continuity and change in china's maritime strategy

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Continuity and change in China's maritime strategySwaran Singh aa Research Fellow at IDSAPublished online: 25 Apr 2008.

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Continuity and Change inChina's Maritime Strategy

Swaran Singh

After two world wars, numerous local wars and standstill delimitationtalks worldwide, the continental partition seems basically over.Accordingly, it is the maritime rights and interests that will increasinglydetermine the flashpoints in the coming years. It is in this context thatone has to understand the recent maritime shift in the militarymodernisation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which seems allset to emerge as the next global power in-the-making. It is important tonote that unlike in the past, the PRC's new-found zeal for maritimeexpansion is no longer guided by its ambition-based motivations alone.In addition to this, its compulsion-based motivations have already startedbecoming far more decisive and pressing. For example, it is the fastgrowing domestic consumption levels that will continue to push Beijinginto seeking greater influence and control over maritime space andSources. Moreover, pending the PRC's historic obsession with Taiwanas also in view of its claims to the whole of the South China Sea, Beijingis bound to find itself increasingly involved in most of the maritimedisputes in the Asia-Pacific. • All these trends only further confirm thatthe People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) is going to become centralto China's maritime thinking and planning. It is in this backdrop ofrising expectations, compulsions and existing capabilities that this papertries to examine and highlight the transformation that has occurred inChina's maritime strategy during the 1990s and from there to outlineChina's maritime profile for the 21st century.

China's Maritime Profile

To start with, in terms of both its history and geography, mainlandChina has essentially been a maritime country. With its 18,000-kmmainland coastline and 14,000-km island coastline, China constitutes thesingle largest maritime landmass in the Asia-Pacific. Also, as early as"by the fifth century BC, China had started to have an army of ships that

Dr. Swaran Singh is a Research Fellow at IDSA.

Continuity and Change in China's Maritime Strategy 1493

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could engage in naval operations."1 It is generally believed that the earliestof the current versions of China's modern maritime strategy had alreadyevolved by the early 15th century when, during the reign of Ming EmperorJen-Tsung, the famous Admiral Cheng He made seven successful navalexpeditions between 1405-1433 which went as far as the Persian Gulf,Red Sea and Africa. By today's standards, however, Cheng He's NauticalCharts present only a vision which can, at best, be described as "coastaldefence". His vision was further elaborated by a late Ching Dynastyscholar, Wei Yuan, who recorded his thoughts in the Charts and Recordsof Naval Countries. Later, this maritime thinking became more focussedfollowing the two major naval invasions of China: one by the Japanesein 1874 and the other by the French in 1884. Following these, a unifiednaval command, the Naval Office, was established by the Chinese emperoron October 24, 1884.

However, the successive rulers of China lacked the maritime visionthat was partly circumscribed by their colonial subjugation during thelate 19th century. In the early 20th century, the Guomindang did try tobuild a naval fleet, but, by the late 1940s, when the Communists came topower, "the constraint of very limited sources" and "the nature ofperceived external threats" once again resulted in "the low priority"accorded to China's maritime build-up during the next 40-45 years.2 Itwas not until the end of their mortal fear of an imminent nuclear warthat.the new post-Cold War situation finally provided the Communistleadership both time and space to manoeuvre and do long-term thinking.

Apart from highlighting China's continued dependence on maritimespace and resources, history also reveals how, be it the colonial empiresof the 19th century or the two superpowers of the 20th century, controlover the open seas was always an essential component of their status asglobal powers. Today, this perhaps also forms the logic behind Beijing'sambition of emerging as the next global power, in which case the oceansare the only natural frontiers for it to expand its influence and exploitresources. Accordingly, the 1990s have seen a marked change in China'spolicies which have all been clearly focussed on expanding its operationalreach and access to the open seas. Going by the current statistics, China'scoastal areas make up 30 per cent of its land, support 40 per cent of itspopulation and generate 60 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP).Moreover, China's expanding economic power and rising living standardshave only further increased its dependence on the seas, thereby compellingits leadership to ensure the security of its sea-lanes and attempt furtherexploration for offshore raw materials.

So far, Beijing has managed this because it has been legally allowed

1494 Strategic Analysis/December 1999

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to expand its authority over its territorial waters, contiguous zones andExclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which have been duly recognised by theUnited Nations under the UN Convention on the Seas of 1982, to whichChina was an original signatory and which it ratified in May 1996. Asa result, China has obtained access to the natural wealth of its threemillion sq. km. EEZ as agreed under the UN Convention on the Seas.Until this convention was ratified and became effective in 1992, the PRChad legal authority only over 380,000 sq. km. of its inland and territorialwaters which it claimed up to the 12-nautical mile limit. It was only laterthat waters of the contiguous zone were recognised and, under the UNLaw of the Seas, Beijing's EEZ was extended to cover an additional 2.6million sq. km. of open seas, taking its total possession to about threemillion sq. km. And, if one were to add to this China's inland sea of BoHai, its maritime area will comprise about 4.7 million sq. km.

But this is not all. Beijing plans to go still further and to explore andexploit resources even in contentious international waters. And this iswhere keeping tabs on its maritime thinking becomes so critical to theregion's peace and security. For example, explaining its claims in termsof the landlocked states' rights under the UN Law of the Seas, the PRCclaims that it has the right to sail and exploit resources in the Sea ofJapan. It claims its access to the Sea of Japan through its Tuman Jiangriver in the north (Jilin province). By this, Beijing not only plans toobtain a great strategic advantage vis-à-vis Japan but also open directaccess to the high seas for its two hinterland provinces of Jilin andHeilongjiang, which (it says) have no other, direct access to the open seas.This should also bring prosperity to these relatively neglected provinces.The UN, in fact, has added one more new category called the"developmental zone" to China's waters. Since 1991, Chinese ships havebeen sanctioned to explore valuable seabed resources in an additional105,000-sq. km. "developmental zone" in the international waters in thePacific Ocean.

Notwithstanding these facts and perceptions, some Chinese scholarsclaim that their access to the open seas is still limited. According to IiuZhenhuan, who is the director of the navy's Military Research Institute(in Beijing), despite having the world's fourth longest coastline, fifthlargest continental shelf (in area) and tenth largest EEZ, compared to theworldwide ratios between the maritime space under a nation's jurisdictionand its land area which averages 94:100, China's ratio stands only at30:100, which is less than even one-third of the existing world average.3

Such projections are generally supported by quoting figures on China'sfuture requirements, especially those for fuel and foodgrains for China's


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population which is expected to reach about 1.6 billion by the year 2010.Accordingly, its Ninth Five-Year Plan of 1996-2000, for example, hasearmarked nearly 800 million yuan to be spent on marine technology,with marine environment, sea water utilisation, accurate survey of thecontinental shelf, utilisation of marine energy, and a comprehensivesurvey of the Polar region and the Spratlys being the thrust areas.4

Maritime Interests

This increasing dependence on maritime space and resources makesChina's maritime expansion both the cause as well as the consequence ofits successful modernisation drive. And it is in this context that one hasto start by first examining some of thé most immediate motivations behindthe sudden expansion of China's maritime consciousness/activity, whichin turn has resulted in effecting a virtual transformation in its maritimepolicies and planning. To enumerate Beijing's maritime interests in termsof their relative urgency, the following can be regarded as some of themajor categories:

• Energy: Firstly, ensuring a continuous supply of energy has cometo be the most important pre-requisite for China to continue itstryst with building an advanced industrial society. As of now,coal accounts for over 77 per cent of China's energy consumptionbut problems of extraction and transportation (from westernChina) and pollution are fast making oil and gas the favouredoptions.5 The potential for increased demand for oil can begauged from the fact that despite being the world's sixth largestproducer of oil, its per capita consumption remains as low asonly one-fifth of that of the United States. But even with thislow level of consumption, China has already become a netimporter of oil since 1993. Imported oil today accounts for asmuch as 17 per cent of its total energy consumption.6 It isestimated that its oil production will reach 165 billion tonnes byyear 2000, but that will still fall short by 45 to 65 billion tonnesas the consumption by then is expected to reach 225 billion tonnesa year.7

• Food: Next in importance is the question of foodgrains. China,which had come to be a net exporter of foodgrains by 1995, hadto resort to importing 16 million tonnes in 1996, which makes itthe second largest food importer, next only to Japan.8 What isworse is that while the consumption level will continue to go up,various studies project threatening scenarios regarding China'sshrinking farmlands, rapid urbanisation, falling regional water


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tables, declining rate of return on the use of fertilisers and,especially, incidents like the drying up of the Yellow river. Also,with the reduction in global grain output from 1.78 billion tonnesfor 1990 to 1.69 billion tonnes for 1996, China's dependence onthe seas for food is bound to become far more pressing.9

• Sea Lanes: Emerging from these aforesaid scenarios, China willhave to ensure the security of its sea lanes and shipping industryfor over 85 per cent of its foreign trade is carried through the

\seas. Also, with its increasing dependence on imports of oil andfoodgrains, Beijing will become increasingly vulnerable to outsidepressures. Besides, China has a flourishing shipping andshipbuilding industry, the future of which depends on assuredaccess and control over its adjacent seas. With its 26 largeshipyards, China has come to be the fourth largest shipbuilderfrom being merely the 16th until the mid-1980s. To date, Chinahas exported over 200 categories of shipbuilding related productsto more than 70 countries. A total of 6.66 million tonnes of shipswere built by China during its Eighth Five-Year Plan whichbrought over $2.7 billion in foreign exchange.10 Besides, sea-shipping also accounts for one-third of China's domestictransportation and communications.

• Islands: And, finally, there is this question of islands which isnot only seen as affecting China's territorial sovereignty andintegrity but also the size of its EEZ and continental shelfconnecting it to each of these islands. In fact, based on variousarguments of historicity, usage and legality, it is China's claim tothese islands that leads to its larger claim to the whole of theSouth China Sea. To many, these claims are actually goaded byChina's desire to exploit the region's fishing, gas, oil, and otherseabed resources. Estimates about oil reserves in the Spratlysalone vary between 1 to 17.7 billion metric tonnes." Despite theobvious difficulties of operating a blue-water carrier task-forcein these waters dotted by not-very-useful atolls and reefs, controlover the South China Sea still forms a critical component ofChina's maritime strategy, for it promises to obtain for the PLAN,the strategic advantage of an extended operational reach into theIndian and Pacific Oceans.

Moreover, apart from these basically domestic and need-basedmotivations, the end of the Cold War era has also created its owndynamics, thus, generating many more global and ambition-basedmotivations for Beijing to seek greater access (read domination) over the


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high seas. The following four can be described as the majorfactors compelling the Chinese leadership to really expand their maritimeactivity:

• Firstly, the collapse of the former Soviet Union has finallyremoved from the minds of China's leaders all fear of an imminentglobal war, thus, providing them with time to think in the long-term for building up their national defence capabilities.

• Secondly, the shrinking of the Soviet/Russian naval presence,followed by reduction in the American naval presence in theAsia-Pacific, has also provided China the physical space tomanoeuvre. China's leaders see this situation as one of a "powervacuum" in the Asia-Pacific, which apparently provides themwith an opportunity to step in.

• Thirdly, the 1990s have witnessed the Asia-Pacific emerging asthe most dynamic centre of economic growth which has attractedthe world powers, including Beijing, into taking an increasinginterest in various multilateral fora. Beijing feels compelled tolook outwards for joint strategies for achieving (a) security andpeace; and (b) a faster growth rate to keep up with thedevelopments in the rest of the Asia-Pacific.

• And, finally, in China's immediate neighbourhood, apart fromconventional strong actors like the US and Soviet navies, countrieslike Japan, Vietnam and the Association of South-East AsianNations (ASEAN) have also begun.expanding their "ocean-going"capabilities which can be seen both as the cause as well as theconsequence of China's maritime activity. To give one example,the recent confusion about the inclusion of the Taiwan Straits inthe operational scope of the revised US-Japanèse securityarrangements has been a major cause of concern for Beijing, andissues like these have obvious implications for China's changingmaritime profile. • . .

Building Maritime Defence

It is in this context of China's increasing dependence on its maritimeassets that the question of building maritime defence becomes a criticalcomponent of its overall maritime policy planning. As of now, Chinafollows a two-pronged strategy of (a) supporting all efforts towardsstrengthening international cooperation in formulating and implementingvarious laws and conventions regarding the high seas; (b) at the sametime, preparing for the worst case scenario where, with the fast depletionof ground resources, the oceans are very likely to emerge as the battle


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grounds of the coming years. This basically means that integrating itsmaritime economy with maritime defence has come to be the focus ofChina's changing maritime strategy. To start with, this transformationin China's perceptions can be observed 'in Beijing's new definitions ofbasic concepts like state sovereignty. Beijing, for example, no longerdefines its territorial sovereignty in terms of landmass alone but hasincreasingly stressed on a far broader definition of territory that includesair space, territorial waters, seabed, underground and all the resourcestherein. Similarly, compared to Mao's "People's War" that confineddefence preparedness to the "yellow earth" and described oceans as the"Great Wall of Seas", China's new thinking on maritime defence goes farbeyond all traditional visions of "sea. guerrillas" that was expected toonly deny imperial aggressors access to China's shores and territorialwaters.

The current Chinese maritime strategy, by comparison, defines thePLAN'S role in terms of "safeguarding maritime interests, thedevelopment of the marine economy, an upgrading of maritime scienceand technology, and protection of the maritime environment."12 China's"maritime defence line" has also since shifted its maritime operationsfrom the First Island Chain to the Second Island Chain that covers mostof the Pacific Ocean, including Australia. In fact, apart from their logicof historicity, much of Beijing's claims to the South China Sea have beenexplained in terms of its jurisdiction extending to the very outer edgesof its extended continental shelf. The Chinese take this internationallyagreed 12-nautical mile limit of territorial waters not from the mainlandbut from their outermost islands which makes their claims extremelycontentious and unacceptable to the neighbouring countries. And, inview of such conflicting interests, the PLAN has taken over a wholerange of extended responsibilities of not only ensuring the defence ofredefined coastal waters but also various non-combatant duties where itkeeps using labels like naval diplomacy, disaster rescue and relief,assisting customs and other public security organs like the border defenceforces in their anti-smuggling activities, cracking down on piracy, as alsoother assignments in international peacekeeping.

Beijing's new vision of itself as a maritime power goes beyond evenrelatively more modern concepts like that of building an independentnavy or a maritime economy. Instead, a wider concept of an integratedmaritime power consists of a whole range of policy and technologicalelements, all geared towards perfecting the ability to efficiently defendits perceived maritime interests and exploit maritime resources whichwill involve both civilians as well as the armed forces at sea, includingbattleships as well as merchant ships, fishing fleet, oceanic observation


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teams, offshore oil-drilling platforms, attic observation teams, and so on.Beijing's current maritime strategy, therefore, aims at focussingsimultaneously on strengthening its naval capability; enhancing andexpanding its physical presence! thus legitimising its occupation; attractingWestern oil companies to explore in the disputed areas; and insisting on,and conducting bilateral diplomacy with the other claimants.13 But,looking at the contentious nature of China's maritime claims, building apowerful navy becomes a vital pre-requisite. As a result, compared tothe ongoing emphasis on downsizing the PLA (ground forces), the navyhas, in fact, deployed more troops and vessels in the south-eastern coastalwaters and the Nansha Archipelago (Spratlys). Accordingly, the PLANtoday has not only obtained a fresh mandate and new priorities or newstrategy, it has also come to be supported by an array of very specialisedforces and the emphasis has gradually shifted from mere manpower toskill and technology.

"Offshore Defence" Strategy

As early as 1982, China's third Navy Commander, Admiral LiuHuaqing was the first one to publicly present his "offshore defence"strategy. This was finally endorsed by China's historic resolution called"Strategic Changes in the Guiding Thoughts on National Defence" whichwas adopted by the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Conunission(CMC) in June 1985. Though for a long time this new doctrine continuedto officially only reiterate China's old hymn of defence against foreignaggressions from the sea, in the words of Admiral Liu Huaqing, thisstrategy was dearly aimed at evolving an operational doctrine as alsothe technical wherewithal for building "Active Defence" beyond China'sterritorial seas. For him, "offshore" induded the water body from China'scoasts to the First Island Chain of the Western Pacific, to the KurileIsland in the north, and up to the maritime borders of Japan, the RyukuIslands, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, and the IndonesianIslands.14 According to the newly appointed PLAN Commander, Lt.Gen. Shi Yunsheng, this new outlook was partly generated by China'seconomic growth, reform, and opening up which has provided the PLANwith a historic opportunity to build an ambitious maritime profile. Andaccording to him, China's leadership is already working on drafting thenecessary developmental blueprint and is taking scientificallyfeasible steps in that direction.15 Some of these programmes include thefollowing.

(i) Specialised Forces for Maritime Defence

According to reports, the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership


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has decided to set up a 200,000-strong special para-military force fromamongst the retired and retiring PLA troops, called the "maritime cruiseunit". These units are expected to manage China's maritime space andto guard against any infringement of its maritime rights. To be keptunder the administrative control of the State OceanographyAdministration, this special force will ensure that the PLAN is notrepeatedly brought into minor day-to-day conflicts. But this maritimecruise unit, however, is going to be more than a simple police force andwill have access to fairly sophisticated weapon systems and equipment,including marine surveillance aircraft, surveillance stations, radar,computers, satellite remote sensing equipment, Zhi-9 helicopters, and soon.16 Reports have also been coming about the CMC's plans to establisha combined land and maritime border defence squad under the Ministryof Public Security which will safeguard maritime law and order, crackdown on criminal activities on the seas, and assist the relevantdepartments in dealing with marine accidents and incidents. Accordingto Chen Weiming, deputy director in the ministry's Border DefenceBureau, his bureau's work for the establishment of such an emergencyrapid response maritime force has already started and the units of thisforce should be duly posted before the end of 1999 in Hainan, Guangdong,Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangxi and Shandong provinces and Shanghai.17

Besides, China's most advanced elite force, the Marine Corps, has alsobeen brought into the country's widening spectrum of maritime forceplanning.

Based on the example of the world famous US Marines, China'sMarine forces have also been providing support to the PLAN'S operations.These units have been moving across all four of China's main sea areas—Nanhai, Donghai, Huanghai, and Bohai. Through their experiences underthe different climatic conditions of the tropical, semi-tropical, and frigidzones, they have worked out warfare plans which are in accord withmodern warfare conditions and whereby they can travel, eat, sleep, andfight in different climates and in a variety of environments. In 1988, theMarine Corps displayed its talents during the conflict with Vietnam overthe Nansha (Spratly) Archipelago and they have since been playing animportant role in safeguarding China's maritime rights and interests.This Marine Corps force, which is referred to as "a fierce tiger on land,a dragon at sea, and a powerful eagle in the air," was established in 1980and its headquarters are located at Haiguanlou in southern China. Thisis the only Chinese force that presents an altogether new experiment inamphibious warfare and it promises to remain central to China's futureoperations on the open seas. It is also the only force that has successfullyundergone training and testing in tropical areas where temperatures reach


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60 degrees Celsius as also in the freezing regions where temperaturesplunge to minus 30 degrees, during their High Intensity Skills and MilitaryTraining. The Marine Corps comprises over 10 different types of troopswhich include marine infantry, artillerymen, scouts, armoured forcetroops, tank troops, airborne troops, diving troops, missile troops, andcommunications troops which provide it an unusual versatility.18

(ii) Ocean-Coing Task Force

Similarly, beginning at least from the mid-1980s, the Chinese Navyhas been working on developing an aircraft carrier task force. However,this is one area where the Chinese have not been very successful. Firstly,being extremely capital intensive, building an aircraft carrier task-forcerequires both long-term heavy investments as also access to advancedtechnologies. The proposed Chinese aircraft carrier is a smaller vessel of40,000-50,000 tonnes displacement, in which case the production costsare normally between $4-5 billion, and annual operational costs at $400-500 million. Therefore, funding has run into serious difficulties. Similarly,in terms of its indigenous capabilities, China remains far from possessingthe power plant, avionics and metallurgy technologies required tomanufacture a plane that can take off and land on an aircraft carrier, thattoo in different weather conditions. Its pilots have minimal training inflying over blue waters as also little experience in flying without groundcontrols.19 The process of obtaining warships or technologies from abroadhas also been extremely slow. After taking into account both foreign anddomestic factors, Beijing has decided to postpone commissioning of itsfirst aircraft carrier from 2005 to until or after 2010. Besides, maintainingan aircraft carrier task-force has its own complications. Looking, forexample, at the operational needs of China's maritime territories, it willtake at least three aircraft carriers to sustain one operational carrier task-force all the time. This task-force will still be vulnerable to attacks bymissiles, torpedoes, and submarines. While on a mission, an aircraftcarrier is usually "escorted" by more than 20 other types of battleships,thus, making command coordination an extremely difficult exercise.

Meanwhile, China's military hierarchy has also accelerated effortstowards developing alternate technologies like the early warning planesand air refuelling capabilities. These two types of capabilities can partiallyfill the gaps, thereby, enabling the PLAN to deal with delay in obtainingan aircraft carrier task-force capability. Also, the Xia class and othertypes nuclear-powered submarines capable of launching anti-ship missilesfrom under water and the newly acquired Russian 877EKM/636-Typesubmarines equipped with air defence missiles and automatic tail current-guided torpedoes, will temporarily help the PLAN to fill the gaps created


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by the absence of an aircraft carrier capability. Lately, China has alsobegun working on obtaining/building more advanced submarines andlarger ocean going warships. Making the best of its new found "strategicpartnership" with Moscow, Beijing has recently signed an agreementwith Russia on the transfer of the Sovremenny class large destroyer whichhas a displacement (with load) of about 7,500 metric tonnes. Apart fromthe US warships, the current largest destroyers in China's neighbourhoodare those of mainland China (the Luhu class) and Taiwan (the ChengKung class), both of which have a displacement of less than 4,200 metrictonnes. But a Sovremenny class destroyer is suitable only for a navyoperating in "green waters" or on routine duty in the distant seas; it isnot suitable for a "blue-waters" navy conducting ocean offensive. Thefact that China has chosen this type of warship, rather than Russia's11,000-tonne Glory class cruiser that has a greater long-distance attackcapability as also .extremely powerful air defence capabilities, provesthat Beijing is fairly sensitive about reactions from the neighbouringcountries and is not jumping in to demonstrate its blue-water capabilities.Instead, it plans to move steadily ahead, adhering strongly to its strategyof "Active Defence" on the high seas.

Maritime Cooperation

Apart from building these defence capabilities, seeking cooperationis the other vital component of China's changing maritime strategy. ThePLAN has lately been conducting joint exercises and participating invarious other multilateral fora, thus, expanding cooperation with othercountries. A joint maritime search and rescue exercise was, for example,conducted in the Pearl River estuary to test the search and rescue strengthof Guangdong, Macao, and Hong Kong in handling accidents at sea.The exercise, codenamed "Maritime SAREX 96", jointly organised by theGuangdong Provincial Marine Emergency Search and Rescue Centre,Macao Marine Department and Hong Kong Marine Department, involvedrescue craft, a helicopter, and launches from Zhuhai, Macao, and HongKong.20 Similarly, in May 1996, the second oceanography meeting heldbetween China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)was held in Beijing, which marked the tenth anniversary of the twonations' cooperation in the field of oceanic research. In October 1995,China's Shandong province hosted the fourth international conference ofthe North Pacific Marine Science Organisation which was attended byover 250 delegates from all over the world, including about 100 from theUnited States, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Russia, thus,obtaining it an air of credibility.21

China has been trying especially hard to evolve maritime cooperation


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with both Moscow and Washington. During their October 1997 Summitin Washington, Presidents Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin signed a MaritimeSafety Agreement, thus, establishing a Liaison Group of the two naviesto exchange information on their experiences in sea disasters andhumanitarian relief. The two sides also signed another agreementestablishing mutually acceptable naval "rules-of-the-road" for avoidingnaval accidents on the high seas.' This was followed by China's DefenceMinister Chi Haotian, and US Defence Secretary William Cohen signingthe Maritime Military Consultative Agreement at Beijing in January 1998,which has been described as their first most important document sincetheir "Peace Pearl" programme of the mid-1980s. In short, this is aimedat streamlining the mutual understanding between the two navalestablishments which are expected to put in place the protocols andcommunications to avoid any misunderstanding, miscalculation, andmishaps on the high seas which, in turn, is expected to strengthen thebroader framework of confidence building measures (CBMs) betweenthe PLA and Pentagon. Similarly, in December 1996, China's DefenceMinister Chi Haotian, had signed in Washington three broad agreements:(a) on US warships continuing to be berthed in Hong Kong after HongKong's sovereignty returned to China in July 1997; (b) for the exchangeof visits of the two countries' warships; and, (c) on the issue of handlingcontingencies at sea by warships of both countries.

At the regional level as well, Beijing has been seeking cooperationwith ASEAN and other regional actors which also includes its freshinitiatives in Sino-Japanese ties. In South-East Asia, its participation atthe ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has made China an integral part ofevolving transparency and CBMs under the auspices of the MaritimeCooperation Group of the Council for Security and Cooperation in theAsia-Pacific (CSCAP). In South Asia, apart from its relations with itstraditional naval equipment recipients like Bangladesh and Pakistan,Beijing has also expanded its defence ties with Myanmar, Sri Lanka,Mauritius, and the Seychelles, raising some fear and suspicion in NewDelhi. However, all this may not necessarily be aimed against India, asrelations between China and India have improved, and India's navalchief had last visited Beijing in March 1997. In fact, despite Beijing'srepeated assertions about using force against Taiwan, the two sides havesuccessfully held four annual maritime seminars which have launchedcooperative exchanges in cross-straits shipping and shippingtechnologies.22 Similarly, following the example set by Taiwan'sannouncement of May 11, 1994, China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichenhad declared at an ASEAN meeting in August 1995, Beijing's willingnessto settle all its maritime disputes in accordance with international law.


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This later saw Beijing ratifying the UN Convention of the Seas in May1996. The PRC has also since been talking of starting negotiations forsetting up Joint Development Agencies (JDAs) for jointly exploringresources even in the disputed water bodies.23

Legal Framework

Not least of all, China's leadership has also been updating andcodifying its maritime legal system to keep pace with the overall changingmaritime profile. Beijing had issued the first "Law on MarineEnvironmental Protection" as early as in 1983. This legal frameworkwas later expanded by implementing six more supportive regulationswhich include the "Regulations Concerning Environmental ProtectionDuring Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation," the "RegulationsConcerning the Dumping of Wastes at Sea", and the "Regulations on theControl and Treatment of Pollutants Which Threaten the Seas". Thelocalities and departments concerned have since set up ocean environmentmonitoring networks to monitor enterprises which dump waste into thesea, and they regularly review the influence of construction on the marineenvironment.24

But perhaps nothing stands comparison to China's "Law on TerritorialSeas and Contiguous Waters Zone" which is the most comprehensivepiece of legislation that clearly codifies China's new maritime thinkingand priorities. Passed by China's National People's Congress (NPC) onFebruary 25,1992, it unilaterally extended China's sovereign claim to thewhole of Taiwan (including its affiliated islands like Tiaoyutai Island),Tongsha Archipelago, Xisha Archipelab, Zhongsha Archipelago, andNansha Archipelago. Moreover, Article 14 of the law authorises thePLAN to intercept and/or attack encroaching foreign vessels, ifnecessary.25 Later, codifying the country's management of marine scienceresearch and other activities carried out in China's waters, involvingforeign governments and companies, either independently or incooperation with Chinese partners, the "Regulations of the People'sRepublic of China Regarding the Management of Marine Science ResearchInvolving Foreign Vessels," came into effect from October 1, 1996.26

In March 1997, the deputies of the Fifth Session of the NPC haddeliberated over a dozen Bills concerning the protection and developmentof the country's marine resources. These included suggestions for creatingspecial administrative bodies and improving the management ofexploration processes in terms of sustainable development concepts. Ledby Du Bilan, a noted oceanographer and deputy of the Eighth NPC,these deputies have been running this campaign for the last several years,


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explaining the negative effects of rampant fishing and irregulardevelopment of marine cultivation, and exhorting China's leaders to takeprompt steps to complete its maritime legal framework so as to definethe nature and extent of state ownership and control of the high seas.Among other things, they have been asking for setting up a "nationalmaritime committee" headed by a senior leader or a "state bureau ofmaritime management" that can be jointly run by the National Bureau ofOceanography and the Ministry of Agriculture.27 These apex bodies willnot only coordinate with other agencies and fill the gaps that may havebeen overlooked in Beijing's new integrated approach in redefining itschanging maritime profile, they will also obtain them the necessary legalbasis and legitimisation in evolving China's maritime strategy for the21st century.

Conclusion

Historically speaking, the Chinese civilisation has made immortalcontribution to man's conquest of the seas. The Chinese not only inventedthe compass but were also the first to map these unknown water bodies.Admiral Zheng He, the great Chinese navigator, accomplished theextraordinary feat of making several trips to the West in the early 15thcentury, much before the Western nations began to expand their oceangoing activities. In the more recent past, however, as China's "closeddoor" policies shunned maritime trade and intercourse with foreigncountries, China's maritime vision deteriorated, leading, over the years,to its being subjected to repeated sea-borne invasions which resulted inthe Middle Kingdom being humiliated and finally its sovereignty beingforfeited. Its experience under the colonial powers only further reinforcedthese inward-looking tendencies. Later, after the establishment ofCommunist China in 1949, owing to Mao's excessive stress on People's(ground) War, the coastal waters once again stayed as the ultimate limitof China's blue-water territory. Thus, it was not until the economicopening up drive was launched by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s thatthe oceans once again came to be China's important link to the outsideworld. The developments since then have had their own momentum,and today, going by this ever expanding spiral of Beijing's ambition/compulsion-based motivations as also looking at the track record of theirabove listed efforts and thinking, the 21st century promises to make theoceans, once again, the most central component of China's future profile..


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NOTES1. Senior Colonels Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxing, "On Maritime Strategy

and the Marine Environment", Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China-97-197, May 20, 1997. Henceforth FBIS.

2. Yacov Y.I. Vertzberger, China's Southwestern Strategy: Encirclement andCounterencirclement (New York: Praeger, 1985), p.143.

3. "Military Scholar on UN Law of the Sea", FBIS-CHI-96-021, November 15,1996.

4. "Beijing Development of Maritime Technology Viewed", FBIS-CHI-96-223,November 17, 1996; also "China: Minister on Importance of Ocean Resources",FBIS-CHI-97-349, December 15, 1997.

5. Chris Skrebowsky, "Coal Dominates But Gas Set to Make Inroads Into EnergySector", Petroleum Economist, vol.64, no.2, 1997, p. 15.

6. Nigel Holloway, "For Whom the Bell Tolls", Far Eastern Economic Review,February 2, 1995, pp. 14-16.

7. Bruce Blanche and Jean Blanche, "Oil and Regional Stability in the South ChinaSea", Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 17, no. 11, 1995, p. 512; also "BusinessBriefings", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 6, no. 10, October 13, 1994, p. 79;also "Strategy to Meet Energy Lack", China Daily, November 18, 1997.

8. Martin Walker, "China and the New Era of Resources Scarcity", World PolicyJournal, vol.13, no.1, 1996, p.8.

9. See, for example, Lester R. Brown, State of the World (New York: W.W. Norton,1996); or Who Will Feed China? (Washington DC: World Watch Institute, 1996).

10. Swaran Singh, "China: Shipbuilding, a Pillar Industry", Maritime International,April 1996, p. 22.

11. "Creeping Irredentism in the Spratly Islands", Strategic Comments, March 22,1995, pp.1-2.

12. Wen Chung Liao, China's Blue Waters Strategy in the 21st Century: From FirstIsland Chain Towards the Second Island Chain, Occasional Paper Series (Taipei:Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, September 1995), p.2.

13. Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea, Adelphi Paper 298, (London:International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 1995), p. 12.

14. Swaran Singh, "Admiral Liu Huaqing: China's Alfred Mahan", MaritimeInternational, November 1995, p.22.

15. "General Shi Interviewed on Navy Building", FBIS-CHI-97-054, February 24,1997.

16. "State to Set Up 200,000-Strong Maritime Cruise Unit", FBIS-CHI-96-236,December 6, 1996.

17. "Land-Marine Joint Defence Force To Be Established", Beijing Zhongguo XinwenShe, May 28, 1997.

18. "Liao Wang Examines PLA Marine Corps", FBIS-CHI-96-040, December 25,1996.

19. Don Flamm, "Impact of China's Military Modernisation in the Pacific Region",Asian Defence Journal, February 1997, p. 18; also Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as aConservative Power", Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 2, 1997, p.37.

20. "Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macao Hold Maritime Rescue Exercise", FBIS-CHI-96-194, October 16, 1996.

21. "International Marine Science Conference Held", FBIS-CHI-95-200, October 16,1995.


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22. Flor Wang; "Cross-Strait Shipping Seminar Opens in Taipei", Taiwan CentralNews Agency (Internet), December 8, 1997.

23. Blanche and Blanche, n.7, p.10.24. "Efforts To Project Marine Environment Succeeding", FBIS-CHI-94-133, July,

12, 1994.25. n.12, p. 10.26. "Oceanography Bureau on Rules for Foreign Marine Research", FBIS-CHI-96-

192, September 27, 1996.27. "NPC Deputies Discuss Protection of Maritime Resources", FBIS-CHI-97-063,

March 4, 1997.


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continuity and change in china's maritime strategy

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