s i lver f r o m c o g n i t i o n and n o t i d e n t i t y . The Buddhis t

cannot however argue t h a t the c o g n i t i o n of s i l v e r a s

Occasioned i n c o n c h s h e l l i s s i l v e r i t s e l f because i t i s

Opposed t o experien~e. When a l l r e a l i t y i s m e n t a l i n c h a r a c t e r ,

t h e r e cannot be a n y c r i t e r i o n t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t r u t h

and error.

I ~ h g &ncluaioh of ~Zcaspsti Mirrats d i s c u s s i o n i s t h a t

the ~ i j ~ l ~ i v i ~ ~ h s are n o t j u s t i f i e d i n making use of the ' . , . , r , . '

I . . . ' .

concept of 'externality' because they do not attribute reality

t o any object outside the very argument they put forward v i z . ,

'What is in te rna l appears a s e x t e r n a l r proves the very

of external obje'cts, Therefore the existence of

the c o n c h a h e l l as an e x t e r n a l o b j e c t must be admit ted .

Otherwise, t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of silver becomes imposs ib le .

Only when there 1 s a n o b j e c t l y i n g o u t s i d e and s e r v i n g a s a

subs t ra tum, it is p o s s i b l e t o t a l k of e r r o r . There fo re , t h e

i t m a k h y ~ t i v ~ d a i s wnsound .

The theory of error c a l l e d ' a k h y z t i ' i s propounded by t h e

~ r i b h z k a r a ~ I r n i m s a kBs .. According t o t h i s t h e o r y , t h e r e i s

no e r r o r a t a l l . I n ' i u k t i r a ~ a t a n ~ i ~ a ' t h e s u b l a t i n g

consciousness d o e s n o t deny e i t h e r t h e s i l v e r o r t h i s n e s s .

It denies , o n l y t h e . . e m p i r i c a l usage of s i l v e r occas ioned by /

the non-apprehension of d i s t i n c t n e s s . I n t h e case of s u k t i -

rajatabhr%ntf, t h e r e are two kinds of c o g n i t i o n s : (1) t h e

s i l v e r , and ( 2 ) t h e t h i s ' . The first 'one i s a c a s e of memory

and t h e Second one is a c a s e of exper ience . , , The element of

t h i s i s the a p p r e h e n s i o n of a mef e objec t before us. f ts

nature as , s h o l l n e r s i s n o t g r a s p e d (apprehended) because of a

defect . , . What is barely grasped c a l l s up t h e memory of s i l v e r ,

of s i m i l a r i t y with t h e impress ion of t h e former ex- . I , . ' . '

Perience of" =ilver. Tha t memory a l o o remains a s a bare appre- , ,

.. I . .:. ;:. , '

bisaui& 6; *c 'loss of the element of c o n t e n t due t o

defect. tlence, according t o the ~r;bh'akar~s, error con-

sists in t a k i n g a composite view of these two cognit ions

without t h e apprehension of the d i f f e r e n c e between them. I n

o t h e r words, the c o g n i t i o n of s h e l l a s silver i s due t o the

n o n - a p p r e h e n s i ~ n of dif ference between t h e p r e s e n t e d o b j e c t

and the r e p r e s e n t e d i d e a . T h e former r e f e r r e d t o a s ' t h i s ' ,

and t h e l a t t e r a s ' s i l v e r t . S i l v e r , as s e e n i n t h e s h e l l

is merely a memory image w i t h t h e e lement of remembrance l e f t

out . When there i s s u b l a t i o n , t h e p r i o r c o g n i t i o n is deemed

t o be delusive because of t h e O p p o s i t i o n a l d e s i g n a t i o n of

memory and experience w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o each o t h e r . According

t o t h i s t h e o r y , a l l c o g n i t i o n s a r e r e c o g n i s e d as val id.

A8 a g a i n s t this view, Vs~aspati ~ i : r a f o r m u l a t e s the

r e f u t a t i o n on t h e l i n e s o f the a n y a t h z k h y z t i v i d i n whose view

w i l l be taken up l a t e r , The c o n t e n t i o n of t h e akhy5 t ivzd in

i s d e f e c t i v e because he who f a i l s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between

memory and experience cannot lead himself t o i l l u s i o n t o such

an extent ae t o kneel down t o p i c k up s i l v e r . This a c t i v i t y

on t h e p a r t of the c o g n i s e r cannot come about from t h e mere

f a i l u r e t o apprehend t h e mutua l d i f f e r e n c e between memory and

Further, the a c t i v i t y and speech of an i n t e l l i

g e n t being arises from apprehension b u t n o t from mere non-

The. Pf lbhbkaris may t r y t o improve t h e i r p o s i t i o n by

that: t h e . .delusion' of s l lver results n o t from bare non-

dpprehen$i~n, / i(l. but . . . f ,.I tom memory and experience, Where their " <,, 8 :, ,'

, , 1", . , ' , . , , '

difference , in . . . geopect , o f their nature and content is not i .' , :,? , ,,: , , : .! + ;+ i" .:{ $ :L ,, : ,,,

dut to the similarity within val id cognition of > * > .8.(3 . :?,.?3,i:y,rc,i , . ; ;, .,:. ,: . ,.,, ,

si lver' before. Her;; v;$kspsti' ~ i i r a arks, "how doe8 the

, ' . . : '. " , , ' ,

by b i i n # ' ~ # ~ d n i i d ? ~ i o z ~ ~ , b ~ : , , , , it$ bgro , , ,exL#t(ncs without being . ' . . , . ,

, . d ' , 4f *he $$x@,t; a . ~ $ , e p n a t e e is the =ere, then

, , . . , . . , . , , . ,

t h e dppmivh;~%&i mur,t b. of,. the form o f the cog nit i o n s o f . , , ,

th f s ':*iZ$,ffad, are o1rnila.r t o v a l i d cognition. Then i t , .

mearir , that ; ther i : i r the apprehension of non-dif ferenee

betweeh' thore:, t W cognitions t h i s and s i l v e r i n respect

of t h e i r na'turr of ' contents, Here, the cognition t h a t t h i s

i s l i k e v a l i d cogni t ion cannot lead t o empirical usage i n the

same way as v a l i d cogni t ion, For ins tance , when there i s

cognition l i k e "gavaya i s like a cowtt, it does not lead to

any a c t i v i t y i n r e spec t of a gavaya. Again, t h e cognition

that there is non-apprehension of d i f fe rence between these

very two i s se l f -cont radic tory because where there is non-

apprehenrion of difference, i t cannot be of the form of between

the two. When there i s the apprehension of 'between the t w o '

i t Cannot be said t h a t there is non-apprehension of difference*

Therefore, i t can be concluded t h a t the non-apprehension of

n o t being i t se l f apprehended, is the cause of

,Usage by.the bare f a c t o f its existence,

h o t h e r quek t ion i s asked i n t h i s connection. "Is it

the CIU$e, of empir ical 'usage through creat ing on impression

or by itself without Creating an impressionltl According t o

vicaspat i ~ i d r a , it must be the former because, t h e empirical I

usage of an intell igent being cannot result from ignorance .

I ~ z c a s ~ a t i o Misra points out t h a t mere non-apprehension of

d i f f e r e n c e c a n n o t account for t h e a c t i v i t y t o which t h e person

i s prompted. It is indeed right t h a t the a c t i v i t y of the

consc iouo a g e n t must be due t o knowledge. S i n c e t h i s

a c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t e d towards t h e object , v i z . , the shell,

t h e r e must be intermediary s t a g e s a f t e r t h e non-apprehension

of difference and t h e actual a c t i v i t y . The intermediary

stages are:

1. the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of s i l v e r w i t h this ( t h e s h e l l ) .

2 . the c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t silver i s of p r a c t i c a l use.

3. t h e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the d i s t a n t object being silver will

serve a prac t i ca l need. The a c t i v i t y on t h e par t o f

the p a r t i c u l a r pre-supposes all t h e s e stages.

I hue, according to ~ G c a s p a t i Misra who r e p r e s e n t s the

adva i ta view, the error i s something p o s i t i v e . I t does . n o t

cons i s t i n the mere failure to keep different perceptions

d i s t i n c t . The object of cognition being immediate, memory of

the P m t , object cannot be regarded a s d i r e c t l y contr ibut ing t o

the p o s s i b i l i t y of error i n a s much as t h e object i n the c a s e

Of memory i s . . n o t immediately present

~ n y a t h 3 k h y Z t i is a theory of error p u t forward by

Naiy 'ay ik 'a~ and t h e Bh'atta school of Midmsa. According t o

this view, the error c o n s i s t s i n t a k i n g one t h i n g f o r ano the r ,

In o t h e r words, t h e o b j e c t a p p e a r s a s anyathz i , e., as

something o t h e r t h a n w h a t it i s . For i n s t a n c e , i n t i u k t i -

ra ja tabhrznt i ' t h e s h e l l i s apprehended a s anyathz i.e.,

a s s i l v e r , which e x i s t s i n some o t h e r p lace . Thus, according

t o t h i s t h e o r y , t h e i l l u s i o n c o n s i s t s i n pursuing s i l v e r not

where it r e a l l y i s , but where it r e a l l y i s n o t , i.e,, i n

the o b j e c t s h e l l .

This V I e w i s c r i t i c i s e d by v i ~ a r p a t i ~ i i r a . I n t h e

case of i u k t i r a j a t a i l l u s i o n , t h e e x i s t e n c e of error accord-

ing t o G y s p e t i ~ i i r a i s c l o s e l y connected w i t h i t s pe rcep t ion

by someone i n t h e same place and i t i s n o t a c a s e of pe rcep t ion

i n different places. T h i s type of p e r c e p t i o n i n t h e same

place occuxs only i n s u p e r i m p o s i t i o n . The c o n t e n t i o n of t h e

Naiyzyikas and the B h z t t a s i s t h a t a t t h e time of i l l u s o r y

Perception, one p e r c e i v e s s i lver i . e . , elsewhere through e x t r a -

mental sense. This does not s t a n d t o reason because i n

J u k t i r s y a t a i l l u ~ ion , s i l v e r i a sc t u a l l y p r e s e n t e d t o t h e

perceiver' thereby prompting h im t o the purpose fu l a c t i o n such

as leaning down to p i c k up s i lver . T h i s s i l v e r i s an e n t i r e l y

new creat ion by .vldyr. Here, avidya c o n c e a l s t h e r e a l na tu r e

Of ' t h l i l ahd ==eater n e w s i l v e r i n i t s place. It i s t h i s

,,, silver that i s b'efore the percipient, I t comes into

existence w i t h perception and goes out of existence with the

cessation of perception. Here, the s i lver which the

percipient observe6 is realised t o be n o t the s i lver of the

market and t h a t i t is a new c r e a t i o n temporarily imposed on I

the shell by avidyam Thus av idya i s t h e m a t e r i a l cause of

illu~0rY s i l v e r * Thus, V W a ~ p a t i ~ i : r a i s t o t a l l y opposed t o

t h e a n y a t h 3 k h ~ = t i ~ g d a . When he s a y s t h a t t h e s i l v e r is super-

imposed on t h e s h e l l , i t can be t a k e n t h a t the a t t r i b u t e s

o t h e r t h a n i t s , own are imposed on t h e shell. Taking t h i s

a s a c a s e of someth ing e lse, it i s p o s s i b l e t o mistake t h i s

view a s anyath;khyHti i t s e l f . Bu t , a s i t i s shown above, I ~ g c a s p a t i Misra i s n o t a s u p p o r t e r o f anya th"ahyz t i . H i s

view a b o u t error i s n o t anya th ' akhyz t i b u t a n i r v a c a ~ i ~ a k h i ' a t i .

T h i s is e x p l a i n e d i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t para.

I Taking the case of s u k t l r r j a t a b h r i n t i , ~;$ar pa t i ~ i :rr

expresses h i s o p i n i o n t h a t t h e i l l u s o r y silver i s neither a

Pos i t ive entity nor a n e g a t i v e e n t i t y . f t i s n o t a n a b s o l u t e

i b y a o r t u c c a l i k e the h o r n s o f a h a r e , n o r i s it a n a b s o l u t e a *

r e a l i t y b e c a u r e . i t gets s u b l a t e d . It canno t be a n a b s o l u t e I r SunYa because it $8 perceived, and an a b s o l u t e a s a t can never

be Perceived. Since the illusory s i l v e r does n o t admit any

definite dsrcription a. r a t or a s a t or a s both. There fo re ,

it should be: ,c ~ , l a d 1 8 p t v i l s k ~ a n a i e , a s something

different from both sat and asat, Hence, it is anirvacadya I

, , something that cannot be def ini te ly described.

I Taking t he instance of mirage, &aspati Misra argues ' *

that the water superimposed on the mirage is neither real nor

unreal . It cannot be both real and u n r e a l because such a

d e s c r i p t i o n i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms. Hence, it must be

considered as a n i r v a c a n l y a t h a t i s something which cannot be

d e f i n i t e l y described.

I The c r i t i c s who i n s i s t on c o n s i d e r i n g ~ 5 c a s p a t i Misra

as a supporter ~f " A n y a t h z k h y i t i v h s t a t e ' s;pa'dhikabhramal , de lus ion caused by a n e x t e r n a l o b j e c t as a c a s e i n po in t .

For i n s t a n c e , when a w h i t e c r y s t a l i s p laced near a red f l o w e r ,

we may mistake t h e w h i t e c r y s t a l to be, red. In the same way,

a person s u f f e r i n g from jaundice mistakes a white she l l t o be

yellow. S t r i c t l y speaking, t h e yellowness be longs to the

bile and not t o the shell , but the yellowness of the b i l e is

wrongly a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e shell. Here, the e r r o r occurs

because of confusion between the c rys ta l and the f lower i n

the former i n s t a n c e and t h e shell and t h e b i l e i n the latter

i n s t a n c e , Thus, t h e error, i n bo th t h e cases l i e s i n the

apprehension of one t h i n g as a n o t h e r t h i n g , Th i s is nothing

but anyath8khygti. Hence, i n t h e s8pgdhikabhrama i l l u s t r a t e d

above, t h i edvaitins have t o accept anyath>khyit i , This view

is really a a i 8 r r p r s s m t a t i o n of the a d v a i t a view. If we

examine the t w o instances g i v e n above, closely and c a r e f u l l y ,

it, is possible to realist, how it cannot be the v iew of the

advaitin~a Although the advaitins accept tha t the red colour

which i s seen, is real, they do not accept its relation with

the crystal as real, but as false because of the f a c t that

it does n o t i n h e r e in the crystal, but only gets reflected

in it. . The red colour may be elsewhere, b u t t h e wh i t e

crystal seen as red is n o t anywhere e lse , b u t before t h e I

perc ip ient ' S eyes . According t o & a s p a t i Misre. the assurnpt-

ion of the a t t r i b u t e s of one t h i n g i n t h e c a s e o f another i s

u n t r u t h or a n r t a t t v a . I t means i n o t h e r words, a n i r v a s a z y a t t v a . b m

The of t h e a t t r i b u t e s of one t h i n g i n ano the r i s

r e a l l y anirvacanlya. This must be accepted by a l l khy'ati-

" id ins whe the r t h e y l i k e i t o r not .

Thus, v;caspati ~ is ! ra refutes t h e d i f f e r e n t k h y s t i v f d i s

v i z . , ~ s e t k h ~ ; t i , i \ tmakhy3ti , ~ k h y z t i and ~ n y a t h 5 k h ~ : t i wi th

formidable a rgumen t s o n l y t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t a l l khy'ativ'adins

must admi t anirva~an?~akh$i t i of the a d v a i t i n s . He i s f i r m l y

of the o p i n i o n t h a t a n i r ~ a e a n ? ~ a k h ~ > t i g i v e s t h e most s a t i s -

f a c t o r y a c c o u n t of the n a t u r e of error i n i l l u s o r y percept ion .

This view a b l y formula ted by ~igaspati ~ i : r a is f u r t h e r con-

firmed by ~ r n ~ l ' a n ~ ~ d . i n his Ved jn t aka lpa t a ru . ~ m a l i n a n d a

t h a t the i l l u s o r y error i s n e i t h e r , s e a l nor u n r e a l

mental b u t an actual c r e a t i o n o f the time being. I t is , ,

whi~h..ir n o t determinable e i t h e r a s real O r as

unreal.

4, THE CONCEPTION [IF JIVA

After the theory of adhyzsa, the most important question

is as t o the nature of J ivj tman, t h e i n d i v i d u a l s o u l . I t i s

often maintained t h a t jivjtrnan i s t h e object of '1' notion

(phampratyayaggfara). According' t o vZFaspati ~ i i r a , jivztman

i s not the o b j e c t of 'I' notion. I t i s Brahman i t s e l f . The

argument is t h a t the n o t i o n of I does n o t br ing out the true

nature of atman Since t h e atman is all-pervading and i n f i n i t e .

It cannot be i d e n t i f i e d with t h e l imi ted concept of I .

Generally it is said ,

'here I am s t a y i n g a t home knowing i t t . I n t h i s statement,

t h e a l l -pervading atman i s deemed l i m i t e d t o a part icular

place. This i s l i k e understanding the trees on the top of a

hill a s blade; of g r a s s by a person who views them from the

bottom. Thus, the real nature and he ight of the t rees are

underestimated. S imi lar ly , the real nature of atman comes

t o be undrrertirnrted i n tho '1' n o t i o n . Therefore, ~ i c a s p a t i I

Misra says t h a t those who assume atman a s the object of 'I'

1 I

Bhramarttra sankarabhbys, published by ~uk'aram ~ g y a ji , - edited, with Notes by Nbrani ~ n a n t h k r i s h n e t b s t r y and ~ & u d e v ~akshkan bar try Pan;ikar, ~ l r n a ~ a e t ~ a r I Press, Bombay,

1917, , l iL . l , , p.11.

notion should no t take i t to be its real na ture& I

E p i ahankirg$~adam i t m ~ n a m :sthidatha tairapyasya

na tittvikatvam abhyup'e tavy an, aham ihaivjsni sada$ - m janana iti sarvavy'apinah pr'ade:ikatvena grah%t uccatara girihkharavartisu mah'atarusu dkv ip rav5 la - '* 2 ' nirbhzsa pra tyayavat.

It cannot be said tha t the exper i ence l i k e ' h e r e I am

s t a y i n g a t home' i s n o t j u s t pertaining t o the body because

there i s the idea of 'knowing it' ( j s n ~ n a h ) . Since the idea I

of d i f f e r e n c e between aham and t h e body i s n o t . a l r e a d y

underly ing i t , t h e e x p e r i e n c e cannot be considered a s

secondary:

Nap-idarn dzhehssya p r ~ d e ~ i k a t v a n anubhayate natu ztmanah iti ssmpratam, n a h i tadaivam bhavati- aham iti; g u n a t v h a na jHnZnab iti. . . natu ahankarasya mukhy%thab n i r l u t i t a g a ~ b h a t a y a dihddibhy% bhinn5nubhGyate. 3

The world i n t h e form of body e t c . , i s something known

through the illusory knowledge like water i n the mirage-

It is not reel as expla ined a lready , it is inde terminate

(anirv'a~ya). B u t , on the o t h e r hand, atm'an i s known through

scriptures and reasoning t h a t i t is eternally pure, wakeful

and free in i t s nature . Thus, it i s regarded a s determinate

(nirvisya) , . , The i m u t a b l r end i n e x h a u s t i b l e s e l f - i l l u m i n a t i o n

is its real nature;

. e . t a d a n h a kramena adhyas tamt:yam param:rtha t;yarniva, 4

a ta eva pirvadrstamiva t a t t v a t a s t u nat'oyan naca pijrva- drstam, kintu anrtam, anirv'afyam. Evan ca deh8ndriySdi I a I I I

p r a p a n ~ i p i anirvicyah.. I . . cid'atm'. tu srtirmrti itih'asa # 0 1

pura'njgEcarah tanmGla t a d a n i r u d d a ny.ayanir$ta &dd;buddamukta svabh%ve?, s a t v e n a i v a nlrv.'cya?. ~ b i d i t a svayam p r a k ~ d a t a i v Z s y a s a t t z , saca svar'u~am'eva c ids tmanab . 4

Atman i s udgsi)la. Hence t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o t h i n k

t h a t h e has the s t a t e s of doing o r enjoying ' k a r t r t v a l o r a 1

' b h z k t r t v a l . Y e t , due t o t h e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e i n t e l l e c t , . t h e mind, t h e s u b t l e and t h e gross body and the senses

created by t h e i n d e s c r i b a b l e and b e g i n n i n g l e s s n e s c i e n c e ,

the atman appea r s delimited, though he i s r e a l l y unlimited.

Although w i t h o u t difference h e b a p p e a r s d i f f e r e n t . R e a l l y

t h e non-doer, he appears as t h e doer, a l t h o u g h t h e non-

enjoyer, h e appears as t h e e n j o y e r , a l though h e i s n o t t h e

ob jec t of a n y t h i n g , h e appea r s as t h e object of ' I ' no t ion .

Thus, t h e atman assumes t h e form of j i v a , and appears i n

t h a t form due t o association w i t h nesc ience:

Satyam pra tyag3tm% s v e y a m p r a k ~ ~ a t v ~ t a v i t a y a ? anadarcai tathlapi ani rvaFanTya anzdyavidyz- p a r i k a l p i t . buddhimzn ht!smasth%l'ula:ar:rgndriya avacc%dgna anavaccinn%pi 0 vastutap ava5:inna iva

abhiAn'opi bhj,nna i v a , a k a r t i p i k a r t s v a , abh'oktipi 0

b h a k t h , evi$ay%pi asmatpra tyaya v i s a y a i v a ~Tvsbhlvarn r b a n n a h avabhzsa te .

5 - 4

Ibid A . 1 . 1 , PI). 24-25. -' I b i d . , 1.1.1, p.38. -

is only the product of avidya and it i s superimposed on the

atman, which is the brahman. He says:

~ a s m 2 t $iditmanab rvayamprak'adasyaiva anevaccinnasya

avaccinn8bhy'o a t buddhyidibhfo bh'edagrah'at tad;bhy3s'sna j ivabhiva iti, t a s y a %a anidamidaniatmanah asmat-

6 pratyaya viQayatvam upap'adyate.

Hence, d u e t o s u p e r i m p o s i t i o n concsequen t upon non-cogni t ion

05 t h e d i f f e r e n c e of t h e i n t e l l i g e n t , s e l f - i l l u m i n e d and

unlimited atman from t h e l i m i t e d buddhi e t c . , t h e r e arises

t h e s t a t e o f j ivabh%va , t h a t atman being covered w i t h avidya

comes to be deemed as the object of I-notion. This jiva

is the form of brahman associated wi th the body, senses e t c . ,

c r e a t e d by t h e i l l u s i o n o f n e s c i e n c e . I t i s n o t t h e r ea l

form o f brahman:

Tath3 ca j i v s p i avidy; k a l p i t a dehEndriysdyupahitam rtpam brahmanah ria t u a v z b h ~ v ikah . 7

T h i s is t h e t h e o r y o f j i v i d h y z s a according t o v;$aspati

~ i : r a . Here h e e x p l a i n s how t h e a t n s n who i s none o t h e r

than brahman assumes t h e j ivahood through adhy"aa.

The t h e o r y of b e q i n n i n g l e s s n e s s ( a n z d i t v a ) :

I t 1s =.id t h a t atman is tsvaysmprak%:at .and ' n i ram?a1. ' ' . .

t h a t he i s not en o b j e c t . I t IS p o s s i b l e t o ask here - I b i d

. 3

-*, 1 , : V pp.38-39. " - I b i d . , 1.3.19, p.303. , .:..:.(:, .. . .', ,# : . .

as to how body etc,, can be superimposed on such an atman? I

v ieaspa t i Misra answers this question by referring t o the @

bhssya statement tha t superimposition is possible on the I

atman in hi's s t a t e of being the abject of I-notion:

Here a g a i n , an o b j e c t i o n can be raised. It i s said

that t h e state of being an object of I -not ion on the part

of atman is due t o 'adhyzsa ' . Thus, t h e r e is an occasion

f o r eny'onyl$rayad6?am

his o b j e c t i o n i s answered by ~5gespati ~ i h a by saying

t h a t there i s no blemish here a s regards the inter-dependence

of adhyzsa and v i i a y a t v a due t o t h e i r beg inninglessness l i k e

t h e r e l a t i o n between t h e seed and t h e sprout :

N ~ C P adhyzse sati v i d a y a t v m , vigayatv; 5. adh$sa?

i t ; a n y ~ n y ~ d r a y a t v a m i t i sPmpratam, bl j azkurava t a n a d i t v a t m 9

T h i s i s how he unders tands the bhssya s ta tement :

I Thus, vZ4sspati Misra t a k e s r e s o r t t o t h e theory of

beg inninqlessnees (an=di tva) i n o r d e r t o exp la in t h e paradox

Of t he nutuai dependence between vit isyatva and adhyssatva.

The i s drawn in to service to answer another w . I

occasion of anyonyasraya between the superimposition of the

body etc * 9 On the atman and the appearance of the body etc, , as a result of a d h y k :

L ~ G P Y ~ ~ Y ~ ~ r a t i t o u satyirn p';rva$stasya sarnzrzpah, samtrzpa nibandhan$a p r a t l t i h iti durv%ram paraspax~s ' raya tvam i t y a t e ah:, na i sa rg ika iti.

sv=bh=vikb an3dirayam vyavah'arab ... t a t a s $ a pkvapzrva mithy>jEana upada r&i t a sya buddh>ndriya

(arir'adeh uttar=ttarZdhyes'opay"oga~ iti a d d i t v o t 1 11

b?Ljinkur;vat na paraspar3srayetvam i t y s r t h a h .

Thus, v;$aspati idr re h a s made use of h i s theory of

anzdi tva as a b r a h m t s t r a a g a i n s t such o b j e c t i o n s i n o t h e r

places a l s o . I t should be n o t e d here t h a t t h i s line of I

t h i n k i n g on the part of ~ Z t a s p a t i Misra is aga ins t the stand

of Gaudapada, who has r e j e c t e d t h e theory of an%ditva and

t h e maxim of bkja 'nkura i n t h i s regard:

~ i j ~ k u r ' e k h y o d r r t & t a h sadarirdhya s a d h i sa?,

nahl szdhyaram; hztuh siddho'lu szdhyasya yu jya t a . 12

l1 . , 1.1.1, p.17. I

l2 ~ a u d ~ ~ $ ( l i e ~ ~ ~ ~ , Sri Sankat. ~ r a n t h a v a l i , vol* 4, IV*19p t

Vani V i l a 8 Press, Srirangah P-147.

I t is already explained earlier how vicaspati ~ i / r a I

of two kinds of avidya namely 'k'aranividyal and

tkiry%ridya'. The bh'ityakira says that avidya 1s the cause

for all e v i l consequences and t h a t the s u p e r i m p o s i t i o n of

non-self on the self, being r e s p o n s i b l e , f o r all e v i l I

consequences s h o u l d be regarded as avidya. ~ Z 5 a s p a t i Misra

has stated that t h e mutual n o n - d i s t i n c t i o n between what i s

se l f and what i s non-self i s the cause o f adhy"asa. The

mutual n o n - d i s t i n c t i o n ( i t a r z t a r i v i v e k a ) i s a c a s e of agrahapa

which i s t h e cause o f adhyzsa . I n f a c t , adhyssa i s a c a s e

of wrong a p p r e h e n s i o n or misapprehens ion (v ipa ryayagraha?a ) .

The fo rmer is the cause and the l a t t e r i s the ef fec t . Both

being c o n s i d e r e d as a v i d y a , one i s 'k=ra?;vidya' and t h e

other is ' k 3 r y g v i d y a ' . T h i s i s t h e t h i n k i n g of V z ~ a s p a t i

~i:ra inspired by Mandam ~idra's v i e r on t h e t o p i c . The

most i m p o r t a n t question which i s raised a b o u t avidya i s regard-

ing its substratum.

The s u b s t r a t u m of avidya:

Who i s t h e s u b s t r a t u m of av idya? The j i v a is n o t

different f =om t h e param=tman. The param'atman i s of t h e

nature of vidya i t se l f . Then, t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o t h i n k .

jiv:tman as, t h e , s u b s t r a t u m of avidya. This i s t h e o b j e c t i o n

raised by ~ h a s k ~ ~ ~ i n h i s bhZsya on t h e ~rahmas; t ras . Th i s I

V i e w t rd&&.d tn by Gcaspati Misn i n t3hzmaf i thus: *

I ' a u vya tirekabhava t, ipi tinanal tasya vldhvyaika

I rasaeya avidyhray'atvinupapa tt&. 1

I At this point, v:cacaspati Misra seems t o take in to account

u

what Mandana ~ i s ( t e h a s stated i n his i r a h n a o i d d h i , According I

t o Mandana Misra avidya i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e ( a n i r v a c a d y a ) .

Avidya i s n o t t h e n a t u r e of e i t h e r brahman o r j i v a . I f it

were t h e n a t u r e of any one, it would become t h e u l t i m a t e

p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f . I n t h a t case, t h e name avidya would be

a misnomer. I n f a c t , t h a t avidya i s n o t absolutely a s a t

because it i s n e c e s s a r y f o r wor ld ly usage ( v y a v a h k a ) . I t

i s n o t a b s o l u t e l y s a t because , what is a b s o l u t e l y s a t cannot

be anything o t h e r t h a n brahman. Hence, being n e i t h e r s a t

nor a s a t , it s h o u l d be r ega rded a s inde te rmina te . This view I

of Mandana ~ i A r a seems t o differ from t h e view of Sankara

who c o n s i d e r s adhyzsa as the cause for t h e appearance of t h e

names and forms, f o r he says t h a t names and forms are I

concocted by av idye . v 5 $ a s p a t i Misra g i v e s a d e v i a t i o n t o

the view of Mandena ~ i l r a by s a y i n g t h a t av idya does no t have

brahman as i t s subs t ra tum, b u t it has j i v a as i t s substratum.

The av idya , however, i s s a i d t o be inde te rmina te . Hence,

brahman i s e t e r n a l l y pure:

- 1 .

Na av idya brahma$ra$t, k i n t u j i v e , s a t u an i rvasan iya ityuktam. ~ z n e nityae'uddhameva brahma.

2

1 :, ' I brahmas5tra ~ a n k ~ r ~ b h ' B t y e , pub l i shed by ~ u k j r a m ~ g y a j i,

edited C i t h ~ o t e s by ~ G r a n j ~ n a n t h k r i s h n a J Z s t r y and ~ g s u d e v

heferring to the view of tlh'iskara mentioned above, he ,

says that the difference of j i v a is created by the beginning-

less indeterminate avidya, and that avidya e tc . , are created

i n the j i v a . Here, he takes the instance of the reflector

and> the reflected. Even t h o u g h the reflector which i s white

is no t essentially d i f f e r e n t from t h e ref lected, y e t , t h e r e

i s an imaginary d i f f e r e n c e due t o t h e ad junc t s i n t h e form

of a blue. jewel, a sword, a glass, e t c . S i m i l a r l y , i s

t h e imagina t ion of t h e d i f f e r e n c e among t he jivas revolv ing

around t h e d i f f e r e n c e of i n t e l l i g e n c e and names. I n t h e

case of r e f l e c t o r and t h e r e f l e c t e d (bimba-pratibimba) t h e

d i f f e r e n c e s of t h e r e f l e c t e d o b j e c t s a s t h e b l u e lotus,

t h e dark pa l aaa , e t c . , o r as round; long, e t c . , a r e observed.

S i m i l a r l y , a l though t h e r e i s no d i f f e r e n c e of t h e j i v a s ,

from t h e paramatman, of t h e na tue of e t e r n a l p u r i t y , y e t

due t o t h e a d j u n c t of beg inn ing le s s i nde t e rmina te avidya,

the d i f f e r e n c e among t h e j i v a s i s assumed, Then, t h e di f fer-

ence between param'atman a s of t h e n a t u r e of pu re i n t e l l i g e n c e

and bliss and j i v a s as s u b j e c t e d t o t h e i n f l u e n c e of avidya

and undergoing g r i e f e tc . , Although the cover of avidya

is not d i r e c t l y found i n t h e param%tman who i s of t h e n a t u r e

of vidya, s t i l l i t i s a t t r i b u t e d t o the paramztman, thouah

the ji\ ias who a r e l i k e h i s r e f l e c t i o n s (p ra t ib imbas ) :

T a t r a yath'a birnbedavad:tPt t'atvikz pratibimbsnlam a b h l d s p i dlamani?rp$nik%cyidyypadhh b h i d s t ,

. I " '

kxlpaniko j ~ v a n i m bhedz , buddhi vyapadesa. bhedo- v a r t a y a t i , idam bimbam avadztam, im'ani $ a .

bh'adabh'anj i bahunl ti, evam paraG tnanah . hddha s v a b h k i t , jivanern abh5de ikantik:su @ anirvacanIya'dya-

Pdyavidyap'adina bh\dat kilpani6 jEvan'em b k d o I buddhi vyapad'e!a bhidan, eyam Fa para i tn ; suddha

vijEanjnda svabhivah, I ink ca jiv'ah avidy'. Q&a duhkhzdi 8 0 @ * I

upzdhdhtna bh'aja i t i v a r t a y a t i . ~vidy'6paddehinam $ a yadyapi vidy"avabhhe param: tma na s'ekdgdas t i , t a t h z p i tatpxatibimbakalpa jivadvix:na paraemin u5yate . 3

*

I t is a t this juncture t h a t an o b j e c t i o n is a n t i c i p a t e d

and anrwered by ~ ; $ a a ~ a t l ~ i i r a . I t i 8 sa id t h a t diva8 ore

due to the v e i l of avidya and a l so tha t avidya pervades

af ter t h e jivas come i n t o e x i s t e n c e . This amounts to

1sny i5ny~r 'reysd~ta ' . This i s t h e ob j e c t l o n . The answer

given by Mandana ~i :ra i s on the ground t h a t the relation

between the j i v a and avidya i s b e g i n n i n g l e s s ( anxd i ) l i k e the

re lat ion between t h e seed and the sprout (bijgnkuranyzya):

I Ne~a ivam any'onyzsreyo, j i v a v ibhaglsra ya avidy;, avidylrraya'sca 'j'iva vibhaga i t i , bl ja=kuravadanzditv'at

4

Therefore, there is no o c c a s i o n f o r t h e questions:

(1) Keeping whom a s the t a r g e t s does the Lord c r e a t e the

Purposeless maya?

( 2 ) Since the j i v a s are absent a t the time of the c r e a t i o n , ,

of the targets of maya, how can atman be crea ted a s t h e '

sama'arin transmigrat ing soul undergoing the various

experiences?

3 ma, 1.4.22, pp.420-421. I b i d . , 1.4.24, p.421.

The questions are not tenable, because the transmigration

does not have a beginninq and bccause d i s t i n c t i o n of jivas

due t o avidya is also without any beginning:

A t a eva k j n uddisya iivar'o msyam%racayati, anarthik;.; I u

udd'eiysn'arn sargiidou j ivlnarn abhzva t , katham Fa ztmanam samszrinam vividhav8danibh'l jam k u r y s t , ityZdyanuy8go n i ravakidah . Na khalu gdimsn aams'ira?, nlpyadimin * avidyz j l v a vibh'agah eva anuyujyzta iti. 5

It can be a g a i n o 'bjected t h a t t h e r e is no possibility

of superimposing j i v a t v a on brahrnan which i s of the nature

of e ternal b r i l l i a n c e and which i s f ree from the cons idera-

t i o n s of t h e g e n e r a l o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r a s i n t h e c a s e of

c o n c h s h e l l e t c . There can be no av idya without j i v a t v a . t

T h i s o b j e c t i o n i s answered by G c a s p a t i Misra aga in on t h e

ground t h a t j i v a t v a and avidya a r e beg inn ing le s s ( a n z d i ) . He s a y s t h a t t h e e n t i r e world i s superimposed on t h e brahman

due t o t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e , beg inn ing le s s av idya , one of i t s

a s p e c t s be ing not g ~ a g p e d , it appea r s t h a t t h e r e is an

i l l u s i o n . B u t , on c l o s e s c r u t i n y i t i s r e a l i s e d t h a t t h e r e

is n o t h i n g l i k e adhy2sa o r super impos i t ion . Hence, a l l

t h i s i s pervaded by i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y i n a l l i t s a s p e c t s .

Hence, i t i s inde te rmina te . This i s t h e cons idered s o l u t i o n

of vicaspati ~ i d r a t o a l l the ob jec t ions :

~ i r a n b e s ~ i ~ i ga an3dyanirvacanIygvidy> I t a d v a r i n a sarn'arbpitg v i v i d h a prapan58tmanab s=msasy~ iva

kasyacit I meaha agrahafit vibhramah iva, paramirtatastu I I

n a v i b h r a d nima kascit naca oams'iro d m a , k i n t u s ~ v a - #

mztat sarvBupapatt i bh; janatvina anirvacanlyamit i 6 rn

yuktam utpalyimah. *

The above discuss ion as regards the substratum of

a v i d y a g i v e s r i se t o t h e nex t q u e s t i o n rega rd ing t h e p l u r a l i t y

of av idye .

The P l u r a l i t y of Avidya ( ~ v i d y ~ n ~ n ~ t v a ) :

I t is a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d t h a t av idya i s n o t connected

w i t h brahman. but w i t h j i v a s . If avidya were t o be associ-

a t e d w i t h brahman, i t w i l l have t o b e assumed t h a t one and

o n l y brahman i s bo th bound and f r e e . F u r t h e r , i t w i l l have

$0 be assumed t h a t i f one i s r e l e a s e d , . a l l a r e r e l e a s e d .

T h e r e f o r e , i t is j i v a s t h a t a r e a s s o c i a t e d wi th av idya and

i t i s t h e y t h a t a r e r e l e a s e d through vitiya. ' This i s t h e

c o n t e n t i o n of Mendana ~ i i r a . Fol lowing t h i s view p o i n t , I

and s t a t i n g i t i n a d i f f e r e n t form, v;caspati Misra has argued

t h a t av idya has j i v a s a s t h e i r subs t ra tum. Th i s c o n c l u s i o n

can be q u e s t i o n e d on t h e l i n e s of ~ h z s k a r a . e n d o t h e r s . I t

may be asked - i f t h e av idya of ohe i s e r a d i c a t e d by knowledge,

a l l s h o u l d be r e l e a s e d from bondage. T h i s o b j e c t i o n s t a n d s

even i n t h e c a s e of t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t ' a v i d y a has j i v a a s

the s u b s t r a t u m , T h i s o b j e c t i o n i s answered i n two ways by '

V'apaspati ~ 1 : r a .

Firstly he says t h a t atman appears to be many due to

the adjuncts in the form i n the aggregates of buddhi, e t c .

or many as created by avidya . As lonq as the adjunct remains, so long t h e atman remains bound. When it i s re-

moved, he appears t o be released:

A p i t u a v ~ d y ~ ~ a s t h ~ p i t ~ n ~ m buddhyzdi sangh=tzngm b h z d e t , t a d t a d buddhy'adi aanghsta bh8dopSdbna atma ek'opl bhinna i v a , v l d ~ d d 8 ~ i avidudda i v a , t a t a s ~ a ekabuddhy%di sangfatspagame tr tra mutta i v a i t ara tra baddha i v a . . . iti naikamuktou s a r v a mukti prasangab. 7

I Secondly , ~ g c a s p a t i Misra seems t o r e a l i s e t h a t t h e r e

might a r i s e a n o t h e r o b j e c t i o n as: ' i f av idya of one atman

i s removed, t h e n , a l l t h e a d j u n c t s c r e a t e d by avidya should

be d e s t r d y e d . Hence, he comes forward w i t h t h e second

s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem. T h i s i s t h e d o c t r i n e of t h e

p l u r a l i t y of av idya . A t t h e r a t e of one avidya f o r each

j i v a , the p l u r a l i t y of avidya must b e accept'ed:

I Na vayam pradhanava t avidy'lam sarva j i v z s u ekam - acalcpmah'e, enaivam upalabhygmahi, k i n t v i a . p r a t i j ivam b h i d y a t e , t e n a yasyaiva j i v a s y a vidyotpann%, tasy<iva a v i d y z p a n r y a t e , na j i v z n t a r a s y a ; b h i n d d h i k a r a n a y = ? , vidyzvvidyay%h a v i r z d h z t. t a t kutah samas ta sams' laro~~=daprasanga~.

8

Here a g a i n , t h e r e could be a c h a r g e of 'anyGny'.s'raya- ' -

dzfa' o n the ground t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e o f j i v a depends

upon the d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e a d j u n c t s of avidya and t h e

d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e a d j u n c t s of avidya depend 'upon t h e d i f f e r e n c e

i n j i v a s a This object ion is again answered by v j c a s p a t i t

I Misra taking recourse t o his u s u a l argument based on the

beginninglessness like the re la t ion between the seed and

the s p r o u t :

Nafa avidy%pzdhi bhzdadhino j ivabhGdo, j ivabhada- d h l n a s f a avidy'opadhi bh%da iti paraspax5s'ra y=d

u b h a y z s i d d i r i t i szmpratam; an lad i tva t b i j a n k u r a v a d ubhayzsiddeh. 9

With t h i s argument, ~gccssps ti ~ i s ( r a esteblishea the

p l u r a l i t y o f av idya .

I t s h o u l d be n o t e d h e r e t h a t from t h e p o i n t of view of

w o r l d l y e x i s t e n c e , there i s t h e p l u r a l i t y of j i v a s . A t

t h e r a t e o f one for e a c h , t h e r e i s p l u r a l i t y of b o d i e s .

Hence, a s t h e r o o t cause of t h a t p l u r a l i t y , t h e r e s h o u l d be

t h e p l u r a l i t y of avidyas. Thus, i t a p p e a r s t h a t ~ z ~ a s p a t i

~ i l r a has come t o t h i s c o n c l u s f on from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of

what appea r s t o the eye . Hence, he does n o t seem t o

r e a l l s e t h e p l u r a l i t y i t s e l f as t h e p l a y of av idya . Hence, I

t h e f i r s t answer a t t e m p t e d by v ; c a s p a t i Misra t o the q u e s t i o n

'eka muktou s a r v a m u k t i p rasangah ' i s i n c o n f o r m i t y wi6h t h e

a d v a i t a d o c t r i n e . The second answer a p p e a r s t o be an a f t e r -

t h o u g h t b a s e d on t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n s about t h e q u e s t i o n s froh

the s t a n d p o i n t of what appears t o t h e eye.

The Cause of Avidya:

dhat is the cause of avidya? his' question is not I direct ly raised by v:caspati Misra. There is no direct

answer t o t h i s question g i v e n by him. However, it i s possible

t o know a n answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n from some of his s i g n i f i -

c a n t s t a t e m e n t s . He s a y s t h a t av idya i s adhy'asa. H e

s a y s t h a t avidya i s endowed with deep r o o t e d and i n t e n s e

impressions and t h a t i t i s beginningless:

~ t i n i r G d h a n i b i d a v%san~nuviddhga avidy; , vidyaya apa b ' a d h i t i p i p u n a r u d d h a r i s y a t i , p r a v a r t a y h y a t i

@ 10 ca vzsan3di kzryarn s v l c i t a m .

I With t h e s e wards, ~ Z c a s p a t i Misra h a s spoken of adhyssa a s

b e g i n n i n g l e s s . Hence, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t he does

not d i s c u s s a b o u t t h e c a u s e of av idya . However, i t can

be p o i n t e d o u t t h a t k k a n z v i d ~ a means non-apprehension

( a g r a h a n a ) . It is s a i d by ~ z c a s p a t i ~ i : r a t h a t j ivz tman

who i s t h e s u b s t r a t u m of t h e I -no t ion and who i s the b a s i s

for both k5ranSvidya and kzrya'vvidya has been t h e sea t of e

mutual adhyssa and adhyEsa has the j i vz tman a s t h e sourace:

K'arya k ' i r a n a v i d y ~ d v a y a d & r o ahan k'ergspadam sams'ari s a r v ' a n a r t i a sams'srabh3 janam Ji;stva i t a r z t a r z d h f i s o -

pfhdsnah tadup3dZnasca adhyzsah. 11

e

I t i s clear from t h i s s t a t e m e n t t h a t k'ara?;vidya c o n s i s t s i n

non-apprehension of d i f f e r e n c e , I t may be noted h e r e t h a t

10 &&;;,, .1.1.1, p.40. l1 I b i d . , 1.1.1, p.45.

~icasyati ~ i i r a has not used the word IuGdLa' i n the sense I

of material cause. Therelora, it soerns t I r i ~ L i ~ t . accel,ta thc I

view of Mandana Misra t h a t vipary'asa and samskira, being

beginningless, are mutual causes for each other. It is

already pointed out tha t according t o him agrahana and C

viparyayagraha!a a r e r e s p e c t i v e l y k5ran;vidya and kgryzvidya .

Avidya and Avyakrta:

I t is necessary here t o consider a passage of ~h:mati

which r u n s as follows:

Yadyapi m a h 3 p r a ~ a y a s a m a ~ e na anta \karan>dayah samuci3carady:t taya~ s a n t i , t a t h s p i svakPra?e

anirv%{y'ey~rn avidyHylm l l n a ? s 6 k s m ~ n e • . d a k t i r ~ ~ s n a

karma. v i k d ~ ~ a k a vidy'a v 5 s e d b h i b r a h k a t i s t a n t o ' t i . . t'. $a avadhim przpya p a r a m e 4 ~ a r ~ c ~ a I . ~ra::dita?

yath'a kiirmad5he n i l ~ n 5 n y a n g ~ n i t a t ; n i s s a r a n t i yath% I - - vjl varSGdye pr>pta rnf.$hbh'sv;ni rnandeka s a r i r a n i

t a d v g s a n > v a s i t a t a f a ghan3ghana s:ra s a h i t s n i

punarmandcka dhhabhzvam a n u b h a v a n t i , tath: ~ G r v a -

vzsan'a va$?it, p z r v a sam'ena nirna r i ipan i u tpadyan te . 12

I It s h o u l d be considered here a s t o what t h a t s?kgmasakti

rGpa s t a n d s f o r . Does i t s t a n d f o r bh5varup'avidya which

is s p o k e n of by t h e d i f f e r e n t commentators such as t h e a u t h o r

of K a l p a t a r u , e tc . I t may be no ted h e r e t h a t the word

a v i d y i J a k t i o c c u r s i n many p l a c e s i n ~ h z r n a t i ( v i d e Bhamati; -

I P-162, 253, 337, 448). ~ g c a s p a t i Misra has s a i d i n t h o s e

p laces that the world is the result of avidy'as'akti, If t h a t

I assume t h a t hc has accepted mulavidya likr thr! ,~\~t.llor 01.

~ a n ~ a p j d i k a w i t h a dif ferent name. I t i s s u r p r i s i n g t h a t

he has not spoken of this avidy'abakti in h i s commentary on

adhyzsa bhzaya, w h i l e h e h a s spoken abotlt. i t a11 of a sudden

i n t h e m i d d l e of t h e t e x t . T h i s avidy%:akti i s r e f e r r e d

to as 'mayat. v & a s p a t i ~ i d r a h a s said t h a t t h i s avidy=-

shkti is manifold as p e r t a i n i n g t o each j i v a :

N a vayarn p radh%nava t sarvaj0ive:u ekam % ~ a \ s r n a h e , ena ivam upalabhy'emahi, k i n t u iyam p r a t i j lvam b h i d y a t e . 13

As regards a v y % \ ~ t a i.e., t h e u n m a n i f e s t , ~ g 5 a s p a t i I

Misra has e x p r e s s e d some i n t e r e s t i n g o p i n i o n s . F i r s t l y

h e says t h a t the p r a d t ~ z n a of t h p ~ z n k h y s s b e i n g one , every-

t h i n g i s d e s t r o y e d t h r o u g h knowledge. I f i t i s n o t d e s t r o y e d ,

no th ing is destroyed. Then emanci~. )a t inn is t o t a l l y d e n i e d .

T h e r e f o r e , t h e c a u s e of bondage i s t h r o u g h a v i d y a I n t h e

form of t h e non-apprehens ion of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n be tween

p r a k z t i and purufa and e m a n c i p a t i o n c o n s i s t s i n t h e app re -

h e n s i o n of d i f f e r e n c e . Th i s i s w h a t t h e sZnkhy'as a r e f o r c e d

t o s a y . I n t h a t case, w h e r e i s t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r accepting

pradh tna? I s n o t a v i d y a a l o n e s u f f i c i e n t 7

P r a d h z n a s y a ekatvzna tadu$:;de sa rv%feda? anucczde

nav'i k a s y a 5 i t iti an i rm?rk~aprasangah . ~ r a d h ' a n a b h l d e p i

13 .&&, 114.1, p.377.

caitat I aviv'ekakhy'a tila ksan'avidp I asadasa tva nibandhanou bandha m'oksou, @ tarhi krtarn pradh'inena, avidya asadasad-

" 14 bhhv'lbhyarneva t adupapa t t eh , ' *

It is clear from t h a t , according t o him, avidya itself

i s maya o r avy:krta and t h a t avidya i s n o t one b u t many. n

H e s a y s t h a t t h e use of s i n g u l a r number i n referring to

avy%\ta or avy%\$.a i s o n l y Secondary , and t h a t all

a v y ' a b ~ t a s c o n s t i t u t e av idya itself:

~ v i d y ' a t v a n'anztve $a ekatv%paczrah a v y z k t a m i t i c a 1s a v y = \ ~ t a m i t i ca iti.

S e c o n d l y , ' i n a n o t h e r p l a c e , he has s a i d t h a t Brahman

becomes t h e o b j e c t of t h e a c t i v i t y of m o d i f i c a t i o n etc.,

w i t h t h e special fo rms and names b r o u g h t o u t by a v i d y a of

t h e n a t u r e of vy'alccta and avy%tccta:

~ v i d y : k a l i p i t % n a t u nzmar%palak$anzna r"upabh2dena vy'elccte vyabrt 'atman> tat tv%nyatvZbhy=m a n i r v a p a n l y P n a p a r i n a m s d i vyavah%r3spadatvam brahma p r a t i p a d a y a t e . 16 . According t o t h i s s t a t e m e n t , a v y > k r t a has i t s form .

I Crea ted by a v i d y a . ~ z ~ a s p a t i Mis ra has a l r e a d y s a i d t h a t

the w a t e r i n a mirage i s i n d e t s r m i n a te ( a n i r v a c a n i y a ) . There-

f o r e it i s n o t clear as t o what e x a c t l y i s h i s s t a n d a s

regards a v i d y e end evy%lcfta. Does h e s u b s c r i b e t o t h e view

avidya i t s e l f is avy=kr tp o r i s h e i n f a v o u r of t h e v iew . t h a t avy=$?ta is created by av idya and t h a t a v i d y a b e i n g

many, avfikrta is also. many, @ t

Thi rd ly , it may be noted that, he seems t o assert the

view tha t avyakta is created by avidya. This i s what we

can make ou t when he says t h a t maya is name and form

brought about by v i kiipasamsk3ra accumulated before c r e a t i o n

and by layalak$a?&ridya which happens t o be t h e cause and

that t h e r e can be no o b j e c t i o n whatsoever because creation

i s brought about by t h e i n f l u e n c e of maya. Crea t ion

being aparamzrtha does not s t a n d i n need of a param'artha

cause as i t e a u x i l l a r y . Fo r t h e imaginary c r e a t i o n there

is t h e a u x i l l a ' r y c a u s e i n t h e form of t h e imaginary maya:

Ai ~ g r a n a b h c t a ~ a layalak?an3vidyay% prallsarg5pac i t h a ca vik~epasamskSrena y a t pra tyupas thzpi tam tad8va may. tadavedena as;. adhylsya aralcf.tpratyuktstv'.t.. . niyam s f s t i h v a s t u m a t i ena a d v a i t i n a ? vas tuso tah d v i t l y a r ya i b h 3 v a t anupeyu j y h a , k%lpanikyam t u * ?rs t o u a a t i k 5 l p a n i kam dv i t lyam sah'ayam m~yhay'am. 17

I f we compare t h i s s t a t e m e n t w i t h t h e two s t a t ements

quoted above, it becomes clear t h a t l a y a l a k f a n j v i d y a and

~ i k k e ~ a a a m s k g r a b r i n g abou t maya. S i n c e , it i s s a i d t~ be

imaginary, t h e v iew t h a t avyzlcfta i s created by, avidya is

i t s e l f s u b s t a n t i a t e d . Then, i t should be assumed t h a t

i d e n t i t y between rvy>krta and avidya i s on ly metaphor ica l .

Thus, as ..pards t h e r e l a t i o n between avidya and a v y % k ~ t a

0s maye, v j c a s p a t i ~ i & r s reems to express two views.

According to one view, avidya and avy'akrta are one and the b I

same. According t o the second view, a v y 5 k r t a i s caused m m

by avidya. v+aspati ~i:ra seems t o l a y greater emphasis

on the latter view,

Brahman as the object of avidya:

v;$aspati ~ i i r a has c l e a r l y s t a t e d the Vivar tavzda

by t a k i n g t h e i n s t a n c e of * b u k t i r a j a t a ' and Ira jjusarpa* . J u s t as the conchshe l l i s t h e cause of knohledgs of t h e

f a l s e s i l v e r and the rope i s t h e cause of the knowledge of

t h e false snake, so i s Brahman t h e cause of t h e world which

i s j u s t a n appearance. This he s t a t e s i n s e v e r a l c o n t e x t s .

1) ~ a t h % r a j jva j n i n a sahet; ra j jcp'adhanadh'ara ra j jv%m saty'amrst i , r a j jv%meva $9 l i y a t e evam av idygsah i t a brahm8pZdZnam j a g a t brahmanygev=sti, t a t r a i v a $a l I y a t e iti siddham. 1 8

Concluding h i s commentary on t h e bh;:ya under t h e

~anrngdisztra he says t h a t just a s t h e rope accompanied by

the n e s c i e n c e of rope forms t h e m a t e r i a l cause for t h e

Cogni t ion of s i l v e r which co -ex i s t s w i t h t h e rope and merges

into it, so i s the brahman a l o n g with nesc i ence i s t h e

material cause of t h e world which exists i n it and a b s o r b s ,

i n t o it.

Thus, in the ikiatyadhikaraty he says that the knowers

of Brahman t h i n k t h a t the world has a sentient material

cause charged w i t h the potency of the indeterminate and

b e g i n n i n g l e a s n e s c i e n c e .

3) ~=ks=$:a 'ekamev>dvitTyam', ' n'aha n'anzst i k i n ~ a n a ' , '?r.ty%Q s a In~tyumihpn8ti. ityadibhirbahubhi9 vecbbhi: brahn@ttriktr@ya prapanSarya pratlhidat 9etan~b#danarneva j a g a t , bhujanga i v l r c p i t o rajjGp5dZnah iti s iddhantah . 20

I n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e ik8atyadhikarana itself h e s a y s

t h a t t h e world h a s a s e n t i e n t m a t e r i a l c a u s e s i n c e t h e world

a p a r t from Brahman i s ruled out by such srt i s t a t e m e n t s

a s l e k a m " e v ~ d v i t i y a m l , 'nzha n a n s s t i k i y a n a ' , ' y5ty 'o~ sa

?~tyudbpn"ot i ' . I t i s l i k e t h e superimposed serpent w i t h

the rope as i ts material cause.

I Thus, ~!~asi~ati Mirra h a s clearly s t a t e d the Vivarta-

v i d a i n s e v e r a l c o n t e x t s .

I It may appear to a superficial v i e w t h a t v;$aspati Misra

speaks of e v i d y 5 d a k t i as t h e material cause of the world.

but, a c a r e f u l study of h i s ~ h = m a t i would show t h a t h e i s

not c l e a r l y in favour of t h e v i e w t h a t a v i d f a i a k t i is

direct ly t h e cause of t h e world. ~t i s t h e r e f o r e , necessary

to consider th is point in the light of his statements,

He an t i c ipa t e s an objection as t o how brahman could be the

cause of the world while it is proper t o consider avidya

which' is unmodified, d u l l and indeterminate as t h e cause

of the world. As a g a i n s t t h i s ob jec t ion , h e urges t h a t

the wor ld i s n o t t h e ' p a r i n k n a ' of brahman b u t t h e ' v i v a r t a '

of brahman. There i s no ru l e t h a t illusion (bhrama) s h o u l d

e x c l u s i v e l y depend upon e x t e r n a l s i m i l a r i t y . S e v e r a l

i l l u s i o n s a r i s e o u t of the menta l d i s l o c a t i o n s such as

p a s s i o n , anger, f e a r , madness, dream, e t c . , w i t h o u t depend-

ing upon o u t e r s i m i l a r i t y . F u r t h e r , i t may be asked as

t o why adhy3sa which i s w i t h a c a u s e assumes such a fo rm,

b u t there i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a n o b j e c t i o n a s regards

t h e i l l u s i o n i n t h e f o r m of t h e world which has been c a u g h t

i n t h e s t r e a m of b e g f n n i n g l e s s a v i d y a and i t s i m p r e s s i o n s .

T h e r e f o r e , brahman b e i n g t h e s u b s t r a t u m of a v i d y % a k t i i s

i t s e l f t h e c a u s e of t h e wor ld t h r o u g h avidya. It c a n n o t

be s a i d t h a t a v i d y a d a k t i i s t h e c a u s e of t h e world:

N a k h a l u bZhya s a r c p a s y a n i b a n d h a d eva s a r v z v ibhrana? I

iti n iyamanimi t t am a s t i , a n t a r a d a p i k3makr'odha b h a y a n d d a svapnxdzh m"anasZdhapar3dhat s a r c p y a anap'Lkf'et t a s y a t a s i a v ibhramesya da r i an ' a t . Api $a h = t u m a t l vibhram% tadabh%v"a anuy6gb yujyate.

Anzdyavidfa tadvzsan 'a prav=hapa t i t a s t u nSnuy5gamarhati. T a s m 3 t p a r a m a r t h a v i v a r t a t a y a pxapan~a! t a d y g n i ~ , b h u j a n g a i v a r a j j u v i v a r t a t a y a tady%nih n a t u t a t ~ a r i n g m a t a y a . 21

21 , 1.2.21, p.257.

Here Comes the question as regards the substratum of

avidya. I t i s s a i d in the bhlgya t h a t brahman is the

sub st rat^ of avidya and t h a t avidya i s s u b o r d i n a t e t o

brahman. v;:aspati is of the clear opinion that

j i v a s are the substratum o f av idya , b u t n o t brahman. Hence,

the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s a s t o how he unders tands t h e s t a t e m e n t s

i n t h e bh=tya. By way of i l l u s t r a t i n g how h e unders t ands

t h e bh2i:ya s t a t e m e n t s i n t h i s r e g a r d , t h e fo l lowing i n s t a n c e

can be taken . T h e bh'i:ya makes an o b s e r v a t i o n t h u s :

~ v i d y % t m i k z h i bf j a i a k t i ? a v y s k t a dabda nird%daaya param'obvar'a&ray% r n ~ y ~ m a y ~ mahHsupti?. Yasmin saritpa p r a t i b 5 d h a r a h i tah ;= ra te s a m i a r i n z jxvah. 22

Taking t h e p r a t i k a of parame$var5draya v7aparpati I

Misra s a y s t h a t t h e i n s e n t i e n t o b j e c t c a n n o t perform any

a c t i v i t y w i t h o u t t h e s u p p o r t ( a d h i s t h t n a ) of t h e s e n t i e n t

one. T h e r e f o r e , a v i d y a i n o r d e r t o perform i t s a c t i v i t y

depends on pa rami&ara a s t h e m a t e r i a l and i n s t r u m e n t a l cause.

J u s t as t h e r o p e i s t h e a d h i s t h z n a so i s i i v a r a the a d h i s t h z n a

f o r t h e i l l u s i o n i n t h e 'form of t h e world. This b e i n g t h e

case, t h e r o p e i s t h e ucadsna f o r t h e i l l u s i o n of t h e s e r p e n t ,

SO is the i l v e r a t h e up%da'ne of t h e world i l l u s i o n . ~ l t h o u g h

avidya has j i v a as its s u b s t r a t u m , t h e bh>!ya says t h a t I

i t h a s i e v a r a as i t s s u b s t r a t u m because i t depends upon h i m '

f o r t ts own rake and hav ing him as i t s o b j e c t . When it is '

s a i d t h a t avidy. i s for t h e i l v e r a , i t d o e s n o t mean t h a t

I isvara is the substraturn of avidya, because brahaan being

of the nature of vidya cannot be regarded as the repository

of avidya:

~ararnes'var'ash~eti nahyaGtanam cetanPdhistitern kzryay; p a r y a s t a m i t i , svak5ryem kartum parame8varam n i m i t t a t a y a upzdsnataya $a = $ r a y a t e , prapanFa vibhrawsya h i i i v ' e r a d h i s t l n a t v a a a p i vibhrernasy&a ra j jvadh i s th=nahvam, t i n a yath'la h i vibhram3 ra jjip8dSna; evam prapanpa vibhrarnah i s ' ~ a r = ~ a ' d ~ n e ? , tasmzt j i v ' e d h i k a r a ? ~ p y a v i d y ~ nimi t tb tay; vigayatay 'a

I ca i l ~ a r i m a d r a ~ a t e i t r a i t y u t f y a t e , 6e tvadh ' a ra tay i , v i d y a svabhzve brahmaqi tadanupa- p a t t'et. 23

Thus, a c c o r d i n g t o v;caspati ~ i s r a , t h e s u b s t r a t u m of

avidya i s the j i v a , b u t n o t brahman. The j i v a s are many

and a c c o r d i n g l y a v i d y z s a r e many and t h e consequent

avy'alcctas a re many. A l l these d i s p l a y t h i s world f o l l o w i n g

brahman a s t h e n i m i t t a . T h i s i s the c o n c l u s i o n of v z ~ a s p a t i I M i s r a l s view. Some q u e s t i o n s may arise here. The f i r a t

q u e s t i o n i s as t o how one can t h i n k of t h e freedom of t h e

brahman. Second ly , a v i d y 5 s being many shou ld n o t the worlds

a r i s i n g from them be a l s o many? These q u e s t i o n s remain t

unanswered in I3h=matj.. Hence, the o p i n i o n of Vla$aspati Misra

has g i v e n rise t o f u r t h e r d e b a t e on the q u e s t i o n .

[elation between Brahman and Jagat;

the cause in the form of brahman. It may be asked hzre an

t o whether this is n o t opposed t o 'satk'aryavida' . The

answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n is in the n e g a t i v e , because, brahman

which i a p r i o r ( e x i r t s n t ) aarumeo t h e form of t h e e f f e c t

which i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e :

~i irvasiddhasyBpi anirvapanlya vik8r8tman'a parinzma?, a n i x v a c a ~ i y a t v ~ t bhhdena abhinna i v a s i d d h a s y i p i ssdhyatvam i t y a r t h a h . 24

The e x i s t e n c e of t h e cause i s i t s e l f t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e

e f f e c t . Therefore, t h e kz rya ( e f f e c t ) i s always e x i s t i n g

i n t h e form of t h e c a u s e i t se l f . Since, i t i s i n d e t e r m i n a t e

i n i t s own form, i t i s n o t born e i t h e r from s a t or from

a s a t . Therefore , there i s no harm done t o ' 'satk%ryav=da' .

Evam ga kiraqasatta eva k'aryasyasatt'a, ria t a t 5 any;, iti katham t a d u t p a tt'e? pr% k s a t i k ' a r a n ~ l ~ n a ~ a t ~ a s ~ t ? S v a x c p i n a t u u t p a t t ' e p pr '&gutpannasya i h v a s t a s y a v j

sadasa tv ibhy 'am ani rv 'acyasya na s a t a h a r a t a ) v'r u t p a t t i - r i t i n i r v i k a y a h satk'.ryavZda pratibeda? i t y a r t h a ? . 25

Hete, a n o b j e c t i o n may arise. I n t h a t case, i s t h e r e

no P o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e effect s t i c k i n g t o

brahutan at the time of t h e a n n i h i l a t i o n of t h e world? T h i s

question i s answered in t h e negative on t h e ground t h a t t h e

24 .&&g., 1.4.27, p.428. 25 I b i d . , 1.4.3, -p.378.

effect is created by avidya, Just as the essential form of the superimposed s i l v e r i s the conchshel l and the conch-

shell is not silver, similarly the ultimate reality is

brahman o n l y and t h e world which i s superimposed on it i s

n o t t h e brahman and brahrnan i s not the world i n the u l t i m a t e

a n a l y s i s :

Y a d i k k y a a y a avibhzgak kzrape, katham kzryadharmz- r z p a ~ a m k'sryasya i t y a t a =ha - asamyatv-e p i iti.

Yath3 r a j a t a s y a a x o p i t a s y a p'eramartikam rtpam l u k t i h , I 26 naca s u k t i r a j a t a m , evam%va idamapi i t y a r t h a ? .

I t may b e asked h e r e as t o why t h e world is reborn

a f t e r a n n i h i l a t i o n . The answer i s t h a t t h e r eason f a r i t

i s t h e f a c t of avidy%s 'akt i be ing r e s t r i c t e d :

~ v i d y ' a d a k t e r n i y a t a t v % t utpa t t i n i y a m a h a . i t y a r t h e ? . 27

I t may be f u r t h e r a s k e d a s t o why t h o s e t h a t are l i b e r a t e d

shou ld n o t be b o r n a g a i n . The answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i s

t h a t , t h o s e t h a t a r e l i b e r a t e d are n o t born a g a i n because

t h e i r i l l u s o r y knowledge and i t s po tency a re t o t a l l y destroyed

by r i g h t knowledge:

26 &&, 2.1.7, p.447. 27 I b i d , , 2.1.9, p.447. 2 8 ,u., 2.1.9, pp. 448-49.

On the re la l i o n between brallnlan and jaga t.

answers give rise t o some more questions. He has answered

those questions also.

Firstly, t h e paramltman must be aware of that he himself

are t h e jivss. Then, if j i v z s a r e s u b j e c t e d t o bondage,

does it n o t mean t h a t h e h a s s u b j e c t e d h imsel f t o bondage? I

~ z ~ a s p a t i Misra answers t h i s question i n ' t h e n e g a t i v e o n

the ground t h a t param"atman knows t h a t they do not rea l ly

possess joy o r sorrow:

.. . param5tma t u ztmana; abhinnarn anubhava t i . Anubhave s z r v a j n y a vysgh=tah , taLhZ :a ayam jrvam, badhnan ZtrnZinameva b a d h n l y z t . . . sa tyam, ayam

param'atma s8rva j n y a t v a t yathwa j Ivan vastuta ) s tmanap 4 abhinnarn p a s y a t i , pas!yati evam n'abhzvata; =&am sukha

d u t ~ b $ z d i vidanasangah asti a v i d y ~ v a $ i t t u etam t e d v a t 29 abhirnana iti.

8

SecondJ.y, i t i s asked as t o how I s v a r a c r e a t e s t h e world

without any m a t e r i a l a t his disposal? ~ a c a s p a t i ~ i : r a answers

this o b j e c t i o n by s a y i n q t h a t i n t h e uJ.timate a n a l y s i s H e

does n o t c r e a t e at all. He need n o t h a v e any e x t e r n a l

material whi le creating the world f rom h i s e x t e r n a l nature

omnisc ience c o v e r e d w i t h av idya . The m i l k i t s e l f becomes .

the curds. The gods are known t o assume s e v e r a l b o d i e s .

S imi la r ly , he c r e a t e s h i m s e l f w i th t h e material t h a t happens

29 Ibid,, 2.1.22, p.472.

t o be the ssed of i n d e i ~ m l n a t e nanle and form:

Yadi ku l3 l id iva t a tyanta vya tirikta sahakzrikfra$- bh'avst a n u p i d h a t v a n sjdhyete t a t a ? k l i r ~ d i b h i ?

vyabhicira? t i p i h i b'ihya cbtan'ldi kiraninap 'ekra eva k a l a p a r i v a s a vadena svata eva parininin;ararn ' a s sdayan t i . A t r a a n t a r a k~ran'.na~ek:etvarn h=tu{ kriyate. tada-

s iddham a n i r v g c y a n'amaripa bl jasahaya t v%t . 30

The t h i r d q u e s t i o n i s - Is i t t h a t brahman i n i t s

e n t i r i t y becomes t h e wor ld o r o n l y a p a r t of it becomes t h e

world? I The answer g i v e n by ~ z : a s p n t i Misra is t h a t brahman

r e m a i n s as it i s and t h e world a p p e a r s a s created by avidya .

Brahman here becomes t h e s u b j e c t of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i n t h e

fo rm of parinsma e t c . , t h r o u g h t h e d i f f e r e n e e i n terms of

name and form c r e a t e d by avidya:

Nanu na brahrnanah t a t t v a t a b parinzmo yena kSf..snya bhlga vlkalp%n; i k s i p y ' e t a , avidy$ k a l p i t e n a tu nima r u p a l a ksan; r upa bhsdena. . . par inzmzdi vyavah%rgspadat-

31 vam brahma p r a t i p a d y a t e .

T h i s c a n be explained w i t h t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n of a dream. J u s t

a s t h e a tmen e x p e r i e n c i n g a dream c r e a t e s t h e c h a r i d t e t c . ,

t h r o u g h i t s mind w i t h o u t hampering i t s own n a t u r e , s i m i l a r l y

brahman c r e a t e s the wor ld th rough a v i d y a w i t h o u t hampering

i t s own essential n a t u r e :

SvapnatFgGtma h i mznasaiva svar'upinupamard'ona rathzdin s r j a t i . 32

a I

. A > . " 7 '

30 .&&, 2.1.23, p.474. 31 -- Ibid I 2.l.26, p.475.

This i l lustrat ion is in support of the statement in

the bhssya that: a

Tatvaikasrnin a p i brahmani ~ v a r b ~ ~ n u p a m a r d e n a i v a

an'ek3klra srstih 8 1 8 bhavis;atiti. 33

F o u r t h l y , i t i s asked, what is t h o purpose wi th which f

I s v a r a c r e a t e s ? The answer a e g i v e n by ~ B c a s ~ a t i ~ i i r a i s

t h a t there i s a b s o l u t e l y no purpose s e r v e d by t h e creation

of b e g i n n i n g l e a s avidya, because, t h e r e is no c r e a t i o n i n t h e

u l t i m a t e a n a l y s i s :

Yadi p r e k s l v a t p r a y f t t i . p r a y % j a n i v a s t a y a ~ y ; ~ t S b h a v e t . . . nayam p ' a ramzr th ik i srstib b anuyu jyZta prayGjsnam, a p l t u anzdyavidyznibandha& Avidy; ca svabhzvata eva

' 34 kzryonmukhi, na janam a p ' e k ~ a t e .

I T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n of v:caspati Misra i s w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e

I b h a r y s on ' ~ 5 k d v a t t u f i l ~ k a i v a l ~ s r n ' .

F i n a l l y , i t i s objected t h a t i l v a r a i n c r ~ a t i n g t h ~ world

should be regarded as p a r t i a l and c r u e l . I t i s urged t h a t I

Isvara s h o u l d n o t be r e g a r d e d as t h e k i r a q a because he would

be 8ubjected t o 'vailarnyahotel a s h e i s t o be r ega rded as

endowid w i t h h a t r e d and p a r t i a l i t y i n caus ing t h e j i v z s t o do

good or bad deeds and lead them t o heaven o r h e l l . T h i s - I

q u e s t i o n is a v e r t e d by ~ ; $ a s p a t f Misra on t h e ground t h a t

1s)vara cannot, have any val(anyad5!a w h i l e c r e a t i n g t h e world -.-.

34 I b i d . , 2.1.33, pp,48&482.

which cannot be determined in its nature, j u s t in the same / manner i n which a magician does not have any Viiramyr e t c . ,

w i t h regard t o the objects of h i s own creations

1 I I s v a r a esa dv'esa ~ a k g a a t i b h ~ a m sidhvas'adhuni tarm%ni klarayitva svargam narakam v'a lokam n a y a t i , tasm'at

~&rnyad8~aprasang%t na i ; v a r a ~ kirapsrn it1 v'.$yam virGdhZt. . . anirvi ic iS t u s r a t i h na psasmartsvyam a t r g p i . ath hi ca may. k%ryena anga s0akalya vaikelya bh-edena v i S i t r i n przninah dardayato na ~airbm~adosah, &has3 . 1

samharato n%ire Aairghrunyam, evam asyzp i bhagavata! b

v iv idha v l c i trs prapancem anirv%cyam vis'vam c i a r i a ~ a t a semharstasia svabh'av~d'v'a lmilay> va na k a a c i t ~ i ' o ~ a : . ~ 2

I The above d i s c u s s i o n by a c a s p a t i Misra i n r a i s i n g

o b j e c t i o n s and answerinq them i t i s c l e a r t h a t he makes use

of h i s theory of ' a n i r ~ % ~ ~ ~ v i d ~ a ' very e f f e c t i v e l y . I n

d o i n g so, he makes h i s th ink ing a k i n t o the thinking of 1

Mandana Misra.

Relation between Brahman and ~ i v z s :

Atman i s ever free. He has no bondage. tluddhi e t c . ,

are i n s e n t i e n t ( j a d a ) . Hence they do n o t have bondage.

Buddhi e t c . , a r e created by a v i d y a . Atman who ' i s bound by

t h e re la t ion w i t h buddhi e t c . , t h e c r e a t i o n s of avidya i s

c a l l e d jiva. It is t h i s j i v a t h a t i s subjected t o bondage

and I (k-sa+ion:

Na ~ a r a d t m a n o mukti sarnsirou, tasya nitvemuktatv'at, N;P~ buddhyidi sangh'itasya, tasyac'atanatv'at. Apitu

u

a v i d ~ t ~ a s t h s p i t h a r n buddhy'adi sangfat~nam bh'edat t a d t ad buddhyldi sangh'ate bhedzpddhana a tmai k8pi bhinna iva viludd'opi avisbdda i v a t a t a sca ika buddhfbdi

sanghat 'apagame t a tra mukta i v a i t ara tra baddha i v a y a t h a m a n l ~ ~ u p ~ n ~ d y u p a d h i bhzdad ekam&amukham dTxghsmiva, y f t t i m i v s , samamiva, avad'.tamiva anya t - pzdhgna vigame muktamiva, a n y a t r z p a h i t a m i v a it1 naikamuktou s e r v a m u k t i ' p r a s a n g a ~ . Tasmi't na. param'atmeni

d k s a sams'arou, n z p i buddhy'adi sangh'atasya, kintu 1

buddhyzdyupahi tas a z tmasvabhavasya jivabhsvam S p a n n a s ~ a i t i param2rtha:. ax

I These a r e t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s of ~ s c a s p a t i Misra on t h e

bhzsya s t a t e m e n t ; ' ' ~ v i d y ; , p r s t y u p a s t h = p i t a t < a t k a r t r t v a

I t i s clear from t h i s t h a t j l v a t v a i s o n l y superimposed

on the atman. Atmen i s n e i t h e r bound nor l i b e r a t e d . H e

i s e v e r free. The q u e s t i o n of bondage and l i b e r a t i o n does

n o t a r i s e i n the case of buddhi e t c . , because t h e y are

insentient. The states of bondage and l i b e r a t i o n a r e app l ic -

a b l e ta j i v a o n l y . Although t h e atman i s one , j i v g 8 a r e many

T h i s is due t o t h e v e i l of buddh i , e t c . , brought a b o u t by

a v i d y a . On a c c o u n t of t h i s v e i l , one atman a p p e a r s a s many.

The p u r e one appears a s impure. When one u n i t of t h e *

aggregate of buddhi e t c . , i s removed, t h e n t h e atman appears , ,

as lidera'ted it were, e l sewhere h e appears a s i f h e is boun . . , , , , ., , ,,, , ,,

36 . ,;&&$*,,, ;:@;,3.4, p.6170

Just as one and the same face appears as many, as long , as

round, as black, as white, e t c . , due t o the d i f f e r e n c e of

r e f l e c t i n g materials such as, a gem, .sword, etc. , similarly

t h e atman appears t o be l i b e r a t e d when one of the covers of

buddhi e t c . , i s removed and a p p e a r s e l sewhere as bound due

t o t h e v e i l of a n o t h e r u n i t of buddhi e t c . This shows t h a t

t h e o b j e c t i o n based on 'ekamuktou sarva muktih' i s n o t t e n a b l e .

In o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t j i v a t v a i s an appearance I super imposed on brahman, ~ z c a s ~ a t i M i s t a has g i v e n s e v e r a l

i l l u s t r a t i o n s . One of them i s t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n ' o f t h e

r e f l e c t i o n of t h e moon i n t h e v e s s e l s f i l l e d with water . The

o r b of t h e moon r e f l e c t e d in t h e v e s s e l s f i l l e d w i t h w a t e r

a p p e a r s t o have motion. This mot ion i s not r ea l , b u t c r e a t e d

o n a c c o u n t o f t h e i l l u s i o n due t o t h e motion of w a t e r i n t h e

v e s s e l . S i m i l a r l y the p r o p e r t i e s such as buddhi e t c . , a re

a t t r i b u t e d t o j i v a s :

~ d a ~ a r ~ v ' a d ~ a d ~ a s t h a s Y a i v a candramasa? bimbasya t i y a

kamce kampsn'adhy'ssa? i tyup ;pad~tam adhy&b bhlqye . T a t h i $a buddhy%dyup~dhikr tam . . a s y a j i v a t v a m l t i buddi? anta? karanbeyanutaya & p i anuvyapad8$a bhjk bh;vst i ,

nabha iva k e r a k z p a h i t a m kara ka parim%?am. 37

. Thus, v Z c a r p a t i ~ i d r a e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t j i v a t v a is on ly - . .

suPeri,mposed .on brahman and it i s t h i s j i v a t h a t i s s u b j e c t e d

t o bondage and l i b e r a t i o n . From a n o t h e r p o i n t of view he

observes tha t j i v a is an amla of brahman. What i s meant by

arndatva is adh lna tva , t hus , j ive remains subse rv i en t t o

brahman. On the disappearance of the adjunct of av idya ,

jivas ge t absorbed in brahman, just as the reflection of an

o b j e c t become~absoxbed i n t o the o b j e c t when t h e ad junc t s of

r e f l e c t i o n Such a s gem, sword, e t c . , a r e destroyed. I n

o t h e r words, whatever t h a t i s a t t r i b u t e d t o the pratibimb%s

( r e f l e c t i o n s ) d i s a p p e a r and t h e a b j e c t (bimba) has nothing t o

do w i t h a11 those a s s o c i a t i o n s . S i m i l a r l y , the a t t r i b u t e s

of buddhi e t c . , are c r e a t e d by avidya a r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

j i v z s . They have noth ing t o do wi th brahman. Therefore ,

a l l t h e s e appearances of j i v a are superimposed on brahman:

Pratibirnbanam iva d y ~ m a t a w a d i t e r d i t i ? J ivanirneva nava v%da n a d i sambandha? , brahmaqas tu bimbasy%va natadabhisambandhah. ~ a t h ; $a darpan=panayane t a d pxatibimbam bimba bhave a v s t i s t a t e , ;a ?:p;ne p r a t i -

bimbitamapi. Evam avidy'opgdana vigame j i v e brahma-

bhgvami t i siddham jive brahmamfa i v a t a t t a n t r e t a y a 38

natvalma iti t l t p a r y = r t h a Q .

I I t should not be mistaken h e r s t h a t v;$aspati Misra iq i n

f avour of t a d s m ? i b h a v a between j i v e and brahman, because I

amsatv. .rant by him i s o n l y adhlna tva . He has taken bimba-

pratibimbabh'.va o n l y a s a n i l l u s t r a t i o n t o show t h a t both

b b a t v a a n d pratibimbbattva are superimposed on brahman. H e

af38ert6 t h a t jivis are created through t h e d i v e r s i t y of

xb$&+,,, . 2';. 3.43. p. 623.

adjuncts, on the basis of this concept ion, j iv% are sa id

t o have emerged from brahman and t h a t brahman is the subs tratua

of j ivas:

Atmaiva bhavatl j i v a pr;?fdhinarn adhikara~am, n z n y a d i t i . Yadyapi $a jiv; nitmano b h i d y a t e , t a th 'api up'idyava$qinnasye paramlgtrnano j i v a t v i n a

upgdhi bhidad bh3daoar'opya 'adhar'adheyabh?lvo !:as tavyah. Evan ga j ~ v s b h a v a n a d h a r a t v a m a d - dana tvam :a paramztmanah upapannam. 39

Thus , i t is clear t h a t paraGatman i s the bdhara of jiv% in

t h e sense t h a t t h e y a p p e a r on brahman o r t h e y a re super-

imposed o n brahman.

I From a n o t h e r p o i n t of view. 6 c a s p a t i Miara says t h a t

paramztman i s l i k e the bimba and t h a t j i v a s a r e l i k e the

pra t ib imb'as . What i s t h e upsdh i of t h e p ra t ib imbgs? The

u p s d h i i s o b v i o u s l y av idya . Al though t h i s upZdhi i s n o t

found i n brahman, i t i s , assumed t h a t i t i s i n brahman through

t h e jiv'rs:

~ v i d ~ 6 ~ i d a ' n a m :a yadyap i vidyz svabh'rve param>tnmni na s%kssdasti, t a t h z p i t a t p r a t i b i m b a k a l p a j i v a - d v k e n a parasmin utyate.

40

Some question* are raised and answered by ~ l c a r p a t i ~ i : r a

The f i r $ t q u e 8 t i o n i s f o r whose s a k e i s t h e maya created by . .

Isvar.7 This q u e c t i o n is asked because j i v % d i d n o t e x i s t . , . . .

39 . 1 ' : . , , " ' , , , ,, ' 1 . .

=&, 1.4.16, p.407. - * I Ibid 2.3.40, p.618.

then. This ques t ion is answered by v;caspati ~ i l r a by taking I

recourse t o his d o c t r i n e of 'sarnska an'%ditvat:

Ata eve k'an uddidya e l s idvarb +y3m zracayati , a n a r t h i k h ? ~ d d e d ~ a ' n a m sarg'adou jiv'anam a b h ~ v a t ,

katham $a itmanam sams'arinam v i v i d h a viidan'abhajarn k u r y i t ? I tyzdyanuyogo n i ravak3da t . Na khalu id iman sambra? , n z p i zdfman avidya j i v a vibhzga) y i n a

a n u y u j y b a . 41

Secondly, it may be asked whether j i v a i s t h e m o d i f l -

I c a t i o n (vik"aaa) of brahman? On t h i s q u e s t i o n , V z c a s p a t i Misra

f o r m u l a t e s his answer by s a y i n g t h a t j i v a is neither different

from brahman nor m o d i f i c a t i o n of brahman and t h a t atrnan himself

i s imagined t o be j i v a on a c c o u n t of t h e a d j u n c t of avidya. I

Here, t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n of t p a r a ~ k ' a : a ' and 'ghat%k"asa' i s I

a p p r o p r i a t e . ~ k ~ s ' a is regarded as ghat%k;la and manik=k%sd

on a c c o u n t of the d e l i m i t a t i o n of g h a t a and r n a ~ i k a . The

g h a t s k i & etc . , are n o t d i f f e r e n t from parern'ak'ada nor a r e they

m o d i f i c a t i o n s of it. S i m i l a r l y , j i v % s a r e nef t h e r d i f f e r e n t

from brahman nor m o d i f i c a t i o n s of brahman. The emergence of

jiv'atmans i s the emergence o f param'atman himself because they

are d i f f e r e ' n t from the brahman:

Na j l v a h 3trna<o anyap, n i p i t a d v i k k a ? , k i n t u m atmaiv.' avidy"$hda'na kalpi t2vacc 'edah, s rkah i v a

ihat*manifidf kalpi t%va$$zdo g h a t t k i d o , m a ? i k i k h b n d f ~ ~ a ; ~ & k % $ ~ d anyat, t a d v i k 5 r o ve , t a t a s g a

. , , ,

41 us, 1.4.12, p.421.

j ivitmanarupakramah pararnitmanaiva upakramanah, ' 42 I 1 tasya tatah abh'edat.

I

Using the same illustration of mahsk'aia and ghat 'akib,

. I ~ i ~ a s ~ a t i Mlsra observes t h a t avidya and i t s deep rooted

impressions form the upzdhi. This u c d h i is a beginningless

stream t h a t is f l o w i n g c o n t i n u o u s l y . Just a s ghat%k%s'a i s ~ a r t e d from t h e mah'dkda end known, similarly j i v e s h o u l d be

p a r t e d f rom brahrnan and known:

~ a t h 5 g h a t ~ k i s d n'erna ne pararn%kis'ed anyak. ~ t a :a a n y a i v a y%ad gha t a m a n u v a r t a t e . Naclbsou durviv 'ecah, t a d u p z d e h g h a t a s y a v i v i k t a t v ' a t . ~ v a m ' a n ~ d y s n i r v a ~ a r ? i ~ ' a v i d y i up id5na bhed6pa'dhlkalpit; jiv'o na v a s t u t a h param'atman"o b h i d y a t e tadufadyudbhzvena abhibhav:bhy\m c a udbhit ta i v a a b h i b h t t a i v s p ra t ' Iya te . . . t a t a s p a ;"idy= t s d v ~ a a n ~ p % d e h anad' i taya k ~ r y a k ; r a n i b h ~ v e n a

43 p r a v a h a t a h s u v i v z k t a v ~ a iti.

Thus f i e a s p a t i ~ i : r a e s t a b l i s h e s t h e view t h a t j i v z s

a r e neither d i f f e r e n t from brahman n o r t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n s of

brahman. They a r e c e r t a i n super imposed n o t i o n s on brahman

created by t h e b e g i n n i n g l e s s and i n d e t e r m i n a t e av idya .

Brahman i s l i k e t h e bimba and j ivGs a r e l i k e t h e pratibimb'as.

Both t h e b imba tva and p r a t i b i m b a t v a a r e superimposed on

beahman. +Jiv;~ a r e f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r e d by him a s t h e a m k s

of brahman I n t h e sense t h a t t h e y are s u b o r d i n a t e t o brahman-

When one u n i t of b t ~ d d h i e t c . , c r e a t e d by av idya a r e removed

42 J a d . , 1.4.22, p.416. 43 Ibid., 3.2.9, p.705.

. t h e jivabh'ava connected w i t h that is also removed. This

only s!~ows t h a t j i v a is not different from brahman. It i s

known as different from brahman only through the difference

created by avidya just as g h a t ~ k a t a is known as d i f f e r e n t

from param'ek~da. It is further to be noted here tha t

V Z p a s p a t i ~ i d r s ' b r i n g s in the d o c t r i n e of serns=ra an5dltva

in explaining many of t h e c r u c i a l p o i n t s i n the c o n c e p t i o n

of j i v h and their r e l a t i o n w i t h brahman.

Although vscaspati ~ i s ) r a has not given much importance a

t o the analysis of 'avasth'atraYa1 (ja'grat, svapna and

s u ? u p t i ) a s found i n t h e bhxsya of ~ l n k a r a and t h e f i r t i k a

of ~ u r P & a r a . y e t , h e has e l u c i d a t e d t h e concepts of svapna

and su:upti i n a manner t h a t i s original to h i m .

I F i r s t l y , a c c o r d i n g t o v;$aspati Misra svapna i s a mete

r e c o l l e c t i o n OX memory c r e a t e d by menta l impress ions a lone

( s a m s k ~ r a m ~ t r a ) . I t i s a c a s e of ~ i p a r l t a j f i n a due t o t h e

d e f e c t o f s l e e p . By way of e x p l a i n i n g t h e bh%tya s t a t e m e n t I l a p i :a s ~ ~ t ~ s $ a y a t svapnadarsenaml *'. H e e x p l a i n s $?:ti

a s t h e knowledge b o r n of menta l impress ions :

I n t h e case o f a person i n s l e e p , t h e mental impress ion

a l o n e remains . S i n c e a l l o t h e r means of knowledge a r e absent .

The dream is t h e r e c o l l e c t i o n born of mental impressions.

Due t o the d e f e c t of s l e e p , even t h a t r e c o l l e c t i o n p r e s e n t s

the father e t c . , as e x i s t i n g a l t h o u g h t h e y are n o t a c t u a l l y

e x i s t i n g :

SamsksramStra j a m h i v i j r a n a m s y 5 t i h . . . Tadiha n i d r 3 n a s y s 8;magryantars v i r a h a t samskzrah p a r i l i f y a t e , tena samsk8ra tv ' i t s y ~ t i ? , *%pi :a n i d r ~ d d a d v i p a r l t a a v a r t a m a n a p i p i t r z d i . var tamznataya bh3saya t i .

2

. .

1 I Brah.mqe8tra SankarabhZs ya , pub1 l s h e d by ~ u k z r a m J ~ Y a j i , e d i t r d , l . w i t h . Notee by NZrani ~ n a n t h k r i s h n a s ~ s t r y and v=sudev

1 . :~:qksfyq~d!l.tr~ yans ' Ika r , ~ i r n , a y a s = g a r Press, Bombay, 1917. - . . . . . . I , .

I as as pa ti Misra considers t h e dream (svapna) a s an

i l l u p t ra t ion (drs tanta) for elucidating the Gy iv ida : # @

, ~ n g n a s p h u r i t o rnzy&zdah svapna drg'atm:hi d n a s y a i v a - m " 3 svarupanipamardena rathad111 srjati.

I

Thue, according t o him, t h e s h r a " m i y n ' d t r s n t u k ~ ~ f s F e n a -

n a b h i v y a k t a s v a G p t v a t 1 ' i s i n t e n d e d t o give t h e n a t u r e of

mithy%jr%na i n g e n e r a l . The o b j e c t s of t h e dream, t h e conch-

s h e l l , t h e silver, e tc . , appear t o be t r u e a t t h e moment,

b u t t h e y a r e s u b l a t e d l a t e r . T h e r e f o r e , . t hey a r e f a l s e .

T h e i r knowledge i s a l s o f a l s e . It c a n n o t be said t h a t the

o b j e c t found i n t h e dream became t h e o b j e c t i n t h e wakeful

s t a t e . S i m i l a r l y it c a n n o t be argued t h a t something which

was false s i l v e r before became t h e c o n c h s h e l l l a t e r . There-

f o r e , since these c o g n i t i o n s a r e s u b l a t e d , it shou ld be

d e c i d e d t h a t t h e i r knowledge i s f a l s e through the a p p l i c a t i o n

of reason. Sometimes, t h e o b j e c t o f a dream can be found

i n t h e wakefu l state, b u t i t i s o n l y a c c i d e n t a l ( k s k a t z l i y a ) . '

T h e r e f o r e , the c r e a t i o n i n the dream i s f a l s e . If one

o b s e r v e s c a r e f u l l y , one can r e a l i s e t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n . found

in t h e dream as w e l l a s t h e wakeful s t a t e i s f a l s e . The '

c r e a t i o n as a wakefu l s t a t e , however, remains t o e x i s t u n k i l

the r ea l i s a t i on of the brahm'atmabh=va ( t h e brahmanhood of the

a t m a n ) ' b u t , t h e c r e a t i o n w i t n e s s e d i n t h e dream is s u b l a t e d '

everyday: , ' ,

3 a d . , 2.1.18, p.477.

anuvart~ te ; brahm'atmabh'ava s'aksj tkirat tu nivartate. ' I

Evam kin s v a p n a s r s t i h i h ' o s v i t p r a t i d i n a 6 v a n i v a r t a t a " 4 i

iti v irnarhr thah . a

It is interesting t o note t h a t . v i c a a p a t i does not take i n t o cons i d e r a t i o n the d i e c u s s i o n about t h e wakeful and dream

s t a t e s in 'the ~zndukyak%rika . He tr ies t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t

both t h e s t a t e s are f a l s e on the ground of a n i r v a S a d y a t v a

itself. This is what we f i n d i n the phrase "brahman'lo 8

anyaeya an irv icyataya ' i n the s tatement quoted above. This

i s t h e . e l u c i d a t i o n of the dream s t a t e according t o v"aaspati

~ i i r a .

Secondly, as regards the Susupti s t a t e , &aspati ~i!!ra

follows Mandana ~ i d r a . Accordingly h e says t h a t there i s a

mental d i s p o s i t i o n (man'oy5tti) of the nature of vik$ipasamsklra

Cven in t h e s u g u p t i s t a t e :

Yadyapi ca atra abhzva pratyay%lambanla y ~ t t i r n2Sgyate. t a t h r p i ;ikflpasarnskaralaksan~ m a d y f t t i h i h i p i asty%va

5 iti sarvam Avad~tam.

I t may be noted here t h a t according t o the bhzqya, t h e j i v a

has the nature of pur i ty in the s u s u p t i s t a t e . As regards

t h i s p o i n t , \Ticaspati ~ i $ r e observes t h a t the nature of purity

in the case of the j iva spoken in the bhlsya is because of I

the! absence of a c t i v i t y on the part of vikkipavidya:

Atma yat'o nissambzdho a t $ svaccat; rupamiva rzpamsya 6 r

iti svaccat; ru'pah, natu svaccataiva laya v i k l i p a * 6 b b I

samrk~ray3) tetra bh'av'at, s a m u d i s a r a d v r t t i vik$;pibhava 6 *

m=trena upamlnam.

Since t h e v i p a d t a j f i n a is a b s e n t h e r e , i n the r u ? u p t i

s t a t e , i t may be s a i d t h a t t h e j i v a e x p e r i e n c e s t h e nature o f

brahman t o t h a t e x t e n t . T h a t , t h e av idya being n o t r o o t e d

o u t c o m p l e t e l y , the j i v a experiences t h e wakeful and dream

s t a t e s again:

at% v i p a r l t a j n y n a n i v r t t l e h . . a s t i m=traya para&tmabfava upayggah, t a y i h i t ~ v a d e d a ' j?vah tadavasthgo b h a v a t i ksvalam. ~ a t t v a j G n i b h z v e n a ss;ul'ak~dam a v i d y a y i

akiia j j ~ ~ r a t s v a ~ n a l w n a m jfvarya vyutthznam b h a v a t i . 7

~t i s necessary here t o note t h a t t h e swoon (mcrfa)

r e s e m b l e s s u s u p t i i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s . This is no ted by

vzcaspati ~ i d r ~ when h e s t a t e s t h a t t h e J i v a is a s s o c i a t e d

w i t h s a t ( t h a t i s , gets s a t s a m p a t t i ) . I n t h e s u f u p t i s t a t e ,

b u t not i n t h e m h p a s ta te . I n f a c t , a c c o r d i n g t o V ~ ~ a s p t l

~ i t r s t h e r e i s h a l f s a t s a m p a t t i i n t h e m%rce s t a t e because

there a re c e r t a i n common f a c t o r s and d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g f a c t o r s - between t h e s u s u p t i and t h e m t r t a s t a t e s :

susupte @ y'agfsi samyatti) na ta'drsi mohe it1 ardha 8 I 8

sampattirikta.

Further, i t may be observed tha t there is layalaksan'a- 1

vidya characterised by vik(epasamsk'ara in pralaya as in

s u q u p t i e What 18 t h e difference between the two s ta tes? 1 ~i:arpatl Miera answers t h i s q u e s t i o n by saying t h a t su8upti

i s character ised by t h e e x i s t e n c e of pr&ia, w h i l e p r a l a y e is

not charac te r i sed by it. Thus, it i s c l e a r that Vscaspati

a has n o t e l u c i d a t e d the concept of susuptl from the

p o i n t o f view of t h e subject ive knower (j ign;su), but has

done so from t h e p o i n t of view of the s u s u p t i of others. I n

the subject ive e x p e r i e n c e of t h e knower, t h e r e i s no c o g n i t i o n

of a n y t h i n g b u t remaining i n t h e brahma s t a t e . .. But, when

t h e same s t a t e i s analysed o b j e c t i v e l y through t h e i n f e r e n c e ,

t h e n on ly it l e possible t o t h i n k t h a t avidya i s n o t completely

rooted o u t i n the s t a t e on t h e ground that t h e pe rson i n t h e

s t a t e rever ts t o t h e wakeful and the dream s t a t e s .

AS regards the question of kotrap~a?ya' , (the authorit of t h e a , vZ$aspeti ~ i t r a considers c e r t a i n objec t ions

and answers them on t h e l i n e s of Mandana ~ i i r a . I n c i d e n t a l l y , 0 as regards t h e ap%uru$iyatva of Veda, vZFaspatl Misra t r ies

t o b r i d g e t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the views of t h e ~ ? m z m s k ' i s

and t h e Vedan t ins .

The first objection r e g a r d i n g the & ' a s t r a p ' r a m ~ ~ ~ a i.,

how can w e c o n s i d e r t h e a d ~ a i t a b l ~ t r a whlch is opposed t o

p e r c e p t i o n as a u t h o r i t a t i v e 7 Fo l lowing t h e l i n e of argu-

ment a d o p t e d by Mandana ~ i t r a , ~ a c a s p a t i ~ i d r a answers t h i s

q u e s t i o n by s a y i n g t h a t Veda i s apouru%gya and on t h a t s c o r e

i t i s f r e e f rom d e f e c t s and t h a t it r e v e a l s t h e knowledge

w i t h o u t depend ing o n p e r c e p t i o n :

Na Fa jyzstha prwama?a pratyakfavir 'odh'sd tmn5yasyaiva tadap%k?asya apr%m39yam u p a p a r i t ~ r t h a t v a m $a iti yuktam. Tasya apourubGyataya n i r a s t a samasta d5q&

8 - I s a n k a s y a , bzdhakataya svatahsiddhapramanabh~vasya

' 1 . s v a k z r y e p r a m i t o u 'anap%k?atv=t.

He g i v e s a n i l l u s t r a t i o n h e r e . Although t h e p e r c e p t u a l

knowledge a r i s e 8 first, i n t h e d u k t i t a j a t a c o g n i t i o n , t h e t

. ,

~rahrna:ttra &anksrabh'.tYat p u b l i s h e d by ~ u k g r a n ~ g y a j I, . , d d i , t i d ' i i t h ~0t.s by ' ~ s r a n i ~ n a n t h k r i s h n a 2 4 s t r y and s s u d e v ~ a l i = t i m a n b s t ~ ~ ~ ~ n s I k a r , ~ i r ~ a y a g a g a r P r e s s , Bombay, 1917.

knowledge of the conchshell sublates the knowledge of the

sublate the perceptual knowledge:

~a j a t a j n h s y a j iyasa$ buktiji~ne'ncna keniya& bidha-

dareariat tadanapabidhane tsdapabzdh'at manab tasya utpa td! anupapat t:h. ~ a r i i t a n c a t i t t v i k a p r ~ m ~ ? y a

2 4 bhsvasya snapek&ite;tvarn.

The second o b j e c t i o n consequen t upon t h e f i r s t o b j e c t i o n

itself IS - a l t h o u g h there i s no n e c e s s i t y of pratyakaa a t

t h e time of u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e szstra, y e t , t h e knowledge of

t h e &!trs s h o u l d depend upon p r a t y a k t a t o arise. This I

o b j e c t i o n is a l s o answered by v;caspati Risra on t h e l i n e s I

I of Mandana Misra . ~ = s t r a d e n i e s t h e u l t i m a t e pramznya f o r I

p r a t y a k s a . 8

It does n o t d e n y t h e vfivah8rikapr'arn'inya I f o r it . The

u l t i m a t e knowledge c a n arise from an i n c i d e n t a l a u t h o r i t y .

For instance, n'aga and nag:, t h e two words d i f f e r i n s e n s e

by v i r t u e of t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e quanti ty of t h e s y l l a b l e s

( d 1 q h a t v a and h t a v a t v a ) . a 1 In f a c t , d h g a and h r s v a I a belong

t o t h e sound b u t n o t t o t h e l e t t e r s . Even t h e n , w e g e t the

cor rec t meanings from t h e words n'aga and nag'a. S i m i l a r l y ,

a l t h o u g h the knowledge of t h e s a s t r a arises w i t h t h e h e l p of

pratysk.a, t h e r e is no rule t h a t the pratyakpapramz~a should- I

be of the u l t i m a t e nature:

pfinitou anap'eksatv'epi utpa t tam pratyaksa'peksatv'at I I r

simvyavaharikam pra ty aksasy a pr'amznyarn upahant i , I

ena k'aran'abh'avat I na bhavi t , a p i t u 6ttvikam. Na ca t a t tasy'otptdakarn a t ' a t tv ika pram%nibh;vEbhy'opi

krnvyvyavah~xika pternen'ebhyah tattvaj&n'otpatti a

dar$an=t . ~ a t h z c a varne h r s v a dIrghatvadayz * t any. dhsrm'. a p i a a h r ~ p i t e ? t a t t v a p r a t i p a t t l h k a v a h . 3

Inc i d o n t a l l y , t h e q u e s t i o n of ap'ouru8&atva of Veda

comes i n t o focus. The followers of J a i m i n i do no t a c c e p t

c r e a t i o n and a n n f h i l a t i o n . Theref o r e , they cons ider Veda

a s b e g i n n i n g l e s s ( a n z d i ) . B u t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e Vedant ins

( ~ a ~ y % s i k z s ) Veda a r i s e s from t h e omnisc ien t and omnipotent I

Paramesvara by v i r t u e of t h e a d j u n c t i n t h e form of beginning-

less a v i d y a . Y e t , i t c a n n o t be a l l e g e d t h a t Veda i s regarded

a s pauru&Zya by t h e Vedan t ins . I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t

v;caepati ~ i l r a o b s e r v e s t h a t t h e r e i s no p a u r d s ~ y e t v a i n

t h e s e n s e of dependence on t h e w i l l of a Purufa (puru5a- I

s v a t a n t r y a ) f o r Veda because Veda i s created by l s v a r a i n

accordance w i t h what i t was i n t h e s u c c e s s i v e l y p r e v i o u s

creations:

, Vayy=. ikzsmtumtan anuvartarnznah %:ti syfti it ih=s%di

siddha srsti • p r a l a y j n ~ s = r e ? a a h d y a v i d y ~ p ~ d a n a l a b d h a '

saxvadakti j d n e s y S p i param3tmano nityssys ve'danam . - y Z n e r s p i na t i t u rv'a tan t ryam. ~ G r v a p i r v a sarg3nus'.re?a

. ., .. -- . -

On the other hand, the a t t r i bu t ion of pauru's'eyatva t o the

Srnrtis of Ka~ila I btc cannot be avoided, Thus vicaspati fi \

I Mists bridges between the views o f the ~Im;rnsak:s and the

vedantins on the question of Veda apauruk'eyatva:

P u r u l a s v a t a n t r y a m'a t r a m cp apauru&'eyatvam rGeayan te j e i m i n l y a ) a p i . T a t Fa asrn>kam a p i saminam, a n y a t t a abh iniv"e&bt.

I t i a on t h e ground o f apauru ' s iya tva and n i f q u s t a t v a

that the Pr'amCnya of Veda and of t h e Advai ta ~ ~ b t r a depending

upon it i s . e s t a b l i s h e d .

~ 5 5 t r a and Tarka:

A s r e g a r d s t h e p l a c e of Tarka (reasoning) i n Vedanta,

~ i c a s p a t i M i s r a expresses h i s c o n s i d e r e d view w i t h arguments.

A l t h o u g h the knowledge of 'the u n i t y of B r a h m a n and Atman'

( b r a h f i t ~ i k ~ a j ~ n a ) a r i s e s from t h e s r t i s t a t e m e n t s such as I I

'tat tvam asi1 e t c . , there i s t h e n e c e s s i t y of r e a s o n i n g fo r

a r r i v i n g a t definite c o n c l u s i o n s because t h e r e a r e doubts

r e g a r d i n g t h e meanings of t h e words t a t , tvam, e t c . ' Here,

reasoning i n t h e form of t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e Vedanta s ta te -

ments i s necessary. b e s i d e s , t h o s e r e a s o n i n g s of t h e ~ i i r v a

~ b i r n s a and t h e N Y z y a which a r e n o t opposed t o the s p i r i t of '

Vedanta should also be pressed into service:

~ 6 g a p i brahmam~m~msa'y a! adci ta vidasya. , . ' sadha

s G ~ Y ~ idamagra &it' ityupakraoiat Itat tvm ar i ' -

ityanGt sandarbh'at nityatv'adyudta brahma svar'up;va- garnab t'avad { p a t a b vic jrad vin$pyastlm A t r a Fa brahmetyadina avaqamha tadvisayam avagamam l a k s a y a t i ,

' 6 t a d a s t i t v m y a s a t i v imar ie vig3?at P X Z ~ a n i r p y 8 t .

vedantam'irn~rns~ t z v a t t a r k a eva , tadavix%dhinasca . ye anygpi t a r k a e v a , t a d a v i r o d h i n a s c a ye anygpi t a r k a adhvaramldrns% yzm nyaye :a veda pra tyakf 'edi pfirnznya

I

p a r i 6 ~ d h a n ~ d i s u uktah te upakbranam yasy%h, ss 7 " h

t a t t v o ' k t a .

I The srti s t a t e m e n t s p r e s c r i b e .manana a long with sravana .

a.

The r e a s o n i n g depend ing upon A r t h z p a t t i and ~nurngna without 1

being opposed t o t h e Sabdaprem'a?a i s known as Manana:

~ n u m s n a n ~ a v e d a n t s v i r = d h i t a d u p a j P v i $a i t y a p i dystavyam. & b d h a v i h d h i n y a tadupa j i v i n y a $a yuk tya v i v ' i ~ a n a m mananam. Y u k t i s t a a r t h g p a t t i - ranumgnam v3. 8

It i a i m p l i e d h e r e t h a t t a r k a w i t h o u t pramsna i s u s e l e s s

because it w i l l have no m a t t e r t o c o n s i d e r . Tarka without I

pram'.?a 1s d r y . v Z c a s p a t i Misra o b s e r v e s t h a t t h e ~ E k i k % s a

depending upon such d r y t a r k a f i g h t with each o t h e r as

regards t h e q u e s t i o n abou t t h e c a u s e o f t h e world:

?.rk&i prarn'ena v i A Y a v i ~ < ~ a k a t a f a t a d i t i k a r t a v y a t i bhztah, I tad;s>ayah . . • a ' s a t i pram.ne anugrahyasya

- .-- -- - 6 7 . bid., 1.1.9, p.83. 8 .-. , 1.1.9, pp.79-80.

U*, 1.1.2, p.89.

r l @ I I ajtayaSya abhavat sus kata; n'adriyate,

8

9

' 8 I Vedana~ekrena I tu tark!?a jag at kiranibhidat avas th'apa.

I

y a t h t;rkik%m any h i a m viprat ipat$h, t a t t v a 8

nirdhhana t kiran'abh'ad ca na tatah t a t i v a vyavastfeti lit I na tetah samyag%nam,

1

Thus vk,aspati ~ika advocates the use of tarka in

Vedanta &i:tra g i v i n g c e r t a i n warning a t t he same time t h a t 8 it shou ld be I n conformity wi th ~abdapramina .

me purpor t of t h e k ~ ~ t r a :

The p u r p o r t of t h e Vedanta h s . r a i s brahman. This

~ 2 s t r a c o n s t i t u t e s the iabdnpram<?a. A t t h i s p o i n t , some

o b j e c t i o n s a r e i n e v i t a b l e . One of t h e ob j ec t ions i s from

t h e p o i n t of view of ~~rvarn?m~ms; , The Vedantin says t h a t

sbbda t e a c h e s brahman, i n order t o do s o iabda should have

' s a n g a t i ' o r harmony among t h e d i f f e r e n t s ta tements . T h i s

s a n g a t i must be g ra sped f i r s t , t o e s t a b l i s h brahman as the

p u r p o r t of the h b d a . According t o t h e ~ i i rva~imZmsak5s

Such a s a n g a t l i s n o t p o s s i b l e here . It i a not a $iDtra

which does no t speak of Y r a y f t t i and N i y f t t i ( i n j u n c t i o n

and p r o h i b i t i o n ) . S ince , manana e t c . , a r e prescribed besides I

s ravana i n t h e s a ~ t r a , it becomes necessary t o accep t t h a t m

t h e kfstra t e a c h e s karma only. This i s t he ob j ec t ion which 0 I

arises a t t h i s point . as as pa ti Misra answers t h i s objectlo! .I

an the l i n k s of Mandana Misra. He s a y s t h a t brahman is

9 m., 2.1.6, p.444. 1 0 u . , , 2 . 1 . 9 , p.449.

I The knowlcdgc! ar i w s tl~rouqh s ravana , manana, c L C , I I I ' I I C P I

there is no purpose served by Karma or Uldsan'a. I t is for

t h i s reason t h a t one should n o t t h i n k of t h e t ~ s t r a as

t h e w o r s h i p of brahlnan (bra l . rm%~%sana) . t'urtt~er.

if m'ikta were t o be regarded a s t h e effect of worship

( u p z s a n a ) , t h e n it s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d as t r a n s i t o r y ( a n i t y a ) ,

T h i s i s t h e answer g i v e n by ~ z c a a ~ r a t i l\lris'ra t o t,hr o b j e c t i o n

raised f rom t h e p o i n t of v iew of ~Grvarnlm'irnsa:

Na k h a l u v e d a n t a b s i d d h a b r a t ~ m a r i ~ p a p a r a b btravitum

a r h a n t i , t a t r z v i d i t n s a n g a t i t v a t . Y a t r a h i b a b d a ~ l z k e na prayujyan.t ; t .n t ra rra t?s;srr~ sar~q,qtj.grakra!~

. . . t a s m a t p r a t i p i t s i t u r n p r a t i p i p j d a y i s a r n ayarn l akqh

p r a v r t t f niy5tti h-etubhttam evar tham p r a t i p Y ~ d a y e t . - . . . v a r l a n t ~ n a r n v ~ c . l n t v a 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ t r n t v ; l ~ . ~ r n s i d d t ~ ~ . r ~ s t i . . - -

P r a v r t t i n i y z t t i paranam :a sandaxbhatvam I s % ? t r a t v e m . '. . . api $ a ;adi !sf tabrahma:; bh:~vaCi

8 s a m s ~ r i k o d h a r m a n i y ~ t t . i h , knsmyqt p t~nab ~ r a v a r ; l ~ s y o ~ > ~ ~ i . r i

J I I

m a n a n ~ c l n y , ~ h sr1~yihti.t~. ' ~ n ~ l r ~ ~ t : t ~ n ; l l n - vnyy,lrttryn

p r a s a n g 5 d a b i na b r a h m a s v r p a vedan tah , k i n t u I

% t m a p r a t i p a t t i v i sayaka ' ryaparah . 11

Etaduktan bhevati - t v a y g p i upzsanav idh ipa ra tvam

v e d s n t s n a m a b h y u p a g a c c a t a n i t y a d u d d a buddha tv5d i rGya brahmatmata j i v a s y a s v z b h Z v i k i vedantagamya

i s t h l y a t e . ~ a c z p Z s a n a v i d a y a s y a vidhe'rnaphalarn

nityatv'ad, a k 3 r y e t v ' a t . N G ~ a n l d y a v i d y a ~ i d h ' a n a p a - nayah, t e s y a ovav i r%dhi v idyadayadeva bh-avzt.

n'amrtatva I a ksmah, tat kiryarn avabh.oddum arhat i. I

Anyadiccati I a anyat kar 'of i t i ~ i ~ r s t i i i d d h e h . 12 0

I Hence, it 1s n o t proper t o say tha t sabda teaches the

articular form of an objec t ident i fy ing it as sf a parti- 8 c u l a r n a t u r e . Hence, t h e s ' a s t r a can r e v e a l brahman by

I I removing t h e i l l u s o r y d i f f e r e n c e . Thus, vZcaspati Misra

* a t a b l i s h e s brahman a s t h e p u r p o r t of t h e 's'astrar

~arvamzvahi v;kyam nedantaya vastubhBdam b8dhayitum a r h a t i . . . t e n a p ramsnzn ta ra s i d d h e laukika e v x r t h e ' y a d i q a t i r T d r s i dabdasya , tad; k a i v a kath% p r a t y a -

e @

g g t m a n i a l a u k i k e . 13

T h i s i s i n s u p p o r t of the bh%sya s t a t e m e n t , " a v i d y z k a l p i t a I

b h i d a n i ~ r t t i ~ a r a t v a t b : t r a a y a l . F u r t h e r , v Z c a s p a t i Misra . e

argues t h a t there i s no r u l e t h a t the words should t e a c h

a c t i o n o n l y . The s t a t e m e n t s l i k e lman%hara! p a r v a t a x ! ja!

sun%ruhw , " n a i a l bhu jangb r a j j u t ~ " e t c . , do not t e a c h any

a c t i o n a t all. They j u s t r e v e a l t h e nature of the o b j e c t ,

as a result of which joy, e t c . , arise. Hence i t is not

j u s t i f i e d t o say t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s which t e a c h the , ob jec t

a r e useless. S i n c e ?$ti t e a c h e s t h e ~ u r u b ; r t h a , t h e reali-

g a t i o n of brahrnan i s regarded as ) s~: tra:

Na d v a t tat p a r a pray%go ne d r s y a t e lzke. ~ u t % h a l a " ,

bhaytdi n i v r t y a r t h ' a n a m a a k 3 r y a p a r a d m , pada sandarbh'ank . - 7

l2 &&:; 1.1.4, p.114. l3 -- I b i d 1.1.4, pp.124-125,

rajjuriyarn ity'ldi,,, Tath; c a prafijanavattaya I

bh'utjrth'abhidh'ana~~a p ie ksava t prayifipi upapannah. I I

Evam Fa brahma sva&a jnanasya pararna purublrtha h'etubhivad anupadidatam a p i p u q a pravrtti nivrt ti

6 1 I I

vedantanam purusa hitfnu8;san'at h! t ra t tvam siddham 14 b h a v a t i .

Thus, ~ z ~ a s p a t i ~ i l r a e r t a b l i s h e s the a u t h o r i t y of t h e

&stra statements t e a c h i n g bcahman . These s t a t e m e n t s I

t e a c h i n g brahman a r e known a s Vedanta s t a t e m e n t s . Here, it

may be con tended t h a t t h e r e is n o t h i n g wrong i f we c o n s i d e r

v e d a n t a s t a t e m e n t s a s ' a r t h a v z d a ' . This c o n t e n t i o n is

a v e r t e d by ~ s ~ a s p a t i ~ i d r a t h r o u g h strong arguments. His

answer i s t h e words i n t h e wor ld c o n v e y ' t h e i r meanings i n

two ways, i.e., by conveying t h e ground and by r e v e a l i n g the

p u r p o r t . J u s t as i n a s i n g l e s e n t e n c e ; t h e words convey

t h e i r meanings , through t h e ground and the s e n t e n c e , conveys

i t s meaning t h r o u g h t h e p u r p o r t ( t z t p a r y a ) . S i m i l a r l y , when

two s e n t e n c e s combine i n t o one , one of t h e sentences conveys

t h e g round and t h e o t h e r s e n t e n c e conveys :the p u r p o r t . For

i n s t a m , ' t h i s cow of d e v a d a t t a i s t o be bought ' i s"one

s en tence and ' t h i s cow g i v e s abundant mi lk ' i s a n o t h e r ' s en tenc

Here, t h e second s e n t e n c e conveys t h e groun d by stating t h e

abundance of m i l k . The p u r p o r t t h a t t h e cow shou ld be bougfit

is Conveyed by t h e former s t a t e m e n t . !hen the meaning - -

conveyed as the ground is rgains t nny other l~n;ani, then one should think of other meanings for the words. When

the purport conveyed is against any other pran'ana, then it @

should be regarded as unauthori tat ive, i f the dabda is

pauru(8yya. I f , on the other hand, the &bda is apauruhya,

it can be grasped t h a t t h e pramzna which i s a g a i n s t t h e

t z t p a r y a i , e . , t h e p u r p o r t , i s of worldly a p p l i c a t i o n and

t h a t the :abda i t s e l f i s of u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y . The a r t h a -

v i d a s t a t e m e n t conveys t h e meaning by remaininq a s t h e ground,

When i t i s apposed t o t h e o t h e r pram%nss, one s h o u l d t a k e it

i n a secondary s e n s e . Th i s i s n o t t h e case w i t h t h e s t a t e -

ments t e a c h i n g brahman because t h e y convey the meaning of

brahman t h r o u g h p u r p o r t by t h e c o n f o r m i t y between what is

i n t h e b e g i n n i n g and what is a t t h e end. Theref o r e , t h e

s t a t e m e n t s of t h e ~ p a n i s ' a d s which t e a c h brahman c a n never be

c o n s i d e r e d as ~ r t h a v % d ; s :

~ a s m " a v a a r t h a v l d a v a d v e d a n t & i gunauzdena na n f y a n t e ? A t r a p y e t e . - l ' o k l n u s ~ r e t o ' d v i d h o h i v i d a y a h 8 (abd~nam, d v a r a t a s f a , t g t p a r y a t a s g a . Y a t h a i k a s m i n v'akye padznam p a d z r t h a dv'rato v o k y = r t h a s c a t z t p e r y a t o v l b a y a h , evam vzkya d v a y a i k a v g k y a t a y a m i t i . Ya th%yam devadattiy'; gauk kr%tavy% i ty%kam vzkyarn, e t a bahuksira . ityapexam, t a d a a y a b a h u k c r a t v a prat ip%danam . d v k a n . ~ Z t ~ e r y a r n t u kr'Btevy5 iti v z k y a r t h a r a n t i

. . . yatre t u t z t p a r y a m t a t r a m:naontara vir 'odhe paurukYa pramgnarn eva b h a v a t i . Vedan tas tu ~ o ' u m a ~ a r ~ l ~ a r ~ ; l ~ ~ a n a y ~ . Iniras tasarnas a bhida-

Evam atrZpi ' a a d b a s'omyedam' iti brahm'ipakradt I

I t a t tvam asi' iti $a jivasya brahmztmana upa- sarnhzrzt t a t p a r a t ; eva vxkyasya . Evam vikyantar=n=m-

1 6 a p i pourv~pary~locanay'a brahmaparatvam avagantavyam.

With these o r i g i n a l a rguments , &caspat l bra has establ ished the authoritativeness of the b i s t r a in respect

o f t e a c h i n g brahman. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t t h e

~ramznzs are n o t a t a l l opposed t o one a n o t h e r according t o . A n k a r a and ~ u i e i v a r a . Mandana ~ i d r a a l s o s t a t e s t h a t

one pram'ana c a n n o t be established as a u t h o r i t a t i v e on t h e

b a s i s of a n o t h e r pram%?a. As. w e have se,en i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n I a b o v e , ~ z c a s p a t i Misra does n o t seem t o t a k e n o t e of t h e s e

o p i n i o n s . H e d o e s n o t a l s o ment ion anywhere i n his ~hzrnat i

t h a t Pram'ants a r e not opposed t o one ano the r .

k ~ s t r a and Exper ience : -

As regards e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e form o f r e a l i s a t i o n through

continuous a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e mind t o t h e knowledge of t h e I - aastra, h&ispsti u ~ i : r a f o l l o w s Mandena ~ i d r a and c o n t r i -

b u t e s h i s own p o i n t s i n e s t a b l i s h i n g it. The e x p e r i e n c e . *

is a c c o r d i n g l y i n the form of r e a l i s a t i o n of t h e knowledge o f

t h e k l s t r a t h r o u g h c o n t i n u o u s a p p l i c a t i o n of mind. It is

t h r o u g h t h i s e x p e r i e n c e t h a t the impress ions c r ea t ed by

av idya are totally eradicated:

~ a s n h t ~ a t h H gandharva l ~ ~ t r i r t h a jnah&hyas$hita satnsk'ara saciva sr%trEndriy 'ena d a d j g d i s v a r a g r h a m<rcan'.bhedam adhyaksam anubhava ti. Evam v%dantar tha j n ~ & i b h y s s i h i t a samsk~ro j f v s s y a brahrnabhlvam a n t a h k a r a n e n 2 t i . 17

~ n u b h a v z a n t a h k a x a n a v r t t i b h i d o brahmag?aksbtk~ra; I *

t a s y & i d y S n i y f t t i d v ~ r e n a brahrnasvarapavirbhiva 18 pramha phalam.

~ z c a s p a t i ~ i i r a has c a t e g o r i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e know- I

l e d g e i n t h e form of soak/ltk'sra i s essential f o r removing

t h e i l l u s i o n , i n t h e form of s%kk'atk'ara:

S; k s z t k a r a r l u p o h i v ipa r fasah , s; ks'atk;rariipenafva 19 ' .

t a t t v a j z a n o n a u c ~ ~ i d y a t e .

M u k t i is n o t w i t h i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e . Yet, it i s t o be

d e c i d e d on t h e a u t h o r i t y of the s r t i . It is c l e a r from t h e a a

I i n s t a n c e s s u c h as r a j j u - s a r p a , s u k t i - r a j a t a , e t c . , t h a t

t a v i d y a i s removed by v idya . Sravana, manana and n id idhy i sana

a r e well known as t h e causes f o r r e a l i s a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e ,

even though it is n o t d i r e c t l y p r e s c r i b e d , i n t h e b : t r a ;

the r e a l i s a t i o n s h o u l d be a t t a i n e d th rough continuous app l i - "

c a t i o n of t h e mind and t h e b i ? t r a :

l8 - 9 I b i d . 1.1.2, p.89 .

Y a d ~ a ~ i muktiradrstac5ri ; tath;pi savzsana . a @ 1

v i d y ~ c c z d e n a • atmanab sverupZvaetlr.ina laksanaya!~ tasy=) ::ti ~ i d d h a t v ' a t . AvidyZyispa v idyztp lda v i r z d h f t a ~ a Vidyatp'adena samuce6dasya ahf -

b

vlbhramasyzva r a j j u t a t t v a s%ks'atker'cns ~ a r n u c c ~ d a s y a , I

upapat t i s iddhatvzd anvayavya~ir'ekab~yam ca dravane manana nididhy'.sanabhy'asasyaiva svag&ara s%k~?i tk~ra pha la tvena 15kaaiddhatvet s a k a l a duhkha vinirmuktaika

. I * a ca i tanyztma k a a m ityapar9oksa rup'*anubhavasyapi ;$avaddyabhy%s ~ a d h a n a t v i n a a n M r B t tadartham I s r a v a k d h i d t s tf rtham bhavanti . 20

I *

I Thus, ~ Z c a ~ ~ a t i ~ i ' s r a , mostly following Mandana Misra, 8

h a s t r i e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e experience of 'brahm'atmatva'

through t h e realisation i n t h e form of continuous engrossment I i n s r a v a n a , manana and nididhyzsana. Th i s i s known a s the

l~rasankhy'gnavsda' . T h i s v i ew i s n o t f ri conformity w i t h I

e i t h e r t h e bhzsya of Sankara or the v%tika of ~ u r s i v a r a .

The bh'asyalt'ara has said t h a t the experience of brahm=tmatva @

cornea direc t ly from t h e knowledge of the srti * rn statements. a Suresvara accepts this stand of the b h ~ s y a k ~ s a . I

As against I

t h i s , l ike Mandam ~ i i r a , v:csspati B Misra t r i e s to a s c r i b e

t h i s ~rarankhy%navzd'da t o the bh'afyakzram

It is shown i n the h r t r a pr'.m'anya as t o how vicarpat i I

M i s r a e s t a b l i s h e s i ~ s t r a a s s t r o n g e r t h a n p m t y a k s a . T h i s . . is done t h rough t h e argument t h a t p r a t y a k t a reveal.$ bhsda

o n l y ( d u a l i t y ) I t becomes necessa ry here t o examine whether

prstyatsa reveals duality at all. Following Handan.

and providing his own arguments ~ j c a s p a t i ~ i : r a arrives a t

t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t p r a t y a k s a does n o t revea l d u a l i t y a t I

a l l . I n f a c t , t he re is no bheda a t a l l i n r e a l i t y .

F i r s t l y , bheda depends on t h e o b j e c t s t h a t a re d i f f o r e n t . In o t h e r words, unless two objects a r e provided to exist,

bheda c a n n o t ex is t . Secondly, each of t h e o b j e c t s t h a t are

different is one only. Thirdly, i f there i s no not ion of

o n e n e s s , there c a n n o t be t h e n o t i o n of bheda, because i n tha t

case, bheda would be w i t h o u t a subs t ra tum, But t h e n o t i o n

of oneness need n o t depend upon bheda a t a l l . F o u r t h l y , i n

order t o know t h e bheda i n such a form a s " t h i s i s n o t t h i s f

( ngyam ayam) , t h e knowledge of t h e p r a t i y z g i n ( c o u n t e r o b j e c t )

which we say i s not t h i s , becomes necessary. F i n a l l y , t h e r e

is no necessity of t h e knowledge of t h e other ob jec t t o L

u n d e r s t a n d oneness. It i s on a c c o u n t of t h e s e r e a s o n s t h a t

bheda c a n n o t be e s t a b l i s h e d as a r e a l i t y through pratyakfat

( i v ) f l y a m a y m i t i ca b h i d s q r a h a ~ ~ a i y o g i g r a h a f i p e k ~ a t v a t

( v ) Eka tvag rahasya Fa any:napek:atv'.t abh&lop:dann eva an i rvapanTya bhgda kelpena iti siimpratam.

Thus, i t is e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e n o t i o n

of bheda has abheda ( n o n - d u a l i t y ) a s i t s m a t e r i a l c a u s e

( up5da"na)

A t t h i s j u n c t u r e , t h e bh5dabh'eda va'dins argue t h a t i n

s u c h c o n t e x t s as cause ( k s r a n a ) and effect (kzrya) t h e general a

( s i rnanya ) and the p a r t i c u l a r ( v i i e s a ) bo th bhoda and abheda @

a r e revealed through p r a t y a k s a i t s e l f , Th i s view o f t h e b

bh 'edabhidavadins i s refuted by ~ i c a s ~ a t i ~ i h a on t h e l ines

of Mandsna ~idra's re jo inder t o t h e o b j e c t i o n . The cate- m

g o r i c a l answer i s k%ya etc . , a r e always a n i r v a c a n f y a . They

appear a s b o t h d i f f e r e n t and n o t - d i f f e r e n t . I n t h e sarpa-

r a j j u nyzya , i t is shown t h a t the n o t i o n of t h e serpent does

n o t d i f f e r f rom the r a j j u (rope); it i s indeed , rope i t s e l f ;

the difference i s only superimposed, Thus, in rea l i ty , the

n o t i o n of the k:rya does n o t d i f f e r from kzrana; t h e k'arya

is indeed k=rana i t s e l f i n i t s nature, Hence, t h e i n d e t e r m i '

n a t e form of t h e k%rya a p p e a r s as i f i t is ' d i f f e r e n t ' a s

well a s 'not d i f f e r e n t ' :

Uktambad ya th'b bhu j a n g a t a t t v a m na r a j j h b h i d y a t e ,

ra j jurgvahi t a t , k ' a lpanikas tu bh'eda!; evam v a s t u t a h - k k y a t a t tvam na kzranzd bhidya t e , k i r a 7 a s v a f i p a r n ~ v a h i t a t , mirv:cyantu k ~ i ~ a r ' u p a r n bhinnamiva abhinnamiva ca

I n order t o establish t h i s doctrine, ~ z c a s p a t i

examines t h e q u e s t i o n as t o what i s t h e n a t u r e of bheda which

i r s a i d t o appear along with abheda, Now, what i s bheda?

If it i s s a i d t h a t bheda i s any'lonyzbhzva (mutual non-existence)

itself, t h e n i t may be asked i n the case of the b r a c e l e t and

t h e go ld , whether t h e r e ex i s t . bheda of t h a t n a t u r e o r not?

I f such a bheda d o e s not e x i s t , t h e n it s h o u l d , , b e admi t t ed

t h a t there is no bheda because o f i t s e x i s t e n c e of oneness,

If i t i s s a i d t h a t there i s bheda, it must be admitted tha t

t h e r e i s no abheda. It i s unreasonable to i n s i s t t h a t bhava

and abhzva should bo th exist a t t h e samd time. I f bh%a

and abhzva were t o e x i s t t o g e t h e r , t h e b r a c e l e t and an

ornament c a l l e d vardham;nak,a should be admit ted a s one only.

T h i s i s because bo th bhada and abhzda a re admit ted t o g e t h e r

by t h e opponent . J u s t as t h e bracelet, t h e e a r - r i n g , t h e

crown, e t c , , a r e n o t d i f f e r e n t i n t h e natur ,e of b e i n g gold,

t h e e a r - r i n g , t h e crown e t c . , a r e n o t t o be rega rded a s

d i f f e r e n t i n t h e i r n a t u r e a s t h e b r a c e l e t , because , t h e r e

i s no d i f f e r e n c e between t h e b r a c e l e t and the go ld . ~ 1 1

t h i s a rgument i s i n t e n d e d t o prove i s t h a t g o l d alone is real

and b r a c e l e t e t c . , a r e no t r e a l i n ds much as the d i f f e r e n c e

among them does not e x i s t a t a l l :

1 ~rahrnaiiutr. ~ Q n k s r e b h ~ ~ a , p u b l i s h e d by Tuk2r.111 ~ a t a j i ,

e d i t e d with Notes by ~ a r a n i ~ n a n t h k r i o h ? a b i ~ t r y and ~ S u d e v , .

Lakihma.nCiatry - p a n r f k a r , ~ i r n a ~ a s s g a r Press, Bombay, 1917,

Kah I Punarayam rn bh'edanzma? Y ah s a h h h e d e n a i k a t ra bhavgt? Yaraspar'ntlh5ve i t i ;et , k i m .yam kgrya-

k=ra?ayob ka taka h% takafoh a s t i nav;? ~ a c z t eka tvan ' evas t i , naca bh'edak. Asti c e t bhede cva '

n'abhodah Napa bhiviibh&ayoh a v i r l d h s h sah 'avas th lna sambhav l t , sambhave va ka ta ka* vardham%n:kay'orapi t a t t v z n a b h e d a p r a ~ a n ~ a ) , bhedasyabheda v i r%dha t . Api :a ka takasya hztak%dabhede y a t h a h%takatmana k a t a k a mukuta kundalzdayo na bh idyan tc , evam

katak%tmangpi na bhidyeran; t a t a t a s y e h=takadabh'.datm ~ a t h b $a h'atekameva v a s t u s a t , na k a t a d d a y a h , b h e d a r y e p r a t i b h % 8 a d t . *

It may be a r g u e d that t h e abh%da among t h e d i f f e r e n t

o rnaments ( e a r - r i n g , crown, e t e . ) i s i n t h e i r n a t u r e of being

gold, b u t n o t i n t h e i r n a t u r e as bracelet. Then, t h e r e i s

a g a i n a q u e s t i o n - If t h e b r a c e l e t i s n o t d i f f e r e n t from g o l d ,

why should it n o t b e found i n t h e ear-ring, t h e crown, etc .?

O t h e r w i s e , how do you t h i n k t h a t t h e b r a c e l e t is n o t d i f f e r e n t

from gold? If it i s f u r t h e r argued t h a t a l l t h e o b j e c t s a r e

r e l a t ed i n t h e i r n a t u r e of being satt; ( e x i s t e n c e ) , t h e n

the very d i s c r i m i n a t i o n t h a t t h i s i s h e r e b u t n o t t h a t (idam

asm"et nedam), t h a t t h i s e x i s t s now b u t not t h a t , t h a t t h i s

of t h i s na ture b u t n o t t h a t , e t c , , would be comple te ly rooted

out. F u r t h e r , t h e r e should n o t arise any c u r i o s i t y t o know

t h e gold a t d i s t a n c e i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r form a s t h e ea r - r ing ,

crown, e t c . , er n o t . Th i s i s because a l l t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r s -

are gold i t s e l f and g o l d is a l r e a d y known: ,

Atha h=taka tvena iv ibhedo na k a t e k a t v e n a , t e n a t u b h a a eva kundaladzh. Y a d l h z t a k a a b h i n n a h ka taka? katham ayam kundalzdisu ngnuvartat;? Ngnuvarta te c = t katham h'atakzddabhinnah k a t a kah? . . . ~ a t t ' . n u y ~ t y a c a s a r v a v a s t u anugam%, idaniha nedam, idamasan dAarn, idarnidznin d d a m iti v ibhzgo na sy%t. Kasya?f t , kvacit, k a d r c i t , kathan: it, vivekah 'e torabhav 'a t . ' A p i c a :;rat kanakamityavagate "a tasya k u n d a l i d a y o v i ~ e s , ; ~ jigtiisyeran; kanakzd- abh%dat t z sam tasya ca jriatatvzt. 3

Therefore, t h e bhEda i n respect of the general and the

articular d o e s n o t e x i s t . The general i n the form of gold

alone is r e a l . The p a r t i c u l a r s a s kataka, k u n d a l a , etc . ,

being i n d e t e r m i n a t e are n o t r e a l . S i m i l a r l y , t h e gold a s

the cause alone is r ea l end t h e effects i n t h e form of

k a t a k a , k u n d a l a , e t c . , being a n i r v 2 c y a a r e not rea l . T h i s

i s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e srti I ' r n r t t i ~ e t ~ v e I. satyamwe

Hence both bh%da and abh5da cannot be regarded a s r e a l , one

of them should be r e a l , e i the r bh.'eda o r abh%da. By the I

arguments g i v e n above, Gcaspat i Mis ra has demonstrated that

bheda is s n i t v a c s n ' I y a and u n r e a l , end t h a t abhzda alone i s rn

ultimately real. This is the ground on which it is

e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t k = t s s t h a n i t y a t a i s t h e u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y b u t

not parinxmanityata: a

T a a f i t k;tarthe n i t y a t a i v a ptarsmar'athlki, na paringmi

nityat%ti siddham. 4

Since V z $ ' ~ . s p a t i ~ i & r a has s a i d t h a t avidye i s completely

rooted o u t th rough t h e exper ience i n the form o f r e a l i s a t i o n

created by the upZsan,a ( con t inuous a p p l i c a t i o n of mind t o

Jravana, manana and nididhyzrana of t h e srti s t a t e m e n t s ) . 0 m

He has rejected what i s known as P r a t i p a t t i v i d h i . There

are four p r a t i p a t t i s i n t h e case af brahman:

(i) The p r a t i p a t t i created by l i s t e n i n g t o ( i r a v a n a )

I the Upanisads,

( i i ) P r a t i p a t t i t h rough t h e unders tanding of t h e ~ ~ a n i l a d i c

s t a t e m e n t s .

( i i i ) P r a t l p a t t i t h rough t h e cont inuous a p p l i c a t i o n of mind

t o t h a t knowledge.

( i v ) P r a t i p a t t i in t h e form of s 'akJatk;rayft t i .

C a t e a r a h rn p r a t i p n t t a f o brahnave, prathami t i v a t u p a n d a d I

&kya A a v a n a m ' a t r a t bhav i , yam k i l a ? c a t f a t c s r a v s n s m i t i , dvitly; rn~rnims~ sahib tasmzdeva upandad vzkyad yarn rcaksate mananamit i , t r i t i T a c i t t a r a n t a t i m a y f , yam I' ' acaksate nididhy 'asanamit i , c a t u r t h i s>ksatk%avati ' * - v ~ t t i r u p a , n'.nteryakam h i t i s f a h kaivalyamiti. .

5 I

Herr, ~ i c ~ s ~ a t i ~ i $ r a argues t h a t t h e first p r a t i p a t t i arises

a u t o n ~ a t i c a l l y i n a person who knows t h e r e l a t i o n between ' the

Word8 and the meanings. The second one a l s o a r i s e s auto- .

matically i n ~ u s h a person. The t h i r d type of p r a t i p a t t i

is created by the first two prst ipatt i s themsc?lvcs. The

f o u r t h t y p e of p r a t i p a t t i i s a t t a i n e d through con t inuous

a p p l i c a t i o n of mind t o t h e knowledge so derived. Hence,

none of these depend upon any a c t i o n p r e s c r i b e d . I n o t h e r

words, t h e y do .no t depend upon any v i d h i a t a l l :

~ a t r ~ d y e t ~ v a t p r a t i p a t t i v i d i t s pada t a d a r t h a s y a v i d i t a v'akya p a t i gzcar'l nyiyasya $a pumsa? u p a p a d y l t e eva, iti r;a t a t r a karn'apSksa. fi eva s i n t a m a y b tritryam p r a t i p a t t i m prasuv'ate i ti na

t e t r b i k a r m ~ p 3 k s ~ . Sa ca jdara nafrantarya d i r g h a k s l a s z v i t a sgksztktrava t i m zdat t a eva p r a t i - p a t t l m c a t u r t h i m i t i ' n a t a t r z p y a ~ t i , kar.'ap;k,s;. ~annsn ta rzya rn ca k a i v a l y a m i t i na tasy=pi karrnlp%ks=. 6

I a

I Thus, on t h e ground t h a t sravana etc . , p r e s e n t them-

s e l v e s before an eligible person, vzccaspati ~ i l r a ha8 r e j e c t e d

P r a t i p a t t i v i d h i w i t h regard t o t h e s e .

I t is n e c e s s a r y t o n o t e h e r e , t h a t Mandana ~ l l r a i s in

favdur of accep t ing karma along with upzsaria in the form of

' Nididhyfrsana f br t h e e r a d i c a t i o n of t h e impress ion of' mithyfi-

jnina which is l i k e l y t o remain even a f t e r t h e knowledge of

t h e upenidadic s t a t e m e n t s (Brahmasiddhi , ~ ~ 3 5 ) . In t h i s '

r e g a r d , ~ i l r a i s t o t a l l y opposed t o t h e stand take6

by M4nd.n. Milrab He is of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t karma is n o t

a t a l l necessary either for upkana ( i n the form of nidi-

argument is t h a t one who has the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the world

i n v o l v i n q t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of t h e a c t i o n , a g e n t , instrument ,

the manner of a c t i o n and t h e f r u i t of ac t ion i s not r e a l ,

c a n n o t be an adhikari for karma.

y ~ t t o u anuvartante s%ms=rik%h pratyaya! tad vyava-

hzrascn , t a t h a p i t a n apyayarnm vyavahlea pretyafan n i thGt i manyami8no vidvan na d r a d d a t t e . . . tath'. f a ayam k r i y % t , ka~:r, karm%ti kartavyatgphala prapangam at% t tvikam v i n i s c invan ka tham adhilccto - 7 nama. . .

I Thus, Vzcaspati Misra does not accept t h e combination

of jn"ana and karma f o r t h e f i n a l m5ksa (anubhava of

brahrngtmatva) which i s created by r e a l i s a t i o n ( s % k s i t k z r a ) ,

As e l u c i d a t e d i n several contexts i n h i s tihl:mati, I ~ ; ~ a o p a t l Miara's concept ion of m'okse c o n s i s t s i n a s t a t e of

the b l i s s f u l consciousness of t h e self, a f t e r e r ad i ca t i ng

avidya t h rough t h e r e a l i s a t i o n of brahmaikya:

t3rahm;nubhavo brahma s>ksltkErah parama puru?'nrtha;, n i r y ~ s t a n f k h i l a duQkba paramhanda r t p a t v a t . 1

Mukti i s not something produced (utp'adya) o r modif i -

c a t i o n (vikzrya) or refined ( samsk:rya) or a t t a i n e d ( 8pya).

Hence, i t , i s n o t proper t o say t h a t m5ksa which i s mixed

wi th i m p u r i t y of avidya i n t h e s t a t e of sams;ra, becomes

manifest t h rough . t h e re f inement of up:sana ( r e l i g i o u s medi-

t a t i o n ) . T h i s i s because mukti means the n a t u r e of brahman

i t s e l f . I t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o t h ink of the v e i l of avidya

in the case of brahman, t h a t avidya i s fur ther s a id t o be w

anirvacaniya. T h e r e f o r e , brahman ( w h i c h i s m u k t i ) is

eternally pure. Hence, t h e q u e s t i o n of r e f i n i n g i t w i t h

upisana does not arise a t all. Those who a c c e p t avidya as

associated w i t h brahman t h i n k that brahman i s rendered impure

by avidya and t h a t i t requires t o be pu r i f i ed by some process

( k r i f i ) . But , even this process i s t o be contended:

' nrahmafitre ~ \ n k a r a b h % ~ ~ a , pub l i shed by ~ u k z r a m ~ q a j i , '

edited with Notes by ~ > a n i ~ n a n t h k r i s h n a s = f t r y and v k u d e v

L ~ ~ i h m a n b l s t r y , . . ~ ~ n ~ l k a r , ~imnavas;gar Yrers, Bombay, 1917,

Ni tya guddhatvam itmano ariddham sarna'argva~th=yam

av idya mal ina t v a ' d i ~ l iank'lm nirH k a r o t i ( na) kuLa?? ( krly='alrayatv'anupap.t te?). ~ Z v i d T a b r a h d l r a y a . k l n t u j i v e , s'a t u a n i r ~ a ~ a n ? ~ ' . i t yuk tam, tens n l t ~ a

s l d d h a m ~ v a brahrna . ~ b h y u p ' e t y a t u d u d d h i m kriy; same ka'tyatvam dfayatG. 2

Thus, i t is shown by v i c a s p a t i ~ i ! r a t h a t mukt l which

i s t h e s t a t e of brahman i t s e l f i s n o t a t a l l samskzryar

T a t t v a t a s t u na krifa na sarnsk%rah. 3

It may be asked whether there is no kriy'a a t a l l in & k y . If there i s no kr iya a t all, then all the isstras meant for

I

t e a c h i n g it and a l l t h e p r a v r t t i s directed towards it become b *

p u r p o s e l e s s . T h i s c o n t e n t i o n i s answered by t h e bh'.fya

statement:

~asm:d j nznam:kam rnuktv; kriyaya gandham%trasyzpi

enuprav%:a i h a nzpapadyate. 4

v>aspa t i ~ d r a a n t i c i p a t e s an o b j e c t i o n hers t h a t jn&a

Could be c o n s i d e r e d as mutual a c t i o n ( rnznas lkr iya) . How

can you s a y t h a t i t i s not t h e s u b j e c t of a v i d h i ? At th is

p o i n t he elucidates by saying t h a t j$na may be regarded a s

mental action. B u t , it cannot produce any r e s u l t i n t h e

brahmgn because i t is s e l f - m a n i f e s t (svayamprak'ada) and does

not dopond upon any r e l a t i o n of krifa and karma ( a c t i o n ,

object); -- - - . - .-

T a t kl. mzkse kriyaiva n'arti, t a t h a ca tadarth'ani a *

k t t r i ? i t a d a r t h r s ~ a p r a v r t tayo anarthekfni i t y a t b a .

upa.amh>ravy=j en'! - ( tasm'sd jn%nam%kamiti) . A t r a j 6 n a m kriy'a mllnaai kaamanna vidhlg%$era??. . . Satyam j 8 n a m d n a a i kr iy 'a ; natviyam brahmavi

# phalam janayi tum a r h a t i - t a s y a svayam prakasa taya v i d h i k r i y a karma bhzvanupapa ttag. 5

Therefore, it i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t rnukti i s t h e r e o u l t

of jn3na.

I t i s s a i d i n C3ndogyat$i ( 4 . 1 5 ) t h a t t h e amznava

purusa l e a d s t h e s2dhaka t o a t t a i n brahman: I

~m%navah s a et%m brahmagamayati. 6

I t may be asked h e r e , whether m u k t i i s s a i d t o be a t t a i n -

able h e r e (pr'lpya). This doubt i s c l e a r e d ' b y v i t a s p a t i

~ d r a i n his ~ h z m a t i . He says t h a t t h e j i v a a l t h o u g h

i n f i n i t e i n n a t u r e , t h i n k s , due t o t h e impress ion of avidya-

karma as d i v i d e d and as d i f f e r e n t from t h e wor ld , I n t h i s

c o n t e x t the !:ti s t a t e s t h a t t h e up5saka proceeds a l o n g the

' a r $ i r % d i p a t h l and attains k~ryabrahma. B u t , i n t h e case

of a person who h a s t h e r e a l i s a t i o n of avidya does n o t have

t h e d i f f e r s n t i a t i o n among t h e ganff ( o n e who a t t a i n s ) , g a t i

( p a t h l e a d i n g t o i t ) , gantavya ( t h a t which i s t o be a t t a i n e d )

and garnayit= ( o n e who l e a d s t o t h a t a t t a i n m e n t ) . Hence, i n . . - h i s case,. b r a h m ~ n i s n o t pr2pya. Some people Say t h a t just

a e a monkey a t t a i n s a g a i n the t r e e which was a t t a i n h d by i t ,

s i m i l a r l y , brdhman which was a t t a i n e d can be once aga in

a t t a i n e d by t h e j i v a . This view i s n o t t e n a b l e . I n t h e

example, t h e monkey l o s e s what was a t t a i n e d e a r l i e r through

s e p a r a t i o n and l a t e r a t t a i n s ano the r by a s s o c i a t i o n , but

s u c h a t h i n g i9 not p o s s i b l e i n t h e m a t t e r on hand (d ' l r s ta .h t ika)

All such concep t ions a s gantr, g a t i , e tc . , a r e being regarded 8 b

a s r n i r v a c a n l y a , the knower i brahma jn"anin does n o t

a t t r i b u t e any r e a l i t y t o them. Hence, mukti i s n o t some-

t h i n g t h a t i s a t t a i n e d . It i s nothing but t h e s t a t e of

blissful c o n s c i o u s n e s s through t h e removal of avidya by

v i r t u e o f brahmasiksatk2ra:

Tat tvam asi vakyar tha saksatkarat pr:k k i l a j iv5tma

a v i d y a karma v8san%dyupady=vacc~dad v a s t u t a h I . I

anava5:inna avaccinnamlva abhinn'opi lok'ebhyo s I

bhinnamiva atm'anam abhimanyam'ana? svar'ipad a nyzn

apr3pt;n a r e i r z d i n lokarn ga tya ;;notiti y u j y s t a . A d v a i t a b r a k a t a t tva s'ak1(1tkars v e s t u v i g a l i t a

n i k h i l a prapanczvabh%a vibhramasya na gantavyam, na g a t i h , na gamryit 'arah, iti kim Lena sangatam7

I Tasmad anidarsanam nyagkdha samyzga vibhaga

nyagr5dha v'anara t a d g s t i t a t sarnyzga vibhaganam mith'b bh'Bdat. Naca t a t r 3 p i p r z p t a pr'8pti?.

~ e r m a j f i n a h i v i b h ~ i e n a viruddh2y'em purva p r g t o u - aprzptar yafva uttaraprzpterupapattieh. Etadapi vas tutah o vic3rarahatay.a o sarvam anir;e5aniyam

v i l r m b h i tarn avidy'ay'ah samutpannadvaita t a t t v a ~ k b t k ~ r a h na vidv& abhimanyate.

7 m e

Thus, ~ z p a s ~ a t i ~ i i r a d i s c u s s e s thoroughly the' q ~ e ~ t i ~

of u ~ l i n d ~ a t v f i , vlk'lryntva, n i c . , o r m u k t i nlai rntntrl ishes

t h a t i t canno t be regarded as ut<atiya, e t c . I t may be noted

t h a t h i s f i n a l answer i s a g a i n on t h e ground of an i rvacaKiya ta

of a l l t h a t i s c o n s t i t u t e d by avidya .

J ivanrnukt i :

Like Mandana ~ i i r s , v;caspati ~ i : r a has accep ted t h e

c o n c e p t of J ivanmukt i i n a d v a i t a philosophy. J i v a n m u k t i i s

a c c e p t e d i n so f a r as t h e r e a l i s a t i o n of brahman i s concerned.

When t h e self remains i n i t s s t a t e of b l i s s f u l consc iousness

w i t h t h e t o t a l e r a d i c a t i o n of avidya through brahrnas'aksgtk%ra

it i s J ivanmukt i . T h i s a d v a i t a s=ksztkara does n o t e r a d i - . s a t e prz rabdha karma. v;caspati ~ i t r a says ! a l though the

r e a l i s a t i o n of a d v a i t a brahma being opposed t o t h e v a r i e t y

of t h e world d i s p l a y e d by b e g i n n i n g l e s s av idya , can be

opposed t o a l l f r u i t s of karma coming w i t h i n i t s f o l d , even

t h e n i t destroys a t once t h e fund of karma which h a s not

taken i t s e f fec t b u t n o t t h a t fund of karma which h a s a l r e a d y

taken effectt1. Otherwise i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o unders t and

.S t o how t h e enl ightened sages l i k e Hiranyegarbha , Menu,

Udd'Llaka ets., c o n t i n u e d t o l i v e f o r a long time. T h e r e f o r e

it must be a d m i t t e d t h a t v idzha mukti i s no t p o s s i b l e u n t i l . the pr%rabdha bhzgs is not exhausted . This i s t h e s ign l f i-

Cancs of the uprni:sdic s t a t e m e n t , ' t a ~ y a t ' rvadsva ciram, I

yjvanna vimtks; a tha sampatsfe (ckndhya , V I . 14.2):

Yadyapi a d v a i t a brahms t a t t v a G k G t M r a h anadya- vidyEp%darbi ta prapancamztra v i r o i h i t s y ' a t%n

madhya p a t i t a s a k a l a Gama v i rodh i ; t a t h z p i anzrabdha VIP'. kam k5ryajatam dr ' ag i ty lva s amucp ina t t i . natu k ~ b h d h a vipakam.. . ka rma j l t an i . . . anyatha d e ' v a r l i n ~ m hiravyagarbha man'uddilaka prabhrtxnam v i g a l i t; n i k h i l a k l i s a jadavarna t a y a p s r i i a h pradyata- mzna buddhi s a t t v ~ n z m na jyog J i v l t a bhavget . ~ f c y a t e ca akam s r t i smrti i t ih ' asa p u r i n i s u t a t t v a j i v i k a Fa

b 6 0

; c r h ~ k a l ~ e nanvant'arldl j i v i t a c . : . tamniad lgamanu- a t r a t a h a s t i pr'arabdha vifak'anim karrna&m ~ r a k f i a v y a

I

tadcya samasta pha l ipabhGa prat:ksa s a t y a p i t a t t v a

s2ks;tka're.' 8

Here, xrabhdha vipaka karmafata and tattvas%ks:tkara,

the fo rmer a case of a j n h a and t h ~ l a t t e r a case of j&a,

are s a i d t o e x i s t s imul taneous ly . I t may be argued t h a t

t h e m u t u a l l y opposing things cannot ex i s t t o g e t h e r . I n t h i s I

c o n t e x t it i s a rgued by G c a s p a t i Misra t h a t t h e r e i s no r u l e

d e b a r r i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of j f i n a and arnana t o g e t h e r . It

i s found i n t h e wor ld t h a t t h e knowledge of two moons

( d v i c a n d r a ) remains even a f t e r t h e knowledge of one moon I

(ekacandra) has a r i s e n . Even when t h e i l l u s i o n of t h e s e r p e n t C

i s gone , i t s e f fec t s such a s f e a r , t rembl ing , e t c . , cont inue .

I n this i l l u s t r a t i o n , t h e knowledge and the fear bo th appear . t o be real . Y e t , it cannot be argued t h a t i t is n o t appl ' i cab le

' t o the Point i l lustrated (dirstiintika) . This is bicclurc

n e i t h e r t h e knowledge nor the fear is real. both a r e

anirva:anIya. If one a n i r v a p a a y a arises o u t of another

a n i S $ y a , t h e r e i s no occas ion f o r wonder:

Y ad; l 5 k e p i virodhin%h kine it k:lam sahgnuy;t t i - r t p a l a b d h i tad; i h a &'benab;l'l t dErghak%lamapi b h a v a t i t i Aakfi v i ~ % a y l t u m ; pramxna s l d d h a s y a n iyzga paryanuyzga anupapat feh. 9

Na ca jnzna krrya bhaya kamp'adayah j n z n a G t r a t

a n u t p l d a t. Sarpzva$$dohi tasya bhaya kampan'adi h t t u h s a p s a a a n a n i r v a c a n i y a i t i ku tz v a s t u t a p

~ % ~ o t p ~ d a h ? Na5a k;jarnapl bhaya kamFadi v a s t u s a t ; t a sy ' ap i v i $ h a ' s a h a t v e n a an i rv 'kcya tva t . ~ n i r v % c y % c c e I * - an i rv%y%tpa t tou nanuupapatti?. ~'adrs'o h i y=ksah

10 ' . a . t z d r s o b a l i r i t i sarvam avadGtam.

Thus , it is argued t h a t t h e r e i s no th ing wrong i f

J i v a n m u k t i i s a c c e p t e d i n s o f a r as the b r a h r n a s ~ k s ~ t k = r a a

i s concerned, a l t h o u g h vidGhamukti w i l l have t o a w a i t t h e

e x h a u s t i o n of a l l pr5rabdhakarma. Th i s is t h e a d v a i t a s t a n d

which Mandsna ~ i $ r a h a s e l u c i d a t e d w i t h t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of

s t r i k i n g o r i g i n a l p o i n t s . F i n a l l y , it may be no ted t h a t

~ z c a o ~ ~ t l ~ i l r a does n o t agree w i t h the view of ~ a n d i n a ~ i : r a CY

who says t h a t s t i t h a p r a j n a means t h e szdhaka h i m s e l f .

v&asPat i M ~ Q ~ ~ argues t h a t t h e s t h i t h a p r a y n a i s n o t t h e

s=dhBka because t h e e a r l i e r c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e l a t t e r do not

s t a n d i n the l i g h t of improvement o f h i s knowlcdgc ihhrouqh

subsequent s t t l d i e s . Uut the sthithaprayna is the one

whose knowledge i s unsurpassab le . He is indeed the siddha

( t h e accompl i shed e o u l ) :

~ t h i t h a p r a 3 a s ~ a na s'idhaks?; taaya u t t a r % t t a r i - dhyayan5t ka r szna p h v a p r a t y a y ' a n a v a s t i t a t v a t . ~ i r a t i s ' a ~ a s t u ; t h i t h a p r a j ~ a h saca s iddha eva . 11

CONCLUSIONS

I Thus, an account of the c o n t r i b u t i o n of vitaspati Misra

t o a d v a i t a v e d a n t a i s g i v e n under d i f f e r e n t t o p i c s . Thanks

t o t h e valuable e f fo r t s of v;caspati ~ i i r a i n h i s ~ h z r n a t i

t h e d v a i t a d v a i t a doctrine once a g a i n received a setback.

Many o f t h e view. of Mendana ~ d r a had begun t o f l o w i n as 1

the v i e w s of S e n k a r a i n course of time. The o r i g i n a l

doctrine t h a t apar'bksajn?jna arises directly from t h e v h k y a -

j n i n a r e c e i v e d a shock. Onco a g a i n a d o c t r i n e t h a t

brahmaprspti came through t h e r e a l i s a t i o n a r i s i n g from the

prasankhy"ana i n t h e form of c o n t i n u o u s a p p l i c a t i o n of mind

t o fSna ( j n z n a b h y Z s a ) cane i n t o vogue. When vzfaspeti ~ i t r a

wrote t h a t ! i r a v a n a t and 'manana' meant 'dhzrana' and

dardana meant t s a m ' d h i ' , a c o n c e p t i o n became deep r o o t e d .

among t h e s d v a i t i n s t h a t ~trnas=k:;tk=ra was n o t p o s s i b l e

without t h e a i d bf yzgasamldhi:

Atra dxGtavy% mrntavya i t i dh'.rangpadi6ah

The fo l lowing quest ionr are worth cons ider ing i n adve i ta

vedantar

(1) Are the j i v a s one or many?

( 2 ) .Is the j i v a t h e pratibimba or i t s amla?

( 3 ) What i a t h e means for s\ksa"tkzra?

These questions became a l l the more important because #

v z c a s p a t i Misra has formulated h i e views on them, ee already

po inted out earlier i n this chapter, Further, t h e p r a c t i c e

o f grafting the material of ~ ~ r v a m ~ m " a s ~ , ~ f a y a , ~ z n k h y a and

Yoga t o the d o c t r i n e s of Vedanta came i n t o vogue. The

a n i r ~ a c a n l ~ a t a v z d a acquired greater importance. The method

of showing t h a t a l l dva i ta i s a n i r ~ a c a ~ ~ a v through arguments

became t h e means of pro tec t ing the main doc tr ine of Advaita

Sikidhanta, It came to be realised t h a t the resort of Advaita

was o n l y Srti whlch i s ~ ~ a u r l ( s ' ~ a . These deve lopmntr were b b

the results of ~ t c a o ~ a t i ~iira's efforts i n h i r ~ h g m a t l .