1

ContradictioninTerms:NationStates,IndividualRightsandRefugeePolicy

intheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights

In1945delegatesfromfifty‐onenationscametogethertodraftthecharterofthe

UnitedNations.Twoyearslateranothersetofrepresentativescametogethertodraftthe

UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR).Thefirstdraftingprocesswasmeanttogive

nationstatesaforumtosolvedisputesandprotectnationalsovereignty.Thesecondwas

intendedtoarticulateandprotectindividualrights.Thoughamarkofprogressforindividual

rights,theforceoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightswasnonethelessbluntedbya

preemptiveconcernfornationalsovereignty.Thiswas,andis,adocumentsettingoutthe

universalrightsofindividuals,butwrittenbyrepresentativesofnationstates.Itisadocument

proclaimingthesovereigntyofindividualscraftedwithinthecontextofagreatdeferencefor

nationalsovereignty.Thegoalofshapingauniversalplanktosecureindividualrightswas

doomedfromthestart–astheUNreallyhadnopowertoenforcetheserightsandnationshad

littleobligationtoupholdthem.Thistensionbetweentheguaranteeofindividualrightsandthe

primacyofthestatewasevidentfromtheoutsetofthedraftingofthedeclaration.

Theassertionofnationalsovereigntyisalsoquiteevidentintheinternationalconflict

takingplacesimultaneously:theArab‐IsraeliWar.TheArab‐IsraeliWarwasthefirst

internationalconflictandinstanceofhumanrightsviolationwithwhichtheUNwasconfronted

asitattemptedtolayoutastandardofuniversalhumanrights.Itwasthefirstnon‐theoretical

ElyseBrouhardThesisdraft,final5‐9‐11

2

eventwithwhichtheUDHRwasputindirectconversation.Thedraftersmadeitclearthatthey

wereawaretherefugeefalloutfromthewarwaspreciselythetypeofsituationthedeclaration

wasmeanttoaddress,andtheemergingdeclarationprovidedaframeworkthroughwhichthe

warwasapproached.Ultimately,thesetwoevents,thedraftingoftheUDHRandtheArab‐

IsraeliWar,examinedintandemilluminatetheimpasseandconflictbetweentherightsof

nationstatesandthoseofindividuals,particularlywhenwelookatthestatusofrefugees.

Nevertheless,theUDHRisregardedbymanyasalandmarkofprogresswithintherealm

ofhumanrights,asoneofthefirstinternationalinstrumentstorecognizetheuniversalityof

certainindividualrights.However,thecontradictioninherenttothedocumentislargely

overlooked.Theconceptofagroupofnationstatesensuringuniversalrightstoindividuals–

rightswhichitisoftennotintheirbestinteresttoensure,andwhichtheyhavenorealimpetus

tocompelthemtoabideby–isinherentlycontradictory.

OnlyonemonthaftertheendofWorldWarTwo,delegatesmetinSanFranciscoto

draftthecharterthatwouldestablishtheUnitedNations.1TheUNwasfoundedasa

replacementofsortsfortheUN’spredecessor,theLeagueofNations.TheLeagueofNations

hadbeendeemedafailureduetoitsinabilitytopreventthewar.AftertheSecondWorldWar,

theworldcommunitymadeasecondattemptatforminganinternationaladministrativebody.

TheUnitedNationswas,inmanyways,verysimilartotheLeague.MarkMazower,scholarof

Europeanhistory,callstheUnitedNations“awarmed‐upLeague”becausetheLeagueandthe

UNboreaverycloseresemblancetooneanother.However,theUnitedNationsdifferedfrom

theLeagueinsomesignificantways,perhapsmostsignificantlysointhatvetopowerwasgiven

1EmmaHaddad,TheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereigns,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),78.ThewarinEuropeendedMay8thandtheUNCharterwassignedJune26th

3

totheBigThree(thenamegiventotheUS,USSRandUK).Thisspecificchangemade“thegreat

powers...simultaneouslybothmorewillingtosupporttheUN–sinceitcouldnotactagainst

them—andmorewillingtoignoreit(forthesamereason).”2

InNoEnchantedPalace:TheEndofEmpireandtheIdeologicalOriginsoftheUnited

Nations,MazowerwritesacriticalreviewoftheoriginoftheUnitedNations.Hetakesahard

lookatthemotivesbehinditsfounding,andgivesarealisticevaluationoftheefficacyofthe

organization.Specifictoitshumanrightspolicy,hewritesthateventhoughtheLeagueof

Nationsgetsaharshassessment,itreallyhadbetterhumanrightsprotectionsthantheUN:

“minoritieswouldfindlessprotectionundertheUnitedNationsthantheyhaddoneunderthe

League...TheUnitedNationsbecameanevenfiercerdefenderofnationalsovereigntythan

theLeaguehadbeen.”3Despiteitsaimsatprovidingmoreprotectionforindividuals,theUnited

Nationsultimatelyachievedless,inthisregard,thanitspredecessorhad.Particulartorefugee

rights,theUNputinplaceabillofrightsthatdeferredtonationalpower.However,Emma

Haddad,ResearchAssociateattheUniversityofOxfordRefugeeStudyCentre,comparesthe

LeagueofNationsandtheUNinadifferentway,sayingthattheLeagueofNationshada

positiveviewofsovereigntythat“sawastate’sinternalsovereigntyastheguaranteeofthe

protectionofindividualsquacitizens,thenegativeviewofsovereigntyupheldbytheUnited

Nationssawastate’sexternalsovereigntyastheguaranteeoftheprotectionoftheindividuals

quaindividuals.”4WheretheLeagueofNationssawthemeansofprotectionforindividualsto

2MarkMazower,NoEnchantedPalace:TheEndofEmpireandtheIdeologicalOriginsoftheUnitedNations,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009),16.3MarkMazower,NoEnchantedPalace:TheEndofEmpireandtheIdeologicalOriginsoftheUnitedNations,(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009),24and25.4EmmaHaddad,TheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereigns,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),137.

4

resideintheirstatusascitizensofnationstates,theUNattemptedtomakeindividualrightsa

universalguarantee,regardlessofcitizenship.TheUDHRwasakeypartofthischange.Adopted

in1948,theUDHRwasoneofthefirstinternationalinstrumentstorecognizetheuniversal

natureofindividualrights.

Withintheliteratureonhumanrights,refugees,andinternationalpolicy,thereisa

generalrecognitionofthisdilemmabetweensovereigntyandrights,butfewmakeaspecificor

detailedanalysisoftheinconsistencywithintheUDHRitself.Attheinitialadoptionceremony

oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,EleanorRooseveltsaid,“Westandtodayatthe

thresholdofagreateventbothinthelifeoftheUnitedNationsandinthelifeofmankind.This

declarationmaywellbecometheinternationalMagnaCartaofallmeneverywhere.”TheUDHR

hassincebeenreferredtoasthechangingpointinthehumanrightsmovement,the

preemptorynormforinternationalpolicy.Scholarsonthesubjectagreethat,althoughthe

Declarationwasadoptedwithoutanenforcementmechanism,ithasrevolutionizedthe

internationalhumanrightsregime.In“TheDeclarationofHumanRightsinPostmodernity,”

diplomatandprominenthumanrightsactor,JoseAlvesexaminestheDeclarationinrelationto

postmodernity.Alves,likemanyscholars,writesoftheDeclaration’spivotalroleinthehuman

rightsmovement:

Formorethanhalfacentury,theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,proclaimedbytheUnitedNationsin1948,hasplayedanextraordinaryroleinthehistoryofmankind.Itcodifiedthehopesoftheoppressed,supplyingauthoritativelanguagetothesemanticsoftheirclaims...Itlaunchedanewandprofusejuridicaldiscipline,theInternationalLawofHumanRights...Itsetparametersforevaluatingthelegitimacyofanygovernment,replacingtheefficacyofforcebytheforceofethics.5

5JoseLindgrenAlves,“TheDeclarationofHumanRightsinPostmodernity,”HumanRightsQuarterly22.2(2000),478.

5

AlvesacknowledgestheDeclaration’sflaws,butisintriguedbywhatheseesastheimpactit

hashadinspiteofthis.OtherscholarsagreewithAlvesabouttheUDHR’smonumentalimpact

onhumanrightslawandpractice.JohannesMorsinkwrites,“Inthelate1940sbelieversin

humanrightshadtofightforintellectuallegitimacy,abattletheyfinallywononaccountofthe

horrorsperpetratedbytheNazis.Now,asthedocumentpassesitsfiftiethanniversary,critics

havetomaketheircaseagainstthebackgroundoftheextraordinarysuccessthatthe

Declarationhasbecome.”6Morsinkreferencesalonglistofinternationalhumanrights

instrumentsandcourtcases,allofwhichreferenceorwereinspiredbytheUDHR,asproofof

itssuccess.7LikeMorsink,JamesNickelwritesinMakingSenseofHumanRightsoftheUDHRs

roleininfluencinghumanrightshistoryandpolicy:“TheUniversalDeclarationhasbeen

amazinglysuccessfulinestablishingafixedworldwidemeaningfortheideaofhumanrights.”8

He,too,citesanumberofinternationalinstrumentsinspiredbytheUDHR.

SpecifictorefugeerightsandtheUDHR,Haddadexplorestherolesofrefugeesin

internationallaw.ShewritesinTheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereignsthat

“withthenewemphasisonindividualrights,asimmortalizedinthe1948Universaldeclaration

ofHumanRights,refugeeswererecognizedasindividualswitharighttoprotectioninastate.”9

Shedoesnotgoontomentionthatthisrecognitionhaslargelybeeninnameonly.Itisoften

notpointedoutthattheprogressmarkedbytheUDHRwasprimarilyabstract.W.M.Reisman

6JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),xi.7TreatiesandconventionsinspiredbytheUDHRinclude:theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(1950),theConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees(1951),theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(1966),TheAmericanConventiononHumanRights(1966),andasmanyasfortyothers.8JamesNickel,MakingSenseofHumanRights,(Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,2007),9.9EmmaHaddad,TheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereigns,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),137.

6

writesaboutsovereigntyinrelationtointernationalhumanrightsinhisarticle“Sovereigntyand

HumanRightsinContemporaryInternationalLaw.”Hefocuseshisdiscussionmorespecifically

onstateversuspopularsovereigntyintermsofgeneralelections,buthecreditstheUniversal

DeclarationofHumanRightswith“dethroning”thesovereign.Healsoclaimsthat“noserious

scholarstillsupportsthecontentionthatinternalhumanrightsare‘essentiallywithinthe

domesticjurisdictionofthestate’andhenceinsulatedfrominternationallaw.”10While

Reismanistechnicallycorrectinhisassertion(becausethehumanrightsreformafterthe

SecondWorldWarchangedtheassumptionthatstatesaresolelyincontroloftheirinternal

affairs)theideaisnonethelessonlytheoreticallyupheld,especiallywhenitcomestorefugees.

Inpractice–forexampleduringtheArab‐IsraeliWar—refugeeswerenomoreguaranteed

protectionafter1948thantheyhadbeenbeforetheDeclarationwasdraftedandendorsed.

TheadoptionoftheUDHRin1948spurredthecreationandadoptionofanumberof

subsequenttreatiesandconventions.However,continuingrefugeecriseslikethePalestinian

refugeesfromthe1948Arab‐IsraeliWardemonstratetheproblematicnatureofupholdingthe

principlesenshrinedintheUDHRandthefollowingconventions,fromtheveryoutsetofits

creation.InDecember2008,theGeneralAssemblyoftheUNcelebratedthe60thanniversaryof

theUDHR,wheretheyrecognizedtheimpactoftheUDHRbutalsothecontinuingneedfor

betterpracticalenforcementofit.MartinUhomoibhi,presidentoftheUNHumanRights

Council,spokeatthe60thanniversaryoftheDeclaration:“Simplyput,humanitytodayno

longerlacksthehumanrightsinstrumentstopromote,protectanddefendhumanrightsand

fundamentalfreedoms.However,whatissorelyneededisforStatespartytoexistinghuman

10W.M.Reisman,“SovereigntyandHumanRightsinContemporaryInternationalLaw,”AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,84No.4(1990),868and869.

7

rightsinstrumentstotakethepracticalstepsnecessarytoimplementtheirprovisionsforthe

benefitofallmankind.”11Thus,over60yearslatertheUDHRremainsastheoreticalastheday

itwasdrafted.TheUNhasnomorepowertoenforceitsprinciples,andnationstatesjustas

littlereasontoliveuptothem.Inhisdiscussionofhumanrightshistoryandpractice,Charles

Beitzwritesthat“internationalhumanrightspracticenotoriouslylacksastandingcapacityto

enforcemanyoftherightslistedinthemajortreaties,andevenwhenanenforcementcapacity

exists,itusuallyappliesselectivelyandoftenonlyatthesufferanceofthosestatesagainst

whichitmightbeused.”12

IagreethattheUDHRisnotpracticallyeffective;itisofgreattheoreticalsignificance

withoutanysubstantialapplication.Thislackofeffectivenessischieflyduetotherootconflict

ofsovereigntybetweenstatesandindividuals.Iexaminethisconflictthroughaclosereadingof

therefugeearticleswithintheUDHR,andthroughacarefulexaminationoftheUNdebates

surroundingthedeclaration.ThoughtheUDHRisimportantfortheideologicalchangeit

effected,itsdownfallhasbeenthatthegreatideaspromotedwithinitlackapracticalmeansof

enforcementorstateswillingtorigorouslyapplythem.Beitzwritesthat“onereasonwhy

governmentsfounditpossibletoaccepttheprincipleofinternationalconcernforhumanrights

wastheexpectationthattheUNwouldrespectthedomesticjurisdictionofstatesbyrefraining

frominterventionintheirinternalaffairs.”13TheUDHRwasadoptedbecauseitsdrafterswere

comfortedbytheknowledgethattheywouldnotbeforcedtoabidebyit.TheUDHRwasa

majordevelopmentintherecognitionofuniversalrights,butwhatmadenationstateswilling

11U.N.GeneralAssembly,63rdSession.65thMeeting,MeetingRecord.10Dec.2008(A/63/PV.65).12CharlesR.Beitz,TheIdeaofHumanRights,(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford:2009),3.13CharlesR.Beitz,TheIdeaofHumanRights,(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford:2009),21.

8

tosignitinthepasthasmadeitsenforcementproblematicinthepresent.Iarguethatthe

UDHRisbothconsequentialandinadequate.Thoughanimportantstepforwardinthe

recognitionofhumanrights,thesupremacyofnationalsovereigntycrippleditsefficacy.The

declarationdebateswerefraughtwiththistensionbetweennationalpowerandindividual

rights,andthefinalarticulationofrightswithintheUDHRdisplaysthisconflict.Lastly,the1948

Palestinianrefugeecrisisshowsthiscontradictioninpractice.

TheinitialrefugeeproblemwithwhichtheUnitedNationswrestledaftertheSecond

WorldWar,whendraftingtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,actuallyhaditsoriginsin

theFirstWorldWarandtheshiftininternationalrefugeepolicyinthe1920sand1930s.Tofully

understandthepolicychangesthatcameinthepost‐warera,itisnecessarytooutline

internationalrefugeepolicyduringtheFirstandSecondWorldWars.

DuringandaftertheFirstWorldWar,immigrationpolicychangedthroughouttheworld.

Specifically,nationsbeganpassingstrictimmigrationquotastolimitthenumberofimmigrants

allowedintotheircountrieseachyear.Inherbook,RefugeesinInter‐warEurope,Claudena

SkranwritesthattheabruptendoftheperiodoffreeimmigrationbeganintheUnitedStates.14

TheU.S.setitsfirstimmigrationquotain1921,whichestablishedlimitsonthenumberof

immigrantsallowedeachyearandattemptedto“ensureacertainethniccomposition.”15Other

nationssoonfollowedsuit.Thissameperiodofimmigrationquotassawthedevelopmentof

otherbarrierstoimmigration:theinstitutionofapassportsystem,stricterbordercontrol,and

14ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),21.15EstherRosenfeld,“FatalLessons:UnitedStatesImmigrationLawDuringtheHolocaust,”UCDavisJ.Int'lL.&Pol'y,1995.p.2.AndClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),22.

9

alienregistration.Thisrestrictionofimmigrationfurthercomplicatedtherefugeeproblemby

addingobstaclestointernationalmobility.16

IntheyearsprecedingtheSecondWorldWar,therefugeeexodusinEuropebecamea

crisis.AfterHitlercametopowerin1933andsubsequentlyembarkedonbuildingtheThird

Reich,Germansbeganfleeingthearea.Initiallythemajorityofthosefleeingwerepolitical

opponentstoHitler;latertherefugeeswerepredominantlyJewish.AtthesametimeasHitler

wasbuildinghisReichinGermany,FranciscoFrancowasrisingtopowerinSpain.Shortlybefore

thewar,hundredsofthousandsofSpaniardsjoinedtherefugeeexodusastheyfledFranco’s

regime.17Fewnationswerewillingtotakeinmorethanafewhundredofthethousandsof

Europeanrefugees.

Thereluctancetoacceptrefugees,inparticularthoseofJewishdescent,wasaggravated

byeconomichardshipandtheNazilawsimpoverishingemigrants.Theworldwideeconomic

depressionlastedfarintothe1930s,andconsequentlymostnationswerereluctanttoexpand

theirpopulations.18Nazipolicyfurthercomplicatedemigrationissues.NazilawsstrippedJews

ofpropertyandbankaccountsbeforetheywereallowedtoemigrate.Hitleraskedtheworldto

takeinimpoverishedrefugeeswhowouldnothavebeenwelcomeunderthemostideal

circumstances.Nationsoperatedunderstrictimmigrationquotasystemsthatsetlimitsonthe

16ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),21and22.17MichaelRobertMarrus,TheUnwanted:EuropeanRefugeesfromtheFirstWorldWarthroughtheColdWar,(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,2002),123.18RichardRubensteinandJohnRoth,ApproachestoAuschwitz:TheHolocaustandItsLegacy,(Atlanta:JohnKnoxPress,2003),122.

10

numberofrefugeesallowedfromeachcountry.Intheend,onlyoneintwelveEuropeanJews

wasabletofindrefugeabroad.19

In1938,aftertheAnschluss20andthesubsequentincreaseinpressuretotakein

refugees,U.S.PresidentRooseveltcalledforaninternationalconferencetodiscusstherefugee

crisis.OnJuly6th1938,delegatesfromthirty‐twonationsconvenedinEvian‐les‐Bains,France.

ThefocusoftheconferencewasonrefugeesinEurope,particularlyJewishrefugeesfrom

GermanyandAustria.21TheConferenceresultedinarecognitionofthegrowingcrisisin

Europe,butafirmunwillingnesstoofferhelp.ThechairmanoftheEvianConference,former

U.S.SteelCorporationCEOandpersonalfriendofRoosevelt,MyronC.Taylor,stressedthe

importanceofnationalsovereignty.Otherdelegatesfollowedsuitand,and,whileexpressing

“supportforthehumanitarianprinciple”behindrefugeeaid,statedconcernfortheirown

nationalwelfare.22Allinall,thedelegatesconcludedthatnationswereunabletoaidrefugees

andstressedtheimportanceofindividualmigrationthroughprivateorganizations.TheEvian

ConferenceresultedinthecreationoftheIntergovernmentalCommitteeonRefugees,but

offeredlittlehelptorefugeesthemselves.23

TheattitudetowardsrefugeesattheEvianConferenceandotherwiseduringthisperiod,

wasfraughtwithracialundertones,asasubstantialpercentageofimmigrantsduringtheinter‐

warperiodwereJewish.WhentheleadersofNaziGermanypursuedapolicyofmassexpulsion

19MartinGilbert,TheHolocaust,(NewYork:BraunCenterforHolocaustStudies,1994),11‐12.20Anchlussliterallymeans“union”or“connection.”AnchlusswasthenamegiventoHitler’sannexationofAustriain1938.21ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),211.22ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),209and212.23ClaudenaSkran,RefugeesinInter‐WarEurope:TheEmergenceofaRegime,(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),214.

11

fortheJews,thenationsoftheworldclosedtheirdoors.Ofthe10millionJewsinoccupied

Europe,only800,000foundrefugeelsewhere.Thatisfewerthanoneinsevenofthetotal

numberofJewsmurdered.24ItwasattheEvianConferenceof1938thattheAustralian

delegatesummeduptheattitudeoftheworldtowardtheJews:“Itwillnodoubtbe

appreciatedthataswe[Australians]havenoracialproblem,wearenotdesirousofimporting

one.”25Nonationwantedtheburdenofthousandsofrefugees,particularlyJewishones,andso

theyremainedtrappedinplaceswheretheywereeasilycapturedandlatermurdered.

AftertheSecondWorldWar,asthescaleofatrocitybecameknown,internationalpolicy

towardrefugeescameunderaprocessofreview.Thetragediesofthewarbroughtona

renewedsenseofdutytotheinternationalcommunity.TragiceventssuchastheNazi

HolocaustandtheJapaneseRapeofNanking,putpressureontheworldtotakeresponsibility

forhumanrightsviolations.Thesetragedies,andparticularlythetestimoniesintheaftermath

ofwar,madetheinternationalcommunityfeelremorsefornothavingtakenactionsooner.

Thissenseofresponsibilitywasevidentintheshapingofpost‐warpolicy.

ThepreeminentdocumentoftheUnitedNationsregardingindividualrightsisthe

UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.Auniversaldeclarationofhumanrights,orsomething

withasimilareffect,hadbeencalledforsincethemiddleoftheSecondWorldWarbutwasnot

completeduntillate1948.By1943,thedemandfor“somesortofhumanrightsplank”within

theprospectivepeacetreatieswasfervent;privateorganizationsevenbegantakingthe

initiativetodrafttheirownversionsofaninternationalbillofrights.”WhiletheCharterofthe

UnitedNationsdidnotincludeabillofrights,itdidmandatetheestablishmentofa

24MartinGilbert,TheHolocaust,(NewYork:BraunCenterforHolocaustStudies,1994),13.25MartinGilbert,TheHolocaust,(NewYork:BraunCenterforHolocaustStudies,1994),12.

12

CommissiononHumanRights,withtheassumptionthatthiscommissionwouldthendraftan

internationalbillofrights.26Withanincreasinglyintensedemandforanexpressionofhuman

rights,theHumanRightsCommissionbegandraftingTheDeclarationin1947.Thedrafting

processlastednearlytwoyears,fromJanuary1947toDecember1948,insevenstagesthat

includeddifferentcommitteemeetingsanddebatesthroughoutwhichthearticulationofthe

declarationwasrefined.27

ThedraftingoftheDeclaration,likethefoundingoftheUNandthedraftingofrelated

legislation,washeavilyinfluencedbytherecenteventsoftheSecondWorldWar.Inhishistory

ofthedraftingoftheUDHR,JohannesMorsinkwritesaboutWorldWarIIasacatalystfor

humanrightsreform:“thedraftersmadeitabundantlyclearthattheDeclaration...hadbeen

bornoutoftheexperienceofthewarthathadjustended.”28Inthefinaldebate,inwhichthe

GeneralAssemblyputtheDeclarationtoavote,theinfluenceofthewarwasfirmlystated.

Throughoutthetwoyeardraftingprocessaswell,theroleoftheSecondWorldWarasa

catalystwasoftennoted.Specificallyrelatingtotherightofrefugees,anumberofdelegates

citedthewarasareasontoguaranteetheserights.ThedelegatefromBelgiummentionedthat

“[article13]wasofvitalimportance:theprinciplesoffreedomofmovementandfreedomof

residencehadtobestressedatthemomentwhenthewarandtheresultingupheavalshad

demonstratedtowhatpointthatprinciplescouldbetroddenunderfoot.”29Theatrocitiesthat

26JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),1‐3.27JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),4.28JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),36.29U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),322.

13

theinternationalcommunitywitnessedduringtheSecondWorldWarmadethenecessityof

theserightsblatantlyobvious.Itwasforthesereasonsthatthemembersincludedaclause

referringtothewarinthepreambletotheDeclaration,whereitstatesthattheDeclaration

wasdraftedbecause“disregardandcontemptforhumanrightshaveresultedinbarbarousacts

whichhaveoutragedtheconscienceofmankind.”30Thisclauserefersbacktotherecent

atrocitiesandthewayinwhichtheyinspiredareformofhumanrightspolicy.Itisalmost

universallyagreedamongscholarsthatthemodernhumanrightsmovementcameoutofthe

SecondWorldWarandthelegacyofthetragediesthathadoccurred.31DavidWeissbrodtand

ConnieDeLaVegaagreethat“thewardemonstratedthatunfetterednationalsovereignty

couldnotcontinuetoexistwithoutuntoldhardshipsand,ultimately,thedangeroftotal

destructionofhumansociety.ItwasoutofthetraumaofWWII...thatthemodernhuman

rightsmovementwasborn.”32TheSecondWorldWarprovidedimpetusforthecreationof

universalhumanrightspolicy,butthesewell‐intendedaspirationseventuallyfelltothe

interestsofthestate.

TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsmarkedanimportantrecognitionofboth

individualanduniversalrights.TheUDHRwasthekeydocumentthatfomentedthe

developmentofhumanrightslaw.Priortothepostwarperiod,“thewayaStatetreatedits

30U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession,Plenary.UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.10Dec.1948(A/res/217A).31However,MarkMazower,inhisbookexaminingtheUnitedNations,notestwoscholarswhodonotseethe1940sasthebeginningofthehumanrightsmovement;SamuelMoyninparticulardoesnotbelievewecandatetheoriginofthemodernhumanrightsmovementbeforethe1970s.31AsweexaminethedraftingprocessoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,itisclearthatWorldWarTwoactedasacatalystforthebeginningofmodernhumanrightspolicy.32DavidWeissbrodtandConnieDeLaVega,InternationalHumanRightsLaw:AnIntroduction,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2007),21.

14

citizenswasregardedasaninternalmatteroverwhichithadsovereigncontrol.”33Afterthe

war,theperspectiveontherightsofindividualsascitizenschangeddrastically.Thewayastate

treateditscitizenswasnolongerconsideredaninternalmatter,butratheraninternationalone

(thoughthisdistinctionwasnotnecessarilytrueinpractice,thewardidchangethe

internationalideology).TheDeclarationacknowledgestheuniversalrighttolife,freedomof

speech,belief,movement,andfreedomfromfear,persecutionanddiscrimination.Articles13,

14,and15specificallyrelatetotherightsofrefugees.Thesearticlesacknowledgetherightto

freedomofmovementandresidence,therighttoseekandenjoyasylum,andtherightto

nationality.34

TheUDHRisofparticularimportancebecauseitwasthefirstinternationaldocument

thatacknowledgedtheuniversalityofparticularrights–rightsthatwerenotdependenton

belongingtoacertainstate.FollowingtheadoptionoftheUDHRalmostall“multilateral

instruments”werebasedontheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.35Forexample,

legislationofparticularimportancetorefugees,suchasthe1951ConventionRelatingtothe

StatusofRefugees,hasusedtheUDHRasakindoflegalfoundation.TheUDHRquiteobviously

playedapivotalroleinthedevelopmentofanewhumanrightsideology.Theextenttowhich

itsroleremainspurelyideological,however,isequallycrucial.

33ErikaFellerandVolkerTürk,RefugeeProtectioninInternationalLaw:UNCHR’sGlobalConsultationsonInternationalProtection,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),37.34JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),332.35EmmaHaddad,TheRefugeeinInternationalSociety:BetweenSovereigns,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),74and78.

15

TheContradictionInherent

ManyarticlesintheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightscameupagainstthenewly

invigorateddemandforindividualrightsandalongstandingdeferencefornationalsovereignty.

Noneofthearticlesfacedoppositionlikethearticlesconcerningfreedomofmovement,

asylum,andnationality.36Articles13,14,and15wereparticularlytroublingforthedrafting

committeesastheyinvolvednotjustonestate,butthecooperationofmanystatestoallow

mobilityfromoneplacetoanother.(SeeAppendixforthefulltextofthesearticles)

Thelanguageofthesearticlessparkeddebatefromtheveryoutsetofthedrafting

process.ThedraftingcommitteeaskedJohnHumphrey,DirectoroftheSecretariat’sDivisionon

HumanRights,todraftapreliminaryversionofadeclaration.37Humphrey’s“base”draftwas

thenreviewedbythelargerdraftingcommittee,theCommissiononHumanRights,the

EconomicandSocialCouncil,andtheGeneralAssembly.Throughoutthesedifferentsessions,

thelanguagewaschangednumeroustimes,oftenwithnationstatesaskingformoreambiguity

andlessresponsibilitywhileNGOsdemandedstrongerprotectionsforindividuals.38Itwasthe

meetingsoftheThirdCommitteethatfinalizedtherefugeearticles.

Sessions120through124oftheThirdCommitteeoftheThirdSessionoftheGeneral

Assemblyconcernedthearticlesaboutrefugeesandasylum,whichbecamearticlesthirteen

throughfifteenoftheDeclaration.WhileArticles13and15demonstratetheconflictbetween

statesrightsandthoseofindividuals,theprovisionsofArticle14broughtonaparticularly

36JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999,72.37JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),5.38JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),76and77.

16

ferventdiscussion.Article13concernsfreedomofmovementandresidence,article14theright

toasylum,andarticle15therighttonationality.

Article13particularlywasnotseenasmuchofathreattonationalpower.The

discussionofthisarticlewaslargelyfocusedontheamendmentputforthbytheUSSR,which

attemptedtorestrictthescopeofthearticleindeferencetonationalsovereignty.Unlikeinthe

discussionthatfollowedforarticle14,mostofthestatesdidnotfeelthreatenedbythe

provisionsofarticle13–largelybecauseArticle13“presupposedthattheindividualinquestion

hadalreadyobtainedpermissiontoenterthecountry,therightofentrybeinggovernedbythe

legislationofthecountryconcerned.”39Consequently,themajorityofthedelegatesopposed

theUSSRamendment.

TheUSSRamendmentsoughttoaddthewords“inaccordancewiththelawsofthat

State”totheendofparagraphone,statingthat“Everyonehastherighttofreedomof

movementandresidencewithinthebordersofeachState.”Andalsotoincludetheclause"in

accordancewiththeprocedurelaiddowninthelawsofthatcountry,”afterthewords

"Everyonehastherighttoleaveanycountry,includinghisown.”40Thegeneralconsensusabout

theUSSRamendmentwasthatitwouldundulyrestricttheprovisionsofthearticle.Whilea

“statewasentitledtodecidehowtheprinciplewastobeapplied;...toincludesuch

interpretationinadeclarationofhumanrightswouldimplytherenunciationoftheinherent

rightsofmankind.”41ThisopinionwasvoicedbythedelegatefromChile,andconfirmedbythe

39U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),319.40U.N.CommissiononHumanRights,3rdSession.ReportoftheThirdSessionoftheCommissiononHumanRights.28June1948(E/800),11and41.41U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),remarkbytheChileandelegate,316.

17

otherdelegates.Itwasfeltthat“adocumentdrawnupinthatsensewouldbeadeclarationof

theabsoluterightsoftheStateandnotadeclarationofhumanrights.”42Obviouslythetension

betweennationalsovereigntyandindividualrightswasapparenttothedraftingdelegations,

However,theywereabletobeidealisticaboutsacrificingnationalsovereigntyonlyaslongas

thissacrificeremainedtheoretical.Assoonasthediscussionturnedtoasylum,theiridealism

quicklydissipated.

Whileanumberofstatesfoundarticle13troubling,43themajoritywerecomfortable

withit,andarguedagainstputtingmorerestrictionsonit.Duringthisdebate,mostnations

actuallyexpresseddivergentconcernsfromtheonestheywouldexpressonlyadaylater,

duringthedebateonarticle14concerningasylum,inwhichtheyexpressedconcernsabouttoo

muchinfringementuponnationalsovereignty.Inthearticle13debate,delegatesinstead

voicedcautionsaboutgovernmentrestrictions.TheHaitiandelegatefelt,“government

restrictionsrancountertotheaspirationsoftheuniversalconscience;theymightbetolerated

asatemporarynecessity,buttherecouldbenoquestionofincludingtheminthe

declaration.”44ThePhilippinesdelegationagreedthat“theamendmentsproposedbytheUSSR

delegation,ifadopted,wouldnullifythemeaningofarticle[13],becauseinsteadofestablishing

commonstandardstogovernthemovementsofpeopleingeneral,theCommitteewouldbe

sanctioningthedeplorablestateofaffairswhichexistedintheworld.”45Thissamepointcame

upduringthediscussionofArticle15–ontherighttonationality–andwasagainpointedata

42U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),316.43LargelytheEasternBlocstates(USSR,Poland,UkrainianSSR,andBelarus).44U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),318.45U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),318.

18

USSRamendment.TheUSSRdelegate,AlexeiPavlov,“wishedtostressthefactthatthe

questionofnationality–bywhichwasmeantaspecificrelationshipbetweentheStateandthe

individual—fellentirelywithintheinternalcompetenceofeachState.Tograntnationalityorto

takeawaywasaprerogativeofsovereignStateswithwhichnothirdpartyshouldinterfere.”46

Theresponsetothispositionwastoreiterateadesirenottosanction“thedeplorablestateof

[world]affairs.”ThedelegatesrespondedtoPavlovwithremarksabouttheintendednatureof

thedeclarationbeingtosetaninternationalstandardandtobeabastionofprincipleforthe

nationsoftheworld.Thedelegatesfeltcomfortablebeingidealisticwhentheyweresecurein

theirsovereignty.TheChileandelegaterespondedtotheUSSR,remarking:

[the]purposewasnottoimposelawsonanysovereignState,buttoenablethepeopleofaStatetojudgeforthemselveswhetherthelawsunderwhichtheylivedwereinconformitywiththeprinciplesofthedeclaration.IftheHitlerregimewerestillinexistence,theresultofadoptingtheUSSRamendmentwouldbetojustifytheactsofthatregimeratherthantoprotectindividualsagainstthem.47

EleanorRooseveltagreedwiththeChileandelegateabouttheneedforsovereignstatestogive

upalittlepowerinordertoconformmorewhollywiththeDeclaration:“Tostatethatfreedom

ofmovementshouldbegrantedonlyinaccordancewiththelawsofeachcountrywouldbe

equivalenttolimitingthefundamentalrightsoftheindividualandincreasingthepowersofthe

State.”HereRooseveltexpressedadesiretoplaceindividualwell‐beingabovestatepower.

However,whenthedebateturnedtotherightofimmigrationorasylum,nationswerequickto

46U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.123rdMeeting,MeetingRecord.5Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR123),355.47U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.123rdMeeting,MeetingRecord.5Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR123),357.

19

restrictthescopeofthearticle,towillingly“increasingthepowersoftheState”and“limiting

thefundamentalrightsoftheindividual.”48

WhentheissueofimmigrationcameupbrieflyinthediscussionofArticle13,andlater

withinthediscussionofArticle14,manydelegatesquicklyreversedtheiropinionsonsacrificing

statesovereignty.RooseveltsympathizedwiththeviewexpressedbytheHaitiandelegate

“especiallywhenheexplainedthateverymanshouldhavetherighttosettleinthecountryof

hischoice”butshefeltthatbecause“economicconsiderationshadforcedcertaincountriesto

takelegalmeasuresrestrictingimmigration...Adeclarationofhumanrightsshouldnot

containprinciplestheapplicationofwhichwasrenderedimpossiblebyexisting

circumstances.”49Thisattitudetowardsovereigntyandimmigrationandasylumisfullyevident

withinthearticle14discussion.

Article14,ensuringtherightofasylum,wasthemostcontestedarticleinthe

Declaration.JohnHumphrey,authoroftheoriginaldraft,wroteinhismemoir,“Noarticlein

theDeclarationhasbeenmorecriticizedthanArticle14,whichsaysthateveryonehastheright

‘toseekandenjoy’asylumfrompersecution.Thisgivesnorighttoasylumbutonlyarightto

enjoyitonceithasbeengranted.Itwasprobablytoomuchtoexpectthatgovernmentswould

giveuptheirdiscretionarypowerunderinternationallawtorefusetoallowforeignerstoenter

theirterritories.”50Humphreyhimselfrecognizedthereluctanceofnationstatestorelinquish

powerinhisoriginaldraftinwhichhe“sidetrackedtheissuesayingmerelythat‘everystate

48U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),319.49U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.120thMeeting,MeetingRecord.2Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR120),319.50JohnP.Humphrey,HumanRightsandtheUnitedNations:AGreatAdventure,(NewYork:TransnationalPublishers,1984),70.

20

shallhavetherighttograntasylumtopoliticalrefugees,’arightwhichwasalreadyrecognized

byinternationallaw”andwhichdidlittletoactuallyfurtherthestatusofrefugees.51Hisdraft

wasamendedtoincludestrongerguaranteesforrefugeeslargelyduetotheinfluenceand

lobbyingofnon‐governmentalorganizations,butthefinaleditingofthearticlewouldstripout

itsstrongestlanguageinfavorforguaranteesmoreamendabletonationstates.

InNovember1948,duringthefinaldebateonthedeclaration,amendmentstothis

articlehadbeenproposedbyeightcountries:Bolivia,Cuba,Egypt,France,SaudiArabia,the

UnitedKingdom,Uruguay,andtheUSSR–allseekingtoamendthearticlestatingthat

“Everyonehastherighttoseekandbegranted,inothercountries,asylumfrompersecution.”52

Thediscussionincludedwhowouldberesponsibleforensuringasylumandwhetherembassies

wouldcountasportsofasylum,butmostofthediscussionconcernedtheextenttowhichthe

articleguaranteedrefuge.Manyofthedelegatestookissuewiththefactthatthearticlewas

guaranteeingtherighttobegrantedasylum.Theyarguedthatthisinterferedwiththe

sovereigntyofthenation,andthattheyoughttoretainthechoiceofwhenandtowhomto

offerrefuge.

ThedebateongrantingasylumbeganwithMargeryCorbetoftheUnitedKingdomand

herreservationsaboutthearticle.TheUnitedKingdomdelegationstatedthatitwasreadyto

“guaranteethatanypersecutedpersonaskingforrefugewouldbetreatedwithsympathy,”but

that“noStatecouldaccepttheresponsibilityimposedby[article14].”53TheUnitedKingdom

51JohnP.Humphrey,HumanRightsandtheUnitedNations:AGreatAdventure,(NewYork:TransnationalPublishers,1984),70.52U.N.CommissiononHumanRights,3rdSession.ReportoftheThirdSessionoftheCommissiononHumanRights.28June1948(E/800).53U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),330.

21

feltthatadoptingarticle14wouldbeimpossible“asnoforeignercouldclaimtherightofentry

intoanyStateunlessthatrightweregrantedbytreaty.”Corbetexplainsthatheramendment

includesthephrase“toenjoyasylum”asopposedto“tobegranted,”andthatthisisabetter

representationoftherighttheassemblywastryingtosecure.TheUnitedKingdomsupported

theSaudiArabianamendment(whichproposedtodeletethewords“andbegranted”fromthe

article),butthoughtitshouldbephrasedas:“Everyonehadtherighttoseek,andtoenjoy,in

othercountries,asylumfrompersecution.”Thisstructuringofthearticlewasamenable

becauseitlimited“theobligationoftheState,”butstillprovidedsomerecourseforpersecuted

people.54

SaudiArabiaagreedwiththeUnitedKingdominthatassuringtheright“tobegranted”

asylum“wouldbeaflagrantviolationofthesovereigntyoftheStateconcerned.”55Because

article14didnotincludeprovisionsforconsultingtheStatesaboutofferingrefuge,ordelineate

whowouldberesponsiblefordirectingpersonstoparticularcountriesforasylum,“thearticle

promisedmorethanitshould.”56Themajorityofthestatessupportedthisposition.The

Australiandelegationvoicedsupport,saying“eachStatemustbefreetodecidetheformin

whichthatright[ofasylum],havingbeenproclaimedinthedeclaration,shouldbeapplied.”57

Thestates’obviousconcernfortheirownpowereclipsedthemorehumanitarianconcernof

securingprotectionsforrefugees.

54U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),330.55U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),331.56U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),331.57U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),338.

22

Theseviewsexpressingconcernfornationalsovereigntywerecounteredbythe

delegatesfromLebanon,PakistanandPoland.Mr.AzkoulofPakistanthoughtthatthe

“conceptionoftherightoftheindividualhadbeenreplacedtoacertainextentbythatofthe

obligationoftheState.Thestatementofarightshouldnot,however,dependonthepossibility

ofStatestocomplywiththatright.”58ThisisexactlytheproblemtheAssemblywaswrestling

withinthisdiscussionofrefugeerights:therightsofastateversustherightsoftheindividual.

Azkoulwasrightinseeingthattheobligationsofthestateweretakingprecedenceoverthe

rightsoftheindividual.Thoughtheybeganwithveryhumanitarianandidealisticintentions,the

delegatessoongotboggeddowninstatepoliticsanddeferencefornationalsovereignty.

PolandthoughtthattheUKandSaudiArabianamendmentwouldweakenthearticle.

UncharacteristicallyforPavlovoftheUSSR,whohadthusfarbeenaferventadvocateofstate

sovereignty,hepushedfortherightnotonlytoseek,butalsotoreceive,asylum:“TheUnited

Kingdomamendmentaffirmedtherighttoseekasylum,butthatwasoflittlevalueunlessthere

wereprovisionsforimplementingit.”59Ultimatelythewords“tobegranted”asylumwere

deletedinfavoroftheideaof“enjoying”asylum,whichputlesspressureonthestatesto

ensureasylum.

ContradictioninPractice

IntheintroductiontohisbookontheUnitedNationsandPalestinianrefugees,Edward

Buehrigwritesthatpoliticalrefugees“arethetragicproductofanincompatible

58U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.121stMeeting,MeetingRecord.3Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR121),335.59U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.122ndMeeting,MeetingRecord.4Nov.1948(A/C.3/SR122),343and344.

23

juxtaposition.”60Hereheisreferringtoconflictslikeclass,religionandideology,butrefugees

arejustaseasilyaproductoftheincompatiblejuxtapositionbetweennationalsovereigntyand

individualrights.Refugeesareoftenunsafeorunhealthyinonecountry,butunwantedby

another.AtthetimeofthedraftingoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,crisesmade

boththenecessityandthecontradictionofthedeclarationevident.TheArab‐IsraeliWarof

1948triggeredamassiverefugeeexodusthatleftthousandsofrefugeescaughtinastruggle

betweennationalsovereigntyandindividualwelfare.Theuseoftheserefugeesinthepolitical

bargainingbetweentheArabstatesandIsraelexemplifiesthedisregardofindividualrightsin

favorofstateconcerns.

ThelongstandingrelationshipbetweentheUNandPalestinemakestheexampleofthe

UDHRandtheArab‐IsraeliWarespeciallymeaningful.TheUNhasbeeninvolvedinthe

Palestineconflictlonger“thaninanyotherregionaldispute.”Itwasinvolvedfromtheoutsetas

crafterofthetwo‐statepartitionplan,asheadoftherefugeereliefeffort,andaspeacekeeper

andmediator.61TheUNplayedakeyroleintheescalationoftheproblemandmorethansixty

yearslatercontinuestopoliceit.Furthermore,theUNsinvolvementinPalestinedeveloped

concurrenttoitsdraftingofauniversalhumanrightsplatform,andthisdeclarationprovideda

backdropforUNactionsinPalestine.

TheoriginsoftheArabJewishconflictinPalestinearecomplexanddateback

considerably.However,theparticularsofthe1948warbeginwithTheBritishMandatein

Palestine.AftertheFirstWorldWar,someterritoriesoftheOttomanEmpire,ofwhich

60EdwardH.Buehrig,TheUNandthePalestinianRefugees:AStudyinNonterritorialAdministration,(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1971),3.61NathanPelcovits,TheLongArmistice:UNPeacekeepingandtheArab‐IsraeliConflict,1948‐1960(Boulder:WestviewPress,1993),1.

24

Palestinewasone,weredividedintomandates.TheLeagueofNationsmandatetransferred

controlfromtheOttomanEmpiretovariousalliedcountries.TheUnitedKingdomgained

controloftheareain1917,andwasofficiallygivenamandatetoadministeranewlydefined

Palestinein1923.62

Throughouttheperiodofthemandate,therewasconstantconflictamongJews,Arabs,

andtheBritish.PalestinianArabsdemandedanArabPalestinewhileZionistJewsrefusedto

curbimmigrationortamedemandsforaJewishstateinPalestine.DuringtheFirstWorldWar,

andtheentiretyofthemandateperiod,theBritishmadepromisestobothgroups,thoughthey

weremoreconsistentlysupportiveofaJewishstate.TheBalfourDeclarationof1917stated

outrightBritishsupportforaJewishstateinPalestine,andthisdeclarationwasincludedasa

partoftheofficialmandateoverthearea.AfteranArabrebellionin1936,theBritishwithdrew

someoftheirpromisestotheJews,andmadeanattempttorestrictJewishimmigration,but

theirprevioussupportforaJewishstateinPalestinehadalreadybothalienatedandinjuredthe

Arabsthere.63

InFebruary1947,BritaindecidedtorelinquishcontrolofPalestineduetoaninabilityto

findanacceptablesolutiontotheconflictandanincreasingdifficultyinmaintainingcontrol

overthearea.64TheMandatewouldnotofficiallyenduntilMay1948,butthe“problem”of

PalestinewasofficiallyhandedovertotheUNinFebruary.65InMaytheUnitedNationsSpecial

CommitteeonPalestine(UNSCOP)wasformedtocreateasolutionfortheconflictinPalestine.

62BennyMorris,1948:AHistoryoftheFirstArab‐IsraeliWar,(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008),11.63IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),84and107.64BennyMorris,1948:AHistoryoftheFirstArab‐IsraeliWar,(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008),15and37.65IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),121.

25

InAugust,UNSCOPpresentedapartitionplantotheGeneralAssemblythatsuggesteddividing

Palestineintotwoseparatestateswithaneconomicunion.Theplanwashotlydebatedinthe

Assembly;deliberationslasteduntilNovemberof1947andtheplanstillbarelymanagedtoget

therequiredtwo‐thirdsmajorityforadoption.Ultimately,theplanwasacceptedbytheJewish

communitybutrejectedbythePalestinians.66

OnSeptember1,1947,thedayafterthepartitionplanwasbroughtbeforetheGeneral

Assembly,fightingbrokeoutinPalestine.Thewidespreadviolencesoonbecameafull‐outcivil

war.67PalestinianArabsriotedandattackedJewishownedbusinesses.InDecember,theArab

HigherCommitteeorganizedastriketoprotesttheadoptionoftheUNpartitionplan.68The

PalestinianArabswereoutragedbythepartitionplanthatgave“37percentofthepopulation

55percentoftheland(ofwhichtheyownedonly7percent)”andwhichforcedthemfromthe

mostfertileland.69TheJewsrespondedtoArabattackswithattacksoftheirown.Thecivilwar

was“characterizedbyguerrillawarfareaccompaniedbyactsofterrorism.”70Thiscivil‐war

betweenPalestinianArabsandJewsintheregionlasteduntilMay1948,whentheBritish

MandateinPalestinewasterminatedandtheArab‐Israeliwarbegan.

TheArab‐IsraeliWarofficiallybeganaftertheJewishnationdeclaredstatehoodonthe

14thofMay,anticipatingtheconclusionoftheBritishMandate.FiveArabstates(Egypt,Iraq,

Jordan,LebanonandSyria)respondedbyinvadingthenewlycreatednation.TheArabStates

66IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),125.67IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),127.68YoavGelber,Palestine,1948:War,EscapeandtheEmergenceofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem(Sussex:SussexAcademicPress,2006),16.69BennyMorris,1948:AHistoryoftheFirstArab‐IsraeliWar,(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008),65.70BennyMorris,1948:AHistoryoftheFirstArab‐IsraeliWar,(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008),77.

26

weremotivatedbyastrongdesirenottohaveaJewishstateestablishedamongtheirown

nations.TheywerefurthermotivatedtoinvadebythesteadyrefugeeflowfromPalestineas

wellastheincreasingcertaintyofPalestinianArabfailureintheconflict.Israel’sdeclarationof

statehoodandtheinvasionbytheArabstatestriggeredfurtherfightingbetweenJewishand

Arabgroupsinthecitiesandontheroads.71

Thefirstwaveofrefugeescamebeforethewarevenbegan.AftertheUNGeneral

Assemblyresolutiononthe29thofNovember1947sanctionedthedivisionofBritishcontrolled

Palestineintotwostates,ArabpeoplebeganleavingtheJerusalemandJaffaareas.Thecauses

oftherefugeeexoduswerethen,andarestill,ferventlydebated.Bothsidesblamedtheother

fortherefugeecrisis:“accordingtotheArabHigherCommittee,some550,000Palestinian

ArabshadbeenforcedtoleavetheirhomesasaresultofJewishattacks”butaccordingto

Israel,“mostofthese[refugees]hadleftPalestineduringrecentmonthsinthewakeofthewar

launchedagainstIsraelbyneighboringArabStates,partlyinobediencetodirectordersbylocal

Arabmilitarycommanders,andpartlyasaresultofthepaniccampaignspreadamong

PalestinianArabsbytheleadersoftheinvadingArabStates.”72Itislikelythatthecauseofthe

refugeeexodusisacombinationofmanyevents.TheinvasionbytheArabstatesexacerbated

theinstabilityalreadypresentintheregion;duringthecivilwarthatprecededtheofficialArab‐

IsraeliWar,thereweresporadicattacksbetweenArabandJewishgroups,aswellasa

persecutioncampaignfocusedontheArabsbytheHaganah.73Inthemonthsleadinguptothe

officialoutbreakofwar,PlanDalet,aZionistoffensiveagainstArabswasenacted.This71BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),13.72TheUnitedNations,YearbookoftheUnitedNations1947‐1948,447.73HaganahwasaJewishParamilitarygroupthatlatebecametheIsraeliDefenseForces.BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),67.

27

campaignincludedforcedmigration,attacks,rapes,andanumberofmassacresofArab

villages.74Theoutbreakofwaronlyincreasedtherefugeeflow.ByJuly1948itwasclearthata

refugeecrisiswasat‐hand.75Bythistime“400,000‐500,000Arabshadbeendisplacedbythe

fighting.”76Therefugeecrisiswasaconcerntotheinternationalcommunity,andparticularlyto

theArabstates,butnoonestatefeltthattheycouldorshouldtakeresponsibility.Therewasa

generalcallfortheUNtoheaduptherefugeereliefeffort.

ThePalestinianrefugeesfirstcameunderdiscussionatthe117thand118thmeetingsof

theThirdSessionoftheUNGeneralAssembly–atthesamesessioninwhichtheywere

conductinganarticlebyarticleanalysisoftheUDHR.FollowingtherecommendationofUN

envoyFolkeBernadottethattheUNtakechargeofrefugees,thecommitteeinitiateda

discussionregardinghowbesttoprovideaid.Themeetingminutesofthe117thmeeting

recognizethatthecaseofthePalestinianrefugeeshadrelevancetotheuniversaldeclarationat

hand.Theminutesstate,“theThirdCommitteewasnolongerfacedwithanabstractideaof

humanityasdescribedinthedeclarationofhumanrights,butwithaspecificcase.”77TheArab‐

IsraeliWarpresentedthecommitteewithanopportunitytomoveawayfromtheabstract

principlestheyweretryingtouphold.Theyacknowledgedthat“thosefineideasand

stimulatingprovisionshadbeenviolatedinthemostmanifestfashioninthecaseofthe

74DavidGilmour,Dispossessed:TheOrdealofthePalestinians,1917‐1980(London:SidgwickandJackson,1980),68and69.75EdwardH.Buehrig,TheUNandthePalestinianRefugees:AStudyinNonterritorialAdministration,(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1971),26.76BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),39.77U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.117thMeeting,MeetingRecord.29Oct.1948(A/C.3/SR117),283.

28

Palestinerefugees.Thatcrimewasbeingcommittedundertheveryeyesofthejudges.”78The

discussioncenteredaroundwherebesttoprocurefundsfromandhowbesttoadminister

them.Thesesessionsledtothedevelopmentofasub‐committeetofurtherexploretheissue.79

Thesub‐committeedraftedaproposalforareliefprogram.AfterreviewbytheGeneral

Assembly,theUnitedNationsReliefforPalestineRefugees(UNRPR)wascreatedonNovember

19th1948.80TheUNRPRwasfollowed,in1950,bytheUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgency

(UNRWA).TheUNRPRwasfundedbytheUN’sWorkingCapitalFundanditsmemberagencies.

Theirfocuswasonofferingeconomicaidfortherefugees.TheUNWRAabsorbedtheworksof

theUNRPRandcontinuesthisworktoday.

TheoriginalUnitedNationsmediatortoPalestine,Bernadotte,whohadrecommended

therefugeesbecomeaUNcharge,wrotetotheAssemblythatthe“choiceisbetweensaving

thelivesofmanythousandsofpeoplenoworpermittingthemtodie.”81Thesolutionbythe

UnitedNations,toofferaidtotherefugeesbutnopermanentrefuge,lefthundredsof

thousandsofrefugeesinalimboofsorts.Refugeecampsstillexistfromthe1948war,more

thansixtyyearslater.TodaytheUNWRAcontinuestoprovide“assistance,protectionand

advocacyforsome4.7millionregisteredPalestinerefugeesinJordan,Lebanon,Syriaandthe

78U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.117thMeeting,MeetingRecord.29Oct.1948(A/C.3/SR117),283.79U.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.117thMeeting,MeetingRecord.29Oct.1948(A/C.3/SR117),279.AndU.N.GeneralAssembly,3rdSession.ThirdCommittee.118thMeeting,MeetingRecord.30Oct.1948(A/C.3/SR118),304.80TheUnitedNations,YearbookoftheUnitedNations1948‐1949,202.81FolkeBernadotte,UnitedNations,ProgressReportoftheUnitedNationsMediatoronPalestine,16Sep.1948,(A/648),53.

29

occupiedPalestinianterritory,pendingasolutiontotheirplight.”82Noonewaswillingtotake

responsibilityfortherefugeesandtodaythesepeoplecontinuetosuffer.

BothIsraelandtheneighboringArabstatesusedtherefugees“asapoliticalpawn.”83

Israelrefusedtolettherefugeesreturn,butlaterusedthemasabargainingpieceinattempts

togainamorefavorablepeacedeal.84DespiteUNsanctionsaskingfortherepatriationof

refugees,theofficialIsraelipolicy,asvoicedbyPrimeMinisterMosheSharett,remainedas

follows:“inthemainasolutionmustbesought,notthroughthereturnoftherefugees

toIsrael,butthroughtheirresettlementinotherstates.”85TheArabstatesinturnrefused

toabsorbtherefugees,hopingthatIsraelwouldeventuallytakethembackandthuseffectively

“destabilize”theJewishstate.Stuckinthemiddleofapoliticalbattlebetweenstates,

individualrightsonceagainweredisregarded.

Israel’sdesireforaJewishstateleftnoroomforthereturnofthousandsofArab

refugees.InamemorandumtotheUnitedNationsConciliationCommissionforPalestine,the

governmentofIsraelwroteinJuly1949:

Theclockcannotbeputback.Sincethisfirstarose,theJewishpopulationhasincreasedby50%.ThequestionofhousingthenewcomerswaspartlysolvedbyplacingthemintohabitablehousesinabandonedArabtownsandvillages.Immigrationcontinuesatanaveragerateof800perday.ThesefiguresalonegiveclearindicationthattheindividualreturnofArabrefugeestotheirformerplacesofresidenceisanimpossiblething.NotonlycanthewholeArabeconomicsystemnotbesimplyrestoredbecause

82TheUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestineRefugeesintheNearEast,“AboutUNRWA,”http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=4783QuotefromMarkEtheridge,PalestineConciliationCommission,inTheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,BennyMorris,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),39.84BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),551.85IsraeliMinistryofForeignAffairs,MemorandumtotheUnitedNationsConciliationCommissionforPalestine,8Aug.1949(A/AC.25/IS.33).

30

itsbasishaspracticallydisappeared;butalsothephysicalreturnoftheArabmiddle‐classessuchasshopkeepers,tradesmen,freeprofessions,hasbecomeaphysicalandgeographicalimpossibility.Theirhouseshavegone,theirjobshavegone.86

TheIsraeliMinistryofForeignAffairssuggestedresettlementinArabcountriesasasolution

morefavorablethanrepatriation.TheArabcountrieswerebothunwillingandunableto

committoincorporationofthehundredsofthousandsofrefugees.Stubbornnessonbothsides

coupledwiththeUN’sinabilitytoenforceitssanctionsledtoastalemateontheissue.Concern

forhumanrightssoonfelltothewayside,asnationalconcernovershadowedthedesireto

secureindividualwelfare.AsthememberstatesoftheUNhadnotadoptedaguaranteeofthe

righttosecureasylum,theUNputpressureonIsraelinanefforttoenforcetherightofreturn,

whichhadbeenestablishedbytheUDHR.Thefinallanguageofarticles13and14inthe

DeclarationhadapivotaleffectonhowthecountriesinvolvedintheArab‐IsraeliWarwere

framed.TheUNrecommendedbothrepatriationandresettlementfortherefugees,but,

becauseoftheinfluenceoftheUDHR,morestronglypushedIsraelontheissueofrepatriation.

TheArab‐IsraeliWarclearlydemonstratesthetragedyofnotestablishingdefinitive

languagetoguaranteerefugeesasylum,butitalsoexhibitsacleardismissalofwhatrightshad

beenguaranteed–specificallytherightofreturn.Thefinaldebateoverarticle13focusedmuch

attentionontherightofreturn.TheworkingdraftoftheDeclarationguaranteedanindividual’s

rightto“toleaveanycountry”andthefinaldebatemadeapointtoguaranteethatan

individualhadtherightto“leaveanycountry,includinghisown,andtoreturntohiscountry.”

ThisrighthasbeenignoredforPalestinianrefugees.ThousandsofPalestiniansfledtheirhomes

86GovernmentofIsrael,MemorandumtotheUnitedNationsConciliationCommissionforPalestineonPrinciplesGuidingtheResettlementofArabRefugees,28July1949,(A/AC.25/Com.Tech/8).

31

andwereneverallowedtoreturn.ThenewlydeclaredStateofIsraelwasthreatenedbythe

ideaofthousandsofArabsreturningtothearea,andrefusedtoletthemback.InAugust1948

theybeganimplementinganofficialanti‐repatriationpolicy.Thisincludeddestroyingor

occupyingPalestinianhomesandvillages.87

OnDecember11th1948theUnitedNationspassedResolution194onPalestine.The

resolutionlaysoutanumberofguidelinesforthesituationinPalestine,perhapsmostnotably,

theresolutioncallsforareturnoftherefugeestotheirhomes:“[TheGeneralAssembly]

Resolvesthattherefugeeswishingtoreturntotheirhomesandliveatpeacewiththeir

neighboursshouldbepermittedtodosoattheearliestpracticabledate.”88Thisdirecturging,

aswellasitsbackingprinciple,Article13intheUDHR,officiallyadoptedonedayprioron

December10th,1948,wasdisregardedbytheStateofIsrael.Israeladamantlyrefusedto

repatriatetherefugees,andtheUNwasinnopositiontoforcethemtodoso.Resolution194

wasthefirstofmanyUNresolutionsurgingIsraeltoacknowledgetherefugee'srighttoreturn.

Infollowingyears,theUNwouldcontinuetosanctionIsrael,petitioningthemtorepatriatethe

Palestinianrefugees.TheUNannuallyrenewsResolution194,andcontinuestoaskIsraelto

"affirmtheinalienablerightsofallinhabitantswhohadlefttheirhomesasaresultofthe

outbreakofhostilitiesintheMiddleEasttoreturnhome,resumetheirnormallife,recovertheir

propertyandhomes,andrejointheirfamiliesaccordingtotheprovisionoftheUniversal

DeclarationofHumanRights."89ThewayinwhichthearticlesintheUDHRwereaffectedbythe

conflictbetweensovereigntyandindividualrightsshapedthewaythe1948Arab‐IsraeliWar87IlanPappe,AHistoryofModernPalestine:OneLand,TwoPeoples(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),145.88U.N.GeneralAssembly,Resolution194,11.Dec1948(A/RES/194(III)).89U.N.GeneralAssembly,CommitteeontheExerciseoftheInalienableRightsofthePalestinianPeople,11March1976(A/AC.183/L.3).

32

wasdealtwith.TheUNhasalsourgedArabstatestoconsiderofficiallyresettlingPalestinian

refugees,buthasdonesowithoutthebackingoftheUDHR,andwithlessforcethanwithwhich

ithasapproachedIsrael.

DespiteUNsanctions,theurgencyofthePalestinianrefugeeproblemsoonfadedfrom

internationalattention.ThoughtheUnitedNationsinitiallyapproachedtheArab‐Israeliconflict

withaferventdesiretobrokerpeaceandimplementtherightsintheUDHR,“intheend,allthe

parties,includingIsrael,accommodatedthemselvestothestalemateofanarmisticepolicedby

theUNpeacekeepers.”90Thischangeinattitudeappliedtotherefugeesituationaswell.The

UNquicklywentfromtryingtoresolvetheproblemtosimplysustainingtherefugeesasthey

were.Thisattitudewasespeciallyapparentthroughoutearly1949,whentheUNbegan

discussingIsrael’sapplicationforUNmembership.JustmonthsaftertheadoptionoftheUDHR

andtheissuingofResolution194,UNmemberstatesshowedlittlecompulsiontoabidebythe

principlestowhichtheyhadagreed.TheArabstatesmadestrongobjectionstoIsrael’s

admission,specificallyduetoIsrael’snoncompliancewiththerefugeesituation.FawziBeyof

EgyptdidnotsupportIsrael’sapplicationandmentionedtherightsgiventotherefugeesbythe

UDHR:“Werethoserefugeesnothumanbeings?DidnotaUniversalDeclarationofHuman

Rightsexist?”TheSaudiArabiadelegationagreedwithBey:“Itwouldbeunwisetoadmit

[Israel]...Theyhadcarriedoutactsofterrorismattheverymomentwhencertaindemocratic

StateswerepromotingtheadoptionoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandwere

abouttosigntheConventiononGenocide....Despitethosefacts,someMembersstill

consideredtheapplicantapeace‐lovingState.”AsBeystates,despiteIsrael’snon‐compliance

90NathanPelcovits,TheLongArmistice:UNPeacekeepingandtheArab‐IsraeliConflict,1948‐1960(Boulder:WestviewPress,1993),7.

33

withtheUDHRandsubsequentUNsanctions,themajorityofthememberstatesarguedto

admitIsraelintotheUN.WarrenAustinoftheUSsummedupthemajorityopinionbyagreeing

thatIsraelneededtoabidebytheUNresolution,buthenonethelessthoughtthat“thelong

discussionofIsrael'sapplicationwasevidenceofthegeneraldeep‐rooteddesireforajust

solutionofquestionsrelatingtoPalestine,andespeciallythoseofJerusalemandtheArab

refugees,”andinlightofthat“theUnitedStatesdelegation,togetherwiththelargemajorityof

membersoftheSecurityCouncilandoftheAdHocPoliticalCommittee,consideredthatIsrael

fulfilledtherequirementsof[membership].”91TheArabStates,withtheirconcernsregarding

Israelandtherefugeecrisis,werehugelyoutnumbered.Israelwasadmittedasamemberto

theUNonMay11th1949.92

Inasomewhathollowgesturetowardsaconclusionoftheconflict,theUNcontinuesto

requestIsrael’srepatriationoftherefugees,andIsraelcontinuestoignorethisrequest.93The

StateofIsraelactivelyignoresindividualrightsinfavorofitsownnationalagenda.Atthesame

time,Arabstatesrefuserefugeescitizenship,denyingthemboththerighttotrueasylumand

therighttonationality.Therefugeetragedystemmingfromthe1948Arab‐IsraeliWar

exemplifiesthetenuousrelationshipbetweentherightsandinterestsofnationstatesand

thoseofindividuals.Bothintheoryandinpractice,nationstatesinfringeuponindividualrights

fortheirownbenefit.Regardlessoftheprogressmadeininternationalpolicy,orthe

promulgationofrights’declarationsandconventions,therightsoftheindividualarenot

secure.

91U.N.GeneralAssembly,207thPlenaryMeeting,MeetingRecord11May1949(A/PV.207).92U.N.GeneralAssembly,207thPlenaryMeeting,MeetingRecord11May1949(A/PV.207).93DavidGilmour,Dispossessed:TheOrdealofthePalestinians,1917‐1980(London:SidgwickandJackson,1980),75.

34

Conclusion

BoththedraftingoftheUDHRandtheArab‐Israeliwarexhibittherepercussionsofthe

tensionbetweenstatepowerandindividualrights.Despitetheambitiousandhumanitarian

intentionsfollowingWWII,numerousfactorsmitigatedthemorehumanitariangoalsofthe

internationalcommunity.InhislargertextontheUDHR,JohannesMorsinkmentionsthat“the

lessonlearnedfromtheHolocaustwaslostinthedisagreementsaboutwhattodoaboutthe

halfmillionrefugeescreatedbythe1948Arab‐Israeliwar.”94Morsinkbrieflysuggeststhatthe

concernsoftheArabstateswerethecausebehindthechangeinlanguageintheUDHR.

However,heglossesoverthefactthatthemostvocaladvocatesforchangingtheprovisionsof

theasylumarticlewerewesternnations,suchastheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom.

ThesenationsdidnotexperiencethesamepotentialaffectoftheunfoldingArab‐Israelirefugee

crisis,yetremainedadamantaboutnotguaranteeingrefugeeasylum.

Still,theUNdiscussionsoftherefugeesfromtheArab‐Israeliwardoillustratetheway

theconflictbetweenstateinterestsandindividualinterestswithintheUDHRplayedout.Yet,

thetwoeventsarenottiedasintimatelyasMorsinkimplies.Becauseofthesimultaneity,itis

temptingtoseeadirectcorrelationbetweenthedraftingoftheUDHRandtheeventsofthe

Arab‐IsraeliWar.Thatis,eithertherefugeecrisisshapedthedebatesandfinalarticulationof

rights,ortheUN’sgrowingconcernforhumanrightsledtheinstitutiontoaddressthe

PalestinianrefugeecrisisinwaysinlinewiththeUDHR.WhiletheArab‐IsraeliWarwasa

legitimatecrisisofhumanrightswithwhichtheUNanditsmemberstateswereconfrontedjust

94JohannesMorsink,TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:Origins,DraftingandIntent,(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,1999),78.

35

astheywereattemptingtoarticulateuniversalrightsforindividuals,thewaractuallyillustrates

theinherentcontradictionofacommunityofnationstateschargedwiththesecurityof

universalindividualrights.Statesholdthepowertoensurerights,buthaverarely

demonstratedthemotivationtoupholdthemwhenworsecomestoworst.Consequently,

Article14oftheUDHRwaspassedwithoutfirmlanguageassertingtherightofrefugees“tobe

granted”asylum,insteadtheywereleftwiththerightsimply“toseekandtoenjoy”asylum.

Otherarticles,likeArticle13regardingtherighttoasylum,whichwerepassedwithfirmer

languagehavesimplybeenignored.And4.7millionArab‐Israelirefugeescontinuetolivea

troubledandstatelessexistence.

However,overthelong‐term,thearticlesintheUDHRandtheparticularwaysinwhich

theyarticulatedthistensionbetweensovereigntyandindividualrightshaveshapedtheway

the1948Arab‐IsraeliWarhasbeenapproached.Becauseofthewaynationalsovereignty

reignedintheUDHRdebates,therighttoasylumwasnotassured,yettherighttoreturnwas.

Becauseofthis,theUNandahostofothershavebeenabletousetheUDHRasatooltoput

pressureonIsraeltoallowthereturnofrefugeestotheirland.Atthesametime,theUDHR

doesnotservetourgetheArabstatestograntthesesamerefugeesasylum.Thisisevident

withintheUNdiscussionsandensuingmeasures,suchasResolution194of1948.Theissueof

grantingasylum(ornot)andtherightofreturnestablishedanintellectualframeworkforhow

thestatesinvolvedwiththePalestinianrefugeeswouldberegarded.

TheUN’sentrenchedinvolvementintheArab‐IsraeliWar,aswellasthetimingofthe

conflict–justasthedelegateswereintheendstagesofdraftingtheUDHR—maketheWara

particularlyinterestingexample.TheArab‐IsraeliWarandtheensuingrefugeecrisisnotonly

36

demonstratetheconflictbetweennationsandindividuals,butthewayinwhichtheUNandthe

internationalcommunityapproachedthesituationwasshapedbythepromulgationofthe

UDHR.BecauseoftheprincipleswithintheDeclaration,pressureremainsonIsraeltorectify

therefugeecrisis.ArabstatescontinuetoofferrefugetomillionsofPalestinians,butrefusefull

asylumorcitizenship.ThesimultaneityoftheconflictandtheDeclarationaffectedthewayin

whichthecrisishasbeen,andis,managed.

TheimpassedemonstratedintheexamplesofboththeUDHRdraftingandtheArab‐

IsraeliWarareparticularlyrelevanttoday,inaworldwherestatesincreasinglyrestrictthe

provisionsforrefugeesinfavorofensuringstatesecurityandnationalsovereignty.ErikaFeller

andVolkerTürkwritethat:

SecurityconcernssincetheattacksintheUnitedStateson11September2001dominatethedebate,includinginthemigrationarea,andhaveattimesovershadowedthelegitimateprotectioninterestsofindividuals.Anumberofcountrieshave,forinstance,revisitedtheirasylumsystemsfromasecurityangleandhaveintheprocesstightenedproceduresandintroducedsubstantialmodifications.95

Stateconcerns,fromPalestinianrefugeestomodern‐dayterrorists,haveoftenovershadowed

therightsofindividuals.Especiallyintheeraofterrorism,whennationalsecurityisheightened

aroundtheworldandimmigrationiscontinuouslybeingrestricted,refugeerightsandtheir

historyareimportant.

InthecaseoftheUDHR,refugeeprotectionsweremarginalizedinfavorofstate

protection.BeforetheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightswascomplete,theArab‐Israeli

Warplayedouttheconflictsbetweennationalandindividualrightsthatthedraftersfaced.

95ErikaFellerandVolkerTürk,RefugeeProtectioninInternationalLaw:UNCHR’sGlobalConsultationsonInternationalProtection,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),5.

37

WhatwasamomentousDeclarationhasbecomelittlemorethanatheoreticalnodtoindividual

rights—rightswhichdonotactuallyplayoutontheinternationalfield.Thisdeep‐rooted

tensionpreventsindividualsfromtrulyhavingtheserightsguaranteed.

38

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41

APPENDIX–Articles13,14,and15oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights

Article13(1)Everyonehastherighttofreedomofmovementandresidencewithinthebordersofeachstate.(2)Everyonehastherighttoleaveanycountry,includinghisown,andtoreturntohiscountry.Article14(1)Everyonehastherighttoseekandtoenjoyinothercountriesasylumfrompersecution.(2)Thisrightmaynotbeinvokedinthecaseofprosecutionsgenuinelyarisingfromnon‐politicalcrimesorfromactscontrarytothepurposesandprinciplesoftheUnitedNations.Article15(1)Everyonehastherighttoanationality.(2)Nooneshallbearbitrarilydeprivedofhisnationalitynordeniedtherighttochangehisnationality.