The Behavior Analyst 1988, 1 1, 161-179 No. 2 (Fall)

Contingencies and Metacontingencies: Toward a Synthesis ofBehavior Analysis and Cultural Materialism

Sigrid S. GlennCenter for Behavioral StudiesUniversity of North Texas

A synthesis of cultural materialism and behavior analysis might increase the scientific and technologicalvalue of both fields. Conceptual and substantive relations between the two fields show important simi-larities, particularly with regard to the causal role ofthe environment in behavioral and cultural evolution.Key concepts in Marvin Harris's cultural materialist theories are outlined. A distinction is made betweencontingencies at the behavioral level of analysis (contingencies of reinforcement) and contingencies at thecultural level of analysis (metacontingencies). Relations between the two kinds of contingencies areexplored in cultural practices from paleolithic to industrial sociocultural systems. A synthesis of thesetwo fields may offer the opportunity to resolve serious problems currently facing modem cultures.Key words: cultural materialism, metacontingency, cultural evolution, behavior analysis

The drawing by B. F. Skinner (1981)of a parallel between biological, behav-ioral, and cultural selection appears tohave stimulated behavior analysts toconsider their enterprise within a broadercontext. Some behavior analysts havesought to clarify the conceptual and sub-stantive relations between behavior anal-ysis and other life sciences (e.g., Ator,1986). Others have turned to the rela-tions between behavioral and culturalphenomena (e.g., Glenn, 1985, 1986a;Malagodi, 1986). Behavior analysis hasbeen characterized as a "border science"because its subject matter provides a sub-stantive bridge between biological andcultural subject matters, much as the sub-ject matter of biochemistry provides abridge between the subject matters ofchemistry and biology (Glenn, 1986b).The subject matters of border sciencesare emergent processes that allow for neworders of complexity in nature. That is,DNA replication made biological evo-lution possible and operant behaviormade cultural evolution possible.Conceptual and substantive relations

between cultural materialism (a partic-ular approach to a science ofculture) andbehavior analysis (a particular approachto a science of behavior) seem especiallyworthy of exploration because the twofields share certain important character-istics. Probably the most critical com-monality is the explanatory role of the

environment in the empirical and theo-retical formulations ofthe two fields. Bothfields also eschew explanations ofhumanactivities that appeal to mental events.Both behavior analysis and cultural

materialism seem to fit into a generalconceptual scheme that is consistent withthe physical and biological sciences. Cul-tural materialists and behavior analysts,however, work at different levels of sci-entific analysis. A science ofbehavior fo-cuses on relations between the activitiesof individual organisms and environ-mental events, while a science of culturefocuses on relations between recurringcultural practices (i.e., interrelated be-havior among individuals) and the en-vironments in which those practices oc-cur. The units of analysis differ.

In behavior analysis the unit of anal-ysis is the contingency of reinforcement(Skinner, 1969, p. 7). Although the em-pirical relations giving rise to the analyticunit are replicated repeatedly over time,instances of the unit are ephemeral inthat both the environmental events andthe organismic events entering into thefunctional relations are often momen-tary. The repeatability of behavioral in-stances allows an analytic unit to emerge(cf. Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980, chap.3). The behavioral units involve intra-organism repeatability, even though theprocesses described are the same fromoperant to operant, organism to organ-

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ism, and to an unknown degree fromspecies to species.Because cultural practices usually in-

volve the behavior of two or more in-dividuals interacting in systematic ways,it is clear that cultural practices may be"reduced to" the contingencies of rein-forcement operating on each individualtaking part in the cultural practice. How-ever, such reduction does not fully ex-plain the evolution and maintenance ofthe practice as such.The issue may be seen as similar to

another with which behavior analysts arefamiliar: While there would be no be-havior without an organism, the biolog-ical characteristics of the organism can-not by themselves account for itsbehavior. To be sure, behavior is the re-sult of the evolutionary history of thespecies ofwhich the individual is a mem-ber, as well as the result of its currentstate (partly a function of its unique ge-netic characteristics). The behavior canalso be characterized in terms of theneural, glandular, and muscular eventscomprising the organism's activities; butthese events do not fully account for be-havior as such -as an interaction be-tween an organism and its world. Suchexplanation requires that the current en-vironment, as well as the history of theenvironment's action with regard to theindividual's activities, be taken into ac-count. Thus the behavioral level of sci-entific analysis takes the organism as the"ground" against which the functionalrelations between its activities and en-vironmental events are experimentallyexamined (Hineline, 1986).At the cultural level of analysis, indi-

vidual behavior becomes the "ground"from which cultural practices emerge andenter into functional relations occurringat the cultural level of analysis. The be-havior ofindividuals that enters into cul-tural practices is the point of contact be-tween behavior analysis and culturalmaterialism. Cultural practices involveconsistencies in behavior of many indi-viduals across both time and space. An-thropologists are interested in preciselythat behavior which comprises culturalpractices. In this role of promulgating a

science of culture, cultural materialistsseek to identify cultural practices havingvarious functions in the evolution andmaintenance of cultures. A scientificanalysis of cultures cannot be reduced tothe behavior of individuals because cul-tural practices, even though comprisedof the behavior of individuals, have out-comes oftheir own- outcomes that affectthe survivability of the culture.

Since behavior (as a subject matter)may be conceptualized as the bridge be-tween biological and cultural phenome-na, and since the formulations ofculturalmaterialism and behavior analysis areconsidered compatible (cf. Lloyd, 1985;Vargas, 1985), the possibility of a syn-thesis of the two fields seems worth ex-ploring. The synthesis oftwo distinct butrelated fields into a larger conceptualframework, the parts of which remainedseparate disciplines, presaged rapid de-velopment in biological science (Mayr &Provine, 1980). A synthesis of behavioranalysis and cultural materialism mightlead to similar scientific and technolog-ical development.Such a synthesis will require that each

discipline's theoretical core remain intactwhile at the same time providing illu-mination and theoretical impetus for theother. A central problem, from my per-spective, is to distinguish between thecontingencies underlying behavior changeand those underlying cultural develop-ment. This article is directed toward thatend. Because many behavior analysts willbe unfamiliar with key concepts in cul-tural materialist theory, the next sectionof the article will summarize those con-cepts. Then behavioral contingencies willbe distinguished from cultural contin-gencies; and finally specific practices thatanthropologists have studied will be ex-amined in terms of behavioral and cul-tural contingencies.

KEY CONCEPTS IN CULTURALMATERIALISM

The scientist most closely associatedwith cultural materialism is Marvin Har-ris. Since 1952 Harris has produced asteady flow of publications ranging from

CONTINGENCIES AND METACONTINGENCIES 163

field studies to philosophical and theo-retical treatises. As Skinner's works spanthe entire field of psychology, Harris'sworks span the entire field ofcultural an-thropology. Because Skinner and Harrisare both acknowledged as leading spokes-men and because both have provided co-herent conceptual frameworks for theirfields, this article will draw heavily onthe work of those two men. Their worksprovide the coherent disciplinary coresfrom which a synthesis might initially befashioned. In order to familiarize behav-ior analysts with cultural materialist con-cepts, this section ofthe article will focuson those concepts discussed in Harris'sThe Nature ofCultural Things (1964) andCultural Materialism (1979).

Conceptsfrom Harris's Earlier WorkIn The Nature of Cultural Things

(1964), Harris develops an empiricalclassification system for cultural entities.The "atomic" cultural entity is a bit ofbehavior called an actone. Examples ofactones are lifting, walking, sitting, cut-ting, etc. That which is lifted or cut is anactone object. Actones enter into largerbehavioral units, or sequences ofactones.Actones and sequences, as described byHarris, are consistent with the behavioranalytic concept ofbehavioral units,' andthey virtually always involve operant be-havior.

Scenes are more extended sequences ofbehavior, usually having an outcome.They are identified in terms of the be-havioral sequence ofa particular actor (ortype of actor) and the place and time ofaction. A farmer who milks his cows dai-ly in his barn by carrying out a series ofacts resulting in milk participates in aparticular scene. Thus, the behavior ofindividuals is specified in terms of thesame kinds of empirical events behavioranalysts use in identifying behavioralunits.

Scenes often involve several actors and

'The size and complexity ofbehavioral units mayvary considerably (see Lubinski & Thompson,1986), but they are always identified in terms ofregularity ofrelations between environmental eventsand organismic activity (cf. Branch, 1977).

the behavioral patterns occur repeatedlyamong specific individuals. Those indi-viduals then comprise a unit called anomoclone-a specific set of individualswho repeatedly take part in one or morespecific scenes (e.g., the Jones family orMs. Smith's first grade class of 19 specific6-year-old children). Members ofa givennomoclone may also engage in repeatedbehavioral episodes with people outsidethat nomoclone and thus be part of asecond (or third, etc.) nomoclone. Forexample, Jones Jr. may be a member ofa neighborhood gang and his father amember ofLocal Union 223, and his sis-ter a member of Ms. Smith's class.The cultural unit that takes account of

the replication of behavioral scenes thatinvolve different individuals across yearsor generations is called a permaclone byHarris. A permaclone is comprised ofin-dividuals engaging in repeated behavior-al episodes wherein the individuals in thegroup may be replaced over time. Thelocal high school football team is an ex-ample of a permaclone. Each year someof the members of the team leave andothers come on, while the scenes mayremain quite similar from generation togeneration or change quickly over a shorttime or slowly over a long time.A permaclonic system is an entity

comprised of several related perma-clones, e.g., Bigtown High School. Theseries of freshman classes (new faces,similar scenes each year), the faculties (afew gone, a few new, many remaining-but similar scenes in classrooms, facultymeetings, etc.), the football teams (grad-ual changes in players and coaches, sim-ilar scenes) comprise a specific perma-clonic system. Permaclonic systems, ofcourse, are also replicated across timesand places in a sociocultural system. Theymay also be similar to (but not necessar-ily historically related to) permaclonicsystems in other cultural systems.Most important to a behavioral syn-

thesis is that the dimensions of the var-ious cultural materialist entities are al-ways behavioral dimensions. Entitiesinvolving interrelated behavior of indi-viduals get classified on the basis of sim-ilarities in repeated behavioral episodes

164 SIGRID S. GLENN

across individuals as well as groups ofspecific individuals and groups whosememberships change over time. The em-pirical phenomena providing the basis forclassification are behavioral phenomena(functional relations between activities ofpeople and their environments). Harris'sclassification of cultural entities as re-ducible to behavioral interactions amongindividuals makes cultural phenomenaaccessible to behavior analytic concepts.

Harris names and describes these cul-tural entities, from actone (smallest cul-tural thing) to permaclonic supersystem(e.g., General Motors). His delineation ofcultural entities is primarily in terms oftheir structure (i.e., their behavioral com-ponents); but Harris does consider thefunctional characteristics of the behav-ioral episodes, noting that scenes cul-minate in a product or outcome or con-sequence. How far a scene could deviatein form from another and still be consid-ered "the same" (based on its outcome)is not clear. This focus on "outcomes"takes on primary importance in Harris'slater works.

Concepts from Harris's Later WorkIn looking for the causes of cultural

evolution, Harris focuses on selectioncontingencies-ultimately survival con-tingencies. But the units selected are notorganisms (or genes) as in biological evo-lution, but cultural entities -perma-clones whose practices are replicatedacross generations.

Because survival (both of individualsand sociocultural systems) ultimately getsdown to overt behavior that operates onthe environment, Harris gives causal pri-macy to overt nonverbal behavior. In facthe divides the behavioral world into twocategories-the nonverbal overt behav-ior in cultural practices is called the "be-havioral component" of cultures, whilethe "mental" component includes verbalbehavior (overt or covert) and other co-vert behavior. Harris also distinguishesbetween rules that can be empirically val-idated independent of the verbal com-munity in which they emerged (the "etic"component) and rules propagated within

a verbal community that may or may notbe empirically tested or testable (the"emic" component).2 I shall not try tomaintain these distinctions in thisarticle but shall focus primarily on thebehavior involved in those practicesHarris labels as "etic behavioral com-ponents." Those practices are classifiedinto three categories-those belonging inthe cultural infrastructure, the culturalstructure, and the cultural superstruc-ture.A culture's infrastructure (Harris, 1979,

pp. 52-53) is comprised of productiveand reproductive practices. The infra-structure includes those cultural practicescritical to the physical survival of the in-dividuals whose behavior keeps thenomoclones and permaclones intact. In-frastructural practices are those that (1)produce the objects needed for subsis-tence of enough individuals to maintainthe practice and (2) regulate the size ofthe group. Harris (1979, pp. 85-95) isclear about the importance he attributesto the physical characteristics of the en-vironment from which infrastructuralpractices emerge. Infrastructural prac-tices have outcomes directly related tosurvival; that is, if a developing perma-clonic system results in a balance offoodand protection from physical harm onthe one hand, and number ofpeople whomust be fed and protected on the other,enough individuals in the group may sur-vive to replicate the cultural practicesmaking up the infrastructure. Premodernmethods of birth control have includedextended lactation, herbal potions, sep-aration of the sexes, traumatic abortion(pounding a pregnant woman's abdo-men, etc.), and infanticide. Althoughsome of these methods are obviouslyaversive to most individuals and deadlyto others (e.g., traumatic abortion andinfanticide), humans have necessarily re-sorted to such methods when less aver-sive methods failed to control population(Harris, 1977, pp. 21-22).The structure of a culture includes do-

2 This is my understanding ofthe distinction Har-ris makes, and is expressed in behavior analyticterms, not in Harris's terminology.

CONTINGENCIES AND METACONTINGENCIES 165

mestic and political practices that sup-port the infrastructure by "maintainingsecure and orderly behavioral relationsamong [the society's] constituent groupsand with other societies" (Harris, 1979,p. 51). The cultural practices comprisingthe cultural structure include the differingbehavioral patterns of different familymembers and different social classes; ageand sex roles; education and socializationpractices; political organizations, taxpractices, military and disciplinary prac-tices. In this system, infrastructural prac-tices are the foundation on which struc-tural practices are built, and not viceversa.Emerging from the infrastructure and

structure is the cultural superstructure,those practices having to do with art, sci-ence, games, literature, advertising, rit-uals, and sports (among others). Thesepractices are accompanied by an entireset of superstructural practices that areless clearly related to empirical conse-quences -e.g., myths, religious beliefs,magic, aesthetic standards, ideologies.A fundamental principle of cultural

materialism is referred to as "infrastruc-tural determinism," which means that therequirements of the infrastructure ulti-mately account for the selection of prac-tices in all cultural components. The rea-soning goes like this. Infrastructural (i.e.,production and reproduction) practicesproduce outcomes that affect survival ofthe permaclone.3 If infrastructural prac-tices do not change as the requirementsof the infrastructure change, the grouptogether with its practices (the perma-clones constituting a sociocultural sys-tem) will ultimately fail to survive. Ifvariations in infrastructural practices en-hance the balance of production/repro-

I Important to note it that the selection processunder discussion here is NOT natural selection. Innatural selection, individual organisms interact withenvironments and, as a result, genes survive andreplicate themselves (Dawkins, 1986). In culturalselection, individual organisms interact with theenvironment (an important part of which is com-prised of the activities of other organisms) and theentity that survives to replicate itself is a culturalpractice (cf. Skinner, 1981). Both the cultural prac-tice and the gene are "carried" by organisms.

duction, changes in the structure and su-perstructure may follow, supporting theinfrastructural changes.

Variations in domestic and politicalpractices may occur, but only thosechanges that are consistent with the re-quirements of the infrastructure spreadthrough the culture. Local inconsisten-cies between structure and infrastructureresult in the structural variations "extin-guishing." If infrastructural require-ments change, then variations in domes-tic and political practices may beamplified throughout the cultural struc-ture and also in the cultural superstruc-ture. However, once a coherent patternof infrastructural, structural, and super-structural practices has emerged, devia-tion amplification is difficult because of"system-maintaining negative feedback,the dampening of deviation resultingeither in the extinction of the innovationor in slight compensatory changes in theother sectors, changes which preserve thefundamental characteristics of the wholesystem" (Harris, 1979, p. 71).Changes in infrastructural practices that

increase productive efficiency or reducereproductive pressure, however, are mostlikely to be replicated throughout the so-ciocultural system, leading to changes instructural and superstructural practices.Variations having their source in thestructure or the superstructure are rarelyamplified in the infrastructure, however,because infrastructural practices are like-ly to remain consistent with productionand reproduction requirements. The pos-itive role of structure and superstructurein cultural evolution is limited to the pos-sibility of "lessen[ing] the resistance toan infrastructural change" that is broughtabout by changing infrastructural re-quirements (Harris, 1979, p. 72).Many of Harris's books (e.g., 1974,

1977, 1981, 1985) analyze cultural prac-tices in terms of infrastructural require-ments of cultures as those requirementshave changed (and are changing) overtime. Domestic, political, and religiouspractices are traced to changes in rela-tions between production/reproductionpractices and the physical environmentsin which the cultures evolved.

166 SIGRID S. GLENN

In his earlier work Harris (1964) buildsthe concept of a culture from the bottomup, beginning with the smallest culturalthing-a bit of behavior. The analysisproceeds from molecular to molar units-permaclones and permaclonic systems.In Cultural Materialism Harris developsanother kind of conceptual scheme, be-ginning with the culture as a whole, withall its existing permaclones presumablyin action. Cultures are described in termsof three general classes of cultural prac-tices, those constituting the infrastruc-ture, the structure, and the superstructureof a culture.

Harris's earlier analysis is not clearlyintegrated with the principles promul-gated in his later works (e.g., 1979).4 Thecomposition of cultural things was Har-ris's first focus and the function of cul-tural things his second. Clear specifica-tion of the relation between behavioralselection and cultural selection may helpintegrate the taxonomic and functionalconcepts of cultural materialism as wellas make possible a synthesis of behav-ioral and cultural sciences.

In the next section of this article, I de-velop the distinction between behavioralcontingencies and cultural contingencies.In the last section of the article I attemptto integrate the theoretical core of be-havior analysis with some ofthe culturalmaterialist concepts summarized above.

BEHAVIORAL CONTINGENCIESAND CULTURALCONTINGENCIES

In the previous section, I mentionedseveral times that cultural practices hadoutcomes; they are empirical and mea-surable. For example, the outcomes ofreproductive practices can be measuredin terms of the number of individuals tobe sustained by a culture during any giv-en time period. Of vital interest is the

4Readers of drafts of this paper have questionedwhether Harris considers his earlier work still rel-evant or important to a behavioral synthesis. I be-lieve he does, because he specifically referred meto The Nature of Cultural Things and went to thetrouble of locating a copy of the book, which is outof print.

rate of reproduction and changes in rate.Similarly, production practices havemeasurable outcomes, for example,number of bison killed, or yams dug up,or cars rolling off the assembly line. Pro-duction can also be measured in termsof"labor efficiency (calories obtained percalorie expended)" (Harris, 1977, p. 34)or changes in labor efficiency.

This section of the article is dividedinto two parts. The first part relates be-havioral contingencies to cultural prac-tices, and the second part relates culturalpractices to cultural outcomes.

Behavioral Contingencies andCultural PracticesThe basic elements in the contingency

of reinforcement are the activity of anorganism in a given environment and theconsequences (changes in the world) con-tingent on that activity. The size of a be-havioral unit may vary over time, andsimilar units may be observed in the rep-ertoire of other individuals, but a behav-ioral unit is specific to an individual or-ganism. Common characteristics inbehavioral units of different organismsmay be seen as similar to the biologicalconcept of convergence. For example, aparticular biological characteristic, echo-location (Dawkins, 1986), evolved in-dependently in bats and oil-birds becauseentirely different evolutionary lines facedsimilar environmental exigencies at quitedifferent points in time.

"Echolocation," then, may be a verbalresponse humans make in the presenceof certain kinds of events having similarfeatures but with different genetic histo-ries. Not all events called "echolocation"have a single evolutionary source eventhough they function as a common stim-ulus class for the verbal response "echo-location."

Similarly, the behavior of several par-ents in responding to their crying chil-dren may have common characteristics(structural and functional), but each par-ent's behavior has its own source in his-torical contingencies. Instances of Ms.Martin's picking up the baby comprise aunit (an operant). The relation of the in-

CONTINGENCIES AND METACONTINGENCIES 167

stance to the unit is parallel to the relationbetween individual organisms and the bi-ological unit called a "species." Mr. Bell'srepertoire may include an operant unitthat resembles Ms. Martin's. We may callthat unit "picking up the baby" too. It iscritical, however, to distinguish betweenthe similarity in the behavior/environ-mental relations we observe (which leadus to call both operants "picking up thebaby") and the individual histories ofthetwo parents that resulted in their behav-ior looking "the same" to us.The behavior of the two parents does

not belong to the same behavioral class(any more than echolocation in bats andoil-birds belongs to the same biologicalclass) because the same behavioral his-tories do not account for both. Althoughthe histories may be similar, differentempirical events actually account for thesimilarities in behavior. A change in con-tingencies for Ms. Martin will affect onlyMs. Martin's picking up the baby operant;that change in contingencies has no effecton Mr. Bell's picking up the baby operant.

Because many individuals in a cultureparticipate in the same cultural practices,it would be tempting to consider theirbehavior as functionally interchangeable.While that may be so at the cultural level,at the behavioral level it is not. Each in-dividual's behavior must emerge as afunction of specific historical, behavioralcontingencies. Whatever a change in cul-tural practices involves at the culturallevel of analysis, it also must involvechanges in contingencies of reinforce-ment for the individuals participating inthe practice.

Sociocultural systems arise from theinterrelationships among the contingen-cies of reinforcement of which individ-uals' operants are a function. As Skinner(1969, p. 13) put it, "A culture ... is thecontingencies of social reinforcementwhich generate and maintain [its mem-bers'] behavior." Obviously, the socialcontingencies are replicated across indi-viduals and generations or there wouldbe no cultural continuity. Harris's per-maclones are the entities exemplifying thesocial contingencies maintained acrossnomoclones of a single generation and

across generations. The systematic rep-lication of interrelated behavioral con-tingencies comprising a permaclone leadsus to the concept of a cultural practice.A culture, of course, is not an unor-

ganized set of social contingencies (anymore than an animal is an unorganizedset ofcells). Conglomerates ofcontingen-cies clump together to form cultural prac-tices as conglomerates of cells clump to-gether to form organs in animals. Thus,a cultural practice is a subset of inter-locking contingencies of reinforcementand a culture is made up of many suchsubsets.

In summary, a cultural practice is a setof interlocking contingencies of rein-forcement in which the behavior and be-havioral products of each participantfunction as environmental events withwhich the behavior of other individualsinteracts. This is the behavioral view ofa cultural practice. As Malagodi (1986)has suggested, the behaviorist vision mustbe broadened if cultural phenomena areto be encompassed by the behavioristworld view. Cultural practices must beunderstood at the cultural level of anal-ysis before a synthesis can be undertaken.We have now reached the point at whichthe notion of a cultural contingency canbe introduced.

Contingencies and MetacontingenciesIf the selection of cultural practices is

to be considered a "third kind of selec-tion" (Skinner, 1981), we need to distin-guish between the contingencies in thesecond kind ofselection (behavioral con-tingencies) and the contingencies in thethird kind of selection.

Behavioral contingencies involve con-tingent relations between the specific ac-tivity of individual organisms and spe-cific environmental events, and eachorganism's behavior has a unique his-tory. When the behaviorally potent en-vironment is made up of the actions ofothers (and their products), and the be-havior of those others has been condi-tioned by similar kinds of contingencies,a cultural practice propagates itself. Thebehavior of any new participant (new-

168 SIGRID S. GLENN

born, new parent, new employee, kin-dergarten enrollee, etc.) is shaped and in-structed by those already involved in thepractice. The new participant's behavioris in part a function of those contingen-cies provided by the others. However, theenvironmental events comprised of theothers' behavior include the behavior ofthe new participant.

Since each individual in a culture isunique (having a unique genetic structureand a unique behavioral history), varia-tions in the cultural practice are boundto occur. They are a function of varia-tions in the specific behavioral contin-gencies for each participant in the prac-tice. The behavior of each individualparticipating in the practice has its ownconsequences. Even so, there are certain"constants" that provide parameters formost participants. For example, in theAmerican practice of building automo-biles some constants have been the typesofjobs to be done, factory design for as-sembly lines, pay scales, and supervisorystructure. Other elements ofthe environ-ment can be more dynamic and fluid(specific ways individual supervisors re-spond to workers, how pay relates to workperformance, co-workers' verbal andnonverbal responses to management aswell as to objects involved in the task).Behavioral contingencies for any specificparticipant in the American practice of"manufacturing cars" may vary, but thebehavioral environment (and the behav-ior) of all individuals is constrained byphysical and institutional structures ofthelarger environment in which automo-biles are manufactured. Those structuresalso provide the framework for the rapidtransmission ofpractices across changingnomoclones that comprise a permaclone.The cultural practice, the set of inter-

locking contingencies supporting the be-havior of all the participating individu-als, has an outcome, of course. In theabove example, the outcome is the num-ber and quality of cars manufactured(measurable in terms of service records,length of car life, drivers with backaches,injuries, or deaths in collisions, etc.). Im-portant to note, the outcomes ofpractices

are a function of the aggregate behaviorofparticipants in the context ofthe phys-ical and institutional structure of thecompany. Because the outcome of thepractice is contingent on the behavior ofso many different people, variations inthe behavior of any individual have nomeasurable impact on the cultural out-come. As long as shifts in individual be-havior average out, there is no change inthe outcome. If shifts in individual be-havior converge to produce a changedoutcome, no specific individual could af-fect that outcome in any significant waybecause the effects of an individual's be-havior are lost as a fraction of the aggre-gate.The outcome of these practices does

affect the viability of the practice as aunit, however. The practice evolved be-cause variations in interlocking contin-gencies resulted in outcomes that en-hanced the survivability of thepermaclone (which, of course, includescultural practices). If the continuing out-come of the continuing practice is carsthat are bought, the practice is likely tosurvive. Ifthe outcomes essential for sur-vival of the practice do not occur, dis-integration of the specific permaclone orpermaclonic system is the result (as inthe recent example of American MotorsCorporation).The metacontingency is the unit of

analysis encompassing a cultural prac-tice, in all its variations, and the aggre-gate outcome of all the current varia-tions. The outcomes of cultural practicesmust, of course, be specified empirically.For example, the number ofchildren whocan read at a certain level of proficiencyis the outcome of educational practices.The amount of milk available for drink-ing is the outcome of farming and dairypractices. The number of children bornis the outcome of sex and birth controlpractices. The functional relationship be-tween cultural practices and their out-comes feeds back into cultures throughthe selection process. If variations in thepractice fail to keep pace with changes inthe metacontingencies, the practice is nolonger selected. Practices that "fit" their

CONTINGENCIES AND METACONTINGENCIES 169

Variation A *- food (VR-9) Rof Operant X c

Variaton B - food (VR-5) VR-5of Operant X

Variation C -00 food (CRF)Rof Operant x BRA

Behavioral Contingencies for an lndividuar's Increasing Rate of Variton CPreviously Acquired Operant X Decreasing Rates of Variatons A and B

Figure 1. Functional relation between behavior/consequence relations and future probability of operantx for Individual 0. The difference in consequences can result in the differentiation of operant x into twoor more units-one that increases in rate and the other(s) that decrease in rate if other conditions areheld constant. Behavioral consequences are contingently related to the behavior ofthe individual emittingoperant x.

environment produce outcomes thatmaintain permaclones (i.e., the contin-uous practices of a group comprised ofindividuals gradually replaced over time).This is selection of the third kind.

Selection at the behavioral level andselection at the cultural level may easilybe confused because they both involverelations between behavioral events andresulting changes in the environment.Cultural outcomes, however, do not se-lect the behavior of individuals; they se-lect the interlocking behavioral contin-gencies comprising the cultural practice.Likewise, the behavior ofany specific in-dividual has little effect on cultural out-comes. The concept of metacontingencyclarifies that cultural processes and be-havioral processes occur at different levelsof organization.The figures here are an attempt to sche-

matize behavioral contingencies and cul-tural contingencies and their relation toone another.5 Figure 1 depicts a behav-ioral contingency and its function in thebiobehavioral world. The contingency ofreinforcement, or the unit of analysis inbehavior analysis, results in increasedprobability of a class of behavior of aspecific person. The contingency func-tions to shift the probability of occur-rence of a class of responses (operant).Consequences select responses of certaindimensions (or a range of stimulus con-

' These figures are variations of those in Glenn(1986b).

trol relations), increasing or decreasingthe probability of replication. Stable re-sponding indicates ecological balance-so long as environmental conditions forthe operant remain consistent, the prob-ability of the operant over time is likelyto remain stable.

Figure 2 depicts the interlocking con-tingencies of reinforcement that consti-tute a cultural practice. The practice of"teaching reading" involves a large num-ber ofpeople, most ofwhom never comein direct contact with others participatingin the practice. Each individual's partic-ipation in the practice is maintained byindividual contingencies. Taken togeth-er, every participant's behavior and thecontingencies maintaining the behaviorcomprise the cultural practice. Elementsin the contingencies include the teachingbehavior of teachers and the reading be-havior of pupils, the reading materials,written and oral guidelines provided bystate agencies, the school board's direc-tives, the verbal comments of otherteachers, the principal's instructions, thenonacademic behavior of pupils andteachers in the classroom, the physicallayout ofthe classroom, and any numberof other environmental events and con-texts. Responses and response productsof the designers, publishers, and sales-people of reading programs plus all thepeople mentioned above who function aspart ofthe teacher's environment are alsopart of the cultural practice.Each ofthe individuals participating in

170 SIGRID S. GLENN

70%ULmacy

Inteilocking behavioral Outcomecontingencies in one variation

of a cultural practc

Metacontingency

Figure 2. Elements of a metacontingency. A cul-tural practice is comprised of interlocking behav-ioral contingencies for a large number of individ-uals. In this schematic the O's denote individualbehavers and the arrows denote behavior enteringinto the contingencies of reinforcement supportingthe behavior ofthose individuals (O's) to which thearrows point. This variation ofan educational prac-tice results in 70% literacy. The behavior of indi-viduals is maintained by the behavior-al contingen-cies, but the outcome of the practice can affect theviability of the culture. Current versions of the ed-ucational practice are variations of practices se-lected by previous relations between earlier meta-contingencies and requirements ofthe infrastructure.

any variation of an educational practiceis behaving as a function of the uniquecontingencies in which his or her behav-ior enters. A teacher's choice ofa readingprogram is a joint function of the verbalbehavior ofthe salesperson, the opinionsof colleagues, the philosophically biasedstatements of the teacher's instructors,and the reinforcement value of the ma-terials themselves for the teacher. Anotherprogram might produce a much bettercultural consequence (more readers), butindividual teachers are not likely to gothrough the painful process of learningnew techniques when behavioral contin-gencies are stable, that is, continue tosupport well-learned behavior (cf. Hop-kins, 1987).

Figure 3 suggests a kind ofcultural par-allel ofthe relations seen in Figure 1. Thepractice ofteaching reading is seen to haveseveral variations, each producing acharacteristic outcome. While the prac-tice as a whole may result in outcomeshaving a suppressive effect on productionefficiency (assuming that productionneeds required almost everyone to read),

one variation of the practice would havea less detrimental (possibly a positive)effect if that eff.t were produced by thepractice as a whole. But the relation be-tween the better variation and produc-tion efficiency could easily be obscuredand its effect obliterated by the effects ofthe other variations.

Considering the three figures together,one might see that cultures whose edu-cational practices produce more readershave a survival advantage (over those thatproduce fewer readers) if reading behav-ior is critical in production and/or repro-duction practices. However, better edu-cational practices (those that producerelatively more readers) may lose out toworse educational practices for a longtime in a complex culture if behavioralcontingencies for individuals support thebehavior of those involved in the lessproductive practices. A gradual declinein productivity could occur. The declinemay or may not be monitored by mem-bers of the permaclone or by others; ifmonitored, the monitors may or may notbe able to identify the variations in prac-tice contributing to the decline (or ca-pable of reversing it); if able to identifythe problematic practices, people may ormay not be able to intervene effectivelyin changing the behavioral contingenciesfor enough people to constitute a changein the cultural practice that could resultin a "better" outcome.As long as behavioral contingencies

support the behavior comprising the lessproductive educational practice, culturaloutcomes may continue to select thatpractice so long as the metacontingenciesdo not change sufficiently to result in dis-solution ofthepermaclone orpermaclon-ic system carrying the practice. Becausea cultural outcome is a joint function ofthe behavior of many different people,the outcome may be poorly correlatedwith the behavior of many of the peopleengaged in the practice. A cultural prac-tice may produce increasingly ineffectiveoutcomes but continue occurring becausethe behavior of its individual partici-pants is maintained by stable behavioralcontingencies.

In summary, metacontingencies de-

CONTINGENCIES AND METACONTINGENCIES 171

Varion Ato - 50% 1of a culturl practice Readers

VW ~~~~~~70%

VatonB * 70% F tj"gtof a cutura practce Readers

variation c 90%ofacultural pracdoe Readers

Metwontingencles for DecreasngCurrent Educatonal Practices Producton Efficency

Figure 3. Functional relation between a metacontingency and future production efficiency. Note thatvariations of this complex practice have varying outcomes. The aggregate outcome can pull productionefficiency down (or up), but a variation that produces more readers does not necessarily result in morereinforcement for individuals involved in that variation. The reinforcement (provided by others partic-ipating in the practice) for participating in a variation is not likely to be correlated with its outcome ifthe practice involves large numbers of people scattered over large areas. The differential correlation ofvariations with different outcomes is even less likely. The variation with a more favorable outcome willreplace lesser alternatives only if behavioral contingencies change for people engaging in the practiceshaving less favorable outcomes.

scribe functional relations at the culturallevel. Those relations involve culturalpractices and their outcomes. Culturalpractices themselves are comprised ofin-terlocking behavioral contingencies. Therelation ofcontingencies to the metacon-tingencies ofthe infrastructure, structure,and superstructure of culture materialisttheory will be discussed next.

CONTINGENCIES,METACONTINGENCIES, ANDEVOLUTION OF CULTURES

The interlocking behavior of individ-uals constitutes cultural practices, whichproduce different kinds ofoutcomes. Thethree structural components of a cul-ture-its infrastructure, structure, andsuperstructure-are classified in terms oftheir associated practices and outcomes.The remainder of this article will focuson two things: (1) the shifting infrastruc-tural metacontingencies of increasinglycomplex cultures and (2) examples ofpossible changes in behavioral contin-gencies comprising the cultural practicesentering into those metacontingencies.Focus will be on infrastructure, ratherthan structure or superstructure, since theinfrastructure is given priority by culturalmaterialists.

Infrastructural Contingencies andMetacontingencies

Infrastructural contingencies are thoseinterrelated behavioral contingencies thatconstitute a production or reproductionpractice characterizing a permaclone. In-frastructural metacontingencies are therelationships between these infrastruc-tural practices and their outcomes-out-comes having direct effect on survival ofa permaclone (succeeding generations ofpeople engaging in a continuous culturalpractice). Cultural evolution depends onthe evolution and maintenance of cul-tural practices that meet changing pro-duction and reproduction requirements,that is, changing metacontingencies.

If at one point in time, a permaclonecould produce two bison a week by eachmember's hunting 3 hours a day, and lat-er they had to hunt 7 hours a day to pro-duce two bison a week, the metacontin-gencies had changed. Variations inpractice that slow, halt, or reverse suchdeclining efficiency enhance survival ofa permaclone. That does not mean, ofcourse, that such variations always occur.Throughout human history, infrastruc-tural metacontingencies have changedcontinuously, one reason being that hu-man cultural practices have continuously

172 SIGRID S. GLENN

brought about changes in the environ-ment with which humans interact.

Variations in cultural practices are al-ways occurring because practices involvethe behavior ofsucceeding generations ofindividuals who live in slightly differentbehavioral environments from individ-uals of previous generations. One im-portant difference is that each genera-tion's environment contains concretetools (e.g., longer spears) and conceptualtools (e.g., the numeral "0") that allowforms of behavior by the current gener-ation that were not possible for previousgenerations (cf. Ayres, 1962).

Like biological evolution and behav-ioral evolution, cultural evolution has re-sulted in increasingly complex organi-zations of entities over time. Malott andWhaley (1976) suggested that systems(chemical, biological, behavioral, or cul-tural) reach a point of instability as com-plexity continues to increase.6 At the pointof instability, systems cannot be main-tained.

Instability of cultural systems may oc-cur when complexity reaches a pointwhere cultural outcomes consistently failto feed back into the interlocking contin-gencies of reinforcement comprising cul-tural practices. The complexity of thepractices obscures the relationship be-tween individual behavior and outcomesof cultural practices. So, behavioral con-tingencies that might support beneficialinfrastructural variations may not bemaintained by individuals participatingin the practice. Both Skinner (1948) andHarris (1981) have suggested small com-munities with face-to-face interactionsamong members as a solution to prob-lems endemic to large, complex cultureslike our own. Such communities would,of course, be more likely to maintain be-

6 Malott and Whaley (1976, p. 23) give the ex-ample of uranium as the element whose atomiccomplexity is at asymptote. Atoms more complexthan uranium exist for only a short time becausetheir complexity makes them inherently unstable.Heavier elements than uranium cannot enter intothe next level of evolution because their existenceis too unstable. Only stable elements could combineto produce organic compounds that eventually madegenetic replication possible.

havioral contingencies closer to culturaloutcomes. In the following pages, I shalltry to show that as cultural practices havebecome more complex, the outcomes ofthose practices maintaining the culturehave become progressively unrelated toreinforcement in the interrelated behav-ioral contingencies making up the prac-tice. We begin with the paleolithic cultureand follow the path traced by anthro-pologists through cultural history.

Paleolithic contingencies. During thecourse of tens of thousands of years ourancestors developed tools and technol-ogies for hunting large animals. Theubiquity ofhunter/collector bands aroundthe world and the time span covered bysucceeding generations of such humanbands suggest that paleolithic practiceshad high survival value. They also sug-gest that the environment with which hu-mans interacted did not change in waysthat required substantial changes in prac-tices. Between 30,000 and 13,000 B.C.paleolithic technology reached its peak;an abundance of large animals provideda highly nutritious diet in return for amodest behavioral investment (Harris,1977).The human bands that hunted and col-

lected during paleohistory may be seenas a large number of permaclones, someof which survived as a continuing unitthroughout the Old Stone Age, some ofwhich failed to survive altogether (allmembers died and their practices withthem). There were also some which failedto survive as a unit, but which contrib-uted members (and components of cul-tural practices) to other permaclones thatdid survive. Because the practices of allthose permaclones were similar, we tendto lump them together when discussingpaleolithic culture. Paleolithic culturesurvived only as long as there was at leastone permaclone engaging in practicescharacteristic of the paleolithic period.Each member of a paleolithic band

must have been engaged directly in foodproduction. Cooperative nonverbal be-havior would have enhanced safety andamount of food per capita in the era ofbig game hunting. Verbal behavior thatcoordinated and supported such nonver-

CONTINGENCIES AND METACONTINGENCIES 173

bal behavior would have resulted in morefood. Of course, the verbal communityitselfmust have evolved. Skinner (1986)provided an imaginary scenario of twopeople whose fishing behavior evolves asverbal behavior gradually emerges, co-ordinating and supporting nonverbal be-havior of the fishers. Skinner's scenarioportrays the emergence and maintenanceof interlocking behavioral contingenciesthat produce an outcome that is the jointfunction of verbal and nonverbal behav-ior ofthe participants. This scenario couldas easily have described the emerging in-tegration ofverbal and nonverbal behav-ior of participants in a hunting practice.While animal proteins were plentiful

and fairly easily obtained, and produc-tion practices involved only a small num-ber ofinterlocking behavioral contingen-cies, the outcome of the practice (foodobtained) might be understandable as re-inforcement in behavioral contingenciesas well as the outcome ofa cultural prac-tice. In the simplest case, each partici-pant's behavioral sequence in the coop-erative enterprise can be viewed as a chainin which the other participants providemany of the discriminative stimuli andconditioned reinforcers.Even in this simplest case, however,

the outcome for the group (amount offood per capita) was a function of theadequacy of the practice (interlockingcontingencies of reinforcement). The be-havior of individuals was necessary butit was not sufficient for survival of thepermaclone. Individuals whose behaviorwas not integrated with others in a cul-tural practice could have little effect onthe outcomes critical to survival ofa per-maclone. The earliest practices integrat-ed the behavior of individuals because asingle event served two functions-re-inforcement ofindividuals' behavior andselection of the interlocking contingen-cies of reinforcement.

Infrastructural reproductive practicesseem to have involved a similar relationbetween behavioral contingencies andmetacontingencies. Children born in rap-id succession made caring for all ofthemdifficult. Limiting the number of birthsprotected the living children and pre-

cluded an excessive number of childrento feed and carry about. When less aver-sive birth control practices failed, peopleapparently have resorted to abortion andinfanticide to avoid negative conse-quences associated with excessive num-ber oflive births. People other than preg-nant women undoubtedly participated inthese practices, both verbally and non-verbally, and their behavior may beunderstood as avoidance ofproblems as-sociated with more infants than could befed and cared for by a nomoclone. Thus,the cultural outcome and the behavioralconsequences for individuals participat-ing in the practice involved the sameevent. Important to note is that the crit-ical consequences were not always im-mediate, they may have been quite de-layed, requiring association withconditioned reinforcers and verbal in-struction (perhaps in the form ofgesture).Immediate or delayed, the same eventsserved to reinforce (as conditioned orbackup reinforcers) the behavior of in-dividuals and to select the cultural prac-tice.

Separation of consequences and out-comes: A village example. A variation ina cultural practice involves a change insome behavioral component ofthat prac-tice which is replicated in the behaviorof other participants. Such a variationwill amount to a change in the behavioralcontingencies for still others engaged inthe practice. For example, consider a vil-lage production practice where somepeople weave baskets in which otherscarry water from a river. The baskets leaka little, but enough water can be obtainedto perform essential tasks on a daily ba-sis. A weaver who ties a slightly differentknot may provide a basket that must beset down periodically in order to tightenthe knots and thus prevent excessiveleakage during transit. The water carrieris likely to complain and possibly instructthe basket weaver to behave differently;ifthings do not improve, the water carriermay provide the basket weaver with asmaller share of the water brought back,or complain to others who may scold orwithhold other items. The basket weavermay revert to earlier knot-tying behavior

174 SIGRID S. GLENN

or experiment with other ways to tie theknots.Another kind of new knot may result

in a basket that does not leak at all. Watercarriers ask for that weaver's baskets andreinforce that weaver's behavior in var-ious ways. Other weavers watch thatweaver tie the new knot and imitate thebehavior. As the new knot becomes thestandard knot, the variation of the prac-tice becomes the standard practice. So-cial reinforcement is now contingent (butdelayed) on weavers making baskets thatdo not leak at all. Interlocking behavioralcontingencies that produce watertightbaskets become the standard practice.Such a practice, brought about by chang-ing behavioral contingencies, results in astate of affairs that allows water storage.At some point (during droughts, for

example), water storage allowed perma-clones that had developed water storagepractices to survive while those perma-clones that had not produced baskets inwhich water could be stored disappeared;the basket-making and water-carryingpractices of the former permaclone sur-vived while replication of the latter'spractices ceased. Only some interlockingbehavioral contingencies (cultural prac-tices) were selected by outcomes.

Contingencies of reinforcement ac-count for the survival of the behavior ofindividuals participating in the changingpractice described above; metacontin-gencies account for the survival of thepractice. In the above example, behav-ioral contingencies constituting a culturalpractice changed as variations in individ-uals' behavior were reinforced and rep-licated in the behavior of others. Thereinforcers provided by others wereclosely related to a primary reinforcer(water) for individual behavior; and ef-ficiency in water production produced acultural outcome (more water than wasneeded for immediate survival) that re-sulted in survival ofthe permaclone whenmetacontingencies changed. The out-come of the practice strengthened thepermaclone as a unit, while the behaviorof individuals was maintained by con-sequences provided by others.

Individuals participating in a practicemaintained the behavior of other partic-ipants because their own behavior indoing so was reinforced. When the prac-tice emerged in the culture, the behav-ioral components remained intact so longas the individuals' behavior was rein-forced (or, perhaps, doing otherwise waspunished). This practice was not directedtoward a cultural "end." However, thepractice had an outcome that affectedsurvival of the group at a later time. Theability ofthe group to increase water pro-duction during a drought (due to theirsuperior water storing, which resultedfrom improved basket making) would re-sult in that permaclone's survival (andfurther replication of that practice).The relation between behavioral con-

tingencies and cultural outcomes is par-allel to the relationship between geneticmutations and the organismic outcomesselected by the environment in naturalselection (cf. Dawkins, 1984). Variationsin the practice, like genetic variations inspecies, do not generally occur becauseof the outcomes they are going to pro-duce.7 Their occurrence may be stimu-lated by conditions in the environment(x-irradiation or the behavior of othersengaged in the practice) or they may berandom (as observed in relation to thelevel of organization that they affect-bodies and cultural practices). But onlysometimes are they selected-when theirresults allow the carrier (organism or per-maclone) to better meet environmentalexigencies, thus allowing further repli-cation.As cultural practices become more

complex, social reinforcement of indi-vidual behavior remains a matter of in-dividuals' maintaining behavior of oth-ers that is reinforcing for thoseindividuals. The cultural outcome ofthese interlocking contingencies of rein-forcement may or may not support cul-tural survival.

7Of course, humans have made planned inter-ventions in contingencies at all three levels afterthey became able to specify the relations betweentheir interventions and outcomes.

CONTINGENCIES AND METACONTINGENCIES 175

The "blind" character of cultural evo-lution is similar to the blind character ofbiological evolution and behavioral evo-lution. From the perspective ofa contem-porary observer, evolution appears tohave been directed toward the presentstate of affairs since only "successful"species, operants, and cultural practicesare around to be examined. At any giventime, however, we must assume (indeedit seems we can see with the help of sci-ence) that some species, operants, andsociocultural systems are not likely tosurvive in their current environments orany environments likely to prevail in thenear future. Variations aiding in survival(or at least not hindering it significantly)at one point in time may carry the class(species, operant, or cultural system) intoan evolutionary corner when environ-mental contingencies (at the relevantlevel) change.

Agricultural intensification and emer-gence ofnonreciprocal behavioral contin-gencies. Cultural practices having theoutcome of"redistributed goods" appearto have characterized virtually all humancultures. The metacontingencies of pre-agricultural cultures (a few ofwhich existyet) favored egalitarian societies whereredistribution took the form of reciproc-ity. Individuals gave to their neighborsat times and got from those neighbors atother times. No one said "thank you"and gratitude did not exist-it suggesteda nonreciprocal relationship (Harris,1974, pp. 105-108). Prestige in thoseegalitarian societies came from being"equal," giving and taking in a reciprocalfashion; and the status relations (relativeranks in a hierarchy) typical of later-emerging cultures did not exist.At the behavioral level of analysis, the

reciprocity in egalitarian cultures is afunction ofthe equal access to, or controlover, reinforcers shared by all membersof the community. Equal access negatesimbalances in behavioral control that, inthe most extreme cases, typify slave/master relations. A master (who controlsall access to primary reinforcement) isable to control the behavior of slavesthrough negative reinforcement and pun-

ishment, while the slaves (lacking directaccess to primary reinforcement) mustpositively reinforce the master's aversivebehavior if they are to survive. The be-havioral contingencies are nonreciprocal."Built into the structure ofany equitablegroup must be the fundamental require-ment that the rulers be subject to the samecontingencies as the ruled-indeed, thatthere be no such distinction as ruler vs.ruled" (Segal, 1987, p. 150).At the cultural level of analysis, egal-

itarian reciprocity was selected andmaintained by infrastructural outcomesthat mitigated against accumulation ofwealth (no place to store it, no way tokeep it from spoiling) and excessive in-tensification (i.e., increasing rate of pro-duction). Any preagricultural perma-clone in which rank and status based oncompetitive production emerged did notsurvive, because the intensification waslimited by the "natural" rate of repro-duction among the plants and animalsthat humans foraged. Preagriculturalproduction was thus strictly limited byecology. Since competition led to inten-sification and intensification to depletionin preagricultural cultures, any such prac-tices that emerged in such cultures dis-appeared.A different set of metacontingencies

prevailed in agricultural economies. Thedevelopment of agricultural practices al-lowed long-term intensification to occurwithout concomitant "sharp depletionsand efficiency losses" (Harris, 1977, p.103), because agriculturists did not waitfor nature to take its course. Agricultureevolved because it allowed people to in-tervene in natural processes in ways thatresulted in higher production rates. Ag-ricultural practices, then, brought abouta change in infrastructural metacontin-gencies. Intensification practices thatwould have destroyed hunter/collectorpermaclones were selected in agriculturaleconomies because they resulted in morefood per capita and related outcomes (e.g.,brawnier fighters).The cultural practices that supported

such intensification involved a new kindof redistribution-one in which nonre-

176 SIGRID S. GLENN

ciprocal behavioral contingencies be-came prevalent.8 An intermediate kindofculture between egalitarian cultures andthe first "states" was that in which in-dividuals (dubbed "Big Men") special-ized in "managing" intensification andredistribution (Harris, 1974, 1977). Atfirst through methods involving inter-personal behavior and a history ofhavingorganized successful feasts, Big Men con-vinced producers to work harder, pro-duce more, and contribute heavily to theBig Man's feast (thereby sharing some ofthe Big Man's status). At the feast, theBig Man gave away the food and otheritems to those in his own village (andsometimes to guests from other villages).The Big Man himself, in the early stagesof the practice, worked harder than any-body and got less than anybody at thefeast ("bones and stale cakes"). In short,the Big Man got the status, and the littlepeople got the "meat and fat"; everybodyworked hard.

This practice functioned to redistrib-ute each year from the haves to the have-nots of a given community, keeping thepermaclone intact. When expanded to in-clude feasts between different perma-clones (that may exchange membersthrough marriage), the practice main-tained both permaclones through redis-tribution.

Agricultural practices evolved and in-tensified as increasing labor efficiencies(associated with advancing agriculturaltechnologies) allowed individuals to keepmore of the children they conceived,thereby avoiding some aversive and dan-gerous abortions and infanticide. But thehuman race dug itself into an intensifi-cation trap: "Despite the fact that irri-gation agriculture was five times moreproductive per man-hour than horticul-ture, the entire 9,000 year sequence ofintensifications, depletions, and techno-logical innovations [from the beginning

8 Richard W. Malott has provided what he hastermed a "microanalysis" ofbehavioral contingen-cies in cultural practices where indirect-acting con-tingencies play a significant role (Malott, 1988). Suchindirect-acting contingencies would seem likely tohave become more prevalent at about this point incultural evolution.

of agriculture to the present] resulted inan overall deterioration in nutritionalstatus [of people in general]" (Harris,1977, p. 35).Cultural systems became more com-

plex; individuals came to participate inmultiple permaclones (e.g., as fathers, ascanal-builders, and as firefighters), eachcomprised of different individuals. Per-maclonic systems emerged, in which in-dividuals contributing to a cultural out-come never interacted with most of theother participants engaged in the culturalpractice. The nonreciprocal behavioralcontingencies that accompanied andcharacterized "the descent of the worldfrom freedom to slavery" (Harris, 1977,p. 102) were institutionalized in large andcomplex cultures.

Rise of the state. The transition fromagricultural economies with "chiefs" tostates with "kings" was one in which theinterlocking behavioral contingenciesgradually shifted. No individual behavedvery differently from one day to the next.But gradually, over time, the practiceschanged. The changes supported thegrowing cultural requirements for centralplanning to coordinate wars and, later,production projects such as hydraulicfarming, which eventually became nec-essary if the ever-increasing populationwas to be fed (Harris, 1977, chap. 13).The shifting behavioral contingencies ofreinforcement can be discerned in Har-ris's description of the changes in thepractice ofcompetitive feasting. Big Mentook more and gave their followers less.The practice still had the cultural func-tion of intensification, but hereditarychiefs gained more and more control overcommunity resources. Once certain in-dividuals controlled resources, they hadthe power ofnonreciprocal aversive con-trol over others. Chiefs, unlike the earlierBig Men, did not have to depend on thegenerosity oftheir followers; they had thepower ofcoercion. Once individuals heldpositions of "relative rank" in a com-munity, those with rank were in a posi-tion to control the behavior of othersthrough institutionalized negative rein-forcement. Because rank was associatedwith control of production practices,

CONTINGENCIES AND METACONTINGENCIES 177

tools, land, or goods produced, social re-inforcement was backed up by concretereinforcers closely related to primary re-inforcement.The rest is, indeed, history. As cultural

outcomes supported practices with ever-diminishing behavioral reciprocity, thebehavior of individuals was locked intothese practices by the contingencies pro-vided by others participating in the prac-tice. The interlocking contingenciesthemselves continued to be selected byan environment that required more andmore intensification and centralizationfor survival (given the increasing popu-lation levels). Centralization necessitatedbureaucracies and further separation ofthose individuals controlling the re-sources from those producing the re-sources.

Technology in the industrial age. In-creasing intensification at the culturallevel has been matched by decreasing rec-iprocity at the behavioral level through-out most ofhuman history. Only once inhuman history has technology advancedfast enough to overtake the intensifica-tion trap that leads to declining efficien-cies. That once has been during the past150 years (Harris, 1977, chap. 15). Inthose sociocultural systems where tech-nology overtook intensification (i.e.,Western Europe and the United States),practices emerged that began to reversethe long decline of behavioral reciproc-ity. The infrastructure of industrial na-tions could give rise, for the first timesince the paleolithic era, to domestic andgovernment practices that fostered a trendtoward more reciprocal behavioral rela-tions among rich and poor, men andwomen, and governors and governed.These changes in domestic and polit-

ical practices have been accompanied bywhat Skinner (1971, p. 61) calls "the lit-erature(s) of freedom and dignity." Ex-plication of the relations between thoseliteratures, the reemergence of reciprocalbehavioral relations in Western structur-al practices, and the changing metacon-tingencies that have supported both mayclarify the importance of a synthesis ofbehavior analysis and cultural material-ism. In ending this article, I shall outline

briefly what appears to be the nature ofthose relations.Technology was able to overtake in-

tensification for the first time during theindustrial age because three infrastruc-tural changes occurred: these Harris(1977, p. 280) calls "the fuel revolution,the contraceptive revolution, and thejob revolution." The fuel revolutioninvolved the massive increase in laborproductivity made possible by the use ofengines run by way of conversions ofelectrical and chemical energy sources asopposed to biologically derived energy(i.e., work animals and people). This in-crease in labor efficiency was accom-panied by the availability of relativelysafe mechanical and chemical contracep-tive devices, allowing individuals the op-portunity, for the first time in history, tocontrol reliably the number ofinfants theyproduced without having to resort in theworst case to infanticide and traumaticabortion. The job revolution motivatedindividuals to limit the number of chil-dren they bore to a very small percentageof the number they were biologically ca-pable of producing. Industrializationchanged the cost/benefit ratio of rearingchildren; they are of little economic ben-efit and of great economic cost in socio-cultural systems where complex skills andlong education are necessary before in-dividuals have economic usefulness.So infrastructural metacontingencies

in the industrial age allowed for the emer-gence and selection of new kinds of pro-duction and reproduction practices. Thesepractices, in turn, produced a populationwhose skills as individuals were moreimportant in the industrial process. In-dividuals who, in earlier times, wouldhave been "behaviorally interchange-able" developed unique behavioral rep-ertoires as they interacted with ever morecomplex environments. A large middleclass emerged, acquiring some degree ofeconomic countercontrol (a function oftheir "buying power" and possibly oftheneed ofgovernment and industry for theirspecific skills).The possibility for countercontrol al-

lowed the reemergence of reciprocal be-havioral contingencies. When cultural

178 SIGRID S. GLENN

practices involve individuals in inter-locking behavioral patterns in whichmany individuals have unique controlover some resources needed by others,reciprocity again becomes possible. Atrend toward parity in behavioral rela-tions making up infrastructural practicescould be amplified, next, in culturalstructures, as has indeed been evident inthe United States as suffrage was extend-ed from property owners to all whitemales, to all races and, finally, to women.Increased parity in domestic practices, ofcourse, awaited infrastructural changesthat made women in the work force eco-nomically useful to producers (Harris,1981, chap. 5).

Infrastructural and structural practicesthat involved increasingly reciprocal be-havioral contingencies were, then, main-tained by the metacontingencies ofa rap-idly changing technological environment.These changing practices were supportedand amplified by the superstructural lit-eratures of freedom and dignity, whichwere an amalgam of prescientific con-ceptions of human nature and accuratelabeling of the nonreciprocal behavioralcontingencies which humans have uni-versally escaped and avoided wheneverpossible (cf. Skinner, 1971).Both Harris and Skinner, as well as

many other writers, agree that moderncultures are at a crucial crossroad. Theentire world faces overpopulation, eco-logical imbalance, resource depletion, andthreat of nuclear annihilation. Our ownculture faces serious economic and socialproblems. A critical problem may be thatthe outcomes of current practices are sofar removed from the behavioral contin-gencies supporting individuals' behaviorthat unproductive variations of culturalpractices continue being replicated. Thesolution to this problem may involvebringing behavioral contingencies withinreach of cultural outcomes.

Harris suggests this can be accom-plished byradical decentralization ... scaling down America'smilitary-industrial complex ... stimulating the de-velopment ofthe right kind ofsolar and other formsof decentralized energy production . . . energy ef-ficient machinery to be used in small manufacturing

plants and in the home . .. development of legalbarriers against takeovers of new energy technol-ogies .. . the passage oflegislation favorable to smallbusinesses and community-based cooperatives.(Harris, 1981, p. 182)

Skinner's fictional utopia, Walden Two(1948), is a sociocultural system in whichboth contingencies of reinforcement andmetacontingencies are portrayed as sup-porting a technologically sophisticatedsociety comprised of productive, cre-ative, and happy citizens. Every citizenhas equal access to resources; behavioralcontingencies are reciprocal; and inten-sification does not exist. The distributionof work and leisure rivals that of ourhunter-collector ancestors, and every in-dividual has opportunity and encourage-ment to develop his or her unique abil-ities for art, music, literature, and science.People live in attractive, comfortable, andprivate quarters, eat healthful and tastyfood, dress as they wish, and develop in-terpersonal relations with those of simi-lar interests or mutual attraction. WaldenTwo, in short, is portrayed as combiningthe best characteristics of both paleolith-ic and modem cultures.Each in his own way, Skinner and Har-

ris outline what needs to be accomplishedin order to avert calamity. Such accom-plishments will necessitate, of course,changes in the interlocking behavioralcontingencies that characterize currentcultural practices. If anybody is going tosuggest how behavioral contingencies canbe modified to accomplish those changes,surely it will be behavior analysts. Ifany-body is likely to provide a cultural anal-ysis that will give direction to the changesneeded, surely it will be cultural mate-rialists.

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Dawkins, R. (1986). The blind watchmaker. NewYork: Norton.

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